

**Individual and Contextual Factors of Right-
wing Populism – New Perspectives through
Methodological Innovation**

**Individuelle und kontextuelle Faktoren von
Rechtspopulismus – Neue Perspektiven
durch methodische Innovationen**

Dissertation zur Erlangung des Doktorgrades (Dr. rer. soc.)

des Fachbereichs Sozial- und Kulturwissenschaften

der Justus-Liebig-Universität Gießen

vorgelegt von

Manuel Kleinert

2024

Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Elmar Schlüter, Justus-Liebig-Universität Gießen

Acknowledgments

I would like to express my great gratitude to my supervisor, Elmar Schlüter, for his constant support, invaluable guidance, and advice throughout the entire dissertation process. His expertise, constructive feedback, and his ability to ‘look beyond the edge of the plate’ have been essential in shaping this research.

I am deeply grateful to my family and wife for their patience and understanding during this demanding journey. Their constant encouragement and belief in my abilities have been an important source of motivation.

Lastly, I would like to thank my friends. The stimulating discussions with them but also their ability to make me forget everything academic, I have learned to appreciate very much.

April 2024

Manuel Kleinert

Content

Tables and Figures	7
Publications.....	9
Summary	10
Chapter 1 Introduction.....	12
The Study of Right-Wing Populism	12
Terms and definitions	12
History of the post-war Far-Right in Europe	14
Organizational forms of Right-Wing Populism.....	14
Theoretical approaches	16
Empirical findings.....	17
Scientific aims	19
Research questions and structure of this study	20
Research designs, data and methods of data analysis	23
References	28
Chapter 2 Why and when do citizens support populist rightwing social movements? Development and test of an integrative theoretical model	37
Abstract.....	37
Introduction	38
Theoretical framework	40
Relative socioeconomic deprivation	41
Anti-immigrant attitudes	42
Political dissatisfaction	43
Developing an integrative theoretical model	43
Hypotheses.....	46
Data.....	47
Inclusion criteria	47
Data search.....	48
Indicators	48

Content

Evaluation of the ‘Pegida’-movement	48
Relative socioeconomic deprivation	52
Anti-immigrant attitudes	52
Political dissatisfaction	53
Control variables	53
Method	54
Results	55
Discussion	58
Notes	62
References	63
Chapter 3 Reconsidering the Relationship between Anti-Immigration Attitudes and Preferences for the AfD Using Implicit Attitudes Measures	70
Abstract	70
Introduction	71
Biases in the Association Between Anti-immigration Attitudes and Sympathy for the AfD	73
The AfD – A Radical Right-wing Populist Party	73
Issues with the Use of Self-reports in Studying the Effect of AIA On AfD Sympathy	76
Implicit Attitudes as a Possible Way to Detect Such Biases	79
Analytic Strategy to Test for Significant Differences Between Implicit and Explicit Relationships	81
Methods	83
Description of the Survey, Data Collection, and Cleaning Process	83
Measurements	85
Results	88
Descriptive Results	88
Multivariate Results	92
Discussion	97
Robustness Checks	98
Selective Covariates Bias – Specification Curve	99
Omitted Variable Bias – Sensitivity Analysis	100

Content

Conclusion	103
Notes	107
References	109
Chapter 4 Parliamentary Status and Drivers of Sympathy for the Radical Right	122
Abstract.....	122
Introduction	123
Linking demand-side attitudes with supply-side circumstances	123
Data and analytic strategy.....	126
Results	128
Conclusion	132
Notes	134
References	135
Chapter 5 Summary and Discussion	138
Summary.....	139
Discussion.....	142
Scientific Relevance.....	142
Applied Relevance	149
References	153
Specification of the Contributions of Co-authors.....	155
Erklärung.....	156

Tables and Figures

Tables and Figures are listed with an index for the chapter and an index within the chapter (e.g. 2-1 is Chapter 2, element 1). Elements of the Appendix are marked with an A (e.g. 2-A1). Appendices and supplementary materials are available directly with the publication (see Publications section below) or as digital copy with this dissertation or under this repository:

Kleinert, Manuel 2024. Online Appendix for Individual and Contextual Factors of Right-wing Populism – New Perspectives through Methodological Innovation.

DOI: [10.17605/OSF.IO/kqbma](https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/kqbma).

