

**Conflict Formation and Transformation in Indonesia:
Chinese and Indigenous Indonesians on Their Way to Peace?
A Peace and Conflict Analysis According to the Transcend Method**

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Glossary and Abbreviations

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| Baperki (<i>Badan Permusjawaratan Kewarganegaraan Indonesia</i>) | Chinese Indonesian political organization, founded in 1954 |
| Cantonese | South Chinese dialect (Guangdong Province) |
| CHH (<i>Chung Hwa Hui</i>) | Chinese Association, founded in 1928 |
| <i>Cina</i> | Official term for ethnic Chinese and China during the Soeharto-regime; considered to be insulting by many ethnic Chinese |
| <i>Cukong</i> | Chinese businessman who entertains close ties to a member of the Indonesian power elite – mainly from the military |
| EU | European Union |
| GANDI (<i>Gerakan Perjuangan Anti-discriminasi Indonesia</i>) | Indonesia Anti-Discrimination Movement founded in 1998 |
| Hainanese | South Chinese dialect (Hainan Island) |
| Hakka | Minority group in China and their dialect (South China, mainly Guangdong and Guangxi Province) |
| Hokkien | South Chinese dialect (Fujian Province) |
| <i>Imlek</i> | Hokkien term for Chinese New Year; also used officially in Indonesia |

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| INTI (<i>Perhimpunan Indonesia Tionghua</i>) | Chinese Indonesian Association, founded in 1998 |
| KCJ (<i>kartu cacah jiwa</i>) | Indonesian census registration card |
| Komnas HAM (<i>Komisi nasional untuk Hak Asasi Manusia</i>) | National Human Rights Commission |
| KTP (<i>karta tanda penduduk</i>) | Indonesian identity card |
| LPKB (<i>Lembaga Pembinaan Kesatuan Bangsa</i>) | Institution for Promotion of National Unity, founded in 1963 |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organization |
| <i>Pao An Tui</i> | An armed self-defence organisation formed during the Indonesian revolution to protect ethnic Chinese lives and property |
| <i>Pancasila</i> | Indonesian State Philosophy / Ideology, introduced by Soekarno |
| <i>PBI (Partai Bhinneka Tunggal Ika Indonesia)</i> | Indonesian Unity in Diversity Party, ethnic Chinese Party, founded in 1998 |
| PIR (<i>Partai Indonesia Raja</i>) | The People's Party of Indonesia, founded in 1929 |
| PKI (<i>Partai Komunis Indonesia</i>) | Indonesian Communist Party, founded in 1920 |
| PNI (<i>Partai Nasional Indonesia</i>) | National Party Indonesia, founded in 1927 (Soekarno's party) |
| <i>Pribumi</i> | Indigenous Indonesian |

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| <i>PRTI (Partai Reformasi Tionghoa)</i> | Chinese Indonesian Reform Party, founded in 1999 |
| <i>PSI (Partai Sosialis Indonesia)</i> | Socialist Party of Indonesia, founded in 1948 |
| <i>PSMTI (Paguyuban Sosial Marga Tionghoa Indonesia)</i> | Indonesian Chinese Social Association, founded in 1998 |
| <i>PTI (Partai Tionghoa Indonesia)</i> | Chinese Party of Indonesia, founded in 1932 |
| <i>Reformasi</i> | [Literally: reforms] Name given to Post-Soeharto period (since 1998 – today) |
| <i>Siang Hwee</i> | Chinese Indonesian Chamber of Commerce, founded in 1907/08 |
| <i>SBKRI (Surat Bukti Kewarganegaraan Republik Indonesia)</i> | Indonesian Citizenship Certificate |
| <i>Sinergy</i> | Chinese Indonesian Magazine, published in Indonesian language |
| <i>Sin Po</i> | Chinese Indonesian Newspaper, published in Chinese-Malay language |
| <i>Suku</i> | Term for ethnic group in Indonesia |
| <i>Teochiu</i> | South Chinese dialect |
| <i>THHK (Tiong Hwa Hwe Kuan)</i> | Chinese organisation, founded in 1900 |
| <i>Tionghoa</i> | Official term for Chinese Indonesian (Chinese in Hokkien dialect) |

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| TRuK (<i>Tim Relawan untuk Kemanusiaan</i>) | Volunteer Group of Humanity |
| UN | United Nations |
| <i>Volksraad</i> | Advisory council in Indonesia, established by the Dutch in 1917 |
| WNA (<i>Warga Negara Asing</i>) | Foreign citizen |
| WNI (<i>Warga Negara Indonesia</i>) | Indonesian citizen, but commonly used to refer to the ethnic Chinese minority only |
| <i>Yayasan Nabil</i> | Foundation for Nation-building projects in Indonesia, founded in 2007 |

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1. Introduction

1.1 Conflict Case Study

The fall the Indonesian President Soeharto which marked the end of his long reign (1966 – 1998)¹, the so-called ‘New Order’ era was marked by severe riots against the country’s ethnic Chinese minority. These violent acts were not the first of their kind, but rather followed a pattern of conflict between indigenous Indonesians and ethnic Chinese that can be traced back to colonial times. Historically in times of economic, political or social instability, ethnic Chinese have repeatedly become scapegoats for indigenous Indonesians.² In between these bouts of large-scale violent acts ethnic Chinese often assumed that the overall conflict between them and the indigenous Indonesians was resolved, and lived in hope that there would be no further violent acts. This included Heryanto (Australian National University), a renowned expert of the Chinese Indonesians, who claimed in a study published early in 1998 that anti-Chinese sentiments had declined if not entirely vanished. He based his statement on the fact that a number of incidents, like the mass-rally in Medan, and riots in Jakarta in the early 1990s, had not triggered anti-Chinese riots. “Up to the 1980s it would have been difficult to imagine that street violence on such a scale could have taken place in the capital city without singling out the Chinese community as primary targets.”³ Shortly afterwards, the May Riots proved him and those who had come to the same conclusion wrong.

Due to the long history of conflict between ethnic Chinese and indigenous Indonesians, this development was not entirely surprising. This conflict is unlikely to be resolved by itself and the absence of open violence – even for years – does not necessarily mean that it would not turn violent again in the future. This study is founded on the assumption that the conflict has not been resolved; the absence of violent acts only implies that for the time being the conflict is currently not in a violent phase. There are indications that sentiments about and prejudices against ethnic Chinese in Indonesia have changed little since the 1998 May Riots. As long as the root causes of the conflict have not changed, it has to be assumed that violent acts could re-occur if no measures of conflict prevention are undertaken. Developing a culture of conflict prevention or

¹ In 1997 the Asian financial crisis hit Indonesia causing mass unemployment as well as increases in food prices due to the devaluation of the Indonesian currency. The crisis revealed that President Soeharto’s authoritarian government was not able to deal with the economic problems which the country was facing. The Indonesian people’s faith in their political leaders vanished and the difficult economic situation triggered a political crisis. Demonstrations initiated by students throughout the country escalated to mass riots which eventually culminated in the May Riots in 1998. Purdey, 2006, pp. 77ff.

² Purdey, 2006, pp. 7-24.

³ Heryanto, 1998b, p. 96.

how to deal in conflicts in general is important for Indonesia as it also witnesses other minority conflicts.

What are the root causes of this conflict? Since the ethnic Chinese have been singled out in times of crises, regardless of their social status, place of residency or religion, it can be assumed that the root causes of this conflict are related to their status as an ethnic minority with a foreign background. Cultural differences resulting in incompatibilities of perceived values between ethnic groups are often mentioned as reasons for conflicts by actors themselves.⁴ However, Indonesia is a multi-ethnic country, hosting more than 1,000 ethnic groups and sub-ethnic groups.⁵ Multi-ethnicity and diversity as such are considered positive characteristics of the Indonesian nation ever since the country's first President Soekarno (1945 – 1965) declared its independence in 1945. Therefore, the position of the ethnic Chinese within Indonesian society perhaps does not stem from their supposed cultural incompatibility with other indigenous Indonesian ethnic groups. In fact, this would not only be an oversimplification of the complex relations between the various conflict actors but also ignore the fact that the concept of ethnicity often only forms the subtext in a broader conflict contexts evolving from interest struggles. Ethnicity may serve as socio-political strategy in a processes of polarization, i.e. the sharpening of distinctions between groups which lead to segregation and tensions. Social structures that have evolved over time are in part responsible for aggravating frictions between the ethnic Chinese and the indigenous Indonesians which manifested in a violent conflict.

The research questions of this thesis therefore are:

- 1) *what is the conflict between the ethnic Chinese and the indigenous Indonesians about,*
- 2) *what are the underlying structures causing frictions between the two groups which initiate violent conflict, and*
- 3) *How can this conflict be transformed into the direction of sustainable peace acceptable to all parties involved?*

1.2 Subjects and Focus

Analysing the conflict between ethnic Chinese and indigenous Indonesians requires a study of the two opposing conflict parties. Although for the purposes of the conflict analysis I will by

⁴ Interview with Conda G. (11.04.2010).

⁵ According to the official national census held in 2000, 1,072 ethnic and sub-ethnic groups were identified. Suryadinata, 2003, p. 22.

necessity refer on occasion to ‘the ethnic Chinese’ and ‘the indigenous Indonesians’, neither group is homogenous. In order to do justice to this heterogeneousness of the two, each group shall be analyzed taking into account different categories.

Social groups can be categorised in numerous ways. These include using demographic categories, such as age, sex, geographical location, ethnicity and religion, or, taking a vertical social perspective; people can be categorized based on social classes. Another category that has been frequently utilised in conflict studies is identity. During the field research, it became clear how the perception of the respondent’s own identity not only shaped their respective perception of the other party in the conflict but also their own position within the conflict, as well as interests and aims.⁶

In examining subgroups amongst the indigenous and Chinese Indonesians, the following categories were taken into consideration:

1. Ethnicity
2. Geographical place of residency
3. Identity
4. Religion
5. Social class

⁶ The concept of identity, in particular collective identity has been vastly debated in academic literature. In contrast to an essentialist understanding of identity, identity in this study is understood as constructed and this construction is influenced by historical developments (Hall, 1996, pp. 3ff). Indonesian identity was constructed during the fight for independence from the Dutch. Especially postmodern academics, however, reject the concept of collective identity entirely. As identity is constructed and characteristics are attributed to it, these academics argue that individuals may be homogenized into one group, possibly against their will. Collective identities are therefore considered to be fictions which have mystifying effects and as such may act as carriers of ideologies (Moya, 2000, pp. 4 -6 and Niethammer, 2000, cited in Straub 1998, pp. 98ff.). To escape the problem of an assigned collective identity, definitions which include the criterion of self-identification of the members of a collective identity have been developed (e.g. Assmann, 1992, p. 132.). With regard to conflicts between groups of asymmetric power relations, self-identification by free choice seems to be illusionary as their group membership is already determined by outside factors as well as the perspective of members of the opposing conflict group (Winkelmann, 2008, p. 19). Indonesians with Chinese ancestry who do not want to be identified as ethnic Chinese but still are labeled thus by indigenous Indonesians do not seem to have a ‘choice’ in this matter. Therefore, the perception of ‘others’ shall be included in the understanding of identity for this study. Even if the perspective from the in-group may differ from that of the out-group, for example, there are ethnic Chinese who are not considered to be ‘Chinese’ by other ethnic Chinese as they do not speak Chinese and are not Chinese cultured, but who are considered to be ‘Chinese’ by indigenous Indonesians or other less ‘Chinese’ cultured ethnic Chinese (Hoon, 2008, p. 31). In the framework of this study, identity shall be understood as a collective cultural identity. The underlying understanding of culture derives from cultural studies and constitutes “culture in its sense of art, literature, film, practices of representation of all kinds, both draw from and participate in the construction of culture as a way of life, as a system of values and beliefs which, in turn, affects culture as a creative, representational practice.” (King, 1991, p. 2). As “most work in cultural studies is concerned with investigating and challenging the construction of subaltern, marginalized or dominated identities (...)” (Jenks, 1993, p. 155), this definition of culture is suitable for the framework of this study.

The categories of age and sex have been omitted here, as in literature and interviews they played a minor role and there was no discernible pattern to show if they influenced attitudes and behaviour.

The case study represents an asymmetric ethnic conflict in which the minority group can further be classified as middlemen minority who occupy a marginalized position in Indonesian society. I will next present the study subjects and define key concepts such as middlemen minority and marginalization. I shall then compare this study with previous approaches to the case of Indonesia's ethnic Chinese, explain the study's focus as well as outline its scientific contribution.

Subjects

Ethnic Chinese / Chinese Indonesian minority

According to the 'Minority Rights Group' a minority is defined as "A group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a state, in a non-dominant position, whose members – being nationals of the state – possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language."⁷ According to this definition, Chinese Indonesians⁸ qualify for the status of a minority group, although, it is difficult to determine how many Chinese reside in Indonesia. In *Indonesia's Population: Ethnicity and Religion in a Changing Political Landscape*, Suryadinata, Nurvidya Arifin, and Ananta note that the definition of 'ethnic Chinese' is in itself problematic. During the first census that included ethnic background in 2000, self-identification was used by all ethnic groups in Indonesia. According to this census, 2.92 million Chinese lived in Indonesia, 1.06 million of whom were born after 1966 (those aged 0 to 34). However, Suryadinata, Arifin, and Ananta cautioned that the figures may not be accurate because some Chinese might not have identified themselves as 'ethnic Chinese' anymore, as they have assumed the identity of other Indonesian ethnic groups. In other words, if a Chinese refused to identify him/herself as Chinese, the person was recorded as non-Chinese. The authors observed that the long process of acculturation and the change of identity of some 'ethnic Chinese' who have assumed the identity of other ethnic Indonesian groups have contributed to the impossibility in estimating

⁷ Minority Rights Group, 1990, p. xiv. For further definitions, see Deschenes, 1985.

⁸ In this research I use the terms 'ethnic Chinese' and 'Chinese Indonesians' interchangeably.

the exact number and percentage of the ethnic Chinese. Regardless of the exact numbers, ethnic Chinese clearly are a numerically inferior group in Indonesia. As discussed below, they possess ethnic characteristics, and some of them also religious and linguistic characteristics which distinguish them from the indigenous majority population.

Ethnicity is the main characteristic that distinguishes this minority group from the indigenous Indonesian majority population. When referring to either ethnic Chinese or Chinese Indonesians in this work, I am referring to Indonesians of Chinese descent, not ‘overseas Chinese’ who are Chinese citizens living in Southeast Asia and therefore sojourners rather than settlers.⁹ The terms are thus used here for people of a group with cultural elements attributable to or recognizable as being part of Chinese culture, who claim to have Chinese ancestry or are considered to be Chinese by non-Chinese members of the local population. While the ethnic Chinese might all be classified as being ‘Chinese’, there are ethnic differences among them due to their different provinces of origin. The majority of them are Han-Chinese, but there are also Chinese whose ancestors belong to one of the many Chinese minorities, such as the Hakka. Therefore, they also do not have one common language. The main Chinese dialects spoken in Indonesia are Hokkien, Teochiu, Cantonese, Hakka, and Hainanese.¹⁰

Ethnic Chinese often identify themselves within different cultural indigenous backgrounds depending on their place of residence in Indonesia in addition to their Chinese identity.¹¹ While the ethnic Chinese in Jakarta would distinguish themselves from the ethnic Chinese in Pontianak, for example based on their different accents when speaking Indonesian or Chinese, they would turn to their common background (we, Chinese) when it comes to referring to indigenous Indonesians (they, Indonesians).¹²

Another aspect of place of residency which proved to be a characteristic for differentiating ethnic Chinese is whether they lived in urban or rural areas. Due to historical developments and restrictions on employment, ethnic Chinese tend to be more concentrated in cities than in the countryside. The largest ethnic Chinese population is in Jakarta, Java. Other cities that have a high proportion of ethnic Chinese are Tangerang, Solo, Surabaya on Java, Pontianak and Singkawang in West Kalimantan, as well as Riau and Medan on Sumatra. Interviews with indigenous Indonesians showed that Chinese Indonesians living in cities where they form larger

⁹ Suryadinata, 2001, p. 55. For more on the differing meanings and connotations of the terms used for ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia, s. Suryadinata, 1997, p. 2ff.

¹⁰ Chua-Franz, 2002, p. 23-4.

¹¹ Hoon, 2008, p. 48.

¹² Hoon, 2002, p. 133.

groups are more likely perceived as exclusive, homogenous middle- and upper-class communities which are mainly engaged in business.¹³

With regard to the ethnic Chinese, the subject of identity plays an important role for many Chinese Indonesians in their daily life.¹⁴ Especially literature on the ethnic Chinese community published prior to the year 2000 differentiates between Totok and Peranakan.¹⁵ Totok were considered to be more 'Chinese', as they still spoke either Mandarin or another Chinese dialect and more knowledgeable with regard to Chinese culture than Peranakan. Peranakan developed a culture of their own, blending Chinese and Indonesian elements. One of the results is the Chinese-Malay language, a mixture of Malay, the Chinese dialect Hokkien and borrowings from Dutch and other Western languages.¹⁶ However, today, only a few older generation Chinese Indonesians still identify themselves as Totok or Peranakan and the importance of this distinction is diminishing.¹⁷ Most Totok were 'Indonesianized' during the implementation of the assimilation policies during the Soeharto-regime. The original distinction became blurred and it does not fit the rather complex and heterogeneous identities of today's Chinese Indonesians anymore. Tjhin even argues that the distinction is confusing, superficial and misleading.¹⁸

In *Identities in Flux: Young Chinese in Jakarta* Thung distinguished her respondents by applying the following categories:

1. Those who believe they are Chinese and will always be Chinese
2. Those who think that they have assimilated successfully into Indonesian society
3. Those who feel they have transcended ethnic and national boundaries and become globalists or internationalists
4. Those who like to think that their lives are dictated by work and thus prefer to refrain from offering an opinion on who they are culturally or politically

Thung herself stressed that her sample was not representative.¹⁹ However, these categories proved useful with regard to the conflict since they include the person's perception of their own identity in the context of belonging to a minority group.

¹³ Hoon, 208, p. 257. Hoon conducted interviews with 16 indigenous Indonesians mainly in Jakarta, but also included 4 respondents from Medan and Solo who confirmed the impression of ethnic Chinese as a homogenous group of 'economic animals'. Ibid.

¹⁴ E.g. interview with Fajar P., 09.09.2008. A few ethnic Chinese scholars even made this subject the topic of their Master or PhD thesis (Tjhin, 2002, Dawis, 2009; Thung, 1998 and Setijadi, still in progress).

¹⁵ E.g. Williams, 1960 and Somers-Heidhues, 1964.

¹⁶ Hoon, 2008, p. 6.

¹⁷ Interview with Tan Swie Liong and B. Teng (10.09.2008).

¹⁸ Tjhin, 2002, p. 8.

¹⁹ Thung, 1998, pp. 18-19.

With regard to religion, ethnic Chinese in Indonesia can be categorized into two general categories: Non-Muslims (Christians²⁰, Buddhists, Confucianists or Atheists) and Muslims. For the conflict, it is especially the first (and larger) group which plays a significant role because members of this group are not only ethnically a minority, but also in religious terms, as the overwhelming majority of the Indonesian population is Muslim.

Social stratification also plays a key role, since the different classes (upper-, middle- and lower) have different interests and aims in this conflict. As during colonial times, Indonesian social structure still resembles a pyramid: the lower class makes up the majority of the population while the elite consists of a relatively small group of people. Politicians and the industrialists are at the top, holding a large percentage of the wealth of the country to the detriment of the majority of the citizens.²¹

In this case study, special attention has been paid to the rising middle-class. In 2006, there were 6.6 million households with an annual disposable income of over US\$10,000 (in constant terms), but by 2011 this number had risen to 13.7 million households.²² Traditionally, ethnic Chinese have formed a considerable part of the middle-class and continue to do so.²³ In the new status symbols of the emerging middle-class, such as luxurious shopping malls that have been built in the capital and other Indonesian cities, a dominance of consumers from ethnic minorities, like Chinese, Indian or Arab Indonesians could be observed.²⁴ This middle-class has often been the most affected by the conflict. Whenever ethnic Chinese became targets of concerted violent attacks, members of the middle class were the most numerous among the victims. In contrast, upper-class Chinese Indonesians had the financial and personal resources to protect themselves during the riots in 1998 or the possibility to leave the country. Even though lower-class Chinese Indonesians were also attacked during the riots, the main targets were districts where middle-class Chinese Indonesians resided. The personal experience of violence has, in part and for some, been incorporated in their self-understanding. Thung states that “it seems unlikely for middle-class Chinese to act as agents of change and / or to become

²⁰ The Christians are further divided into and classified as Catholics and various Protestant groups.

²¹ The combined wealth of Indonesia’s 40 richest people is equivalent to that of about 60 million of its poorest citizens, or more than 10 percent of its GDP (di Stefani Pironti, 2012).

²² Euromonitor International, 2012.

²³ Cohen, 2011 and interview with William Kwan (15.04.2010).

²⁴ Observation made during field trips in 2008 and 2010 when visiting shopping malls in Jakarta: Grand Indonesia, Plaza Indonesia, Senayan and Taman Anggrek. This observation has been confirmed by respondents, for example Patricia S. (Interview 02.09.2008).

the motor of the Indonesian nation-building process; as might have been the case if ethnicity were not in conflict with nationality.”²⁵

Nevertheless, with regard to the conflict, most of the respondents from this social group interviewed for this study acknowledged that if someone was going to change something about their situation, it would have to be them – the middle-class Chinese Indonesians.

Indigenous Indonesian majority population

Only a very limited insight into this group will be provided here as Indonesia is the fourth largest nation in the world with a population of more than 240 million people²⁶ of which the ethnic Chinese only constitute about 2-3% leaving almost 235 million people in this heterogeneous group. A detailed study of this group would therefore be beyond the framework of this thesis. The term ‘indigenous Indonesians’ in this study refers to the people living within the borders of the Indonesian nation-state, holding Indonesian citizenship, and who consider themselves or are considered by others as belonging to one of the ethnic groups which have been classified as native Indonesian or *pribumi* (meaning ‘sons of the soil’) by the Dutch colonial administration. This classification did not change after Indonesia’s independence and expresses a dichotomy between ethnic Chinese²⁷ as non-indigenous, and the other ethnic groups residing on the archipelago. The largest ethnic group of indigenous Indonesians are the Javanese who make up approximately 41% of the total population of the archipelago.

They mainly live on the island of Java, although they have also migrated to other Indonesian islands.²⁸ The next largest groups are the Sundanese, Malay and Madurese. There are also small ethnic groups who only have hundreds of members, for example some indigenous tribes in Kalimantan and Papua.²⁹ The many Indonesian local ethnic identities have been strengthened especially after 2001 in the course of the decentralization policies.³⁰ Therefore, local identities play an important part with regard to the understanding of identity among indigenous Indonesians.

Religion often plays a crucial role in ethnic conflicts in Indonesia. The Indonesian Constitution guarantees religious freedom to all Indonesians. The first of the five principles of the state

²⁵ Thung, 1998, p. 219.

²⁶ Deutsche Stiftung Weltbevölkerung, 2012 (www.weltbevoelkerung.de, 14.09.2012).

²⁷ It also involves other non-indigenous groups, like the Arabs or the Sikhs, but the dichotomy has mainly been between the ethnic Chinese and the indigenous Indonesians.

²⁸ The other main islands are Kalimantan (the Indonesian part of Borneo), Sumatra, Sulawesi and Madura.

²⁹ For a more detailed composition of the Indonesian population according to the 2009 census, s. Suryadinata et al., 2003.

³⁰ Diprose & Ukiwo, 2008, p. 9.

ideology Pancasila is: “The belief in one God”. Indonesian citizens are required to register as belonging to one of the following main religions: Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism or Confucianism – even if Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism are not monotheistic religions. The majority of Indonesians are Muslims (88%).³¹ Only 10% are Christians, 1.7% are Hindus and less than 1% are Buddhists. The Hindus are mainly residents of Bali and Lombok.³²

The conflict discussed here is also related to the conflict between Christians and Muslims in Indonesia, since many ethnic Chinese are Christians while the majority population is Muslim. In “Mehrheit mit Minderwertigkeitskomplex? Der Islam in Indonesien”³³, Schreiner points out two basic strands of Indonesian Islam: modernism and traditionalism. Traditional Indonesian Islam is characterized by a greater flexibility and accommodation of Javanese traditions and can be found mainly in the rural areas of Central and East Java as well as Madura and South Kalimantan. The religious leaders are called *kiyai* are highly respected in the community because of their religious education. The second strand, the modernists, have been influenced by an Islamic reformation movement in the 19th century led by Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani (1839-1897) , Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905) and Rashid Rida (1865-1935) whose main aim was strengthening the role of classical Islam in daily life. Adherents of this group can be mainly found in the coastal parts of West Sumatra, West Java and South Sulawesi. It was introduced by the urban middle-class of these areas which is stronger connected with the Islamic world outside Indonesia and adopted the ideas of the reformation movement. The modernists try to translate old Islamic values and principles into modern language or to integrate modern theories into Islamic tradition.³⁴ This group is trying to extend the influence of Islam in the public realm, especially in the field of jurisdiction. In 1989 the competence of Islamic courts was extended to divorce, heritage and marriage.³⁵ It is very difficult to make general statements about the positions of the two strands with regard to the conflict here for these two strands are only a very broad classification. In addition to these two major strands there are also adherents of other forms of Islam in Indonesia, including Ahmadis and Shiites.

The definition and function of social classes in Indonesia is a matter of considerable controversy. Although few would dispute that Indonesia is a highly stratified society, it is

³¹ For the different strands of Islam in Indonesia see Schreiner 2001, pp. 159ff and Geske, 2002, pp. 45ff.

³² According to the 2010 census conducted by the Indonesian Central Statistics Agency for statistics in May 2010.

³³ The following paragraph is based on Schreiner, 2001, pp. 159-161.

³⁴ Schreiner, 2001, pp. 160ff.

³⁵ Geske, 2002, p. 45.

nonetheless difficult to identify the constituents of the different classes.³⁶ The 1970s witnessed a shift among the indigenous upper class. While the indigenous elite was mainly active in the politico-bureaucratic realm before, it began extending its activities into the commercial sector. Sato lists three policies of the Soeharto government that encouraged this shift: giving priority (1) to national capital instead of foreign capital, (2) to state capital instead of private capital, and (3) to indigenous capital instead of Chinese capital.³⁷ These protectionist policies were designed to favor the indigenous in order to bring about a more equal distribution of wealth in society. However, in the end these policies became a mere “legitimacy device for the predatory self-enrichment” of the ruling class.³⁸ The collusion between capital and the state, the politicians and high bureaucrats, was intensified and this transformation of parts of the political elite into indigenous capitalists marks a significant change. From this time onwards (1980s), indigenous capitalists began to flourish.³⁹

Due the economic development of the country – especially the cities, a diverse urban middle-class continues to grow. Similar to the rise of indigenous capitalists, the 1980s marked the emergence of the Indonesian middle-class.⁴⁰ Even though non-indigenous play a major role in the make-up of Indonesia’s middle-class, more and more indigenous Indonesians are entering this group and thereby adding to its growth.⁴¹

Lower class citizens make up the majority of the Indonesian population. According to the Indonesian Central Statistics Agency, 30.02 million people in Indonesia are classified as being poor.⁴² The definition for ‘poor’ is based on an income of less than 1.25 USD per day.⁴³ In 2011 the number of poor people has constantly declined from 13.33 percent (which translates into 31.02 million people) of the population in March 2010 to 12.5 percent in 2011. Rural areas accounted for 950,000 of those who rose from poverty, while only 50,000 came from urban areas.⁴⁴ While the reduction in poverty figures is positive, the definition of poverty which they

³⁶ Nyman, 2007, p. 94.

³⁷ Sato, 1994, p. 136.

³⁸ Robinson & Hadiz, 1993, p. 26.

³⁹ Chua, 2008, p. 86.

⁴⁰ Ansori, 2009, p. 90.

⁴¹ Hervandi, 2011 and Euromonitor International, 2012.

⁴² Jakarta Globe, July 4, 2011.

⁴³ The figures of the people living in poverty vary between sources depending on the parameters the different researchers apply. In addition, poverty is a very fluid dimension. Household surveys which were conducted over years in South India or China showed that over time many households frequently move in and out of poverty. While less than 20 percent of the households have always been poor in South Indian villages and 12 percent were never poor, the vast majority constantly moved in and out of poverty, Gaiha and Deolalikar, 1993, pp. 409-421. Another study by Jalan and Ravallion using six year panel data of households in rural China found that only 6.2 percent of households remained poor. In fact, less than 20 percent were found to be poor in any given year and 54 percent had experienced at least one episode of poverty, Jalan and Ravallion, 2000, pp. 82-99.

⁴⁴ Jakarta Globe, July 4, 2011.

are based upon has been critiqued.⁴⁵ Bambang Shergi Laksmono, University of Indonesia's Social and Political Science Faculty, stated that "We can't be happy with the percentage, because it only reflects absolute poverty. We need to analyze the relative poverty, the gap between the rich people and the poor people that is getting wider and wider."⁴⁶

When the financial crisis hit Indonesia in 1997, the poverty rate increased and about 16 percent of the rural households moved from non-poor to poor.⁴⁷ Headcount poverty rate in Indonesia increased from 15.6 percent in 1996 to 27.4 percent in 1999, which is an increase of 11.8 percentage points or 76 percent from the pre-crisis level.⁴⁸ As Indonesia is dependent on imports for basic commodities such as rice, sugar, soybean, maize, wheat and cassava, increases in international food prices 2007-2008 directly affected the Indonesian markets.⁴⁹ Even if the government is resolute on reducing poverty, Indonesia still has not fully recovered from these set-backs and more than 30 million people are living below or slightly above the poverty line.

Middlemen minority

Blalock, a US-American sociologist, was one of the first to coin the term 'middlemen minority',⁵⁰ even though the concept itself was not new at the time. The phenomenon of middlemen minorities or pariah minorities (as these minorities are also referred) had already been noted by academics in the 19th century, such as Weber and Sombart. Although the Jewish minorities of various European countries served as initial examples for such a group, however, Roscher already drew a comparison to the Chinese of Southeast Asia as early as 1875.⁵¹ In several writings Vajiravudh, King of Thailand (Rama VI), castigated Chinese as 'Jews of the Orient' (1914) and associated the supposed negative characteristics of European Jews with Chinese in Southeast Asia.⁵²

⁴⁵ Sri Palupi, director of the Institute for Ecosoc Rights, doubted the value of the figures, questioning if it would really be possible to live on less than 1.25 USD per day. He also considers the reduction in poverty as being rather small in the light of the government's large poverty reduction efforts, which include nine years of free basic education, health insurance schemes, cash handout programs and microcredit schemes, *ibid.*

⁴⁶ *Ibid.* According to Euromonitor, between 2006 and 2011, Indonesia's Gini coefficient rose from 33.0 to 37.7, reflecting greater income inequality. A zero Gini coefficient represents perfect income equality and a score of 100 indicates absolute income inequality. Euromonitor International, 2012.

⁴⁷ Skoufias et. al., 2000, pp. 97-114.

⁴⁸ Suryahadi and Sumato, 2001, p.10.

⁴⁹ Warr and Yusuf, 2010, p. 20.

⁵⁰ Blalock, 1967, pp. 79ff.

⁵¹ Reid, 1997, pp. 34ff.

⁵² Callahan, 2003, p. 495.

Many minorities are low-status groups, but there are some who occupy intermediate positions due to benefits offered to them or thanks to high adaptive capacity. Blalock notes that “such minorities are often associated with special occupational niches by virtue of a combination of circumstances, plus a cultural heritage that has been used as an adaptive remains structurally the same, these groups often become ‘perpetual’ minorities, whereas minorities that are initially less fortunate may eventually become completely absorbed into the dominant group.”⁵³ He explicitly mentions the Chinese in Southeast Asia as an example of these groups.⁵⁴ Further, he points out that the power of the middlemen minority “is largely dependent on the goodwill or tolerance of the power elite. As long as it is fulfilling its role successfully, but not too successfully, it will be protected by the elite. But although its power is weak, its general status and income are highly relative to that of the subordinate masses. The middlemen minority is thus in a vulnerable position.”⁵⁵

The middlemen minority serves as a buffer between two other groups – usually the elite and the masses. Their function as a buffer precludes them from being absorbed into either the elite or the masses.⁵⁶ Since this group is needed as buffer by the elite, the elite has no interest in absorbing its members.⁵⁷ The middlemen minority does not have a natural interest in being absorbed in the masses for it would have to sacrifice its competitive advantage – nevertheless, even if members of the group wished to be absorbed, the indigenous would be reluctant to accept them as they are only perceived as the helpers of the elite.⁵⁸

There are a number of typical professions performed by this middlemen group such as e.g. merchants, overseers, tax collectors or money-lenders. These professions cannot be occupied by the elite, but they are required for the smooth functioning of social, economic and political processes.⁵⁹ In the case of the Dutch East Indies and later Indonesia, the ethnic Chinese filled these roles.

It proved to be more than convenient for the colonial and later political Indonesian elite to benefit from their skills on the one hand and to use them as an intermediate towards the masses on the other. During colonial times, unpopular professions such as overseer or tax-collector were later also delegated to the Chinese by the Dutch colonial administration. It was therefore the ethnic Chinese who were blamed for the consequences of colonisation for they were the

⁵³ Blalock, 1967, pp. 79-80.

⁵⁴ Other examples he mentions are the East Indians in Burma and South Africa.

⁵⁵ Blalock, 1967, p. 80.

⁵⁶ According to Blalock, people are interested in a social upward movement, i.e. they rather strive to become members of the elite than the masses. Blalock, 1967, pp. 80ff.

⁵⁷ Blalock, 1967, p. 83.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Blalock, 1967, p. 81.

‘face’ of colonialism to the indigenous population rather than the colonial masters themselves. This impression may have been encouraged due to the fact that the middleman minority was an ethnically distinct group.

Consequently, in times of peace, the middlemen minority can live in agreeable circumstances, however, during crises, its members can become scapegoats. Social psychological theories of scapegoating predict that in case the source of frustration is either unknown or too powerful, a substitute target is searched for.⁶⁰ In the case of the Dutch East Indies and Indonesia until 1998, the privileged were not only powerful, but were also difficult to reach since they comprised only a relatively small group. It was therefore convenient for the population to direct their aggression towards a group of people which has a more obvious presence, but is still closely associated with the elite.

Marginalisation

Marginalization is defined here as the restriction of physical or social mobility for members of a specific social group. With regard to physical mobility, this means that the members of a group are denied their right to settle where they please, but instead are forced to live in certain areas (e.g. ghettos). In extreme cases, the group is not allowed to leave designated areas without permission. Social mobility is limited when a group is trapped by the social structure of a society and where its members are prevented from changing their social status due to state regulations or social / religious customs that restrict their access for example to education or to professions that would otherwise allow for social development.⁶¹ Members of a marginalized group often serve as social outsiders (out-group or underdogs) whose existence is essential to satisfy another group’s need for superiority – the in-group (or topdogs).

Focus

An abundance of literature provides conflict analyses of minority conflicts in general and conflicts in Indonesia in particular. In the field of political science, many of these conflicts have been approached in research following democratic theory, security / comprehensive or good governance approach. All of these approaches can be classified as top-down approaches which rely on governments and their institutions as agents for change in conflict situations.

Democratic theory approach:

⁶⁰ Blalock, 1967, p. 82.

⁶¹ This definition is similar to Rotter, 1954 and Degner, Meiser, Rothermund, 2009.

Democratic theories revolve around the concept of rule by majority vote. Dahl identified three characteristic of democracies:⁶²

- Popular sovereignty,
- Political equality, and
- Majority rule.

Due to the focus the majority, representatives of democratic theories struggle to incorporate minority participation or minority rights without endangering the overall concept of majority rule. On this basis, minority conflicts are not in the focus of democratic theories. Further, it has to be debated whether or not the concept of democracy is applicable to each and every conflict environment and if so which type of democracy would be best suited for the needs of the people depending on their cultural background and historical development. As this thesis does not aim at providing suggestions with regard to reforming the political system of Indonesia, but instead focuses on a minority conflict, the democratic approach which does not focus on minority conflicts has not therefore been further considered when choosing the theoretical approach for this thesis.

Security or comprehensive approach

After the Cold War, the world view which focused on potential invasions as the existential threats which required solely military instruments as response shifted towards a more holistic view of crisis situations in conflicts.⁶³ In 2006 the United Nation's Security Council adopted resolution 1674 in which the Security Council "[e]mphasises the importance of preventing armed conflict and its recurrence, and stresses in this context the need for a comprehensive approach through promoting economic growth, poverty eradication, sustainable development, national reconciliation, good governance, democracy, the rule of law, and respect for, and protection of, human rights, and in this regard, urges the cooperation of Member States and underlines the importance of a coherent, comprehensive and coordinated approach by the principal organs of the United Nations, cooperating with one another and within their respective mandates"⁶⁴ The Security Council thus recommended conflict prevention strategies which include not only military, but also civilian instruments to develop a multi-faceted approach to address the different aspects and dimensions of a conflict situation in a coherent manner. Such an approach requires rapid response capabilities as well as complementary long-term

⁶² Krouse, 1982, p. 442.

⁶³ Barry, 2012, p. 1.

⁶⁴ UN Security Council, SC 8710, 2006, 10.04.2013.

strategies.⁶⁵ Despite the inclusion of civilian approaches, this approach relies on governments of the states and their actions with regard to their national security and defence policies. Organizations such as the EU and NATO in their function as “global security actor”⁶⁶ or national states have difficulties including non-government organizations in their strategies even though they play an important role in many conflict environments.⁶⁷

This approach attempts to include civilian and military approaches. It perceives working on conflicts or preventing conflicts as crisis management and not as a strategy towards peace as aimed at in this thesis. Further, the focus on governments renders this approach less promising for the specific case study of this thesis. The conflict between the ethnic Chinese and indigenous Indonesians is not a so-called “hot conflict” at the moment and the government (along the lines of its security policy) is concentrating on other conflicts instead which are characterized by a higher level of physical violence. Developing approaches along the lines of the comprehensive approach therefore do not appear to be reasonable in this case.

Good governance approach

This approach also focuses on governments and their institutions as major drivers in handling conflicts as it centers around their responsibility as governments and their associated bodies to meet the needs of their citizens. A conflict analysis according to the good governance approach could include an analysis of the relationships between the government and its national or local institutions and the citizens.

The analysis of these relationships may uncover deficits that in order to achieve good governance would have to be compensated through reforms of human development and political institutions. According to the UN, good governance has to comprise eight characteristics:⁶⁸

- consensus oriented
- participatory
- following the Rule of Law
- effective and efficient
- accountable
- transparent

⁶⁵ Barry, 2012, p. 2.

⁶⁶ Barry, 2012, p. 1.

⁶⁷ Ministry of Defence Finland, 2008, p. 19.

⁶⁸ UNESCAP, 2009, 15.04.2013.

- responsive
- equitable and inclusive

These characteristics reveal that this approach is closely aligned with the concept of democratic governance and as such oriented towards the Western concept of democracy which cannot be applied to all cultural environments. Similar to the democratic theory approach focuses on the needs of the majority of a country's population and minority conflicts and their rights are a side topic. As the comprehensive approach was not considered to be promising for this case study, this approach's strong focus on the government and its institutions.

The conflict between ethnic Chinese and indigenous Indonesians particular has principally been studied by researchers who have focused only on one of the conflict parties: the ethnic Chinese. The topic of ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia in general has gained importance for historians, social scientists, economists and other scholars worldwide since the 1960s.⁶⁹ Abundant literature focusing on the cultural perspective of the topic, such as analyses of their socio-cultural background, are available, ranging from a broad comparative perspective including other Southeast Asian Chinese communities to more specific research focusing on, among other things, on their culture and (the construction of) identity. A significantly smaller body of literature examines ethnic Chinese and their relationship to indigenous Indonesians from a political perspective (e.g. participation in the political system). The relevant studies and literature from which this work draws upon have been grouped as follows.

Historical perspective

The available literature sources on Chinese settlers before the colonization of the islands which today belong to the Indonesian archipelago are especially rare making it difficult to form a nuanced or reliable picture of this time period. However, academics such as Liem, Somers-Heidhues, Reid and Taylor have compiled and published multiple data on ethnic Chinese during this period. Liem's book *Überseechinesen – eine Minderheit: zur Erforschung interethnischer Vorurteile in Indonesien* (1986) as well as Somers-Heidhues' *Southeast Asia's Chinese Minorities* (1974) provide detailed information about this early period and remain valuable sources even until today (end of research 2012). Reid has published a number of studies about ethnic Chinese as entrepreneurial minorities in Southeast Asia and thereby

⁶⁹ Documents about ethnic Chinese were lost over the years or have been neglect in the archives in many of the Southeast Asian countries. Documentation and research centres have only been established in the 1990s to rescue the remaining documents and collate a systematic collection of current and retrospective material (e.g. the Shao Overseas Chinese Documentation and Research Center at the Ohio University, USA and the Chinese Heritage Center in Singapore).

actively shaped the academic debate on this subject. His work *Southeast Asia in the age of commerce, 1450-1680. I: The lands below the winds* (1988) which analyzes economic and social change in pre-colonial times as well as the emergence of entrepreneurial minorities in Southeast Asia is one of the few sources available analyzing the distinct development of a Chinese merchant class in Indonesia. Taylor's "The Chinese and the Early Centuries of Conversion to Islam in Indonesia" (2005) provides an interesting and rather new insight into the involvement of Chinese in the introduction of Islam and the subsequent social consequences for the Chinese. These sources proved themselves to be valuable when working on the development of the conflict and its setting.

Cultural perspective

Many of the academics, who work on the subject of Chinese Indonesians, focus on issues of culture and identity. One of the first comprehensive monographs on this topic was published by Purcell (1951) which laid the groundwork for successive scholars, among others Tan (1987 and 2004), Wang (1981 and 2004), and Dawis (2009). They offer valuable insights about the development of a distinct Chinese Indonesian culture which consists of a mixture of Chinese and Indonesian elements. Somers-Heidhues' (2003) study on ethnic Chinese on the 'outer islands' shows how Chinese Indonesian culture has been influenced by the surrounding local cultures. A major focus is on identity and how it adapted to the changing social circumstances which the ethnic Chinese faced. Two book-length sources are worth of particularly mention are *Identities in Flux. Young Chinese in Jakarta* by Thung (1998) and *Reconceptualising Ethnic Chinese Identity in Post-Suharto Indonesia* by Hoon (2008). They provide empirical research on how ethnic Chinese perceive their identity and implicitly the conflict. These results were taken into consideration when discussing attitudes and behaviour of the conflict actors in this study.

These publications consider the ethnicity of the Chinese Indonesians at least indirectly as a natural boundary marker which explains the behaviour of the ethnic Chinese as well as their treatment by indigenous Indonesians. Up till now only a few studies deviate from this prevailing paradigm, among them Heryanto (1998) and Chua (2008) who convincingly argue that the ethnicity of the Chinese Indonesians has repeatedly been constructed by the political elites (colonial as well as indigenous) to maintain the social status quo. This more critical perspective on ethnicity has been taken up in this study in particular when discussing different dimensions of violence in the conflict.

Social / Political Perspective

Further literature which formed the groundwork for analyzing the conflict along the lines of empirical peace and conflict research included studies by Mackie, Suryadinata, Reid, Heryanto, Purdey and Coppel.

Mackie approaches the ethnic Chinese by concentrating on their business elite. He relates the difficult social position of the ethnic Chinese as a group to the economic success of this business elite.⁷⁰ The topics of the political thought and the political participation of ethnic Chinese, their role within the nation-building process, their relation to the indigenous Indonesians as well as to China and how these are affected by the economic rise of the latter, have been studied by Suryadinata, a renowned analyst who approaches this minority from the perspective of social and political studies.⁷¹ By comparing the ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia to the Jews in Europe, Reid discloses analogies that explain the treatment of the ethnic Chinese based on their status as middlemen minorities.⁷² Heryanto published insightful articles regarding the issue of discrimination against ethnic Chinese and rape as a new type of violence which first occurred during the May riots 1998.⁷³ The most comprehensive study analyzing violent acts prior to and after the May riots is Jemma Purdey's *Anti-Chinese Violence in Indonesia, 1996 – 1999*.⁷⁴ The main incidents are closely analyzed and placed in the broader context of anti-Chinese sentiments and violence. She convincingly argues that the riots were organized by members of the military and were initiated by the political elite. Coppel⁷⁵ is among the few scholars who explicitly deals with the case of the ethnic Chinese as a conflict. Even though he focuses entirely on one of the conflict parties, he places this conflict in the broader context of Indonesian ethnic conflicts in general. The studies above provide insightful analyzes of the causes and impacts of the conflict on the ethnic Chinese which help to understand the contemporary setting of the conflict.

Although the existing studies include valuable perspectives and insights into the case of the ethnic Chinese, research gaps requiring closure remain. The research does not cover analyses of the conflict or its violence in the time period after the May Riots 1998 and its direct aftermath, thereby leaving a historical gap of more than a decade. Even if no large-scale violence has

⁷⁰ Mackie, 1988.

⁷¹ Suryadinata, 1978; Suryadinata, 1988; Suryadinata, 1997; Suryadinata, 1999; Suryadinata, 2001; Suryadinata, 2002; Suryadinata, 2003; Suryadinata, 2004; Suryadinata, 2006; Suryadinata, 2008.

⁷² Reid, 1997.

⁷³ Heryanto, 1998a); Heryanto 1999; Heryanto, 2008.

⁷⁴ Purdey, 2006.

⁷⁵ Coppel, 1983; Coppel, 2001; Coppel, 2006.

occurred since then, this does not mean that the conflict is resolved. The topic is therefore still of relevance and further research up-dating the current status is required.

Approach to the Conflict in this Thesis

Although previous studies acknowledge that ethnic Chinese are in conflict with indigenous Indonesians, these studies did not examine both conflict parties but rather remained only focused on ethnic Chinese. Therefore, while ethnic Chinese play a major part in this work as well, the focus is set on the whole of the conflict formation, thereby including the indigenous majority population as well. This focus requires a different perspective than those already classified previously for approaching the case of the ethnic Chinese. I have chosen to tackle the research questions with the Transcend method developed by Johan Galtung which derives from the field of peace and conflict research.⁷⁶ This approach has been developed for practitioners engaging in conflict transformation work in the field and consists of a theoretical, academic part which includes methods for conflict analysis and a practical part which provides concrete guidance for field work, especially mediation. Due to this background, it differs from purely academic approaches which do not aim at preparing the grounds for practical conflict transformation work. It includes for example the search for potential stake-holders beyond the primary conflict parties who could be mobilized in the course of a conflict transformation process. As I am not engaging in practical conflict transformation, I will only apply the theoretical, academic part of the Transcend method in this analysis.

Other academic conflict analyses evaluate different concepts, approaches or mechanisms by testing their applicability with respect to specific conflict case studies.⁷⁷ In this study, measures and approaches which may serve as guidance to political institutions or non-governmental organizations or even individuals (in case they attempt practical conflict transformation) are developed. These recommendations are based on the results of an extensive context-sensitive conflict analysis. Apart from academic research, a number of organizations or institutions also deal with conflict analyses and issue recommendations for dealing with conflicts or conflict

⁷⁶ Due to the fact that the theoretical approach to the present conflict has been developed by Galtung his publications form the main body of research literature for the theoretical background of this thesis. In addition, studies by other researchers, such as Lederach, Francis, and Ropers, which offer approaches to conflict analysis and transformation, are also considered. The interest in conflict and conflict transformation as an academic topic blossomed throughout the 1990s, as did the literature on the subject. The theoretical approaches used in the thesis were chosen based on their relevance to and applicability to answer the research questions of the case study. For the purpose of this thesis, a sample of theoretical approaches that appeared to be most relevant for answering the research questions regarding the present case study has been chosen.

⁷⁷ For example, in my own master thesis, I applied the concept of autonomy to the minority conflict of the Uyghurs with the government of the People's Republic of China in order to investigate and prove that an extended autonomy concept which provides more self-governance could produce peace enhancing effects.

actors, such as for example the International Crisis Group. The recommendations, however, usually follow a similar pattern regardless of the diverse and individual background of conflicts as they are not based on results of preceding conflict analyses.⁷⁸

Using the Transcend approach for the case study of ethnic Chinese and indigenous Indonesians, this study contributes a new perspective to the conflict and helps close the research gap for the period 1998 – 2012. It further provides impulses for concrete conflict transformation efforts into practice. Also, the study tests the applicability of the analytical part of the Transcend method in the context of academic conflict analysis, thereby contributing more generally to the field of peace and conflict research.⁷⁹

1.3 Theoretical Background of the Research

As the Transcend method has been chosen as the theoretical basis for approaching the conflict case study, the theoretical background of this study draws extensively on the ideas of peace and conflict research as developed by Johan Galtung. With regard to the selection of literature by Galtung, I focused on articles and books relevant for the development of his peace and conflict theories. Based on his works, three stages within this development can be identified: 1969 Galtung introduced his extended definition of violence in his article “Violence, Peace and Peace Research” which he further developed in the 1970s. In the 1990s constructive conflict transformation and minority conflicts played a major role in peace and conflict research. 1996 Galtung published “Peace by Peaceful means”. This book contains further basics of this conflict and peace theories as well as instruments for conflict analysis which I have applied in this thesis. The latest re-conceptualization which comprises systematic steps for conflict transformation and links theory with practical work is revealed in his book “A theory of conflict” published 2010. A further book “A theory of Peace” is announced but has not been published at the time of writing and could therefore not be included here.

Within peace and conflict research there are numerous methods and approaches on how to deal with conflicts, such as conflict settling, conflict management; conflict resolution and conflict

⁷⁸ Recommendations of the International Crisis Group aim at conflict management and therefore mainly address top-level actors as entry-points: national or international institutions (national governments, military and police, the United Nations or other nation states). The recommendations therefore often aim at issuing or implementing new laws and regulations, restoring the rule of law and implementing political mechanism and programs, however, not transforming the conflict itself.

⁷⁹ Galtung, 2007b, p. 145-146.

transformation.⁸⁰ The Transcend method belongs to the family of ‘conflict transformation’ approaches.⁸¹ Even though it is applied by practitioners in the field, among academics the approach is often viewed skeptically and rarely used for academic conflict analyses. In particular, the broad definition of violence and peace which constitute an important pillar of Galtung’s approach represents a major point of criticism as discussed in more detail in chapter 3.

Peace and Conflict Research According to Johan Galtung

Peace and conflict research is multidisciplinary and encompasses, but is not limited to, academic disciplines such as political science, sociology, anthropology, cultural science, psychology, and economics. Like interdisciplinary studies in general, peace and conflict research has been criticized for blurring distinctions and for being unscientific as well as conceptually banal doubting their academic status.⁸² However, building upon the methods and theories of different fields of study ensures that peace and conflict research is subject to academic rigor. The premises, such as data and theories, as well as deductions and their coherence have to be analytical and withstand close scrutiny, including public verification. The subjects ‘peace’ and ‘conflict’ themselves cannot clearly be attributed to only one academic field, but touch upon different academic disciplines. Therefore, analyses are conducted from different angles. According to Galtung and other founders of peace and conflict studies, this discipline is a normative one. As a normative discipline, peace and conflict research aims at connecting theoretical research with values and involves judgements. Critics – disregarding or even objecting the explicit claim of peace and conflict research to be normative – point out that research, programs and publications of peace and conflict studies merely reflect the ideologies of its researchers and can therefore not be considered science as the dominance of ideological positions goes “far beyond the boundaries of careful and value-free discourse”.⁸³ Peace and conflict researchers reply to this and acknowledge that they are influenced by normative moral concepts and have different perceptions of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ – instead of ignoring this and pretending that research can be conducted purely objective, neutral and value-free. As an academic discipline it is theoretical; due to its subject (peace and conflict) though, it is also an

⁸⁰ Definitions and distinctions between these methods and terms have been dealt with in articles by Reimann (2004) and Miall (2004) in the *Berghof Handbook of Conflict Transformation*. <http://www.berghof-handbook.net/all> (20.07.2011).

⁸¹ According to Miall and Reimann, but also to Galtung himself.

⁸² Rodgers et al., 2003.

⁸³ Steinberg, 2007, p. 788. Steinberg further claims that peace and conflict studies are influenced by subjective political positions and in particular by postcolonial ideology, *ibid*.

applied discipline. Peace and conflict research thus aims at advising and suggesting how to deal with conflicts peacefully and how to initiate the relevant changes from violence to peace.⁸⁴

There are different strands in peace and conflict research. Following the classification as suggested by Galtung, these are:⁸⁵

1. Empirical peace and conflict research
2. Critical peace and conflict research
3. Constructive peace and conflict research

The first strand of peace and conflict research is characterized by the empirical analysis of past peace or conflict, and theories are formulated both inductively and deductively based on carefully collected and analyzed data.⁸⁶ Using these methods, not only can the development of a conflict's past be reconstructed, but also root causes which may still be relevant for a conflict's present can be analysed. Even though lessons learned from the past cannot necessarily be applied in the present or in the future, they can help in gaining a better understanding of a particular conflict, sensitivities, causes, and the impact they have generated. Therefore, the case study of the ethnic Chinese will be first introduced by following this strand with an analysis of the conflict's past, i.e. its historical development in general as well as the development of the violence in particular (chapters 2 and 3).

The second strand of peace and conflict research deals with the present. Data and information are evaluated in the light of values. Values are analyzed by depicting value statements as dichotomous: desired or rejected. Peace e.g. is considered to be a desired value. If the 'present reality' does not correspond with the values, the 'present reality' has to be changed accordingly. This would infer that values therefore, overrule reality.⁸⁷ This approach will be applied in this work in evaluating conflict formation with respect to developments that have taken place since the last violent riots of the conflict in 1998 (chapters 3, 4 and 5). The actors and their respective aims will be analyzed using the tool box developed by Galtung. The conflict will thus be depicted with as many of its facets as possible – as far as they can be handled – in order to prepare the ground for a vision of positive conflict transformation. In assessing the actors with respect to their potential and willingness to engage in a conflict transformation process, patterns for their respective motivations and latitudes to act will be taken into account.⁸⁸

⁸⁴ Galtung, 2007b, p. 31.

⁸⁵ Galtung, 2007a, p. 32.

⁸⁶ Galtung, 2007b, pp. 32-33.

⁸⁷ Galtung, 2007b, p. 32-33.

⁸⁸ Cf. Pattern of „Handlungserklärung“: Reckwitz, 2000, p. 91ff.

The third strand of peace and conflict research focuses on the future and tries to combine theories about possible ways of transforming conflicts, effective peace-building, and peace-making measure with values.⁸⁹ This constructive, future-oriented strand forms the basis for the attempt in this work to formulate analysis-based recommendations for conflict transformation in practice (chapter 6). Measures and approaches drawn from the Transcend method will be evaluated with regard to their applicability to the case study. Since these measures and approaches aim at constructing a new conflict reality, this falls within the constructive third strand.

As this study follows the Transcend method, it incorporates all three strands of conflict and peace research as stipulated by Galtung. The critical analyses of the conflict's past and present as well as the evaluation of new empirical data form the basis for formulating constructive suggestions for a possible conflict transformation in the future.

Conflict Transformation

In order to establish a reference framework for 'conflict transformation' and consequently the Transcend method, I shall next focus on the questions: What is 'conflict transformation' and how is it different from other concepts or generic approaches dealing with conflicts? The basis for the definition of the approach relative to and as distinct from other approaches relies on the Berghof Handbooks on conflict transformation Vol. I and II.⁹⁰ In these two volumes authors access state-of-the-art knowledge on conflict transformation from a theoretical as well as a practitioner perspective.

According to Reimann and Miall,⁹¹ conflict transformation refers to peace-building strategies which aim at overcoming all forms of violence regardless. Violence does not only refer to physical violent acts here, but also covers violent structures.

In contrast, concepts like conflict settlement and conflict management aim at ending direct violence by negotiating win-win solutions. Limited resources or a lack of political will often only allow for these types of approaches in practice; however, contemporary, complex conflicts require more profound changes in society than merely the reframing of positions and the identification of possible win-win outcomes. Without working to the core of a conflict,

⁸⁹ Galtung, 2007b, p. 32-34.

⁹⁰ Austin et al, 2004 and Austin et al, 2011.

⁹¹ Reimann, 2004 and Miall, 2004.

violence-prevention will be unlikely and the approaches of conflict settlement and conflict management are consequently insufficient.

The strategies of conflict transformation can be characterized as long-term, outcome-, process- and structure-oriented. They consist of processes of engaging with and transforming the relationships, interests, and discourses of conflict parties. These processes may go as far as changing the very constitution of society that supports the continuation of a violent conflict. Conflict settlement and management, meanwhile, concentrate on making conflicts controllable, i.e. reaching political agreements without necessarily addressing the underlying conflict causes and initiating far-reaching social change. The propensity for violent acts of aggression arises from existing institutions and historical relationships, as well as from the established distribution of power. Since these are deep-seated in society, these approaches generally perceive resolving conflicts as being unrealistic; the best that can be done is to manage and contain them. According to these approaches, a historic compromise can occasionally be reached through which violence may be suspended.⁹² Conflict transformation aims at engaging all actors, including intervening actors, and mobilizing their ‘peace resources’, as all actors are expected to be able to contribute to the conflict transformation process in various forms based on their personal strengths and capacities. The involved parties as well as outsiders have to be made aware of their contradicting aims and have to be willing to change their attitudes and behavior. This comprehensive and wide-ranging approach emphasizes support for groups in conflict within the society rather than for mediation by outsiders. It also recognizes that conflicts are transformed gradually, through a series of smaller or larger changes, in which a variety of actors may play important roles.⁹³ Conflict transformation is therefore an open-ended, long-term, multi-track and dynamic process, which significantly widens the scope of the actors involved. Unlike conflict settlement and conflict management which do not consider any long-term efforts and deal only with violent outbursts, conflict transformation aims at effectively combining track I, II and III activities along the continuum of short-, middle-, and long-term involvement. It is thus likely to engage a wide variety of actors, including: official, military and political leaders (track I); informal conflict transformation experts, international NGOs working in conflict transformation (track II); grassroots, local NGOs providing development cooperation and humanitarian assistance (track III). In conflict transformation, conflicts are not per se perceived as bad; on the contrary, constructive, non-violent conflict is seen as a vital agent or catalyst for change.⁹⁴

⁹² Miall, 2004, p. 8ff; Reimann, 2004, pp. 8ff.

⁹³ Miall, 2004, p. 4.

⁹⁴ Reimann, 2004, pp. 10–13 and Miall, 2004, p. 4.

At first glance, conflict transformation does not seem to differ significantly from conflict resolution. Conflict resolution also includes all process-oriented activities (short-, middle-, and long-term engagements on all three tracks) whose aim is re-defining the conflict as a collective new problem. The conflict has to be analyzed with regard to its root causes and creative solutions can be found with the help of skilled third parties that are acceptable to all parties involved.⁹⁵ Strategies also include in-depth conflict analysis, process-oriented and relationship-oriented strategies that comprise non-coercive actions and track II negotiations. Examples range from facilitation or consultation in the form of controlled, direct communication, to problem-solving workshops and organized round-tables.⁹⁶

Consequently, researchers such as Mitchell question whether or not the term conflict transformation actually adds anything new to the academic debate: “As I have argued elsewhere (Mitchell 2002), the original interpretation of the term ‘conflict resolution’ certainly involved a process that recognized the possible need for far-reaching structural changes and changes in relationships as part of any durable solution, so I prefer to retain this term rather than the currently fashionable one of ‘conflict transformation’.”⁹⁷

Lederach on the other hand sees the concept of conflict transformation as being more holistic and comprehensive than the concept of conflict resolution as the former points to the inherent dialectical process, the ability to transform the dynamics of the conflict and the relationships between the parties, in other words to transform the very creators of the conflict.⁹⁸ Galtung also rejects the term conflict resolution as he claims that underlying the conflict resolution perspective is the assumption that every conflict has a finite life and a clear end and can, therefore, either be solved or declared intractable.⁹⁹

When comparing conflict transformation with conflict resolution, the main difference between the two concepts which thus becomes visible is the understanding of the life cycles of conflicts. Consequently, the goals of those working on conflicts utilizing the two different approaches will not be the same. In conflict resolution, the aim is to reach a stage in which the conflict is solved and thereby vanishes. For conflict transformation, the accepted premise is that the conflict does not vanish but rather takes on new forms. If working on the conflict is successful, the new forms will be less, or without violence. Therefore, there is not one final change that is

⁹⁵ Reimann, 2004, p. 9; Miall, 2004, p. 3.

⁹⁶ Reimann, 2004, p. 10.

⁹⁷ Mitchell, 2011, footnote 3, p. 77.

⁹⁸ Lederach, 1995b, pp. 201ff.

⁹⁹ Galtung, 1995a, p. 51.

aimed for but rather changes are pursued one step at the time. Along the way, the understanding and competences of how to deal with conflicts non-violently are developed among the conflict parties and in the context of their societies. This understanding and associated skills should then help the conflict parties and broader society in dealing with new, future aspects of the conflict or future conflicts. Even if some of the measures or tools such as round-tables or workshops are applied by both concepts, their overall understanding of conflict and their goals are not the same. It is this understanding of complex conflicts as on-going social phenomena that explains their longevity. Since the measures and tools suggested by methods affiliated with the conflict transformation approach, e.g. the Transcend method, are based on this understanding, they are considered to be most suitable for protracted conflicts, such as the case study presented here.

1.4 Research Method

As relatively little academic material has been published about the case study conflict, mainly Indonesian media outlets in the English, Chinese and Indonesian language, such as newspapers and magazines, were also examined. Chinese-language newspapers and magazines have been re-admitted in Indonesia after the end of the Soeharto-regime. An examination of the main Chinese-language press revealed that they mainly deal with cultural and economic topics. Publications in Indonesian (*bahasa Indonesia*) were only briefly examined, as apart from two magazines, articles regarding the discourse about ethnic Chinese or the conflict in particular were mainly published in the local English language media (e.g. The Jakarta Post). This is not surprising considering that many ethnic Chinese have been and still are educated abroad or in schools and universities where the first language is English. This language therefore seems to be their first choice when it comes to publications.¹⁰⁰ These publications were contrasted and compared with direct observation as well as that of others (scholars, experts, activists etc.). The texts were analyzed qualitatively rather than quantitatively as it was not the aim of the study to detect quantitative coherences or interrelations between the sources. The texts were interpreted following the style of the ‘qualitative content analysis’ (*qualitative Inhaltsanalyse*)¹⁰¹ developed by Philipp Mayring, though in contrast to Mayring who advocates a classification of the material without advance considerations (criteria, clusters etc.), the material gathered was pre-screened and classified according to its relevance with regard to the focus of this study.

¹⁰⁰ For example, Thung, 1998 or Dawis, 2009.

¹⁰¹ Mayring, 2007, pp. 42ff.

In order to be able to further understand the current needs and interests of the involved parties, interviews with leading groups and organizations, scholars as well as activists who are working on the issue were conducted. These expert interviews were mainly conducted in Jakarta (Java), which is not only the capital of Indonesia and thus the centre of political activities, but also attracts many Indonesians from different regions of the country allowing for a more diverse sample of ethnic Chinese as well as indigenous Indonesians. 47 interviews were one-on-one interviews and two were group interviews. The one-on-one interviews proved to be more efficient for this research even though they were more time-consuming. The respondents tended to reveal more information when they were interviewed on their own. When conducting the two group interviews, one participant – the oldest member of the group – would mostly take the lead while the others would merely confirm his or her statements.

The interviews provided further insight into the different subgroups that exist and their interests. This informed my analysis of what measures and ways to support conflict transformation would be acceptable. Similar to the text analysis, a qualitative approach was chosen for the interviews. Qualitative inquiries examine “the constitution of meaning in everyday social phenomena” and also focus on how meanings are produced¹⁰². According to Erlandson¹⁰³, qualitative research methods such as interviewing using open-ended questions and relatively unstructured observations can be preferable to quantitative ones. This is because quantitative measures mainly seek to reduce data to numbers that represent a single criterion. By so doing, they remove that data from the rich detail that distinguishes it from other similar data and from the contexts and alternative constructions that give the data meaning. Therefore, a qualitative approach was the most suitable for assessing the respondents’ perception of the conflict, their needs and interests as well as their thoughts about transforming the conflict.

The field research period was centred around the Parliamentary and Presidential elections in 2009 were chosen as an event of potential political change; the situation prior to and after the elections was also assessed. Over the course of two field visits in 2008 and 2010, the year before and the year after President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was re-elected, I interviewed a total of 51 persons in semi-structured face-to-face interviews. Afterwards, the data deriving from the interviews was clustered according to the categories reflecting my theoretical framework. The interviews were structured by identifying themes that were mentioned frequently. These included evaluating the current situation of the conflict, identifying actors, the actors’ attitudes, problems or fears, personal aims, suggestions with regard to improvement,

¹⁰² Lindlof, 1991, p. 24.

¹⁰³ Erlandson et al., 1993.

their own contributions and behaviour, experiences with other people's behaviour in the conflict and the respondents' perception of fragmentation of the conflict parties. Having identified the themes, it was necessary to further re-categorize them based on the Transcend method according to the conflict actors' attitudes, behaviour, and aims. This categorization enabled an interpretation and analysis of the data with direct reference to my theoretical framework and formed the basis for the analysis of the conflict's present state.

1.5 Thesis Outline

Having introduced the research topic and purpose of the study as well as the theoretical approach, research method and sources in the first chapter, the following chapters will deal with the case study.

Chapter 2 provides an insight into the development of the conflict's social and historical setting. Root causes and the development of conflict structures that are still valid today are analyzed from the initial settling of Chinese in the archipelago throughout the colonial era and the declaration of the Indonesian nation-state (1945) until the Soeharto era.

Chapter 3 analyzes violence during Soeharto's New Order regime (1965 – 1998) as well as the post-Soeharto era (1998 – 2012) according to the analytical tool of the violence triangle. By comparing the results of the analyses of the two time periods, both the existence of different types of violence and their development will be assessed.

Chapter 4 examines the conflict formation by analyzing the conflict actors' behaviour and attitudes as well as their contradicting aims. Since the conflict parties are not homogenous, subgroups will first be formed.