Tables with short title

Chapter 1

Table 1-1: Overview of Chapters and studies

Chapter 2

Table 2-1: Key facts of the data sets and descriptive statistics of the control variables

Table 2-2: Descriptive statistics of the variables used

Table 2-A1: Original wordings of the variables used

Chapter 3

Table 3-1: Illustration of combinations of implicit and explicit variables

Table 3-2: Multi-group regression analysis

Table 3-3: Combined regression model of all groups

Table 3-4: Results of sensitivity analyses testing the interaction effects

Table 3-A1: Confirmatory Factor Analysis of explicit anti-immigration attitudes

Table 3-A2: Primes used in the SC-IAT

Chapter 4

Table 4-A1: Table listing countries and status of RRPPs

Table 4-A2: Variables used in analyses by data set

Table 4-A3: Table of RRPPs defined by Popu-List as ‘farright’ and ‘populist’

Table 4-A4: Results of sensitivity analyses for 3-way-interactions

Table 4-A5: Regression results for each country separately

Table 4-A6: Results of pooled Regression Analysis

Table 4-A7: Results of pooled Regression with 3-way-interactions

Figures with short title

Chapter 2

Figure 2-1: Conceptual diagram of the theoretical model

Figure 2-2: Forest-Plots of bootstrapped standardized regression coefficients

Figure 2-3: Plot of interaction effects

Figure 2-4: Index of moderated mediation for both mediators

Chapter 3

Figure 3-1: Density plots of explicit and implicit AIA and AfD sympathy

Figure 3-2: Descriptive statistics for AIA and AfD by age and education

Figure 3-3: Multiverse analysis for the results obtained in Table 3-3

Figure 3-4: Sensitivity plots for the interaction terms between AIA and groups

Figure 3-A1: Quotations, collected and valid cases of male and female participants

Figure 3-A2: Descriptive statistics for AIA and AfD by gender and working status

Chapter 4

Figure 4-1: Forest plot of coefficients by variable and country

Figure 4-2: Plot of interaction effects

Figure 4-A1: Sensitivity plots for ‘in isolation’ and ‘in government’

Figure 4-A2: Correlation plots of variables in RECONNECT and CSES data set

Publications

All three studies of this work have been published as academic articles under peer-review in the following outlets. They are included in this work as they appear in the respective journal, meaning that citation and other style elements may vary between chapters.

Chapter 2:

Kleinert, M; Schlueter, E. 2020. Why and when do citizens support populist right-wing social movements? Development and test of an integrative theoretical model, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 48:9, 2148-2167, DOI: 10.1080/1369183X.2020.1763788.

Chapter 3:

Kleinert, M. 2023. Reconsidering the Relationship Between Anti-immigration Attitudes and Preferences for the AfD Using Implicit Attitudes Measures. *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*. DOI: 10.1007/s11615-023-00500-3.

Chapter 4:

Kleinert, M. 2024. Parliamentary Status and Drivers of Sympathy for the Radical Right. *Swiss Political Science Review*, DOI: 10.1111/spsr.12591.

Summary

Right-wing Populist Parties established themselves in most European party systems. As these parties ‘challenge the liberal foundations of contemporary advanced democracies’ (Pirro 2023), they have attracted a vital and diverse strand of social science research to explain this success. The most influential and fruitful trajectories of such research are micro-level explanations, usually based on individual attitudes assessed through surveys. Existing research has examined a wide range of such attitudes, with anti-immigration attitudes (Rooduijn 2018), political dissatisfaction (Klein et al. 2018) and economic deprivation (Gidron and Hall 2017) among the most prominent. Notwithstanding this empirical progress, this strand of research has not always kept pace with methodological innovations in the social sciences. This is particularly unfortunate as new techniques open up more detailed perspectives on these findings. This perceived gap in current research marks the starting point for the present study. Using Structural Equation Modelling, we will first integrate and highlight interrelationships between the theoretical perspectives mentioned above (chapter 2). We will then investigate, how implicit attitudes (Greenwald and Banaji 2017) allow an estimate of the extent to which well-known biases, namely social desirability and avoidance of cognitive dissonance, distort the impact of anti-immigration attitudes on sympathy for the Radical Right (chapter 3). Lastly, using micro-meso moderations – interactions between party system characteristics and individual attitudes –, we will deepen existing knowledge about how isolation or governmental participation of such Radical Right-wing Populist Parties relates to changes in individual attitudes (chapter 4). Results of the first study reveal that economic deprivation influences sympathy for Pegida – a Right-wing Populist Movement – indirectly by increasing anti-immigration attitudes and political