Chapter 5 reveals underlying dimensions of the conflict formation which are unconscious to the actors, but influence their attitudes and behaviour towards the members of the other conflict party as well as their general position within the conflict formation. Since they are deeply rooted inside the actors, these dimensions can only be uncovered by an outsider to the conflict.

Chapter 6 discusses attempts for a possible transformation of this conflict based on the results of the preceding conflict analysis. According to the conflict cycle, this conflict is in the 'After (direct) violence'- stage and different measures can therefore be applied for its transformation. Suggestions will include how the conflict formation as analyzed in chapter 4 can be transcended and how the violence of the conflict as assessed in chapter 3 can be reduced.

Chapter 7 examines experiences made by approaching the present case study with the Transcend method. It further offers elements from other conflict transformation approaches that can complement the Transcend approach.

Chapter 8 reviews the findings of the case study by revisiting the research questions on the one hand and the Transcend method as a possible approach for academic conflict analysis on the other.

2. Analysis of the Socio-historical Development of the Conflict's Setting

Indonesia is characterized by diversity: Across its approximate 6,000 inhabited islands, the archipelago consists of more than 1,000 ethnic, linguistic, cultural and religious groups.¹⁰⁴ To understand the conflict between the ethnic Chinese and other (indigenous) ethnic groups, it is necessary to return in history to how its setting evolved, i.e. the 'making of' of Indonesia, as it were until 1965. The current conflict configuration cannot be attributed to single incidents, it is embedded within the structure of Indonesian society. It is thus essential to analyze the particular social and political tendencies and patterns in Indonesian history that are relevant to current issues and problems. I shall begin with the early history of the archipelago, followed by the arrival of the first Chinese settlers, the introduction of Islam (today's most prominent religion), and finally the colonial period primarily under the Dutch until the founding of the Indonesian national state and the first Presidential era under Soekarno. founding of the Indonesian nation state and the first Presidential era under Soekarno.

2.1 Pre-colonial Times: Early Societies and the Arrival of Chinese Settlers

The Population of the Archipelago

In order to understand today's constellation of the multi-ethnic and multi-religious Indonesian society, it is beneficial to return to the period when the archipelago was settled. The Austronesian population, who form the majority of the modern Indonesian population, migrated to South East Asia from Taiwan in 2000 BC. They spread throughout the archipelago and comprise the indigenous population. Due to archipelago's good agricultural conditions, villages, small towns and eventually kingdoms developed until the 1st century AD. Indonesia's strategic maritime position fostered inter-island and regional trade which also opened Indonesia to foreign influence at an early stage of its development. Trade relations with Indian kingdoms and China brought with it Hinduism and Buddhism to the archipelago.¹⁰⁵

From the 7th century AD onwards, the sea-faring Buddhist kingdom of Srivijaya based in Sumatra flourished.¹⁰⁶ Between the 8th and 10th century AD, the agricultural Buddhist Sailendra

¹⁰⁴ Indonesian embassy in Germany. http://www.botschaft-indonesien.de/de/indonesien/indonesien_index.htm.

¹⁰⁵ Taylor, 2004, pp. 5ff.

¹⁰⁶ Taylor, 2004, pp. 20ff.

and Hindu Mataram dynasties initially thrived, but later contracted in inland Java. The last influential Hindu kingdom, the Majapahit kingdom, was founded in eastern Java in the late 13th century. It was also in the 13th century that Islam entered the archipelago and like Buddhism and Hinduism it was introduced by foreign traders or explorers from Islamic kingdoms. Subsequently, it spread throughout the archipelago and became the dominant religion by the 16th century. Elements of the already existent cultures and religious rituals have been semi incorporated, shaping the traditional form of Islam still widely practiced today in Indonesia.¹⁰⁷ In the 16th century, European traders also were drawn to the archipelago. The main commodities of interest were nutmeg, cloves, and pepper. At first, Portuguese traders tried to establish trade monopolies in Maluku; followed later by British and Dutch traders but eventually it was the Dutch who established themselves as the colonial power on Java. Subsequently they extended their power to the outer islands including the entire territory of what is known as Indonesia today (s. figure 1).¹⁰⁸




Figure 1: Map of Indonesia.

The trade and the geographical position of Indonesia have without doubt influenced its population and the development of its societies. Due to the fact that Indonesia consists of

¹⁰⁷ Ricklefs, 1993, pp. 3-14.

¹⁰⁸ Ricklefs, 1993, pp. 22-24.

numerous islands populated in surges over the centuries, it has never been a closed society – on the contrary, the islands have been heavily influenced by foreign cultures, albeit to different extents. The first trade contacts involving Indian kingdoms, China as well as Arab countries already introduced foreigners to the archipelago during the initial stage of the development of its societies. Multi-ethnicity and multiculturalism have thus played an important role throughout its history. Due to its maritime location, the archipelago became an attractive destination for traders from different origins, including Chinese merchants some of whom settled permanently.

It is important to note that none of the ancient kingdoms entirely covered the current territory of Indonesia. Even the Dutch could only extend their power to the country's current boundaries by the early 20th century. Therefore, although strong regional identities developed over centuries a sense of a national identity encompassing all islands of today's Indonesia only emerged and developed during the fight for independence from the Dutch during the 20th century.

Chinese Settlers and Their Role in Local Societies

Trade brought the first Chinese settlers to the archipelago and established nearly 1000 years of trade relationship, as well as cultural exchange, between China and what is today Indonesia (mainly Java). Liem states that Chinese traders made their way to Java as early as the Tang-Dynasty (618-907 A.D.) and started establishing trading routes.¹⁰⁹ The first comprehensive descriptions of Chinese settlements and trading centers on Java can be found in Admiral Zheng He's travel reports of his journeys during the Ming-Dynasty (1368-1644 A.D.) under the Yongle Emperor (1403-1425 A.D.). These trips intensified trade relations and led to the first migration wave and the founding of more settlements on Java by Chinese merchants.¹¹⁰

Anthony Reid has termed the pre-colonial era the age of commerce.¹¹¹ Commerce or trade was the main reason for Chinese merchants to migrate and to either commute between Java and China or to move entirely to Java. The majority of these merchants who immigrated to Indonesia mainly came from the southern provinces of China – namely *Fujian* and *Guangdong* (s. figure 2).

¹⁰⁹ Liem, 1986, p. 94.

¹¹⁰ Somers-Heidhues, 1974, p. 6; Liem, 1986, p. 85ff.

¹¹¹ Reid, 1988, title.



Figure 2: Map of the People's Republic of China. *Fujian* and *Guangdong* (marked in red and blue)¹¹²

Building on the knowledge obtained by Admiral Zheng He, Chinese sailors established trade routes with the coastal regions of Java despite imperial edicts aimed at restraining overseas trade. Commercial cities with an increasing Chinese population developed first to facilitate off-shore production associated with Chinese industries during the period of market development in Southeast Asia. The Chinese grew sugar in West Java, peppers in Riau and Ha Tinh in modern-day Vietnam, and traded specialty foods used for medicines and Chinese feasts and exported them to Southern China. Furthermore, Chinese mined gold in West Kalimantan.¹¹³ The Chinese market was the primary market for Southeast Asian goods at that time.¹¹⁴ Chinese

¹¹² www.weltkarte.com, public domain.

¹¹³ Taylor, 2005, p.153.

¹¹⁴ Reid, 1999, p. 464.

merchants had the means and necessary connections for trade with China and thus acted as agents, an occupational niche which could not have been filled by the indigenous population. Chua states that the reason why trade had not been monopolized by locals was because the profession of a merchant was either not known or not respectable in the traditional Hindu-Javanese society, leaving the Chinese a vacant position to fill within these communities.¹¹⁵ Unfortunately, no further evidence to support this hypothesis could be found. However, at least for overseas trade it could be argued that since the local population had not been involved in overseas trade before the arrival of foreign traders like the Chinese or the Arabs, they were lacking the required experience in sailing as well as in trading with foreign countries. Due to their advantageous experience, it was a logical step for local rulers to appoint Chinese as intermediaries between them and the Chinese market. As such, the ethnic Chinese started to fill an occupational niche in local society and emerged as a new social class whose members would often work directly for or with local rulers. A Chinese merchant class that interacted closely with the local rulers or elite constitutes a pattern that has prevailed throughout Indonesian history. The existence of a Chinese merchant class certainly hindered the emerging of a local/indigenous merchant class especially with regard to overseas-trade, even if it did not prevent it entirely. Having a class of their own may have also hindered something else: the full social integration¹¹⁶ or absorption of Chinese into indigenous society.

Were the Chinese from the outset an exclusive ethnic group at the margins of society? Whether or not the Chinese merchant settlers were integrated in full or whether they were just tolerated as sojourners in pre-colonial times is indeed difficult to assess due to the limited historical material available. However, apart from their occupational niche, there is another indicator of social integration that can be assessed to some extent: intermarriage (exogamy). Since the influxes of Chinese consisted mainly of men coming to the Indonesian archipelago to work, those who decided to settle permanently married local women. The offspring of these marriages were later named *Peranakan* – meaning ‘children of the country’ or ‘descendants’ (indicating a

¹¹⁵ Chua-Franz, 2002, p.63.

¹¹⁶ Integration is a widely discussed term in social science. Representatives of systems theory (Luhmann (1985) and Nassehi (1999) e.g.) even argue that the term itself should be replaced by the term “inclusion” into partial systems (of society). There are different concepts about integration ranging from next-to-assimilation to multiculturalism and hybridism. In this context, being integrated means to be fully accepted as part of the local society. To be able to actually measure the degree of integration of the ethnic Chinese, it would be necessary to develop indicators for data collection for this case based on a multidimensional approach covering economic, social and political measures, Cf. Council of Europe, 1995, p. 175. Data would have to be collected consistently over a sufficient length of time. Further, one has to evaluate in fact two social processes (two points of view): the minority as well as the host society has to be taken into account.

person of mixed ancestry, where one ancestor was indigenous to the archipelago). Historical accounts recount biographies of Chinese migrants who achieved higher social or political positions due to intermarriage with women from respectable indigenous families.¹¹⁷

However, since none of the sources provide the numbers of intermarriages, it is impossible to generally conclude that intermarriages were common, and thus underlining a high degree of integration of the Chinese into Indonesian society in pre-colonial times. It is also possible that the Chinese had serious problems being accepted by the local population and that the available accounts dealt with exceptional cases. Nevertheless, they show that intermarriages – even on higher social levels – were generally possible at the time. Chinese were therefore not excluded per se from broader society and marrying a Chinese was not necessarily considered a social descent for locals. If there was a degree of social exclusion or segregation, it was a permeable barrier and allowed for social mobility.

Arrival of Islam

From the 16th century onwards, Islam spread in Indonesia, not only bringing with it a change in religion but also social change. Although Admiral Zheng He and his crew were Muslims and were among the early Muslims who spread Islam in its initial stage,¹¹⁸ the majority of ethnic Chinese who arrived due to the intensification of trade relations were not. The more local society turned to Islam, the more difficult it became for non-Muslim Chinese migrants to marry into society. Once a family had converted to Islam, the daughters of that family were forbidden to marry a non-Muslim since the religion of the offspring is determined by the father's religion in Islamic tradition. Therefore, male Muslims would have been allowed to marry non-Islamic women, but not the other way round. As a consequence, social mobility for Chinese men became restricted: Chinese men could no longer gain access to higher levels of society – let alone the ruling class – by marriage. Only girls of Chinese ancestry could marry into Muslim families, but they were often left with the status of second-wives or concubines with little chance of improving their own blood families' social status.¹¹⁹

To overcome these social limitations set by religion, those Chinese who intended to stay and to integrate into society would be required to follow the trend and convert to Islam. No historical

¹¹⁷ Liem, 1986, p. 110-111; Taylor, 2005, p.150.

¹¹⁸ Liem, 1986, p. 117ff quoting from Slametmuljana's book *Runtuhnya Kerajaan Hindu-Jawa dan Timbulnya Negara-negara Islam di Nusantara* (The Fall of the Javanese-Hindu Kingdoms and the Rise of the Islamic States in the Archipelago), 1968. Taylor states that even if the Chinese were not acting directly as Muslim missionaries converting parts of the population, they have indirectly helped the spreading of Islam by providing trading infrastructure and attracting Islamic traders. Taylor, 2005, pp. 152ff.

¹¹⁹ Taylor, 2005, p.158.

sources on Chinese converting to Islam could be found. Thus, adopting a ‘new’ religion together with the locals would have been another useful strategy and indicator towards the integration of the Chinese. The fact that the Dutch encountered a socially distinct group of ethnic Chinese when they arrived at the archipelago, however, suggests that the ethnic Chinese did not, for the most part, convert to Islam. One can conclude that the introduction and spread of Islam in Indonesia and its establishment throughout the country enhanced the marginalization of the Chinese. Islam as a dominant religion is still important today as supra-regional element to the archipelago. Even though the practices of Islam differ between regions, it has a major influence on the social setting in today’s Indonesia as well as on the conflict formation between ethnic Chinese and parts of the indigenous population.

Thus, while a few prominent Muslim Chinese (e.g. Admiral Zheng He) engaged in shaping the Muslim society of today’s Indonesia by either directly introducing or helping to spread Islam, this did not improve the social integration of the ethnic group as a whole. On the contrary, due to the fact that most Chinese immigrants who came to the islands were not Muslims, Islam as the new dominant religion proved to have a negative effect on the overall integration process. Together with their specialized occupation as merchants, the foundation for an exclusive and marginalized position of ethnic Chinese in Indonesian society was already laid in this early period of their history.

2.2 Colonial Times: Ethnic Chinese as Middlemen Minority under Colonial Powers

Towards the end of the 16th century (1595/6) a Dutch expedition under van Houtman arrived in Indonesia and in 1602 the East Indian Company – later United East Indian Company (*Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie* - VOC) – was established to handle trade in the name of the Dutch government.¹²⁰ The VOC was more than merely a trading company – it was granted a monopoly to carry out colonial activities by the Dutch government and was thereby provided with quasi-governmental powers, including the ability to wage war, imprison and execute convicts, negotiate treaties, coin money, and establish colonies.¹²¹ *Jacatra* – later *Batavia* and today’s *Jakarta* – became the main trading centre of the Dutch.

In 1800, the company went bankrupt and was formally dissolved. Its possessions and debts were taken over by the government of the Dutch Batavian Republic and the territories became

¹²⁰ Liem, 1986, p.126.

¹²¹ Glenn, 2008, pp. 102ff.

the Dutch East Indies. Over the course of the 19th century, further territories were conquered and by the beginning of the 20th century, the Dutch East Indies included almost the whole of the archipelago. Apart from the Dutch, the Portuguese, the British and the Japanese also had set foot on the archipelago as colonial powers but only for short periods of time. In 1945, the nation-state of Indonesia was declared by its first President Soekarno. The period from 1602 – 1945 therefore constitutes Indonesia's colonial period.

Instrumentalization of Ethnic Chinese for a 'Divide-et-Impera' Approach

Since the VOC needed infrastructure for successful trading, they required middlemen to expand their influence into the inner regions of Java. Forming a close relationship with the ethnic Chinese proved to be the easiest and quickest way for the Dutch to gain access to an already existing trade infrastructure. The ethnic Chinese were known as both diligent traders and workers, and at that time more than 2000 were living in Banten, an economic centre for pepper trade on the Northwest coast of Java, where they had already established themselves as successful distributors (middlemen) and formed the local merchant class.

The Dutch therefore aimed at attracting these ethnic Chinese into their operational centre, Batavia. However, peaceful attempts to lure them to Batavia failed. The Sultan of Banten who had come to value the ethnic Chinese merchants had offered attractive economic prospects to persuade them to stay. It was only after the Dutch imposed a total blockade leading to the crash of the economy in Banten that ethnic Chinese merchants were forced to move to Batavia to further pursue trading activities.¹²² However, the ethnic Chinese from Banten were too few to fulfil the needs of the Dutch. To increase the number of Chinese in Java, more Chinese from the Chinese mainland were introduced (lured and/or kidnapped) to Batavia to populate the city.¹²³ Eventually, the Dutch successfully established Batavia as the economic centre of Java and solidified their position as an economical power in the archipelago.

In addition to their experience and established trading networks, employing ethnic Chinese was beneficial to the Dutch for another reason. As the Dutch presence was very limited in numbers, they required middlemen to not only act as agents but also to take over bureaucratic tasks. A minority group that took over brokering roles was perceived to be less threatening to the colonialists than to empower the local indigenous elite – as long as the middlemen minority could be separated as a distinct group and restricted to their (economical) area of influence. As ethnic outsiders with a specialized occupation who did not even share the religious belief of the

¹²² Liem, 1986, pp.130-1.

¹²³ Chua-Franz, 2002, p.64.

majority population the distinctiveness of the ethnic Chinese was easy to cultivate and maintain, making them suitable middlemen. The Dutch were thus able to instrumentalize the distinctiveness of the ethnic Chinese and the resulting special and exclusive position within the existing political and economical structures for their colonial ‘divide-et-impera’ approach to gain and later keep control over the archipelago. Keeping the ethnic Chinese separated from other groups proved to be essential for the success of this approach and resulted in a social pyramid with the Dutch on top, the ethnic Chinese in the middle, and the indigenous population on the bottom.




Figure 3: The Social Pyramid (Indonesia, during colonial times)¹²⁴

As overseas trade began to flourish at the beginning of the 18th century, it became increasingly attractive for the Chinese – in particular from the Southern provinces of China – to migrate to Java. Push-factors such as famines, floods, overpopulation, and civil wars in China and pull-factors such as established trade connections to the region along with working opportunities in industries producing for the Chinese market led to an increase in the Chinese population, reaching approximately 80,000 people in the 1730s.¹²⁵ Although the increase in Chinese settlers was at first welcomed by the Dutch colonists, the situation changed markedly when the growth of the Chinese population became unmanageable for the Dutch as the Chinese started to spread over the islands to pursue their own economic interests.

The Dutch took steps to regain control by introducing administrative measures such as a poll tax, along with restrictions on the right to settle, a ban on owning agricultural land, deportation, and

¹²⁴ Based on Heidhues, 1974, p. 18.

¹²⁵ Chua-Franz, 2002, p.65.

the discharge of Chinese workers. The Dutch – as a small group of people – wanted *Batavia* to remain the sole economic centre of the region as they did not have the resource ability to control more than one economic centre. Had the Chinese mingled with other local groups in the inner country and established other economic centres, the Dutch would not only have lost their services as a separate and distinct merchant middlemen class, but also lost control over the country's economy. Therefore, the Dutch needed to prevent them from migrating to other islands and from integrating into local societies to maintain control, in a classic 'divide-et-impera' fashion.

Despite the regulatory measures introduced by the Dutch, many Chinese continued to settle in the inner regions of Java and even took part in local rebellions against the Dutch.¹²⁶ The ethnic Chinese could no longer be regarded as reliable 'economic helpers' but as competitors. In order to deal with illegal immigrants from China so-called 'permissiebriefjes' (residence permits) were imposed in 1738. Whoever was caught without a residence permit was to be arrested and deported to Ceylon as a slave.¹²⁷ The growing dissatisfaction of the Chinese towards these measures was known by the Dutch VOC administration. Warnings of a possible Chinese rebellion as well as the general economic advances made by the Chinese led to the massacre of Batavia in 1740. On October 7, hundreds of Chinese (most of them were mill-workers) killed 50 Dutch soldiers. As a consequence, the Dutch dispatched troops as they expected a Chinese revolt, imposed a curfew and cancelled plans for a Chinese festival. Dutch troops searched Chinese houses in Batavia and confiscated any weapons. Two days later, rumours about possible attacks by Chinese led to pre-emptive burning of Chinese houses and killing of the Chinese by Dutch troops and bolstered other ethnic groups living in Batavia who acted on rumours that the Chinese were plotting on killing and enslaving them. Almost the entire Chinese population of Batavia, comprising around 10,000, were killed during the violence inside the city which lasted until October 22, 1740.¹²⁸ In the long history of physical violent acts against the Chinese in the archipelago, this was the first documented large-scale incident.

However, the Dutch were very aware of the fact that they were depended on such middlemen for their economic activities. They recruited (new) Chinese again for Batavia while at the same time they further constrained the economic power of the Chinese by acts of repression. To improve the control over the Chinese from the outset, Chinese ghettos were built.¹²⁹ Due to the establishment

¹²⁶ Liem, 1986, pp. 137-8.

¹²⁷ Blussé, 1986, p. 94.

¹²⁸ Setiono, 2008, pp. 111ff. Liem, 1986, pp. 134ff.

¹²⁹ Somers-Heidhues, 1998, p. 152.

of these Chinese ghettos (Chinatowns), ethnic Chinese who were already in various stages of integration were subsequently brought together reversing the successful integration of at least a section of the community. It further prevented ethnic Chinese from gaining roots in Indonesian society and instead enhanced their position as a distinct and separate group. This aided the development of the unique status of the ethnic Chinese, not only economically, but also socially and culturally. As a consequence, the Chinese minority's cohesion grew and any differentiating factors, such as Chinese religions, language and traditions were further cultivated – a development typical for suppressed middlemen minorities. Middlemen are therefore more likely than low-status minorities to remain perpetual minorities.¹³⁰ Preserving a distinct cultural heritage helps to maintain the competitive resource from one generation to the next. Paradoxically, this thinking which reflects an individual's interest in giving a competitive advantage to his or her own children can result in long-term disadvantages for the minority group as a whole.¹³¹ Therefore, the establishment of Chinatowns during the colonial era became part of the cause for later integration problems which the ethnic Chinese have encountered since.

After the VOC was officially dissolved in 1800, ethnic Chinese managed to replace the VOC in parts of the economic sphere of influence and began dominating the markets on Java.¹³² For the Dutch, the objectives of colonialism shifted from trade to the exploitation of raw materials. This change required a more effective administrative framework and economic infrastructure. Again, the small number of Dutch was not able to handle the new tasks on their own. The Dutch decided to sell local administrative rights (e.g. taxation) in order to subsidise their own administration costs. These rights were sold to members of a group that had already performed bureaucratic tasks for them and that they had already successfully separated from the majority of society: the ethnic Chinese. The only other group capable of buying these rights and working as administrators for the Dutch would have been the Javanese aristocrats. However, the risk that the aristocrats could have turned against the colonial masters with the support of the local people posed a considerable threat to the rule of the Dutch.¹³³

The sovereign right of tax collection and revenue farming were thus sub-contracted to already wealthy and well-connected Chinese businessmen. By doing this, the Dutch did not have to invest their own capital, nor bankroll an existing bureaucracy, and moreover, they did not have

¹³⁰ Blalock, 1967, p. 84.

¹³¹ Blalock, 1967, p. 84.

¹³² Chua-Franz, 2002, p. 69.

¹³³ Reid, 1993, p. 78.

to conduct these rather ‘unpopular’ tasks themselves. Again, even though for the individual and the direct family, working as administrator for the Dutch had considerable economic advantages, it had negative consequences for the ethnic group as a whole. Ethnic Chinese were thus not only considered to be different and foreign, but also associated with the ‘dirty work’ they conducted on behalf of the Dutch. This expanded the social gap between the indigenous communities and the ethnic Chinese – creating and establishing negative stereotypes¹³⁴ of Chinese in general which have prevailed until today.

When referring to ethnic Chinese merchants, it is important to distinguish between petty traders and businessmen. Only the elite of the ethnic Chinese business community was able to play a role in the colonial system.¹³⁵ Wealth and political connections were the basis for an appointment as a revenue farmer or tax collector. In turn, such positions intensified the concentration of economic and political power held by a few ethnic Chinese and were beyond the reach of most members of the community.¹³⁶ Those ethnic Chinese who gained such positions were able to accumulate wealth through different channels: as tax collectors, through opium farming, gambling dens, pawnshops, or as financiers and bankers of the rural population. Due to this combination of economic and bureaucratic power, these ethnic Chinese managed to control the entire internal rice market and general trade, eliminating many of the indigenous trading communities by the end of the 18th century.¹³⁷

According to Ramanathan, some of these rich and powerful ethnic Chinese abused their positions of responsibility and exploited indigenous Indonesians. Although this was only true

¹³⁴According to O’Sullivan and Durso, stereotypes are created by attributing specific traits and characteristics to a certain group. They are cognitive frameworks influencing the processing of incoming social information by overstressing or simply acknowledging information which is consistent with the stereotypes (O’Sullivan & Durso, 1984). Stereotypes can be described as ‘inferential prisons’ - even when information inconsistent with the stereotype is encountered, tacit inferences are made to change the information in a way that it fits the stereotype again (Dunning & Sherman, 1997, p. 459). In general, stereotypes do not have to be negative. They can also be positive or neutral. Like prejudice, stereotypes can derive from social learning – they may be transferred from generation to generation within one society or result from information and experience gathered by an individual about members of a certain social group (Degner, Meiser, Rothermund, 2009, pp. 76-77). When assuming that stereotypes can be learned, transmitted, and changed through indirect sources (parents, peers, political and religious leaders and the mass media), language plays an important role as a way of transferring them. It is therefore often in the focus of respective cultural approaches (Stangor & Schaller, 1996, p. 10). While prejudice is a developed attitude towards one group, stereotyping allows for the grouping as such. By bundling information such as certain traits and characteristics which are attributed to a one particular group, members of this group are then perceived to be homogeneous carriers of these traits and characteristics. As a consequence, the negative attitude (prejudice) can then be directed against every member of this particular group. The prejudices are then justified by referring to the traits assigned to the stereotype.

¹³⁵ Fernando & Bulbeck, 1992, p. 77.

¹³⁶ Onghokham, 2003, p. 189.

¹³⁷ Ramanathan, 1994, p. 71.

for a small group of ethnic Chinese, negative stereotypes of the greedy, ruthless money lenders and helpers of the colonial masters developed and were soon regarded as being valid for all Chinese. In contrast to pre-colonial times, the degree of integration at this time can be expected to have been considerably lower, not only because of the evolving negative image of the ethnic Chinese. As the new situation improved the economic prospects for the ethnic Chinese, especially for those who had arrived during colonial times, they did not orientate themselves towards the poorer local population as assimilation with the indigenous population at this point in time would instead have meant a decline in their social status.¹³⁸

In 1811, the Netherlands were conquered by France; the British took their chances and landed on Java under Sir Stamford Raffles who became the new governor of Java until the Dutch returned in 1816. The British enforced a number of reforms curbing the privileges of the ethnic Chinese such as abolishing their monopoly rights, leading to a more direct rule by the colonial masters. Although those measures were not fully implemented during the short period of British reign, a number of Chinese landowners were dispossessed.¹³⁹

After the Dutch regained power, they adopted some of the reforms the British had enforced and added further reforms themselves under the so-called 'ethical policy'. This policy was officially aimed at improving the living conditions of the indigenous people, but at the same time directed against the increasing commercial influence of the ethnic Chinese which was perceived as a major threat for the Dutch authorities by that time. The Chinese were no longer perceived as allies by the Dutch but rather as serious competitors, even as 'the foremost enemies' of the state.¹⁴⁰ As a consequence, the rights and privileges of the ethnic Chinese were restricted and regulated, including the rights to settle, to travel, and to work. The opium farming system was replaced by a government monopoly.¹⁴¹

In order to reduce their dependence on only the ethnic Chinese, the Dutch also turned to the local aristocracy to recruit administrators. Some of the privileges and tasks previously given to the ethnic Chinese were then transferred on to the local aristocracy. To strengthen the power of the aristocrats, territories formerly annexed by the Dutch were returned.¹⁴² However, the administrative and economic system still depended on the Chinese, their investments, taxes,

¹³⁸ Ramanathan, 1994, p. 64.

¹³⁹ Liem, 1986, p.154.

¹⁴⁰ Gie, 1992, p. 14; Coppel, 2004, p. 22.

¹⁴¹ Coppel, 2004, p. 22. However, the ethnic Chinese did not cease their business activities when their monopoly rights were revoked. They continued illegally and therefore organized self-governing groups (like the *Kongsis* in West Kalimantan) for illegal activities (like gambling, smuggling), and illicit opium trade. The *Kongsis* even organized their self-defence against the Dutch until they were finally broken up by the Dutch in the 1830s. s. Ramanathan, 1994, p. 71; Liem, 1986, p. 176.

¹⁴² Liem 1986, p.157.

revenue collections, and trade activities. They had become indispensable for running the country's economy and administration. The strengthening of the local aristocracy in the course of the 'ethical policy' was not aimed at fully replacing the ethnic Chinese in the system but rather aimed at reducing their power and influence without empowering the local aristocracy to a degree where they could pose a threat to Dutch rule.

Over the course of the colonial period, the ethnic Chinese were established as marginalized middlemen – not only economically, but also socially. The colonial rule of the Dutch imposed a social structure on the archipelago that has in part prevailed until today. As a middlemen minority, ethnic Chinese were prevented from moving socially upwards or downwards by economical incentives as well as punishments (raids, discriminatory laws and the forcing into ghettos) and kept in a marginalized position in society. This position was ambivalent: on the one hand, the ethnic Chinese were dependent upon the Dutch for their positions and titles which had not been earned but rather been bestowed upon them. In saying that, the Dutch also needed them as merchants and administrators. In their functions for the Dutch, the ethnic Chinese nurtured a colonial power that, in the end, found it expedient to place restraints on their economic role. Even though both parties were dependent upon each other, it was the Dutch who proved to be the more powerful partner in this symbiosis since they could regulate the social and economical influence of the ethnic Chinese.

On the other hand, the integration process of the ethnic Chinese into the indigenous population was hindered. To ensure this, it was important for the Dutch elite to stress the distinctiveness of the ethnic Chinese to the local population as well as to the ethnic Chinese themselves. Stereotypes stemming from negative examples of the ethnic Chinese community, their image as collaborators and the fact that contact between locals and ethnic Chinese was reduced due to the ghetto system resulted in anti-Chinese sentiment among the indigenous population. Being aware of their 'otherness', the special privileges granted by the elite, and the reluctance of the local population to regard them as an integral part of East Indies society, made a Chinese identity the only one they were allowed and willing to accept. Marginalisation was thus cemented and ethnic Chinese successfully prevented from either moving towards the top or towards the bottom of the social pyramid – both economically as well as socially. In conclusion, ethnic segregation ('divide et impera') as intended by the Dutch was successfully established at this point, enabling the colonials to remain the dominant group despite of their small numbers.

Ethnic Chinese: Not Only Helpers of Colonial Masters

The image of the ethnic Chinese as collaborators of the Dutch is a dominant one. However, not all of them were working for the Dutch nor did all of them support or benefit from colonial rule. Those who suffered under the Dutch rule probably suffered more than the indigenous population due to the additional restrictions and suppressive measures specifically directed against the ethnic Chinese. Anti-Dutch resistance by the Chinese minority took on various forms, including violent physical uprisings as well as the founding of nationalist organisations, a nationalist press, and Chinese political parties. The latter actions being inspired by the rise of nationalism in China and even though these were mainly initiated to help the situation of the ethnic Chinese, they also indirectly influenced the indigenous population in their struggle for independence.

The participation of ethnic Chinese in anti-colonial uprisings as well as their suffering under colonial rule are a neglected chapter in Indonesian history. Nevertheless, a few records exist that deal with revolts initiated by the Chinese due to the restrictions against them during the implementation of the 'ethical policy' between 1825 and 1851.¹⁴³ However, the imposed restrictions, such as the forcing of ethnic Chinese to live in ghettos, the suppressive regulations on occupation, free movement, the break-up of Chinese organizations which constituted their social and economic structures, the agricultural law of 1870 which prohibited the transfer of land from 'natives' to Europeans or other 'foreigners' (like the Chinese or Arabs),¹⁴⁴ as well as direct violent acts against the Chinese minority are rarely mentioned in Indonesian history writings. This might be due to the persistent image of ethnic Chinese as collaborators of the Dutch and the fact that they were classified as foreigners (foreign Orientals) by the Dutch in contrast to indigenous Indonesians. Thus, it is not entirely surprising that Chinese conflicts with the Dutch were not considered noteworthy by indigenous historians and only incidents directed against the indigenous population and their sufferings under colonial rule are part of the regular school curricula in Indonesia today.¹⁴⁵

Apart from direct revolts against the colonial rule, ethnic Chinese inspired by mainland Chinese nationalism started setting up the *Tiong Hwa Hwe Kuan* (THHK – Chinese organisation), the *Siang Hwee* (the Chinese Chamber of Commerce), the Chinese newspaper *Sin Po*, and Chinese political parties. The THHK opened Chinese schools promoting Chinese values of Confucianism

¹⁴³ Liem, 1986, p.160.

¹⁴⁴ Gie, 1992, p. 13; Ramanathan, 1994, p. 66; Coppel, 2004, p. 21.

¹⁴⁵ Acc. to several (mainly Chinese Indonesian) interviewees, e.g. Protus Tanuhandaru (02.09.2008).

which proved to be a very effective in maintaining a sense for Chinese heritage.¹⁴⁶ The pride in being Chinese was awakened and many re-sinicized¹⁴⁷ ethnic Chinese started to orientate themselves politically towards China.

In the 1920s ethnic Chinese nationalist organizations co-operated with Indonesian nationalist organizations under the banner of Pan-Asianism to free Indonesia from colonialism. When ethnic Chinese organisations promoting nationalist thoughts started influencing other indigenous Indonesian groups¹⁴⁸, the Dutch started lifting restrictions against the ethnic Chinese. The limitations on the right of movement were abolished and civil rights were granted after 1911. Instead of scapegoating the ethnic Chinese for the misery of the indigenous population and cutting back the influence of the Chinese merchants, the Dutch sought to win them over as allies again. These measures were clearly designed to appease the ethnic Chinese, to reduce the influence of Chinese nationalism, and to turn them into loyal Dutch subjects. Chinese were even given seats in the *Volksraad*, a mainly consultative organ established in 1918.¹⁴⁹

The ethnic Chinese organizations and parties shared a common (positive) view of Chinese culture and a Chinese heritage, however, it is important to note that they did not all share the same vision and approaches to improve the situation of the ethnic Chinese in the Dutch-Indies. Three concepts can be distinguished: the colonial, the kinship and the independent concept:

- The colonial concept was orientated towards the Dutch and its followers tried to play a more active role in the political system of the colony (in the *Volksraad*, e.g.). Supporters of this concept were mainly Dutch-educated peranakan professionals and businessman. They established the *Chung Hwa Hui* which advocated the acceptance of Dutch Nationality and active participation in the colonial administration.¹⁵⁰ This group consisted of ethnic Chinese who already worked for the Dutch administration and who then established associations such as the *Chung Hwa Hui* (Chinese Association) (established in 1928). This organization promoted a purely cultural relationship with China and loyalty towards the Dutch. It aimed at achieving equal legal status with the

¹⁴⁶ Wang & Cushman, 1988, p. 33.

¹⁴⁷ 'Re-sinicization' refers to efforts to make Chinese Indonesians aware of and revive their cultural heritage after a long time of suppression.

¹⁴⁸ Coppel, 1976, p. 28.

¹⁴⁹ Coppel, 1976, p. 27 ; Liem, 1986. p. 356-7.

¹⁵⁰ Suryadinata, 1999, p. xv.

Dutch for ethnic Chinese and strongly encouraged its members to work for the prosperity of the archipelago under Dutch rule.¹⁵¹

- The kinship concept was orientated towards China politically, counting on the ‘motherland’ for protection. This was supported by a group of ethnic Chinese who had incorporated the anti-colonial resentments strongly enough to openly oppose the Dutch¹⁵². The *Sin Po* newspaper (mentioned above)¹⁵³ in which anti-Dutch feelings were openly expressed belonged to this strand. Its members wanted to maintain ties to China as the ‘motherland’, cherish Chinese Nationalism, but also support Indonesian nationalism.¹⁵⁴
- The independent concept supported the nascent Indonesian independence movement and hoped for an equal status among the other Indonesian indigenous people. Later, supporters of this concept founded a political party called Chinese Indonesian Party (PTI, *Partai Tionghoa Indonesia*) in 1932. In contrast to the *Sin Po* group, the PTI strongly supported Indonesia’s independence and a common citizenship for all ethnic groups – urging the ethnic Chinese to leave behind Chinese Nationalism, however, without abandoning their Chinese culture heritage.¹⁵⁵

The first two strands did not help to improve the image of the ethnic Chinese among the local population and the local political parties due to their orientation towards either the Dutch colonists or the Chinese motherland. The third strand – even though supporting Indonesian independence and trying to blend into the national picture of a new Indonesia – failed due to the already long-established segregation between ethnic Chinese and indigenous people. It should also be kept in mind that there were also Chinese who did not belong to any of these categories, who were apolitical or subscribed themselves to other political movements, e.g. the communist movement that did not focus on nationalism.

¹⁵¹ Ramanathan, 1994, p.76; Coppel, 1976, p. 32-33; Suryadinata, 1999, p. 33ff.

¹⁵² The Chung Hwa Hui blamed supporters of this concept for misleading other ethnic Chinese in the Indies by directing their orientation towards China. Kan Ho Hoei (1881-1951) who was elected president of the Chung Hwa Hui from its beginning until its dissolution in 1942 and appointed Governor-General as a representative of the Chinese in the Volksraad, stated in an article in 1928, that China had not and would not press the Dutch to provide the ethnic Chinese with more equality and rights as it would not want to do what it disliked foreigners doing in China. Due to an immense rise in population over the last decades, China would not be likely to welcome them, since many were unskilled workers who could neither speak nor read Chinese. They would rather add to China’s problems and might end up starving in China. s. Suryadinata, 1999, p. 45ff.

¹⁵³ Due to the strong association with the newspaper, this group was also referred to as the *Sin Po* group.

¹⁵⁴ Suryadinata, 1999, p. xiv – xv.

¹⁵⁵ Although Liem Koen Hian, the first president of the party, believed that when the time came the process of full absorption of the ethnic Chinese into the Indonesian population could not be stopped: Suryadinata, 1999, p. 54; Coppel, 1976, p. 35-6.

There were also individual ethnic Chinese who sought to contribute to the independence movement but who were excluded from participating in the significant political parties. Early in his political career, the later president Soekarno had refused to admit ethnic Chinese (even *Peranakan* Chinese) to his National Party of Indonesia (PNI, *Partai Nasional Indonesia*, founded in 1927). He did not consider them to be a part of the Indonesian nation-to-be. Other parties such as the Socialist Party of Indonesia (PSI, *Partai Sosialis Indonesia*) and the People's Party of Indonesia (PIR, *Partai Indonesia Raya*) also stated that its members should be indigenous as distinct from non-indigenous groups. Indigenous groups should explicitly be favoured, and given special privileged treatment to protect them from alien economic exploitation.¹⁵⁶ This clearly excluded ethnic Chinese from participating in the most influential political parties. The under-representation of ethnic Chinese in these parties further fostered the alienation of ethnic Chinese.

Birth of the Indonesian Nation-State: Without Ethnic Chinese

During World War II Imperial Japan occupied the Dutch East Indies from March 1942 until the end of World War II in 1945. Being themselves under German occupation, the Dutch had little ability to defend the colony against the Japanese Imperial Forces. Within only two months, the Japanese navy and army overran the Dutch armed forces, ending 300 years of Dutch colonial presence. In 1944–45, Allied troops largely by-passed the archipelago and did not fight their way into the islands – not even populous islands like Java or Sumatra. As such, most of the islands were still under Japanese occupation when Japan surrendered in August 1945.

Initially the Japanese were welcomed by the Indonesians as liberators. However, later tens of thousands of Indonesians were to die of starvation and forced to work as slave laborers away from their homes serving Japanese war needs. The Japanese encouraged local nationalist movements across Southeast Asia and the Indonesian independence movement increased in popularity during this time – especially on Java. The Japanese created new Indonesian institutions and promoted nationalist leaders like Soekarno. In July 1942, Soekarno accepted Japan's offer to rally the public in support of the Japanese war effort. As a reward both Soekarno and Mohammad Hatta, the later vice-president, were decorated by the Emperor of Japan in 1943. The Japanese regime perceived Java as being the most politically sophisticated but as the least important area economically; its people were Japan's main resource. The outer

¹⁵⁶ Coppel, 1983, p.16; Ramanathan, 1994, p. 76.

islands, which were administered by the Imperial Navy, on the other hand were regarded as politically backward but economically vital for the Japanese war effort.

The Japanese occupation had several affects on the ethnic Chinese. The closing of Dutch schools forced many ethnic Chinese to send their children to Chinese schools – initiating harmonisation between the less acculturated *Totoks* and the more acculturated *Peranakans*.¹⁵⁷ Chinese nationalism had influenced the ethnic Chinese organizations strongly enough to openly support the mainland Chinese war against the Japanese. For this reason, most of those who were leading Chinese organisations were imprisoned or had to go into hiding¹⁵⁸ and the Chinese organisations were shut down.¹⁵⁹ Especially in the beginning of the occupation, ethnic Chinese were targeted by Japanese and – with their encouragement – by the indigenous population as well. The so-called ‘Pontiniak-Affair’ in October 1943 resulted in large-scale arrests and executions of ‘prominent persons’ to suppress a suspected rebellion. Among the 1,500 people who were killed, 854 were Chinese.¹⁶⁰ The Chinese press was silenced.¹⁶¹

The members of the ethnic Chinese organisations were left without their leaders. As a result the ethnic Chinese on the whole remained rather passive during the important phase of the Independence Movement and many were even surprised by Soekarno’s announcement of Indonesia’s independence in 1945.¹⁶² Since the ethnic Chinese ‘missed’ this crucial moment of the birth of Independent Indonesia, the stereotype of their questionable loyalty was enforced and they were perceived by the local population as generally not being interested in the nation-state of Indonesia. Furthermore, the perceived unity of the ethnic Chinese against the Japanese deepened the impression of them as a homogenous and oppositional group of ‘Others’.

Some of the ethnic Chinese abused the prevailing chaos by indulging in black-marketing, smuggling, and other illegal activities which harmed the local population, leading to attacks against the Chinese communities regardless their involvement. In 1946 an anti-Chinese incident took place in Tangerang which resulted in the killing of more than six hundred Chinese¹⁶³ and an exodus of Chinese from rural areas to the more secure urban areas. In order to protect themselves, the ethnic Chinese established a self-protection force called *Pao An Tui*. Since this body was armed by the Dutch, it appeared to the indigenous to be pro-Dutch and anti-

¹⁵⁷ Liem, 1986, p. 362.

¹⁵⁸ Ramanathan, 1994, p.73.

¹⁵⁹ Ramanathan, 1994, p.73.

¹⁶⁰ Purdey, 2006, p. 7.

¹⁶¹ Coppel, 1976, p. 39.

¹⁶² Liem, 1986, pp. 362-3.

¹⁶³ Purdey, 2006, p. 7.

revolution, thus leading many indigenous to further resent the ethnic Chinese.¹⁶⁴ In areas already occupied by nationalists, repressive measures and special taxes were enforced to control the ethnic Chinese.¹⁶⁵

The fact that the Chinese had ‘missed the birth of the nation’ and the fact that Mainland China had four years later turned communist made their loyalty more dubious since the nationalist leaders followed bourgeois, nationalist rhetoric.¹⁶⁶ As the ethnic Chinese were the victims of numerous attacks both during and shortly after the Japanese occupation, a reluctance to engage in political activities remained after the Japanese left. This attitude widened the gap between the indigenous population and the ethnic Chinese. Although some of the independence leaders were sympathetic towards the ethnic Chinese, violence directed against them could not be prevented, leading to more hesitation among the ethnic Chinese to actively support the independence movement. Instead, they further retreated to their ethnic community at the margin of society. The independence movement would have been a chance for the ethnic Chinese to leave their marginalized middlemen position and to overcome negative stereotypes and their image of being the foreign ‘others’. Instead, their lack of engagement fuelled an image of them as ‘others’ and they were not regarded as full members of Indonesian society.

2.3 Soekarno’s ‘Old Order’: Ethnic Chinese in the Dawn of the Indonesian Nation-State

The birth of the Indonesian nation-state marked the end of the colonial rule and profoundly changed the lives of the people of the archipelago. However, for the ethnic Chinese, their difficult position at the margin of society did not change for better, but was instead further cemented. At the top of the pyramid, the Dutch were replaced by a group of indigenous Indonesians. Since the young government was lacking economic aptitude, they decided to maintain the social and economical structures of the old regime, leaving the ethnic Chinese capitalists in their position and thus incorporating an essential element of the colonial system (the class structure) into the nascent nation-state. In this social contract based on business cooperation, political protection was given in return for economic cooperation. This information settlement was not a fusion of economic and political power, but a shaky solution for both groups to ensure their survival.¹⁶⁷ However, if it was a decision arising out of

¹⁶⁴ Coppel, 1983, p.25-6.

¹⁶⁵ Ramanathan, 1994, p.77; Coppel, 1976, p. 41.

¹⁶⁶ Wang, 2003, p. 64.

¹⁶⁷ Chua, 2008, p. 50.

convenience that left the ethnic Chinese with economic power at the very beginning of the newly founded state. Having them continue to occupy this position was clearly a political decision.

To give in to the demands of the indigenous population, the government established programs to counter the still existing Dutch and Chinese economic dominance with the intention to alter the economy towards a more self-sufficient industrial economy based on indigenous capital. Programs such as the *benteng* (fortress) program were established in 1950, through which import licenses and credits were only to be given to indigenous importers.¹⁶⁸ It was not only the aim of the program to reduce Dutch and Chinese economic dominance but also to build up an indigenous business class.¹⁶⁹ In 1959, Presidential Regulation No. 10 ruled that alien Chinese were not allowed to conduct retail business outside of urban areas. Even if the ban was not directed at ethnic Chinese who had Indonesian citizenship it also affected them in many cases, since bureaucrats required sufficient proof of citizenship which the ethnic Chinese often could not provide.¹⁷⁰ The efforts to encourage more indigenous to engage in business by restraining the ethnic Chinese only showed moderate success. The *benteng* program could be bypassed by using indigenous license holders as substitutes and Presidential Regulation No. 10 mainly affected small Chinese businesses rather than the well-established Chinese businessmen. The government focused on the lower levels of economy, such as the transfer of ownership of small shops. One of the reasons for this might have been that for small businesses neither required much capital or expertise, thus providing a good starting point for building up an indigenous merchant class.

Another motivating factor was that it was not in the political interest of the new government to build up a powerful indigenous capitalist class. Even though Soekarno wanted to keep his promises of economic nationalism made during the struggle for independence, he did not want to fully eliminate the ethnic Chinese merchant class. Instead of merely concentrating on the lower levels of economy, the government could have transferred Dutch and Chinese businesses to indigenous merchants. However, the government chose to seize them and hand them over to the military to manage. Another indicator is that no significant state credits were given indigenous businessmen who might have helped to build up an indigenous capitalist class.

Like the Dutch before them, the indigenous power-holders obviously did not want a strong indigenous bourgeoisie wielding economic power because they could pose a potential threat to

¹⁶⁸ Thee, 1996, p. 317.

¹⁶⁹ Thee, 2006, p. 80.

¹⁷⁰ Somers-Heidhues, 1974, p. 24-25.

their political power: “The particular importance of indigenous businessmen as opposed to Chinese is essentially political. Whereas a dominant Chinese capitalist class may impose the general interests of capital upon the state, an indigenous capitalist class possesses the potential for direct and public political action. Chinese capital may impose constraints and imperatives upon the policies of the state, but a powerful indigenous capitalist class has the potential to transform the very structure of power.”¹⁷¹

It was thus safer for the power-holders to keep the ethnic Chinese as an economic bourgeoisie since these did not have access (or very limited access) to the state apparatus. Furthermore, getting rid of the ethnic Chinese during the rather chaotic time immediately after the founding of the nation would have caused enormous damage to the Indonesian economy as well as to individual alliances between power-holders and ethnic Chinese businessmen.¹⁷² It was therefore only the former Dutch businesses which were for the most part nationalized and handed over to the military. This, among other factors, helped the military to grow into the most important politico-bureaucratic force in the state. Alliances between generals and ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs were formed; one of the most prominent for the next decades being that of General Soeharto and the ethnic Chinese businessman Liem Soe Liang.

Political Awakening of Ethnic Chinese

In spite of the continuation of the difficult middlemen status and the on-going ‘othering’ during the so-called parliamentary democracy period (1949-58), President Soekarno’s pluralistic approach to nation-building allowed ethnic Chinese to form their own organizations and to become more politically active than during colonial times. The most prominent organization was the *Badan Permusyawaratan Kewarganegaraan Indonesia* (Baperki, the Indonesian citizenship consultative body). The founding of this organization is linked to the issue of citizenship of the ethnic Chinese which had been under debate already towards the end of colonial times. The Citizenship Act of 1946 and the Round Table Agreement 1949 both were promulgated based on the *jus soli* principle and the ‘passive system’ which automatically assigned Indonesian citizenship to those who were born on Indonesian territory and had lived there for a minimum of five years. This resulted in dual citizenship for many ethnic Chinese as according to mainland Chinese law (‘*jus sanguinis*’) all ethnic Chinese were regarded mainland Chinese citizens. Those who did not want to be Indonesian citizens had to officially reject their

¹⁷¹ Robinson, 1986, p. 88.

¹⁷² Robinson, 1986, p. 87.

Indonesian citizenship. Thus, instead of simplifying the situation, this led to a complication of the issue which the government tried to solve.¹⁷³ In 1954 a draft law was introduced in parliament which aimed at changing the system from a 'passive' to an 'active' one. According to the draft law, ethnic Chinese had to officially reject their Chinese citizenship in order to become Indonesian citizens

The citizenship issue in general was more of interest to the government than to the members of the ethnic Chinese or indigenous communities. After the new citizenship act in 1958, the ethnic Chinese had to officially declare that they rejected their Chinese citizenship in order not to lose their Indonesian citizenship within a limited period of time. In a situation of political instability and limited infrastructure this 'active system' which aimed at solving the problem of dual citizenship, however, limited the number of ethnic Chinese who become Indonesian citizens.¹⁷⁴ When the act was fully implemented in 1960, there were two categories of ethnic Chinese: the *Warga Negara Indonesia* (Indonesian citizen, WNI, mainly *peranakans*) and the *Warga Negara Asing* (Foreign citizens, WNA, mainly *totoks*). Nevertheless, it was possible for members of one ethnic Chinese family to have different citizenships.¹⁷⁵ Regardless of their official citizenship status, both WNI as well as WNA of Chinese descent were continuously discriminated against as 'unwanted aliens'.¹⁷⁶ It was the social distinction between indigenous (*pribumi*) and non-indigenous (non-*pribumi*) in society that was important in daily life rather than the legal distinction between citizens and non-citizens.

Ethnic Chinese opposing this draft law founded the Baperki organization to demonstrate that they were indeed interested in their future in Indonesia and were politically conscious.¹⁷⁷ Even if Baperki was founded because of the draft citizenship law, the organization did not focus on this issue alone. The organization was dominated by *peranakans* and promoted political equality in general among all Indonesians regardless of their origin and cultural rights for their ethnic group in particular.¹⁷⁸ They wanted the ethnic Chinese to be treated as another ethnic group (*suku*) in a multi-ethnic Indonesia.¹⁷⁹ Those who did not agree with the orientation of Baperki joined the 'assimilationist' group LPKB (*Lembaga Pembinaan Kesatuan Bangsa*, Institution for Promotion of National Unity) who favored the complete assimilation of the

¹⁷³ For more details on the debate on citizenship of the ethnic Chinese, see Willmott, 1961, p. 16-49, Suryadinata, 1978, p. 113-124.

¹⁷⁴ Willmott, 1961, pp. 25ff.

¹⁷⁵ Wang, 1981, p. 264.

¹⁷⁶ Willmott, 1961, p. 56.

¹⁷⁷ Coppel, 1983, p. 36.

¹⁷⁸ Suryadinata, 2001, p. 504.

¹⁷⁹ Somers-Heidhues, 1974, p. 82.

ethnic Chinese into Indonesian society. They considered ‘Chineseness’ as the reason for and source of discrimination against ethnic Chinese.¹⁸⁰

Soekarno’s Political Shift and Its Consequences

In the course of the 1950s, the influence of the communist party increased in Indonesia. The PKI won 16.4% of the votes in the elections 1955. President Soekarno shifted politically from bourgeois but anti-colonialist and nationalist ideas to socialism and the influence of the PKI within the governmental administration increased. Baperki followed this leftward shift and formed an alliance with Soekarno and the PKI which increased the organization’s political influence significantly.¹⁸¹ Under Siauw Giok Tjhan, Baperki promoted socialism and the idea that with a socialist society ethnicity would not be regarded as important anymore.¹⁸²

The government itself showed a considerably open political attitude towards the ethnic Chinese which might be attributable to the active involvement of the Baperki. However, there were also groups who openly expressed anti-Chinese sentiments. For example, in 1956, Assaat, a businessman and former Minister of the Interior (1950 – 1951) openly demanded discrimination against ethnic Chinese in economic affairs in favor of indigenous Indonesians. He blamed ethnic Chinese for the problems which the Indonesian economy was facing and further called them opportunists beholden to Dutch and mainland Chinese interests. The directness of anti-Chinese sentiments expressed by Assaat, a man of economic and (once) political importance, triggered the establishing of many committees consisting mainly of businessmen throughout the country in support of his ideas.¹⁸³ Even though the so-called Assaat-movement did not achieve its objectives with regard to official economic discrimination against the ethnic Chinese,¹⁸⁴ it verifies that explicitly anti-Chinese organizations were at work. Apart from business associations, the military, whose position in the government had been weakened due to the political rise of the PKI and the Baperki, also took a strong anti-Chinese stance. The Central Army Head Quarters issued a decree in 1959 authorizing regional military commanders to remove aliens from their places of residence for security reasons.¹⁸⁵ Due to the

¹⁸⁰ Suryadinata, 1999, p. xix.

¹⁸¹ In 1963, Soekarno explicitly referred to the *peranakan* Chinese as one of Indonesia’s people (*suku*). Coppel, 1976, p. 57.

¹⁸² Suryadinata, 2001, p. 504.

¹⁸³ Thee, 2006, pp. 85-86. The Assaat-movement itself lost importance by the end of the 1950s, because Assaat had committed himself to other activities.

¹⁸⁴ In 1959, Rachmat Muljomiseno, the then Minister of Trade and supporter of the movement, issued a regulation banning foreign nationals from rural trade and forcing them to transfer their businesses to indigenous Indonesians. However, before the regulation was implemented, a new cabinet was installed without Muljomiseno. Thee, 2006, p. 87.

¹⁸⁵ Ramanathan, 1994, p. 92.

uncertainties related to their citizenship status, this decree could and was used to remove ethnic Chinese from their homes.

Even though the ethnic Chinese were present in the political sphere, they did not manage to have their ethnic group included as one of the many Indonesian peoples (*suku*) into the imaginary Indonesian national identity. In the course of the construction of a national identity that had to encompass the numerous different ethnic groups of the archipelago, there would have been a chance for the ethnic Chinese to overcome their status as ‘foreigners’ and to be become officially recognized as local Indonesians. Instead, they served as non-indigenous (*non-pribumi*) counterpart to the rest of Indonesia's ethnic groups who could then become joined under the umbrella of all being indigenous (*pribumi*) to the archipelago regardless of their different ethnic, cultural, and religious backgrounds.¹⁸⁶ The ethnic Chinese were thus the only group left outside of the newly created common Indonesian identity, reinforcing their problematic as well as vulnerable position in society once again.¹⁸⁷

Soekarno’s orientation towards the political left proved to be disturbing not only to the military whose influence was reduced as a consequence, but also for another nation-state: the United States of America. Since the struggle for independence, Indonesia had been entertaining good relations to the government of the United States of America. For the USA a good relationship with Indonesia was economically important due to the intense trade relationship with Indonesia: from 1945 onwards, US imports from Indonesia grew steadily and by 1947, the US was in the third largest importer of Indonesian goods. Conversely, Indonesia was also reliant upon imports from the US. The USA were also politically interested in Indonesia as an ally against the Soviet Union. In the 1950s, the United States exerted their influence by providing economic aid to Indonesia. The ideology of anti-communism was smoothly conveyed. The objectives of the United States were:

“To prevent Indonesia from passing into the Communist orbit; to persuade Indonesia that its best interests lie in greater cooperation and stronger affiliations with the rest of the free world; and to assist Indonesia to develop toward a stable, free, government with the will and ability to resist Communism from within and without and to contribute to

¹⁸⁶ Chua-Franz, 2002, p. 95-6.

¹⁸⁷ Possible reasons for this included that they were the last ethnic group to arrive and settle in the archipelago (400 years ago), their standing in society as collaborators of the colonists and their perceived passiveness during the fight for independence as well anti-Chinese sentiments in general might have led to this decision as well. Further, religion could not serve as common basis with the ethnic Chinese for only very few of them were Muslims.

the strengthening of the free world.”¹⁸⁸

Simultaneously however, Soekarno also entered into relations with the Soviet Union, which also offered economic aid. In 1956 Soekarno even claimed that Western concepts, such as democracy, would not work in Indonesia.¹⁸⁹ The United States had to fear that Indonesia would lean towards communism and thus fall into the ‘enemy camp’. The US government therefore provided assistance in the form of training as well as funds to groups who were anti-communist and supported their cause. Among these were General Soeharto and his troops.¹⁹⁰ Soekarno’s orientation towards the political left therefore indirectly helped the rise of his competitor. The support of the US government might serve as an explanation why Soeharto allied himself very closely to the US after he came to power. He adopted part of the Western ideology from the US with a focus on nationalism and anti-communism. This ideology formed the basis for legitimizing violent acts against communists as such and as a consequence also against Chinese Indonesians.

By the end of the 1950s when the nationalist faction within the military was gaining influence, anti-communist and anti-Chinese riots were initiated by these troops - mainly starting in the rural areas of Java and Bali and later spreading throughout Indonesia. The masses were easily triggered by the military thanks to the consequences of the unsuccessful economic policies of the Soekarno government, which led to price inflation and wide-spread poverty.¹⁹¹ Some articles claim that hundreds of thousands of ethnic Chinese were among the victims of these riots.¹⁹² However, this high number of ethnic Chinese victims seems to be unlikely. The killings mainly took place in rural areas where ethnic Chinese were underrepresented as the majority of ethnic Chinese were living in urban areas after the passing of Presidential Regulation No. 10. As a consequence of the riots, about 130,000 ethnic Chinese in 1959 – 1960 not only left the countryside, but the country as whole seeking a new life in Mainland China. In 1960, the PR Chinese government sought to stem this influx and urged the ethnic Chinese to stay in Indonesia.¹⁹³

¹⁸⁸ Montero, 2004, pp. 39-40.

¹⁸⁹ Montero, 2004, p. 46.

¹⁹⁰ Montero, 2004, p. 76. There are studies that even suggest that the CIA was involved in the launching of the coup d’état in 1965 that resulted in the change of government, s. Montero, 2004, p. 93.

¹⁹¹ Mackie, 1976, p. 98.

¹⁹² According to Coppel, respective articles were published in the *Far Eastern economic Review* (editorial, 28 April 1966) and *Life* (Australian edition, 22 July 1968), Coppel, 1983, p. 58.

¹⁹³ Mackie, 1976, p. 95.

In 1965/66 Soeharto took over power by means of a coup-d'état. He justified the need for taking over the government as a counter-reaction to an attempted coup-d'état by the PKI. The communist party was accused of having formed ties with military leaders and planned to take over the government. The government's official version of the events of October 1, 1965 state that six generals were killed in the attempted coup led by Lieutenant Colonel Untung. After that Untung's forces occupied the national telecommunication centre and the president's palace. General Soeharto then opposed Untung with the country's strategic reserve, seized control of Jakarta and gradually had executive powers transferred to himself from Soekarno. He wanted to ensure that communism would no longer be a threat to the state and that Communists and their presumed sympathizers within the military would be punished.¹⁹⁴

This official version of the events has been questioned by several academics. They assume that there had not been an attempted coup d'état by communist forces, but that Soeharto had orchestrated an attempted coup to justify his actions.¹⁹⁵ Since the main enemy of the military before the coup had been the PKI, the newly formed government therefore initiated anti-communist measures which included wide-spread massacres. It is difficult to assess the number of victims who have died in these massacres, but it is commonly assumed that around 500,000 people were killed. There are no reliable figures on how many ethnic Chinese were killed. It can however be assumed that their percentage was higher than their percentage of the Indonesian population (2-3 percent).¹⁹⁶ During the riots, the ethnic Chinese proved to be an easy target for the military as they were easily recognizable due to their distinct physical appearance. Therefore, even though the aim was to persecute Communists, it was often ethnic Chinese who were attacked. This further fostered anti-Chinese sentiments in general and thereby the singling out and marginalization of ethnic Chinese as a group.

On the surface, this period of time seems to be characterized by a considerable amount of freedom for and political openness towards the ethnic Chinese. The ethnic Chinese did not only return to political engagement - they even actively interacted with the government through an ethnic Chinese organization. However, their overall social and economic position in this new nation-state was not fundamentally different from their position under colonial rule. They were

¹⁹⁴ Freedman, 2000, pp. 102-103.

¹⁹⁵ E.g. the Northwest Center for Holocaust, Genocide and Ethnocide Education (University of Washington), <http://www.wce.wvu.edu/nwche/genocide/indonesia.shtml> (20.05.2012).

¹⁹⁶ Purdey, 2006, pp. 14-15.

still the middlemen minority and the negative stereotypes which had developed during colonial times still prevailed among the indigenous people.

Furthermore, their national loyalty was often put in question and instead of becoming part of the new Indonesian national identity, they constituted an alien 'other' which allowed the other ethnic groups to feel as 'one' people. Their vulnerability was manifested in physical violent acts against them towards the end of the Soekarno administration. They were dependent upon the government to protect them, but since its position was steadily weakened by the military, it could not act upon it.

2.4 Conclusions

In order to understand the conflict, it is important to note that the basis for a marginalized position in society for the ethnic Chinese had already been laid in pre-colonial times. They were of foreign origin, specialized occupationally, and (mostly) non-Muslims. During colonial times, their distinctiveness was further fostered, instrumentalized but also repressed by the Dutch colonial masters. Thus they became a constant element in Indonesian society, occupying a position in which they largely remain in until today - a predominantly ethnic Chinese merchant class characterized by economic strength and political weakness. Even if the ethnic Chinese were more involved and considerably active in politics under Soekarno, their position as 'others' in the middle of the social pyramid did not change.

When assessing the historical development of their social position as a middlemen minority within Indonesian society and in particular their relationship with the ruling elite, it becomes clear that their economic success as well as their political weakness is grounded in the construction and instrumentalization of their ethnicity by the ruling elite. The ruling elite entered a symbiosis with ethnic Chinese merchants, from which both the ethnic Chinese elite as well as the power-holders drew a mutual benefit from.

However, historical developments show that the economically strong minority played the weaker part of this alliance and was thus, highly depending on the ruling elite. In times of crises all members of this marginalized minority, even those who were not aligned with the elite, could easily be played as scapegoats by the ruling elite in times of economic and political crises. As such, they became victims of physical violent acts against themselves and their property in the course of riots. However, not only during crises and resulting riots were the ethnic Chinese exposed to violence: To keep the status quo and thus this minority in their vulnerable and dependent middlemen position also other forms of violence were exerted.

Their vulnerable position has been well established over centuries and forms an integral part of the make-up of Indonesian society. As a consequence, it will be very difficult to change. Any transformation of their position will have to be addressed carefully as they would have a significant impact on Indonesia's overall social structure.

3. Analysis of Conflict Violence

In colloquial language, statements like “If ever there was a true opposite of Peace, conflict would appear the natural culprit”¹⁹⁷ suggest that conflict is the opposite of peace. According to Galtung, however, it is not conflict itself which hinders peace, but rather the violent and destructive ways of dealing with it. The basis for peace is therefore not the absence of conflict but the absence of violence.¹⁹⁸ Enabling a move towards peace means reducing violence; and as a first step, the violence in this conflict has to be assessed. The previous chapter focused on the conflict setting as well as on how the conflict came about and developed over the last 700 years. The following chapter concentrates on comparing the violence in the conflict during the ‘New Order’ regime under President Soeharto (1968 – 1998), linking the conflict’s past with its present state (1998 – 2010). These periods are analyzed using the ‘triangle of violence’ developed by Galtung. Results of the violence analysis of the past and the present will be compared using three dimensions: direct violence, structural violence and cultural violence. This comparison forms the basis of an analysis of the development of violence over this period until the present day.

The analysis in this chapter aims not only at specifying dimensions of violence that some conflict actors exerted and others endured. It also seeks to assess the need for conflict transformation to reduce violence in the future. In the following sub-chapters, the use of the triangle of violence as a tool will at first be presented and discussed. The method is then applied to the conflict's most recent past – the New Order regime and the riots in the 1990s which constitute a peak in the history of violence against ethnic Chinese. An analysis of today’s violence follows afterwards. By comparing the results of the assessment of past and present violence, the development of the violence over time will be assessed in order to determine whether or not the violence could be reduced and if there are issues which still would need to be addressed.

¹⁹⁷ Owen, 2003, p. 7 (http://www.knowledgeboard.com/download/1141/PoP_Book_1-2.pdf) (16.06.2010).

¹⁹⁸ Galtung, 1969, p. 167.

3.1 The Concept “Triangle of Violence”

Different Dimensions of Violence: Direct, Structural and Cultural

The World Health Organization (WHO) defines violence as “the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment, or deprivation.”¹⁹⁹ The unambiguous definition by WHO defines violence as purely an act of direct (personal) violence. The focus on direct (personal) violence was prevalent when peace research emerged in the 1950s within the university scene. In the 1960s Galtung, however, introduced an extended concept of violence to the theme of peace research as he believed that along with the absence of direct (personal) violence, which he refers to as ‘negative peace’, then ‘positive peace’ which “is the integration of human society”¹⁹⁹ was also required. The reason for the extended concept was Galtung distrusted that measures and strategies aimed at ‘negative peace’ (e.g. general and complete disarmament through multilateralism or regulation of means of violence by international conventions which are mainly top-down approaches on the national and international level) would be sufficient in themselves to achieve negative peace.²⁰⁰ Therefore strategies to achieve ‘positive peace’ were considered to be required to work towards peace including items such as efforts to improve human relationships through dialogue, peace education, political, economical and cultural exchange and cooperation not only within nation states but also across the national borders.²⁰¹ Inspired by the principles of health science where a healthy body is perceived not only as a body that is not affected by a disease, but also as a body capable of resisting diseases, Galtung formed an analogy to peace. Strategies to counter ‘negative peace’ were considered to be like curative measures for diseases while strategies aiming at ‘positive peace’ were considered to be preventive measures to avoid diseases in the future.²⁰² Based on this understanding of peace in a negative and positive manner, he extended the concept to violence. If the opposite to ‘negative peace’ is defined as the direct and visible act of physical/psychological violence, i.e. the intentional incapacitation and / or deprivation of health of a human being by an identifiable actor, then the opposite to ‘positive peace’ had to be characterised as well.²⁰³ In his article “Violence, Peace and Peace Research”²⁰⁴, Galtung distinguished between manifest personal

¹⁹⁹ Galtung, 1964, p. 2.

²⁰⁰ Galtung, 1964, p. 3.

²⁰¹ Ibid.

²⁰² Galtung, 1985, pp. 144-148.

²⁰³ Galtung, 1969, p. 168.

²⁰⁴ Galtung, 1969.

violence (also referred to as direct violence) and latent structural violence (also referred to as indirect violence).²⁰⁵ The idea of structural violence was inspired by Ghandi who did not approach the perpetrators of violence, but instead the structure of violence in his fight for peace.²⁰⁶ By adapting this idea, Galtung extended the actor-oriented explanation of violence to a structure-oriented one in which structural violence must be overcome to achieve ‘positive peace’. Using this as a basis, Galtung employed a set of two distinct parameters to investigate and categorize different dimensions of violence and their intermittent interaction. Direct violence means restricting the basic human needs of others (by killing, maiming etc.), while structural violence is embedded in social structures that leads to among others exploitation and/or repression. In addition structural violence can trigger direct violence and vice versa. In 1990, Galtung identified a third form: cultural violence²⁰⁷ and thereby completed what is known as the “triangle of violence” (s. figure 4). Cultural violence is harder to grasp conceptually and it is more difficult to detect in practice than the other two forms. Cultural violence serves to legitimize any form of violence or provides a cultural background which justifies it for the perpetrators, thus forming the basis for the acceptance of other forms of violence – direct and structural violence.²⁰⁸ It is important to keep in mind that all of these forms of violence constitute violence in themselves.

He extended the definition of violence to encompass “avoidable insults to basic human needs, and more generally to life”.²⁰⁹ Basic human needs have been categorized by Galtung based on interviews conducted in different parts of the world and are catalogued into the following types of needs: survival, well-being, identity / meaning, and freedom needs. An attempt was thus made to define human needs that generally apply to all people regardless their ethnic, cultural, local or individual background based on empirical data. Galtung collected the data during his research for the ‘World Indicator Program’ at the University of Oslo.²¹⁰ By having identified the basic human needs, he attempted to measure whether or not these needs were affected by violence. If people’s basic human needs are not fulfilled, according to Galtung, they are considered victims of violence as violence has been defined by him as “the cause of the difference between the potential and the actual [fulfillment of their needs]”.²¹¹ According to

²⁰⁵ Galtung, 1969, pp. 173ff.

²⁰⁶ Galtung, 1985, p. 145.

²⁰⁷ Galtung, 1990.

²⁰⁸ Galtung, 2007, pp. 81-82.

²⁰⁹ Galtung, 1990, p. 292.

²¹⁰ Galtung, 1974.

²¹¹ Galtung, 1969, p. 168.

him, basic human needs are not debatable; they cannot be compromised and there is no ranking among them, i.e. they are to be treated equally.²¹²




Figure 4: The Triangle of Violence (based on Galtung 2007a, p. 348)

In contrast to indirect violence, direct violence is generally easy to recognize: it is manifested in physical or psychological violence, performed by human beings directed against other human beings or their property. The perpetrators are identifiable and it is thus actor-generated.²¹³ Structural violence is structure-generated; it occurs whenever people are disadvantaged by political, legal, economic or social traditions. The violence caused does not have to be intended, i.e. a victim may suffer from violence even if a perpetrator did not intend to harm someone. The concept of violence (and, implicitly, guilt) is therefore not linked to the intention of harming.²¹⁴ In the definition as presented here, the concept of violence focuses on the consequences and hence the victims instead of the perpetrator. Even the victims of structural violence themselves are often not aware of the systematic ways in which their plight is determined by an unequal distribution of society's resources.²¹⁵

In most cases, indirect violence is rendered invisible and generally accepted as ‘ordinary’ by victims and perpetrators as it is embedded in ubiquitous social structures, normalized by stable institutions and regular experience (“the way things are and always have been”). Why people

²¹² Galtung, 1978, pp. 20-21.
²¹³ Galtung, 1969, pp. 169ff.
²¹⁴ As it is for the World Health Organization (WHO), Krug et al., 2002, p. 5.
²¹⁵ Galtung, 1969, pp. 172ff.

who are suffering from indirect violence tolerate the status quo may be explained by referring to the concept of ‘symbolic violence’ developed by Bourdieu²¹⁶ in which he refers to a mechanism whereby the socially dominated blame themselves for their domination. According to Bourdieu, those who are dominated misrecognize their own position and consider their (low) social status as accurate and deserved.²¹⁷ Unequal access to resources, political power, education, health care, or legal standing constitutes violent social structures. Since even those who are victims of structural violence are often not aware of it, it can be difficult to determine the entire extent of unequal distribution of society's resources. Nevertheless, despite its invisibility, structural violence is shaped by identifiable institutions, relationships, force-fields or ideologies, such as institutionalized inequalities between ethnic or social groups or racism which may be manifested in e.g. health disparities.²¹⁸ Galtung assigned direct and structural violence to the four basic human needs and added examples for a better understanding (table 1).²¹⁹

| Violence (D/S) | Survival needs (SN) | Well-being needs (WN) | Identity needs (IN) | Freedom needs (FN) |
|---------------------|----------------------|---|--|--|
| Direct Violence | Killing (DSN) | Maiming, Siege, Sanctions, Misery (DWN) | Desocialization, Resocialization, Second class citizen (DIN) | Repression, Detention, Expulsion (DFN) |
| Structural Violence | Exploitation A (SSN) | Exploitation B (SWN) | Penetration, Segmentation (SIN) | Marginalisation, Fragmentation (SFN) |

Table 1: Violence and their Effects on Basic Human Needs

While the examples for infliction of direct violence with respect to the four basic human needs are quite clear, the inflictions by structural violence may require further introduction.

1. Survival needs

Exploitation A: the underdog (as Galtung refers to the victims) may actually die – e.g. starve or die of curable diseases – because of the disadvantages exposed to by the topdog (as Galtung refers to the perpetrators).

²¹⁶ Galtung explicitly deals with Bourdieu’s research and his finding on conflict in comparison to his own, Galtung, 2010.

²¹⁷ Bourdieu, 2000, pp. 170ff.

²¹⁸ Bourgois, 2004, p. 19.

²¹⁹ Galtung, 1990, pp. 292ff.

2. Well-being needs

Exploitation B: the underdog may be left in a permanent, unwanted stage of misery, suffering which may include malnutrition, curable diseases, limited access to water or housing. In contrast to Exploitation A, the underdog does not die.

3. Identity needs:

Penetration: implanting the view of the topdog in the underdog's mind and
Segmentation: assigning only a social segment to the underdog, limiting his view as well as forced assimilation

4. Freedom needs:

Marginalization: keeping the underdog on the outside and
Fragmentation: keeping the underdogs away from each other and prevent them from organizing themselves

Sørensen commented on this definition: "It is broad enough to include the most important dimensions, and precise enough to point to pertinent foci of peace research."²²⁰

Cultural violence, the other form of latent violence, makes people consider structural or direct violence as normal, natural or not noticeable.²²¹ Cultural violence is deeply rooted in a society's culture. When interviewing people from a specific culture, they are often not able or capable of mentioning aspects of cultural violence because it has been deeply grounded in them and thus rendered invisible or 'natural'. According to Galtung, there are six main domains in which cultural violence is to be found: religion and ideology, language and art, empirical and formal science. In all of these domains there are elements which can be (mis)used to legitimize direct or structural violence.²²² An example is the ideology of the 'Herrenvolk' which the National Socialists in Germany established during the Third Reich. This provided the basis for the implementation first of structural violence against Jews, such as depriving them of their civic and human rights and repressing them in other ways. Later by imprisoning, forcing them to work in labor camps under miserable conditions and finally killing them, the National Socialists then exerted direct violence.

²²⁰ Sørensen, 1992, p. 136.

²²¹ Galtung, 1990, p. 295.

²²² Galtung, 1990, pp. 296ff.

The three types of violence differ with respect to time: direct violence is an event, structural violence is a developing, fluctuating process, and cultural violence is rather an invariant, remaining constant for a considerable period of time.²²³ Therefore, attempts to break through the vicious triangle need to tackle very essential and basic layers of a culture in order to be able to actually constitute a change towards positive peace.

Extended vs. Narrow Understandings of ‘Violence’: An Insight into the Academic Discourse

The approach by Galtung to expand the term violence has been acknowledged as a major breakthrough in peace research, marking the emergence of critical peace studies in the 1970s.²²⁴ The concept has, however, not been without its critics.

Among others, disputed issues are:

- 1) definition of violence and its effects on the understanding of peace and conflict research as analytical or normative
- 2) broadness and limited operationalization of the extended concept of violence and peace
- 3) interrelation between the different types of violence
- 4) Utopian approach by Galtung versus realistic approaches

1) Examining the field of peace and conflict studies in Germany, Lars Schmitt refers to Galtung’s definition of violence as the crucial point which separates the older from the younger generation of peace researchers. According to Schmitt, members of the founding generation of peace and conflict studies tend to hold on to a highly normative, practice-oriented thinking of peace studies as applied science and the extended definition of peace as the absence of violence as defined by Galtung. The younger generation however, or at least parts of it, lean towards a less normative approach to Peace and Conflict Studies based on a definition of violence limited to that of Galtung’s direct violence which they claim to be more analytic.²²⁵ This dichotomy based on or deriving from the acceptance of Galtung’s definition of violence (in particular the inclusion of structural violence) does not only generate gaps between generations of peace and conflict researchers, but further prevents conceptual integration of conflict analysis and conflict transformation.²²⁶

²²³ Galtung, 1990, p. 292.

²²⁴ Schmidt, 2001, p. 509.

²²⁵ E.g. Sahm & Jahn, 2006.

²²⁶ Schmitt, 2006, p. 7.

2) Another issue of dispute is the broadness and vagueness of the concept of violence and the correspondingly the concept of positive peace. Critics maintain that it implies that everything could be understood as violence as long it is conceivable that it could be normatively better.²²⁷ It may be argued that the concept thereby loses its analytic value and is not ‘operationalizable’ as one cannot distinguish analytically between the different phenomena falling under the category of violence.²²⁸ Those who reject the concept as not sufficiently analytic therefore may dismiss the Transcend method (as it is based on Galtung’s concept of violence and the related concept of positive peace) as idealistic and not applicable in scientific research. Therefore, criticism with regard to a limited operationalization of Galtung’s concept of violence as well as its ‘broadness’ shall be discussed here in more detail as these reservations touch the essence of the method of this study.

Galtung defines violence based on the perspective of its victims. Galtung has himself admitted that defining violence as the difference between the potential and the actual living conditions of people “may lead to more problems than it solves.”²²⁹ The question of how or even whether or not this extended understanding of violence is operationalizable is a matter of debate among academics. Those who claim that it is not, further claim it to be prone to ideology and as such not applicable for academic studies, even though lacking operationalization does not necessarily mean that a theory is not scientific. Relating ‘scientificness’ to operationalization (only) ignores the heuristic and normative character of studies in the field of peace and conflict research.²³⁰ What his critics do not take into consideration is that Galtung provided an example of how to operationalize his conceptualization of violence in his article “Direct and Structural Violence – A Note on Operationalisation”.²³¹ The example he chose was ‘death’. With regard to direct violence, one way of measuring the degree of violence is counting the number of dead persons killed as a result of direct violence. Simultaneously, the number of avoidable deaths that occur because medical or sanitary resources are not available can be regarded as being due to structural violence. Since cases of death occur at different ages, Galtung decided to measure not the number of avoidable deaths as such, but rather the ‘number of years lost’. To calculate the ‘number of years lost’, an average life-expectancy is assumed which has to be compared to the actual life expectancy of people in a society. As a result the ‘number of years lost’ can be compared for both types of violence, direct as well as

²²⁷ Criticism summoned up in Imbusch, 2003, p. 24.

²²⁸ Schmitt, 2006, p. 7.

²²⁹ Galtung, 1969, p. 168.

²³⁰ See Schmidt, 2001, p. 513.

²³¹ Galtung, 1971, pp. 73-76.

structural.²³² Such an approach requires creativity from those who engage in empirical peace studies. His article demonstrates how interdisciplinary thinking can work in practice: as mathematician, Galtung was able to combine natural science with social science to help operationalize his concept.

Social scientists are monitoring human society and produce systematic studies of the 'quality of life' in numerous given societies. The resulting sets of data, including infant mortality, unemployment, social security recipients and juvenile crime vary from society to society which helps to develop 'benchmarks' for a 'potential quality of life'. If we take the case of unemployment as a concrete example, the question arises why people happen to be unemployed. Some might argue that they do not want to work, that they are lazy and have chosen to be poor. It could, however, also be the case that barriers confronting those who are unemployed are built into society in a way that results in unemployment, for example in the case of discrimination directed against a certain ethnic group. This marks structural violence. Similar arguments would apply to other 'quality of life' indicators (e.g. health, housing, education). Therefore, cross-nation comparative 'quality of life research' could help to detect structural violence in societies by determining differences between the potential and the actual. With regard to the disputed topic of the concept's broadness, Kjell Eide, for example, marks that the meaning of 'violence' would be function of a chosen goal structure with no meaning without an explanation of the goal structure that it would derive its meaning from. He would therefore suggest a more subjective definition of violence: the cause of what the user of the term dislikes.²³³ However, this definition does also create difficulties of its own: without explaining the background of the respective user, it is difficult to grasp the meaning of the term. Depending on his/her background, each user would perceive violence differently. With this definition, Eide mainly avoids actually defining what 'violence' means and therefore does not help to 'solve' the problem of the concept.

In his article "Twelve Friendly Quarrels with Galtung", Kenneth Boulding as well criticizes the 'broadness' of the definition. According to him, the concept of structural violence includes problems of a system, like poverty, misery, and deprivation that are caused by other systems. He does accept that cultures of poverty and cultures of violence are often related, but denies a cause and effect relationship.²³⁴ While both Eide and Boulding admit that Galtung's concept of violence shows that a narrow concept of violence, i.e. one only related to direct violence, is too

²³² Galtung, 1971, p. 75.

²³³ Eide, 1971, p. 71.

²³⁴ Boulding, 1977, p. 84.

limited to grasp the complexity of violence in a conflict environment, they consider the concept itself as being too vague and difficult to apply.

Galtung once commented on Boulding that he “tells half the story and the other half is just as important”. As an evolutionary theorist, Boulding would tend to consider it acceptable that the better developed countries, the so-called first world countries, assimilate the other countries based on their insight and generosity.²³⁵ Structural violence seems to be negligible in the course of ‘social’ evolution to Boulding. The world seems to be going through different cycles: war-peace cycles, war-cycles and peace-cycles towards what Boulding calls ‘stable peace’ more or less on its own.²³⁶ Galtung, however, argues that the potential of direct violence is still very (or too) high as long as structural violence is present. Therefore, if one remains passive while facing indirect violence, one may risk for direct violence to occur. According to him, the active removal of structural violence is necessary in order to obtain ‘stable peace’.²³⁷

Despite the difficulties with the concept as pointed out by Eide and Boulding and others²³⁸, it is questionable, however, why violence should be restricted to only direct violence if conflict realities suggest otherwise. Although Bourgois refers to Galtung’s concept as “opening the Pandora’s box”²³⁹, he points out that expansion is necessary as direct violence is merely the tip of the iceberg which distracts from seeing the “less clearly visible forms of coercion, fear and subjectification through which violence deceptively and perniciously morphs over time and through history.”²⁴⁰ Especially, as in current conflict risks that compromise living conditions of people are increasing that cannot be attributed to individual actors.²⁴¹ Indirect violence is therefore an inseparable part of violence which is necessary may not only explain, but also cause direct violence.

If seizing the suggestion by Bourgois to refer to indirect violence as ‘invisible’ violence, Galtung’s concept of violence could be regarded as analytic heuristic which helps to detect and make invisible violence visible against the backdrop of a conflict setting.²⁴² Therefore, including indirect violence in the concept of violence is not only prerequisite to reflect conflict

²³⁵ Galtung, 1987, p. 201.

²³⁶ Galtung, 1987, p. 202.

²³⁷ Galtung, 1987, p. 200-2.

²³⁸ E.g. Roth, 1988 and Daase, 1996.

²³⁹ Bourgois, 2004, p. 18.

²⁴⁰ Bourgois, 2004, p. 17.

²⁴¹ Schroer, 2004, cited in Schmitt, 2006, p. 7.

²⁴² Schmitt used a similar approach for developing a heuristic-analytic framework for conflict analysis based on Bourdieu’s concept of symbolic violence. Schmitt, 2006.

reality, it also provides an analytic tool suitable for scientific work for such a tool is required for detecting and analyzing violence in complex conflicts, like the case study conflict.²⁴³

3) Another dispute regards the interrelation between the different types of violence. Sørensen asked in this context if one form of violence could justify another? What if there is a high level of structural violence in a society created by the small ruling elite which could be removed in a revolution during which the repressed people resort to direct violence.²⁴⁴ Here lies a dilemma in which one type of violence could be removed by using another. People may argue that the dimension of structural violence legitimizes direct violence, once the basic human needs of many can be served by violating the basic human needs of few.²⁴⁵ Galtung does not deny that violence may be used at times to fight violence. In cases where direct as well as structural violence are present, depending on the case, the affected actor(s) may have to assert to one type of violence to counter the other one. Nevertheless, according to Galtung it does not necessarily have to be one or the other (dualism), according to the Buddhist tetralemma thinking which he adopted for his approach, it can also be both or neither.²⁴⁶ Therefore, it may also be possible to counter more than one type of violence without using means of any type of violence. He further stresses the individual nature of each conflict and that it is not possible to have one standard procedure of how to deal with conflict. Galtung's approach is holistic and therefore conflict and violence can neither be understood nor explained without taking the whole picture or context into consideration. Any approach or measure taken is determined by results that arise from conflict analysis which may provide possible solutions as well as possible obstacles.

4) The problem academics might have with the 'broadness' of the definition is further closely related to the perception of peace as utopia in Galtung's approach. For Galtung, world-wide peace is the unattainable ideal – a utopia. The 'obstacles' are multiple and difficult to deal with in this concept of peace. If one thinks of peace as an achievable goal, having to overcome as many kinds of violence that touch every aspect of a society as suggested by Galtung is difficult to accept.²⁴⁷ Sørensen, for example, remarks that it is difficult to point to societies as examples where violence is not present. Furthermore, there is no strategy that clearly shows how to pave

²⁴³ Schmitt argues that applying such an 'heuristic pair of glasses' reveals *how* phenomena are studied instead of pretending there would be no 'pair of glasses' and the phenomena would be studied entirely neutral and objective. Schmitt, 2006, p. 7.

²⁴⁴ Sørensen, 1992, p. 138.

²⁴⁵ Schmidt, 2001, p. 512.

²⁴⁶ Galtung, 1990, p. 139.

²⁴⁷ Bourgeois and Scheper-Hughes try to overcome this problem by utilizing the concept of a continuum of violence with three processes of violence: structural, symbolic, and normalized. Bourgeois, 2004, p. 18.

the way to such societies. He further points out that making progress in one dimension of violence tends to create new problems and deficiencies on other dimensions of violence. For example, when fighting hunger and poverty, one is likely to create other problems, such as damage to the environment and ‘welfare’ diseases. Thus, he concludes, contradictions are already built into this concept.²⁴⁸ Due to the strong utopian aspect of Galtung’s approach, Sørensen detects a tendency “to run away from the problems”²⁴⁹, i.e. the inherent contradictions.²⁵⁰ It may be true that the solution of one problem may create a new one, however, that does not mean that one should therefore not address them at all. Instead, the problems will have to be solved as they come along for it is not possible to foresee each and every one of them.

The academic discourse reveals limits have to be considered when applying the concept of violence as developed by Galtung to a conflict for analysis. For this case study especially disputed broadness of this concept proved to an advantage as it allows detecting and examining violence in its different spheres as well as their interrelations. Without the elements of structural and cultural violence it would further be difficult to explain why direct violence against ethnic Chinese would occur and re-occur despite long periods of none or less violence. Therefore, this concept was considered to be very suitable especially for this case study.

Application of the Concept of the Triangle of Violence to the Case Study

Applying the tool of the violence triangle in practice proved to be a challenging task. Due to the strong interrelations between the three types of violence outlined in the triangle, attempts to structure the cases according to these three types are therefore not reasonable. The three types of violence are often intertwined and in general more than one type can be detected in any given example of violence. In assessing the conflict, it was not possible to distinguish sharply between the types of violence involved without risking to lose too much of the intersecting set in the process. Nevertheless, keeping the violence triangle in mind helped in exploring more potential levels of violence beyond merely the visible and manifest.

Galtung has outlined examples of different types of basic human needs that are infringed both upon on the levels of direct as well as of indirect violence (see table above). Even, the distinctions between the different categories are not always clear. For example, Galtung places de-socialization into the category of direct violence. By way of an example, he mentions

²⁴⁸ Sørensen, 1992, p. 137.

²⁴⁹ Ibid.

²⁵⁰ Sørensen, 1992, p. 142.

regulations on the use of certain languages.²⁵¹ If the use of one's language is prohibited, this could be interpreted as direct violence when referred to the implementing of a law (as an act). However, when the law has been enforced a long time ago and has become part of a state's legal system, it might also be interpreted as penetration: the group of people affected might have lost the ability to speak and think in their 'own' language. This will limit their access to information other than what other groups provide them with. Consequently this may narrow their perspectives on their own situation. Penetration, however, is categorized as structural violence. This example shows that an act of violence can be assigned to more than one type of violence depending on the moment in time of its assessment. What does not change however is that both de-socialization as well as penetration are considered as being violence as understood by Galtung. It is also not desirable for an understanding of the violence in this case study conflict to examine the conflict's violence strictly according to the conflict categories. Nonetheless, in spite of the practical challenges, both the violence triangle as well as the table of the effects of violence on basic human needs served as useful tools that assisted in detecting and examining violence in this case studies.

Rather than organizing the following sections according to the three types of violence and assigning events or structures of violence to each of them, I will present examples of events and patterns and related them to type(s) or category(ies) of violence. The examples presented here provide an overview over the extent and different types of violence in the conflict's recent past and present. The different types of violence will be marked using short abbreviations: when direct violence is inflicting upon the survival needs, the abbreviation is DSN: D(irect violence)S(urvival)N(needs). For structural violence directed against the freedom needs of the victims, the corresponding abbreviation will be SFN: S(tructural violence)F(reedom)N(eeds). As cultural violence serves to legitimize the other two forms of violence, it has not been related to the basic human needs and therefore the abbreviation CV: C(ultural)V(iolence) will be used. The different types of violence are not marked in preparation for a quantitative analysis, but rather to assist in more easily identifying the different violence types in their respective context.

²⁵¹ Galtung, 1990, p. 292.

3.2 Soeharto's 'New Order': Ethnic Chinese In-between Violence and Privileges

After Soeharto rose to power, his major concern was the Communist Party of Indonesia, PKI, and Communists in general. In the course of its fight against Communists and other political enemies, the Soeharto government also took up an anti-Chinese position which brought the government many sympathizers among indigenous Indonesians. The new government thus faced a dilemma. On the one hand, the ethnic Chinese as a group were perceived officially one of the four major 'others' of the constructed New Order Self²⁵² and therefore perceived as political enemies to be treated as such; on the other hand, the ethnic Chinese were indispensable for the running of the country's economy as the Soekarno administration was not able to establish a self-sustaining national economy without them. Even though Soeharto opened Indonesia's economy to foreign investors (among those were mainly US and other Western companies), the country's economy would have suffered severely without the ethnic Chinese merchant class. In the economic situation in the middle of the 1960s, the Soeharto government provided the ethnic Chinese with more economic incentives and privileges to benefit the overall Indonesian economy than the Soekarno government had.

Apart from economical reasons, socio-political reasons made the ethnic Chinese essential to the government: As distinct group of unpopular 'others', they continued to be important for the nation-building process and the concept of 'indigenusness' in the national identity. Having an ethnic counterpart to the imaginary community of Indonesian groups proved to be very useful for the political elite in terms of consolidating the not yet fully-accepted Indonesian national identity. These reasons for keeping the ethnic Chinese as distinct middlemen minority were not new. Soeharto would come to depend on the ethnic Chinese as scapegoats in times of political and economic crises. During his fight against Communism, it became evident that he could easily motivate indigenous Indonesians to act against the ethnic Chinese by sponsoring "witch-hunt and terror"²⁵³. Having an economically strong, distinct ethnic minority which did not pose a political threat to the ruling elite proved to be more than convenient. The official political position of the government which had declared ethnic Chinese to be political enemies based on their presumable links to communism, however, would have to call for the removal of ethnic Chinese or at least their 'Chineseness' instead. To deal with this dilemma, the Soeharto government walked a fine line between policies aiming at assimilation, repressive and discriminatory policies as well as granting economic privileges at the same time. The paradox

²⁵² The other three being the 'West', 'Communism' and 'Fundamentalist Islam'. Heryanto, 1998b, p. 97.

²⁵³ Heryanto, 1998b, p. 99.

of economic dominance and political and cultural deprivation is not contradictory in this case: a group of successful entrepreneurs was required for the nation's economy and the indigenous elite was not experienced enough and capable of playing such a role yet. To counterbalance the success of ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs, the government instigated popular anti-Chinese sentiments and discriminatory policies. As unpopular, marginalized group of others, ethnic Chinese did not enjoy support from other ethnic Indonesian groups (which would have been necessary for them to gain political power) and therefore did not pose a threat to the political elite, but were depending on them for security in times of anti-Chinese riots. Periodic anti-Chinese riots reproduced the dependence of ethnic Chinese on state protection, discredited popular native efforts to express grievances and deflected anger from the state.²⁵⁴

Assimilation of Ethnic Chinese: Policies and Acts

In order to address the so-called 'Chinese problem' (CV), the official solution was to remove everything Chinese from Indonesia and assimilate the ethnic Chinese. Another possibility would have been to force the ethnic Chinese to leave the country. However, the committee founded to deal with the 'Chinese problem' in 1967 advised against the latter strategy in order not to harm the country's economy. As a consequence assimilation policies (SIN), were implemented in the course of the 1960s.²⁵⁵ These assimilatory policies were justified publicly by citing alleged security reasons. The long history of riots and violent acts against ethnic Chinese was considered as being sufficient proof of the incompatibility of ethnic Chinese co-existing with indigenous Indonesians.²⁵⁶ By blaming the victims of the riots for the riots, the government officially sided with the perpetrators. Since the government claimed that these kinds of riots caused security problems and threatened the nation's unity and integration, assimilation policies were therefore considered to be justified to maintain state security. The overall accepted concept of state security in order to prevent direct violence therefore legitimized structural violence.

Removal of 'Chineseness'

In order to remove everything Chinese, the government issued decrees to close down the Chinese organizations in October 1965, as well as Chinese schools in May 1966.²⁵⁷ It further

²⁵⁴ Heryanto, 1998b, p. 102.

²⁵⁵ The "Basic Policy on Indonesian Citizens of Foreign Descent" in the Presidential Decision No. 240, 1967 as well as the Presidential Instruction No. 14, 1967.

²⁵⁶ Heryanto, 1998, p. 103.

²⁵⁷ Purdey, 2006, p. 19.

outlawed Chinese organizations, the public use of Chinese characters as well as cultural events. The government also prohibited the importing of printed material using Chinese characters. Importing Chinese magazines was placed on the same level as importing arms, narcotics or pornography.²⁵⁸ Prohibiting the Chinese language and culture forced the ethnic Chinese to de-socialize from their culture and to re-socialize (DIN) with indigenous Indonesian culture. The government clearly marked ‘Chineseness’ as something unacceptable and unwanted in Indonesian society. The assimilation program also worked as a tool for marginalization and fragmentation, infringing upon the basic needs of freedom and identity. The schools and organizations as well as the press had been forums bringing the ethnic Chinese community together. Closing down these forums can be interpreted as aiming at the fragmentation (SFN) of the group.

Limiting Chinese Indonesian culture to the domestic sphere denied the Chinese Indonesians the public expression of their own identity in the country which they considered their home. The government attempted to eliminate the Chinese Indonesian culture by penetrating (SIN) their (the ‘topdogs’) thinking into minds of the ‘underdog’. Since there is no general ‘Indonesian culture’, the ethnic Chinese were expected to adopt the respective culture of the area they lived in. This is an example of how structural violence can enable the ruling elite to exert direct violence, as the basic human need of identity and freedom were denied through the government bans on the ethnic Chinese to practice their cultural identity. These acts of direct violence – the issuing of laws banning the culture – were possible due to the violent structures which the indigenous elite had inherited from the Dutch. These structures prevented the ethnic Chinese from moving up to the elite level and from participating in politics, thereby possibly preventing the passing of discriminatory legislation. Later, once the laws were implemented, they further strengthened the marginalization of the ethnic Chinese and as a result reproduced the violent structures.

In order to assimilate ethnic Chinese, different approaches were suggested. In 1975, one approach put forward was forced biological assimilation through laws which, would they have been implemented, would have prohibited marriages among ethnic Chinese for 25 years. Parliament also mooted the idea of training centers for ethnic Chinese in which they would be indoctrinated in the national ideology of Pancasila²⁵⁹. Neither of these approaches were

²⁵⁸ Coppel, 2001, p. 32; Heryanto, 1998b, p. 101.

²⁵⁹ “Pancasila” refers to the five principles of state ideology formulated by Soekarno in 1945 and incorporated into Indonesia’s constitution: Belief in the one and only God, Just and Civilized Humanity, The unity of

enforced, however. Indonesian politicians, nonetheless officially recommended intermarriage, the taking-up of Indonesian sounding names (a corresponding regulation was introduced in 1966) and conversion to Islam to the ethnic Chinese. However, these practices did not benefit those who followed suit. Muslim Chinese Indonesians with Indonesian names as well as children of inter-ethnic couples continued to be considered non-indigenous (*non-pribumi*) and identifiable by the ‘Chinese’ code on their identity cards (CV).²⁶⁰ While conversion to Islam was recommended to the ethnic Chinese, the government did not make reference to the role played by Chinese influence in spreading Islam in parts of Indonesia.²⁶¹

Legitimization of Anti-Chinese Sentiments in Popular Culture

Indigenous Indonesians perceived assimilating ethnic Chinese and thereby eliminating ‘Chineseness’ to be legitimate not only because it was foreign, but because they were branded as asocial, unpatriotic and blamed for supposedly pursuing selfish interests.²⁶² This perception had already been incorporated in local customs and beliefs (CV). A Central Javanese thanksgiving ritual, conducted by peasants at the end of the harvest season, is an example. The ritual involves cooking rice and it is considered to be bad luck when an ethnic Chinese person enters or even passes the kitchen while this rice is being cooked. Should this nonetheless happen, the rice has to be thrown away and new rice has to be prepared.²⁶³ Another example indicating that anti-Chinese sentiments are embedded in local cultures can be found as part of the batik traditions of certain areas in Indonesia. Batik as cultural heritage²⁶⁴ has a high value in Indonesia and is heavily loaded with symbolism. The different motives and colors have their own meaning. For example, brown colors were the official colors of Javanese royal courts and green colors stand for Islam. After Chinese arrived to the archipelago, they introduced red dye as well as patterns from China to the indigenous Indonesian patterns and colors. The color red represents luck, happiness and fortune in Chinese culture. The Dutch introduced indigo as a dye and as a result blue colors were associated with the Dutch. While at the beginning of the Dutch colonial period all colors were integrated in batik fashion, over the centuries in certain parts of Java, such as Yogyakarta, Solo and Surabaya, the use of red color in batik was reduced and eventually ceased as relations with the ethnic Chinese in these particular areas deteriorated.

Indonesia, Democracy guided by consensus arising out of deliberations amongst representatives, Social justice for all people of Indonesia.

²⁶⁰ Heryanto, 1998b, p. 103-104.

²⁶¹ Taylor, 2005, pp. 152ff.

²⁶² Heryanto, 1998b, p. 103.

²⁶³ Interview with William Kwan, (15.04.2010).

²⁶⁴ In October, 2009, the traditional Indonesian dyeing technique, batik, has been included in the Intangible Cultural Heritage list of UNESCO.

Chinese cultural influence in these areas was unwanted by either the local elite or the local population, and hardly any red color can be found in traditional local batik there until today. In other areas, such as Lasem, where the gap between ethnic Chinese and indigenous Javanese was less pronounced and ethnic Chinese were better integrated in society, the color red is still present in batik and has even become characteristic for the batik of this area. No anti-Chinese riots took place in Lasem in 1998, in spite the fact that provocateurs were sent there as well. The Muslim leaders of this area opposed the riot-makers and sent them away. In Solo and Surabaya, on the other hand, large-scale anti-Chinese riots took place.²⁶⁵

Reconstruction of the Chinese Identity to Maintain Distinctiveness

Since assimilation policies were issued to abolish ‘Chineseness’, the government had problems keeping the counterpart alive. Therefore, the very identity that the official policies were trying to abolish by promoting assimilation had to paradoxically be constantly reconstructed to survive. A distinct group of ethnic Chinese served the purpose of unifying the other indigenous Indonesian groups, while constituting the politically weak pillars of the Indonesian economy, and also acting scapegoats in times of crises.²⁶⁶ In order to maintain their distinctiveness, the government employed various different measures and approaches.

Stereotyping of Chinese Indonesians

Negative stereotypes of and prejudice²⁶⁷ against Chinese deriving from their position as middlemen (often merchants and tax collectors) had already spread during the colonial period and had been internalized by indigenous Indonesians. The main negative character traits attributed to ethnic Chinese were: greediness, selfishness, exclusivity (not open to others but ethnic Chinese).²⁶⁸ For many indigenous Indonesians these characteristics already justified

²⁶⁵ Interviews with batik entrepreneurs in Lasem, April 2010 (e.g. Gustav P.).

²⁶⁶ Heryanto, 1998b, p. 101.

²⁶⁷ Prejudice is defined here as attitudes towards a group based solely on their membership to this group (negative or positive). In case of negative prejudice, they create a negative affect or hostile attitude towards members of a social group based on a pejorative attitude or conviction. This negative affect can lead to a negative treatment of members of this group. Among other explanations or theories deriving from social psychology, sources for prejudice can be competition over scarce or desired sources (Realistic conflict theory, e.g.: Sherif et al. 1961; Bobo & Tuan, 1983) and/or social categorization which results in competing for a distinctive and positive social identity by dividing the social world into two camps, the so-called us-versus-them effect, (social identity theory, e.g.: Tajfel, 1970). It can also derive from social learning. In the case of social learning, prejudices can be transferred from generation to generation through classical conditioning, instrumental conditioning, and modeling (social learning theory, e.g.: Rotter, 1954; Bandura, 1977).

²⁶⁸ The characteristics evolved already during colonial times and are still prevalent today according to the respondents (both Chinese Indonesian as well as indigenous Indonesians) (interviews in 2008 as well as 2010).

(CV) prejudice and discrimination which violate the basic human need of well-being (SWN). Another prominent stereotype was that of superior Chinese work ethics, involving diligence, thrift and perseverance.²⁶⁹ These comparatively positive traits seemed to offer an explanation for the economic success of ethnic Chinese businessmen. Even if these characteristics are positive, they also caused jealousy among the indigenous population which in turn served as a motivator for maltreatment of this group. These anti-Chinese sentiments were fuelled by the press close to the government. As such, positive examples of the ethnic Chinese community, like badminton world champions of Chinese descent, were known in public media (close to the government) by their Indonesian names, while ethnic Chinese criminals were referred to by their Chinese names.²⁷⁰ Caricatures or cartoons portraying Chinese Indonesians as fat people with slanted eyes who enrich themselves at the expense of indigenous peasants were published:



Figure 5: An ethnic Chinese exploiting an indigenous Indonesian²⁷¹

²⁶⁹ Heryanto, 1998b, p. 103.

²⁷⁰ Heryanto, 1998b, p. 104.

²⁷¹ Mingguan Trisakti, May 25, 1966, Chua, 2004, p. 83.



Figure 6: Indigenous entrepreneurs with small businesses begging an ethnic Chinese conglomerate to adopt them.²⁷²

The Chinese Indonesian business elite contributed to the fostering of negative stereotypes and consequently the prejudice against ethnic Chinese as a group, similar to the colonial times, the Chinese business elite was needed to expand the country's economy.²⁷³ The New Order government's five-year economic development plan which the Chinese business elite benefited from, helped the overall Indonesian economy but simultaneously widened the gap between them and indigenous Indonesians. Ethnic Chinese engaging in trade especially in urban areas managed to enhance their status to middle class or higher.²⁷⁴ While their political and cultural status declined drastically with the beginning of the New Order, their economical status reached new peaks.²⁷⁵

The stereotypical image of the rich ethnic Chinese tycoon did not apply to all Chinese Indonesians. In fact only a small number managed to form alliances with the political elite. Those who did were protected under the so-called *cukong* system in which an ethnic Chinese

²⁷² Far Eastern Review, May 2, 1991, Chua, 2004, p. 84.

²⁷³ Mackie, 1988, p. 243.

²⁷⁴ Thung, 2001, p. 167.

²⁷⁵ Heryanto, 1998b, p. 102.

businessman maintained close ties to a member of the Indonesian elite, mainly high-ranking politicians or military officers. These ties normally protected the respective ethnic Chinese from harassment and ensured influence and control over the private sector for the Indonesian power holders in return.²⁷⁶ The ethnic Chinese businessmen tried to gain political influence, especially with regard to laws and regulations concerning their strand of business, through the *cukong* system and occasionally succeeded. This created resentment among indigenous businessmen who were often supported by Islamic groups and opponents of the government. They criticized that Indonesia was not ruled by Indonesians but rather by foreigners who controlled the economy, i.e. ethnic Chinese, who were perceived as foreigners in spite of their Indonesian citizenship.²⁷⁷

From the point of view of the political elite, in addition to their experience and skills, it was their status as unpopular foreigners which rendered the ethnic Chinese suitable for the role of the country's business elite. Due to their outsider status, they could not endanger the political elite's position in power. After Indonesians had freed themselves from colonial rule, it was unlikely that the people would accept being governed by 'foreigners' again. Therefore, they posed less of a threat to the political elite than a successful indigenous merchant middle class would have, as the latter might have challenged the political status quo. Thus, a small group of Chinese Indonesian tycoons became disproportionately rich, seemingly re-iterating the stereotype of the greedy Chinese 'economic animal'²⁷⁸ who enriched himself at the cost of the indigenous poor. The constant reproduction of this stereotype from one generation to the next has shaped the perception of Chinese Indonesians among indigenous Indonesians. The Institute for the Promotion of National Unity, a semi-governmental organization established in order to facilitate assimilation of ethnic Chinese, did not promote 'sameness' of indigenous and Chinese Indonesians or aimed at countering stereotypes like the image of the 'economic animal', but instead highlighted their differences, making it difficult for either or both of the groups to narrow the gap between them.²⁷⁹ For the political elite, it was easy to point to a few very wealthy ethnic Chinese with extravagant lifestyles to stir up hatred among impoverished

²⁷⁶ Suryadinata, 1988, p. 266.

²⁷⁷ Suryadinata, 1988, p. 267.

²⁷⁸ The term 'economic animal' as deeply rooted stereotype reflects the image of ethnic Chinese who are only focusing on their work and do not engage in social and cultural activities. According to Thung, the "longstanding and widespread perception of the Chinese as 'economic animals' retarded the ability of other Indonesian groups to conceive of Chinese activities as having the same social and cultural significance as their own." Thung, 1998, p. 220-221.

²⁷⁹ Purdey, 2006, p. 21.

indigenous, leaving unmentioned the fact that it was only a very small portion of the ethnic Chinese who were in such a position.²⁸⁰

‘Othering’ of Chinese Indonesians

Groups often define themselves against a perceived ‘other’ to define themselves. The ‘othering’ and thus marginalization (SFN) of ethnic Chinese served a functional purpose by identifying the salient ‘out-group’ against which the nation sought to define itself. This in turn influenced the ethnic Chinese’s understanding of their own identity.²⁸¹ The non-acceptance and ‘othering’ of ethnic Chinese by other Indonesian ethnic groups fostered hostile prejudices against ethnic Chinese. As a counter-reaction to the hostile attitudes they were facing, ethnic Chinese increased their in-group solidarity. This re-enforced their outsider identity which was then often perceived as exclusivity and an assumed feeling of superiority vis-à-vis the indigenous, creating a vicious circle.

In spite of government public efforts, Chinese Indonesian ethnicity remained visible and they were recognized as being a group of ‘others’. Not only were those who still considered themselves to be Chinese marginalized but the group as a whole. This also included those who sought to assimilate. Many ethnic Chinese already did not feel Chinese but rather Indonesian. A considerable number did not speak the Chinese languages²⁸² or follow Chinese rituals or beliefs. This social segregation not only served the purposes of the government, but proved useful to the masses as well. In times of frustration, the outsider group could be blamed and the indigenous had a chance to vent their anger at members of this group without having to fear official censure. A group of underdogs leading a relatively socially marginalized existence often proved to be a suitable scapegoat (marginalization, SFN).²⁸³ By keeping the official discussion about the so-called ‘Chinese problem’ alive, the government made sure that ethnic Chinese would not cease to be perceived as ‘others’. Their ethnic identity was kept alive or even reproduced to maintain the status quo of ethnic Chinese as social middlemen.²⁸⁴ To this aim, negative stereotypes which fostered prejudices were constantly perpetuated and ethnic Chinese were discriminated against by the state and its organs.

²⁸⁰ Purdey, 2006, p. 22.

²⁸¹ Purdey, 2006, p. 24.

²⁸² A study conducted already in the early 1970s indicated that 81% of the Chinese Indonesian households spoke Indonesian. Purdey, 2006, p. 29.

²⁸³ The Indonesian term ‘*kambing hitam*’ (black goat), meaning scapegoat, is frequently referred to by ethnic Chinese (Interview with Christine Tjhin, 01.09.2008).

²⁸⁴ Heryanto, 1998b, p. 104.

(Physical) Segregation and Segmentation of Chinese Indonesians from Indigenous Indonesians

To maintain the distinctiveness of Chinese Indonesians, a number of politicians argued that they should be excluded from the rest of Indonesian society. A first step would be the reintroduction of colonial-era ghettos or camps for Chinese Indonesians. This was however only implemented in West Kalimantan.²⁸⁵

As response to riots in West-Kalimantan²⁸⁶ in 1967, during which ethnic Chinese were attacked by Dayaks, the government re-activated Presidential Decree 10 and relocated ethnic Chinese from the rural areas to the coast. An estimated 50,000 Chinese Indonesians were gathered in camps and later resettled in the coastal towns of Pontianak and Singkawang.²⁸⁷ As most ethnic Chinese distrusted the country's legal system²⁸⁸ and feared that in case they might file a claim, they would be further harassed by other indigenous Indonesians, no official claims were filed against the Dayak perpetrators.²⁸⁹ Thus the experience of past direct violence shaped a culture of silencing incidents such as this one (CV).

A consequence of the Presidential Decree was that most Chinese Indonesians were forced to live concentrated in the cities as they were prevented from working in rural areas. For the Indonesian elite, like for the Dutch colonial masters before them, restricting the freedom of movement and hindering the integration process of ethnic Chinese made controlling them easier. Due to the high concentration of ethnic Chinese in the cities, the likelihood of inter-ethnic marriage was reduced. From an outsider's perspective, they formed a more homogeneous group. For the local population, they were segmented (SIN) and at the same time expelled (DFN) from the country side.

²⁸⁵ Liem, 1986, p. 557-8.

²⁸⁶ In 1967, a riot against ethnic Chinese broke out in West Kalimantan. The violence was triggered by an attack by the mostly ethnically Chinese Malaysian guerilla force PGRS (Pasukan Gerlyawan Rakyat Sarawak) which was active in the jungle near the border. This troop launched an attack on Indonesian troops and villages as a reaction to Indonesia's campaign of "Confrontation against the new nation of Malaysia". Dayaks were among the dead in the villages. The villagers noted that the members of the guerrilla were ethnic Chinese and thus struck back at Chinese Indonesian villages, killing several hundred ethnic Chinese. The local government did not intervene and the attacks by the Dayak went unpunished.

²⁸⁷ Purdey, 2006, pp. 19-20.

²⁸⁸ Precedents for making legal claims against the perpetrators who were indigenous were rare and most ethnic Chinese did not expect to be treated fairly by authorities including courts. Purdey, 2008, p. 520. Similar experiences were reported by Ester Jusuf who tried to convince victims of the 1998 riots to file claims without success (interview 05.09.2008).

²⁸⁹ In case of other physical attacks against ethnic Chinese during the New Order era (e.g 1973 in Bandung, 1980 in Ujung Pandang and Solo, 1983 in Sumbawa), the government did not punish perpetrators and the victims did not receive reparations. Winkelmann, 2008, p. 60.

Apart from physical segregation, the government separated the ethnic Chinese from the indigenous population by occupational segmentation. The negative image of the ethnic Chinese as ‘economical animals’²⁹⁰ might have faded over the years had the Chinese Indonesians no longer been primarily engaged in business, the segment assigned to them since Dutch times. In order to ensure that the ethnic Chinese remained in this segment, the government implemented maximum quotas for Chinese students at public universities and in administrative positions.²⁹¹ They were mostly excluded from public service or positions in the military to prevent them from gaining political influence (SFN). This segmentation (SIN) in terms of profession was important as the group would not only continue to be perceived as one group based on their ethnicity only but also on their social class and assigned professional fields. As a distinct group of ‘others’ linked to negative stereotypes, becoming fully accepted as Indonesians in many cases proved to be impossible.²⁹² These regulations fostered the marginalization (SFN) of Chinese Indonesians and discouraged integration.

State-led Discrimination against Chinese Indonesians

Despite the official claim of furthering the assimilation of the ethnic Chinese, the Soeharto regime did not change the status of the Chinese Indonesians to indigenous. Even if they wanted to become fully Indonesian as a group, ethnic Chinese would not have been able to succeed since the concept of ‘Indonesianness’ was reserved for people considered as being indigenous to the archipelago. Discrimination was thus already embedded in the concept of national identity. This concept was not questioned, neither by ethnic Chinese or indigenous Indonesians, since the categorization of indigenous and non-indigenous had already been introduced by the Dutch before and the emergence of an Indonesian nation (nationalism) and subsequent independence (CV).

Language forms an important basis for stereotyping. The ethnic Chinese were referred to as Chinese (‘cina’)²⁹³ rather than as Chinese Indonesians or other terms such as *tionghoa*, thus marking them as foreigners and marginalizing (SFN) them. No difference was made between people from China (residing and holding the citizenship of the People's Republic of China or Taiwan) and Chinese Indonesians who called Indonesia their home. Chinese Indonesians

²⁹⁰ Interview with Mohammad Gatot (08.09.2008) and Gustav P. (14.04.2010).

²⁹¹ Heryanto, 1999, p. 326; Reid, 2001, p. 75.

²⁹² Hoon, 2008, pp. 107-108.

²⁹³ The term used was ‘cina’ which stressed the strong linkage to the country of their ancestors downplaying their active choice (if made) to be Indonesians and questioning their sincerity of their choice as well as their loyalty to Indonesia. The rather neutral term ‘*tionghoa*’ (Chinese) was banned from public use by the government in 1967.

considered the use of the term '*cina*' as an offence. The cultural and historical identification of some ethnic Chinese with Chinese civilization was interpreted in public as being a political identification with the current government of PR China. Especially during the Cold War – when Indonesia froze all diplomatic relations with PR China (from the end of 1960s until the beginning of the 1990s), ethnic Chinese were frequently reported as having maintained their ties to Mainland China. Many indigenous Indonesians considered this to be sufficient proof of their disloyalty towards Indonesia as well as their (alleged Communist) political orientation, thus justifying discriminatory acts and cultural oppression.²⁹⁴ The use of the word '*cina*' for ethnic Chinese enforced this association in daily life. Therefore, language also played a role in legitimizing violence (i.e. cultural violence).

In 1970, ethnic Chinese were required to re-register as Indonesians of Chinese descent. This procedure especially offended those Chinese who before had already actively confirmed their Indonesian citizenship. After this registration procedure, everyone of Chinese descent was identifiable by their identity card (*karta tanda penduduk* – KTP) and census registration card (*kartu cacah jiwa*). In contrast to indigenous Indonesians, the cards of ethnic Chinese showed a special code.²⁹⁵ This official stigma exposed them to discrimination by officials (bureaucrats, police and military). In order to renew their identity cards, for example, ethnic Chinese were often asked for a higher fee than indigenous Indonesians.²⁹⁶ Thus government policies that fostered stigmatization and discrimination led to an institutionalization of discrimination against Chinese Indonesians (SWN)²⁹⁷. This legitimized treating a Chinese Indonesian differently from an indigenous Indonesian. As the state already made this distinction between Chinese Indonesian and indigenous Indonesians, it is not surprising that the population transferred the discrimination from the governmental down to the grass-root level.

In order to transform existing prejudices and discrimination to direct violence in the form of large ethnic riots as happened during the May riots 1998, Brass mentions the need for 'riot specialists' or 'riot engineers' that implement structures and mobilize the crowds.²⁹⁸ These acts of direct violence then reproduced the dependency of the ethnic Chinese on security provided by the state and thus the political elite. Due to this dependency, this merchant class could not

²⁹⁴ e.g. Coppel, 1983, pp. 5-27.

²⁹⁵ Reid, 2001, pp. 74-75.

²⁹⁶ Interview with Ester Jusuf, (05.09.2008).

²⁹⁷ Purdey, 2006, pp. 25-26.

²⁹⁸ Brass, 1996, pp. 12-16.

evolve to become a threat to the political elite. This reinforced the structure of indirect violence which ensured the existing gap between the ethnic Chinese and other ethnic Indonesian groups.

3.3 End of an Era: Anti-Chinese Riots in the 1990s

The Asian Crisis and Scape-goating of Chinese Indonesians

The violence against ethnic Chinese came to a peak during the final years of the Soeharto regime, when the political system of the New Order was challenged by other political parties. These included the Indonesian Democracy Party (PDI) led by Megawati Soekarnoputri (the daughter of Soekarno) as well as other smaller parties, such as the Islamic party (PPP), supporting the call for more democracy and reforms. In order to silence the voices raised against New Order policies, the government banned newspapers and magazines closely linked to the opposition in 1994. In this context, Soeharto also ended the ‘program of openness (*keterbukaan*)’ which was introduced in the early 1980s to promote foreign investment in Indonesia and greater integration into the world economy.

Even though the economy was still booming in 1996, the gap between rich and poor increased instead of decreased which the Indonesian public blamed on the government and the ethnic Chinese conglomerates.²⁹⁹ It became obvious that the wealth of the family Soeharto increased substantially and a national project for the development of the Indonesian car industry which was awarded to Soeharto's son, Tommy Soeharto, along with other lucrative deals, confirmed accusations of nepotism. President Soeharto made an effort to divert interest from his family's wealth by publicly criticizing the wealth of ethnic Chinese tycoons.³⁰⁰ The masses' anger resulting from the economic crisis, unemployment and hunger should thereby be directed towards the ethnic Chinese.

The mass media stated frequently that the ethnic Chinese who made up only approx. 3% of the population controlled 70% or even more of the nation's economy.³⁰¹ This myth of the ethnic Chinese' dominance of the nation's economy had been perpetuated already in the past to strengthen their image as the ‘rich’ and ‘exploitive’ minority. Even though it is true that a

²⁹⁹ Thung, 1998, p. 232.

³⁰⁰ E.g. Soeharto held a meeting at his Tapos ranch in 1990 with the heads of the leading business conglomerates (mainly Chinese Indonesians) during which he appealed to the conglomerates to assist in the development of economically weak groups by transferring assets and to allow them to buy shares to close the gap between rich and poor. Thee, 2006, p. 94.

³⁰¹ Heryanto, 1999, pp. 310-314. In an article of the Asia Times online dd. Feb. 20, 2002, it says: “Although Chinese Indonesians account for less than 3 percent of the country's 215 million people, they control almost 90 percent of the economy.” Langit, 2002.

disproportionally high number of ethnic Chinese played a significant role in the country's private sector, especially since Soeharto took over, their overall influence has been overrated. The myth was based on a study made by Michael Backman, Executive Officer with the East Asia Analytical Unit of the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, in 1995. However, the study states that the Chinese-Indonesians controlled about 73% of Indonesia's listed companies 'by market capitalization'. Those who cited this study apparently failed to note this detail. This means their "control by market capitalization has been determined after listed firms controlled by governments or foreigners are discounted."³⁰² However, the study seemed to confirm the impression many indigenous Indonesians had based on casual observation. Many business establishments, shops, banks and manufacturing facilities were and still are today owned by Chinese Indonesians.³⁰³

By exaggerating their economical influence, the indigenous elite maintained, further developed and even (re-)constructed the image of the 'exploitive rich Chinese'. Despite his efforts, Soeharto could not manage to shake the allegations of nepotism against him as he could not hide that fact that the Chinese tycoons were his close allies. The negative publicity for the ethnic Chinese fostered their image as agents of a system in which the political elite (mainly the Soeharto family) and their cronies (the ethnic Chinese) enriched themselves at the expense of the rest of the population. They were also held responsible for the widening of the gap between rich and poor.

The Asian Economic Crisis began with the collapse of the Thai baht in early 1997, with the Indonesian Rupiah following soon after. Along with inflation, the unemployment rate was rising and even those who were employed did not earn enough to keep up with the falling currency. Prices of food and basic commodities did not fall accordingly, causing panic (buying) and accusations against shop-owners of hoarding food to artificially inflate prices.

During the 1990s new facilities such as shopping malls, leisure complexes and churches were built by Chinese Indonesians to satisfy the needs of the growing middle-class in Jakarta. The government fueled anti-Chinese sentiments by singling out ethnic Chinese conglomerates as being disloyal to the government, as these officially opposed government policies by publicly stating that the state should embrace the reforms demanded by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).³⁰⁴ These reforms included the elimination of economic policies which had been

³⁰² Barber, 1999.

³⁰³ Simandjuntak, 2006, p. 62.

³⁰⁴ Wanandi and other business leaders had called on the government already in October 1997. Purdey, 2006, p. 90.

identified as damaging to the national economy, such as ending the national car project and the clove monopoly which both involved family members of Soeharto. The ethnic Chinese businessman Wanandi, for example, was publicly accused of transferring money out of Indonesia and refusing to exchange US Dollars for Indonesian rupiah, thereby further weakening the Indonesian economy. Wanandi thus served as a scapegoat for a government that was not able to deal with the financial and economical crisis at the time.³⁰⁵ The causal relation between the ethnic Chinese and the financial crisis was constantly stressed by the government and served as a motor for violence at the grass-root level.³⁰⁶

(Direct) Violent Acts

In 1996, violent acts against ethnic Chinese in Jakarta (July 27), Situbondo, East Java (October 10) and Tasikmalaya, West Java (December 26) took place. These focused mostly on property (houses, shops, factories) and churches or temples (Confucian or Buddhist) of ethnic Chinese rather than their lives.³⁰⁷ As I shall discuss in more detail below, it is often difficult to assess the number of deaths since the figures vary from one source to the other. Many incidents and cases were not reported to the police, making it difficult to compile exact figures. In 1997, violent incidents occurred in Sanggau Ledo, West Kalimantan, Tanah Abang, Jabotabek, Rengasdengklok, West Java (all in January), Bandung, West Java (February 18), Pekalongan, Central Java (March 27), Banjarmasin, South Kalimantan (May 23), Tangerang, Jabotabek (September 9) and Ujung Pandang (Makassar), Sulawesi (September 15). It was not possible to determine the exact number of people who died in the above mentioned incidents. In the case of Tangerang, for example, it is doubtful that all deaths were reported to the officials as many of the ethnic Chinese residing there are missing the Indonesian Citizenship Certificate (SBKRI, Surat Bukti Kewarganegaraan Republik Indonesia) and were not even registered as citizens. As only ethnic Chinese needed to provide the Indonesian Citizenship Certificate, for example for applying for citizenship documentation, this document provides an example for discrimination against ethnic Chinese by organs of the state. The most incidents happened throughout 1998 (the main locations of violent incidents are marked in red on the map, see figure below).

³⁰⁵ Purdey, 2006, p. 88ff.

³⁰⁶ Purdey, 2006, p. 104.

³⁰⁷ Purdey, 2006, p. 46 and p. 59.



Figure 7: Map of Indonesia; places of 1998 riots are marked in red.

The climax of violent acts with regard to their scale as well as their number was reached with the riots in May 1998, occurring in Jakarta, Solo, Surabaya, Lampung, Medan and Palembang. Witnesses of the incidents reported of organized groups of men acting under orders and large groups of people that followed and took advantage of the situation by plundering.³⁰⁸ After 1998, riots continued to occur, though, they were on a much smaller scale than those in 1998. Examples include Karawang, West Java (January 9) and Bandung, West Java (March 8) in 1999.

The total number of victims of the May 1998 riots remains contested. NGOs, such as the Volunteer Group of Humanity (TRuK) estimated that 1,190 people had died in fires and 27 were shot dead, whereas the police reported 451 dead, the district military reported 463 dead and the Jakarta regional government 288 dead.³⁰⁹ Other violent riots in Indonesia which were present at the same time caused more casualties, such as in Ambon in 1999. According to the International Crisis Group at least 5,000 people (up to 10,000) were killed.³¹⁰ As further

³⁰⁸ Purdey, 2006, p. 108.

³⁰⁹ The Joint Fact-Finding Team, 1998.

³¹⁰ Purdey, 2006, p. 198.

detailed in the following section, rioters targeted mainly ethnic Chinese shops and houses. It was apparently not their intention to harm the ethnic Chinese in person. Instead, their actions rather displayed an anger which they vented on the ethnic Chinese collectively as scapegoats. By making them feel inferior and subordinate despite their assumed wealth, the perpetrators undermined the dominance of the majority population. Since the state did not protect the victims, these actions went unpunished.

Even though each incident started off differently, a certain pattern is visible. In the riots prior to the economic crisis (before May 1998), an event involving a Chinese Indonesian triggered violent acts, such as:³¹¹

- a Chinese Indonesian shop-owner who had strip-searched an indigenous woman whom he accused of shoplifting (West Java, 2 June, 1997)
- the murder of an indigenous by a Chinese Indonesian (Makassar, 15 September, 1997)

These events served as triggers for riots. Instead of being limited to the people involved, violence against the property of ethnic Chinese as well as against the people themselves in general broke out across the respective cities. While negative, anti-Chinese stereotypes and prejudices created an atmosphere in which riots could occur, turning 'normal' people into rioters may have required the actions of active provocateurs.³¹² Witnesses of violent acts in different places reported to the Joint Fact Finding Team that people not from the area had come on motorcycles, talked to the people, and guided them.³¹³ Before May 1998, an active mobilization of masses to act against the ethnic Chinese seemed to have been necessary. During the peak of violence in May 1998, however, rumors of shop-owners hoarding food or selling food at high prices sufficed to start riots against them which then often spread to other cities.³¹⁴

After Soeharto stepped down and an interim government took over, riots against Chinese Indonesians continued throughout Indonesia, although they were not on the same scale as the May riots. It is very unlikely that those would have been engineered by the new government. Upon closer examination, a shift in the focus of violent acts becomes visible: instead of targeting all ethnic Chinese, the perpetrators concentrated on Christian Chinese. In many, though not all, incidents of anti-Chinese violence, non-Muslim symbols such as churches were targeted. In Indonesia, religious conflicts between Christians and Muslims became frequent in

³¹¹ Purdey, 2006, p. 78.

³¹² Brass, 1996, pp. 12-16.

³¹³ Purdey, 2006, p. 127.

³¹⁴ Purdey, 2006, p. 38ff.

the 1990s. As many ethnic Chinese are non-Muslims they are considered to be infidels. Violence against ethnic Chinese has been legitimized (CV) with the argument of them acting in an impure manner, e.g. by eating pork. In many cases the victims were not only ethnic Chinese, but also Christian indigenous people. In addition to Christians, the perpetrators targeted mainly Chinese Indonesians with considerable or at least ostentatious wealth. The attacks were directed specifically at churches and house estates belonging to the 'rich' (e.g. in Bandung, March 1999 as well as in Tangerang and Bogor in 2004).³¹⁵ Thus a shift can be observed, away from ethnic or racial aspects towards religious and class components of the conflict.

Gender-based Sexual Violence: Rape

A new, gendered aspect became prominent in the May 1998 riots that had not been present or at least not reported in previous riots, namely gender-based sexual violence (DWN). In the course of this type of violence, women (mainly ethnic Chinese, but also indigenous women of the urban poor) were raped. Whether isolated or systematic, the effects of rape are devastating to individuals and damaging to whole communities. The physical consequences can include unwanted pregnancies, sexually transmitted infections including HIV, and genital injury including fistula, all of which can leave women scarred, disabled, unable to conceive, or deemed unsuitable for marriage. Apart from physical consequences, the victims suffer from psychological damages (traumata). Like the number of people killed, the number of women raped is also very difficult to ascertain. Local human rights groups, such as TRuK recorded 168 victims of rape, whereas the Joint Fact Finding Team appointed by the interim government under Habibie could only verify 85 cases of rape. Due to disagreement among the members of the team, the report does not state whether the rapes were a spontaneous side-effect of the violent attacks against ethnic Chinese in general or whether they had actually been a pre-meditated part of the engineered violence.³¹⁶

As rape is still considered a taboo topic in Indonesia, women who have been raped are often hesitant to talk about their experience fearing that they might bring shame upon themselves and their families.³¹⁷ After the violence, the Indonesian journalists, religious leaders and members of parliament started questioning if the rapes had actually taken place.³¹⁸ Even though the UN

³¹⁵ Purdey, 2006, pp. 200ff.

³¹⁶ Purdey, 2006, p. 146; Tan, 2006, p.233.

³¹⁷ Interviews with Ester Jusuf who tried to convince ethnic Chinese women to file a claim against their perpetrators. (05.09.2008).

³¹⁸ Purdey, 2006, p. 145. Purdey quotes as example an article by Antara Newsagency reporter Sri Muryono titled 'Did Rapes Actually Happen?' published in the Republica Newspaper on 2 August, 1998.

Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, Radhika Coomaraswamy, had confirmed mass rapes of Chinese Indonesian women.³¹⁹ Once the credibility of the victims was questioned, less women were willing to step forward. TRuK reported that they had supported more victims of rape than the number stated by the Joint Fact Finding Team, who, however, were not willing to officially file a claim against their perpetrators.³²⁰ Their hesitation was further fostered when in 1998 top officials of President Habibie's newly formed cabinet, e.g. the Minister for Women's Affairs, representatives of the military and major Islamic organizations also joined the public debate and questioned the integrity of the victims.³²¹ Mass media reports stated that the economic crisis, unemployment and hunger directed the masses' anger against the ethnic Chinese, due to their disproportionate economic power.³²² As a consequence, the general public emotionally distanced themselves from the victims and justified them as a specific ethnic problem arising from prolonged economic disadvantage.³²³

Muslim organizations accused groups protecting the victims (such as the Volunteers for Humanity) of fabricating sensationalist stories to discredit Islam.³²⁴ Reporters, like Sri Muryono demanded to disclose and persuade the alleged victims to testify in public.³²⁵ Their demands were also supported by top government officials, like General Wiranto (Chief Commander of the Armed Forces).³²⁶ The victims were therefore violated twice: at first by their perpetrators and later by the media and the public who questioned their integrity and honesty. Even though the Joint Fact Finding Team had confirmed that rapes had taken place, the government initiated no actions to deal with the perpetrators or to provide help to the victims.³²⁷

The May-Riots: A New Peak in the History of Violence against Ethnic Chinese

Why was the violence in 1996-1999 different from 'normal' discriminatory acts against ethnic Chinese? First, the scale of the violence was larger than 'everyday' violent acts prior to these riots. Second, physical attacks on ethnic Chinese during the climax of violence in May 1998, were committed on a national scale involving an organizational strategy and mobilization of

³¹⁹ Coomaraswamy, 1999.

³²⁰ Purdey, 2006, pp. 145ff.

³²¹ Winarnita, 2008, p. 2.

³²² Heryanto, 1999, pp. 310-314.

³²³ Winarnita, 2008, p. 3.

³²⁴ According to Heryanto, 1999, p. 306, footnote 8, those Islamic groups were self-proclaimed and close to the Soeharto and Habibie regimes.

³²⁵ Purdey, 2006, p. 145.

³²⁶ Heryanto, 1999, pp. 321ff.

³²⁷ Tan, 2006, pp. 233ff.

masses by members of the state apparatus (political and military). Apart from active involvement of state sections, the state also failed in fulfilling its responsibility to protect its citizens from violence. The riots also revealed how deep-seated anti-Chinese sentiments, prejudice and discrimination were among the indigenous population. Although it was mainly property that was attacked and only few people were killed directly, many ethnic Chinese (and also some indigenous – especially poor ones) died because they were not rescued when their houses or shops etc. were looted (non-assistance of a person in danger). Therefore, due to the higher scale of destruction, the death rate was higher than in incidents before.

The years 1996 – 1999 also saw the emergence of new kinds of violence: the rape of (mainly) Chinese Indonesian women as well as systematic destruction of ethnic Chinese property.³²⁸ Systematic destruction of property can be interpreted as meaning that the violence was motivated by ethnic or religious antipathies as well as social envy rather than purely economical aims. The social differences seemed to legitimize the destruction of their property, common sayings such as: “They have so much, they can afford it. It will not threaten their existence.”³²⁹ show that not much harm was seen in “making them more equal”³³⁰ by destroying their property. Even though most of the frustration of the rioters sprang out of the difficult economical situation they faced, they chose to destroy the property rather than stealing it. Instead of taking over shops, factories, churches etc., they merely burnt them down.³³¹

The material losses of around 457 billion rupiahs (ca. 46 million US\$) incurred upon the ethnic Chinese in Solo during the 1997 riots alone provides an idea of the extent of the material damage. These losses made it difficult for many ethnic Chinese to go on with their lives. Interestingly, even though indigenous Indonesians destroyed the property of Chinese Indonesians to vent their anger and to “make them more equal”, the widespread belief that Chinese Indonesians would have the means to build up everything and go back to where they left off still remained quite strong.³³² Possibly, this was based on, the fact that the Chinese as a group had managed to recover from past riots created the false belief each and every individual would be able to do so as well.³³³ For the tycoons who had secured their money, the losses they suffered might have been substantial, but they did not endanger their existence. For small shop owners, however, who had lost not only their shops and goods, but also their homes, their

³²⁸ Purdey, 2006, p. 36.

³²⁹ Interview with Christine Tjhin (01.09.2008).

³³⁰ Ibid.

³³¹ Purdey, 2006, p. 65.

³³² Purdey, 2006, p. 215

³³³ Stories of poor Chinese families who lost their small businesses in the May 1998 riots and did not recover do not seem to fit the popular perception of ethnic Chinese. Purdey, 2006, p. 215.

economic basis was entirely gone.³³⁴ As a consequence their basic human need of well-being, in this case security of their existence had been taken away, in some cases even seriously threatening their very survival.

In contrast to the violence against ethnic Chinese before 1998, the May riots were reported in the news outside South-east Asia, mainly due to the considerably large scale of direct violence. Although media reports brought this conflict to attention for the people in other countries and raised sympathy and moral support for ethnic Chinese among foreign governments (especially PR China, Taiwan, USA) which pressured the new Habibie administration to establish the Joint Team, there was also a downside to this. Portraying the ethnic Chinese as victims on the international level made many of them feel uneasy. International reactions (especially on the internet) included anti-Indonesian or anti-Muslim slurs which the victims (being Indonesian and some of them Muslim as well) could not agree with. These reactions also did not help the cause of the ethnic Chinese as they highlighted their ‘foreignness’ or link to the overseas Chinese community at a time when they needed to be recognized as Indonesians.³³⁵

Aftermath of the Riots – Dealing With Violence

In the aftermath of the riots, foreign governments such as the Chinese, Taiwanese and US governments, as well as Indonesian human rights organizations and the National Human Rights Commission (*Komnas HAM*) have all pressured the Indonesian government on behalf of the ethnic Chinese. In reaction, President Habibie and his government appointed a Joint Fact Finding Team as early as July 1998 to investigate the incidents.

The report issued by the Joint Fact Finding Team is a valuable source of information, especially since the research was conducted in the immediate aftermath of the riots. However, there were limits set to the work of this team, which was only given three months to complete its report. Finding witnesses willing to talk about the events only two months afterwards proved to be difficult. The members of the team faced further difficulties in gathering information as the incidents had taken place in various locations across Indonesia. Another impediment was that most members of the team did not have any prior experience in fact finding and in conducting this kind of research. Nevertheless, they received only very little training due to the tight time

³³⁴ Purdey, 2006, p. 215.

³³⁵ Purdey, 2006, pp. 167-168.

schedule.³³⁶ After the report was completed in October 1998, only the government and a handful of researchers received the report in full length. While the full report covered several hundred pages, only an abridged version of twenty pages was made available to the public (as cited here). The team came to the conclusion that the violence was orchestrated by more than one party. The parties involved, according to the report, included members of the army, political and mass organizations as well as local criminals.³³⁷

Since the Joint Fact Finding Team was set up by President Habibie to determine those responsible for the riots, it was crucial to the team to identify culprits. The team members singled out Prabowo, the Commander of the *Kostrad* (the Jakarta-based Army Strategic Reserve), as their main suspect for being responsible for the May riots. According to the report, he played a crucial role in the so called ‘Makostad meeting’ on May 14, 1998, during which the violent acts were said to have been planned. The Joint Team suspected other members of the political elite as having been present at that meeting as well. However, the team did not find sufficient proof to name further suspects. Therefore, the team recommended that further investigations concerning this meeting should be carried out to find the missing links to members of the political elite. As a consequence of the report, Prabowo had to face a military trial. During the trial, he stated that he was not the mastermind and had acted only according to orders given to him by his superiors, Armed Forces Commander Lt. Gen. Feisal Tanjung and Army Chief of Staff Gen. Wiranto. However, his claims were dismissed by the military council, insisting that Prabowo had misunderstood the orders given to him. He was discharged from military service.³³⁸ The Joint Fact Finding Team did not question the decision by the military council, although it seems likely that Prabowo served as a scapegoat and that by ‘handing him over’, the military prevented further investigations in their rows. Prabowo fled the country and sought asylum in Jordan. In public mind, this proved his guilt and responsibility for the planning and initiating of the May riots.³³⁹

The Joint Fact Finding Team may have managed to provide the name of a key person involved, but it did not investigate more thoroughly, neither to uncover more people of the military and the government involved, nor to better understand their intentions and reasons. As a consequence, several members of the team refused to sign the final report, demanding further investigations. Even though the Joint Team had collected evidence to suspect military and

³³⁶ Purdey, 2006, pp. 110ff.

³³⁷ The Joint Fact-Finding Team, 1998.

³³⁸ Purdey, 2006, pp. 154ff.

³³⁹ Purdey, 2006, p. 155. She cites an article published in Tempo Newspaper on 12 October 1998.

government involvement in the violence acts occurred in May 1998³⁴⁰, they could not find more links between the violence in the streets and the elite (other than Prabowo). According to Purdey, the testimony provided by the Army's chief of intelligence, Makarim, and his hesitation to support the Joint Team, was the key to why the Joint Team was not able to uncover the whole elite machination behind the violence.³⁴¹ Many potential suspects remained in office which may explain why no further investigations were initiated. Apart from these weaknesses, the report was obviously not prepared in order to bring upon justice for the victims but rather mainly to respond to international pressures. Apart from Prabowo, no perpetrators were brought to trial. The report was rejected by the military, widely ignored by the government and questioned by sections of the national media.³⁴²

While many aspects of the May 1998 riots remain unstudied, the available data allows for a few assumptions. It seems likely that the riots were initiated to allow President Soeharto to declare a state of emergency. This would have allowed the president to proclaim martial law if necessary and to restore order with force. Further, the president was thus given the opportunity to discredit rivals of his family (e.g. Gen. Wiranto) by showing that they were not able to control the situation. Last, but most important for the ethnic Chinese, the riots aimed at redirecting the people's anger from the government toward the Chinese Indonesians.³⁴³

Since no other attempt was made to bring about justice, a culture of silence was cultivated (CV). In many interviews, ethnic Chinese were reluctant to talk about the riots. Instead, phrases such as: "Oh, let's better forget about 1998 and move on – like we always do,"³⁴⁴ were repeated like a mantra. Jusuf also identified a 'normalization' of violence against Chinese Indonesians which leads to a tradition of silencing violence. The victims choose silence over testimony.³⁴⁵ It might also hint at the deep-seated fear that if the victims actually go to court and demand justice, they and their families could again become targets of violence. On the one hand they feared being hurt by having to re-live the events in court and on the other hand they feared that if the perpetrators were to be sentenced, people connected to the perpetrators could seek revenge in the form of violent acts against them.³⁴⁶ The feeling of being treated as second-class

³⁴⁰ Provocateurs who were questioned, testified that they had been trained under military commanders which explains their skills and equipment they used during the attacks. Purdey, 2006, p. 150.

³⁴¹ Purdey, 2006, pp. 151ff.

³⁴² Purdey, 2006, p. 144.

³⁴³ Heryanto, 1998b, p. 76.

³⁴⁴ Interview with Dr. Grace W. (18.04. 2010).

³⁴⁵ Interview with Ester Jusuf (05.09.2008).

³⁴⁶ Ibid.

citizens by the organs of the state has been embedded in the self-understanding of many ethnic Chinese.³⁴⁷

Shortly after the May violence, President Habibie tried to convince the ethnic Chinese who had fled the country to return. Exact numbers are not available, but estimates rank between 20,000-30,000 ethnic Chinese who left the country by Mid-May.³⁴⁸ However, riots continued after May 1998, the reports of which caused a number of Chinese Indonesian to remain abroad. After the violence subsided in 1999, Chinese Indonesians slowly started to return – nevertheless, there were also those who decided to remain abroad.³⁴⁹ They were disappointed that their security could not be guaranteed and they had lost their trust both in the Indonesian government and the country itself.³⁵⁰ President Habibie stated several times in public that the ethnic Chinese had his full sympathy and that they were needed in Indonesia.³⁵¹ However, according to Sofyan Wanandi, the government remained mostly passive and thus unconvincing in its efforts at healing the wounds of the Chinese Indonesian community.³⁵² Ethnic Chinese were only urged to come home in order to revive the economy again by reopening their businesses as if nothing happened. The calls by politicians (e.g. President Habibie and his successor Wahid³⁵³) for ethnic Chinese to return to Indonesia all mention their importance for the Indonesian economy. They were not ‘called home’ as an integral part of the Indonesian nation and society, but (at least primarily) for their financial assets and business skills. When some ethnic Chinese refused to reopen their shops as they were frightened of what had happened before or because they did not have the financial resources to recover again, the government blamed them for being anti-patriotic and disloyal.³⁵⁴

These reactions to returning ethnic Chinese who either chose not to re-open businesses or were unable to do so show that the perception of ethnic Chinese had not changed after the riots. They further show that it was not considered wrong to exploit the economic skills and resources of the ethnic Chinese. The perception that if they wanted to stay and be Indonesians, they would have to contribute more than other ethnic groups supports the assumption that the national

³⁴⁷ Interviews with Wahyu Effendi (08.09.2008) and Protus Tanuhandaru (02.09.2008).

³⁴⁸ Purdey, 2006, p. 174.

³⁴⁹ During the interview with Charlotte Setijadi (05.04.2010), she revealed that a large community of Chinese Indonesians were living in Melbourne, Australia (like herself), comprising at least 200-300 people.

³⁵⁰ Purdey, 2006, p. 137.

³⁵¹ According to interviews with Habibie in the Asian Wall Street Journal and Business Week in Autumn 1998. Purdey, 2006, p. 176.

³⁵² Wanandi, 1999, p. 133.

³⁵³ Wahid stated: “So will you please return, because we need you to revive our economy“, quoted in Reuters, 24 June, 1998, cited in Purdey, 2006, p. 177.

³⁵⁴ Purdey, 2006, p. 177.

concept which is based on 'indigenusness' furthered the marginalized position of the ethnic Chinese and discrimination against them.

The riots in the 1990s, peaking in May 1998, marked a turning point not only in the history of the Indonesian nation as such, but also for the history of the Chinese Indonesians in particular. The massive direct violence faced by the ethnic Chinese was unprecedented both in terms of its scale and its geographical scope. It further included new factors, such as the systematic destruction of property as well as rape. Religion also fuelled anti-Chinese sentiments. This scale of direct violence would not have been possible without a build-up and intensifying of structural violence against Chinese Indonesians in the years prior to the outbreaks. Shortly after the violence, little was done to initiate a healing process for the victims. Only few perpetrators were punished and the victims were not compensated for their losses.³⁵⁵ Nonetheless, in order to win back the ethnic Chinese, measures have been initiated by the governments following the Soeharto administration in order to reduce violence in general and to prevent direct violence in the future.

3.4 Reformasi: Shifts in Forms and Degree of Violence against Ethnic Chinese

After the fall of Soeharto regime 1998, Habibie, the vice-president took over the government until the first elections in 1999. The period following the end of the New Order was termed 'reformasi' (reformation), marking the transition from authoritarian rule to laying the foundations for constitutional liberalism and a democratic political structure. The successors of Soeharto had and at the time of writing (2012) still, have to deal with the legacy of the New Order regime. On the one hand, the transition ushered in unprecedented freedoms, such as giving Indonesians, for the first time, a chance to elect their own leaders and the liberty to organize themselves in the way they prefer. On the other hand, the removal of the lid on politics fomented previously suppressed ethnic and religious conflicts, and even encouraged regional separatism, creating political and economic uncertainties. Political and economic instability, social unrest, corruption, and acts of terrorism have slowed the progress of establishing democratic structures. Although relations among different religious and ethnic groups are largely harmonious, discontent with the current social, political or economic situation and

³⁵⁵ Interview with Yap Hong Gie (20.09.2008).

violence remain problems in some areas of Indonesia, e.g. in Papua or Sulawesi.³⁵⁶ However, the restructuring of the political system towards decentralization satisfied many local organizations who aimed at secession – an exception being Papua where secessionist movements are still strong. In the face of violent conflicts, such as Papua, the international media pays little attention to occasional violent attacks launched against ethnic Chinese. This lack of media information may mislead to think that there are none.

Removal of Discriminatory Legislation

Since the fall of the Soeharto regime in 1998, successive governments have repealed legislation that discriminated against Chinese Indonesians, leading to an increased participation in politics, the arts and the media. In order to persuade ethnic Chinese who have left the country to return home, the Habibie administration abolished several discriminatory laws. The transitional government issued Presidential Instruction No. 26, 1998 which eliminated the difference between the ethnic Chinese and indigenous Indonesians by abolishing the terms ‘*pri*’ (indigenous) and ‘*non pri*’ (non-indigenous) in official government policies and administration. In 1999, Presidential Instruction No. 4/ 1999 stipulated that the Indonesian Citizenship Certificate (SBKRI, Surat Bukti Kewarganegaraan Republik Indonesia) would no longer be required for citizenship applications or marriage registrations. This regulation aims at simplifying procedures as the Indonesian Citizenship Certificate was or for some ethnic Chinese is still difficult to obtain, because they do not possess the required birth certificates. Further, in the final clause of the instruction, the ban on the study of the Mandarin (Chinese) language was lifted. Under Habibie’s successor, President Wahid (also known as Gus Dur), Chinese New Year was declared an optional holiday and the bans on the display of Chinese characters as well as the import of Chinese publications were lifted. Wahid also promulgated Presidential Decree 6 of 2000, which repealed Presidential Instruction 14/1967 that had banned the public display of Chinese religions, beliefs, and traditions, thus allowing Chinese religions (Buddhism as well as Confucianism) and traditions be practiced freely without the need of a permit. After Wahid was forced to step down in 2001 and was succeeded by Megawati Soekarnoputri, the course initiated by him with regard to the abolishing of discriminatory laws against ethnic Chinese continued. Megawati declared Chinese New Year to be an official national holiday in 2002.³⁵⁷ Chinese New Year is now celebrated publicly not only by ethnic

³⁵⁶ For example: <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/232-indonesia-dynamics-of-violence-in-papua.aspx> (10.09.2012) and <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/218-indonesia-the-deadly-cost-of-poor-policing.aspx> (10.09.2012).

³⁵⁷ Unidjaja, 2002.

Chinese but also indigenous Indonesians, who participate in the parades and other Chinese traditions like the lion dance – notwithstanding the lack of knowledge about the meaning of the rituals performed.³⁵⁸ The new freedom to express their cultural background freely has been greatly welcomed by many members of Chinese Indonesian community.³⁵⁹ Chinese New Year is viewed by ethnic Chinese as a symbol of new opportunity for freedom of expression, but also a recognition and acknowledgment of their long suppressed identity and a renewal of the government's commitment towards 'Chinese' culture.³⁶⁰

During Chinese New Year celebrations in 2007, President Yudhoyono reaffirmed his commitment to replace the pejorative term '*Cina*' with the neutral term '*Tionghoa*' in official usage.³⁶¹ This measure might slowly work in reducing cultural violence in the sphere of language against ethnic Chinese. This is an essential move as a reduction of violence on the structural or direct level is unlikely in the long-run without addressing cultural violence.

Violent Attacks against Chinese Indonesians

In spite of a clear reduction in scope and scale, attacks on the ethnic Chinese (DSN) – especially on their property (DWN) after the Anti-Chinese riots 1996-1999 still occasionally occur. During my interviews, I asked about violent attacks against ethnic Chinese and many respondents replied: "There are still some attacks here and then, but nothing as terrifying as the riots in 1998. It is now back to normal."³⁶² The relief about the fact that no large-scale attacks occurred prevails over the fear arising from random, occasional attacks. Since the attacks on ethnic Chinese were not on a large-scale, they were and are overshadowed by other ethnic or religious conflicts that are reported on in the news. However, in spite of limited attention given to them in general, some examples of violence which have been portrayed more prominently in the media.

One well-publicized case was the series of attacks on Chinese Christian churches in Tangerang as well as places of worship in Bogor.³⁶³ A pastor and a parishioner were injured while attempting to stop the attackers. Attacks against Christians by Muslims in this particular area

³⁵⁸Not only on the side of the indigenous Indonesians, many Chinese Indonesians also do not have an in-depth knowledge about Chinese culture due to the oppression of Chinese culture during the New Order. Interview with Fajar P. (09.09.2008).

³⁵⁹ Interviews with members of ethnic Chinese organizations (INTI and Ketau).

³⁶⁰ Therefore, political leaders (including the President) are officially invited to Chinese New Year celebrations. Hoon, 2008, p. 140.

³⁶¹ Seneviratne, 2007.

³⁶² E.g. Interview with Wahyu Effendi (08.09.2008), Yap Hong Gie (20.09.2008), Christine Thjin (01.09.2008), Benny Setiono (16.09.2008), Dr. Grace W. (18.04.2010), Gustav P. (14.04.2010).

³⁶³ Purdey, 2004, p. 6.

continue at the time of writing.³⁶⁴ In June 2004, the police suspected the involvement of about 50 local men in attacks on two churches in Tangerang during religious services which left a preacher injured. The news agency Reuters noted that local Muslim communities in Indonesia have hindered efforts by Christians to open new churches (e.g. in Bogor), citing fears of Christian proselytization.³⁶⁵ The reports of violence in the Indonesian media against Christians in Indonesia between 2004 and 2006 did not directly mention the ethnicity of the victims. However, during interviews, respondents from Bogor and Tangerang confirmed that the Christians involved were ethnic Chinese.³⁶⁶ Both towns have a high concentration of ethnic Chinese who make up the majority of the local Christian population.

A general trend to not disclose the ethnicity of neither the victims nor the perpetrators in Indonesian media could be observed. Conflicts in Papua and West Kalimantan have shown that Indonesia has not yet managed to overcome ethnic tensions in the country and to build up or strengthen a national identity. In order to not stir ethnic tensions, ethnicity is often not mentioned in the media. Chinese Indonesian journalists and lawyers further revealed in interviews that most of the attacks on property of ethnic Chinese were either hardly mentioned in the press or, if mentioned, not related to ethnic tensions, but rather ascribed to 'social envy'.³⁶⁷

In late 2005, Chinese Indonesians received anonymous cellular text messages, threatening them with violent acts and accusing them of being "robbers with Indonesians' money"³⁶⁸, threatening to hurt or even kill them. President Yudhoyono officially asked the police to investigate the allegations, though one of his spokespersons explained that it was difficult to trace the perpetrators because they had used prepaid cellular telephones to send the messages.³⁶⁹ If actual attacks had followed on the text messages could not be confirmed.³⁷⁰ Even if no reported violent attacks followed, the threatening of ethnic Chinese, however, shows that their ethnicity is still being singled out.

³⁶⁴ Hariyadi, 2010.

³⁶⁵ International Crisis Group, 2012 and Immigration and Refugee Board Canada, 2006.

³⁶⁶ E.g. Interview with Frans Tshai (20.04.2010).

³⁶⁷ Interview with Andreas Harsono (15.09.2008) and Iwan Wibowo (10.09.2008).

³⁶⁸ Asmarani, 2005.

³⁶⁹ Ibid.

³⁷⁰ Only one of the respondents reported to have received messages from strangers aiming at threatening him as ethnic Chinese. However, he did not experience any attacks or other forms of harassment afterwards. Interview with Gustav P. (14.04.2010).

Cultural Repression on the Local Level

Despite the removal of official repression of the Chinese culture on the national level, there are still examples of such bans on the local level. For example, the mayor of Pontianak (West Kalimantan), where ethnic Chinese form the third largest ethnic group after the Dayaks and the Madurese, issued Decision No. 12/2008 that prohibited the display of fireworks and the public performances of dragon and lion dances during Chinese New Year. Before the issuance of the Decision, the United Malay Front Movement had called for the revival of bans on Chinese culture and characters in public. They based their call on the fact these traditions were not deriving from an indigenous Indonesian cultural background and therefore should be forbidden in public. The mayor did not follow this request in full, but rather issued the restrictions on Chinese New Year celebrations as a compromise to prevent social unrest.³⁷¹ In Aceh, the provincial government prohibited a lion dance performance as part of commemoration for the fifth anniversary of the 2004 tsunami. Members of the Buddhist commemoration committee who planned to include lion dance groups had obtained permits from the mayor and police chief; however, they could not obtain a required permit from the Aceh Religious Affairs Office.³⁷²

Thus, while bans on Chinese culture and the assimilatory policies have been abolished on the national level (at least temporarily), the regional and local governments still have the power to revive such bans in case the authorities consider them necessary for security reasons. As the central government officially abolished these bans, ethnic Chinese could, however, file a claim against the local governments or institutions to revoke discriminatory bans on their culture. Even if ethnic Chinese are still hesitant to go to court to claim justice fearing that they will not be treated fairly by the juridical administration, in contrast to the Soeharto-era, they have the legal right and opportunity to do so.

The development of regional decrees or decisions overriding national regulations mirrors a general trend of decentralization in Indonesia. Like many post-authoritarian, multi-ethnic states, Indonesia faces the question: “How to govern the many different ethnic groups without going back to an authoritarian system?” In order to better be able to deal with the identity needs of the many ethnic groups in Indonesia, the national government has given the local governments more political independence over the course of the years. De-socializing ethnic Chinese from their Chinese cultural background and encouraging them to re-socialize (i.e. assimilate) with the majority's culture still seems to be considered to be the best or even only chance for

³⁷¹ Hoon, 2009.

³⁷² Hasan et al., 2009.

peaceful integration and peaceful life within society, at least in some regions (as proven by examples of Aceh and West Kalimantan).³⁷³ These assimilative measures, however, contradict the concept of peace according to Galtung since accepting structural violence against the identity needs of ethnic Chinese (de-socializing and re-socializing, SIN) to avoid direct violence does not lead to sustainable peace. It can merely be a short-term solution. According to Galtung, structural violence is as harmful as direct violence and may eventually lead to direct violence.

Marginalization of Chinese Indonesians through Negative Stereotyping

While the Indonesian elite before the fall of Soeharto mainly concentrated on fields such as politics and the military, quite a number of former politicians or military commanders have by now successfully turned to the field of business.³⁷⁴ On the level of tycoons, it is no longer mainly Chinese businessmen who dominate the private sector. Instead, examples of Aburizal Bakrie or Jusuf Kalla³⁷⁵ show indigenous Indonesians who are also successful in the private sector.³⁷⁶ Struggles over economic influence at the elite level have an impact on the ethnic Chinese as a group. Kalla, for example, stated on his personal website that indigenous business should be favored.³⁷⁷ To foster and maintain such favoritism, he further stated his support for former government policies, including presidential regulation no. 10, the benteng program (fortress program) and reviving the Assaat movement which do not only support indigenous Indonesian, but at the same time restrict and hinder ethnic Chinese engaging in business.³⁷⁸ As a businessman himself whose family business (import-export) had benefitted from the fortress program (as import licenses were only given to indigenous Indonesians) in the 1950s,³⁷⁹ such measures would have likely increased his business opportunities and provided him with an

³⁷³ Apart from cases regarding the ethnic Chinese, other regions have also acted against national law by hindering the building of Christian churches, e.g. in Bogor. In this case, the Christian community had even filed a claim and the Supreme Court decided in their favor. Nevertheless, the local government in Bogor failed to comply with it. <http://www.humanrights.asia/news/ahrc-news/AHRC-STM-182-2012> (13.09.2012).

³⁷⁴ For example, Aburizal Bakrie who owns PT Bakrie & Brothers (business fields are agriculture, real estate, trade, shipping, banking, insurance, media, manufacturing, construction, and mining). From 2004 – 2009 he served as Coordinating Minister for Economy and People's Welfare. Since 2009, he is the chairman of the Golkar party and candidate for the 2014 Presidential election.

³⁷⁵ Jusuf Kalla was Vice-President from 2004 – 2009 and chairman of the Golkar party. He is also the CEO of NV Hadji Kalla, originally an import-export trading company which expanded into other sectors, such as transportation, telecommunication and oil palms).

³⁷⁶ Even though according to the Forbes magazine, the top ten of Indonesia's richest people is still dominated by ethnic Chinese. <http://www.forbes.com/sites/luisakroll/2011/11/23/fortunes-of-indonesias-richest-up-19/>, 15.07.2012.

³⁷⁷ Wibowo, 2004.

³⁷⁸ Ibid.

³⁷⁹ Ibid.

advantage over his ethnic Chinese competitors. In such case, however, not only conglomerates would have been negatively affected, but ethnic Chinese small and medium-sized companies as well. While Kalla was Vice-President, none of the former policies were officially revived. Nevertheless, as he is a politician with direct access to the decision-making process at the highest level, ethnic Chinese were worried that his pro-indigenous and anti-Chinese sentiments could or have enter(ed) Indonesian politics.³⁸⁰ During the fight against corruption, the government seems to set a focus on ethnic Chinese businessmen. In the case of ethnic Chinese conglomerate Sukanto Tanoto, financial-fraud investigations were revived in 2006 after charges against him had been dropped in 2000.³⁸¹ As general prejudices can hardly be reduced if cases that seemingly prove or re-enforce these very prejudices are repeated in the media, the Indonesian elite not only harms their competitors, but also ethnic Chinese as a whole.

Further, it hinders the process of de-homogenization of the ethnic Chinese. Since state-led segmentation (SIN) has been widely abolished, Chinese Indonesians have started to diversify professionally out of business into other fields, including politics. Not being perceived as a homogeneous group helps the integration process and reduces marginalization (SFN). Therefore, if the conflict on the business elite level is passed through to the lower social levels, it prevents a narrowing of the gap between indigenous and ethnic Chinese in society, in spite of the abolition of official state-led segregation and marginalization (SFN). The perception of ethnic Chinese as dominating the Indonesian economy and especially the private sector continues to make them vulnerable in times of political and social unrest.

A number of ethnic Chinese have now entered the political realm. In interviews with Chinese Indonesian politicians, most stated that they wanted to actively engage in politics in order to free the ethnic Chinese from dependency on the indigenous elite. Only by engaging themselves in forming and developing Indonesia, they stated, would they be able to protect themselves and their community.³⁸² Although ethnic Chinese political parties such as the Chinese Indonesian Reform Party (PRTI, Partai Reformasi Tionghoa Indonesia) and the Indonesian Bhinneka Tunggal Ika Party (PBTII, Partai Bhinneka Tunggal Ika Indonesia) failed to gain much support in the 1999 and 2004 elections, numerous candidates of Chinese descent for political offices ran for national (not ethnic Chinese) parties. Between 1999 and 2004, the number of Chinese

³⁸⁰Harsono, 2004. Interview with Eddie Lembong (16.09.2008). Lembong further stated that Kalla's official expression of his views would serve as negative example for Indonesians, as it would keep the dichotomy between indigenous and Chinese Indonesians alive.

³⁸¹Guerin, 2006 and Interview with Thung Ju Lan (20.04.2010).

³⁸²Interview with Christopher Nughoro (09.09.2008), Frans Tsai (20.04.2010) and Basuki Purnama (10.04.2010).

Indonesian candidates standing in national elections increased from fewer than 50 to almost 150, and some of them have won offices in local elections in recent years.³⁸³ Of the 58 candidates of Chinese descent who ran for office in the 2009 legislative election as representatives from Jakarta, two won seats in the People's Representative Council.³⁸⁴ Political participation, even if difficult, can be considered as a means to narrow the social gap by diversifying the image of ethnic Chinese, to show that they are not 'only' economically oriented, but are also interested in their country's well-being. Nevertheless, according to accounts of Chinese Indonesian politicians, they are still not readily accepted by indigenous Indonesian politicians and parts of the public. Two of the politicians interviewed claimed that during their campaigns their opponents used anti-Chinese slogans perpetuating negative stereotypes in order to prevent them from being elected. Apart from ethnic slurs, they were stigmatized on religious grounds as well (SFN). Muslims were told to not vote for Chinese Indonesian Christians since they eat pork and therefore are impure.³⁸⁵

Prior the 2012 elections for the position of governor of Jakarta, Dangdut star Rhoma Irama, quoted a passage from the Qur'an which states that Muslims should never chose an infidel to lead them or they would incur God's wrath during a religious sermon.³⁸⁶ This remark was directed against Basuki Purnama, a Christian and ethnic Chinese, the running mate of Joko Widodo (mayor of Solo). The pair had been successful in the first round of balloting, receiving 41% of the votes on July 11, 2012 and eventually won the elections on September 20, 2012.³⁸⁷ The Qur'an passage quoted by Rhoma Irama indeed seems to create difficulties for Muslims to vote for a non-Muslim. Mujar Ibnu Syarif, of the Islamic University of Syarif Hidayatullah in Jakarta, found Muslim scholars' views divided. While some agree with Rhoma Irama, others (more liberal scholars) see the ban on electing non-Muslims as discriminatory and against the democratic rights of the minorities.³⁸⁸ During the election campaign, Purnama was the target of more than just the one negative campaign (the poll supervisor received at least three negative campaigns involving ethnic and religious attacks on Purnama) and as a consequence, the poll supervisor officially asked the Jakarta branch of the Interfaith Communication Forum and local religious leaders to keep the elections from them ethnic and religious slurs.³⁸⁹ Sarman Simanjorang, chairman of the Jakarta chapter of the Indonesian Indigenous Entrepreneurs

³⁸³ Tjhin, 2009.

³⁸⁴ Ibid.

³⁸⁵ Interview with Frans Tsai (20.04.2010) and Basuki Purnama (10.04.2010).

³⁸⁶ Tambon, 2012a.

³⁸⁷ <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/09/21/jakarta-welcome-its-new-leaders-oct-7.html>, 21.09. 2012.

³⁸⁸ Osman, 2012.

³⁸⁹ Arditya, 2012.

Association (Hippi), also called for an end to the current smear campaign against Purnama as anti-Chinese rhetoric could be particularly damaging for Jakarta's business and tourism (given that businesses and tourists from China and Singapore accounted for around a fifth of all foreign arrivals each month).³⁹⁰

Unofficial Acts of Discrimination against Chinese Indonesians

The amendments and changes to the legislation abolishing discrimination against ethnic Chinese are important and represent a successful reduction of structural violence. However, they are limited in their effects. For example, even though Presidential Instruction No. 4 issued in May 1999 stated that the Indonesian Citizenship Certificate (SBKRI) was no longer needed as proof of citizenship. Years after the Presidential Instruction, the document was still being demanded by authorities and ethnic Chinese were still forced to pay bribes when wishing to have their passports processed.³⁹¹ This was not only to the case with citizenship applications, however. Depending on the civil servant in question, ethnic Chinese have for example been required to present their parents' Citizenship Certificates when they want to register for marriage (SFN).³⁹²

As mentioned above, the national government has started to engage in a decentralization process. As with the case of the banning of Chinese cultural elements in public in Pontianak, local governments of some regions have ignored the policies of the national government. The International Crisis Group states that local institutions (empowered by decentralization) "are defying the country's highest courts with impunity, undermining judicial authority and allowing local conflicts to fester."³⁹³ They have begun to explicitly request Citizenship Certificates again as official regulation for administrative procedures.³⁹⁴ While the national government has officially 'abolished' the Citizenship Certificate, it has not imposed legal or bureaucratic sanctions on civil servants nor overruled local regulations that still require it. In order to keep the ever more complex national construct together, the central government is willing to overlook these kinds of local breaches of national laws.

Since Presidential Instruction No. 4, 1999 did not prove to be sufficient, a new citizenship law issued in 2006 again abolished the distinction between indigenous and non-indigenous (ethnic Chinese). It aims to help Chinese Indonesians who have resided in Indonesia for generations to

³⁹⁰ Tambun, 2012b.

³⁹¹ Purdey, 2006, p. 179; Interview with Ester Jusuf (05.09.2008).

³⁹² Effendi, 2009.

³⁹³ International Crisis Group, 2012.

³⁹⁴ Effendi, 2009.

obtain Indonesian citizenship, even without the Citizenship Certificate (SBKRI). Since this law was relatively recent at the time of writing, the effects will need to be evaluated by future research. Currently, there are still thousands of mostly poor Chinese Indonesians who have still not managed to gain Indonesian citizenship and are therefore stateless.³⁹⁵ In many cases, they lack the educational background to deal with the administrative requirements. Although lawyers from legal aid groups provide assistance, the large number of cases means that it will take time to process all cases.³⁹⁶ As stateless people they cannot purchase the land which they live on. In a recent case of Cina-Benteng (in the Chinese quarter in Tangerang) in 2010, the local government has claimed the land and forcibly evicted the residents when they refused to leave. This expulsion (DFN) from their homes constitutes an infringement of their freedom needs. They refused to leave their homes not only because they wished to remain but also because they were not provided with alternative housing by the local government.³⁹⁷ Thus, in spite of abolishing of discriminatory laws and implementation of a new citizenship law, the situation has not improved yet for ethnic Chinese who lack the educational background and the financial resources. They are still experiencing discrimination based on their ethnicity when dealing with bureaucracy.

The difference to the discrimination they faced during the New Order regime is that it is no longer due to official state policy. Nowadays, it is not the interest of the political elite as such but rather of individual civil servants who want to increase their monthly salary by demanding bribes. To the officials, it 'feels right' to ask the Chinese Indonesians for extra money, because they have allegedly enriched themselves at the expense of the indigenous (CV).³⁹⁸ Since they are not indigenous to the country, it appears to be only fair that they should pay more than indigenous citizens. Some Chinese Indonesians, however, also blame the Chinese Indonesians for this situation: "The Chinese just always pay. They don't want to wait in line or go through any trouble – they just pay. No wonder they [the indigenous civil servants or police] keep asking them for money."³⁹⁹ Thus, there is a degree of acceptance (at least among some ethnic Chinese) of this situation on both sides. On the side of the Chinese Indonesians there is reluctance to go to the trouble of fighting for their rights even if by now they would have a legal basis. By trying to avoid confrontation and choosing the path of least resistance in dealing with discrimination (i.e. violence), they may further encourage and foster it.

³⁹⁵ Khouw, 2010.

³⁹⁶ Interview with Mohammad Gatot (08.09.2008).

³⁹⁷ Primanita, 2010.

³⁹⁸ Interview with Rudi K., local government official Lasem (14.04.2010).

³⁹⁹ Interview with Veronica Purnama (10.04.2010).

There are also other forms of discriminatory behavior against ethnic Chinese which many indigenous do not necessarily perceive as being such. One example explicitly directed against Chinese Indonesian girls is the use of the term ‘Amoy’. It connotes lascivious exotic Orientals. Ethnic Chinese women who were victims of rape in the course of the 1998 riots were also referred to as ‘Amoy’. This indicated that it was their fault that they were raped due to their unchaste behavior.⁴⁰⁰ Many indigenous Indonesians often do not even know that the term is offensive and therefore do not see the harm in using it when referring (only) to Chinese Indonesian girls. Chinese Indonesian women, however, feel offended and discriminated against, but are often hesitant to act against it.⁴⁰¹ It will take time for changes made on the national government level to come down to the grass-root level.

3.5 Conclusions

A reduction of violence can arise out of different approaches or entry-points. In the case of the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia, the changes that brought about a reduction of violence were initiated in a top down manner by the new political leaders of the country (B.J. Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid and later Megawati Soekarnoputri) who aimed at improving the relationship between the ethnic Chinese and the indigenous Indonesians by sending clear signals.⁴⁰² With the abolishing of discriminatory and repressive laws, Chinese Indonesians can now officially live out their cultural identity and are no longer restricted to their previous social position.

However, on the local level, they still may counter discrimination and cultural repression. The negative stereotyping which is still present due to the competition between indigenous and the Chinese Indonesian business elites makes it difficult for the two groups as a whole to bridge their differences and close the gap which has been created over centuries. Nevertheless, against the backdrop of violence during the Soeharto regime, a number of positive developments can be detected which have lead to a significant reduction especially of violent attacks (direct violence) and state-led discrimination (structural violence) against ethnic Chinese. Riots on a major scale such as they occurred in the 1990s have not been reported since. This does not mean that there has been no physical violence against ethnic Chinese. Such incidents still occur, but they are more difficult to detect as they are not openly discussed as ethnic violence in the

⁴⁰⁰ Budianta, 2002, p. 50.

⁴⁰¹ Interview with Pratiwi Kartika (18.09. 2008).

⁴⁰² Hoon, 2004.

media. The focus in these cases has often shifted from an ethnic to a religious conflict. However, due to the fact that many ethnic Chinese are also Christians, they are often involved when the media refers to religious clashes.

While state-led discrimination has been officially abolished by the removal of discriminatory laws and policies against Chinese Indonesians, they still encounter unofficial discrimination and cultural repression by organs of the state (civil servants, the military and the police) in daily life. In such cases, they are still being exploited and treated as second class citizens. There has thus been a shift of violence, away from the official and thereby visible violence on the state level in the form of laws and decrees towards unofficial and thus more invisible or hidden violence on the administrative level. The new reforms that the successive governments initiated make it harder to detect violence and it is less present for the people involved. These acts, nonetheless, constitute continued structural and direct violence against their well-being needs.

As discussed above, there has been a general shift from political centralization to decentralization in Indonesia. Over the course of this development, direct violence against identity needs that took place during the Soeharto regime, such as de-socialization and re-socialization measures, have been abolished at the national level. Nevertheless, there are examples showing that they have been revived on the regional level. There are currently no signs of state-led discrimination against the ethnic Chinese, but the display of their culture is occasionally forbidden by local elites. Structural violence against identity and freedom needs is also visible in the form of segmentation of the ethnic Chinese as a homogenous group of businessmen. Due to stigmatization in form of negative stereotyping and ‘othering’ of ethnic Chinese, the group as a whole is still marginalized in Indonesian society.

With regard to cultural violence, the grounds that legitimized violence against ethnic Chinese have remained the same as in the past. To date, only little attention has been paid to work on cultural violence and therefore no significant progress could be observed in this area. As reducing cultural violence means to change the actors’ perceptions of the ‘others’ and themselves which they have inherited from previous generations, the respective process requires long-term efforts. Due to the long history of direct and indirect violence, violence is deeply seated in the social construction of Indonesian society. Therefore, although areas can be seen where violence has been reduced, indicating a positive development, the current status

quo of violence requires further measures to sustain these developments over the course of a sustained conflict transformation process.

The triangle with its three dimensions of violence can be combined with another tool developed by Galtung to understand and analyze a conflict formation: the conflict triangle. The three variables used in this method are the conflict actors' attitudes, their behavior and contradictions between each others' aims. The types of violence can be connected to the dimensions of the conflict formation: Direct violence is related to behavior (violent acts), cultural violence to attitudes and structural violence to the contradictions.⁴⁰³

⁴⁰³ Galtung, 2000, p. 115ff.

4. Analysis of Conflict Formation

4.1 The Concept of the Conflict Triangle

Conflict has been mainly a topic of research in the academic fields of political, social and psychological science. For conflicts on the macro and meso level (like the case study of this thesis), Hobbes, Marx, Weber and Simmel provided the basis for many conflict theories in political and social science.⁴⁰⁴ Hobbes understands conflicts as a general part of human relationships which have to be regulated by (state) institutions. Marx does not understand conflict as part of the human nature, but instead he derives conflict from the unequal distribution of assets and a hierarchical structure of society. Conflicts are there conflicts of interests between two groups and considered to be necessary by Marx to generate social change with regard to the structure of a society until equality is achieved. Weber attributes conflicts to a contradiction of values of groups and individuals. In contrast to Hobbes and Marx, Webber does not approach conflict from the perspective of social structures, but concentrates on the actors and their relationship in which they try to enforce their claims against those of others. Like Weber, Simmel also approaches conflicts from the perspective of the actors. For him conflicts are the result of social differentiation. People and groups feel as part of one group by differentiating themselves from others. Conflicts – like consensus – are both factors that constitute societies.⁴⁰⁵

Galtung combined the structural perspective (as in the approaches by Hobbes and Marx) with the actor perspective (as in the approaches by Weber and Simmel) in his understanding of conflict. According to Galtung, every conflict can be mapped by using the conflict triangle. A conflict is a contradiction either within an actor (dilemma) or between at least two actors (dispute). These contradictions constitute the content or the root causes of the conflict. In his article “Konflikt als Lebensform”⁴⁰⁶ he defines conflict as incompatibility between aims and values of actors within a social system. Seen through a conflict triangle, the aims of each party which are in contradiction to one another (C) are reflected on the actors’ side in the attitudes (A) as intentions and as means of pursuing these aims through their behavior (B).⁴⁰⁷ All dimensions of the triangle may influence each other. For example, attitudes of actors towards the contradictions may influence actors’ evaluation of a conflict situation. The contradictions

⁴⁰⁴ Bonacker, 2008, p. 19.

⁴⁰⁵ Bonacker, 2008, pp. 19-21.

⁴⁰⁶ Galtung, 1975, pp. 108-132.

⁴⁰⁷ Galtung, 2010, p. 27 and 70.

can result in frustration which may then lead to aggressive attitudes. The contradictions and the attitudes which together form the latent side of a conflict may then form a specific conflict behavior (the pursuit of the goals) which constitutes the manifest side of a conflict. If one party's conflict behavior means resorting to aggressive behavior towards the other party, new contradictions may arise which may result in a vicious cycle of violence that is difficult to break. Violence can thus lead to the (re-)production of further violence.⁴⁰⁸

Even though Galtung depicts both the concept of violence and the concept of conflict by way of triangles which are related to each other, there are differences between the two. Conflict cannot be equated with violence or vice versa.⁴⁰⁹




Figure 8: The Conflict Triangle⁴¹⁰

Galtung uses the triangle to clarify that a conflict consists of different dimensions and uses it to portray conflict dynamics. A conflict analysis according to this triangle may render these dimensions and dynamics visible. Such an analysis is the prerequisite for developing peace-enhancing measures that aim at reducing violence. In any attempts to transform a conflict towards peace it is necessary to work on each of the ABC aspects of the conflict triangle. In order to transform the contradictions, creativity is required to find solutions which accommodate the legitimate but contradicting aims of the conflict parties. Attitudes can slowly be changed by enhancing empathy among the actors. Violent behavior can be transformed into non-violent behavior. According to the Transcend method, as a point of entry for most

⁴⁰² Galtung, 2007a, p. 135ff.
⁴⁰⁹ Galtung, 2010, p. 32.
⁴¹⁰ Based on Galtung 2007a, p. 136.

conflicts, the focus lies in transcending the contradictions. Softening of A and B is easier when the parties see progress on C. This does not mean that there should be no work on A and B in the meantime.⁴¹¹

Classification of Conflict Actors

The two major parties dealt with in this conflict are ethnic Chinese and indigenous Indonesians. When dealing with the attitudes and behavior of the groups, however, it is necessary to specify subgroups within the two groups and to identify how these relate to the conflict. According to Galtung’s definition⁴¹², this conflict is complex as it involves numerous actors and goals which cannot be assessed at once. For analytical purposes, it may be necessary to reduce them in a structured manner and allows the researcher to include them again at a later stage of the analysis. It is essential to not lose a conflict’s complexity entirely as it may be the source for possibilities to transform a conflict. Based on the interviews conducted in Indonesia in 2008 and 2010 and related literature, both of the conflict groups shall therefore be divided into three subgroups.

Indigenous Indonesians

| | Subgroup 1 | Subgroup 2 | Subgroup 3 |
|--------------------------------|----------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------|
| Conflict transformation | Opposing / not encouraging | Interested in / actively engaged in | Indifferent |

Chinese Indonesians

| | Subgroup 1 | Subgroup 2 | Subgroup 3 |
|--------------------------------|----------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------|
| Conflict transformation | Opposing / not encouraging | Interested in / actively engaged in | Indifferent |

These categorizations are not absolute, as there will always be exceptions within these subgroups as well people who could be placed in more than one subgroup. Nevertheless, this rough categorization helps to determine the main positions vis-à-vis this conflict within the two main actor groups. The A(ttitudes) and B(ehavior) of the conflict triangle are both party- or actor-oriented while C(ontradiction) is goal-oriented.⁴¹³ In the presentation of the concept of the ABC-triangle, the goals are located in A as intentions and as means in B.⁴¹⁴ It can be difficult to

⁴¹¹ Galtung, 2010, p. 83.
⁴¹² Galtung, 2007b, pp 145ff.
⁴¹³ Galtung, 2010, p. 27.
⁴¹⁴ Galtung, 2010, p. 70.

clearly delineate A and B since they are interrelated and influence each other. Latent intentions can surface at the manifest level as behavior. Cultural prejudice as an internal attitude for example can transform into discrimination as externally-oriented behavior. Due to such interrelations, the various levels need to be examined together rather than separately to avoid losing such intersectionalities.

4.2 Attitudes and Behavior of Conflict Actors

Indigenous Indonesians

Subgroup 1: Opposing / Not Encouraging Conflict Transformation

In the analysis of violence, the reviving of bans on the public display of Chinese culture on the local level by a few local governments (Aceh and West Kalimantan) was discussed. Attitudes behind these actions indicate that the actors (local elites) responsible for the reviving of bans do not encourage the integration of Chinese Indonesian culture as part of the local culture.

On the level of bureaucracy, those bureaucrats who still discriminate against ethnic Chinese by, for example, requiring Chinese Indonesians to present the Indonesian Citizenship Certificate (SBKRI) and accepting bribes for processing the document even though it is officially not required anymore,⁴¹⁵ do not have an interest in changing the status quo. They seem to accept discriminating against ethnic Chinese as ‘normal’ and ‘justified’ and therefore do not seem to see the need in changing their practices from which they benefit personally.⁴¹⁶

During interviews, respondents stated that some indigenous Indonesians do not want Chinese Indonesians to enter the political scene.⁴¹⁷ Ethnic Chinese politicians have to fight very hard to get into parliament or to be elected into political offices against the opposition of indigenous politicians. Tsai, an ethnic Chinese politician, reported that when he ran for a seat in parliament for his home town in West Kalimantan, ethnic Chinese who wanted to vote for him told him that they were sent home when they arrived at the election office. “The officer told them that their ID card was not registered at this office and that meant that they could not vote – they cheated us!”⁴¹⁸ Even though other politicians⁴¹⁹ have reported similar experiences, it is difficult to prove that there actually has been electoral fraud which was directed against their ethnicity.

⁴¹⁵ Winkelmann, 2008, p. 70 and interview with Ester Jusuf (05.09.2008) and Mely Tan (17.04.2008).

⁴¹⁶ Interview with Wahyu Effendi (08.09.2008).

⁴¹⁷ Interview with Frans Tsai, ethnic Chinese politician (20.04.2010) and Nico Harjanto, indigenous Indonesian researcher at CSIS focusing on the political landscape and participation in Indonesia (03.09.2008).

⁴¹⁸ Interview with Frans Tsai (20.04.2010).

⁴¹⁹ Interview with Basuki Purnama (10.04.2010).

Difficulties in accepting ethnic Chinese as political leaders is not limited to some indigenous politicians, as shown by anti-Chinese campaigns against Basuki Purnama (vice-governor of Jakarta, elected in September 2012)⁴²⁰. More than a decade after the fall of the Soeharto-regime, anti-Chinese sentiments aiming at the exclusion of ethnic Chinese from the political sphere still appear.

Two ethnic Chinese researchers, Thung⁴²¹ and Chua⁴²², pointed towards the competition between indigenous Indonesian and Chinese Indonesian businessmen- and women which they consider to have a negative effect on efforts to transform the conflict. During the Soeharto-period, indigenous businessmen for the most part did not develop their own commercial activities in competition to the Chinese Indonesian businessmen. Instead, the Chinese tycoons and the indigenous political power-holders complemented each other through an elaborate division of labor.⁴²³ There was no need for the ethnic Chinese businessmen to possess own political power, as their interests were well represented by the political elite.⁴²⁴ Despite the enormous economic growth of Chinese conglomerates⁴²⁵, the power-holders saw no reason to curb their partners, especially as the social and political position of the tycoons remained weak.⁴²⁶ The political power-holders did everything to retard the rise of independent indigenous businessmen in order to protect their own position and keep a potentially challenging indigenous bourgeoisie at distance.⁴²⁷ The politicians and bureaucrats close to Soeharto also started to accumulate capital themselves, which decreased their financial reliance on Chinese businesses. They could even hope in the long run to become their own class of businessmen and eventually be able to emancipate themselves from their Chinese counterparts.⁴²⁸

After the fall of Soeharto, the protectionist economic policies favoring indigenous Indonesians were replaced by more liberal policies, both in terms of decentralizing the state and deregulating the economy. Without political control over the economy, indigenous businessmen had to fear for their position in this new economical environment.⁴²⁹ The ethnic Chinese conglomerates that survived the transition and adapted to the new economic environment

⁴²⁰ This case was discussed in more detail in the previous chapter.

⁴²¹ Interview on 20.04.2010.

⁴²² Interview on 15.02.2008.

⁴²³ Chua, 2008, pp. 81-82.

⁴²⁴ Ibid.

⁴²⁵ For example, Liem Sioe-Liong.

⁴²⁶ Chua, 2008, pp. 81-82.

⁴²⁷ Budiman, 1988, p. 121.

⁴²⁸ Chua, 2008, p. 77.

⁴²⁹ Chua, 2008, p. 140.

became more successful than before.⁴³⁰ Due to decentralization, many of the political power holders ethnic Chinese tycoons now have to deal with are on the regional level and thus less powerful than those who were concentrated in Jakarta during the New Order regime. Nevertheless, it is still advantageous to cultivate ties to the central government for businesses which go beyond the local level.⁴³¹

According to the Chinese Indonesian tycoon, Winarta⁴³², competing indigenous businessmen feel that the Chinese ‘always’ bribe state officials, particularly the police and the military. He believes that as long as these traditional anti-Chinese sentiments remained prevalent in Indonesian society, indigenous businessmen would exploit them in their fight for market shares.⁴³³ According to Thung, the indigenous elite are competing with ethnic Chinese tycoons for large-scale governmental projects and therefore interested in weakening latter’s position.⁴³⁴ Through the stigmatization of the tycoons as ‘Chinese’ and thus non-Indonesian, Chinese Indonesians’ economic success is defined as undeserving and unfair to the ‘indigenous’ population. By utilizing such discourses, the politically active indigenous tycoons set thumbscrews on the businessmen which they can tighten at times to keep the competition at bay.⁴³⁵

Apart from business opportunities in Indonesia, a part of the ethnic Chinese business community seems to be in a better position than the indigenous business community to benefit from the economic rise of China and the trade arrangements made between China and ASEAN⁴³⁶ due to either personal relationships, Chinese language skills or a general cultural understanding of Chinese business practices.⁴³⁷ Although it is difficult to assess to what extent ethnicity plays a role in Sino-Indonesian business arrangements, arguably due to “their leading position in business, Chinese Indonesians have more to benefit from the rise of China than

⁴³⁰ According to Anthony Salim, interview with Chua on 13.04.2004, Chua, 2008, p. 141.

⁴³¹ Chua, 2008, p. 173.

⁴³² Tomy Winarta, Chinese Indonesian, CEO of Artha Graha.

⁴³³ Chua, 2008, p. 171.

⁴³⁴ Interview with Thung Ju Lan (20.04.2010). She mentioned that one of the instruments the elite use is the media, where negative headlines alleging Chinese Indonesian corruption and nepotism are frequently launched to reduce the latter’s chances in government tender processes. Unfortunately, no examples proving this statement could be found in the course of the research. The number of cases of possible corruption under investigation in Indonesia at the time of writing was too large to be able to determine how many related to Chinese Indonesians only

⁴³⁵ Chua, 2008, p. 183.

⁴³⁶ On July 1, 2005 the Agreement on Trade in Goods of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation under the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area became effective. Under this agreement commodity items which were classified as “normal track” can be im- and exported duty free.

⁴³⁷ Interview with Eddie Lembong (16.09.2008). However, no reliable studies proving or disproving this could be found to date.

Indonesians do⁴³⁸. If indigenous businessmen believe that ethnic Chinese stand to gain more economic power due to this new business opportunity, it may add to their perception of the ethnic Chinese as a threat to their own (personal) interests.

Turning from the country's economic and political elite to lower class indigenous Indonesians, anti-Chinese sentiments based on negative stereotypes have prevailed. During the field research in 2008,⁴³⁹ I interviewed two mechanics working at a garage in Jakarta. Even though they said that they do not want to be involved in ethnic prejudice, they said that all the Chinese they knew were greedy and only business-oriented. They also stressed that they as *pribumi* (indigenous Indonesians) would never be able to understand the Chinese (they used the pejorative term *cina*), because the latter were "too different".⁴⁴⁰ Even though the term 'cina' was officially replaced by the term 'tionghoa', it is still commonly used, as is the dichotomy 'pribumi' and 'non-pribumi'.

Subgroup 2: Interested in / Actively Engaged in Conflict Transformation

The representatives of this subgroup interviewed during the field research were mainly from Jakarta and Central Java (Semarang, Lasem and Rembang). The coastal area on the north coast of Java was chosen as an example in Indonesia for a good integration and strong interaction between ethnic Chinese and Javanese. During interviews with indigenous Indonesians, they often stressed the good relationship with ethnic Chinese.⁴⁴¹ Islamic leaders pointed out that they often join forces with ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs in Rembang when organizing communal projects.⁴⁴² This may be related to the long history of ethnic Chinese settlers in this area. In 1405, Admiral Zheng He landed in Semarang during the first of his seven expeditions and returned to this city during later expeditions. His stay influenced the development of the small fishing village into the city of Semarang. Public festivals are held each year on the 29th and 30th of the sixth months of the Chinese lunar calendar to commemorate the first of his expeditions to Java.

In May 1998, rioters who came to this area were turned back by local Islamic leaders, an incident which is very well known and appreciated by the ethnic Chinese communities living in

⁴³⁸ Simandjuntak, 2006, p. 67.

⁴³⁹ Unfortunately, I did not succeed in conducting more interviews with members of the lower class indigenous Indonesians, thus the sample is not very representative.

⁴⁴⁰ Interview with anonymous mechanics (05.09.2008).

⁴⁴¹ Interview with members of Lasem Historical Organization (15.04.2010).

⁴⁴² Interview with Gus Shihhabuddin (17.04.2010).

this region.⁴⁴³ One of these local Islamic leaders, KH. Zainuddin, the director of an Islamic boarding school, later became a member of the Lasem Lion Dance committee which was established shortly after the end of the Soeharto regime. Even though he stated that he does not like Lion Dance very much himself, it was nonetheless important to him to demonstrate the good relationship between the different communities. When asked why he thought that the ethnic Chinese asked him to be on the committee, he answered that they felt safer when he was “on board”. Although there had not been any riots in Lasem and surroundings, the reports of violence all over Indonesia in 1998 created fear among ethnic Chinese. The government might have abolished the bans against the public display of Chinese culture, nevertheless, the Chinese community felt the need for protection, which they satisfied by inviting a Muslim leader to join their committee.⁴⁴⁴ KH. Zainuddin as a respected member of the community and a religious leader was considered by the Chinese community an ideal candidate to support the cause of reviving Chinese Indonesian culture.

Not only societies reviving Chinese festival traditions have received support from indigenous communities of the region. The northern part of Central Java is also known for its Chinese temples, many of which were refurbished after 1998, not only by members of the Chinese community, but also by indigenous Javanese who offered their practical help as well as financial support.⁴⁴⁵ The temples have been accepted by the indigenous communities in the region as part of their historical heritage as well.⁴⁴⁶ A local NGO, whose members are mainly indigenous Indonesians, was founded to catalogue and restore Lasem’s historical architectural sites. As proof for the long history of ethnic Chinese integration, its members showed me different parts of the city where old Chinese-style buildings are located next to indigenous buildings, in contrast to other cities where the ethnic Chinese had been confined to ghettos. This development survived the course of time and resulted in the mixed ethnic streetscapes of today.⁴⁴⁷

A further example of Javanese engaging in an NGO which directly or indirectly work towards the transformation of this conflict is the NGO Solidarity of the Nation-State (SNB). It was founded by Jusuf, a Chinese Indonesian lawyer, two years after the May riots. Jusuf left the Jakarta Legal Aid where she had been working previously along with other young activists, including indigenous Indonesians. Along with other NGOs, such as the Committee for Missing

⁴⁴³ Interview with Gustav P. (ethnic Chinese, 14.04.2010).

⁴⁴⁴ Interview with KH. Zainuddin (15.04.2010).

⁴⁴⁵ Interview with members of Lasem Historical Organization (15.04.2010).

⁴⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁷ Trip with Lasem Historical Organization (15.04.2010).

Persons and Victims of Violence (Kontras), the organization established a coalition of NGOs to investigate the mass killings that occurred during the May riots.⁴⁴⁸

In addition to human rights organizations and legal aid for victims, there are also other organizations dealing with ethnic tension and nation-building in general. The Indonesian Institute for Pluralism (IPI), for example, was also formed after the May riots with the goal of promoting pluralism. The founders were ethnic Chinese as well as indigenous who considered it to be necessary to contribute to the development of Indonesia as a multi-ethnic state.⁴⁴⁹

Especially during the May riots, individuals all over Indonesia sided with Chinese Indonesians, and this solidarity has also continued since. Several of the ethnic Chinese interviewees reported that their neighbors and friends volunteered to organize night patrols to protect them and offered accommodation for those who did not feel safe in their homes anymore.⁴⁵⁰ Even though these are private, individual acts and the motives for sympathizing with the ethnic Chinese remain unknown, it is interesting to see that especially among the same social class or group, indigenous perceive the Chinese Indonesians as Indonesians like themselves who therefore deserve to be protected as such. Some of the individuals who offered help during the riots later joined organizations which directly or indirectly deal with the issues of the ethnic Chinese.⁴⁵¹

Subgroup 3: Indifferent to Conflict Transformation

The conflict between indigenous and ethnic Chinese Indonesians is not a priority for all Indonesians. This can be attributed, for example, to limited personal contact with ethnic Chinese, being occupied with other conflicts either involving their own ethnic or religious group, while others prefer not to get involved in conflicts or other people's matters in general. With respect to conflict transformation, this subgroup of 'indifferents' has both negative as well as positive potential for change. This category consists of respondents who in the interviews stated that they were indifferent to the issue of ethnic Chinese. However, over the course of the interviews, differences in this 'indifference' emerged. Respondents were either

- a) Indifferent, but sharing the common negative prejudices against ethnic Chinese as a group (but not against individuals) and thinking of the ethnic Chinese as non-indigenous and thus non-Indonesians

⁴⁴⁸ Interview with Ester Jusuf (05.09.2008).

⁴⁴⁹ Interview with William Kwan (09.09.2008).

⁴⁵⁰ E.g. Interview with Dr. Grace W. (18.04.2010), Widji S. (12.04.2010), Hari S. (09.09.2008).

⁴⁵¹ Interview with William Kwan (09.09.2008).

- b) Indifferent, but not caring about the common negative prejudices and thinking of the ethnic Chinese as Indonesians

This classification is only a very rough one and there are nuances in-between. Nevertheless, it helps to understand that even those who claim to be indifferent and impartial need to be taken into account in the course of possible conflict transcendence efforts. Those who belong to group a) are more likely to oppose attempts to work on the conflict while those who fall into group b) might even consider engaging themselves in working on conflict transformation.

The topic of Chinese New Year (*Imlek*) celebrations proved to be a good indicator for seeing which of the two categories an ‘indifferent’ respondent would fall into. When asked about how they felt about the fact that Chinese New Year was now a public, and publicly celebrated, holiday in Indonesia, many stated that they had nothing against it in general, especially as other ethnic groups also celebrate their traditional festivals. Some would, however, respond that they thought the celebrations were “too pompous – typical for Chinese, they just like to show off”⁴⁵². Other indigenous Indonesians responded that they were annoyed that Chinese New Year was now celebrated on a large scale: “During Chinese New Year, it is even all over TV. You can hardly avoid watching them – but not everyone is interested in the celebrations.”⁴⁵³ Even though all of the interviewees agreed that the ethnic Chinese have been and to some extent still were being treated unfairly, a few expressed that they do not want to see them being favored.⁴⁵⁴ Surjadi, an Indonesian scholar, also expressed his concerns about the Chinese New Year celebrations. According to him, some Chinese have aggressively commodified the New Year’s celebrations to exhibit the official recognition of Chinese identity and equality in terms of rights. There might be the danger that this celebration of ‘Chineseness’ may lead to an uncritical assumption of ‘re-Sinicization’ by the Indonesian public. There are still many people who cling to an understanding of identity according to which the more a person is Chinese, the less Indonesian can he/she be.⁴⁵⁵ These concerns could lead to renewed doubts about the loyalty of Chinese Indonesians to Indonesia or seen as ‘proof’ of their self-chosen exclusiveness. This may once again serve as arguments for those who want to deny ethnic Chinese full social integration and acceptance.

⁴⁵² Interview with a group of young anonymous indigenous Indonesians (15.09.2008). There are also ethnic Chinese who think that the sometimes lavish celebrations of Chinese New Year might disturb the feelings of Indonesians living in poverty, Hoon, 2008, p. 147 (interview with Harry Tjan Silalahi, a prominent Catholic Chinese Indonesian).

⁴⁵³ Interview with anonymous Indonesian couple in Jakarta (18.04.2008).

⁴⁵⁴ Interview with Slamet W. and Jamiatum R. (14.04.2010).

⁴⁵⁵ Surjadi, 2006.

On the other side, there are also indigenous Indonesians who enjoy the Chinese New Year festivals and participate actively in lion dance, martial arts performances and other aspects of the celebrations⁴⁵⁶ and could therefore be placed in group b). However, their interest in Chinese ‘cultural products’ should not be mistaken as support of the Chinese Indonesian case or as an acceptance of them. Tjhin warned her fellow Chinese Indonesians against believing that having been granted the permission to celebrate Chinese New Year “manifests the Rise (or Victory) of the Chinese Indonesian”⁴⁵⁷. “Employing *Imlek* as the main measurement for the achievements of the Chinese Indonesian in the politics of recognition could be misleading. It serves a symbolic purpose only visible on the surface.”⁴⁵⁸ Other severe problems, however, like discrimination are still left unattended.⁴⁵⁹ Nevertheless, even if the participating in Chinese New Year’s festivals does not constitute support or willingness to engage in work related to the conflict, this group is more likely to have a positive attitude towards the ethnic Chinese than group a).

Another trend that could be interpreted as mirroring a positive development for ethnic Chinese is the boom in learning Chinese (Mandarin) in Indonesia. In 2004, seven universities in Jakarta had established Chinese language departments. More than 100 universities had applied to the Ministry of Education for permission to offer Chinese courses in the following years. In addition, there are more than 3000 Chinese language tuition centers operating in Indonesia.⁴⁶⁰ Students consist of both ethnic Chinese and indigenous Indonesians. Interest in the language is driven by market demand for people with Chinese language skills for business with China. For people interested in engaging in business with the economically prospering neighbor, it is advantageous to be able to speak the language. Furthermore, an influx of Chinese movies, melodramas, and TV series has raised the popularity of the Chinese language and created a more positive image of Chinese culture, in particular among young indigenous Indonesians.⁴⁶¹ Learning Chinese could be a chance for increasing cross-cultural understanding, though it needs to be reiterated that mainland Chinese culture and Chinese Indonesian culture differ from each other. What indigenous Indonesians may learn in their language classes and on TV is mainly the former rather than the latter. Efforts made by indigenous Indonesians to learn

⁴⁵⁶ Hoon, 2008, p.145. Also interview with Conda G. (11.04.2010).

⁴⁵⁷ Tjhin, 2006.

⁴⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁰ Hoon, 2008, p. 149.

⁴⁶¹ Hoon, 2008, p. 155.

Chinese should therefore not be mistaken for an automatic interest in Chinese culture in general or Chinese Indonesians in particular. Also, many Chinese Indonesians do not speak Chinese themselves and for indigenous Indonesians to learn the Chinese language would therefore not necessarily create common ground. Nevertheless, while learning the language, the students' interest for China and Chinese cultures may raise their interest in ethnic Chinese.

Due to the indifference of the members of this subgroup to the conflict, they are not actively engaged in transformation processes. This might change over time or may be influenced by actions of other subgroups (mainly subgroups 1 or 2) as well as social changes.

Ethnic Chinese

Subgroup 1: Opposing / Not Encouraging Conflict Transformation

In their strategies to protect themselves and their businesses, ethnic Chinese members of the economic elite seek to cultivate a positive public image. During his fieldwork, Christian Chua repeatedly experienced how many of the Chinese Indonesian conglomerates were even concerned with what would be written about them in PhD theses.⁴⁶²

“James Riady⁴⁶³ disinvited me from an already confirmed interview appointment. Instead, I first had to talk to his friend, advisor, and Lippo Commissioner Farid Haryanto who – so it seemed – was supposed to find out if the questions I wanted to ask were too critical. Obviously I failed this fit-and-proper test, as Riady henceforth refused to meet me. This might be coincidental or due to other reasons, but it is not unlikely that this signified Lippo's stance on how to deal with the public.”⁴⁶⁴

With regard to public relations, many business groups have purchased media companies, including TV stations and newspapers. The Lippo Group, for example, has a relationship manager for ‘extraordinary public relations efforts’ such as taking journalists around in helicopters, bringing them to the nightclubs of Kota on all-inclusive ‘nights out’ or, directly paying journalists to ensure favorable coverage. In case of negative coverage, companies often sue journalists and editors or threaten to withdraw advertisement, thus hurting the respective media financially.⁴⁶⁵

⁴⁶² Interview with Christian Chua (15.02.2008).

⁴⁶³ Chinese Indonesian CEO of the Lippo Group.

⁴⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁵ Chua, 2008, pp. 128ff.

Indigenous tycoons are also interested in cultivating a positive image and as such the practices of ethnic Chinese to influence the media may not differ substantially from those of indigenous Indonesians. However, ethnic Chinese tycoons display an eagerness to reconcile their ethnic identity and stress their solidarity with the Indonesian people. In interviews (with the press and also Chua), ethnic Chinese tycoons (like Riady, Winarta and Salim⁴⁶⁶) stated that they ‘love’ the country and its people and are committed to its development.⁴⁶⁷ Winarta further stressed that he is “purely Indonesian”⁴⁶⁸ and that his company Artha Graha is a “truly patriotic enterprise”.⁴⁶⁹ The tycoons are therefore aware that their ethnicity may still be perceived as non-Indonesian by the public. They acknowledge the risk that anti-Chinese sentiments may be instrumentalized again by political elites in times of crises and in this case the stereotype of the rich, Chinese businessmen may be useful tool to stir anger among the indigenous population and make them the primary targets.⁴⁷⁰ They do not rely on the state to protect them but rather rely on their own financial assets. Most of them do not see the need to engage directly in working on the conflict.⁴⁷¹ Their main interest is to ‘stay in business’ and they have managed to do so until now by being flexible and adapting to the challenges of every new situation. As Anthony Salim put it in an interview with Chua: “What is so wonderful about market forces, they can be black, they can be white tomorrow, [...] but the main thing is that during black and white you have to survive.”⁴⁷²

In addition to cultivating a positive image, ethnic Chinese tycoons still rely on allies in the political elite. Regarding this strategy, it should be noted that political campaigning is very expensive in Indonesia. Even a local election campaign requires several billions of rupiah⁴⁷³, while presidential campaigns were estimated to require between Rp140 billion (approx. 11 million EUR) to Rp500 billion (approx. 40 million EUR) per team merely during the first round in 2004.⁴⁷⁴ Thus, the political parties as well as the candidates themselves are dependent upon large donations from the business world as there is no funding of political parties. Only few of

⁴⁶⁶ Anthony Salim, Chinese Indonesian, President of the Salim Group.

⁴⁶⁷ Chua, 2008, p. 164.

⁴⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁷⁰ Chua, 2008, p.163. Chua further states that “No indigenous power bloc would voluntarily relinquish this instrument of authority, *ibid.*”

⁴⁷¹ Chua, 2008, pp. 162ff.

⁴⁷² Chua, 2008, p. 144.

⁴⁷³ Interview with Frans Tsai (former parliamentarian) (20.04.2010) and Basuki Purnama (current parliamentarian) (10.04.2010).

⁴⁷⁴ Chua, 2009, p. 214.

the tycoons go into politics themselves even though they would have the necessary assets. Most of them prefer to act in the background where they feel safer.⁴⁷⁵

Among the respondents interviewed during the field research, a number of upper-middle-class Chinese Indonesians emerged who think only of ethnic Chinese as their in-group and cultivate their Chinese identity as opposed to that of the indigenous Indonesians. Lydia S., a young Chinese Indonesian (age 23, middle-class) living in Jakarta told me that her Indonesian language skills were not very good because she was raised in an exclusively Chinese neighborhood. She attended a middle school where the language of teaching was English and afterwards studied in Singapore. Her mother-tongue is a Chinese dialect (Hokkien). When asked about any contacts she had with indigenous Indonesians, she replied: “Only our employees: the maid, the driver, the gardener.”⁴⁷⁶ She stated that she did not want to get in contact with indigenous Indonesians; she said that she felt uncomfortable around them. Having grown up in an almost self-contained Chinese Indonesian environment, she felt almost foreign to the country she lived in. Even though she had been very young in May 1998, she still remembered the events as being traumatic. This might have triggered or fostered her fears and suspicions towards indigenous Indonesians.

Thung observed that people like Lydia S. had ‘inherited’ many of the stereotypes about indigenous Indonesians from their parents who chose exclusiveness over integration. As for the Chinese Indonesians, there are also negative stereotypes of indigenous Indonesians, such as assumptions that they are lazy, slow and likely to steal from those who are rich (e.g. the ethnic Chinese).⁴⁷⁷ Thung interviewed respondents with similar backgrounds to Lydia S. and found out that even those who attended public Indonesian schools did not have any personal contact with indigenous Indonesians.⁴⁷⁸ Instead the perceptions and attitudes of these ethnic Chinese towards indigenous Indonesians were similar to those of their parents.⁴⁷⁹ They showed suspicion and fear of indigenous Indonesians, because they are very aware of their own vulnerability.⁴⁸⁰ As a consequence, like their parents, they seek security and comfort behind the “emotional barriers the exclusiveness which their Chinese group seems to provide”⁴⁸¹. Their reaction seems to be partially driven by the thought that since the state was not able to protect

⁴⁷⁵ Interview with Christopher Nugroho (09.09.2008) and Hanjaya Setiawan (10.09.2008).

⁴⁷⁶ Interview with Lydia S. (11.09.2008).

⁴⁷⁷ Interview with Lydia S. (11.09.2008).

⁴⁷⁸ Thung, 1998, p. 94. s

⁴⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁸¹ Ibid.

them in 1998, they would have to take care of themselves.⁴⁸² It is therefore considered to be advantageous to live close to one another and avoid too much contact with potential perpetrators in order to be better able to take care of and assist each other. Patricia S. stated that she vividly remembers how her father together with neighbors organized night watches during May 1998 in order to protect their homes and families in Jakarta.⁴⁸³ Instead of working on establishing or working towards peace, they increased their security measures.

In addition to Jakarta, similar Chinese Indonesian communities can be found in other cities with a high concentration of ethnic Chinese. Veronica P., a Chinese Indonesian, at the time of the interview living in Jakarta with her husband and three children, grew up in Medan (Sumatra) and it was only after she moved to Jakarta that she got into contact with indigenous Indonesians. While in Medan, she lived in a closed Chinese community, like Lydia. She told me that it scared her at first to talk to indigenous Indonesians, because she expected them to treat her unkindly or call her names. Now that she had met more indigenous Indonesians and even befriended some, she felt more and more comfortable around them, less scared and more at home in Indonesia as a whole.⁴⁸⁴ Therefore, being more exposed to indigenous Indonesians has changed her attitude towards them.

The state of exclusion in which the Chinese Indonesians of this subgroup live in presumably adds to their hesitation to deal with the conflict actively. Instead, they prefer to hide from it by hiding themselves. They fear being victimized (again) and assume that the indigenous would never fully accept them in Indonesian society. Since they have only limited contact with indigenous Indonesians, they have little chance to garner opposite experiences. It is also difficult for them to reduce their own negative stereotypes against the indigenous without increased mutual contact.

Apart from creating a feeling of security and comfort, keeping to themselves also brings with it further benefit, namely business advantages. Businessmen and businesswomen stated that having Chinese origins makes it easier for them to build trustworthy business relationships with other Chinese in Indonesia, other Southeast Asian countries, but also other countries with a Chinese majority population. With the economic rise of China, their ethnic background may provide them with an advantage over indigenous businessmen. Even if it can be argued that business practices that are linked to the Chinese culture may later be abandoned when businesses

⁴⁸² Interview with Thung Ju Lan (20.09.2010).

⁴⁸³ Interview with Patricia S. (02.09.2008).

⁴⁸⁴ Interview with Veronica Purnama (22.04.2010).

grow bigger and are replaced by international business practices, it cannot be denied that they are helpful to build up the initial contacts.⁴⁸⁵ These business prospects are even leading some Chinese Indonesians to ‘return to more Chineseness’. In a study conducted by Efferin and Pontjoharyo, the majority of respondents (Chinese Indonesian businessmen) stated that they expect the rise of China to have a positive impact on them, even if they are also aware of the fact that the rise of China is also the rise of a competitor (e.g. in the shoe and garment industries).⁴⁸⁶

Apart from new business opportunities, the respondents also named a political reason why the rise of China would have a positive impact on them: the rise of China as a global economic player would force the Indonesian government to maintain good relationships with China and consequently with them (the Chinese Indonesians) as well and abolish state discrimination completely.⁴⁸⁷ It remains questionable though whether the relationships between China and Indonesia on the state-level will reflect positively on how the government treats or protects its ethnic Chinese citizens. Most of the discriminatory regulations on the national level have been abolished and no evidence was found during research that the Chinese government approached the Indonesian government after the May riots 1998 in order to call for more changes. How the Indonesian government deals with discrimination on the local or bureaucratic level is part of Indonesia’s internal affairs. According to one of the five principles of peaceful co-existence (enumerated in 1954 and reconfirmed in 2004 by the Chinese government) guiding China’s foreign policy, the Chinese government prefers to not interfere with other country’s internal affairs.⁴⁸⁸

A respondent of Thung’s stated that “[i]n Southeast Asia, the Chinese are dominant, so for the business, to take the lowest risk approach is to look for and use the Chinese network.”⁴⁸⁹ The common ground based on their ethnicity therefore further increased the trust they have towards each other. Thung attempts to explain what could be meant by the ‘Chinese way of doing business’, which is valued highly among those in Chinese networks. The idea seems to be that

⁴⁸⁵ Interview with Sigit W. (12.04.2010), Hari S. (09.09.2008).

⁴⁸⁶ Efferin and Pontjoharyo, pp. 156ff.

⁴⁸⁷ Efferin and Pontjoharyo, pp. 151-152.

⁴⁸⁸ An example of China’s non-interference policy is China’s veto of the UN resolution on Syria, 2012. Maintaining its policy of non-interference, however, becomes increasingly difficult for the Chinese government the more it becomes involved with other countries, e.g. Sudan (Large, 2008). A debate of China’s non-interference policy, however, goes beyond the framework of this thesis.

⁴⁸⁹ Thung, 1998, p. 77.

Chinese trust people with a Chinese background more than others.⁴⁹⁰ On this basis, ethnic Chinese are granted privileges. While people from other ethnic groups might be required to pay down-payments for goods or services provided by mainland Chinese business partners, ethnic Chinese on the other hand might even succeed in having payments deferred. Both, mainland Chinese and Southeast Asian ethnic Chinese further believe that their common ethnic identity would enable business operations to go faster and smoother.⁴⁹¹

Ethnic Chinese relying on business networks and opportunities based on a Chinese ethnicity might be afraid to become less Chinese by engaging more with indigenous Indonesians and identifying themselves more with Indonesia, thus potentially losing their business advantage.⁴⁹² Such fears are a result of a similar rigid and dichotomous perspective of identity which conversely makes it difficult for ethnic Chinese to show their cultural heritage without having to fear being criticized as unpatriotic by some indigenous Indonesians. The rhetoric of the New Order's assimilation policy is still in the minds of many Indonesians, both indigenous and ethnic Chinese.

Another reason for Chinese Indonesians to stress their Chinese background is the stereotype that Chinese are successful in conducting business. Some ethnic Chinese like to refer to this as a 'cultural characteristic'. A Chinese Indonesian pharmacist stated: "We, Chinese, are never at the bottom of society – no matter where we go. We are diligent, hard-working and clever. We make it, we climb up. Of course, some are lower class, but the majority is not."⁴⁹³ Here, a feeling of superiority is linked to the ethnic background and supposed attributes linked to it. Indigenous Indonesians frequently related to me in interviews that they felt that the ethnic Chinese would think of themselves as superior and therefore act arrogantly.⁴⁹⁴

Subgroup 2: Interested in / Actively Engaged in Conflict Transformation

The members of this subgroup who were interviewed during the field research were already actively working on issues related to the conflict. Many of them have been educated abroad, have returned with a number of ideas and are keen on contributing to social and political developments in Indonesia. They further think that it is them, the ethnic Chinese, who have to

⁴⁹⁰ Most ethnic Chinese businesses are family businesses. Nepotism and employing ethnic Chinese is often used to counteract the problem of limited trust towards indigenous Indonesians. Efferin and Pontjoharyo, p. 111.

⁴⁹¹ Interview with Prof. Hendrawan (11.09.2008).

⁴⁹² Interview with Prof. Hendrawan (11.09.2008).

⁴⁹³ Interview with Charles N. (16.09.2008).

⁴⁹⁴ Interview with Rudi K. (14.04.2010) and Mohammad P. (18.04.2010).

become active to make a change and therefore they try to convince other ethnic Chinese to join their projects. Their activities include:

1. Activities aiming at reviving the Chinese Indonesian culture and social life
2. Charity work
3. Work on human rights issues
4. Work related to the nation-building process or fostering of pluralism in Indonesia
5. Political activism

Some of the activities which the respondents engaged in could not be clearly placed in one category only as they covered more than one field.

Those respondents who had witnessed the events of the 1960s and the developments during the Soeharto regime experienced a deterioration of Chinese culture in Indonesia. After the fall of Soeharto and the lifting of the ban on Chinese culture and organizations, they felt the need to re-establish organizations whose main goal is to revive the Chinese Indonesian culture. The organizations they established cover different aspects of cultural heritage. Buddhists for example have organized themselves to build, renovate and maintain temples. Other ethnic Chinese established so-called 'family organizations' as they consider themselves to be an extended 'family' as their ancestors originated from the same region (sometimes even the same village) in China and they may even share the same surname. People belonging to these organizations meet to practice Chinese traditions of ancestral worship together.⁴⁹⁵ Most organizations are small and restricted to the local level. There are, however, also two national organizations which warrant a closer examination: the Indonesian Chinese Social Association (PSMTI, *Paguyuban Sosial Marga*) in the context of reviving Chinese Indonesian culture and the Indonesian Chinese Association (INTI, *Perhimpunan Indonesia*) in the context of their work of promoting equal rights for Chinese Indonesians.

The Indonesian Chinese Social Association (PSMTI) is mainly concerned with reviving Chinese Indonesian culture. In order to encourage young Chinese Indonesians living in Jakarta to either learn or improve their knowledge of Chinese culture as well as their Chinese language

⁴⁹⁵ Lembong, 2008, p. 54.

skills, PSMTI organizes the *Cici Koko*⁴⁹⁶ contest which is also broadcasted on television. Apart from testing the contestants' knowledge, the members of the jury also evaluate their Chinese-style costumes. With this contest, the organization wants to preserve and promote the Chinese cultural heritage among Chinese Indonesians.⁴⁹⁷ The way 'Chineseness' is presented in the contest reveals the ideal image of 'Chineseness' which the organization wants to revive, exhibit and promote. However, especially the traditional mainland Chinese costumes and the focus on the contestants' presentations in Mandarin ignore the fact that most young Chinese Indonesians usually have limited knowledge about Chinese culture and language, let alone wear traditional Chinese costumes. The image of Chinese Indonesians in Indonesia which is broadcasted not only within Indonesia but also in the People's Republic of China, Taiwan and Singapore, may therefore transmit a distorted picture. Further, the televised projection of a homogenized, essentialized version of 'Chineseness' may confirm prejudices of ethnic Chinese 'otherness' among the rest of Indonesian society.

The organization has also embarked on a major project to further re-sinicize ethnic Chinese by establishing the Indonesian Chinese Cultural Garden in the Taman Mini Indonesia Indah (Beautiful Indonesia Miniature Park) in Jakarta. In this park, the different provinces are represented in their cultural diversity. In the 1970s, the park was a project of the first lady Siti Hartinah, the wife of President Soeharto. It is thus not surprising that initially no Chinese Indonesian pavilion had been constructed. The Indonesian Chinese Social Association has attempted to change this and has been granted permission to build a Chinese Indonesian Cultural Museum in 2007. Given that the projected cost of the project is estimated at 70 billion Indonesian rupiahs (about 5.7 million EUR), the association has been relying on donations. During an interview with T. Jusuf, the chairman of the association, he described how difficult it had been to collect enough donations to complete the project. The project was originally planned to be finished in 2008, however, due to a lack of funds, it had not yet been completed as of 2011. For Jusuf, the project was an important signal to show that Chinese Indonesians are as much a part of Indonesia as the Balinese, the Javanese or the people from Sumatra: "When the children are still in elementary school, they come here to learn about the different cultures that are all united in Indonesia. If they learn from a very early age that the Chinese are also part of it, this is good, isn't it? Also, the Chinese children will not feel left out and they will learn more about their cultural heritage and will be proud of it."⁴⁹⁸

⁴⁹⁶ Cici Koko means older sister and older brother in the Chinese Fujian dialect. It is a competition for ethnic Chinese children.

⁴⁹⁷ Interview with Teddy Jusuf (08.09.2008).

⁴⁹⁸ Interview with Teddy Jusuf (08.09.2008).

The project has not gained support from all Chinese Indonesians. Some respondents stated that even though they support the idea of a Chinese pavilion, they worry about the costs for the project. They also expressed fears that it could be interpreted as showing off the wealth of the Chinese Indonesian community.⁴⁹⁹ A further point of critique was that the park was too ‘Mainland Chinese’ instead of ‘Indonesian Chinese’. The architecture does not represent the style of Chinese Indonesian buildings nor does the concept take the development of Chinese culture in Indonesia into account.⁵⁰⁰ Thus, although the Chinese organization was longing to openly present ‘Chineseness’ as part of Indonesian society after the long suppression of Chinese culture, the style of the museum might lead to misunderstandings. If the aim of the undertaking was to present the Chinese Indonesians as part of Indonesia, building a miniature version of Mainland China with a typical mainland Chinese pagoda and a theatre which strongly resembles the Forbidden City in Beijing may not send the intended message. It can be questioned whether this superficial exhibition of ‘Chineseness’ alongside other artificially created local cultures would help Chinese Indonesians to enter the imagined community of Indonesian ethnic groups or empower them within the process of nation-building.⁵⁰¹ There is a risk that this exhibition of ‘Chineseness’ may substantiate the narrow definition of Indonesian national identity which is based on indigenusness by pointing out that the ethnic Chinese are from a different origin, instead of challenging it.

The Chinese Indonesian Association also publishes newsletters and magazines in Chinese and supports the import of Chinese language newspapers from abroad. The post-Soeharto era of Reformasi is marked by the revival of the freedom of the press. In this context, many previously banned as well as new daily newspapers and magazines directed at the ethnic Chinese community published in the Chinese or Indonesian language therefore (re-) emerged.⁵⁰² Due to the fact that especially the younger generation of Chinese Indonesians is not able to read Chinese, the audience of these papers is mostly limited to members of the older generation. Nevertheless, many young Chinese Indonesians the respective press acknowledge the existence of Chinese language press as a sign for the official recognition

⁴⁹⁹ Interview with Surya Tjandra (23.04.2010) and Mohammed Gatot (08.09.2008).

⁵⁰⁰ Interview with several Chinese Indonesians in 2008 and 2010.

⁵⁰¹ Anderson argues that the Taman Mini in general may not help this purpose as the traditional houses at Taman Mini are merely “icons of ethnicity” and that “concrete and immediate life is drained” from those houses. Anderson, 1990, p. 182.

⁵⁰² For the research, the following Chinese language newspapers and magazines were included: *The International Daily (Gouji Ribao)*, *The Archipelago Daily (Qiandao Ribao)*, *The New Indonesia and ASEAN (Xin Yindong)*, *Media Aspiration (Hu Sheng)*, *The Voice of Indonesian Chinese (Yinhua Zhisheng)*, *Sinar Glodok* and *Sinergy Indonesia*.

of their cultural and identity by the state, even if they are not able to read it.⁵⁰³ As the press is directed at Chinese Indonesians, it mainly deals with Indonesia and topics related to ethnic Chinese on the one hand and with topics about the People's Republic of China, Taiwan, Singapore or the Chinese diaspora. It is striking that many articles and reports are dealing with the development of PRC economy, reflecting readers' interest and the pride which they take in China's economic rise. The papers also cover topics regarding traditional Chinese culture.⁵⁰⁴ The press has further become a space for its readers to socialize and to imagine themselves as part of the so-called Chinese diaspora, a possible global identity for ethnic Chinese.⁵⁰⁵ This identity might serve as a retreat for those who are dissatisfied with their marginalized position in Indonesian society, but do not want to engage actively in processes of changing this. The focus on the development of the Chinese economy and the 're-sinicization' of Chinese Indonesians which some of the papers and magazines have, goes beyond the intentions of reviving and preserving Chinese Indonesian culture. Instead, the People's Republic of China as well as Chinese culture and values as practiced there are presented as an ideal. It seems to be the 'cultural mission' of these media outlets to encourage Chinese Indonesians to become 'more Chinese'. Therefore, although the revival of the Chinese language press in Indonesia as such sets a positive signal for the acceptance of Chinese Indonesian culture in general, the publishers' determination to 're-sinicize' Chinese Indonesians may hinder rather than encourage social integration.

There are only few ethnic Chinese papers that are published in Indonesian. After two ethnic Chinese magazines (SIMPATIK published by the Jakarta-based organization Youth Solidarity for Justice and *Suara Baru* published by the Chinese Indonesian organization INTI) came to a halt due to financial problems, the only remaining ethnic Chinese magazines published in Jakarta are *Sinar Glodok* and *Sinergy Indonesia*. *Sinar Glodok* is a bi-weekly newspaper which is circulated in the so-called 'China-town' of Jakarta. It consists mainly of business reports and advertisement. By focusing on the business activities of ethnic Chinese and their successes, the authors tap into and perpetuate stereotypes about the Chinese Indonesians as rich businessmen, even if these stereotypes may hold a dangerous potential. 'Chineseness' is presented as the key to success and as such this newspaper as well uncritically promotes 're-sinicization'.

⁵⁰³ E.g. Interview with Patricia S. (02.09.2008).

⁵⁰⁴ As e.g. *The International Daily (Gouji Ribao)* and *The Archipelago Daily (Qiandao Ribao)*.

⁵⁰⁵ Hoon, 2008, pp. 239-240 .

The other Indonesian language magazine, *Sinergy Indonesia*, does not aim at ‘re-sinicization’. The magazine aims at presenting a bigger and more diverse picture of ethnic Chinese and to thus de-construct stereotypes. The magazine is therefore published in Indonesian in order to reach a broader audience. It promotes the idea of pluralism by reporting about different ethnic groups, including the ethnic Chinese, and how despite or because of their differences they can blend together as one very diverse nation. Multi-ethnicity is presented as an advantage that Indonesia has and which should be more often regarded as a positive asset. During the interview, editor Tan raised concerns that the idea of assimilating ethnic Chinese to solve the ‘Chinese problem’ could re-emerge as a topic in Indonesia. From his point of view the ethnic Chinese like other ethnic groups will make their contribution to Indonesia and it will be a valuable one. Getting rid of this ethnic group would harm Indonesia and therefore they should be included and treated like other ethnic indigenous people.⁵⁰⁶

For those who speak and understand Chinese, but cannot read or write the language, there is also the possibility of watching the Chinese program of Metro TV. The TV station broadcasts international and national news as well as reports about ethnic Chinese in Indonesia in Mandarin since the year 2000 during one time slot per day. While ethnic Chinese, especially of the older generation are keen on having programs in Chinese, it seems to reach only a limited number of ethnic Chinese. These are mainly people who went to a Chinese school before the Soeharto regime closed them down in the 1960s and people who now study the language as a foreign language as well as foreign nationals who speak Chinese. Most Chinese Indonesian households that still use Chinese speak one of the many Chinese dialects (mainly from South China) rather than Mandarin, which means that those who grew up during the Soeharto-regime, may be able to understand and to communicate only in a Chinese dialect.

Ong, responsible for the Chinese program at Metro TV, said that was it was among their aims to not only provide Chinese Indonesians with Chinese language TV but also to show that the ethnic Chinese deserve to be represented in the Indonesian media like other ethnic groups. They also intended to work on the reduction of the stereotype of the rich business Chinese by showing reports about Chinese Indonesians in other regions working as

⁵⁰⁶ Interview with Dr. Tan Swie Ling (10.09.2008).

peasants or craftspeople.⁵⁰⁷ However, due to the language barrier, indigenous Indonesians do not watch these programs and their intention to reduce stereotypes therefore seems to be difficult to realize. It would therefore make sense to broadcast these reports during normal programs in the Indonesian language.

While the Chinese Social Organization, Chinese press and Metro TV are mainly concerned with reviving the Chinese culture, the Indonesian Chinese Organization (INTI) is mainly concerned with promoting equal rights for Chinese Indonesians and their obligation to contribute to the Indonesian nation. As the organization states on its website,

“Although it brings together particularly the Chinese Indonesians, Perhimpunan INTI is not an exclusive grouping. A need is felt, however, that Indonesian community members of Chinese origin must strengthen the unity among themselves and promote their awareness of their obligations as well as their rights as Indonesian citizens.

Perhimpunan INTI will not turn a blind eye to the fact that from generation to generation the Indonesian community members of Chinese origin have suffered various forms of discrimination, something which seems to be considered and accepted as proper. However, Perhimpunan INTI also realizes the impression prevailing among the board community that the Chinese Indonesians at least have not fully met their commitments and obligations as Indonesian citizens. On this basis, Perhimpunan INTI is resolved to develop itself as an organization in which the spirit of nationalism will be kept a flame so that it can foster the awareness of Chinese Indonesian regarding their rights, commitments and obligations as Indonesian citizens.”⁵⁰⁸

The organization focuses on fighting against discrimination in general and in particular against discrimination of ethnic Chinese. This includes improving the social image of the community by promoting social responsibility and organizing charity projects. While the Chinese organization PSMTI falls in the first category (engaging in reviving the Chinese Indonesian culture), INTI's work falls into the two following categories (working on human rights issues and engaging in charity work). Regarding discrimination, the organization meets regularly with government institutions, such as the National Commission on Human Rights or the Ministry of Home Affairs to discuss the issues. The charity projects are often conducted in cooperation

⁵⁰⁷ Interview with Susi Ong (19.09.2008).

⁵⁰⁸ Profile INTI: <http://en.inti.or.id/profile/1/> (04.02.2011).

with Muslim institutions; these projects include e.g. food donation for the poor during Ramadan or essay competitions for socially deprived children in cooperation with elementary and secondary schools. Through its two approaches, the organization hopes to work with both a top-down (encouraging anti-discrimination policies on the governmental level) as well as a bottom-up (charity on the grass-root level) approach.⁵⁰⁹

The input and engagement of organizations like INTI has been important for the lifting of discriminatory laws and the developing of new legislation to replace them, such as the new nationality (or citizenship) law passed in 2006 and the Anti-discrimination Bill in 2008. As far as their work to improve the social image of ethnic Chinese at the grass-roots level is concerned, it is difficult to evaluate their impact. For outsiders, this organization is still perceived as an exclusively Chinese organization – a closed club.⁵¹⁰ Even some ethnic Chinese stated that it was “too Chinese” for them.⁵¹¹ Even if charity is provided and the recipients are grateful for what they receive, this does not necessarily mean that the act will necessarily change the recipients’ general opinion about ethnic Chinese. Some may even consider it normal and “the least they can do” for “they are all rich”.⁵¹² It might therefore also have a negative effect and stress the economic gap between ethnic Chinese and indigenous Indonesians, confirming again the stereotype of the wealthy ethnic Chinese. The benefits of using charity to enhance public popularity thus seem debatable.

In addition to INTI, charity is also provided by Christian churches. In addition to food donations, free medical supplies are often provided by churches. Other types of projects conducted by Christian churches are free schooling and vaccinations for socially deprived children.⁵¹³ The idea and practice of charity is a well-established concept in Christianity and does not aim mainly at raising the popularity of the ethnic Chinese donors. Nevertheless, one cannot deny that this aspect also plays a role. Some respondents revealed that by trying to improve their image among indigenous Indonesians through charity work, they hope to prevent violent acts like those during May 1998.⁵¹⁴

A number of the ethnic Chinese respondents fall into the second category of those “engaging in human rights issues”. These include the likes of lawyers such as Jusuf, who try to bring cases of

⁵⁰⁹ Interview with Benny Setiono (16.09.2008).

⁵¹⁰ Interview with Kartika Dewi (15.04.2010).

⁵¹¹ Interview with Surya Tjandra (23.04.2010).

⁵¹² Interview with two indigenous mechanics in Jakarta (05.09.2008).

⁵¹³ Visit to a protestant church in Jakarta and interviews with some of its members after church service (07.09.2008).

⁵¹⁴ Interviews with members of a Protestant church (07.09.2008).

discrimination or human rights violations to court. In the course of their work, they have been threatened by people opposed to their efforts. Another ethnic Chinese lawyer, Gatot, was physically attacked by a group of radical Muslims after he claimed compensation in court in 2001 for a man who had been accused of being a Communist, captured, maltreated and dispossessed by the military after the coup d'état in 1965.⁵¹⁵ Apart from bringing cases like this one to court, many of these ethnic Chinese lawyers frequently publish about human rights issues related to the case of ethnic Chinese and other minority groups. Iwan Wibowo for example constantly reviews changes in the law with regard to their impact on minority groups and makes them public.⁵¹⁶

Others are active in anti-discrimination organizations such as the Indonesia Anti-Discrimination Movement (GANDI). This organization was founded by ethnic Chinese after the 1998 riots and supported by President Wahid and later President Megawati. Through its programs, GANDI promotes legal actions that help in decreasing discrimination in Indonesia in general. In this context, the members of this organization monitor policies and put forward suggestions on their website (lobby work). The organization was also involved in the drafting of the new Nationality (citizenship) Law and the Anti-Discrimination Bill. It maintains close connections to the Indonesian Human Rights Committee as well as foreign organizations such as the German development cooperation agency (GIZ).⁵¹⁷

In addition to running ethnic Chinese-founded human rights organizations, ethnic Chinese of other professions also actively support the promotion human rights in Indonesia. This category further includes journalists writing and publishing about human rights abuses with regard to minorities. Andreas Harsono, an ethnic Chinese who at the time of writing is with Human Rights Watch Indonesia, has published numerous articles in the national press as well as in his online blog about the human rights violations in West Kalimantan and other outer islands in which he does not refrain from criticizing state authorities. By trying to raise attention for ethnic and religious conflicts all over Indonesia, he attempts to widen people's perceptions of Indonesia and its problems, especially in Jakarta.⁵¹⁸

⁵¹⁵ Interview with Mohammad Gatot (08.09.2008).

⁵¹⁶ Wibowo, 2007.

⁵¹⁷ Interview with Wahyu Effendy (08.09.2008).

⁵¹⁸ Interview with Andreas Harsono (15.09.2008).

A central concept for many of the NGOs dealing with ethnic conflict in Indonesia is pluralism, i.e. the acknowledgment of diversity. Numerous NGOs have adapted this concept to the Indonesian context and gone beyond a simple acknowledgment or acceptance of diversity to embracing it. Having left behind an authoritarian regime, a bottom-up instead of top-down approach is considered desirable by many Indonesians.⁵¹⁹ Pluralism aims at defining people's needs and common interests in society through a process of dialogue and sometimes conflict. Thus many ethnic minority groups who feel dominated by other ethnic groups may see pluralism as a chance to integrate their interests and needs into a re-defined Indonesian nation. Even if one group may be able to establish its view as the hegemonic one, this would be as result of a negotiation process within a pluralistic framework. Creating space for dialogue provides an opportunity for all groups to represent their interests.

Most of the NGOs working on promoting pluralism try to raise awareness and understanding for the positions of different ethnic groups. They also try to encourage and empower ethnic groups who lack the requisite educational background to formulate their needs and interests and participate in the process of nation-building. Their efforts are not limited to ethnic but also other marginalized social groups.

For example, the Institute for Pluralism in Indonesia (IPI) has initiated the project 'Batik Lasem' to increase pluralism and local empowerment. Currently, there are still many ethnic Chinese who work as batik entrepreneurs in the area. The batik work itself is mainly done by indigenous workers. It is often difficult for batik workers to leave their employers to start a business of their own as they lack both the recipes of the dye, which is kept secret by the entrepreneurs, and the necessary financial assets. Many workers have been frustrated with the situation and translated this frustration into anti-Chinese sentiments, even though their situation is similar for those who work for indigenous batik entrepreneurs.⁵²⁰

For the Batik Lasem project, three villages in the area surrounding Lasem were selected. Women living in these villages had previously been working for Chinese Indonesian batik entrepreneurs were now unemployed. IPI organized seminars to support these women to help them start their own businesses, to produce their own dye, create designs of their own, and to manage their finances. The empowerment of female batik workers has helped them to gain a new self-understanding and self-esteem. During local fairs these female batik workers are now able to sell their batik cloths next to other, already established, batik entrepreneurs. As they have now become batik entrepreneurs, they have started to communicate with other long-established (often ethnic Chinese) businessmen and businesswomen on a different level, from

⁵¹⁹ Interview with William Kwan and Kartika Dewi (15.04.2010).

⁵²⁰ Interview with Mariati M. (13.04.2010) and Jamiatum R. (14.04.2010).

entrepreneur to entrepreneur. IPI also organized exchange meetings for batik entrepreneurs where the women had the opportunity to learn from the experiences of Chinese Indonesian entrepreneurs, who also gave them advice on improving their designs. Two of these women successfully extended their business to areas as far as Solo and Yogyakarta. They stated that they now had a different level of access to some of their former employers, which also changed their perception of ethnic Chinese in general. The NGO hopes that projects such as this one will help in overcoming the ethnic and social class gaps between ethnic groups and foster more cooperation.⁵²¹

The Yayasan Nabil foundation has another approach to promote pluralism. It funds academic projects which promote the equitable integration of Chinese Indonesians into the Indonesian nation, not as outsiders but as an integral part who have to contribute to the nation's development and well-being and fulfill their social responsibility as they might not have done in the past. The organization thereby tries to promote the ideas of pluralism and nation-building among academics in Indonesia. The organization not only enables students and academics to publish works related to this topic, but helps them in promoting and distributing them, organizes book launchings and readings as well as seminars and workshops.⁵²² Addressing academics not only fosters their academic interest in the topic. Many academics are interested in politics or even enter politics.⁵²³ They either act as source of information for politicians or transfer their knowledge directly into the political realm and therefore the topic of the ethnic Chinese may be brought into politics.

The final category within this subgroup is ethnic Chinese who are directly engaged in politics. Shortly after the ban on Chinese organizations was lifted, several ethnic Chinese political parties were founded. During the first free elections, however, these parties failed to gain even the support of the ethnic Chinese communities. The parties were mostly dissolved or merged with larger, not exclusively Chinese Indonesian, parties. A number of individual ethnic Chinese have joined different political parties and managed to become elected. Purnama, for example, became the first ethnic Chinese mayor in Indonesia, winning on Belitung Island despite ethnic Chinese only making up 0.3 percent of the population on this island. According to him, many ethnic Chinese fail to get elected

⁵²¹ During my field visit 2010, I spent a week in Lasem where I was able to talk to the initiators of the project, participants (batik women worker, e.g. Mariati M., 13.04.2010) and ethnic Chinese batik entrepreneurs.

⁵²² Interview with Eddie Lembong (16.09.2008).

⁵²³ E.g. Prof. Hendrawan.

because they focus too much on issues regarding ethnic or religious problems in Indonesia. In his campaign, he instead focused on reforming the health system.⁵²⁴ Others have been elected into parliament, including Prof. Hendrawan and Tsai. Despite reported cases of discrimination and manipulation during elections and electoral campaigns⁵²⁵, increasing numbers of ethnic Chinese are entering politics. The politicians interviewed here stated that they hoped that more young ethnic Chinese would join political parties, to show that they are not scared but rather that they want to be part of building the nation's democracy. Through their political engagement they also want to prove to the indigenous public that ethnic Chinese are not only 'economic animals', but also socially and politically active, responsible citizens.

However, the respondents also admitted that there were ethnic Chinese who enter politics as part of a business strategy. Being politically active is still not easy in Indonesia and running campaigns requires vast amounts of money, thus making it difficult to separate politics from capital. Some ethnic Chinese politicians voiced their concern that some fellow ethnic Chinese "just buy themselves a seat a parliament" without actually caring for politics, but rather in the hope of gaining business advantages.⁵²⁶

The members of this subgroup have organized themselves to work towards their aims using different approaches to work on the conflict, be it directly or indirectly, often investing remarkable amounts of their time and personal assets. Although many groups have rather abstract goals such as abolishing discrimination (equal rights for all), justice for victims (reconciliation), initiating a society forming process in the framework of pluralism, or reviving Chinese Indonesian culture. The projects are very diverse and touch upon different levels and areas of conflict transformation. Nevertheless, there is always space for improvement and if the groups would be working together, synergies could emerge which would allow for a more structured approach. To date, each organization or individual has developed a concept or measure which is considered to be helpful in the process, without prior analysis of the conflict or developing an overall aim which the process should lead to.

Conflict transformation is also in the interest of ethnic Chinese who do not live up to the stereotype of the 'wealthy' ethnic Chinese. The situation of lower class ethnic Chinese in the

⁵²⁴ Interview with Basuki Purnama (10.04.2010).

⁵²⁵ Interview with Frans Tsai (20.04.2010) and Basuki Purnama (10.04.2010).

⁵²⁶ Interview with Hanjaya Setiawan (10.09.2008) and Christopher Nugroho (09.04.2008).

surrounding of Jakarta⁵²⁷ is a difficult one as poor indigenous Indonesians consider them to be ‘Chinese’ while the wealthy ethnic Chinese refer to them as ‘indigenous’, even though they have preserved Chinese cultural elements. The majority of them has Chinese names, worships Daoist or Buddhist deities and their ancestors and has developed a Chinese Indonesian cuisine of their own.⁵²⁸ In the past, physical traits or anything which highlighted their Chinese heritage was sufficient to make them targets of anti-Chinese mobs. Like other ethnic Chinese, residents of Cina Benteng also encounter discrimination. Even though the new citizenship law has changed the requirements such as dropping the requirement for the SBKRI document, many still have not succeeded in officially becoming Indonesian citizens.⁵²⁹ In contrast to other Chinese Indonesians who are better situated, they lack the resources to “buy their way out of trouble”⁵³⁰. In spite of being offered assistance by legal aid services and NGOs such as GANDI, many poor and less educated ethnic Chinese still struggle with bureaucratic processes. Until they are officially Indonesian citizens, they are regarded as stateless people with only limited rights in Indonesia. Respondents also claimed that they were often not included in food assistance programs and cannot participate in other pro-poor initiatives of the government and therefore are interested in conflict transformation if it helps to improve their situation.⁵³¹

Subgroup 3: Indifferent to Conflict Transformation

Similar to the subgroup on the indigenous side, this subgroup can be divided into those who are more inclined to get positively involved in issues regarding the conflict and those who are more inclined to get negatively involved. Unlike indigenous Indonesians who in some cases do not even notice the conflict or do not perceive the situation as a conflict, ethnic Chinese have little chance of escaping the conflict entirely. Most have encountered situations in which they were ‘confronted’ with their identity as ethnic Chinese, regardless their own perceptions of their identity.⁵³² Thung classified this subgroup of people as ‘internationals’ who choose “to go international”⁵³³ for their alternative identity. As such they engage “in appropriating national modes of development in such a way that they lose the significance of personal identity, including that of their ethnic origin, and instead adopt

⁵²⁷ For practical reasons interviews could only be conducted with residents of Cina Benteng. Therefore, only a limited insight about the attitudes and behavior of lower class ethnic Chinese can be provided in this study.

⁵²⁸ Interviews with anonymous Chinese Indonesians during a visit to Cina Benteng.

⁵²⁹ Khouw, 2010.

⁵³⁰ Interview with Andreas Harsono (15.09.2008).

⁵³¹ Interviews with anonymous Chinese Indonesians during a visit to Cina Benteng.

⁵³² Interviews with Lina Alexandra (03.09.2008) and Pratiwa Kartika (18.09.2008).

⁵³³ Thung, 1998, p. 174.

a rather general and uniform identity, for example as a ‘professional’.”⁵³⁴ Thereby, they try to avoid the topic of their identity and the conflicts connected to it. In some cases, these people have been traumatized by events such as the May riots 1998. If the people are willing to accept help to deal with their sometimes traumatic experiences, trauma experts might be able to provide this. However, respondents from this subgroup stated that they preferred to forget about the traumatic events and ignore their traumatic experiences.⁵³⁵

Depending on their behavior, they can also influence public opinion about ethnic Chinese. If they display their wealth ostentatiously and treat their employees badly, they strengthen negative stereotypes about ethnic Chinese. Harsono stated that he felt ashamed about how some fellow Chinese Indonesians “celebrate parties like they are kings and they don’t care that the others [indigenous Indonesians] are watching them”.⁵³⁶ By throwing lavish parties which are then documented in the newspapers or magazines, not caring about the economic situation of the poor living close by, they seem to do everything to confirm the bad images of ethnic Chinese.⁵³⁷ Harsono believes that if they behave modestly and act as good examples, they might contribute to deconstructing negative stereotypes.⁵³⁸

4.3 Contradictions

Having assessed the attitudes (A) and behavior (B) of the involved subgroups, the focus will now shift from the actors to the contradictions (C). These contradictions may either result from the attitudes and behavior of the conflict parties or bring them about. In most protracted conflicts, both occur over the course of time. Contradictions here are understood as the contradicting aims and interests of the conflict parties. According to Galtung, all three aspects of a conflict have to be addressed. However, the contradictions form “the root of the conflict, the *condition sine qua non*”⁵³⁹ and are therefore in the focus of interest when it comes to transforming the conflict. If the contradictions are transformed first, the attitudes and behavior that infringed on the basic human needs of one or more parties can be reduced or even

⁵³⁴ Ibid.

⁵³⁵ Based on interviews with Patricia S. (02.09.2008), members of a protestant church in Jakarta (07.09.2008), Charles N. (16.09.2008) and Thung Ju Lan (20.04.2010).

⁵³⁶ Interview with Andrea Harsono (15.09.2008)

⁵³⁷ Ibid.

⁵³⁸ Ibid.

⁵³⁹ Galtung, 2010, p. 125.

overcome.⁵⁴⁰ Transforming contradictions does not mean that only one of the parties achieves her goals (victory) or that neither of them achieves their goals (compromise). This would not eliminate the contradictions, as both options do not necessarily imply that the other party accepts the result. Even if the result is accepted for the time being, the possibility remains that conflict may arise again at a later point in time. The sharper the contradictions the more the social system needs to be changed.⁵⁴¹

Galtung distinguishes between objective and subjective contradictions. Objective contradictions “may be unconscious and unarticulated”⁵⁴² while subjective contradictions “pass through the human brain, as thought-consciousness, speech-articulation and action-organization.”⁵⁴³ Subjective contradictions can be revealed by listening to the conflict parties and the articulation of their respective aims and interests which cannot be satisfied as they are being opposed by the other conflict party. Objective contradictions are often to be found on the next higher level, in underlying structures that mostly are not obvious to the involved actors themselves. Before being able to work on objective contradictions, they need to be made conscious to the actors. Galtung depicted the possible development of a contradiction with a ‘contradiction life cycle’:⁵⁴⁴

[0] Objective contraction, independent of consciousness

[1] Consciousness-formation through THOUGHT (intrasubjective)

[2] Articulation through SPEECH (intersubjective)

[3] Organization through ACTION (private and-or public)

[4] Struggle among mobilized actors

- Violent or nonviolent
- Quick or slow
- Without or with outside parties assisting, mediating
- With more or less polarization, escalation between actors

[5] Outcomes of struggle:

- Prevalence or compromise: go back to [0]-[4]
- Transcendence = a new reality

⁵⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁵⁴¹ Galtung, 2010, p. 171.

⁵⁴² Galtung, 2010, pp. 171.

⁵⁴³ Ibid.

⁵⁴⁴ Galtung, 2010, p. 172.

Subjective Contradictions of This Conflict

The subjective contradictions in this case are not easily identifiable as they are not directly linked to e.g. territory struggles between two parties. There are not only two conflict groups, the ethnic Chinese and the indigenous Indonesians, but at least six conflict subgroups, all with different attitudes, behaviors, aims and interests. This complexity is due to the goals of individuals but also of groups being influenced by deeper, underlying patterns of social relationships in their direct surroundings (their social environment) as well as subjective assumptions. There are contradictions between the two main conflict parties which override the divisions into subgroups. However, there are also contradictions overriding the division between the ethnic Chinese and indigenous Indonesians as well. As the analysis of the conflict subgroups revealed, there are conflict actors in each major conflict group that are opposing conflict transformation on the one hand as well as conflict actors that are already engaging in projects aiming at conflict transformation.

Based on the analysis of the field research results, ethnic Chinese who are striving for acceptance of their identity as ethnic Chinese and self-realization without restrictions due to their ethnicity are in favor of conflict transformation efforts. They have a need for equal rights and treatment as Indonesian nationals by their fellow indigenous Indonesians. This precondition would enable them to better reach their personal goals. Lower class ethnic Chinese who are stateless have problems finding decently paid work to improve their economic situation as long as they do not have Indonesian citizenship. The upper- and middle-classes aim at living out their Chinese Indonesian identity with all of its cultural implications without having to face discrimination. They have begun going beyond the segment of work (business) traditionally assigned to them to other fields such as politics and aim to expand their options and possibilities in life by exerting their right to choose their profession freely. Their goals are legitimate and further fall under the (according to Galtung) non-debatable basic human needs of identity and freedom.

In the case of the other conflict party, indigenous Indonesians of Subgroup 1 are interested in maintaining the social status quo, i.e. keeping ethnic Chinese in their traditional role as middlemen. Ethnic Chinese, especially from the upper- and middle-class, are seen as posing a threat to their political or economic power (or both). If ethnic Chinese would be able to extend their influence to politics, they would be in the same position as the indigenous elite who also have combined economic and political activities, like the Soeharto family or Kalla (vice

president 2004-2009). In order to preserve their power, it is in the interest of the indigenous elite to prevent ethnic Chinese from rising above their current position, be it in society or the economy, in order to stay in power and not have to share it. While striving for personal success or at preserving one's position are legitimate goals, if this means that another group of people has to suffer infringements upon their basic human needs, these aims lose their legitimacy. A further element is that indigenous Indonesian seem to have difficulties with the idea of being governed again by foreigners, as which many of them classify Chinese Indonesians as well. These fears can be seen as a kind of trauma deriving from negative collective memories of a colonial past as Indonesia has only been independent less than seventy years. These fears should be kept in mind and dealt with sensitively when seeking to transform the goals of this subgroup.

The Chinese Indonesians of Subgroup 1 also support the aim of the indigenous Subgroup 1 (preserving the status quo), albeit for other reasons. Those who currently benefit from the ethnic Chinese' position as marginalized middlemen and Chinese (business) networks would not be able to do so anymore if this position and its functions would disappear. Therefore, they feel more comfortable remaining in an exclusive position and over time have developed prejudices against indigenous Indonesians. They are not interested in being 'Indonesian', instead they prefer being either 'Chinese' or neither. Many of them have either shown a clear orientation towards Singapore, Mainland China, Taiwan or Western countries such as Australia, the USA or Europe. Since they have come to terms with their situation, they do not see any reason why this should change as change would mean that their perception of their selves (their identity) would have to be altered.

Subgroups also disagree about the perception of ethnic Chinese and the understanding of the Indonesian nation. While there are members of both groups, ethnic Chinese as well as indigenous (especially in the respective Subgroups 2), who want Chinese Indonesians to be as much a part of Indonesia as other Indonesian peoples, there are other subgroups among both primary conflict parties who still perceive them as different and to some degree as foreigners. The understanding of the nation is still strongly tied to the concept of 'indigenouness'. The state's portrayal of ethnic Chinese as a distinct group of 'others' in order to form a counterpart to Indonesian identity the New Order regime has prevailed until the time of writing (2012). Indigenouness is therefore an important, if not the main part of how many Indonesians define and understand their identity. While there are subgroups who would like to see changes in this

concept of the nation, members of the sub-group opposing conflict transformation efforts feel threatened by change and fear for the unity of Indonesia. As can be seen from the many ethnic but also religious conflicts all over Indonesia, the concept of unity is very fragile in spite of efforts made by successive governments to engender a feeling of being one nation among the Indonesian people.

Choosing and being able to live one's own identity is among the basic human needs. Both opposing subgroups have a right to their respective identity. However, the two understandings of national identity exclude each other. For one subgroup, the exclusion of ethnic Chinese is a pre-condition of their concept of indigenesness as the basis for their understanding of an Indonesian national identity. For the other subgroup, the inclusion of ethnic Chinese in the Indonesian national identity is necessary to be able to unfold and live their identity freely.

Objective Contradictions

When trying to identify objective contradictions from the subjective contradictions and the statements of the respondents, the contradictions can be summarized as maintaining the status quo vs. changing society. There is a clash of interests with regard to the social structure of the nation in which the ethnic Chinese are in a long-established position as a distinct, marginalized, non-indigenous middlemen minority. The analysis revealed indigenous Indonesians as well as ethnic Chinese who want to uphold the social structure as it is. As they are content with the situation, they are unlikely to welcome change. On the contrary, change might challenge their current positions and endanger their economic and social situation. This fear of change should not be underestimated, and while Indonesia has only been a democratic state for a little over a decade and changes are occurring on a frequent basis, social structures have not changed much in this period and vestiges of the colonial era still remain. The current topdog-underdog structure in which those in power can use ethnic Chinese as scapegoats against whom the masses can vent their frustration, has proven itself to be convenient for both the indigenous elite as well as the lower classes. For the Chinese Indonesian elite, their middlemen position and the resulting economic symbiosis with the indigenous elite have provided individuals with business advantages and personal wealth. Therefore, it is in their interest to maintain the status quo and not endanger the social structures which are beneficial to their current personal situation.

There are subgroups both ethnic Chinese and indigenous which aim at more integration and ultimately at creating a new, perhaps pluralist society, in which Chinese Indonesians are full

members. In this context a new understanding of nationhood would be required which is not bound to the concept of 'indigenouness'.

4.4 Conclusions

In order to portray and analyze the formation of the conflict, it was mapped based on the conflict triangle, thereby covering both the actor and factual levels by dealing with the conflict's contradictions. The two main conflict groups, Chinese Indonesians and indigenous Indonesians, were divided into subgroups based on their attitude (and behavior) towards conflict transformation. In defining the attitudes and behaviors of the different subgroups, not only differences between the various subgroups emerged but also similar attitudes which transcend the division into two main conflict groups. Identifying similarities and common ground among the parties is important when it comes to working on transforming the conflict.

The respective Subgroups 1 are those who could potentially jeopardize efforts to transform the conflict as they have vested interests in maintaining the status quo. Since the Subgroups 1 and 2 are in opposition to each other, this category will need special focus in conflict transformation efforts.

In terms of conflict transformation, it is the respective Subgroups 2 which are the most promising ones. Here, there are both indigenous as well as Chinese Indonesians who are interested in, and often already working on, the conflict. They have already paved the way for comprehensive conflict transformation by having initiated diverse projects on different levels which tackle the conflict from different angles. The different organizations have not joined forces yet, although this would help in approaching the conflict more strategically.

Subgroups 3 on both sides are not interested in contributing to the conflict, and they are also not expected to actively oppose efforts leading to conflict transcendence. Nevertheless, depending on the circumstances, they might lean towards either supporting efforts to transform the conflict or towards opposing them. Therefore, they could move from Subgroup 3 to either Subgroup 2 or Subgroup 1. The ethnic Chinese of this category are also affected by violence directed against their group as a whole, even if they try to ignore the conflict as such.

It can be thus concluded that there are different subgroups within both main conflict groups, which have interests and attitudes that transcend the ethnic division between the major groups. Therefore, when looking at and dealing with the conflict actors a horizontal and a vertical component need to be considered. The horizontal one distinguishes between ethnic Chinese and

indigenous Indonesians as the primary conflict parties, while the vertical perspective looks at the different subgroups within these primary conflict parties.

The contradictions on the objective level point to a clash of interests with regard to the social structure of the nation (change vs. status quo) which translates at the subjective level into opposing interests that touch upon personal needs and fears. These range from the need and desire to be able to openly and acceptably express one's own cultural identity, to work on one's self-realization (e.g. with regard to occupation), to fears of losing one's personal advantage over others. These contradicting aims need to be discussed with regard to their legitimacy and need to be worked on by the actors involved. This should be done mainly with both indigenous and ethnic Chinese members of Subgroups 1 and 2. The attitudes, behaviors and contradicting aims which constitute conflict formation in protracted, complex conflicts often derive from or are fostered by underlying structures embedded in deeper dimensions that the involved conflict actors are not consciously aware of.

5. Analysis of Conflict Deep Dimensions

5.1 The Concept of the Deep Dimension Conflict Triangle

To deal with the contradictions in the conflict implies analyzing their roots. According to Galtung they can be rooted or derived “from Nature, Culture and Structure. Nature is in us and around us; Culture is in us as internalized values and norms; and Structure is around us as institutionalized norms, backed by positive and negative sanctions.”⁵⁴⁵ Within the theoretical framework developed by Galtung which aims at uncovering the unconscious, underlying dimension of a conflict, the understanding of nature, culture and structure is based on theories developed by Freud, Jung, Marx and Darwin. While Freud and Jung focused on nature as ‘the id’ (the human drives) and culture as ‘the super-ego’, Marx focused on nature as basic needs and structure as class relations. Darwin concentrated on nature as a struggle between and within species. Galtung combined elements of all three approaches and refined them for his approach to conflict transformation. From Freud, he adopted the focus on meeting nature’s drives and social values, from Jung the understanding of a collective unconscious, from Marx the focus on goals as structure-induced interests, and from Darwin the basic needs focusing on self- and species survival. For completion, specific private goals of individuals had to be added to these.⁵⁴⁶




Figure 9: The Deep Dimension (Conflict) Triangle⁵⁴⁷

⁵⁴⁵ Galtung, 2010, p. 73.

⁵⁴⁶ Galtung, 2010, p. 73-74.

⁵⁴⁷ Based on Galtung, 2010, p. 77.

The term 'deep' is a pre-conditioner and in this conflict triangle refers to what is unconscious, hidden and underneath the surface of a conflict's formation. The term 'deep' attitudes refers to 'deep' culture, the collective subconscious of a group which may cause cultural violence. The term deep behavior is based on deep nature, i.e. on basic human needs which can form the basis for direct violence in case those needs are endangered. The term deep contradictions means the deep structures, the infrastructure of a conflict which may include structural violence.⁵⁴⁸

The deep dimension triangle is closely related not only to the analysis of conflict formation, but also to the analysis of violence in a conflict as depicted in the violence triangle. While the violence analysis focuses on the infringement of basic human needs, the basic human needs are looked upon as a subconscious source of human behavior in the analysis of the deep dimensions. This translates into concrete behavior in the conflict as described in the conflict formation analysis. All the three triangles (the triangle of violence, the conflict triangle and the deep dimension triangle) are interrelated. They complement and complete each other and thus allow for a comprehensive approach to understanding the complexity of conflicts. In the analysis of the conflict's deep dimensions, the two main conflict parties (indigenous Indonesians and ethnic Chinese) will not be examined in subgroups which were presented in the previous chapter, as the deep dimensions deal with the underlying general characteristics of whole societies or civilizations. After presenting the concept of deep culture, deep nature and deep structure in more detail, I will analyze elements of this deep dimension which are relevant for the analysis and approaches to conflict transformation of this specific conflict case.

Deep Culture

Galtung adopted three axioms as guidelines: "There is something subconscious conditioning our body-mind-spirit. To be master of yourself(ves) be conscious of the subconscious; and internalize better consciousness for a better future subconscious."⁵⁴⁹ For a better understanding of sub-/unconsciousness and Freud's vision of the human mind, it is often represented metaphorically as an iceberg mostly submerged in the sea although Freud himself did not use this analogy.⁵⁵⁰ The visible part of the iceberg represents the conscious level of the mind. A far larger portion remains beneath the surface and stands for the unconscious (also referred to as the subconscious part of the mind). Freud first encountered what he later defined as unconscious when treating his first female patients diagnosed with hysteria. He discovered that

⁵⁴⁸ Galtung, 2010, p. 75.

⁵⁴⁹ Galtung, 2010, p. 77.

⁵⁵⁰ E.g. by Ruch and Zimbardo, 1974.

they had ‘strategically forgotten’ traumatic events which were too painful for them to recall.⁵⁵¹ According to Freud, there are three levels of consciousness: conscious, preconscious and unconscious.⁵⁵² Ideas, memories, feelings, or motives of which people are actively aware of are said to be conscious, while the other two levels remain initially hidden. Aspects of experience that are not conscious at a given moment because they lack psychological importance for that particular point in time, but which can easily be brought to awareness, are stored at the so-called preconscious level. Cognitions, feelings, or motives, however that are not available at the conscious or the preconscious level are said to be located on the unconscious one. On this level, ideas, desires, and memories are located which people are not or cannot easily become aware of. They have to be discovered and brought to the level of awareness with the help of a third party.

The process of shifting ideas, desires, and memories from the conscious or the preconscious to the unconscious level is called repression.⁵⁵³ Despite the ‘unawareness’ of those thoughts and feelings located in the unconscious level, Freud claims that they still influence the respective person. There are different reasons why those thoughts and feeling are kept suppressed at the unconscious level. According to Freud, the deep attitudes are located beneath the conscious attitudes within the individual – since his focus of his research was the individual psyche he did not extend his theory to a larger entity such as a social community.

When Freud later developed his topographical concept of the mind in the so-called structural model, the unconscious became ‘the id’ which wants and desires in the here-and-now. It knows no other time than the present and no other answer but ‘yes’. In the diagram of the deep dimension triangle ‘the id’ can be related to the deep nature. It strives for the satisfaction of the basic human needs which is reflected in the actors’ behavior on the conflict level depicted by the conflict triangle. ‘The ego’ on the other hand represents the conscious part of a person. It is also the individual’s image of oneself as a self-conscious being. In contrast to the id, the ego recognizes time and preserves the self by holding back desires when necessary and negotiates with reality.⁵⁵⁴ The ‘super-ego’ is the self-critical aspect of the ego which judges the conscious

⁵⁵¹ Thurschwell, 2009, pp. 16ff.

⁵⁵² Freud developed this distinction in his book *Traumdeutung* (Interpretation of Dreams) (published in 1900) where he tried to gain access to the two hidden levels by interpreting dreams as a window to the unconscious. Thurschwell, 2009, p. 3. Definitions of the term ‘unconscious’ followed e.g. in *Einige Bemerkungen über den Begriff des Unbewußten in der Psychoanalyse* (A Few Remarks on the Term Unconscious in Psychoanalysis) (published in 1912). However, in his publications about the term ‘unconscious’, the definitions are not consistent as he sometimes uses the term ‘unconscious’ also for what earlier has been defined as ‘preconscious’.

⁵⁵³ Köhler, 2007, pp. 39ff.

⁵⁵⁴ Thurschwell, 2009, pp. 79ff.

and unconscious decisions of the id and the ego. The criteria and standards by which the super-ego judges the id and the ego are set by the respective society the individual lives in. While the id and the ego are focused on the self as individual, the super-ego recognizes that the individual lives not only for itself, but in a community responding to and also responsible for others. The ego acts as the moderator between the id and the super-ego.⁵⁵⁵ If transferred to the deep dimension triangle, the super-ego not only represents the social setting of the conflict actors, but further also deep culture.




Figure 10: The topographical concept of the mind, depicted as iceberg

Even though Freud's focus is on the psyche of the individual, the concept of the super-ego shows that he goes beyond the individual to the community, however never leaving the realm of the individual far behind. Parents tell a child what it should do or not do or make him/her feel guilty for things he/she should not have done. This forms the super-ego, the individual's 'inner voice' or conscience.⁵⁵⁶ Later on in life, social standards are also internalized. Feelings of guilt therefore derive from the super-ego. It is not only conscious thoughts (the ego) that influence a person, but also natural instincts (the id) and its socially influenced conscience (the super-ego).

Carl G. Jung, a student and follower of Freud, was less focused on the individual as a separate from society than on the collective. As Galtung puts it, Freud saw deep attitudes behind

⁵⁵⁵ Thurschwell, 2009, pp. 89-90.

⁵⁵⁶ Thurschwell, 2009, p. 45.

personal attitudes while Jung saw them behind collective attitudes.⁵⁵⁷ Jung followed Freud's theories of the unconscious, but extended Freud's concept of the 'personal' unconscious and added the concept of the 'collective' unconscious in his work *Archetyp und Unbewußtes* (Archetype and Unconscious).⁵⁵⁸ According to Jung, each person's unconscious mind consists of not only suppressed feelings generated and experienced by the individual, but also extends the origin of such feelings to the collective. The collective unconscious is located between the individual unconscious and the part of mind which can never be actively made conscious. The collective unconscious suggests an original set of archetypes common to all people, i.e. the entire humankind, out of which people formulate meanings, contexts, and patterns.⁵⁵⁹ Archetypes are innate psychic dispositions for experiencing and representing basic human behavior and deriving innumerable images, symbols and patterns of behavior. While the emerging images and forms are comprehended by the individual consciously, the archetypes which inform them are elementary structures which are unconscious and difficult to grasp. Being unconscious, the existence of archetypes can only be deduced indirectly by examining behavior, images, art, myths, etc. Archetypes are inherited potentials which are actualized when they enter consciousness as images or manifest in behavior on interaction with the outside world. Ideas such as the concept of rebirth, which occur independently in various cultures and ages, are advanced as evidence for an archetypal structure in the human psyche; in effect, a collective unconscious.⁵⁶⁰ The number of archetypes is limited for they correspond with typical or archetypal events which human beings regardless their cultural background have experienced for countless generations: birth, death, and separation from parents, initiation, marriage, or the union of opposites. Archetypal figures range from the great mother, child, devil, God, to wise old man / woman and while archetypal motifs can be the Apocalypse, the Deluge, and the Creation.⁵⁶¹ Jung provided proof for the existence of archetypes in analyses of adult and childhood dreams, active imagination, psychotic delusions, and fantasies produced in the trance state.⁵⁶² Although the general idea of an archetype seems to be comprehensible, their exact nature and the way they result in universal experiences appears to be more difficult to grasp. Archetypal figures such as the great mother and the wise man for example are not

⁵⁵⁷ Galtung, 2007b, p. 198.

⁵⁵⁸ Jung, 1984, Vol. II.

⁵⁵⁹ Jung stated in his book *Seelenprobleme der Gegenwart*: „Das kollektive Unbewußte ist die gewaltige geistige Erbmasse der Menschheitsentwicklung, wiedergeboren in jeder individuellen [...] Struktur.“, Jacobi, 1940, p. 63.

⁵⁶⁰ Jung, 1984, Vol. III, p. 31.

⁵⁶¹ Jacobi, 1940, pp. 80ff.

⁵⁶² Jacobi, 1940, p. 72ff.

archetypes, but archetypal images which have developed from archetypes.⁵⁶³ Jung compares archetypes with crystal axes. The axe system only determines the stereometric structure of a crystal, not the concrete form of the individual crystal.⁵⁶⁴

Galtung incorporates the idea of both the individual and, perhaps more importantly, collective unconscious in what he refers to as deep culture. He further includes the idea of archetypes as patterns of how people ascribe meanings to things and phenomena which form part of the collective unconscious and therefore constitute a prerequisite for the behavior of actors. He mostly refers to the 'unconscious' as the 'subconscious'⁵⁶⁵ and thereby emphasizes that whatever is in the subconscious can be made conscious even though the person is not aware of it. Due to the person's unawareness of what lies in the subconscious, the process moving subconscious elements to awareness therefore cannot be initiated by the person himself/herself. An outsider has to be involved to detect what is in the subconscious and reveal it to the respective person.⁵⁶⁶

However, in contrast to Jung, who relates the collective unconscious to humankind in general, Galtung distinguishes between collective unconscious of different civilizations.⁵⁶⁷ He thereby leaves the realm of the generic archetypes and adds another level to the concept, namely cultural or social subgroups of archetypes. The collective subconscious is formed by collective value systems deriving from historical experiences of a certain society and therefore may differ substantially from that of another. For example, a society which, due to its geographical location and its economic history is dependent on overseas trade is more likely to have developed a positive attitude towards strangers than a society which has experienced strangers mainly as invaders. This difference may aggravate communication between members of two societies as they interpret what is 'normal' and 'natural' differently, resulting in divergent perceptions of reality. Galtung refers to this deep-seated collective interpretation of reality, perceptions of what is seen as normal and natural, as the 'cosmology' of a civilization.⁵⁶⁸ The cosmology is the code of a civilization which produces cultural elements and thereby reproduces itself.⁵⁶⁹ Sources for the attitudes of conflict actors and legitimizations of violence can often be found in the respective cosmologies. This perspective therefore provides an

⁵⁶³ Jung quoted in Jacobi, 1940, p. 75.

⁵⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁶⁵ For example, Galtung, 2010, p. 77.

⁵⁶⁶ Galtung, 2010, p. 81.

⁵⁶⁷ Galtung, 2007b, p. 198.

⁵⁶⁸ Galtung, 1986; Galtung, 2007a, pp. 367ff.

⁵⁶⁹ Galtung, 1986, p. 1.

additional dimension in the search for root causes of violence as well as contradictions in a conflict.

In order to uncover cosmologies, to gain insights into the conflict actors' deep culture and to discover differing perceptions of reality and violence potentials, Galtung defines civilizations as well as parameters or dimensions to analyze their cosmologies. Galtung identifies six civilizations based on the cultural characteristics of societies. He understands a civilization as a macro-culture spanning vast areas of space and large intervals in time. The civilizations he identified do not cover all parts of the world. African or Asian-Pacific indigenous cultures, for example, have not been taken into account in this listing of civilization, a fact which Galtung himself acknowledges as a shortcoming.⁵⁷⁰

For Galtung two factors are dominant for identifying civilizations: first, the distinction between 'occident' and 'orient'⁵⁷¹ and second the distinction between Abrahamic religions (Judaism, Christianity and Islam) and oriental 'religions' or spiritual guidance (Buddhism, Hinduism, Daoism, Confucianism, Shintoism). With regard to the Occident, he further differentiates between Occident I and Occident II which differ in time as Occident I represents modern civilization while Occident II refers to the civilization of the medieval Occident.⁵⁷² Concerning the Orient, he distinguishes between Buddhist, Sinic (Buddhism in combination with other Chinese perspectives such as Daoism and Confucianism), and Nipponic (Buddhism in combination with other Japanese perspectives like Shintoism) civilizations.⁵⁷³ The Indian (Hindu) civilization is considered to be in between the Occident and Orient. Societies are grouped under these civilizations based on the two main factors and therefore constitute theoretical constructs in terms of Weber's ideal types. They therefore form analytical benchmarks and means to enable the study of macro-cultures and their underlying cosmologies.⁵⁷⁴

⁵⁷⁰ Galtung, 2007a, pp. 368ff.

⁵⁷¹ Galtung uses these terms (Galtung, 2007a, p. 368) for depicting his concept of civilizations and they shall therefore be applied in the presentation of his ideas even though these terms are acknowledged to be oversimplifying and problematic. Among other critics of these terms, Edward Said emphasizes in his book *Orientalism* (first publication in 1978) the constructed and constituted nature of once ontological categories, such as the 'Occident' and the 'Orient'. He contends that it is a politically constructed binary, a category of interpretation rooted in preconceived and historically constituted ideas about the 'Orient' as an 'other'.

⁵⁷² According to Galtung, a civilization can survive even if all inhabitants have perished as long their material (e.g. layout of cities, art and artifacts) and symbolic (e.g. cross for Christianity) manifestations are still present. Galtung, 1986, pp. 1-2.

⁵⁷³ Galtung, 2007a, p. 371.

⁵⁷⁴ Galtung, 2007a, p. 368 and footnote 306.

Galtung's taxonomy of civilizations is debatable.⁵⁷⁵ Identifying macro-cultures is a challenging task and depending on the choice of determining factors, the resulting macro-cultures may vary. Since numerous societies are subsumed under a civilization, the theoretical construct of a system of civilizations is unlikely to be entirely coherent and consistent. Without questioning the general choice of determining factors (occident/orient and Abrahamic/oriental 'religion') by Galtung, the inclusion of Islamic cultures (including Indonesia) in Occident I is disputed. Not only does the history of conflicts between Muslims and Christians suggest different cosmologies, but further the majority of Muslims lives in the 'Orient'. As such they have oriental cultural backgrounds which are reflected in their cosmology, foremost in different perceptions of the self and the social structure.

Apart from the major factors, the categorization of civilizations does not follow a consistent pattern. The Sinic, Nipponic and Indian civilizations can be clearly assigned to geographical units which are further influenced by other religions or ideologies, while the Buddhist civilization remains a construct which is only defined by religion.⁵⁷⁶ The parameters used to distinguish oriental civilizations differ from those used for the occidental ones. While the oriental categories are mainly geographical, Occident I and II are distinguishable by historical time, with Occident I marking the present while Occident II represents the medieval past.

In order to analyze what a civilization perceives as 'natural' and 'normal', i.e. how it perceives reality, Galtung divides reality into six dimensions. Analysing cosmologies of civilizations leads to simplification and certainly bears the risk of essentialism. In the analysis of cosmologies Galtung included only dimensions which reveal deep-cultural elements with regard to the perception of reality – not, for example, to the perception of right or wrong.⁵⁷⁷

- Nature (relationship between human beings and other life forms),
- self (reception of Freud's structural model: ego/id/super-ego),
- society (vertical/horizontal and individual/collective),
- world (how do civilizations distinguish the world geopolitically),
- time (how do civilizations perceive time – as endless or limited),
- transpersonal culture (religious reality) and

⁵⁷⁵ According to Lawler e.g., even idiosyncratic and their depiction as simplifying, essentializing and even caricaturizing complex, fluid aspects of collective identity. Lawler, 2008, p. 90.

⁵⁷⁶ Galtung claims that Buddhism in its pure form can be encountered in Hinayana-countries (Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Tibet and Mongolia). Galtung, 2007a, p. 379. However, this does not mean that these cultures can be characterized by their religion only. Like China or Japan, there are also other ideological influences. E.g. The theocratic structure in Tibetan society differs from that of the other countries.

⁵⁷⁷ Galtung, 2007a, p. 369, footnote 311.

- epistemological culture (understanding and description of reality).⁵⁷⁸

The presentation and social-anthropological anchoring of cosmologies may evoke the impression of cultural determinism and collective programming – even though Galtung opposes the idea of cultural determination and states that “any cosmology can be lost, can be delearnt”⁵⁷⁹. Without an explanation of which circumstances or mechanisms can mobilize or change deep cultural elements of cosmologies, the concept may appear static.

Even if the conflict parties could be assigned to two different civilizations (indigenous Indonesians to Occident I and ethnic Chinese to Sinish) the cosmologies as presented by Galtung cannot be applied to this case study conflict without reservations. Apart from a general skepticism whether Muslim societies belong to Occident I, Indonesia has furthermore been influenced by other non-Abrahamic religions (e.g. Buddhism and Hinduism) and local animist beliefs. Moreover, in contrast to the characterization of Occident I societies, Indonesian society is not individualistic but rather collectivistic. It is characterized by strongly defined social framework in which individuals are expected to conform to the ideals of the society and the in-groups (e.g. the family) to which they belong.⁵⁸⁰ Galtung’s description of the Sinish cosmology also cannot be applied to ethnic Chinese in full, either. In the course of the long history of Chinese settlement in Indonesia, ethnic Chinese were influenced by Indonesian deep culture. Even if only partially applicable, the characterizations of Occident I and the Sinish civilization along the six dimensions Galtung developed, nevertheless, provides a guiding matrix for detecting elements deriving from the conflict parties’ cosmology which may have an impact on their attitudes towards the other conflict party.

According to Galtung, aspects of a cosmology or the collective unconscious may come together and form ‘syndromes’⁵⁸¹. Galtung focuses on two syndromes that are especially problematic in

⁵⁷⁸ Galtung, 2007a, pp. 369 – 370.

⁵⁷⁹ Galtung, 1986, p. 2.

⁵⁸⁰ In cross-cultural comparison studies, Indonesia ranks high among collectivistic countries, e.g. Hofstede, 1980 or Triandis 1986. This underlines the observations made during field research. For example, in Indonesia, if a Javanese wishes to marry, it is important to meet a woman’s family. The man has to visit the latter’s family and introduce himself formally to the parents of the girl. It is inappropriate to court a woman and formalize the relationship without informing the parents of the girl first. Another example of collectivism is in the relationship between child and parent. Indonesian children are committed to their parents, as are the parents committed to them all their growing lives. Family loyalty is apparent in the fact that Indonesian families usually keep elders (such as grandparents) at home instead of sending them to any institution.

⁵⁸¹ In medicine, the term ‘syndrome’ is used when more than one symptom is identified as well as their causal link.

conflicts on the macro (between nation-states) and mega level (between civilizations), but also have their influence on the meso (between communities) and mirco (between individuals) level. The CGT-syndrome refers to a group whose members believe they are a chosen (C) people with a glorious (G) past or future. These people suffer from traumata (T) inflicted on them by non-chosen ones who envy them. The traumata are perceived as proof of their ‘chosen-ness’ and the dreams of past or future glory call for perseverance. On the micro level, this means that an individual believes to have received a divine order or a mission and expects to be glorious in the future. At the same time he/she is deeply influenced and hurt by traumata. This type of person will show tendencies of megalomania-narcissism (C and G part) and paranoia (T part). On the macro level (nation-state), affected nation-states may display excessive patriotism. Examples for this syndrome can be found dominantly in Occident I: Hitler narcissism, Israeli exceptionalism or fundamentalist Islamism.⁵⁸²

Another syndrome is the DMA-syndrome: a group whose members believe that there are two powers (good / evil; God / Satan) who form opposites (dualism = D) like in manicheism (M) and engage in a final battle in which only one side can prevail (Armageddon = A). A group or individual with this syndrome is not interested in a conflict’s objective solution, but only aims at destroying the other party. However, this other party is needed to fulfill the role of an enemy (or of evil). Due to polarized thinking (we are good, the others are evil), it is not necessary to listen to the other parties’ aims and interests; instead it is considered to be sufficient to know that they are evil.⁵⁸³ Collective, unconscious elements legitimize direct or structural violence and result in syndromes like CGT or DMA.⁵⁸⁴ In order to form the basis for positive and peaceful approaches to dealing with conflicts, i.e. a positive conflict culture, peace-workers and conflict actors need to think about ways to overcome these syndromes, Gaining an insight in the deep culture of the conflict parties is important as deep culture strongly influences actors’ attitudes. The goal is not only to understand conflict dynamics, but also the ways in which people deal with conflicts: “The road towards more positive handling of the conflict passes through the painful process of deep culture awareness.”⁵⁸⁵

⁵⁸² Galtung 2007a, pp. 439; Galtung, 2007b, pp. 205 – 206; Galtung, 2010, p. 77 – 79.

⁵⁸³ Galtung, 2007b, pp. 208 – 209; Galtung, 2010, pp. 77 – 78.

⁵⁸⁴ Galtung, 2010, p. 81.

⁵⁸⁵ Galtung, 2007b, p. 33.

Deep Nature

Deep nature or (deep behavior) is the latent behavior of human beings and resembles ‘the id’ of Freud’s topography of the human mind. In his concept of deep nature, Galtung further adopted theories from Darwin. In *On the origins of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life*⁵⁸⁶ Darwin came to the conclusion that all life forms have not been created by a supreme being, but rather have evolved over time. The self- and species survival which constitutes the first basic need for each life form also represents the basis for evolution. In order to survive, species try to adapt to their environment and thus either develop or become extinct.

Galtung extended the idea of basic needs (which Galtung refers to as basic human need for survival) by Darwin to a set of basic human needs. Apart from survival, Galtung further identified the needs for well-being, identity and freedom (see also chapter 3). Deep nature manifests itself in actions that result from basic human needs. Thus people’s behavior can be manipulated by either fulfilling basic human needs or withholding them (carrot-and-stick-practice): diplomats or managers, for example, are either invited to luxurious dinners in the hope that this might change their behavior and decisions in negotiations or are alternately forced to negotiate for long hours without breaks and food until an agreement is reached. If basic human needs are not met, the result will most likely be frustration which may then lead to violent behavior.⁵⁸⁷

Deep Structure

Deep contradictions can be located in the deep structure of a society in the form of an infrastructure where differences between categories, such as gender, generation, race, class (political, economic, military, cultural), included/excluded and nation/territory, interact unequally on the meso or mega level.⁵⁸⁸ Karl Marx was among the first to identify fault-lines in society by identifying a contradiction within social structures: the economic structure of work and property which is normalized and reproduced through cultural ideology.⁵⁸⁹ The fault-line lies between those who are in possession of means of production and those who are not. According to Marxist theory, in a capitalist system the former are the bourgeoisie, i.e. the capitalists, and the latter the proletariat, i.e. the workers. These two groups are further divided by their market behavior: workers sell their labor power because they are forced to do so as

⁵⁸⁶ Darwin, 2003, first published in 1859.

⁵⁸⁷ Galtung, 2007b, p. 210.

⁵⁸⁸ Galtung, 2010, p. 81.

⁵⁸⁹ Elster, 1986, pp. 126ff.

they lack of means to produce themselves and capitalists purchase this labor power. People within a certain class are thus bound together by necessity and a common fate.⁵⁹⁰

It is in the workers' best interest to maximize wages and benefits while it is in the capitalist's best interest to maximize profit at the expense of the former, leading to a contradiction or fault-line within the capitalist system. Marx developed his ideas against a historical background. Earlier epochs, according to Marx, were characterized by complex social orders and graduations of social rank. In the epoch of bourgeoisie, the epoch of Marx, class antagonisms were reduced and simplified in industrialized societies, gradually resulting in the establishment of two opposing classes: the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.⁵⁹¹ The most important transformation of society according to Marx was the proletariat's massive and rapid growth throughout two hundred and fifty years in capitalist, industrialized societies. Starting with the industrial revolution, more and more occupations provided a living through wages or salaries. Due to automation, manufacturing became cheap for those who had the financial means for economies of scale while private, self-employed, small-scale manufacturing, became less viable. People who once controlled their own labor-time became employed workers through industrialization. Groups that in the past subsisted on stipends or private wealth, such as like doctors, academics or lawyers, also increasingly worked as wage laborers. As a consequence, the proletariat became the largest class in societies of the so-called 'developed world'.⁵⁹²

Based on these assumptions, Marx developed his theories of social classes and class conflict as published in *The Communist Manifesto*. A class is formed when its members achieve class consciousness and solidarity. It views its interests in opposition to those of other groups; its members organize themselves politically to fight for them.⁵⁹³ Based on this theory, the workers would become aware of their exploitations and conflict with another class, namely the capitalists. The workers would then realize their shared interests and develop a common identity. As a result, they would then take action against exploitation and consequently against the capitalists. Marx introduced objective and subjective factors of a class. Objectively, a class shares a common relationship to the means of production, i.e. they either have means to produce or they do not. The members will necessarily have some perception of their similarity and common interest, i.e. class consciousness. Class consciousness is not simply an awareness of one's own class interest but is also a set of shared views regarding society's status quo and

⁵⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁵⁹¹ MacLellan, 1995, p. 191.

⁵⁹² MacLellan, 1995, pp. 192-194.

⁵⁹³ MacLellan, 1995, p. 185.

how it should be. These class relations are reproduced through time.⁵⁹⁴ Apart from the main division of society into the owners and non-owners of production means, Marx later introduced a sub-class: the petite bourgeoisie. This group includes those who possess their own means of production, but who do not employ others, e.g. people with small businesses who cannot afford to hire people. He further mentions managers, supervisors or army servants who may belong to the proletariat, but act as intermediaries between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, often working in the interest of the latter. They are therefore also referred to as ‘class traitors’ by the other. People who are unemployed are subsumed as ‘Lumpenproletariat’. With regard to peasants, dependent on whether or not they owned more or less land, their loyalty would either be with the capitalists or the workers. In general, they play a rather insignificant role in the class struggle according to Marx. He further mentions the ‘ideological class’ in which he places himself: ‘ideological representatives and spokesmen’ who have been highly educated, originate from the bourgeoisie, but also dare to criticize their own class.⁵⁹⁵

According to Marx’ definition, society is divided into an upper, middle and lower class based on their income and wealth. It also does not distinguish between occupations, i.e. the specific nature of the work the members of a group perform. Instead, it is the work context than work itself that constitutes a class.⁵⁹⁶ Marx’ distinction of groups is not focused on understanding why individuals differ in their way of life (e.g. consumption, health, marriage habits etc.), but on which organized groups are likely to be involved in collective actions of a social struggle, i.e. a class struggle.

While Marx and his followers are convinced that the key dimensions or the principal lines of social cleavage within the system are mainly economic, critics point out that there are also other dimensions or divisions that have to be considered, such as racial, religious, or sexual ones. Parkin, for example, states that “societies marked by conflict between religious or racial communities do not exhibit the same type of class structure as societies lacking such conflict, notwithstanding similarities in their occupational systems and property relations.”⁵⁹⁷ While Galtung includes the idea of social fault-lines dividing societies into his theories, he also considers the Marxist perspective as being too limited. He therefore extends the concept of fault-lines by adding further deep contradictions in social structures which are socially vertical

⁵⁹⁴ Hanagan, 1994, p. 184.

⁵⁹⁵ MacLellan, 1995, pp. 184ff.

⁵⁹⁶ Elster, 1986, p. 124.

⁵⁹⁷ Parkin, 1979, p. 4.

and potentially carriers of structural violence.⁵⁹⁸ As a result, he developed the table below which lists patterned infrastructures that struggle for equity.

| | Dimension | Meso individual level | Mega State level |
|----|-----------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| 1 | Nature | Human vs. environment | States vs. environment |
| 2 | Gender | Men vs. women | Penetrator vs. penetrated |
| 3 | Generation | Old vs. middle-aged vs. young | Old vs. middle-aged vs. young |
| 4 | Race | White vs. yellow/brown vs. black/red | White vs. yellow/brown vs. black/red |
| 5 | Class political | Repressors vs. repressed | Repressors vs. repressed |
| 6 | Class economic | Exploiters vs. exploited | Exploiters vs. exploited |
| 7 | Class military | Killers vs. killed | Killers vs. killed |
| 8 | Class cultural | Conditioners vs. conditioned | Conditioners vs. conditions |
| 9 | Nation | Dominant culture vs. dominated | Dominant civilization vs. dominated |
| 10 | State | State vs. other states | Region vs. other region |

Table 2: Social Fault-Lines⁵⁹⁹

Corresponding to the three axioms for deep culture, Galtung also developed three axioms for deep structure: “There are deep structures conditioning surface structures; to master structures be conscious of those infrastructures; and institutionalize better structures for better infrastructures.”⁶⁰⁰ For the specific conflict in Indonesia, the focus will be on the meso- and individual level of fault-lines between races, classes political, classes economic, classes military and classes cultural. No indications were found, neither in literature nor during the field trips, that the other fault-lines were of relevance to this specific conflict.

5.2 Deep Dimensions of the Case Study Conflict

Next, I shall analyze the deep dimensions of the conflict between indigenous Indonesians and ethnic Chinese with a view to underlying aspects that help to explain the attitudes and patterns of behavior as well contradictions within conflict formation. These results have to be considered with regard to possible approaches for conflict transcendence. The deep dimension elements of the conflict that arose in the course of the research can further provide the basic

⁵⁹⁸ Galtung, 2007b, p. 211.

⁵⁹⁹ Galtung, 2010, p. 78.

⁶⁰⁰ Galtung, 2010, p. 79.

groundwork or starting points for future long-term research aiming at uncovering the deep culture of Indonesian ethnic groups and the deep structure of Indonesian society.

Elements of Deep Culture in the Case Study Conflict

Even if Indonesia's classification as belonging to Occident I is questionable, the characterization of the religious dimension is applicable to Indonesia as the majority of Indonesians are either Muslims or Christians. In his impressionistic description of cosmologies, Galtung characterizes the religious dimension of Occident I as follows:

The transpersonal is dichotomous. The people of Occident I have an immortal soul that God and Satan (both transcendent) are fighting about. The respective religion is regarded as being the only true one (singularism) and valid everywhere and at any time (universalism) as expressed by the Great Commission.⁶⁰¹

The Sinic cosmology may also only be partially applicable to Chinese Indonesians due to their long history in Indonesia. However, during the field research evidence for the eclectic character of the Sinic cosmology was encountered repeatedly. This characteristic of Sinic cosmology arguably supported Chinese in the process of adapting to new environments, like Indonesia, once they left their country of origin, as it appears to be easy for new elements to be included into their cosmology. However, this cosmology can also become a factor preventing ethnic Chinese from totally dissolving into the host society. Based on the interviews, they were reluctant to give up heterogeneity and to adhere for example to one religion or identity only.⁶⁰² Instead of an 'either-or' solution, they consider a dialectic 'as-well-as' solution to be possible and preferable. Thus, even those who are nominally Muslims or Christians often keep house shrines for their ancestors, Buddhist and Daoist deities as well as Indonesian national heroes of Chinese descent. Even if their families have resided in Indonesia for more than three generations, many Chinese Indonesian houses are built resembling Chinese architecture with small details reflecting Indonesian influence. Further, ethnic Chinese respondents stated that they prefer to follow Chinese wedding and funeral customs instead of local indigenous ones.⁶⁰³ Thus, Chinese style cemeteries or Chinese style grave stones on private grounds (s. pictures below) can be found across Indonesia wherever Chinese Indonesian reside.

⁶⁰¹ Judaism differs from Christianity and Islam with regard to universality as it is particularistic (only applicable for Jews and only limited conversion). Galtung, 2007a, p. 374 and footnote 318.

⁶⁰² For example, interview with Eddie Lembong (16.09.2008).

⁶⁰³ Interview with Charlotte Setijadi (05.09.2008) and Chang-Yao Hoon (10.04.2008).



Picture 1: An ethnic Chinese household in Lasem (Java) whose members have converted to Islam, but still worship their ancestors and two Chinese deities (17.04.2010).



Picture 2: Chinese picture and Chinese names on the wall of an ethnic Chinese household in Rembang (17.04.2010).



Picture 3: Building in Lasem with Chinese characters on the left side and Arabic characters on the right side (16.04.2010).



Picture 4: House shrine in ethnic Chinese household in Lasem whose owners are Christians (12.04.2010).



Picture 5: Chinese style grave stone in the backyard of an ethnic Chinese house in Rembang (14.04.2010). Grave stones in the same style can be found on Chinese cemeteries throughout Indonesia.

In the Sinic cosmology, China is perceived as the center of the world and whatever is outside as the periphery. Those residing in the periphery, the ‘others’, are barbarians who should be kept outside. Since the Chinese Indonesians are already outside of this center geographically, it is difficult for them to fully identify with the centre and to keep the others outside. There are still those who manage to do so, by keeping to themselves in exclusively Chinese Indonesian communities with only limited contact with indigenous Indonesians. They consider themselves to be in the ‘centre of the world’ – not in the geographical sense, but in a cultural sense and therefore refer to themselves as part of *Greater China*.⁶⁰⁴

Cosmologies and the Conflict

The cosmology which influences indigenous Indonesians includes a tendency to sharply distinguish between those who are insiders and those who are outsiders. This tendency is manifested for example in long established distinctions between indigenous and non-indigenous, but also between ethnic groups. On the level of cosmologies, the religious

⁶⁰⁴ Interview with Eddie Lembong (16.09.2008).

dimension might serve as indicator to explain this tendency. Those who are practicing their belief as Muslims or Christians perceive themselves as chosen followers of the only true belief.⁶⁰⁵ This also corresponds to their perception of national identity which is limited to insiders, in this case indigenous Indonesians. Therefore, even today Indonesians have difficulties to accept ethnic Chinese' claim to be both Indonesians and ethnic Chinese. Ethnic Chinese on the other hand, influenced by an eclectic cosmology, do not see difficulties in being both and taking one part (the ethnic Chinese part) away from them is something they do not want to accept.⁶⁰⁶ As described above, many ethnic Chinese still have preserved visible elements of Chinese culture (architecture, shrines, graveyards, ancestor worship). This makes it difficult for some Indonesians to not perceive them as Chinese and thus as foreigners. Chinese architecture whose features include walls that surround the buildings (s. picture 6) further underlines the impression that ethnic Chinese want to remain Chinese and live separately from the rest of society.



Picture 6: Chinese style house from outside with characteristic walls in Lasem (15.04.2010).

Their impression may not be entirely wrong. For many Chinese Indonesians, as in Sinic cosmology, the family is the most important unit that has to be set apart and protected from

⁶⁰⁵ Interview with KH. Zainuddin (15.04.2010) and Gus Shihhabuddin (17.04.2010).

⁶⁰⁶ Interview with Eddie Lembong: "...taking our Chineseness, it would be like taking our soul....", 16.09.2008.

other units. Thus, houses are traditionally surrounded by walls that separate each unit from the next one. Erecting walls is a traditional sign of marking the 'in-group'. The same applies to the national level. Walls were built in China from 5th century B.C. onwards to separate and protect the Chinese empire from outsiders. Later these walls were rebuilt and maintained throughout the history of the Chinese empire and became known as the Great Wall. There is thus a clear tendency in the cosmology to keep to one's own kind and to exclude the rest. This tendency can also be observed in Indonesia. Several Chinese Indonesian respondents during the fieldwork identified themselves as part of Greater China. Chinese as well as indigenous Indonesians further pointed out that when it comes to the topic of intermarriage it is rather ethnic Chinese who would object to it than indigenous Indonesians.⁶⁰⁷ With regard to this element of deep culture (the Chinese architecture), however, it has to be taken into consideration that the history of violence against the ethnic Chinese and their property has contributed to suspicion and caution by especially wealthy ethnic Chinese. The walls of their houses are not only architectural elements of Chinese style; they also serve security and safety purposes. The owners feel the necessity to protect themselves and their property (s. picture below where a Chinese Indonesian house is further secured by barbed wire). Their cosmology provides them with a mindset of how to cope with their fear which results in establishing security measures. Here again, it appears to be more logical to ethnic Chinese to deal with the consequences rather than the root problem (security logic instead of peace logic).

⁶⁰⁷ Interview with Pratiwi Kartika (ethnic Chinese) in Jakarta (18.09.2008), Rudi K. (indigenous Indonesian) in Lasem (14.04.2010), Mohammad P. (indigenous Indonesian) in Semarang (18.04.2010).



Picture 7: Outside an ethnic Chinese house in Semarang (18.04.2010).

Signs of the DMA and CGT Syndrome in the Conflict

Some important collective memories and traumata are shared by both groups, such as the colonial occupation by the Dutch or the anti-communist campaign in 1965 of the Soeharto regime. Others have only been experienced by one of the groups, such as the massacre of Chinese in Batavia by the Dutch in 1740. Collective unconscious syndromes can evolve, deriving from especially traumatic collective memories. Next, I shall assess in how far, ethnic Chinese and indigenous Indonesians are suffering from DMA and CGT syndromes as outlined by Galtung.

Historical events caused long-lasting traumata which have entered and shaped the collective subconscious of ethnic Chinese. They (or at least some of them) seem to have developed a tendency towards the CGT (chosen-glory-traumata) syndrome. Even though they do not perceive themselves as chosen by god or other deities, they were chosen by the Dutch during colonial times as a group to stand above indigenous Indonesians. Later, Soeharto continued to provide them with economic privileges even if he discriminated against them in other fields of life. The economic success of many of them seems to confirm their 'chosenness' and constitutes their glory. Due to their success, there are indigenous Indonesians who envy them

and try to diminish their success. The violence against them – especially traumatic events like the massacre of Batavia in 1740, the anti-communist campaigns and the May riots 1998, but also the heavy state-led discrimination throughout the Soeharto regime – has resulted in traumata for the group as a whole. These traumata can be taken as further proof of their chosenness and until now, despite the violence against them, they (not all, but a considerable part of the group) have managed to regain their economic success (their glory).

As a consequence, the group as a whole clings to its cultural identity which has brought them economic privileges and social marginalization. The individuals may be more inclined to feel special, even superior and as a consequence chose to live exclusively among members of their group. This might provide an insight into why there are a number of ethnic Chinese who surround themselves with high walls, live in exclusively ethnic Chinese communities and are reluctant when it comes to intermarriage. Ethnic Chinese may subconsciously underline their special position in society by choosing a religion other than that of the majority of Indonesians, such as Christianity or Buddhism.

While the CGT syndrome seems to apply at least to a part of the ethnic Chinese community, indigenous Indonesians on the other hand rather show a tendency towards the DMA (dualistic-Manichaeism-Armageddon) syndrome. There is a division between ‘us’ and ‘them’. A dualistic view seems to be dominant and popular especially with a number of religious and ethnic groups in Indonesia. The own group is the ‘good’ one while the other groups is generally seen as ‘bad’ one (Manichaeism). Once someone or a group does not belong to the good, they are the enemy and have to be fought, if necessary with violence (Armageddon). Violent clashes between groups of different religions or ethnic backgrounds can be observed across the archipelago. The enemy is de-humanized to legitimize violence. In case of the case study conflict, ethnic Chinese were de-humanized by claiming that they were infidels (even though there are ethnic Chinese who are also Muslims) or by calling them ‘economic animals’ – clearly degrading them as less human and not equally worthy. The syndromes may play a role in possible conflict transcendence; as such they do have to be kept in mind, as do the cosmologies of both groups.

Elements of Deep Nature in the Case Study Conflict

Previous chapters detailed when and how basic human needs have been violated in the conflict. Here, possible conclusions for the deep behavior deriving from the basic human needs or their infringement will be explored. Regarding the conflict situation at the time of writing, the analysis showed that especially the identity needs of ethnic Chinese are still compromised. Even though this has not led to direct violence from the side of ethnic Chinese against

indigenous Indonesians, large Chinese Indonesian communities hesitate to actively integrate themselves into society. During interviews, indigenous Indonesians often criticized the self-chosen exclusiveness or segregation of Chinese Indonesians. Since ethnic Chinese see their identity needs unfulfilled in the country they are living in, some of them form their own closed environment and prefer not to engage in the 'normal' Indonesian society. They choose private schools for their children or, if possible, send them abroad. The connection to Indonesia as their home country is therefore very weak and they do not 'feel' as Indonesians. Indigenous Indonesians consequently perceive this as confirmation of the ethnic Chinese image as 'foreigners' who are merely guests in their country and therefore do not deserve the same rights they have.

On the side of indigenous Indonesians, well-being and in some cases even survival needs are in jeopardy. Direct violence against ethnic Chinese is therefore often related to economic crises. Once people feel that their survival and well-being needs are endangered, they become frustrated and feel the need for action. In May 1998, this energy was channeled by prominent military men and radical Muslim leaders who aimed at diverting people's anger from the country's elite to the ethnic Chinese. They accused ethnic Chinese of hoarding basic commodities (like rice and cooking oil).⁶⁰⁸ This strategy proved to be effective, since basic commodities form the basis for survival. These actions against ethnic Chinese reflected the people's frustration and their need to vent their anger. In many cases, the property of ethnic Chinese was not looted, but destroyed instead.

Another aspect influencing this specific conflict derives from suppressed basic human needs of identity and freedom prior to the fall of the Soeharto-regime. Therefore, various ethnic and religious groups in Indonesia started to strive for more autonomy or even independence after the end of the regime, leading to a range of violent conflicts.⁶⁰⁹ Apart from the provinces of Papua and West Papua where violence continues and has escalated, other Indonesian ethnic groups are not longer actively seeking to secede from the Indonesian state. In Papua, the government established a security force in the region to act against the secessionist movement. The Indonesian security forces raided the third Papuan People's Congress, during which Papua declared its independence from Indonesia in October, 2011.⁶¹⁰ As violence begets violence, violence has escalated in Papua. In August 2011, for example, separatists killed a soldier while

⁶⁰⁸ Coppel, 2006, p. 5.

⁶⁰⁹ As e.g. Aceh, Kalimantan, Ambon or Maluku.

⁶¹⁰ Hariyadi, 2011.

attacking an army helicopter.⁶¹¹ However, the demand for local self-governance has been expressed by local groups all over Indonesia, showing that the establishing of a common national identity by the administrations of Soekarno and Soeharto did not succeed in overriding local differences as had been intended. The main demand apart from political and financial autonomy was for native governors and district heads ('local sons' *putra daerah*).⁶¹² Identity needs had not been satisfied by the concept of national identity even though the Indonesian motto 'Unity in Diversity' at least in theory acknowledged the multi-ethnic and multi-religious character of Indonesia.

Attempts to decentralize the centralized political system inherited from colonial times⁶¹³ failed during the Soekarno and Soeharto administrations. Even though the Soekarno administration had agreed to the establishment of regional autonomy after Indonesia's Independence (law 1), it was removed in 1957 due to political unrest in several regions. In 1974, regional autonomy was revived, but never implemented as the Soeharto administration was reluctant to share political power with local governments. A third attempt in 1996 failed, because the government did not assign sufficient financial and personnel assets for the implementation of decentralization.⁶¹⁴ After the end of the Soeharto-era, local organizations and officials again addressed the need for decentralization and their claim was supported by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. To pre-empt separatism and preserve national unity, the national parliament approved two laws, one regarding administration (law 22) and the other financial decentralization (law 25) which focused on the empowerment of the sub-provincial level in 1999. The first set of implementation regulations was published in May 2000 and implementation started in 2001.⁶¹⁵ To answer the call for effective local empowerment and self-governance in the following years, subsequent administrations approved, implemented, and revised further laws to foster the decentralization process. Difficulties in the process, however, include clear delineations of responsibilities and positions as well as harmonization of laws and regulations at the national and local levels. For example, Law 32 (approved in 2004) was revised in 2011 strengthening the supervisory role of the province governors as representatives of the central government.⁶¹⁶ Progress on the harmonization of laws and regulations would in particular be of importance for the present conflict. As revealed in the analysis of violence,

⁶¹¹ Ambarita, 2011.

⁶¹² Van Klinken, 2007, p. 8.

⁶¹³ Even though van Klinken argues that the Dutch had intended a federal structure for the archipelago (van Klinken, 2007, p. 8), the Dutch had a centralized bureaucratic system which did not satisfy the need for local self-governance as proven by the claims by various regions after Indonesia's Independence.

⁶¹⁴ Green, 2005, p. 3.

⁶¹⁵ Ibid.

⁶¹⁶ Effendy & Sjahrit, 2011.

regulations on the local level, for example, which restrain the public cultural display of Chinese Indonesian culture would have to be abolished to comply with national law.

The decentralization process in general to respond to longstanding grievances by offering opportunities for expressing diversity and better attention to local needs.⁶¹⁷ Especially resource-rich provinces, like Riau, benefit from decentralization as they can access more revenues leading to an increase of the province's yearly income.⁶¹⁸ Decentralization as such is a preferable concept (in contrast to centralization) in the Indonesian context as it reflects Indonesia's ethnic and cultural diversity on the political and administrative level. Nevertheless, despite the increase of income for provinces, reports state that positive impacts of decentralization for the local population are hindered by lack of administrative capacity and by corruption.⁶¹⁹ Corruption has been one of the major challenges the Indonesian state has been facing and has not been reduced. Rather, it has been gifted from Jakarta to the local level, bringing with it new actors and variation in the background and 'modus operandi' for corruption.⁶²⁰

Due to decentralization, local identities have grown stronger and the Javanese dominance (perceived as Javanese chauvinism) of the Soeharto-era has decreased, improving the relationships especially of ethnic groups from outer islands with the Indonesian majority ethnicity. This does not mean that decentralization has led to a general decrease in conflicts or improved ethnic relations in general.⁶²¹ Several components of the decentralization process have the potential to negatively affect local identity and minority politics as well as conflict dynamics. The establishment of new districts may change demographics and shift majority-minority relationships for better or worse.⁶²² In Poso (Sulawesi) for example, a district where Christian Pamonas and Muslim Bugis and Gorantalese mobilized by their respective elites along religious lines engaged in violent clashes, the establishing of sub-districts shifted demographics (the proportion of Muslims in one of the sub-district was lower than before), and created more job opportunities for elites in the new administrations reducing competition between them, thus leading to a reduction of the violence.⁶²³ In other regions, local participation

⁶¹⁷ Rinaldi et al., 2007, p. 18.

⁶¹⁸ Ibid.

⁶¹⁹ The process further has a negative impact on the forest as the number of licenses exceeds the amount of forest actually designed for conversion. Human Rights Watch, 2003.

⁶²⁰ Rinaldi et al., 2007, pp. 5ff.

⁶²¹ Diprose & Ukiwo, 2008, pp. 10ff.

⁶²² Ibid.

⁶²³ Diprose & Ukiwo, 2008, pp. 10ff.

in decision-making processes through direct elections do not only provide incentives for local elites to mobilize and instrumentalize sensitive identity issues in their competition for power and resources, but also strengthen the dominance of the ethnic majority population of a region.⁶²⁴ In asymmetric conflicts, the position of the minority group (in case it is not the dominant party) may therefore be further weakened by the decentralization process. For ethnic Chinese who are both an ethnic and religious minority in most of the regions they live in, this may further explain why they encounter violence on the local level in the form of restraints on their expression of identity or discrimination when trying to leave their marginalized position and participate in the political decision-making process, despite the positive developments in terms of reducing violence on the national level.

The deep nature of the conflict actors has influenced the behavior of the conflict groups and will continue to do so until the basic human needs on both sides are satisfied, at least to a minimum degree. The analysis of the deep nature reveals that this conflict has to be analyzed in the broader context of the internal problems that Indonesia is facing today. These include economic problems which threaten the basic human needs of survival and well-being, as well as striving for more autonomy by ethnic groups that aim at satisfying their own identity and freedom needs but who may simultaneously compromise the identity and freedom needs of others.

Elements of Deep Structure in the Case Study Conflict

Fault-line of Ethno-linguistic Group

Ethno-linguistics as a fault-line is to be expected in a multi-ethnic country like Indonesia. The most general fault-line lies between indigenous and non-indigenous Indonesians. In this context the conflict between indigenous Indonesians and ethnic Chinese is the most prominent example, even though there are also other 'foreign' minorities living in Indonesia, such as Arabs or Indians. The next level of ethno-linguistic fault-lines would be fault-line between indigenous ethnic groups. Due to the decentralization process, the dominance of the Javanese who make up the largest group among the Indonesian population decreased and local indigenous identities were strengthened. However, there are still other ethno-linguistic fault-lines in Indonesia, like in Papua and West Papua provinces, where separatist organizations aim

⁶²⁴ This applies especially to regions in which the local elite and the middle-class depend on control over bureaucracy, as it is the case e.g. in West Kalimantan and Maluku. Van Klinken, 2007, p. 10.

to secede from the Indonesian nation-state.⁶²⁵ On the local level, ethno-linguistic fault-lines can be found between groups who claim to be ‘culturally incompatible’ and therefore aim to drive out or at least dominate the other ethnicity(ies). Examples include the Kao and the Makian in North Maluku or the Dayak and Madurese in West Kalimantan.⁶²⁶

Often, the relationships between conflict parties on opposite sides of a fault-line are asymmetrical, making it difficult to establish a dialogue between equals. However, without dialogue, it will be difficult to work on an adapted concept of Indonesian nationality which may accommodate the different ethno-linguistic groups across fault-lines. For the conflict case study, it is essential to overcome the fault-line between indigenous and non-indigenous Indonesians which would enable ethnic Chinese to overcome their status of being the ‘others’ in Indonesia. In order to cross the fault-line, the concept of ‘indigenoussess’ can no longer form the basis for the concept of the Indonesian nation. This does not mean that local ethnic identities should be detached and not acknowledged anymore. As discussed previously, the concept of Indonesian national identity remains problematic. Not only has the concept of ‘indigenoussess’ (re)gained importance on the local level, it is also probably the most convincing argument why all the different ethnicities of the archipelago could be perceived as one nation. Changing this concept would question the deep structure of Indonesia as a multi-ethnic state. Accepting a new and different concept of national identity will therefore be challenging and require work especially on the side of indigenous Indonesians. On the other side, for overcoming the ethnic fault-line, ethnic Chinese who want to remain exclusive in Indonesia and orientate themselves towards Mainland China and Taiwan or Western countries instead would also have to work on their understanding of their identity as Chinese Indonesians in the context of the Indonesian nation.

Fault-Lines of Class

The term ‘class’ in the context of deep structures in a society does not have the same meaning as ‘social class’. Here the focus is on potential clashes between groups (as in Marx’ theories). For the present conflict, the distinctions Galtung made with regard to class (political, military, economic and cultural) will be assessed to detect deep structures which lead to or enhance contradictions or form the basis for structural violence in the context of the present conflict.

As outlined previously, ethnic Chinese were politically repressed during the Soeharto-regime and even today, although there are no official obstacles, they remain largely underrepresented

⁶²⁵ Hariyadi, 2011 and Ambarita, 2011.

⁶²⁶ Loveband & Young, 2006, pp. 152-153.

in the political arena. In the 2009 elections in which almost 12 000 candidates competed for a seat in the national parliament, and roughly 79 000 competed for seats in local assemblies, Benny Setiono, the chairman of INTI, estimated that only roughly 100 Chinese Indonesians ran as candidates.⁶²⁷ At the time of writing (until 2012), only few official positions were occupied by Chinese Indonesians. These included the Vice Governor of Jakarta, the Vice Governor of the Province of West Kalimantan, the Mayor of Singkawang, and the Regent of East Belitung. Even if they constitute less than 3% of the population, the number of candidates is relatively small. However, not only ethnic Chinese are poorly represented in Indonesian politics. Other ethnic groups who are minorities in the regions they live in face similar difficulties. As long as there still is a fault-line between ethnic or religious) groups that are in political control and other groups who only have limited access to political power, there will be a tendency for frictions to arise. It is important for all ethnic groups to be represented at the level of political decision-making in order for them to be able to articulate and integrate their political ideas and interests into Indonesian politics.

In the past, very few ethnic Chinese were allowed to enter the military. Regulations and discrimination in the enrollment process kept the number of ethnic Chinese in the military low.⁶²⁸ Today, the official obstacles were removed, but the number of ethnic Chinese in the military hardly increased. This could be due to unofficial discrimination in the enrollment process on the one hand, but also to the fact that many ethnic Chinese still fear the military due to their involvement in the anti-Communist campaigns in the 1960s and the riots in May 1998. As a consequence they prefer to have as little contact as possible.⁶²⁹

Since the War for Independence, the military has played a key role in the country's politics and in imposing unity on a fragmented state. After the collapse of the New Order regime, the armed forces may have lost some of their political influence, but they are still playing an important role in Indonesia. The government is relying on its military in case of natural disasters, such as tsunamis or volcano eruptions.⁶³⁰ Being underrepresented in this realm might be perceived by indigenous Indonesians as lack of sense of patriotism. Since their loyalty to the Indonesian nation is often doubted or at least questioned, this may add to difficulties Chinese Indonesians

⁶²⁷ <http://www.topix.com/forum/world/indonesia/TL15HU4DFHLUABMHB> (15.06.2011).

⁶²⁸ Interview with Teddy Jusuf (08.09.2008) – one of the very few ethnic Chinese who managed to rise through ranks and retired as Brigadier General.

⁶²⁹ Ibid.

⁶³⁰ After the 2004 tsunami, the Indonesian government acknowledged the necessity to improve the capabilities for its armed forces to respond to natural disasters and claimed that Indonesia's defense spending of the following decade would be used for respective improvements (e.g. the army's transportation capabilities), http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/304956/1/.html, 10.09.2012.

have to overcome before being fully accepted into society. This means that it could either help to increase the number of ethnic Chinese in the ranks of the military or to reduce the influence and importance of the military in general.

While the ethnic Chinese make up the weaker party in the conflict formation with regard to their political and social role, this cannot be claimed for their economic role. Even if the perception that many indigenous Indonesians have that all Chinese Indonesian are rich is not true, they still make up a large part of Indonesia's middle-class and are also present in the upper-class. For indigenous Indonesians, ethnic Chinese are therefore often perceived as exploiters while they are the ones being exploited.⁶³¹ For those who feel exploited it does not seem to be important whether or not the whole ethnic group of Chinese Indonesians are 'the exploiters' or not.⁶³² As long as ethnic Chinese are perceived as exploiters, they may be subject to prejudice and discrimination and in times of economic crises, even victims of violent acts. As discussed in chapter 4, studies show that the situation of the poor in Indonesia might have improved along with Indonesia's general economic situation after the economic breakdown in 1998. The number of poor people has constantly declined from 13.33% (which translates into 31.02 million people) of the population in March 2010 to 12.5% in 2011. Rural areas accounted for 950,000 of those who rose from poverty, while only 50,000 came from urban areas.⁶³³ Nonetheless, an estimated 12.5% of the population still remains below the poverty line which also marks an economic fault-line between rich and poor.

Apart from the general economic fault-line between rich and poor, there is also a geographical one. During the end of 2006 until the end of 2009, poor households, especially in the rural areas, experienced larger pressure from inflation than the overall population. They were hit harder by inflation because of the significant increase in prices for food.⁶³⁴ Since the majority of ethnic Chinese lives in urban areas, they were less affected, again feeding into the image of the 'rich Chinese'. As long as the economic distribution remains unequal and therefore an underlying deep structure, it will be difficult to overcome prejudices against ethnic Chinese and reduce resultant structural violence.

Development programs during the Soeharto period not only favored ethnic Chinese tycoons, but also Java over the outer islands.⁶³⁵ There has been an uneven distribution of revenues between the provinces and the Central Government. Especially those islands with rich natural

⁶³¹ Interview with Mariati M. (13.04.2010).

⁶³² Ibid.

⁶³³ Jakarta Globe, July 4, 2011.

⁶³⁴ Sugema et al., 2010.

⁶³⁵ Suryadinata, 2002, p. 5.

resources, felt that they have been seriously deprived.⁶³⁶ In the course of decentralization, a more equal distribution of economic assets was achieved, nevertheless, one can distinguish between areas which have developed more quickly due to export trade, (examples are Palembang, East Sumatra, Southeast Kalimantan) and areas which stayed behind and only slowly managed to follow the modernization process that took place elsewhere (as for example Bengkulu, Timor, Maluku).⁶³⁷ As a result, economic well-being varies between the ethnic groups and thus socio-economic differences can become ethnicized. Tensions deriving from this economic fault-line between different groups result in tensions, which also may lead to violent conflict.

Religious fault-lines often play an important role (with religion as cultural system) as cultural fault-line in many conflicts. In Europe, for example, religious fault-lines have marked the geographical position of a conflict. Sarajevo was the geographical point for the clash of Christians (Protestants, Catholics and Orthodox) and Muslims in the 1990s.⁶³⁸ With regard to the present conflict, the majority of indigenous Indonesians are Muslims and the majority of ethnic Chinese are either Christians or Buddhists. This factor adds to their status as minority as they are a religious and ethnic minority at the same time. To escape this unfavorable status, some ethnic Chinese converted or are in the process to convert to Islam in hopes of leaving behind this status. The rate for conversion rose especially after anti-Chinese riots. For example, after an anti-Chinese riot in Surakarta in the 1980s, it has been reported that many local ethnic Chinese converted to Islam.⁶³⁹ Nevertheless, as the riots in May 1998 or other smaller riots showed, conversion to Islam did not protect Chinese Indonesians from becoming the victims of attacks. Physical features revealing their ethnic Chinese background mark them as potential targets. Therefore, converting to Islam – even for those who are not practicing another religion – for security reasons is not attractive for the majority of ethnic Chinese.⁶⁴⁰

Religious fault-lines between Muslims and Christians gained importance after the fall of the Soeharto-regime in the landscape of violent conflict in Indonesia. Decentralization not only led to a rise of local identities, but also to respective religious identities. Thus, it not only intensified ethnic but also religious boundaries. To gain supporters, local political elites implemented religiously-influenced local regulations satisfying needs of followers of the

⁶³⁶ Ibid.

⁶³⁷ Touwen, 2010.

⁶³⁸ Lecture by Galtung at the University of Giessen, 10.05.2011.

⁶³⁹ Ali, 2007, p. 14.

⁶⁴⁰ Interview with Mohammad Gatot, an ethnic Chinese who converted to Islam, but was still attacked during the May riots (08.09.2008).

prominent religion of the respective region but simultaneously fueling religious tensions. In South Sulawesi, a number of districts passed shariah by-laws regarding *zakat* (mandatory donations by Muslims). They were implemented by local politicians to increase local government revenues to establish and maintain private networks for those in power.⁶⁴¹ Islamic Shariah law has influenced the local legislation in Aceh and Minang⁶⁴² while Christian-influenced laws have been introduced in Papua and West Papua. In Manokwari (West Papua) regulations were promulgated that stipulated that Christians have to obey bible-teachings and that forbid the building of mosques.⁶⁴³ These regulations triggered emotional reactions not only in Indonesia among those who are not active followers of the respective belief and those who consider religion a private matter, but also on the international level in the media as well as at academic conferences. In 2006, for example, 56 legislators signed a petition to the President requesting him to revoke Shariah inspired laws. They argued that these laws were unconstitutional and not consistent with the state ideology which grants religious freedom. The petition was formally opposed by 134 legislators and therefore failed.⁶⁴⁴ Violent conflicts between Christians and Muslims cannot be generalized or simplistically referred to as ‘religious conflicts’ only. Like ethnic conflicts, most cases involve violent competition for economic, political or social power and dominance. Nevertheless, religion is assumed to play an important role in many conflicts, as opposing parties often are followers of different religions and contradictions between them often involve religious issues. Violent clashes between Christians and Muslims in Ambon and Central Maluku, Halmahera and the North Malukus are clearly religiously motivated. The same applies to the Muslim-Christian violence in Poso (Central Sulawesi), in East Timor and various parts of Kalimantan as well as in West Papua.⁶⁴⁵ Religious dialogue is therefore required to overcome this fault-line, not only in the case of the ethnic Chinese but in other religious conflicts or ones which have a religious component to them.

5.3 Conclusions

The analysis of the conflict’s deep dimensions revealed aspects which go beyond the conflict formation itself and influence conflict actors and conflict infrastructure subconsciously. Even though the conflict is an intra-state conflict, the conflict parties are influenced by differing

⁶⁴¹ Buehler, 2008, pp. 258ff.

⁶⁴² Laws cover, for example, dress-codes for Muslims in general or Muslim civil servants.

⁶⁴³ Ardeney-Risakotta, 2008, p.1.

⁶⁴⁴ Bush, 2008, pp. 178ff.

⁶⁴⁵ Ardeney-Risakotta, 2008, p. 7.

collective sub-consciousness and cosmologies (**deep culture**) that underlie their attitudes. The cosmology of indigenous Indonesians reveals a clear division between in-groups and out-groups. As the criteria for belonging to the in-group (on the national level) is indigenesness to the archipelago; ethnic Chinese with their cultural Chinese features are thus perceived as members of the out-group. The Chinese Indonesians' cosmology includes eclecticism. Therefore, ethnic Chinese do not perceive an 'eclectic' identity – Chinese and Indonesian at the same time – as problematic. Due to the different perceptions of the 'Chinese Indonesia' identity, indigenous Indonesians often doubt the loyalty of ethnic Chinese, while ethnic Chinese are not willing to give up on their 'Chineseness' as it forms an integral part of their identity. The ethnic Chinese can further be diagnosed with the CGT syndrome and the indigenous Indonesians with a tendency to the DMA syndrome which both impede working on conflict transformation or engaging in dialogue.

Basic human needs (**deep nature**), if not satisfied, may lead to violent behavior (direct violence). On the side of the indigenous Indonesians, it is mainly basic human needs for well-being and survival as well as identity and freedom that are infringed upon. This led to violent acts not only against the ethnic Chinese, but also against the state (e.g. Papua) or among other ethnic groups (e.g. Dayaks and Madurese) in Indonesia. Decentralization of the centralized state structure aims at satisfying identity and freedom needs by allowing for more self-governance of ethnic groups, including administrative and financial responsibilities. To further foster the process, laws and regulations need to be harmonized, and administrative infrastructure has to be supported. Nevertheless, decentralization alone does not necessarily reduce or end local conflicts, especially in regions where many ethnic and religious groups co-exist. It also did not result in reducing another major problem that the Indonesian state is dealing with, namely corruption. Chinese Indonesians mainly suffer from infringements on their basic human need for identity and freedom which in some of their cases leads to retreat into exclusiveness. For those who work on leaving the marginalized position, decentralization programs shifted problems they were previously facing with the state (e.g. discrimination) to the local level.

In this case study conflict, the major fault-lines are related to race and class (**deep structures**). The analysis revealed that the 'indigenous' factor as basis for the concept of Indonesian national identity and the resurrection of local ethnic identity are problematic for the integration process of Chinese Indonesians. Further, underrepresentation of ethnic Chinese (as well as

other ethnic minority groups) in the political realm and the military stress their status as outsiders. With regard to the country's economic situation, the uneven distribution of economic assets and development programs between ethnic groups in Indonesia fuels ethnic tensions in general. Furthermore, the religious component to the conflict adds to the minority status of the ethnic Chinese, underlines their position as marginalized 'others' and involves them in other conflicts between Muslims and Christians, for example in Bogor.

Apart from complementing the analysis of the conflict, the deep dimensions analysis places the conflict in a broader context. The deep dimension analysis reveals general political, economic and cultural (ethnic/religious) problems which Indonesia is currently facing and indicates how they are related to this specific conflict. It therefore shows the underlying setting of the conflict. In order to attempt conflict transcendence it will not be enough to tackle this conflict on its own, detached from other conflicts in Indonesia. Instead, it has to be included in a broader context where other conflicts and problems will also have to be addressed. It is therefore necessary to make the underlying dimensions conscious to the involved actors which could be or probably even has to be done by a third party.

6. Analysis of Attempts to Transform the Conflict

6.1 Conflict Transformation according to the Transcend Method⁶⁴⁶

The 1990s saw a historically high number of ‘peace agreements’ or ‘peace accords’⁶⁴⁷ being signed, with at least fourteen in place by the end of 1996. Most of these agreements pertained to conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa. However, examples like Angola, Somalia, Sri Lanka, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone show that a peace agreement alone is usually not sufficient to end a conflict.⁶⁴⁸ There are multiple and distinct reasons for the failure of each of these peace agreements. They would appear to confirm Galtung’s argument that a conflict cannot be transformed if only subgroups among the conflict parties (in the case of these agreements mostly the upper echelon elites) sign an agreement.

The failure of agreements is another indicative of the different phases happening within a conflict cycle during which parties or subgroups conclude a temporary agreement which partially reduces the degree of violence in a conflict. In Galtung’s analogy, a conflict transformation process does not come to an end; peace is a utopian stage which cannot be achieved but which one can continue working towards.⁶⁴⁹ As the term transformation indicates, something changes in form or function from being an X to becoming a Y, which would suggest that X is not removed; but only incorporated into something new and thus does not vanish. Contradictions are considered a good entry-point for conflict transformation. If, for example, conflict parties work on contradictions by transcending their goals (which may lead to the defining of new goals) with suitable results that all conflict parties (including their subgroups) can agree upon and support, contradictions can be transformed, at least in part.⁶⁵⁰ Attitudes and behavior may then follow suit. Often not all three aspects of a conflict (ABC) are transformed simultaneously. After transcending conflict actors’ goals, it may take time for progress and for behavior and in particular attitudes to change. In the meantime before any of these aspects can be achieved, new contradictions may develop due to changing internal or external factors. Thus conflict formation itself changes over time, but a conflict is seldom dissipated completely. According to Galtung it is important to learn how to deal with conflicts without resorting to

⁶⁴⁶ The presentation of the Transcend method here is based on Galtung 2007a, 2007b and Galtung, 2010.

⁶⁴⁷ The definition of peace in the term ‘peace agreement’ does not correspond to the definition by Galtung as applied in this thesis. Instead, the term ‘peace’ in ‘peace agreement’ only refers to the absence of physical violence against people and/or their property.

⁶⁴⁸ Stedman, Rothschild and Cousense, 2002, p. 59.

⁶⁴⁹ Galtung, 2010, p. 91.

⁶⁵⁰ Galtung, 2000, p. 30.

violence and to develop conflict transformation capacities instead of reaching out for a final ‘solution’ for a conflict.⁶⁵¹

Galtung criticizes that academic research in peace and conflict studies often limits itself by focusing on a conflict’s past and present while “shying away from the future”⁶⁵². In this study, suggestions for a practical conflict transformation of the present conflict shall be presented based on the results of the conflict analysis outlined in the previous chapters as well as the theoretical basis for conflict transformation for third parties (referred to as peace-workers) as laid out in the Transcend approach. This section of the Transcend method includes planning conflict interventions and suggests measures which can be taken during different stages of a conflict. As researchers of a conflict are also third party actors, the method provides useful guidance for developing possible strategies for the case study conflict.

Transcending a conflict aims at introducing a new workable reality which is developed with or by the conflict actors as a result of a creative conflict working process. In this process conflict actors, possibly with the help of peace-workers, attempt to identify suggestions derived from the conflict formation to transcend conflict contradictions.⁶⁵³ Ideally, the aims of all parties are satisfied and therefore no basic human needs harmed. Further, their attitudes and behavior allow them to live in peaceful harmony. However, the respective objectives do not remain static; it is an important part of the process to alter, change or define any new aims of the parties. According to the Transcend method, third parties should work on transforming a conflict non-violently using empathy and creativity to reach acceptable, sustainable outcomes for all parties.⁶⁵⁴ Third parties should proceed with great caution since attempting to change a problem may also create new problems. Therefore, suggestions or attempts to transform a conflict by third parties need to be reversible.⁶⁵⁵ The main guidelines for assisting in peaceful conflict transformation according to the Transcend method are:

- Peace: the capacity to transform conflicts with empathy and creativity, without violence; a never-ending process
- Transforming conflicts: enabling the parties to move on in a self-reliant, acceptable, and sustainable manner
- Empathy: ability to understand the conflict including the ways the parties understand the conflict themselves

⁶⁵¹ Galtung, 2007a, p. 166.

⁶⁵² Galtung, 2010, p. 72.

⁶⁵³ Galtung, 2007a, p. 178.

⁶⁵⁴ Galtung, 2010, p. 99.

⁶⁵⁵ Galtung, 2007b, p. 242.

- Creativity: channeling conflict energy towards new innovative ways of satisfying basic human needs for all
- Non-violence: the process should avoid any threat or use of violence (neither direct, structural nor cultural violence)⁶⁵⁶

Even though only the analytical section of the Transcend method is applied in this academic study, these guidelines should be kept in mind while developing suggestions for putting potential conflict transformation into practice. The guidelines are further reflected in the transcended conflict triangle. Like the conflict formation, deep dimensions or violence of a conflict, a transcended conflict can also be depicted in the form of a triangle. This triangle is up-side-down as it does not show the present or past of a conflict formation but rather the targeted future. The conflict itself still exists, but in a new, transcended form.




Figure 11: The Transcended Conflict Triangle

Conflict Diagnosis, Prognosis and Therapy

In order to work towards this target state of a transcended conflict, Galtung suggests three major steps: diagnosis, prognosis and therapy. Galtung has intentionally chosen medical terms, as he compares the work of a peace-worker to that of a medical doctor. Both work towards healing their ‘patients’ – the medical doctor works on a patient’s disease while a peace-worker

⁶⁵⁶ Galtung, 2010, p. 91.

works on contradictions, i.e. the relationships between conflict actors.⁶⁵⁷ The conflict analysis is required for the diagnosis and the prognosis of a conflict, however, for therapy, prescriptions are needed.⁶⁵⁸

The critical analysis forms the diagnosis of a conflict based on the analytical schemes developed by Galtung, i.e. the violence triangle, conflict formation triangle, and deep dimension triangle, as conducted in the previous chapters. Based on the results and experiences from other conflict histories, a prognosis about a conflict's further development can be made: what is likely to happen if nothing changes? Will there be further violence? Have the involved parties learned how to deal with the conflict in a peaceful way to entirely avoid violence in the future?

In most cases, “biochemical-psychology-sociology based-hatred and violence processes in A [attitudes] and B [behavior], if nothing demobilizing is done to C [contradictions].”⁶⁵⁹ If no work on conflict transformation is undertaken, Galtung outlines possible primary, secondary, tertiary and basic consequences. He further distinguishes them according to I. Inner narrative (context: culture), II. General narrative (context: nature) and III. Outer narrative (context: structure) (s. table 3):

| Prognosis | Inner narrative | General narrative | Outer narrative |
|---------------------------------|-------------------------------|--|--------------------------------------|
| Context | Culture | Nature | Structure |
| Primary Consequences | Negative cognitions, emotions | Frustration | Negative speech, behavior |
| Secondary Consequences | Attitudinal polarization | Polarization, dehumanization | Behavioral polarization |
| Tertiary Consequences | Hatred: Self-destruction | Aggression, escalation | (direct) Violence, other-destruction |
| Basic Consequences | Trauma to Self | Trauma | Trauma to Other |
| Producing Vicious Cycles | Trauma to Other | Winner's goal more Glory, loser's goal Revenge | Trauma to Self |

Table 3: Conflict Prognosis⁶⁶⁰

⁶⁵⁷ Galtung's father was a physician, Galtung, 2006, p. 23. His family background has influenced him in choosing the medical terminology. “Festsymposium anlässlich des 80. Geburtstags von Johan Galtung“, Villigst, 03.12.2010.

⁶⁵⁸ Galtung, 2010, p. 72.

⁶⁵⁹ Galtung, 2010, p. 80.

⁶⁶⁰ Extract from Table 10: Peace by Peaceful Conflict Transformation: A TRANSCEND Model, Galtung, 2010, p. 75.

As visualized in this table, frustrations resulting from unsolved contradictions may lead to polarization and dehumanization of the ‘other’ (conflict party). As a consequence, hatred in inner attitudes may result in violence in outer behavior (aggression and aggressive behavior), reinforcing an escalation of violence. This violence can then inflict traumata on victims as well as perpetrators for having traumatized victims. In increasingly vicious cycles, perpetrators may seek for more glory while victims may aim for revenge. According to Galtung, such experiences may eventually enter the collective memory of a group, leading to negative syndromes such as CGT or DMA, which then hinder conflict parties from working constructively on a conflict. Therefore, if nothing changes, i.e. no therapy is applied, chances of a conflict to develop towards non-violence and eventually peace are regarded by Galtung as being low.

To prevent further violence, a therapy for dealing with the conflict or at least with some of its aspects has to be developed. In order for researchers or peace-workers to successfully develop such strategies, timing is important as different stages of a conflict require different conflict intervention measures.

Conflict Intervention

The analysis of violence (part of diagnosis) helps to determine in which phase of the conflict cycle a conflict is currently located. In his handbook *Conflict Transformation by Peaceful Means* (2010), Galtung identifies three phases of violence and respective measures or foci for conflict work (depicted in the conflict diagram below). A conflict cycle can be divided into three phases:

Phase I: Before Violence

Phase II: During Violence

Phase III: After Violence

It has to be noted here that the use of the word ‘violence’ may cause some confusion. In contrast to the extended, broad meaning of violence (direct, structural and cultural) typically employed by Galtung, the term ‘violence’ in this diagram is limited to direct violence infringing upon survival and well-being needs, i.e. harming (killing or injuring) people and destroying (their) property. This is reflected in suggestions for conflict interventions. In Phase I ‘Before Violence’ Galtung advises to focus on violent structures and violent cultures. ‘During Violence’ the focus is set on stopping violence that leads to the harming of people and destruction of property (peace-keeping).





Figure 12: Conflict Diagram⁶⁶¹

After Phase III, the conflict may return to Phase I or Phase II again if no efforts are made to work on its transformation. Depending on the conflict development, it can be difficult to determine whether a conflict is still in Phase III or if it is already in Phase I again.

⁶⁶¹ Based on Galtung, 2000, p. 14.

Phase I: Before Violence

Before violence, suggestions by researchers or peace-workers should aim at sustainable peace initiatives and the focus of intervention should be on:⁶⁶²

- *Violent cultures* that justify violence
- *Violent structures* of repression, exploitation, alienation etc.
- *Violent actors* attracted to violence to show or gain power and hatred to distinguish themselves from the others
- *The root conflict*, i.e. contradicting goals

The target state for measures and approaches dealing with violent cultures, structures and actors is to escape vicious circles and to replace them by a virtuous circle consisting of cultural, structural and direct peace. Apart from possible strategies to reach this target state, Galtung further introduced a mediation process in order to deal with the root conflict, i.e. the contradicting goals of the conflict actors.

Violent cultures call for peace cultures. For establishing a culture of peace in which peace is defined as “good, right, sacred and beautiful”⁶⁶³ and violence (without exceptions) as the opposite, Galtung suggests the introduction of human rights⁶⁶⁴ as a possible starting point; however, only if they fit the cultural environment. Even though human rights originate from a Western⁶⁶⁵ tradition, they are generally considered and accepted to be universal – which Galtung attributes to the assumption that the ‘West’ is the cradle of early self-realization of mankind.⁶⁶⁶ Galtung does not reject the human rights approach as such; however, he claims it to be problematic in that the human rights that originated in and were propagated by Western countries have been declared to be universal in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted by the UN which at that time consisted of mainly Western countries).⁶⁶⁷ It should be identified which crucial parts of the declaration are not applicable to civilizations other than to the Western ones and on this basis these should be removed. Further, the question should be raised about what other civilizations could offer to complement the declaration and thereby

⁶⁶² Galtung, 2000, pp. 15-16.

⁶⁶³ Galtung, 2000, p. 107.

⁶⁶⁴ According to the “International Bill of Human Rights” (consisting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted in 1948), the Covenant of on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) by the United Nations).

⁶⁶⁵ The term ‘Western’ here is used by Galtung and covers what he defined as Occident I.

⁶⁶⁶ Galtung, 1994, p. 9.

⁶⁶⁷ Galtung, 1994, p. 28.

enhance its universality and benefit more people.⁶⁶⁸ The human rights approach therefore requires critical review leading to further development and better definition. Nevertheless, it represents a valuable approach if adjusted to the cultural setting. If there is a strong tendency to think in dichotomies (i.e. true/false) in the respective culture, introducing more ‘shades of grey’ is a possible approach to blunt absolutism. Practices like peace education and peace journalism can help to identify and foster (possibly) subconscious, constructive, peace-enhancing elements of a culture.⁶⁶⁹ Instead of legitimizing violence, peace would be legitimized in religion, law, ideology, language, art and science to build a positive culture of peace.⁶⁷⁰

Violent structures have to be identified and reflected upon. If there is an underlying infra-structure of interacting meso- and mega-fault-lines, peace strategies should aim at peace structures, i.e. an infra-structure creating “reciprocity and equity across fault-lines”.⁶⁷¹ Apart from the human rights approach, another approach could be to empower (for example by increasing the level of education) more people to take part in decision-making processes and thus increase equity to overcome fault-lines.⁶⁷² Formulated in Galtung’s terminology of the infringements of basic human needs this means: dialogue instead of penetration, integration instead of segmentation, solidarity instead of fragmentation and participation instead of marginalization. Together with the satisfaction of basic human needs, establishing a peace culture and peace structure constitute therapy approaches to work on the transformation of deep dimensions of the conflict.⁶⁷³

Violent actors have to be identified and taken seriously. They also should be included in as many dialogues as possible, or at least provided with the chance of doing so, as neglecting them may make them more intractable. In order to support handling conflict processes non-violently, it may help to include more actors in the process. Balancing the gender ratio or inviting actors with a religious (not hard-liner), intellectual or commercial instead of military background, can increase the level of empathy, creativity and non-violence to work constructively on a conflict.⁶⁷⁴ Actions should aim at satisfying all basic human needs: survival, well-being, freedom and identity that might have been infringed upon previously by direct violence.

Apart from working on establishing peace culture and peace structure as well as increasing the number of peaceful actors, structural, cultural and direct violence need to be reduced. Work on

⁶⁶⁸ Galtung, 1994, p. 35.

⁶⁶⁹ Galtung, 2010, p. 81.

⁶⁷⁰ Galtung 2007a, p. 67.

⁶⁷¹ Galtung, 2010, pp. 81 – 82.

⁶⁷² Galtung, 2010, p. 82.

⁶⁷³ Galtung, 2010, p. 75, Table 10.

⁶⁷⁴ Galtung, 2000, pp. 15 – 16.

peace and reduction of violence should be simultaneous and consistent; neither should be prioritized at the expense of the other.⁶⁷⁵ The diagnosis of violence in a conflict (direct, structural and cultural) helps to identify violence that has to be countered. By making culture, structures and actors less violent and more peaceful, chances are that contradicting goals can be attended without any of the actors resorting to violent behavior. Working on a conflict formation (according to the conflict formation triangle) therefore has direct effects on a conflict's degree of violence.

For the *root conflict*, i.e. the underlying problems of a conflict or the contradictions between goals, Galtung suggests mediation to find a “new, acceptable and sustainable reality”⁶⁷⁶. In this new reality, contradictions may not be completely resolved and do not disappear, but they may have been blunted or appear less contradictory than they did before. While working on the contradictions, the parties' behavior and attitudes need to be attended to by peace-workers. Conflict actors need to reach a stage in which they can start working both on the conflict and with each other, e.g. by participating in a mediation process.⁶⁷⁷

The process of mediation should be conducted as a dialogue with all actors. According to the Transcend method, mediators first meet with the parties one-on-one before they facilitate direct dialogue, e.g. a round-table. The dialogue should comprise the following:⁶⁷⁸

- 1) Mapping the conflict formation (parties, goals and contradictions)
- 2) Distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate goals
- 3) Bridging the legitimate goals with creativity

In the mediation process, the focus is on contradictions, therefore finding ways to work on them is given priority. In the course of discussing contradicting goals and their legitimacy, the parties are sensitized to the basic human needs, both their own as well as those of the other party. It is assumed that when contradictions are less sharp, attitudes and behavior will be softened rather than the other way round. How to attend to all three aspects of a conflict (attitudes, behavior and contradictions: the ABC triangle) may vary from conflict to conflict. In his book *50 Years - 25 Intellectual Landscapes Explored*,⁶⁷⁹ Galtung describes the agenda used by Transcend mediators to guide actors through the process as a double dialectic of future vs. past and good-pursued (i.e. the dreams and glories) vs. bad-rejected (i.e. the fears and traumata).

⁶⁷⁵ Galtung, 2008, p. 130.

⁶⁷⁶ Galtung, 2010, p. 82.

⁶⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁷⁹ Galtung, 2008.

| | Bad-rejected | Good-pursuit |
|--------|-------------------------|------------------------|
| Future | (4) The Fears | (1) The Dreams |
| Past | (2) The Traumata | (3) The Glories |

Table 4: The Double Dialectic of Past vs. Future and Good vs. Bad⁶⁸⁰

The numbers represent a standard sequence of mediation which often has to be repeated several times over the course of the process.

1. The dreams represent a common constructive vision of the future
2. The traumata are destructive aspects of the conflict up to now⁶⁸¹
3. The glories stand for the positive-nostalgic elements of a common past⁶⁸²
4. The fears represent the negative prognosis of the future⁶⁸³

Each actor or party may then reflect upon their dreams, traumata, glories and fears to come to a better understanding of how they perceive the conflict as well as how other party(ies) perceive it. The actors then discuss how a new reality might emerge in which contradicting goals of the parties might co-exist. This approach, along with other mediation approaches, is based on criticism, empiricism and constructivism.⁶⁸⁴ The mediator's goal is to guide the parties away from their fears / nightmares towards a compelling dream, inspired by theories and values that make the dream become as constructive, creative and concrete as possible.⁶⁸⁵

Phase II: During Violence

According to Galtung, while the conflict is at its most manifest, violence has to be stopped, even if this means military or police intervention.⁶⁸⁶ Peace-keeping therefore may include violence. This behavior-oriented approach is necessary to gain control over violent actors and stop them from destroying others or themselves.⁶⁸⁷ Circumstances leading to the emergence of direct violence need to be identified and included in possible strategies. Direct violence may emerge for different reasons. An unattended conflict in which one party wants to impose its goals on the other by force may lead to the flare-up of violence. It also could be that one party

⁶⁸⁰ Galtung, 2008, p. 83.

⁶⁸¹ Later, Galtung refers to this mode as 'reality' (past, negative), Galtung, 2010, p. 88.

⁶⁸² Galtung also named this mode 'nostalgia' (past, positive), Galtung, 2010, p. 88.

⁶⁸³ Another term for this mode is 'nightmare' (future, negative), Galtung, 2010, p. 88.

⁶⁸⁴ Galtung, 2008, pp. 82- 83 and p. 225.

⁶⁸⁵ Galtung, 2010, p. 90.

⁶⁸⁶ Galtung, 2000, p. 13 and p. 18.

⁶⁸⁷ Galtung, 2007a, p. 187.

is acting out of frustration over unachieved goals or compromised basic human needs. Another reason why conflict parties resort to direct violence may be due to an underlying culture that justifies its use for gaining honor or to avenge previous acts of violence.⁶⁸⁸

Galtung outlines five different options for ending direct violence Handbook:⁶⁸⁹

1. Embargoes on weapons and mercenaries
2. Removal of targets and evacuation of people
3. Demoralizing soldiers (or in general people using direct violence) by clarifying visible and invisible consequences of violence
4. Making clear to parties that they will all lose in the long run due to the spiraling nature of violence
5. UN peacekeeping missions with peacekeeping units that should be large enough to not leave space for fighting parties to continue fighting.

Options 1. and 5. have to be initiated by governments, while options 2. – 4. can also be initiated by organized groups, like NGOs, although all of the mentioned options constitute large-scale operations for which only very few NGOs have the necessary means (personnel and financial assets). Therefore, in most cases these options depend on the willingness of asset-rich outsiders (e.g. uninvolved governments) to engage.

With regard to what involved actors can do in this conflict phase, Galtung names non-violent de-escalation as a therapy against direct violence (as a therapy against tertiary consequences of the prognosis, see table 4). Galtung identifies the spiral of violence in which violence breeds violence is identified as being problematic.⁶⁹⁰ In order to break the vicious cycle of escalating violence, it is necessary to de-escalate violence by refusing to react with violence.⁶⁹¹ It is not without risks for a party to exercise non-violence. Actors risk surveillance, arrest, maiming and in the worst case killing. The basic idea, inspired by Gandhi, is to be willing to suffer violence without returning it. Actions of non-violence include peace movement actions, such as officially reporting incidents of violence, holding meetings and organizing mass demonstrations. Galtung divides measures of non-violence into first, second and third party non-violence:

- First party non-violence acts are offensive acts against structural violence, such as massive non-cooperation and civil disobedience.

⁶⁸⁸ Galtung, 2000, p. 18.

⁶⁸⁹ Galtung, 2000, p. 19.

⁶⁹⁰ Galtung, 2010, p. 84.

⁶⁹¹ Ibid.

- Second party non-violence measures include defensive acts against invasion/occupation with massive civil disobedience.
- Third parties engage in non-violence by facilitating conflict work, bringing parties together and conducting mediation.⁶⁹²

These measures or therapies are suggested by Galtung for de-escalating a conflict and ending or reducing direct violence, if only temporarily. As soon as direct violent acts have decreased, work on reconstruction, reconciliation and resolution (the ‘three Rs’) should already be initiated which shall then be continued in Phase III.⁶⁹³

Phase III: After Violence

Once violent actions have occurred, breaking the conflict life-cycle becomes increasingly difficult. People who experienced the end of direct violence (e.g. after a peace accord) may feel enthusiastic and may not feel the need for further conflict work. Therefore they may neglect long-lasting effects of past violence and the fact that a conflict does not necessarily disappear with the end of violent acts.⁶⁹⁴ Thus, it is important to continue conflict work similar to the work suggested for Phase I (before violence) which aims at *resolving* the root conflict (i.e. working on the conflict triangles). This constitutes the first one of the ‘three Rs’ which Galtung identifies as necessary in his approach. The other ‘two Rs’ are *reconstruction* and *reconciliation*. For all three topics (resolution, reconstruction and reconciliation) the Transcend methods provides exemplars of concrete measures which may be applicable depending on the results of the conflict analysis.⁶⁹⁵ In addition, dialogue is required to include the actors (e.g. in the form of seminars or workshops or interviews with conflict actors, if necessary with a facilitator (conciliator)) during which the applicability of different approaches is discussed. Conflict parties could then decide together which approach(es) they would prefer.⁶⁹⁶

The Transcend Method: An Insight into the Academic Discourse

Galtung’s approach of conflict transformation has been criticized as being too simplistic. Boulding, for example considers the approach to be too ‘taxonomic’ and ‘dichotomist’, failing therefore to recognize the complexity and randomness of the world.⁶⁹⁷ Bonacker, sees Galtung’s totalizing definition of peace (‘der totale Friedensbegriff’) as problematic as it does

⁶⁹² Galtung, 2010, p. 84.

⁶⁹³ Galtung, 2000, p. 19.

⁶⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁹⁵ For more details regarding each of the approaches, see Galtung, 2000, pp. 20ff.

⁶⁹⁶ Galtung, 2010, pp. 84-85.

⁶⁹⁷ Boulding, 1977, p. 78.

not allow for any contradictions, conflicting aims or ambivalences.⁶⁹⁸ As Galtung offers only models that seem to fit everything perfectly into one concept, empirical problems and challenges in peace processes are neglected. As an example, Bonacker refers to the conflict or dilemma between the attempt to bring all perpetrators to justice and the attempt to focus on establishing stability in post-war societies which often requires leaving perpetrators in their positions of power.⁶⁹⁹ In the Handbook of Peace and Conflict Studies edited by Webel and Galtung⁷⁰⁰, post-conflict problems are not assessed in detail, but considered solved after conducting measures according to the ‘three Rs’. The result is summed up as ‘past cleared, future together’ in a table. However, especially ‘future together’ has proven to be a complicated and difficult undertaking in most post-conflict societies.⁷⁰¹

Post-conflict problems are indeed not addressed by Galtung in the Handbook of Peace and Conflict Studies. However, they are addressed in his article “After Violence”⁷⁰², in which he explicitly deals with

1. The problem of reconstruction after the direct violence;
2. The problem of reconciliation of the conflict parties; and
3. The problem of resolution of the underlying, root conflict.

The problem of dealing with a juridical approach to punish perpetrators on the one hand and establishing stability in post-conflict societies mentioned by Bonacker is also one of the topics addressed in this article. Galtung criticizes the processes to deal with perpetrators according to Western concepts of justice as being too narrow. Alternately, he suggests expanding the concept by adding a restitution and apology approach (similar to the process initiated by the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission) which could enable perpetrators to remain in society and help the rebuilding process instead of excluding them.⁷⁰³ Due to the comprehensive and complex nature of the Transcend approach and the abundance of theoretical work which forms its basis, it is difficult to reduce Galtung’s method to one compact handbook without running the risk of oversimplifying and essentializing it. Therefore, a critique such as presented by Bonacker of the approach being too simplistic does not do justice to the complexity of the method as a whole.

⁶⁹⁸ Bonacker, 2009, p. 2.

⁶⁹⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰⁰ Webel & Galtung, 2007.

⁷⁰¹ Bonacker, 2009, p. 2.

⁷⁰² Galtung, After Violence, undated.

⁷⁰³ Galtung, After Violence, undated.

6.2 Suggestions for the Case Study Conflict

Next, I will determine the current status of the case study conflict within the conflict cycle based on the analysis of the conflict's present levels of direct violence. An approximate indication in numbers of the status of conflict transformation (to what extent the conflict has already been transformed) for this specific conflict has been calculated according to the conflict transformation index developed by Galtung in Annex 2. The result reveals that conflict transformation of this conflict has reached about 37.5 of 100 points (0 means no conflict transformation has taken place and 100 means the conflict has been fully transformed). In spite of occasional incidents of direct violence infringing mainly upon the well-being needs of ethnic Chinese, the conflict is currently not in a phase of large-scale violence as it was during the May riots in 1998. During the riots, violence was on a scale that would have required peace-keeping actions and the conflict was therefore in Phase II (during violence). It thus has to be determined whether the conflict is still in Phase III (after violence) or whether it has already re-entered Phase I (before violence) again. For the time period of research (until 2012), the conflict is still in Phase III (after violence) as the May riots are still very present to conflict actors and the healing process has not been concluded yet. On the other hand, there are no indications that large-scale direct violence would occur in the near future. Even though anti-Chinese sentiments were instrumentalized during the election campaigns for the position of Governor and Vice-governor of Jakarta in mid-2012, they did not trigger acts of direct violence. The focus of suggestions for conflict transformation should therefore be set on the therapies attributed to Phase III (after violence).

Galtung suggests approaches in order to deal with the 'three Rs' (*reconstruction, reconciliation, resolution*) which may or may not be applicable to a conflict depending on the results of the conflict analysis. These approaches will therefore be presented and discussed with regard to their applicability to the case study conflict. For the sake of clarity, concrete and practical suggestions will then be explicitly highlighted at the end of long sections.

Reconstruction

According to the Transcend method, four different tasks help the reconstruction process after violence:

- **Rehabilitation** (trauma and sorrow approach)
- **Rebuilding** (development approach)
- **Restructuration** (peace structure approach)
- **Reculturation** (peace culture approach)

Rehabilitation

Galtung suggests a trauma and sorrow approach to initiate rehabilitation. In this approach, a time of collective sorrow could be set up during which sorrow is expressed as condolences to those who have lost someone, suffered from injuries or other damages during violence (Phase II). By the end of the sorrow period, a public celebration could mark its end and a new beginning as life goes on. This approach should however not contribute to a culture of war, in which perpetrators (or victors) celebrate sacrifices necessary to 'win' and victims (or vanquished) deplore their losses. Instead, war or violence as such should be disapproved of collectively as a sign of human failure. Violent actors, violent structures and violent cultures should be addressed by both perpetrators and victims alike. The long-term goal of rehabilitation should be the abolition of violence. For the healing process, the focus has to be on leaving the wounds behind and to focus on the future without harboring revenge. This is especially difficult when dealing with collective trauma.⁷⁰⁴

There was no public collective sorrow period after the May riots 1998 and during interviews with ethnic Chinese, many were still hoping for an official apology, not knowing that President Habibie had in fact offered one in his traditional Independence Day speech in August 1998 for the losses the ethnic Chinese had suffered.⁷⁰⁵ This could be attributed to the fact that Habibie and his government were generally not perceived as having been apologetic by Chinese Indonesians. The official apology was therefore not understood as an apology, but rather a reaction to international pressure and as an effort to convince ethnic Chinese who had left the country with their financial assets to return.⁷⁰⁶ It may thus have not been considered as sincere and gone mainly unnoticed by ethnic Chinese as well as indigenous Indonesians. More than a decade after the riots, it may be too late for a collective sorrow period.

Suggestion

However, it could help to initiate a commemoration day for the May riots, e.g. in May 2013 (fifteen years after the riots), during which perpetrators and victims step forward to condemn the violent acts of the past and mourn its consequences. In this context, members of the political elite, but also the military, would have a chance to officially apologize and reach a nation-wide

⁷⁰⁴ Galtung, undated, pp. 54-55. According to Galtung collective trauma may be brought upon by large-scale violent acts, like war, *ibid.*

⁷⁰⁵ Interview with e.g. Lydia S. (11.09.2008) and Fajar P., half-Chinese Indonesian (09.09.2008).

⁷⁰⁶ Wanandi, 1999, p. 133.

public. It is also quite likely that an official apology would be accepted by ethnic Chinese and helps them to work on closure.⁷⁰⁷ A renewed sincere apology and official recognition of crimes could further help both groups to concentrate on a common goal, such as ending other on-going forms of violence, like discrimination, in Indonesia.

Rebuilding

For some societies, reconstruction of property destroyed in the conflict can offer new opportunities. Construction processes after Phase II can mark a visible new beginning. Apart from governmental efforts, the involvement of the private sector is often required for reconstruction projects. This, however, also carries with it the danger that private investors are only interested in profiting from past violent incidents. The result could be economic dominance which could replace direct with structural violence. To prevent this, a national dialogue including general citizen participation is required. Citizens, as future inhabitants, would be provided with the chance to engage in the planning of new houses, districts and cities. Peace-workers can help in initiating and facilitating dialogues about development and open possibilities that may go beyond classical models, like social democratization which includes elites as well as non-elite sections of society.⁷⁰⁸

After the riots in 1998, Indonesia required rebuilding after the twin collapse of the authoritarian regime and the national economy. In contrast to other conflicts where the victims are economically weaker than the perpetrators, e.g. the Kurds or the Tibetans, the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia formed an essential part of the country's economy. Even if they had lost much of their assets during violent acts, in this case, the Chinese Indonesians were needed for the country's rebuilding process, because of their business experiences and remaining business assets. There were without doubt also those who lost their livelihoods during the crisis and did not recover, but on the whole, the financial capital of the Chinese Indonesian community and its reputation as major catalysts of the private sector ensured them an active role in the rebuilding process. This role was however limited to the economical part. They have not been explicitly invited into the political sphere even if the number of politically active Chinese Indonesians is slowly increasing.

General prejudices against Javanese and ethnic Chinese dominance of the Indonesian economy will be difficult to counter as long as a more equitable economical distribution has not been

⁷⁰⁷ At least five ethnic Chinese respondents stated that they would welcome an official apology (Fajar P., Christine Tjhin, Protus Tanuhandura, Wahyu Effendi and Alexandra Wulan).

⁷⁰⁸ Galtung, undated, pp. 56-57.

achieved. Despite the reductions in the number of poor, Indonesia is still a country where large sections of the population are economically disadvantaged. The rebuilding process of the economy in Indonesia has not been concluded by the end of the research for this study (2012). Economic programs that reflect democratic structures are required. The Indonesian researchers Thee and Tan go as far as to claim that only if the economic gap between ethnic Chinese and indigenous Indonesians is narrowed can the conflict be transformed towards peace.⁷⁰⁹ To achieve this, it would be necessary to develop and implement sound economic policies which foster economic growth in combination with social development.⁷¹⁰ Expertise in economics and commerce of (at least some) ethnic Chinese businessmen would be a valuable asset to draw upon by the government, which would call for more political and bureaucratic participation of ethnic Chinese. As unlike the other ethnic groups ethnic Chinese are not living in only one specific territory in but rather across Indonesia, they may assume the role of intermediaries in case of disagreements between ethnic groups. They are familiar with local thinking (hopes and concerns alike), but due to their special position as a marginalized ethnic group, ethnic Chinese may have another perspective from other ethnic groups and might be able to assist in bridging contradictions.

Suggestions

Establishing economic forums (e.g. by the World Bank) or workshops in which ethnic Chinese businessmen would be part of and could encourage discussions for new economic concepts for the resource-rich country that benefit society more broadly.

Due to the strengthening of local identities with the implementation of decentralization policies, local organizations and local governments can be expected to have an interest in participating in the economic rebuilding process, especially as it also touches upon issues of importance to local governments, such as the distribution of economic assets. These workshops could therefore be initiated and provide the required infrastructure for workshops all over the country on the communal level for discussing national and local policies for economic development. Organizing and coordinating of economic forums or workshops (as peace-building tool) could either be the central government's task or that of an international organization. Outcomes are expected to not only reflect the country's diversity, but moreover to transfer this diversity into a rebuilding process of the country. By including different ethnic groups and sections of society, the results of this process could achieve a higher level of acceptance among the people.

⁷⁰⁹ Thee, 2006, p. 98; interview with Mely Tan (17.09.2008).

⁷¹⁰ Thee, 2006, p. 98; interview with Mely Tan (17.09.2008).

Due to the long history of Javanese dominance in the archipelago, the risk that Javanese representatives might take over a leading position in the workshops has to be considered and reacted to. On the local level, the same has to be considered with regard to the respective dominant ethnic group which forms the local elite. In the process, ethnic Chinese would have to be treated as equals with the other, indigenous, ethnic groups. This would open opportunities for ethnic Chinese to contribute to the country's development, prove their loyalty to and interest in Indonesia.

Restructuration

The analysis of the conflict's deep dimensions identified violent structures, i.e. an underlying infra-structure of interacting meso- and mega-fault-lines. An approach to establishing an infra-structure with reciprocity and equity across fault-lines which is favored by democratic countries is increased democratization.⁷¹¹ Galtung names two common structural causes for outbreaks of direct violence: too much dominance (politically as oppression and economically as exploitation) and too much distance between classes or other groups. In combination, this may result in marginalization or social exclusion of one or more groups. Democratization processes should therefore aim at countering marginalization and exclusion, for example by raising educational and health levels of those who are marginalized or excluded (empowerment). Productive resources such as land, credit, technology and management, would also have to be made accessible more equitably to counter inequity. According to Galtung, building peace structures could imply extending the concept of democratization from a merely political meaning to an economical and cultural understanding.⁷¹²

The suggested measures here only hint at possibilities of what could be done to work towards structural peace. The list is neither comprehensive nor can success in terms of achieving structural peace through them be guaranteed. Working on structures of society is a difficult and long-term undertaking for which these suggestions can, however, provide impulses. More important than possible effects of the measures, is the initiation of a general process that might slowly pave the way from structural violence towards structural peace.

Democratization in Indonesia

Indonesia started its democratization process after the fall of the authoritarian Soeharto-regime. However, the process has not been completed yet and the country is still in the course of defining its own type of democracy. Elements inherited from former non-democratic

⁷¹¹ Galtung, undated, p. 58.

⁷¹² Galtung, undated, pp. 59-60.

administrations can still be found in the social, legal and political structure of the country. As the analysis of the conflict context shows, the pyramidal social structure introduced by the Dutch is part of this legacy. Other elements include laws, regulations and political structures inherited from the Soekarno and Soeharto administrations, including weak institutions on the local level and, on occasion, military intervention in politics.

Decentralization programs have included the establishing of local administration structures and limiting of the military's influence in the political realm which is a key part to democratization. This is further reflected in reforms of the electoral system and improvements of democratic structures to better adapt them to the local and national context.⁷¹³

Suggestion

As Indonesia is still undergoing a democratization process, this leaves space for peace-workers to facilitate dialogue about democratization and nation-building which may lead to including ethnic Chinese in the process. Dialogue will be necessary not only in order to reduce potential fears among indigenous Indonesians that Chinese Indonesians may become too powerful if their number of political representatives increases, but also to encourage ethnic Chinese to participate in political processes.

Political Representation of Minorities

As decentralization programs are still in the process of being implemented, political mechanisms are required which ensure minority representation in local governments and local bureaucracy. Literature on the subject of minority political representation is divided between those who consider mechanism ensuring minority representation to be positive discrimination in favor of minorities which would be against the principle of democracy (one equal vote per person only)⁷¹⁴ and those who consider these mechanism to be necessary to enable minority groups to become part of the political decision-making process⁷¹⁵. As the experiences of other countries (e.g. New Zealand) show, ensuring the political representation and participation of

⁷¹³ During its 2002 annual session, the People's Consultative Assembly (*Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat*, MPR) added fourteen amendments. From 2004 onwards, the MPR is composed of the existing People's Representative Council (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat*, DPR) and a new Regional Representative Council (*Dewan Perwakilan Daerah*, DPD) to meet demands of the outer islands for more co-determination. Since all the seats in the MPR are directly elected, the military was removed from the legislature, whose 38 representatives had been appointed before. Another amendment was the direct election of the President as well as the Vice President. Only parties or coalitions of parties that gained at least 3 percent of the DPR seats or 5 percent of the vote in national legislative elections were eligible under the 2004 amendment to nominate a presidential and vice presidential ticket. See for example U.S. Department of State, *Diplomacy in Action*. <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2748.htm>, 20.05.2012.

⁷¹⁴ E.g. Heywood, 2002.

⁷¹⁵ E.g. Phillips, 1995 and Goodin, 2004.

minority groups is important for strengthening and consolidating both democracies and the integration of minority groups.⁷¹⁶ These experiences further show that in those societies in which minorities are politically represented, they are likely to develop a more positive attitude towards the state they live in, as they have the chance to address issues which affect them and at the same time to contribute to a more collective approach to democracy.⁷¹⁷

In the case of Indonesia, minority political representation would not only comply with the general aims of the decentralization programs, but further support the nation-building process by fostering more positive attitudes towards the nation-state as well as the national and local governments. This would help minorities to accommodate themselves in the political structure of a multi-ethnic state and encourage them to contribute actively to the nation-building process. Political participation by ethnic Chinese on the decision-making level is still subject to constraints. Despite efforts to decentralize the political system, the party system is centralized and focused on Jakarta. This has an impact on the 'local sons' who aim at positions in local governments. Candidates who are not close to their party's centre in Jakarta are unlikely to be nominated for positions in the local governments by their party. Further, those running for any political position need to have considerable financial assets available or supporters who do.⁷¹⁸

Suggestions

Establishing minority political representation mechanisms on the national, but probably even more importantly on the local level is highly recommended. Further, the call for decentralization has to be answered not only in the electoral system but also by reforming the structure of the political parties to encourage people who are not close to the political base to become political candidates, regardless their ethnicity or religion. Means to enable potential political candidates who lack the financial assets to participate have to be found, as for the time being, access to capital determines active political engagement.⁷¹⁹

The Nation-Building Process

Engaging in the nation-building process on the political level is important for the social integration of Chinese Indonesians. This may not be an easy undertaking, not only due to possible resistance by indigenous Indonesians but also because, as outlined by researchers like

⁷¹⁶ Banducci et al., 2004.

⁷¹⁷ Ibid.

⁷¹⁸ Interview with Hanjaya Setiawan, ethnic Chinese politician (10.09.2008).

⁷¹⁹ While the Indonesian government provided quite generous public funding to political parties between 2001 and 2005, it afterwards cut this support by as much as 90 per cent. Mietzner, 2007.

Wang Gungwu,⁷²⁰ ethnic Chinese have inherited a deep-rooted and distinctive culture. He argues that it is not only a difficult mental process for a culture-based people (like ethnic Chinese) to move to a state-based people, but also that globalization forces or encourages Southeast Asian Chinese to look beyond their national borders and return to (a more) cultural identification. A focus on globalization and the overseas Chinese community may even serve as part of the survival tactics employed by ethnic Chinese when dealing with discrimination in their own nation-states or in the respective nation-state building processes.⁷²¹ Therefore, being more aware of their 'Chineseness' may become a mechanism to avoid those parts of the nation-building-process or their country's politics which they do not agree with and reduce their general interest in engaging with the national political realm. On the other hand, it can also be argued that ethnic Chinese have already been involved in the Indonesian nation-building process in the past and should get involved again as an opportunity to improve their image in the eyes of the indigenous Indonesians.⁷²²

Suggestion

To encourage the ethnic Chinese to participate (again) in politics and in particular the nation-building process, ethnic Chinese organizations or politicians could promote a sense of responsibility towards Indonesia among their fellow Chinese Indonesians. Programs to raise political awareness and the need for especially the younger generation of Chinese Indonesians could be initiated and conducted.

Re-conceptualization of Indonesian National Identity

With regard to specific fault-lines as identified in the course of the conflict analysis, the concept of Indonesian national identity and underrepresentation of ethnic minorities (also on the local level) were identified as hindering 'structural peace'. The concept of Indonesian national identity is regarded here as problematic as it is based on a concept of indigenouness which excludes ethnic Chinese as well as ethnic groups with a 'foreign' origin like Indonesian Arabs, even if the Indonesian national motto 'unity in diversity' suggests otherwise. Peace-workers could not only initiate and facilitate dialogue about national identity among ethnic groups, but further try to encourage a re-thinking of 'Indonesian-ness' that would adapt the present concept by referring to examples of other countries with multi-ethnic backgrounds.

⁷²⁰ University Professor at the National University Singapore (focus Far Eastern History).

⁷²¹ Tan, 2004, pp. 3ff.

⁷²² Tan, 2004, pp. 20ff.

Suggestions

In the course of the democratization process and nation-building process, it would therefore be recommendable to explicitly detach the concept of indigenusness from the concept of the nation. The conflict analysis showed that leaving the concept unchanged will hinder transformation efforts. In contrast, re-conceptualizing is expected to have a positive effect on conflict development even if it may not be an easy task and should be given priority in a conflict transformation process.⁷²³

Including ethnic Chinese into Indonesian national identity will leave a gap which has to be filled. Indonesia witnessed a rise of local ethnic identities after 2001, eclipsing in part the issue of national identity. Therefore, dialogue would need to be initiated to encourage and revive discourses on national identities. These discourses may include, on the content level of identity, the construction a common past, present and future, cultural and political elements as well as common values. For example, with regard to a common past, it will be necessary to work on the presentation of the Indonesian historical background. Indonesian history lessons usually do not include sufferings of ethnic Chinese under colonial rule or involvement of ethnic Chinese in the Indonesian fight for independence.⁷²⁴ The first Chinese Indonesian was added to the list of Indonesian national heroes only in 2009. Even though he was not the only ethnic Chinese who fought in the war for independence, the inclusion of Major John Lie can be regarded a significant step in the process towards the acceptance of Chinese Indonesians as part of the Indonesian nation. This list of heroes (together with their biographies) forms an integral part of the Indonesian school curriculum. National heroes are symbols of freedom which Indonesians are proud of and serve as resources for cultural unity. As such, lives of ethnic Chinese would enter the collective memory and ethnic Chinese would be represented positively, altering their negative image. Identity constructions of a common present would include ethnic Chinese, if contributions of Chinese culture to Indonesian civilization would be made accessible to the Indonesian public, for example by being taught at school. A cultural contribution that could be

⁷²³ Other multi-ethnic countries such as Canada face similar difficulties trying to build a common national identity while promoting diversity and tolerance. As identities can both include and exclude, they require boundaries to sustain themselves. Boundary mechanisms are established by collectives to protect their distinctiveness in contrast to other collectives. Stressing unique traits or characteristics which can include anything from language to dress code or diet can be use as boundary mechanisms. For example, Croatia introduced new vocabulary to differentiate its language from the Serbian language. This strategy aims at distinguishing the Croatian identity from the Serbian as both identities (despite their cultural differences) share a language which is philologically the same (Schöpflin, 2001, pp. 5ff). To underline the distinctiveness of an identity, identities are also constructed against a specific group of outsiders. In the case of Canada therefore, anti-Americanism became a dominant part of Canadian identity (Granatstein, 1996, pp. 286ff). Even if critics argue that being against another group should not be the basis for any rational national identity a 'common other' seems to serve as marker to unify a group of otherwise diverse people (ibid).

⁷²⁴ Interviews with e.g. Mohammad Gatot (08.09.2008).

highlighted would be the official integration or acceptance of red dye to Indonesian batik. Batik is perceived as ‘typically Indonesian’ by most Indonesians and Indonesians are proud of their batik tradition, especially after it was proclaimed part of world cultural heritage by UNESCO in 2009.⁷²⁵ Therefore, contributions by ethnic Chinese to batik could encourage seeing them as integral to Indonesian culture.

It will not be possible to detach indigenusness from the concept without finding something new to substitute for it. Apart from elements listed above which explicitly include ethnic Chinese, dialogue with other ethnic groups is expected to lead to more elements being identified that can be considered ‘typically Indonesian’ which may be added to the concept. The results of nation-wide dialogues would need to be compiled in a new concept, for example by a committee with representatives of various ethnic groups. The committee would further have to develop a plan for the promotion of this new concept in public, especially on the pre-school and school-level.

Representation of Ethnic Chinese in the Military

At the time of research for this study, ethnic Chinese were underrepresented in the military.⁷²⁶ As reasons for this, fear on the one hand and unofficial discrimination in the recruitment process on the other hand were identified. Peace-workers would have to work on the traumata related to the military’s involvement during the May riots which ethnic Chinese are suffering from and to encourage them to lose their fear of the military. With regard to discrimination in the recruitment process, the analysis revealed that negative prejudices against ethnic Chinese seem to be still high in this field of occupation. However, this does not refer to ethnic Chinese only, as other minorities are also being discriminated against in the admission process.

Suggestion

In the context of military reforms, an anti-discrimination committee being present at the admission process might help preventing that Indonesians are not admitted based on their ethnic background. Such a state committee could ensure that the anti-discrimination law is adhered to more generally as well. As the research only provides limited insight into the structures of the military, a thorough analysis of the military and related cases of ethnic discrimination will have to remain another challenging gap to be closed by future research.

⁷²⁵ E.g. interviews with William Kwan (15.04.2010).

⁷²⁶ Interview with Teddy Jusuf (08.09.2008).

Reculturation

Substituting a culture of violence with a culture of peace is a long-term process. This process includes all transformation measures aiming at dismantling cultural elements which legitimize the use of violence and instead promoting peaceful ways to deal with conflicts. In order to establish a constructive conflict culture, Galtung suggests peace education from kindergarten onwards throughout the adult life.⁷²⁷ This can be supported for example by peace journalism.⁷²⁸ Further, it is necessary to develop an understanding for the deep culture of ‘others’ among conflict parties. However, this does not imply that raising awareness alone is sufficient. In some cases, aspects of the deep culture (cosmology) have to be brought to the surface so that the respective group can actively work on it. Working on the CGT syndrome for ethnic Chinese and on the DMA syndrome for indigenous Indonesians also will be an important and difficult task. It can be expected that psychological therapy may be required to overcome traumata – even if conflict actors do not feel the need and may refuse treatment. According to several respondents, many ethnic Chinese prefer to ignore discrimination and past violent incidents instead of actively dealing with them.⁷²⁹

Building peace structures and a peace culture together with satisfying the basic human needs constitute therapies necessary to work on the deep dimensions on a conflict. If direct violence, structural violence and cultural violence can simultaneously be reduced, this would form the basis for a virtuous cycle. Suggestions on how to possibly deal with violence in this particular conflict, will be discussed in the section ‘resolution’ below.

Suggestion

The ethnic Chinese, for example, could work on their ‘exclusiveness’. This includes overcoming their distance to indigenous Indonesians, which may require frequent contact and joint projects. Those who do not want to be exclusive, but evoke that impression, for example because of their Chinese-style houses, would not necessarily have to move into Indonesian-style ones. Chinese Indonesian architects could try to develop a new ‘Chinese Indonesian-style architecture’ which incorporates Indonesian as well as Chinese architectural elements. Peace-workers could help to encourage people to deal with their traumata and to facilitate accessing professional help, e.g. in the form of psychoanalytical therapy.

⁷²⁷ Galtung, 2010, p. 81.

⁷²⁸ Ibid.

⁷²⁹ E.g. Veronica Purnama (10.04.2010) and Dr. Grace W. (18.04.2010).

Reconciliation

Reconciliation includes different strategies or measures which aim at a healing process for conflict actors. Conflict actors from both sides are brought together to participate in projects, usually facilitated and guided by peace-workers, during which they explore their mutual fears, anger or other emotions. This may then mark the beginning of building bridges of trust between them. Different suggestions for such projects by Galtung will be listed below. As not all approaches are appropriate for all conflicts, they will be examined one after another to determine whether or not they could be a possible option for the present conflict.

Exculpatory Nature-Structure-Culture Approach or Blaming the Circumstances Approach

In this approach, perpetrators and victims both agree that the circumstances, i.e. violent structures and cultures were underlying causes of a conflict which turned one group of people into perpetrators and the other into victims. Once both sides agree on this, they can counter circumstances that caused the violence together. Peace-workers explain to each party (one-on-one) this perspective of their situation. After each of the parties has reached an exculpatory position, both can be brought together to work out approaches for a common future.⁷³⁰ This approach might be applicable to the case study conflict; however, it should not be the only approach. It could be a supplementary perspective that would make it easier, especially for those ethnic Chinese who still perceive indigenous Indonesians as enemies and are of the opinion that they have to protect themselves against them. Blaming the circumstances might help them to see the indigenous Indonesians as victims as well with whom they can work on underlying causes together.

Reparation / Restitution Approach

When reversible harm, such as the destruction of property, has been inflicted, perpetrators or the state can offer reparations or restitution. Since replacement or restitution of property should not only cover the cost of what was destroyed, but also time and inconvenience lost in the process, the reparations should be higher than only the material costs only for what was destroyed. The peace-workers' task would not only be to make sure that the replacement is appropriate, but that both sides understand the correct symbolic message behind the act. Perpetrators neither buy themselves out nor is it an explicit admission of guilt. The peace-

⁷³⁰ Galtung, 2005, pp. 222-223.

worker may have to work out a contract that ensures that the symbolic closure is fixed.⁷³¹ This approach is not considered to be an option for the aftermath of the May riots 1998 as it is impossible to identify all perpetrators of the May riots, and it is doubtful that they would have the financial assets to replace property they destroyed. The state is also not in the position to offer reparations. If the ethnic Chinese were to be receiving restitutions, other ethnic groups involved in conflicts who suffered material losses would claim the same. Therefore, this approach is not practicable in this case.

Apology / Forgiveness Approach

In principle, in this approach, perpetrators are conscious of the harm done and apologize to victims. Victims in turn, accept their apologies and forgive them. In order to prevent that this process is merely a superficial exchange of words, peace-workers have to be make sure that both parties are sincere and in the right stage for this approach.⁷³² As suggested under Restruction (rehabilitation) a commemoration is recommended. Since the incidents are more than a decade ago, based on the research conducted in the framework of this study, chances are quite high that ethnic Chinese have reached a stage in which they would actually be able to forgive and start to overcome the trauma resulting from the riots.

Theological / Penitence Approach

This highly religious (Christian) approach involves submission, confession, penitence and absolution. In this approach, the individual sin of the perpetrators is stressed and, in order to avoid eternal suffering, they have to work on redeeming themselves in this life (e.g. by praying or going to a monastery). Peace-workers in this case, would be religious leaders or prominent persons representing a religious community. A prerequisite for this approach is that perpetrators and victims are religious believers in a Christian tradition and willing to accept guilt. The victims play a relatively minor role in this process, making it a perpetrator-oriented approach.⁷³³ Since this approach focuses strongly on perpetrators, it seems to be less comprehensive than the previous ones and would not be recommended for this cast study conflict. As the majority of perpetrators in the case study belong to a different religion than the victims (Islam / Christianity), victims and perpetrators are unlikely to accept this approach.

⁷³¹ Galtung, 2005, pp. 223-224.

⁷³² Galtung, 2005, p. 224.

⁷³³ Galtung, 2005, pp. 224-225.

Juridical / Punishment Approach

This approach represents the secular version of the religious one described above. The religious leader is replaced by a judge and God by the state. The approach is focused on punishing perpetrators only – victims have to be content knowing that justice was done.⁷³⁴ This approach has similar flaws to the previous one, though it could however be applied as an additional approach. It is a very common and accepted approach especially in Western societies and due to the wide-spread influence of these societies, other societies have adopted this approach as well. In Indonesia, the judicial system has been inherited from the Dutch and this legacy remains strong. Some of the perpetrators of the May riots have been sentenced in court, but as the analysis of the conflict's past showed, their trials were merely show trials aimed more at satisfying the calls for justice by the international community than the victims' needs.⁷³⁵ As it would be impossible to find key perpetrators let alone all of the perpetrators and bring them to justice for the May riots, the effects, especially for the victims, would not justify the costs necessary for this measure.

Codependent Origination / Karma Approach

This meta-approach originates in Buddhism where the decision of the perpetrators to act violently is influenced by their karma⁷³⁶. The victims' karmas also contribute to this decision. Therefore, perpetrators and victims share bad karma which has led to violence and they have to counter it together by dialogue. Dialogue is conducted in the form of round-tables for outer dialogue accompanied by meditation as a form of inner dialogue. In contrast to previous approaches, this approach does not focus on perpetrators and their punishment or ways to gain absolution from guilt. It concentrates on the cooperation of both parties in order to improve their bad karma. The approach is neutral, dialogue-based and holistic, not focusing only on the dichotomy between the perpetrator and victim.⁷³⁷

Even though Buddhism is nowadays only a minor religion in Indonesia, it used to be the leading religion in some of the ancient kingdoms. Due to this historical influence, the concept of karma is not entirely unknown to Indonesians. Ethnic Chinese, depending on their family history as well as background, are often even more familiar with it, especially as the majority of Indonesian Buddhists today are ethnic Chinese. As a result, the approach could have a chance of being accepted by both sides. It could be broadened by not only addressing the conflict

⁷³⁴ Galtung, 2005, p. 225.

⁷³⁵ Purdey, 2006, p. 144.

⁷³⁶ The accumulation of whatever he / she has done before in this life or in lives before the present one.

⁷³⁷ Galtung, 2005, p. 226.

between ethnic Chinese and indigenous Indonesians, but also conflicts involving other ethnicities, like Papuans. A culture of setting up nation-wide round-tables for peace would be a valuable contribution to the process of establishing a peace culture for Indonesia.

Historical / Truth Commission Approach

In this approach, perpetrators explain to a commission in detail what happened during violent acts. In doing so, their acts of violence will be set into a broader context, rather than being seen as single acts. Victims get the chance to understand how violence came about and based on this understanding may be able to forgive their perpetrators. The problem is however that understanding does not necessarily lead to forgiveness. Admitting their guilt by stating everything they did may be punishment for perpetrators and they may feel tormented by this exposure, however, this ‘self-punishment’ does not necessarily result in forgiveness. Nevertheless, these reports of the truth (of every individual truth) may prove helpful if they are collected and made public to become part of the collective memory. However, not only perspectives or truths of perpetrators have to be part of this, truths of victims revealing how they perceived the violence also need to be included.⁷³⁸

The idea of a collection of truths by both sides – perpetrators as well as victims – seems to be a highly valuable addition to other approaches. It would contribute to ‘healing the past’, closing wounds and contributing to a common future of all conflict groups. Books about the traumatic events that occurred during the anti-communist campaigns in the 1960s in Indonesia are still of academic and public interest almost 50 years after the incidents. They include the truths of individuals who obviously wanted to share their truth, which shows their need for dealing with the past.⁷³⁹ In order to raise a similar interest for the anti-Chinese incidents during the May riots 1998, Jusuf initiated a travelling exhibition in 2008 of photographs taken during and shortly after the May riots occurred.⁷⁴⁰ She considers it to be important that the May riots are not forgotten and dealt with as something that should not happen again in the future.⁷⁴¹ Therefore, collections (in writing or as photographs or as recordings) of past truths would most likely be a positive contribution to reconciliation in this conflict.

⁷³⁸ Galtung, 2005, p. 227.

⁷³⁹ For example, Heryanto, 2008.

⁷⁴⁰ Interview with Ester Jusuf (05.09.2008).

⁷⁴¹ Interview with Ester Jusuf (05.09.2008).

Theatrical / Reliving Approach

In this approach, the conflict parties relive what happened by re-staging their subjective experience. There are different measures to do so. In addition to story-telling, people may also stand up and re-enact like in a theatre and in the course thereof even switch roles between perpetrators and victims. By reliving the experience, not only will facts be exchanged but also emotions. People may be reluctant though to re-stage their experiences for they may be too painful, socially unacceptable and lead to re-stigmatization. In that case, the events may be rewritten to disguise obvious similarities. Peace-workers can help parties to initiate conflict plays and accompany them through the process as part not only of reconciliation, but also conflict resolution and reconstruction.⁷⁴² This approach may be helpful especially for smaller incidents of violence based on ethnic or religious tensions on the communal level. Cases of discrimination would be suitable examples for a conflict play at Indonesian schools. This could become an integral part of peace education. For large scale violence, it seems to be very difficult to imagine how this could be staged. However, for local communities, storytelling by witnesses could be recommended, especially for teenagers who were too young to experience the riots in 1998. It could help them to gain an understanding of what happened. It would therefore be a valuable addition to other approaches, especially as this approach can be used to encourage especially young people to work on strategies that may help to prevent future violence.

Joint Sorrow / Healing Approach

In this approach, joint sorrow is publicly announced for all conflict parties. War or violence is deeply discussed and deplored in mixed groups of 10-20 people involving people of all parties. Victims and perpetrators work with peace-workers and try to see violence for what it was, ask how it could have been avoided and how to avoid it in the future. An important part of this approach is exploring alternatives to what happened together with the opposing conflict party. It is the task of peace-workers to bring people together, for example by arranging meetings between members of opposing conflict groups who may further meet politicians or representatives of the military. The meetings should not be seen as tribunals where guilt is passed from one party to another, but as meetings of joint sorrow. The focus should be on creating a starting point for a healing process.⁷⁴³

This would be another approach to be suitable for the communal level in Indonesia. The analysis of violent acts during the May riots highlighted several 'hot spots' where anti-Chinese

⁷⁴² Galtung, 2005, pp. 227-228.

⁷⁴³ Galtung, 2005, p. 229.

violence occurred during the May riots in Indonesia, e.g. Solo and Bogor while in other places, like Semarang and Yogyakarta, ethnic Chinese were left basically unharmed. As violence or how ethnic Chinese experienced violence differs from place to place, it would be recommendable to conduct joint sorrow meetings in different regions with representatives from other regions to exchange their different experiences. Ethnic Chinese and indigenous Indonesians who were part of the violence would meet, deplore the conflict and discuss the questions of how to deal with it in the future.

Joint Reconstruction Approach

In the joint reconstruction projects, all parties would work together to rebuild and repair what was damaged as a result of direct violence. While rebuilding is a concrete and practical act, reconciliation is a spiritual one. During the work conducted together, reflection about what caused the destruction and how not only material things have to be rebuilt, but also structures and cultures, would be an integral part of the work. It would therefore be the peace-workers' task to guide participants from practical to spiritual reconstruction.⁷⁴⁴ In the case of the May riots, it might be too late for this approach since the practical rebuilding has already been carried out.

Joint Conflict Resolution Approach

This approach is mainly practiced by diplomats, politicians or military leaders. Both sides come together and try to resolve the conflict in (what is often) a top-down and non-participatory approach. Negotiations happen behind the veil of secrecy and the 'common people' often do not even know about them. This could be modified by including people from other levels in the process and initiate discussions (e.g. using online platforms) about what went wrong in the past, what could have been done differently, as well as on how the future would be if there was work done on peace. By creating a joint idea pool, human, cultural and structural healing could be processed. Peace-workers would provide guidance in conflict transformation by introducing peaceful means.⁷⁴⁵ When taking into consideration that all three 'Rs' have to be tackled, conflict transformation does not seem to be an approach under reconciliation, but under the last of the 'three Rs', 'resolution', and will be further discussed under the respective section.

⁷⁴⁴ Galtung, 2005, p. 230.

⁷⁴⁵ Galtung, 2005, pp. 230-231.

Ho'o Pono Pono Approach

This approach is derived from indigenous Hawaiian culture and is an approach which combines reconstruction, reconciliation and resolution. When an act of violence has occurred, the parties gather with a moderator (a village elder) and present their version of what happened, including why and how. Apologies are offered and accepted, forgiveness demanded and granted. Perpetrators have to make up for damage caused and together they try to devise ways to help perpetrators so that they will not have to resort to violence again in the future. In the end, the acts of the violence are put down in writing in a way acceptable to all parties and then burnt, as symbol of the end of the conflict. This approach combines several aspects of the approaches described above: it includes rehabilitation for victims, apology and forgiveness, restitution, joint sorrow, sharing karma, efforts to attribute causes for violence to circumstances for violent acts of violence, penitence and punishment of perpetrators as well as telling subjective truths.⁷⁴⁶ This approach may be adapted to other cultural contexts and practiced also by other cultures, like the punishment approach is also practiced outside Western societies. In Indonesia, (Javanese) village communities established the *musyawarah* institutions. In these conflict-resolution processes, conflict parties approach each other in order to develop a general agreement which can be accepted by all parties. In the course of the process, the parties make adjustments in their viewpoints or integrate contrasting standpoints into a new conceptual synthesis. In the end, all conflict actors need to unanimously accept the agreement which shall prevent majorities from imposing their views on minorities. At the end of the process, an official ceremonial meeting is held during which the representatives of the conflict parties vote for or against the agreement (normally, there are no votes against the agreement during this meeting as it is held after all behind-the-scenes lobbying was completed to avoid controversy in public).⁷⁴⁷ This approach is similar to the Hawai'an approach and could be valuable in the context of the case study conflict as well.

Resolution / Transformation

As in Phase I ('Before violence'), work on the conflict's transformation is required in Phase III as well. Even though Galtung uses the term 'resolution' when referring to working on conflict formation in the context of the 'three Rs', it will be referred to in this study as conflict transformation to avoid confusing the Transcend approach with conflict resolution (as for

⁷⁴⁶ Galtung, 2005, pp. 231-232.

⁷⁴⁷ Kawamura, 2011, pp. 4-5.

example defined by Burton⁷⁴⁸).⁷⁴⁹ Conflict transformation is as important for conflicts which are in Phase III as it is for those which are in Phase I, for if no work is done on the conflict, manifest violence can easily re-occur.⁷⁵⁰ Therefore, peace-workers as well as conflict actors have to work on the elimination of the various forms of violence, direct, structural and cultural (violence triangle), to reach negative peace as one part of a virtuous cycle. Approaches to building positive peace as the other parts of a virtuous cycle by establishing direct peace, peace structures, and a peace culture have already been presented in the sections on ‘reconstruction’.

Reduction of Violence

The violence analysis or diagnosis of this particular conflict showed a reduction of direct violence inflicting on survival and well-being of ethnic Chinese since 1998. Direct violence against identity needs as during the Soeharto regime, including de-socialization and re-socialization has been abolished on the national level. Nonetheless, examples emerged in the analysis where these have been revived on the local level. While state-led discrimination was officially abolished, discrimination by organs of the state, such as the bureaucracy, the military and the police are still existent. When dealing with these organs, ethnic Chinese are still being discriminated against and exploited due to their ethnic background. Segmentation of ethnic Chinese as one homogenous group of businessmen and marginalization deriving from stigmatization in the form of negative stereotyping and ‘othering’ was also still visible. Cultural violence legitimizing the direct and structural violence against ethnic Chinese has remained unchanged over the years and is mainly based on their ‘non-indigenusness’. These are broad areas of direct, structural and cultural violence that have to be reduced and eventually eliminated in order to reach a stage of negative peace.

In order to transcend a violent conflict Galtung suggests non-violence, empathy and creativity as basic capacities to counter each of the possibly types of violence.

In his book *Peace by Peaceful Means*, Galtung includes a table showing the praxis triad of how to deal with the three types of violence:

⁷⁴⁸ Burton, 1993, pp. 55-64.

⁷⁴⁹ It might have been for the sake of the alliteration (reconstruction, reconciliation and resolution) that the term resolution has been referred to, however, that remains speculation.

⁷⁵⁰ Galtung, 2010, p. 80.

| Conflict triangle | Behavior | Contradiction | Attitudes / Assumptions |
|--|---|--|---|
| Problem = violence | Direct violence | Structural violence | Cultural violence |
| Diagnosis | History of direct violence: history of structural violence; history of cultural violence; all defining the present | Vertical: Repression / Exploitation Penetration Segmentation Fragmentation Exclusion; horizontal: too much or too little interaction | Cosmology: CMT syndrome DMA syndrome Universalism cum singularism; Utopianism cum final states |
| Prognosis | Escalation, continuation till prognoses coincide; or no energy | Continuation if no consciousness formation and efforts to build peace | Continuation if no consciousness formation and efforts to build peace |
| Self-Therapy (what you can do to reduce violence) | Non-violence Negative: marches, strikes, fasting, etc.; Positive: construction, human contact, dialogue, joint efforts | Creativity Consciousness of verticality Organization Confrontation Struggle Decoupling = Self-reliance Re-coupling, but carefully | Empathy Consciousness of individual collective subconscious; Trace origins Trace effects Modify codes Build codes |
| Other-Therapy (what others may have to do, intervention) | Non-violence Negative: as hostages Positive: facilitators as links of communication as above, willing to incur risks | Creativity Sowing seeds, one party at a time, watering the seeds, being the facilitator for ideas, participation in dialogue with explicit peace goals, mediation, arbitration | Empathy Positive: trying to identify the legitimate goals of all parties Negative: trying to eliminate illegitimate, unnecessary goals, limit the conflict surface |

Table 6: Dealing with Violence: The Praxis Triad⁷⁵¹

A number of measures or therapies to counter violence as suggested in Table 6 can be applied to the present conflict. With regard to direct violence and in specific violations of identity, it seems to be unlikely based on the interviews conducted here that ethnic Chinese would start striking or marching for their identity rights. Building up contacts between ethnic Chinese and indigenous Indonesians through meetings to start dialogue around this issue seems to be far more likely and promising. Since infringements of identity needs are present at the local level,

⁷⁵¹ Based on Galtung, 2007a, table in annex: Peace by Peaceful Means: the praxis triad,

representative of local governments and administrations will need to be included in respective dialogues. Peace-workers may help facilitating dialogues and act as mediators.

Many ethnic Chinese also should be made aware of their collective subconscious and that of indigenous Indonesians. It is not only indigenous Indonesians who have internalized the idea that ethnic Chinese are non-indigenous and therefore deserve to be treated differently. Due to the historical dichotomy between indigenous and non-indigenous already introduced by the Dutch, ethnic Chinese as well have gotten used to their status as ‘others’ in Indonesia. Peace-workers as outsiders are required to help the parties to realise their collective subconscious before they can start working on them.

Suggestions

For reducing the structural violence present in this conflict (discrimination, i.e. repression / exploitation, marginalization, segmentation), ethnic Chinese who are not aware of these vertical structures have to be made aware of them. Raising awareness could be the task of Chinese Indonesian organizations (like IPI or INTI). It will be difficult at first to encourage ethnic Chinese to actually act against structural violence. As many ethnic Chinese prefer to remain silent when encountering discrimination, in spite of anti-discrimination legislation providing them with a legal basis, these Chinese Indonesian organizations together with legal aid organizations could work on convincing the ethnic Chinese community that it is their right and their responsibility to claim their rights publicly. Since they are not the only ethnic group facing discrimination, it would help to approach other groups as well, bring them together and thereby reduce their fear of opposing organs of the state. Once the various groups learn that they are not the only ones who are discriminated against, their willingness to act against it could be increased.

Mediation Process

By reducing violence and making culture, structures and actors more peaceful, chances are that the root conflict, i.e. the contradicting goals can be handled without any of the actors resorting to violence. The focus for conflict transformation according to the Transcend method is on contradicting goals and working towards a “new, acceptable and sustainable reality”⁷⁵². With respect to the present conflict, the contradictions have been summed up as follows:


There are contradictions on the objective level involving a clash of interests with regard to the nation’s social structure in which the ethnic Chinese are in a long-established position in the

⁷⁵² Galtung, 2010, p. 82.

middle of a social pyramid as a marginalized middlemen position or a distinct group of non-indigenous 'others'. This translates to the subjective level as well: While the majority of ethnic Chinese has the need and desire to be able to openly and acceptably express their own cultural identity and working on their self-realization (e.g. with regard to occupation), a (sub)group of indigenous Indonesians fears losing their advantage over the ethnic Chinese as 'underdogs of society', a group of defined 'others'. Each of the positions above is supported by a group from the respective other major conflict party for their own reasons. Therefore, there are subgroups among the two groups who share the same goals and therefore oppose other subgroups in their own, larger group. There are conflict actors who are open to social change or are already actively striving for it on the one hand, and other conflict actors who are opposing social change and therefore also oppose efforts to transform this conflict on the other.

It should be easier for those who are already interested and familiar with dealing with this conflict, to work on creative ideas of how to deal with the contradictions and how a new reality could look like. Afterwards, other subgroups would need to be addressed. These groups may be more difficult to convince to engage in the process, since they either oppose a transformation of the conflict or their interest in the conflict is relatively limited. Nevertheless, they should be provided with the chance to be included as well. In the process of discussing aims, it is important to sensitize these subgroups to the basic human needs of the opposing subgroups which are currently infringed upon. In this case, this touches identity and freedom needs on the side of those in favor of conflict transformation. The aim would be to reach a new understanding of the opposing party and their aims. It should be the mediator's goal to guide the parties according to the mediation agenda (the dialectic of 'future vs. past' and 'good-pursued vs. bad-rejected') towards 'the compelling dream' and away from the 'fears / nightmares'.

In this context, it may help to map possible outcomes of the conflict: a simplified display of the conflict with subsequent solutions can be provided by Galtung's basic diagram.



| | | |
|---|--|---------------------------|
| 1. No conflict transformation, no full integration, keep status quo | 2. No conflict transformation Chinese granted equality and special rights and preserve "exclusive Chineseness" | 3. Negative Transcendence |
| | | 4. Compromise |
| | | 5. Positive Transcendence |

Figure 13: The Basic Diagram for Conflict Outcomes⁷⁵³

For this conflict, the differing positions could be simplified as:

Conflict actors opposing conflict transformation (Group A / Subgroups 1): Indigenous Indonesians as well as Chinese Indonesians groups do not want ethnic Chinese to fully integrate into Indonesian society in order to keep the status quo alive.

Conflict actors in favour of conflict transformation (Group B / Subgroups 2): Indigenous Indonesians as well as Chinese Indonesians groups want ethnic Chinese to be accepted in the society as equal members without having to give up their 'Chineseness'.

This leads to five possible outcomes:

1. Unilateral A: Ethnic Chinese continue to live as outsiders in the society.
2. Unilateral B: Ethnic Chinese are granted equal rights and furthermore obtain special rights to live and preserve their 'Chineseness', e.g. in the form of cultural autonomy.

⁷⁵³ Based on Galtung 2007a, p. 26.

3. Negative transcendence: Ethnic Chinese leave Indonesia to live their ‘Chineseness’ somewhere else (e.g. Singapore, PR China, Taiwan).
4. Compromise: Ethnic Chinese continue to live as outsiders in Indonesia, but obtain legal rights to preserve their ‘Chineseness’.
5. Positive transcendence: Ethnic Chinese are not a marginalized group of ‘others’; instead they live and are treated as one of the many ethnic groups within an Indonesian society which cherishes its pluralism and diversity.

Solutions (1) and (2) would not lead to more acceptance of ethnic Chinese in society, but would rather enhance their special position within Indonesian society. Since this special position has led to maltreatment in the past, these options should be avoided. Solution (3) is not acceptable and has already been dismissed in the past as this would lead to a mass emigration and none of the neighbouring countries could deal with this amount of refugees. Furthermore, this option would weaken Indonesia’s economy.

Solution (4) is very close to the current situation. It is certainly considered to be an improvement in contrast to the situation of ethnic Chinese under Soeharto, but as revealed in the course of the study, it is not sufficient to prevent future violence.

Solution (5) represents the most preferable option, even though it also requires long-term and in-depth changes. Apart from willingness of all parties involved, assets for its implementation have to be made available. Transcending contradictions requires work towards a new social reality in which ethnic Chinese would leave their marginalized position behind. A new concept of society will have to be developed to substitute the current one. Since there is no short-term solution available, a variety of measures and approaches on different levels addressing different aspects and layers of the conflict would have to be applied which, over time, foster the process towards transcendence without infringing upon basic human needs of any of the involved parties.

6.3 Conclusions

Working on a conflict and going beyond the diagnosis can be difficult for researchers working from a distance and rather than from the inside of a conflict, like peace-workers or mediators. However, the researcher can offer a different perspective, which may not be more ‘objective’ (as perspectives for everyone working on a conflict become ‘subjective’ after a while) but a broader, structuralized and critical perspective. This might enable him or her to consider and

assess different aspects of the conflict as well as various possible measures and approaches based on a comprehensive conflict analysis at once. This can contribute to the transformation of a conflict by providing groundwork for the practitioners in the field, including concrete impulses as well as the conflict's bigger picture.

Conflict transformation work in the case of the present conflict requires work towards a new social reality in which ethnic Chinese are no longer in their marginalized position as middlemen and distinct 'others'. For this long-term process, a range of therapies or approaches as suggested by the Transcend method were identified as being suitable and these could and should be applied simultaneously. Since all 'three Rs' should be worked on simultaneously, significant resources, both in terms of personnel and financial assets, would be required to actually apply the approaches considered, especially as the conflict would need to be tackled on different levels, across Indonesia and involved a great number of conflict actors. Nevertheless, this should not prevent peace-workers or conflict actors (groups as well as individuals) from initiating respective processes. On the contrary, when working on this conflict and practicing approaches discussed above that aim towards the 'three Rs', general conflict transformation capabilities will be built that would not only benefit the ethnic Chinese. Establishing and practicing these capabilities would be valuable for Indonesia in order to deal with its many current conflicts and ones it might have to face in the future. Peace-workers can help in this process; however, the conflict parties will eventually have to engage in the transformation process themselves. Outside actors may help, suggest, comfort, facilitate and mediate, but the willingness to engage in conflict transformation has to arise from the actors involved. To date, only subgroups of the major parties have shown this willingness. It will therefore be a challenging task to convince and include the other subgroups in the process of conflict transformation as well.

The Transcend method provided a range of impulses for approaching practical work on this specific conflict; however, since it is not the only method or approach to conflict transformation, a number of questions have to be raised: how far can this approach carry? Where are its limits? And at what point can other conflict transformation theories step in or provide a better approach?

7. Review of the Transcend Method by Galtung

7.1 The Transcend Method and the Case Study Conflict: Experiences

Based on experiences of applying the method to this specific conflict case in Indonesia, I will assess to what extent the chosen approach provided a solid theoretical frame to guide and ‘carry’ research work on this case study. Every method has its limits and limitations and the ones which have been encountered over the course of the research process shall also be presented. These limitations will be further assessed with respect to other approaches to conflict analysis and transformation.

The theoretical framework provided by Galtung proved to be very helpful in analyzing this complex and long-lasting conflict. The holistic and complex nature of the approach provided a comprehensive basis for working on the conflict even though it was not an easy method to grasp in its entirety at first. The approach not only takes different layers and phases of the conflict into consideration but also combines theory, method, empiricism, as well as different cultural perspectives and approaches. The epistemology of Transcend tries to integrate different ways of thinking derived from different cultures, and seeks to thereby contribute to ‘universal’ peace research.⁷⁵⁴

Conflict Analysis according to the Transcend Approach

A conflict analysis according to the Transcend method covers the following aspects:

- **Time** (a conflict’s past, present, and future)
- Various **conflict dimensions** of the formation itself (conflict formation, deep dimension, and violence dimension)
- **Perceptions** (perception of the conflict formation by those involved)

Time

Analyzing the conflict according to three steps (diagnosis, prognosis and therapy) as suggested by the Transcend approach, covers a conflict’s development from its conception up to the present as well as prospects for the future. These three steps have therefore been adopted for the structure of this study and analyzed respectively using tools as provided by Galtung. The past

⁷⁵⁴ Galtung, 2008, p. 47.

and present of the conflict are dealt with within a conflict's diagnosis. As the roots of the case study conflict can only be understood within the context of the development of Indonesian society, a historical background of these processes from the first Chinese settlements until the founding of the Indonesian nation in 1945 has been provided. The more recent past, the period of the Soeharto-regime 1965 - 1998 as well as the conflict's present, have been analyzed according to the triangle of violence, a tool which connects the conflict's past and present. This allowed not only a recording of violence in both the past and present, but also the ability to reconstruct its development over time.

The conflict formation which was mapped based on the ABC triangle also depicts the present of the conflict, but from a different perspective than the triangle of violence. It concentrates on conflict actors and their contradicting aims. Negative experiences derived from the history of ethnic Chinese in Indonesia have been introduced into the deep culture and deep structure of both conflict parties, making it more difficult for the two parties to work on the conflict constructively. The analysis of deep dimensions therefore covers the entire three time dimensions, past, present and future. The results of the diagnosis which cover primarily the past and present form the basis for the 'prognosis', meaning the bridge to conflict's future. The future is further examined in the 'therapy' part (chapter 6) of this study. In this section, possible ways of transforming the conflict peacefully based on the results of the conflict analysis are analyzed to formulate constructive suggestions for the conflict's future. The Transcend method thus offers the ideal tools to deal with all three time dimensions of the conflict.

Various Conflict Dimensions of the Conflict Formation

Conflict formation encompasses various interdependent dimensions which can be mapped as follows:




Figure 14: Conflict formation, its underlying deep dimensions, resulting violence and the transcended conflict.

Conflict formation consists of the conflict actors' attitudes, behavior and their contradicting aims. Beneath this surface formation lie the deep dimensions of conflict formation. Together, they may result in direct, structural and cultural violence. In order to overcome violence, the conflict has to be transformed into transcended attitudes, behavior and contradictions leading towards direct, structural and cultural peace. The conflict does not vanish, i.e. the transcendence does not stand for a dissolution of the conflict formation itself. Instead, it stands for a transformation that enables non-violence in dealing with contradictions, paving the way to (positive) peace. All these dimensions are portrayed by Galtung as triangular formations which provide academics as well as practitioners working on a conflict with tools that are plausible and capable of providing guidance.

Examining the case study conflict through the lens of the ABC triangle, the triangular division had to be altered as the attitudes and the behavior of the actors were assessed together for the case study. Connections and relations between attitudes and behavior provided interesting insights with regard to the conflict actors. On the factual level, the contradictions show that this conflict, together with other Indonesian conflicts touch the core of the country's society. Transforming this conflict would therefore require altering the current social construct, which would affect other conflicts and their transformation as well. Without the perspective offered by the conflict triangle, these insights which are essential for suggestions to transform the conflict might not have become visible.

The analysis of the conflict's deep dimensions revealed different cosmologies which the two major parties of this conflict have inherited, syndromes such as CGT (ethnic Chinese) and DMA (indigenous Indonesians) as well as social fault-lines which can aggravate communication between actors. This study alone cannot claim to have dealt with this issue of deep dimensions entirely and further research is both necessary and desirable, however the examination of the conflict's deep culture, deep structure and deep nature in this study was conducive for a better understanding of the actors involved and unconscious reasons which may hinder them in overcoming their contradictions. This understanding of the deep dimensions further increases the ability to evaluate possible conflict transformation methods and their approaches with regard to their applicability to the conflict and possible acceptance by the conflict actors.

The analysis of the resulting violence based on the triangle of violence underlined the fact that levels of violence have been reduced in the years following the end of the authoritarian Soeharto-regime. Nevertheless, violence in its entirety has not vanished, as it is still present in different forms. There are parallels applicable to general social and political developments in the country which however do not necessarily imply a causal relationship.

By way of example, political power is being de-centralized in Indonesia; correspondingly, with regard to violence against ethnic Chinese, a shift of discrimination on the state-level to discrimination at the local level was identified. The political system of the country has also been transformed from an authoritarian regime to a democracy, while simultaneously the forms of violence against Chinese Indonesians moved from the manifest, direct to the latent, indirect level. During the processes of decentralization and democratization, violence did not disappear, but rather shifted to a different level paralleling larger social and political shifts. In its latent

and decentralized form, the violence is also now more difficult to detect than previously. The movement of violence against ethnic Chinese as revealed with the help of the triangle of violence not only underscored the necessity for further work on the conflict, but also the specific areas of violence which need to be addressed.

In order to develop suggestions for a possible conflict transformation, Galtung suggests different measures which can be applied during various stages of a conflict. Following the suggestions made and evaluating them based on the results of the conflict analysis provided the foundation for the development of specific recommendations for this case study.

Perceptions

The analysis of the actors' attitudes and behavior provided an insight into how they, as insiders, perceive the conflict. For an approach which aims at putting conflict transformation into practice, learning about the conflict actor's perceptions of the conflict, their role therein as well as the perception of the opposing party is essential for developing conflict transformation strategies. In the present conflict, for example, it often was a fear of change for the worse that strongly influenced the actors' perception of the conflict and their attitude towards a possible conflict transformation. For some ethnic Chinese this fear even results in the denial of the existence of a conflict as such.⁷⁵⁵ Confronting this fear therefore has to be included in the concept of 'therapy' for this conflict.

(Broad) Definitions of Violence and Peace

In contrast to how critics perceive the extensive and comprehensive definition of the terms 'violence' and 'peace' by Galtung as being problematic, these did not cause difficulties in this analysis. On the contrary, they proved to be helpful in gaining a more thorough understanding of the conflict and to explain why violent outbursts may still occur. During interviews, it was not possible to simply ask the respondents whether or not they were experiencing violence as most of them were not familiar with this broader definition of violence.⁷⁵⁶ However, over the course of the interviews which usually lasted an hour at a minimum, respondents indirectly revealed that they encountered forms of violence in this broader sense of the term, e.g. discrimination or marginalization, which they themselves may not have classified as violence.

⁷⁵⁵ Interview with Ester Jusuf (05.09.2008).

⁷⁵⁶ Most respondents thought of violence only in terms of violent acts directed against themselves or their property.

Keeping the theoretical basis of the broad definition in mind therefore helped to look for and detect violence even when it was not explicitly mentioned by the respondents.

The analysis of the historical development of this conflict revealed conflict phases in which forms of violence were less manifest and phases in which they were more manifest. In the common understanding of violence, phases of latent violence are perceived as phases of relative peace. The end of the Soeharto-regime for example brought about euphoric reactions from ethnic Chinese communities in Indonesia and ‘the present’ is celebrated as being relatively peaceful. This optimistic assessment of the current situation carries the risk that actors do not see the necessity to (further) work on the conflict. However, as long as one type of violence is still present, violent acts may still occur – this also means that as long the three types of violence have not been eliminated and their peaceful counterparts have not been created and established, peace cannot be achieved. The broad definitions of violence and peace help to understand why working on a conflict usually does not come to an end. Reaching ‘negative’ peace (mere absence of violence) may be a desirable stage, but it does not constitute ‘positive’ peace, which is an almost utopian stage, yet. Some organizations in Indonesia, such as IPI or INTI, share a similar understanding of the terms ‘violence’ and ‘peace’ as used by Galtung and who therefore see the need to continuously work on attempts to transform the conflict, even in times that are perceived by the majority of conflict actors as being peaceful.

Limits Encountered

Even though the theoretical basis provided by Galtung proved to be comprehensive, there is always room for improvement. Some limits and difficulties were encountered when applying the approach to the case study conflict. Galtung divided the conflict cycle into three parts: before, during and after violence, and attributed a wide range of conflict intervention measures to these stages. People working on the conflict (especially practitioners in the field) may be able to identify ‘where they stand’ in this protracted, complex conflict. However, the conflict cycle only helps to determine the present situation of the conflict and offers a very broad range of possible means of intervention. It does not provide guidance to the following stages of conflict transformation which could be expected or should be aimed at once the intervention process has started. A map of a conflict transformation process covering more stages of a conflict, especially those following interventions, could help to deal with this problem.

In most of the examples for conflict analysis and suggestions for conflict transformation based on the Transcend approach, actors within one conflict party are divided into only two groups:

the elite and the people.⁷⁵⁷ Even though Galtung briefly mentions actor levels that are in-between, like NGOs, they do not play an explicit role in the analysis and the transformation process. For this case study, differentiating actors within each conflict party, in contrast to Galtung's theory of conflict as well as the approach in practice, was important not only with regard to the analysis, but also for developing specific strategies for transforming the conflict. The conflict will have to be tackled at different levels, all over Indonesia and there is a high number of conflict actors involved. It would therefore be helpful if strategies for conflict transformation would further be differentiated with regard to different levels of actors and their leadership for reasons of coordination and identification of 'entry-points'.

Due to the long history of the case study conflict, it has developed complex conflict dynamics that are influenced by more general social, political and economic transformations that change over time, adding to its complexity. Galtung's approach may take the complexity of conflicts into consideration; however, he does not offer any tools which would help in portraying complex conflict dynamics and factors which may influence conflict developments. Such tools, however, would be helpful not only for a conflict analysis, but also a conflict prognosis.

As long as conflict parties are not willing to work on transforming the conflict, peace-workers cannot start their mediation process. Possible approaches to encourage or even convince conflict actors to join the process have not been covered by the Transcend method.

7.2 Complements to the Transcend Approach: Francis, Lederach and Systemic Approaches

In addition to the Transcend method, I examined other conflict transformation approaches in order to overcome limits of the method encountered. I was able to identify several approaches or, more specifically elements of these, that could potentially enrich the Transcend approach. For the purpose of this thesis, I will only highlight approaches here which provided helpful impulses for the analysis of the present conflict. The approaches have different backgrounds: While Francis and Lederach developed their approaches in order to create analytical methods based on their practical field experiences of dealing with conflict; the systemic approach derives from an already existing theoretical background. The latter has been developed and applied by researchers of other academic disciplines before being applied to conflict transformation in practice, for example by Ropers.

⁷⁵⁷ See for example Galtung's conflict transformation indicators, Galtung, 2010, p. 240.

(Road) Mapping Conflict Transformation:

In an interview with Mischnick, a practitioner (mediator) actively working in conflicts in Indonesia, it became obvious that the three-stage Transcend conflict cycle as depicted by Galtung may not be sufficient for peace-work in practice. Instead, a more detailed outline which hints at possible subsequent stages following a successful conflict intervention would be required. Mischnick referred to a conflict diagram by Francis as a helpful tool in this regard.⁷⁵⁸ This diagram (s. below) describes the different phases of conflict (ellipses) and related processes (rectangles) that can be used by peace-workers to transform conflicts. The diagram is based on over 30 years of experience in working on non-violent conflict management, mediation and reconciliation in the United Kingdom and in other countries. Most of Francis' practical experience was gathered in the post-communist countries, particularly in former Yugoslavia and the Caucasus. She also worked in conflict regions Africa, Asia and the Middle East. Her focus is set on conflicts with unequal power relations which is similar to the conflict of the case study conflict.⁷⁵⁹

According to Francis, protracted conflicts are complex, and it therefore helps to develop a framework, an intention and a direction to deal with them. Without a framework, people are dealing with a myriad of matters of dispute without a clear understanding of what the potential impacts of the actions can be. Problems may be solved superficially without necessarily leading to a significant, constructive social change on a deeper level. In her diagram, phases should not be understood as being static and the actors could also be in different phases. Even though the diagram hints at a chronological order, conflict transformation processes do not necessarily work in a linear manner. There can always be setbacks and new approaches will have to be applied (see inverted arrows in Figure 15). Phases and processes thus may not be clear-cut and separated from each other. Different actors may work on different processes simultaneously or commence their work at different entry-points. In some cases, for example, it can be important to start with reconciling the past as a prerequisite for negotiations. The diagram was developed for asymmetric conflicts.

⁷⁵⁸ Interview with Ruth Mischnick (20.07.2009) who worked as mediator in conflicts in Indonesia (Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Sumatra, West Papua and Moluccas).

⁷⁵⁹ The following paragraphs explaining the diagram of conflict phases and processes have been adapted from Francis, 2002, pp. 49ff.




Figure 15: The Conflict Diagram by Diana Francis⁷⁶⁰

The diagram starts with a situation in which the oppression or exclusion of a group constitutes a hidden or latent conflict and the oppressed group remains passive in the face of injustice or structural violence⁷⁶¹ They may remain passive due to a long history of social injustice which they have come to accept as ‘normal’, due to a lack of awareness or because the power constellation itself does not allow them to make requests. To change this, people within the weaker group or subgroups need to reflect upon their situation, express what is happening and

⁷⁶⁰ Based on Francis 2002, pp. 49ff.

⁷⁶¹ It is not clear, whether structural violence for Francis refers to social injustice only or whether she follows the wide-ranging definition developed by Galtung.

encourage others to do the same. Francis refers to this process as ‘conscientisation’.⁷⁶² If this process reaches a stage of sufficient determination, groups can aim at changing the situation. The application of conflict transformation at this point requires non-violent options that often have to be pointed out to conflict actors involved by a third party (empowerment).⁷⁶³

When their power and visibility increases, the weaker groups may be noticed by those in power and a threat and a phase of open confrontation may follow. This phase includes the possible use of repressive measures by those in power even if the group oppressed chooses to resort to non-violent actions.⁷⁶⁴ During the phase of open conflict, the power relationship between the opposing parties changes as a consequence of continuing confrontation as well as other developments inside the groups and the wider environment. As soon as the oppressed groups increase their relative power sufficiently, they can expect to be taken seriously as a dialogue partner.⁷⁶⁵

The next phase of the diagram consists of conflict resolution processes, through which communication can be restored and as a result the conflict groups (or their representatives) can negotiate settlements.⁷⁶⁶ However, talks can collapse, settlements can be breached and the conflict may be set back to its phase of confrontation or violence. Third party intervention may help at this stage, for example through mediation aimed at preparing parties for negotiations or supporting the negotiation process itself. Preparing the ground and face-to-face dialogue may relax the situation and create the hope and trust necessary for the parties to reach and adhere to settlements.⁷⁶⁷

The next phase focuses on working on the psychological damage caused by the conflict and aims at developing a positive relationship between formerly opposing groups.⁷⁶⁸ These positive relationships will have to be strengthened by a long-term peace-building process supported by social, political and economic institutions. It includes development, political participation and the democratization of societies.⁷⁶⁹ Like Galtung, Francis does not perceive societies as static constructs.⁷⁷⁰ Therefore, she also doubts that there could be a final phase of peace and promotes peace education for conflict actors to learn how to deal with conflicts in general.⁷⁷¹

⁷⁶² Francis, 2002, p. 52.

⁷⁶³ Francis, 2002, p. 53.

⁷⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁶⁵ Francis, 2002, p. 54.

⁷⁶⁶ Francis, 2002, p. 55.

⁷⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁶⁸ Francis, 2002, p. 56.

⁷⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷⁷¹ Ibid.

When translating Francis' diagram to the present case study, the conflict is in the stage of conscientisation. Conflict actors within the major conflict groups, e.g. organizations like INTI or IPI as well as individuals such as journalists and politicians, are already working on the process of conscientisation. They are trying to counter the tradition of 'silencing the conflict' and ignoring it out of fear. As the process of conscientisation is still in progress at the time of writing, supporting measures from outside (third party intervention) would be recommendable. Third parties could focus on non-violent approaches suggested by Galtung, such as the joint sorrow / healing approach, or other appropriate measures for raising awareness and fostering conscientisation.

Despite the fact that ethnic Chinese have already experienced repression and even large-scale violent attacks, this phase of the conflict has not actually been reached in Indonesia, at least not yet. As the analysis of past and present violent acts shows, ethnic Chinese were and are still in the role of the victims and they have not started to organize themselves to actually oppose indigenous Indonesians. Over the course of the research, I came across only a few published statements by ethnic Chinese in which they openly express their anger and claim equal rights and treatment.⁷⁷² Open conflict does not necessarily imply physical violent acts and fighting, but rather refers to a stage in which the conflict has come to the surface and cannot be denied or ignored anymore by any (sub)group.⁷⁷³ This phase could be the next target phase in a potential conflict transformation process following a successful conscientisation process.

Following Francis' scheme bears the risk of limiting a mediator's or peace-worker's perspective on the conflict. It may prevent him/her from developing new approaches deriving from a specific conflict context or conflict parties themselves. Instead, the mediator's vision may be simply imposed on the parties. Nevertheless, Francis' diagram can be helpful, especially to practitioners, since it not only helps the mediator or peace-worker assess which stage a conflict is currently at, but further provides guidance through (possible) developments and enables him or her to keep a 'bigger picture' in mind. While working on conflict transformation in practice, the peace-worker may need to know what the next concrete stage could be instead of only working towards the rather abstract goal of peace.⁷⁷⁴ Therefore, a combination of the conflict diagram and the approaches offered by Galtung (see chapter 6)

⁷⁷² For example The Jakarta Post, 22.05.2006. <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2006/05/22/time-chineseindonesian-claim-equal-rights-citizenship.html> (30.04.2012).

⁷⁷³ Francis, 2002, p. 53.

⁷⁷⁴ Interview with Ruth Mischnick (20.07.2009).

would improve the analytical quality of the approach for conflict transformation in the present case study.

Dealing With Many, Different Actors: John Paul Lederach

John Paul Lederach is often mentioned together with Galtung as one of the key scholars in the field of peace studies. Conflict transformation and reconciliation form the core of his research and publications.⁷⁷⁵ However, while in Galtung's approach the method of analysis (underlying praxis) is dominant, Lederach's approach to conflict transformation focuses more on the method of conflict transformation in practice.

In Lederach's approach to conflict transformation, the key lies in the understanding of a culture's interpretation of a conflict (social context), a positive notion of conflict as potential catalyst for positive change, rebuilding and healing of relationships between involved actors by initiating constructive social change leading to relationships based on mutual understanding, equality, and respect.⁷⁷⁶ Therefore, rather than perceiving peace as a static 'end-state', Lederach perceives peace as a continuously evolving and developing quality of relationships. Instead of concentrating exclusively on the content and substance of a specific dispute, his approach to conflict transformation suggests that the key to understanding conflict and developing creative change processes lies in examining less-visible aspects of relationships, which represent a web of connections that form the broader context of the conflict.⁷⁷⁷ Nonetheless, conflict issues are also important and require creative responses. It is out of this relationship context that particular issues arise and either become volatile or are swiftly resolved.⁷⁷⁸ In Galtung's approach, on the other hand, the focus is first on contradictions and the specifics of a conflict (factual level) and, once progress is made on the contradiction, the relationships between actors (actor(s) level) may improve as a consequence.

Lederach suggests two basic 'sets of lenses' when examining conflicts: The first lens involves focusing on the level of those actors who are concerned with conflict transformation and peace-building in an affected population as well as the respective resources and activities available at each level.⁷⁷⁹ The second lens focuses on the structural component of conflict transformation, i.e. micro-issues as well as a broader systemic context in which a conflict is situated. Lederach

⁷⁷⁵ See for example *Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation Across Cultures*, 1995 and *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*, 2006. The following summary of Lederach's approach is based on these two sources.

⁷⁷⁶ Lederach, 2006, pp. 63ff.

⁷⁷⁷ Lederach, 1995, pp. 7ff.

⁷⁷⁸ Lederach, 2006, pp. 74ff.

⁷⁷⁹ Lederach, 2006, p. 39.

adopted the ‘nested paradigm of conflict foci’ developed by Dugan⁷⁸⁰. The nested paradigm consists of the following components to define a conflict’s setting: the issue, the relationships, the subsystem and the system. It corresponds in part to Galtung’s theories about conflict formations, especially the ABC triangle and the triangle of the deep dimensions. The issue corresponds to the (subjective) contradiction; the relationship between the actors in the paradigm can be found as attitudes and behavior of actors. The subsystem and the system are part of the underlying deep dimensions of the conflict (especially the Deep Structure). The paradigm might serve the purpose of looking at a conflict’s dimensions, but it is not as complex nor does it touch the deeper layers of conflict examined by the models developed by Galtung.⁷⁸¹ For the present conflict, especially the first lens which is focusing on the leaders of different actor levels was a useful addition to the Transcend approach.

In a conflict, actors often can be divided into groups with respective leaders. Based on this observation, Lederach developed a pyramid which is divided into three levels: Top Leadership, Middle-range Leadership and Grassroots Leadership (s. below). The pyramid also illustrates where the fewest and the largest number of people within a population affected by conflict are. The pyramid further describes the types of leaders at each level and outlines suggestions for conflict transformation activities these may be able to undertake. This analysis of actors can be helpful in determining needs and resources at different levels as well as entry-points for conflict transformation. The actors listed are not limited to those involved in the conflict themselves, but also includes outsiders.

Top Leadership

This group represents key political and military leaders characterized by a high visibility, access to power, and influence. Due to their position, they have the possibility of influencing peace processes to a large extent which can be advantageous for a positive conflict development. However, their publicity and public profile can reduce their room for maneuver freely. In case they settle for anything less than what they officially demanded, this could be perceived as weakness by their supporters as well their adversaries.

Middle-range Leadership

This group consists for example of well-known people who function in leadership positions. In contrast to the first group, they are not on the top level as key political and military leaders. They can occupy positions as heads of well-known NGOs, national universities or religious

⁷⁸⁰ Dugan, 1996, pp. 9ff.

⁷⁸¹ Lederach, 2006, pp. 37ff.

communities. Due to their position in the middle, they are connected to both the top as well as the grassroots levels. For Lederach, middle-range leaders can “provide practical initiatives for addressing immediate issues, are able to draw on valuable human resources, tap into and take maximum benefit from institutional, cultural, and informal networks that cut across the lines of conflict, and connect the levels of peace activities within the population.”⁷⁸² This observation was supported by the research presented here, in which middle-range actors from both conflict groups were identified as the most promising agents and ‘entry-points’ for transforming the conflict.

Grassroots Leadership

The leaders here include people involved in local communities, members of small NGOs who are close to the daily effects of the conflict, such as lack of access to resources or security.⁷⁸³




Figure 16: The Pyramid of Conflict Actors by John Paul Lederach⁷⁸⁴

Possible conflict transformation approaches differ depending on the capacities of each level. Top-down approaches involve top-level leaders. They may engage in peacemaking as

⁷⁸² Lederach 2006, pp. 60-61.
⁷⁸³ Lederach, 2006, pp. 38-43.
⁷⁸⁴ Based on Lederach, 1997, p. 39.

intermediaries between conflict parties if they are outsiders to the conflict⁷⁸⁵ or represent one conflict party articulating their demands in negotiations as insiders. The outcomes are often ceasefires or peace accords which are often subject to media scrutiny. After peace accords, top-level actors can facilitate reconciliation process by initiating dialogue or political measures such as nation-building, depending on the context of a conflict. The measures are supposed to trickle-down to the other levels; however, the success of this approach depends on whether or not the other levels accept what has been decided upon at the top-level, often behind closed curtains.⁷⁸⁶

Approaches for middle-range leaders are divided into three categories: problem-solving workshops, conflict resolution training and development of peace commissions. For Lederach, these approaches hold the most potential to help establish a relationship- and skill-based infrastructure for sustaining a peace-building process⁷⁸⁷ which corresponds with his strong emphasis on relationships and the socio-cultural context in a conflict.

Grassroots leaders can implement their work at the local and communal level through bottom-up approaches, including programmatic peace efforts, such as the UNICEF-funded project 'Circus for Peace'. For this project, a traveling show (resembling a circus) toured in Mozambique combining drama and arts. The themes of the show were all related to the nature and challenges of war and conflict as well as skills to resolve and reconcile. It also served as a way of initiating public grief over the losses the country had experienced over conflict.⁷⁸⁸ Efforts on the grassroots level often focus on the victims of violence, including through projects concerning rebuilding of the economy and infrastructure, reconciliation and overcoming the trauma of conflict.⁷⁸⁹

The pyramid can help in finding 'entry-points' for conflict transformation. Resources for conflict transformation are never unlimited and often have to be channeled at first. Lederach further broaches the issue of entry-points by highlighting difficulties of coordinating the implementation of a comprehensive transformation and peace-building approach. Due to multiple roles, activities, strategies and approaches, peace-workers and conflict actors need points of contact for conducting conflict transformation measures. For those who initiate wide-ranging, comprehensive conflict transformation strategies, it poses a great challenge to establish

⁷⁸⁵ For example, Kofi Annan in Syria (February – August 2012).

⁷⁸⁶ Lederach, 2006, pp. 44-46.

⁷⁸⁷ Lederach, 2006, pp. 46-51.

⁷⁸⁸ Evans, 1996, p. 21.

⁷⁸⁹ Lederach, 2006, pp. 51-55.

points of contact and to coordinate them.⁷⁹⁰ Taking into consideration that the case study conflict is nation-wide and affects a very population-rich country, having points of contact on different levels of leadership appears to be a practicable and necessary way to coordinate any large conflict transformation attempt. Since the middle-range has been identified as a promising entry-point, middle-range leaders and activities attributed to this level would have priority when it comes to budgeting resources for a conflict transformation process.

Apart from his contribution in the form of the pyramid presented above, Lederach's training models for conflict transformation can also be complementary elements to the Transcend approach. In his book *Preparing for Peace – Conflict Transformation Across Cultures* (1995), he analyzes training models which can be categorized as either prescriptive approaches based on transferring conflict resolution technology from one setting to another or elicitive approaches which build on the cultural resources in a given setting. Based on his experience as a practitioner, he recommends a combination of both approaches in most settings best as both methods have their advantages and disadvantages.⁷⁹¹

Lederach's elicitive conflict transformation approach has been further developed by other researchers and practitioners in order to offer diverse and creative methods for peace-workers as well as researchers in dealing with different aspects of conflicts and their transformation. Among others, Wolfgang Dietrich, added different practical methods to the approach which are derived mainly from psychology and communication studies as well as Shamanism, Sufism, Daoism, tantra as well as Zen Buddhism.⁷⁹² He further includes techniques from Butō (Japanese dance theatre according to Tatsumi Hijikata), Aikidō (Japanese martial arts as developed by Morihei Ueshiba)⁷⁹³ as well as hypnosis methods inspired by Osho (founder of the neo-Sannyas movement)⁷⁹⁴ in his approach to conflict transformation. Considering these methods as tools for conflict transformation provides creative additions which emphasize the interdisciplinary character of peace and conflict research and could also be applied during workshops with involved conflict actors in the present conflict.

⁷⁹⁰ Lederach, 2006, p. 152.

⁷⁹¹ Lederach, 1995b, pp. 69-71.

⁷⁹² Dietrich, 2011, pp. 41-42.

⁷⁹³ Dietrich, 2011, pp. 230ff.

⁷⁹⁴ Dietrich, 2011, pp. 156ff.

*Coping with Complexity: Systemic Approaches to Conflict Transformation*⁷⁹⁵

Systemic approaches constitute an interdisciplinary way of thinking which uses systems to describe and explain different complex phenomena such as conflicts. A system, although consisting of elements, should not be merely understood as their sum (as for example according to Cartesian logic).⁷⁹⁶ The inter-relations and interactions between elements create something new that cannot be covered by the elements if they are only analyzed separately. The actions of an individual are therefore not explained by an individual's characteristics, but by its position in society and resulting social restraints. Systemic approaches not only portray the complexity of systems, but also help in analyzing this complexity and understanding underlying structures which generate change by organizing complexity.⁷⁹⁷

Systemic approaches can also be applied to conflict transformation. The result, systemic conflict transformation, is based on the assumption that conflicts are complex systems that can only be changed or altered to a limited extent. The approach offers tools for understanding and explaining non-linear developments, like complex social and political changes. Using this approach requires a complex analysis of the whole conflict system in order to detect where possible entry points for change could be found. In order to deal with the problem of conflict complexity, the system dynamic approach as applied by Ropers⁷⁹⁸ will be examined here. Ropers uses elements of a systemic approach which was first developed in the 1960s by the management and engineering expert Forrester⁷⁹⁹. This method aims to depict and simulate the behavior of complex systems in which the development of one factor in a system is normally not linear, but is rather 'balanced' or 'controlled' by other factors.⁸⁰⁰

⁷⁹⁵ Systemic thinking encompasses a broad spectrum of theories, principles, methods and techniques, which are all rooted in the observation that the whole is more than the sum of its parts. It was first proposed under the name of 'General System Theory' by the biologist Ludwig von Bertalanffy (first published 1968). Even though originating in the field of natural science, the approach has later been adopted by other fields of science like social science (e.g. by Niklas Luhmann who developed social systems theories, Luhmann, 1984).

⁷⁹⁶ Wils et al., 2006, p. 13.

⁷⁹⁷ Wils et al., 2006, p. 13.

⁷⁹⁸ Ropers is one of the editors of the *Berghoff Handbook of Conflict Transformation*.

⁷⁹⁹ Forrester, 1968.

⁸⁰⁰ Ropers, 2011, pp. 105ff.




Figure 17: Example diagram according to the systemic approach

In the example diagram above, two factors influencing a conflict transformation process for the case study conflict are portrayed as interconnected feedback loops and time delays. When analyzing the level of support for pro-active work on conflict transformation by the elites of the two major conflict groups, it becomes obvious that their support depends on the interaction of two loops: a reinforcing one and a counteracting one. This makes it unlikely for the level of support to grow in a linear fashion. The reinforcing loop shows that the stronger the support is, the more likely it is that financial support will be made available for the transmission of conflict conversion methods to be applied on a large scale throughout the country. This may then have a positive effect on other subgroups by enhancing their awareness of the conflict, leading to more understanding why conflict transformation work is necessary. The effect can be enhanced if a peace dividend is generated for the constituencies of both groups. The counteracting loop shows factors which work against supporting conflict transformation work. One factor may be unwillingness due to economic competition which may result in fear that changing the status quo may result in personal disadvantages. Negative stereotyping of the other group may influence other subgroups to also oppose conflict transformation efforts. This diagram only shows a small aspect of the conflict, but it can be extended with more loops and variables to provide an organized picture of a complex conflict.

Based on systemic approaches it is essential to define the system's boundaries as basic steps for conflict analysis.⁸⁰¹ Main variables that have an impact on a specific conflict and its setting have to be reflected upon. The setting is framed as the environment which influences the system through certain parameters. It is further necessary to identify key issues, flows and time

⁸⁰¹ Ropers, 2008, p. 16.

delays between them.⁸⁰² In the next step, data on these factors needs to be collected for defining the main feedback loops which form patterns of interaction with a strong dynamism of their own. Other causal loops have to be added to map the conflict ‘architecture’.⁸⁰³ This map visualizes the actors, their position within the overall conflict system and their relationship with each other in order to gain a ‘bird’s eye view’ of the interactions (the supra-system).⁸⁰⁴ Eventually, information about a conflict system can be combined in an adequate diagram or, in the case of highly complex conflicts, in a computer simulation.⁸⁰⁵ The approach offers a practical tool for understanding and explaining a conflict’s complexity and its non-linear developments. It also illustrates why peace processes are often fragile and characterized by numerous setbacks along the way. Due to the complexity of causal interactions, of time delays and various in-built resistances, systems do not function or develop in a predictable linear way.

The systemic conflict transformation approaches do not take the time factor or the conflict’s development over time sufficiently into consideration. As a consequence they do not provide guidance with regard to which measures or approaches would be appropriate at a given stage of the conflict. They merely point out five core elements have to be worked on at all times simultaneously:⁸⁰⁶

- Systemic conflict analysis and conflict monitoring
- Strategic planning of systemic interventions
- Engagement with key stakeholders
- Mobilization of agents of peaceful change
- Creativity in the imagination of sustainable solutions.

Apart from dealing with complexity, systemic approaches also address issues of how actors can be convinced and encouraged to engage in the conflict transformation process, for example through multi-stakeholder approaches and forms of network management⁸⁰⁷ As for Lederach, relationship-building plays a crucial role in this approach.⁸⁰⁸

In the case of a conflict transformation process in Sri Lanka, the so-called ‘One-Text Initiative’ was chosen as an attempt to support dialogue between actors after the 2002 ceasefire (started in

⁸⁰² Ibid.

⁸⁰³ Ibid.

⁸⁰⁴ Ropers, 2008, p. 23.

⁸⁰⁵ Ropers, 2008, p. 16.

⁸⁰⁶ Wils et. al., 2006, p. 31.

⁸⁰⁷ Wils et. al., 2006, p. 31.

⁸⁰⁸ Wils et al., 2006, p. 52.

2003 and ended in 2005). With help of a computer application, technical experts created a platform for exchanging and discussing ideas and problems. After having gathered issues and interests of all parties, a nominated process manager and technical experts drafted a proposal which was accessible by all actors and open for their input and criticism. Representatives of political parties, NGOs, consultants and researchers were provided with a platform for discussion as well the ability to discover common needs and interests that should be included in the next draft of the proposal. The proposal was revised and re-drafted according the actors' inputs until a version was created which was believed to best represent the interests of all parties. Thereby this method created a framework in which many actors, state and non-state, local as well as international could participate in as equals.⁸⁰⁹

This method could be a very interesting approach for the case study conflict, since it would enable the actors to virtually bridge the geographical distance between them. In Indonesia online social networking (e.g. Facebook) enjoys nation-wide popularity⁸¹⁰ and therefore an online platform would be an appealing method to reach different actors across the country and to even attract those who are at first less interested in the transformation process. Although those who are strongly opposed to transformation efforts are unlikely to be convinced by such an offer, even without them, a dialogue process as such could be useful to gain new knowledge which could be applied to transforming the conflict.

7.3 Conclusions

The Transcend approach does not offer a 'road map' or scheme which can simply be applied to every conflict. When dealing with protracted conflicts, such as the case study conflict, a 'prescriptive' approach is unlikely to be applicable. Instead, a complex and comprehensive approach which captures the multiple layers and dimensions of the conflict is required. In working with conflicts, different ways of thinking have to be included to do justice to different cultural settings. The Transcend method provides an insightful and in-depth analysis of a conflict as well as guidance for suggestions for practical conflict transformation. In applying this approach, creative thinking is required. It may help to 'practice' working with this

⁸⁰⁹ Wils et al., 2006, pp. 62-63.

⁸¹⁰ According to Facebook, there are more than 44 million users registered in Indonesia (rank 4 in the Facebook user country statistic). <http://www.socialbakers.com/facebook-statistics/indonesia>, 08.09.2012.

approach at first by applying it to daily-life micro-conflicts before moving on to more complex conflicts on the meso or even macro level.⁸¹¹

Elements from approaches by Francis, Lederach as well as systemic approaches can further contribute to this approach. These approaches were assessed and compared to the Transcend approach.

Francis approach to conflict transformation provides helpful guidance throughout the process which is depicted in a compact diagram. The approach by Francis if applied on its own may, however, hinder a flexible and creative search for steps in a conflict transformation process due to its prescriptive character. In contrast to Galtung's approach which has a more 'universal' character, Francis does not leave the realm of Western academic thinking. With regard to the present conflict's setting (geographically and culturally) this proved to be a considerable limitation.

The approach by Lederach was perceived as the most comparable to Galtung's approach both with regard to structure as well as content. Like Galtung, Lederach calls for the need of "an integrated framework for peacebuilding"⁸¹² to deal with conflicts due to their structural and systematic complexity. However, his approach appears to be less holistic than the approach by Galtung as it does not include as many different fields of study, episteme, and epistemologies. On the whole, the theoretical basis for conflict analysis offered by Lederach was perceived as less original and monolithic compared to Galtung. Galtung developed a theoretical framework of conflict and peace theory which the Transcend method is based on, while Lederach adopted different theoretical models by other academics (Dugan). Elicitive conflict transformation methods which are build upon Lederach's approaches (by for example Dietrich), further include valuable additions which may add to the interdisciplinary character of the approach.

The systemic approaches offer a range of useful methods and tools for understanding and interpreting conflicts, but seem to lack an overall framework for how to deal with conflicts in their different stages. However, during different stages of a conflict, there is usually the necessity to focus on certain aspects only as resources are limited, especially if, as with the case study conflict, it does not attract as much attention as other 'hot conflicts', such as those in

⁸¹¹ In his book *Transcend and Transform* (2007b) Galtung also starts by introducing micro-conflicts and the way they can be transformed. Based thereon, daily conflicts can be used to try and practice conflict transcendence.

⁸¹² See for example Lederach, 2006, p. 73.

Aceh or Papua. Therefore, while the systemic approach holds a lot of promise, it would need to be tried and tested more in the field in order to develop it into a comprehensive, consistent and practicable method.

8. Conclusion

8.1 Case Study Conflict

After the May Riots 1998 and the subsequent demise of the Soeharto-regime, the number of violent acts against ethnic Chinese in Indonesia and their property has significantly decreased. The governments succeeding the Soeharto administration abolished laws and degrees which discriminated against ethnic Chinese and forbade the public practicing of Chinese Indonesian customs. The most prominent example of the new spirit of tolerance towards ethnic Chinese are public nation-wide celebrations of the Chinese New Year '*Imlek*', which was even declared a national holiday in 2002. In the atmosphere of the post-Soeharto democratization and reform process which promotes multiculturalism and pluralism, Chinese Indonesians have organized themselves within social organizations to defend their legal rights. These have worked towards reviving their long-suppressed Chinese Indonesian identity and cultural heritage. Furthermore, Chinese Indonesians and indigenous Indonesians have founded NGOs together to promote solidarity between ethnic groups and foster the emerging nation-building process in Indonesia. Ethnic Chinese have also entered the political realm and although their number is still comparatively small, some have been elected into the national parliament and into local governments.⁸¹³

The lifting of bans on the use of the Chinese language and representations of Chinese Indonesian culture in 2004 triggered almost euphoric reactions among many ethnic Chinese. This may have mistakenly misled them into assuming that the overall conflict between indigenous Indonesians and ethnic Chinese had been fully resolved and that continued efforts to work on conflict transformation are therefore no longer required. However, an analysis of the conflict using the triangle of violence developed by Galtung shows that in spite of positive developments in terms of the reduction of violence, the conflict has not vanished, but rather entered a new but clearly defined phase within a conflict cycle. The conflict's violence has shifted on the one hand from the manifest to the latent and on the other from national to local level. The current largely indirect forms of structural and cultural violence have remained and would be expected to further develop until they eventually again evolve at some point into direct forms. Therefore, despite the positive developments mentioned above, the requirement for a sustainable conflict transformation process is still valid.

⁸¹³ At the time of writing, positions occupied by Chinese Indonesians include the Vice Governor of the Province of West Kalimantan, Mayor of Singkawang, and Regent of East Belitung.

At the beginning of the thesis, I introduced the following research questions:

- 1) *what is the conflict between the ethnic Chinese and the indigenous Indonesians about,*
- 2) *what are the underlying structures causing frictions between the two groups which initiate violent conflict, and*
- 3) *How can this conflict be transformed into the direction of sustainable peace acceptable to all parties involved?*

Regarding the first research question: In contrast to conflicts in which the involved actors fight over territories, natural resources or political power, the main (objective) contradiction for the present case study is rooted in Indonesia's social structure. An analysis of the conflict formation based on the conflict triangle tool affirmed a clash of interests regarding the social system which was initially introduced by the Dutch during the colonial era and maintained and further developed by the subsequent Indonesian governments under Presidents Soekarno and Soeharto. Within this social construct, the ethnic Chinese were positioned in the middle of the social pyramid as a marginalized middlemen minority and a distinct group of non-indigenous 'others'. In order to maintain this balance and prevent the minority group from either mingling with the elite or the majority population, the elite offered them economical incentives, while simultaneously discriminating against them on the socio-political level. Although a number of ethnic Chinese maintained close business and personal relations with members of the political elite, the ethnic group as a whole served as scapegoats in times of political crises, preventing attacks against the elites.

Even though the political system has changed from a centralized authoritarian to a decentralized democratic system and the social constellation in general has become more flexible after 1998, this middleman position held by the ethnic group of Chinese Indonesians as a whole within the country's social structure continues to be prevalent until today. Subgroups of indigenous Indonesians and some of the ethnic Chinese who belong to the political and economic elite of the country continue to ensure that the social structure remains as it is. These subgroups are content with the status quo and do not welcome social change – on the contrary: change may well challenge their current social position and endanger the economic privileges they enjoy. Moreover, a subgroup of indigenous Indonesian members of the political elite do not want to lose their advantage over a distinct group of 'others' who could serve as potential scapegoats in the case of any future crises. Other more conciliatory subgroups, however, want to change the current social status of the Chinese Indonesians as not fully-accepted Indonesians who are discriminated against and marginalized. The main contradiction of this conflict can

therefore be summed as the want to preserve the social structure status quo on the one hand and to implement social change on the other.

To answer the second research question, the underlying structures responsible for the frictions leading to this violent conflict have been analyzed using a third tool the deep dimension triangle (subsequent to the triangle of violence and the triangle of conflict). Based on this analysis, a range of general tendencies among the conflict parties emerged, the importance of which varies depending on the different conflict actors. The opposing conflict groups are far from being homogenous – even if they are often viewed as such by members of the respective opposing group. According to the analysis, the conflict actors have slightly differing cultural backgrounds that serve to shape their respective perceptions of the conflict as well as the other conflict party. On the side of the indigenous Indonesians, a partial reluctance to fully accept the claim by the Chinese Indonesians’ to be Indonesians while at the same time preserving Chinese cultural traits emerged. Many indigenous Indonesians consider some, especially visible, cultural characteristics, such as Chinese-style houses, as proof of the foreignness and eliteness of the ethnic Chinese in general. As a result, indigenous Indonesians question the loyalty of the minority to the Indonesian national identity. Ethnic Chinese, however, do not perceive their Chinese and Indonesian cultural identity as being contradictory and they are therefore not willing to accept a loss of their ‘Chineseness’.

Historical experiences have entered the collective memory of all conflict parties and contribute to the way they view and perceive themselves and others. Even though the experiences are located in the past, the painful collective memories (traumata) of the suppression during the colonial era (with regard to indigenous Indonesians) or the riots in 1740, 1965 and May 1998 (with regard to ethnic Chinese), diminish their willingness today to empathize with the other party. The actors have difficulty acknowledging the right of the other party to also satisfy their own basic human needs.

The analysis of the deep dimensions of the conflict further revealed several general social, political, and economic problems which Indonesia is currently facing but which actually form the background of the conflict. Indonesia was declared a nation-state in 1945; however, despite Soekarno’s and Soeharto’s efforts to establish an umbrella national identity unifying the various ethnic groups of the archipelago, local identities have remained strong. After 2001, these identities strengthened by the decentralization of the political system. In contrast to the Soeharto era, the political and social domination prevalent to the Javanese people has

decreased. Local ethnic groups both in and outside of Java have successfully accessed local leadership positions such as governors, regents, mayors or district heads. These positions are now increasingly occupied by *putera daerah* ('local sons'). While many ethnic groups welcomed this development which corresponds more to the multi-ethnic character of the Indonesian nation, it has also created problems in regions where numerous ethnic groups co-exist. Apart from the ethnic factor, the religious factor has further gained importance in politics. Some local governments have been pushing for the implementation of Islamic Syariah (e.g. Aceh and Minang) or Christian law (e.g. Papua and West Papua). Groups such as the Chinese Indonesians who are both an ethnic and religious minority in most of the regions they live in (with the exception of Pontianak, West Kalimantan), often therefore encounter problems when competing for seats in local governments or when dealing with legal issues. The political decentralization and strengthening of local indigenous identities make it more difficult for the national government to accommodate all ethnic groups under one common national identity and thereby foster a nation-building process.

Even though the Indonesian economy is growing and has not faced another crisis like the Asian crisis in 1997/8, the country is still struggling to reduce poverty and although absolute poverty levels have come down, there is a widening gap between rich and poor. In addition the central government has responded to the demands of the resource-rich regions for a more equal distribution of economic assets to the benefit of these regions. Economic development programs have been initiated throughout Indonesia with differing degrees of success, leaving some regions (as for example Bengkulu, West Timor or Maluku) lagging behind more successful ones. The resulting economic differences and social status are at times linked in public discourses to ethnicity, fuelling tensions and rivalry.

Following the analysis of the conflict, I focused on the third research question. This question was approached by both drawing on the results of the conflict analysis and approaches as suggested by the Transcend method and elements of other conflict transformation approaches (therapy). As outlined in the Transcend method, the entry-point for conflict transformation lies in transcending the contradictions, for which the actors' attitudes and behaviour need to be transformed as well. The three components⁸¹⁴ of conflict transformation are interlinked and co-dependent.

Due to the complexity of conflicts, transcendence processes are also complex, with no single short-term 'solution' to the contradictions. Instead, a variety of measures and approaches on

⁸¹⁴ Attitudes, behavior, and contradictions (ABC).

various levels addressing different aspects and layers of the conflict have to be applied over time. Specific therapies or measures, such as the Ho'o Pono Pono approach, have been evaluated in this study with regard to their suitability for the present conflict, taking into consideration the different conflict subgroups as well as the deep dimensions of the conflict. Subsequently, approaches tackling different dimensions of the conflict have been identified that could initiate and support a conflict transcendence process. The aim of such a process would be to diminish the conflict's violence levels and direct the process towards a stadium of negative peace while simultaneously initiating the building and establishing of positive peace.

Transcending the contradictions in this case requires working towards a new social reality. In this, the ethnic Chinese would be less regarded as a marginalized non-indigenous group while simultaneously the basic human needs of the indigenous Indonesians as well as subgroups within the overall group of ethnic Chinese would not be infringed upon. This new reality would also need to address reasonable demands for a more equitable distribution of the country's economic assets and development programs. Furthermore, adequate political and social representation of all ethnic and religious groups regardless whether or not they form the majority in their region would need to be ensured.

The Indonesian government abolished the official distinction between indigenous Indonesians and ethnic Chinese (non-indigenous) on a national level by legislating a new citizenship law in 2006 and a further anti-discrimination law in 2009. However, more time and further measures by the government and civil society are required if mental barriers between the two groups are to be overcome. The Indonesian national motto 'Unity in Diversity' as introduced by President Soekarno at the time of Indonesia's Independence remains valid, but ethnic Chinese require explicit inclusion within the national identity. How people perceive and understand the motto and the concept of Indonesian national identity is subject to constant change. As local ethnic identities have grown stronger since 2001, the national identity will need to be remodelled and structured with a view to satisfying the identity needs of all ethnic groups in Indonesia. In order to foster this integration process, an overview committee could be formed consisting of representatives from all ethnic groups who would develop and introduce an adapted concept of national identity which is not based on the concept of indigenusness or where indigenusness places itself behind national identity. Despite the fact that the ethnic group directly affected by the conflict only constitutes 2-3% of the country's population, the analysis has shown that this conflict would be better served if examined and approached in the broader context of the social, political and economic developments of the country in general. The process of conflict

transformation will therefore influence the continuing processes of nation-building by remodelling and structuring the Indonesian national identity.

This thesis argues that launching a structured attempt to transform the conflict will be a challenging task due to the wide range of actors involved who are spread across a population-rich state consisting of more than 17,000 islands. In contrast to continental countries with contiguous territories, this specific aspect requires a very well-structured approach. However, there are promising prerequisites for such an attempt:

- Chances of finding entry- or starting-points for a transformation process are higher if the parties themselves are heterogeneous. The conflict analysis showed that the conflict parties in this case study are not monolithic. Within both of the conflict groups subgroups that have a vital interest in working towards transforming the conflict were identified in the study. Having already started this work, these groups thus provide promising entry-points for conflict transformation. Breaking up the opposing blocks of conflict parties into smaller less affiliated units offers more starting-points as well as space for new options and possibilities to approach the conflicts.
- Other ethnic and religious groups share, in part, similar problems as the ones the ethnic Chinese are confronted with. Therefore the latter's claim for a new reality embracing multiculturalism and pluralism is not a lonely voice. The subgroups interested in conflict transformation can reach out and find allies among conflict parties of other regional conflicts, such as conflict(s) in Southeast Maluku, West Kalimantan or Papua. Once these groups come together and formulate their common aims, they can increase their influence and push for changes.
- Indonesia is still a very young democratic state which is still in the process of defining itself. Therefore, there is space for social changes. Once the concept of 'indigenesness' becomes less dominant, ethnic Chinese could be better integrated as part of the nation, as equals among other ethnic groups in terms of the national identity and the nation-building process. This could end their position as marginalized middlemen.

Working on this and other Indonesian conflicts based on the Transcend Method could generate conflict transformation capabilities within Indonesian society. Establishing and practicing these capabilities would help Indonesia in dealing with its present and future conflicts. Peace-workers can assist in this process: they can put forward suggestions, provide comfort, facilitate meetings or workshops and mediate between the respective parties. The willingness to start working on conflict transformation has to be initiated by the actors themselves. It is therefore necessary to

actively draw attention to the fact that conflict transformation is still essential in this case by raising its profile through public awareness by and increasing the actors' want and willingness to engage in the process. The infringement of basic human needs among all of the conflict actors underscores the need for conflict transformation. Approaches aiming at conflict transformation by local actors which have already been implemented, such as the batik project of the Indonesian Institute for Pluralism, should be further encouraged and built upon by the Indonesian government and both local and international institutions and organizations. Specific measures to be implemented as suggested in the framework of this thesis, such as the joint sorrow / healing approach or diversity projects could help to introduce a modified national identity concept at the pre-school level and schools. Such measures require long-term engagement, but the prospects are promising in that over the course of time this conflict could be transcended.

8.2 Theoretical Approach

Based on this thesis, the chosen analytical approach can be regarded as a reliable and solid framework for use when working with this particular conflict. The approach combined an extensive body of theoretical literature which offered both analytical tools and practical suggestions for conflict transformation. Although the Transcend approach is comprehensive in nature by itself, elements of other conflict transformation methods such as by Lederach, Francis and the systemic approaches, can be used to complement the Transcend approach. This is applicable both in general and in this particular case study.

The Transcend method allows for a holistic and universal approach to conflicts. It can thus be applied to conflicts other than this case study, regardless of the conflict frame on the micro-, meso- or macro-level. Galtung's approach of including basic human needs in the analysis of conflicts has increased the applicability and depth of peace and conflict studies, linking it with broader human rights discourses. As a consequence, peace research has been further de-nationalized and de-culturalized, allowing for the development of 'international' or 'universal' peace studies. In order to reduce the reliance on Western epistemologies for his approach,⁸¹⁵ Galtung adopted South and East Asian ones, such as the Buddhist Wheel (tetralemma) and elements of Daoist logic (holism-dialectics).⁸¹⁶ Even if other epistemologies, such as those from

⁸¹⁵ According to Galtung, the Western epistemologies which are influenced by the Abrahamic-Christian religion which brought upon the pyramid of dilemma as well as philosophers such as Aristotle and Descartes who introduced causality, atomism and deduction are not sufficient on their own for working on conflicts. Instead, other epistemologies have to be added. Lecture at University of Gießen, May 10th, 2011.

⁸¹⁶ Galtung, 2008, pp. 46ff.

African societies, have not been explicitly included yet, the road leading towards universality has been paved.

In addition to the incorporation of different episteme, the Transcend method as applied in this thesis combines different academic theories⁸¹⁷:

- Conflict diagnosis is based on criticism where the conflict's data is analyzed and evaluated according to moral expectations ('good' or 'bad').
- Conflict prognosis is based on empiricism when the objectively-obtained data is interpreted, i.e. verified or falsified by comparing it to already-existing theories.
- Conflict therapy is based on constructivism, i.e. the current status of the conflict is compared to the target state. Plans and ways to achieve the target stage are then developed and require evaluation with regard to their applicability and adequacy.

In contrast to Cartesians' atomism and deduction, Galtung, together with representatives of systemic approaches, argues in favor of holism for the following reasons. Atomism and deduction may bear the risk of "losing key features of the 'whole' which [is] [...] more than the sum of its parts".⁸¹⁸ As with other social phenomena or systems, one cannot attempt a conflict analysis or transformation by breaking it down into pieces (atoms) and dealing with these one by one. Instead, one should approach and work on a conflict as a whole. Galtung offers a three-fold schematic (depicted as a triangle) which enables a complex and holistic understanding of conflicts consisting of

- attitudes, behavior, and contradictions as well as their underlying deep dimensions;
- its violence in the forms of direct, structural, and cultural violence; and
- the target stage of peace which requires non-violence, empathy, and creativity.

The Transcend method thus constitutes a universal and holistic conflict transformation approach that encompasses a variety of conflict factors (time, conflict dimensions and perspectives) as well as different academic perspectives and cultural epistemologies.

The Transcend method strives to combine theoretical and practical work. For academic conflict transformation as performed in this thesis, the strength of the approach lies in its extensive and structured framework for conflict analysis. With regard to the practical work, parts of the

⁸¹⁷ These theories are also reflected in the three strands of peace and conflict studies. Therefore, not only the theories as such but also the different strands of this academic field have been combined.

⁸¹⁸ Ropers, 2011, pp. 104-105.

approaches application to this conflict – especially those involving an imaginary mediation with the parties – have to remain merely speculative as no attempt at conflict transformation involving mediation has been carried out to date. Nonetheless, the theoretical analysis of the conflict along with direct discussions with Indonesians (diagnosis) allow for a realistic estimation of the conflict's further development (prognosis). This also applies to the evaluation of measures and approaches to transform and transcend the conflict (therapy). Future studies on this conflict should include practitioners' experiences once/if a conflict transformation process implementing these measures and approaches are commenced.

8.3 Future Studies: Closing Research Gaps

The present case study and the approach by Galtung offer a rich potential for further academic studies. Over the course of the research, research gaps emerged that are worth re-visiting. As Galtung focuses on violence enhancing elements of actor's deep culture, an analysis of peace enhancing elements in general and with regard to the Indonesian deep culture in particular would be a challenging research topic. Further, the relation between the category of ethnicity and other collective identities, such as gender and age which have not been considered in this case study should be conceptually questioned or tested. Therefore, this specific case study conflict should be re-assessed by applying a different conflict transformation approach. Having gained a brief insight into the systemic approaches to conflict transformation, an analysis of this conflict from a systemic perspective appears productive. Since conflicts are perceived as systems in systemic theories, systemic tools which derive from different academic disciplines allow for a comprehensive and holistic approach. Initial attempts to apply system thinking to conflict transformation have been made e.g. by Ropers. His studies of the conflict in Sri Lanka reveal the potentials of systemic tools. Apart from new insights for the present conflict, applicability and effectiveness of systemic tools needs to be examined. More case studies are required to develop an overall framework for their application during different conflict stages as a consistent systemic method for conflict transformation process to be used by practitioners in the field.

Even though the experience of applying the Transcend approach to the present case study suggests that it is generally applicable to other case studies as well, more case studies are required to verify this assumption as well as provide new perspectives and insights. Other Indonesian conflicts, such as the conflict(s) between Christians and Muslims in Southeast

Maluku, South Sulawesi, or West Kalimantan⁸¹⁹ would lend themselves to such an analysis. Due to the common conflict setting and the fact that the religious factor is also present in the conflict between ethnic Chinese and indigenous Indonesians, one would expect some results from the present case study to be transferable.

Another interesting research question would further be if and to what extent a revised foreign political involvement could contribute to the transformation of the case study conflict. I would assume that this could be feasible if China chose to change its minority policies or if ASEAN would develop a normative process (like e.g. the EU) that would initiate a conflict transformation process in one of the member states.

Also, other conflicts in Southeast Asia which involve ethnic Chinese, for example in Malaysia or Vietnam, would provide suitable case studies given similar social dynamics. Studies of these conflicts would not only prove whether or not the method by Galtung is generally applicable, but they could further offer new valuable perspectives for comparative studies on ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia. Furthermore, additional research revisiting these topics would provide a test of ‘intersubjectivity’ upon which the results of this thesis could be re-evaluated.⁸²⁰

In the course of the research for this study, I observed that ethnicity not only plays a role in the conflict itself but also in the academic research surrounding the conflict. To date, research on this conflict has mainly been conducted by Chinese Indonesians researchers, many of whom have been educated in ‘Western’ countries, or researchers from ‘Western’ countries, often with an ethnic Chinese background. Academic contributions by indigenous Indonesians on this conflict are rare. This is unfortunate as such contributions would not only complement the understanding of the conflict from another perspective, but could possibly also help to raise awareness of and an interest in this conflict among their fellow indigenous Indonesians. Therefore, research by indigenous Indonesians on this topic should not only be welcomed, but encouraged as it could support the long process of conflict transformation in practice.

⁸¹⁹ For details regarding the conflicts see Asia Briefing No. 19, 27 June 2001, Asia Briefing 60, 18 July 2003, and Asia Briefing 64, 22 May 2007, International Crisis Group.

⁸²⁰ Galtung, 1979, p. 213.

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Annex 1 List of Respondents⁸²¹

| Name/sex/age group | Occupation / Position | Date of interview |
|----------------------------------|---|--------------------------|
| <i>Chinese Indonesians</i> | | |
| Alexandra, Lina/f/30-40 | Researcher at Center of Strategic Studies (CSIS) | 03.09.2008 |
| Chua, Christian/m/30-40 | Lecturer (Lehrbeauftragter) at the Department of Southeast Asian Studies at the University of Frankfurt | 15.02.2008 |
| Dawis, Aimee/f/30-40 | Lecturer in the Department of Communication at the University of Indonesia | 21.04.2010 |
| Effendi, Wahyu/m/30-40 | Member of NGO against Discrimination (GANDI) | 08.09.2008 |
| Gatot, Mohammad/m/30-40 | Lawyer at Legal Aid | 08.09.2008 |
| Harsono, Andreas/m/40-50 | Journalist | 15.09.2008 |
| Hartono, E., Dr./m/60+ | Member of Chinese Indonesian Organization PSMTI | 09.09.2008 |
| Hendrawan, S., Prof. Dr./m/50-60 | Prof. for Economics at University of Indonesia, member of Parliament | 11.09.2008 |
| Hoon, Chang-Yao/m/20-30 | Assistant Professor of Asian Studies at Singapore Management University | 10.04.2008 |
| Irwan, Alex/m/30-40 | Ford Foundation | 18.09.2008 |
| Jusuf, Ester/f/40-50 | Lawyer and Human Rights activist | 05.09.2008 |

⁸²¹ For this thesis the respondents were asked at the beginning of the interview whether or not they wanted to have their full names revealed. Some even insisted on having their full names in the thesis so that their voices could be heard. For the others only their first name and first letter of their last name were used in this work which they agreed to.

| | | |
|---|--|---------------------------|
| Jusuf, Teddy/m/60+ | Leader of Chinese Indonesian Organization PSMTI | 08.09.2008 |
| Kartika, Pratiwa/f/20-30 | Researcher at Center of Strategic Studies (CSIS) | 18.09.2008 |
| Kwan, William/m/40-50 | Founder of Institute for Pluralism in Indonesia (NGO) | 09.09.2008 and 15.04.2010 |
| Lembong, Eddie/m/60+ | Former chairman of INTI and founder of Yayasan Nabil foundation | 16.09.2008 |
| N., Charles/m./40-60 | Pharmacist | 16.09.2008 |
| Nughoru, Christopher/m/30-40 | Politician | 09.09.2008 |
| Ong, Susi/w/30-40 | Producer of Chinese news on Metro TV | 19.09.2008 |
| P., Fajar/m/20-30 | Student | 09.09.2008 |
| P., Gustav/m/20-30 | Batik entrepreneur | 14.04.2010 |
| Protestant Church visit and interview with a few church members | Various | 07.09.2008 |
| Purnama, Basuki/m/40-50 | Politician, member of house of representatives, former Mayor of Bangka Belitung, candidate for vice-governor of Jakarta (2012) | 10.04.2010 |
| Purnama, Basuri/m/40-50 | Medical doctor, candidate for Mayor in Bangka Belitung (2010) | 22.04.2010 |
| Purnama, Fifi /f/40-50 | Lawyer | 23.04.2010 |
| Purnama, Veronica/w/35-40 | Wife of Basuki Purnama | 10.04.2010 and 22.04.2010 |
| S., Hari/m/60+ | Member of Chinese Indonesian Organization PSMTI, businessman | 09.09.2008 |
| S., Lydia/w/20-30 | Student | 11.09.2008 |

| | | |
|-----------------------------|--|------------|
| S., Patricia/w/20-30 | Student | 02.09.2008 |
| S., Widji/m/60+ | Batik entrepreneur | 12.04.2010 |
| Setiawan, Hanjaya/m/30-40 | Politician | 10.09.2008 |
| Setijadi, Charlotte/f/20-30 | PhD-Candidate at La Trobe University, Melbourne | 05.04.2010 |
| Setiono, Benny/m/60+ | Chairman of Chinese Indonesian Organization INTI | 16.09.2008 |
| Tan, Mely G./f/60+ | Researcher | 17.09.2008 |
| Tan, Swie Liong/m/60+ | Founder of Chinese Indonesian magazine Sinergy | 10.09.2008 |
| Tanuhandaru, Protus/m/30-40 | Founder of NGO One Destination (for equality in Indonesia) | 02.09.2008 |
| Teng, B., Dr./m/60+ | Co-Founder of Sinergy | 10.09.2008 |
| Thung, Ju Lan/f/40-50 | Researcher at the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) | 20.04.2010 |
| Tjandra, Surya/m/40-50 | Lawyer (for labour unions) | 23.04.2010 |
| Tjhin, Christine/f/30-40 | Researcher at Center of Strategic Studies (CSIS) | 01.09.2008 |
| Tsai, Frans | Politician, former member of house of representatives | 20.04.2010 |
| W., Grace, Dr./w/60+ | Dentist | 18.04.2010 |
| W., Sigit/m/60+ | Batik entrepreneur | 12.04.2010 |
| Wibowo, Iwan /m/30-40 | Lawyer | 10.09.2008 |
| Wijaya, Nancy/w/60+ | Chairwoman of the women division of INTI | 24.04.2010 |
| Wulan, Alexandra/f/30-40 | Researcher at Center of Strategic Studies (CSIS) | 03.09.2008 |
| Yap, Hong Gie/m/40-50 | Member of Chinese Indonesian Organization INTI | 20.09.2008 |

Name/sex/age group Occupation / Position Date of interview

| <i>Indigenous Indonesians</i> | | |
|---|---|------------|
| Dewi, Kartika | Project assistant at IPI | 15.04.2010 |
| G., Conda/m/20-30 | Project assistant at IPI | 11.04.2010 |
| Gus Shihhabuddin | Muslim leader in Lasem | 17.04.2010 |
| Harjanto, Nico/m/20-30 | Researcher at CSIS | 03.09.2008 |
| K., Rudi/m/30-40 | Government official in Lasem | 14.04.2010 |
| KH. Zainuddin | Muslim leader in Lasem | 15.04.2010 |
| M., Mariati/w/40-50 | Batik worker | 13.04.2010 |
| Members of Lasem Historical Organization | Various | 15.04.2010 |
| P., Mohammad/m/30-40 | Medical doctor (married to a Chinese Indonesian) | 18.04.2010 |
| R., Jamiatum/w/40-50 | Batik entrepreneur | 14.04.2010 |
| W., Slamet/m/60+ | Teacher at High School | 14.04.2010 |

Annex 2 Classification of the Conflict according to the Conflict Transformation Index

Before applying the Galtung approach to the case of the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia, it will be determined to what extent the conflict has already been transformed or rather how far away the conflict currently is from being completely transformed. Conflict transformation indicators will therefore be applied to the conflict of the case study which (when all taken into consideration) result in a rating of the conflict according to the conflict transformation index. The first indicator introduced by Galtung is **conflict consciousness (CC)**. This indicator is based on the assumption that conflict narratives or perceptions can be distinguished into the following two types of narratives:

“Narrative I [the mainstream narrative]:

Problem: there are evil forces out there waiting for their time;

When time comes their evil is articulated as violence;

Remedy: be strong enough to deter evil and crush it if needed;

If strong enough there is a gift: security.

Narrative II:

Problem: there is a difficult unresolved conflict out there;

The conflict leads to frustration leading to aggression-violence;

Remedy: conflict resolution with empathy-nonviolence-creativity;

If acceptable-sustainable-equitable enough there is a gift: peace.”⁸²²

These two narratives can be depicted in a table which makes it easier for deciding on a numerical index to determine the conflict conscious degree of a specific conflict.

⁸²² Galtung, 2010, p. 239.

| Dimensions | EITHER Narrative I | NEITHER-NOR HALF-HALF BOTH-AND | OR Narrative II |
|---------------|-----------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------|
| Conflict Root | Other | | Conflict |
| Violence Root | In Other | | In context |
| Approach | Fight Other | | Process conflict |
| Goal | Victory | | Solution |

Table 6: Indicators for a Conflict Transformation Index, CTI (reconstructed acc. to Galtung, 2010, p. 239).

Most conflict narratives may be in-between the two narratives (second and fourth column). For the index, it is now necessary to decide on a rating of 0, 1, or 2 (low, medium or high) to the second, third and fourth row (conflict root, violence root, approach and goal), which adds up to an overall index from 0 to 8. To this first indicator, other indicators have to be added which depending on their status will also be rated with 0-1-2 each:

- Three indicators of **mediation**: mapping-legitimation-bridging (x + x + x)
- Three indicator for **transformation process**: empathy-nonviolence-creativity (x + x + x)
- Three indicators for **solutions outcome**: acceptability-sustainability-equity (x + x + x)

After each of the indicators was rated, an index from 0-18 will be the outcome which represents the **conflict transformation scope** (CTS). Additionally, the **conflict transformation domain** (CTD) has to be considered. Here, it has to be determined who shares the goal of conflict transformation and who participates in the conflict transformation scope. It could be none, only one party or both. Another perspective would be: none, people only, elites only or both. For none, an index of 0 shall be given, an index of 1 for the case that only one party participates and an index of 2 for the case that both are involved. As a result, the index for conflict transformation domain can range from 0 to 4 for each of the above presented indicators. After the first indicator is added (conflict consciousness), a total conflict transformation index can be determined.

The formula would be: $CTD \times (CC + CTS) = 0 - 100$, while 0 means no conflict transformation at all und 100 means conflict transformation has successfully reached all parties at all levels for all dimensions.⁸²³

⁸²³ Galtung, 2010, p. 240.

It is difficult to set up an index for a complex conflict with many sub-parties to the general conflict parties involved. Nevertheless, an attempt will be made here, since the conflict transformation index provides an idea of where the conflict stands in terms of transformation:

Conflict consciousness: none of the parties, neither ethnic Chinese nor indigenous Indonesians seem to blame the other party entirely for the conflict or consider eliminating the other party as approach to deal with the conflict. However, there are some who deny the existence of a conflict as such. The idea of disharmony which is implied for many when confronted with the term 'conflict' often raised discomfort with respondents. Therefore, during interviews numerous indigenous Indonesians as well as ethnic Chinese denied the existence of a conflict – at least for the moment.⁸²⁴ The problem seems to be the understanding of conflict and violence: conflict and violence is mainly associated with direct physical violence. As long as no wide-ranging direct violence (like during the May riots 1998) is present, many Indonesians preferred to ignore violence or conflict, or even appeared to be ashamed of it. As a consequence, interviews revealed that many respondents would prefer to leave the conflict untouched in hopes it might disappear by itself over time. Other respondents clearly recognized that the conflict has not ended after 1998 with the change of the political system and still has to be worked on to prevent future violence.⁸²⁵ It is difficult to determine which of the two positions is dominant and the fact that both of the positions are found among people in both parties makes it even more difficult to give a numerical index. It is not clearly narrative I nor narrative II, the index would be neither-nor / half-half / both-and.

Result conflict conscience (CC): the most suitable numerical index therefore seems to be: **4.5**.

Now turning to the **three indicators of mediation**:

Since there is no on-going mediation process, the following indicators are difficult to rate. When imagining a mediation process, the indicator for mapping would be considerably high. The conflict parties are very much aware of the actors involved and more or less know what their goals are: 1.5.

Concerning legitimation and bridging, there are (mainly ethnic Chinese) NGOs or organizations, like INTI, Yayasan Nabil or IPI, who try to deal with this indirectly by trying to make their goals public and defend their legitimacy. They also try to put forward suggestions to realize these goals in a way they perceive as acceptable to both parties. The same applies to

⁸²⁴ Interview e.g. with Dr. Grace W., ethnic Chinese (18.04.2010) and Slamet W., indigenous Indonesian (14.04.2010).

⁸²⁵ Interview, e.g. with Eddie Lembong, ethnic Chinese, organization Yayasan Nabil (16.09.2008) and KH. Zainuddin, head of Islamic boarding school (15.04.2010).

bridging goals. However, since the majority of conflict actors do not present their goals, the index for these two indicators has to be considerably low: 0.5.

Result mediation: a total of **2.5**

The three indicators for the transformation process:

Empathy: a rating of 1 seems to be appropriate. As could be learned from the analysis of the conflict formation, subgroups among the ethnic Chinese as well as the indigenous Indonesians are not preoccupied with the conflict or try not to get involved even though they are also affected by it. Others are very interested and actively work on it. In total numbers, it can be expected that only the minority of actors is working on transforming the conflict. Among those who work on conflict's transformation, the level of empathy is very high, since they try to find sustainable approaches which can be accepted by both sides. However, since the majority of involved people, is less empathizing, the overall rating cannot be more than 1.

Non-violence: according to the analysis of violence, violence in general was reduced after 1998. Direct violence diminished quickly, while the level of structural and cultural violence is decreasing slowly. Looking at the situation from another perspective reveals that none of the parties seems to be trying to increase the level of violence to reach their goals – at most there are subgroups who are actively trying to maintain the current level of violence to preserve the status quo. An estimate for the index of non-violence in the conflict transformation process would be: 1.5.

Creativity: those groups who are working on conflict transformation, mainly organizations, NGOs, politicians, lawyers and journalists as presented previously, provide very interesting, diverse approaches to work on the conflict. None of them claims to have found the one and only solution, instead they are aware that they are working on one part or aspect of the conflict only (like on a puzzle). Their creativity index would therefore be high, but has to be reduced as the majority of actors are not involved in the process at all. Nevertheless, since it is normal that not all of the involved or affected actors are actively working on a conflict, the index should still be rated: 1.5.

Result conflict transformation process: a total of **4**.

When it comes to the **three indicators for solution outcomes** of the transformation process, it is more than difficult to give a numerical index, since projects that constitute a conflict transformation process are not (yet) organized in a way leading to a common goal or solution outcome which could then be tested for acceptability, sustainability and equity. The different project groups are not working together and there are no prominent representatives speaking for their groups. However, one cannot claim that there are no outcomes or approaches at all.

Therefore, the index cannot be 0. Instead an index of 0.5 for each indicator appears to be appropriate.

Result solution outcome evaluation: a total of 1.5.

Consequently, the **overall index for the conflict transformation scope (CTS)** would be: **8**.

For the **conflict transformation domain (CTD)**, the questions are:

Who shares the goal to transform the conflict and who participates in the transformation process? People of both groups are working actively on the conflict. However, people of both groups ignore the conflict and others even try to hinder the conflict transformation process. Some of them belong to the people, others belong to the elite. It is therefore difficult to clearly provide an answer to the question. However, since all groups (both parties as well people and elites) are present among those who work actively on the conflict transformation process, it seems to be reasonable to give a considerably high rating.

Result conflict transformation domain (CTD): 3.

If adding the indices of all of the indicators, the **total conflict transformation index** would be:
3 x (4.5 + 8) = 37.5.

The result is only an estimated approximate figure. It is difficult to evaluate the appropriate indices, because there is currently no on-going mediation process or dialogue with conflict parties in general to refer to. Nevertheless, the index can provide us with a broad idea of where the conflict currently stands with regard to conflict transformation. Conflict transformation work is being conducted which can be evaluated positively. However, it is still far from having reached all actors involved at all levels and it does not touch all necessary dimensions of the conflict (yet).