Summary

dissatisfaction, which in turn are strong direct predictors. It also shows that these two factors interact and mutually reinforce each other in their effect on sympathy for Pegida. The results of the second study suggest that social desirability appears to be a relatively minor threat to valid results about the relationship between anti-immigration attitudes and sympathy for the AfD. On the other hand, respondents' avoidance of cognitive dissonance by respondents appears to lead to an overestimation of this effect in explicit surveys. The third study revisits the interaction effect between anti-immigration attitudes and political dissatisfaction from the first study. It shows that this effect varies with the parliamentary status of the party in question. When it is isolated, the effect is reinforcing, when it has governed in the past, there is no interaction and when it is part of the current government, the effect is reversed. This is interpreted as evidence that isolated Right-wing Populist Parties benefit from this status, because in this case political dissatisfaction is associated with a greater salience of a main motive – anti-immigration attitudes – for supporting them. Taken together, the results of this work suggest that sympathy with Right-wing Populism is rooted in different causes that are strongly interconnected at different levels. Thus, by applying innovative methodologies to primary and secondary survey data, this study integrates existing theoretical perspectives and deepens our empirical understanding of the micro-level success factors for Right-Wing Populism in Europe.

Chapter 1 Introduction

The Study of Right-Wing Populism

Before introducing the three independent – yet connected – studies of this work, this introductory chapter will set the frame of our research. After explicitly defining the area of study, recapturing history and contemporary forms of Right-Wing Populism and major theoretical and empirical explanations surrounding this phenomenon, the major scientific aims of this study are spelled out. Subsequently, the specific research questions guiding the remaining chapters of this work and the research designs developed to answer them are introduced.

Following this introduction, this work incorporates the three studies designed to answer the research questions in chapters 2 to 4. We will close with chapter 5, which summarizes the studies and their findings as well as their perceived relevance and implications for academic research and society.

Terms and definitions

The study of Right-wing Populism uses a wide range of definitions and terms. Important distinctions among them are: ‘Far-right’, ‘Extreme Right’, ‘Radical Right’, ‘Right-wing Populism’ and combinations of them, such as ‘Radical Right-wing Populist’ or ‘Extreme Right-wing Populist’ (Odmalm and Rydgren 2019; Castelli Gattinara 2020). The term ‘Far-right’ is mostly understood as an umbrella term, encompassing the ‘Extreme Right’ and the ‘Radical Right’. The former is characterized by ‘rejecting the constitutional order’ while the latter does not attempt ‘to destroy the democratic system’ (Pirro 2023, p. 105-106). Although there appears

to be relatively broad general acceptance of these minimal definitions, others have strived for more fine-grained distinctions between these terms (Carter 2018). Among such additional features, ‘populism’ is probably the most frequently added term, resulting in ‘Right-wing Populism’ or ‘Radical right-wing Populist Party’. Compared to the facets of ‘Right-wing’, this term is relatively new and its definition highly contested. An often-cited definition by Mudde (2004) highlights the importance of an element of ‘identity’ in politics when characterizing Populism. As a rather thin-centered ideology, it mainly rests on the idea of a deep divide between the ordinary good people and the current elites and identification with the former. More recent studies seek to identify several relatively well-defined criteria, which may include, for example, whether ‘the electorate sees the party as far right’ (Donovan 2020). Alternatively, some researchers split the term, defining ‘Populist’ and ‘Radical/Extreme Right’ separately and then identify parties that meet both criteria (Rooduijn et al. 2019). Despite this lack of an accepted definition, there is ‘a near consensus on which parties should be included in the party family’ (Rydgren 2007).

This study will focus solely on the Radical Right, thus parties and movements which tend to embrace nativist and authoritarian ideas, thereby opposing pluralism and minority rights of contemporary liberal democracies but not democracy in general (Castelli Gattinara 2020). For ‘Populism’ we closely follow the definition of Mudde (2004), defining it as the perception of society as separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, the ‘pure people’ and the ‘corrupt elite’, and that politics should be guided by a so-called ‘*volonté générale*’ (general will) of the people. We will limit our analyses to entities of the Radical Right also deemed ‘Populist’. This section set the frame for this study in terms of defining which actors are included.

The following short section defines the time frame of this study and places it in the context of the history of the far-right in Europe.

History of the post-war Far-Right in Europe

A common perspective clusters the success of Far-Right Parties in four waves (von Beyme 1988). The first wave includes the years from 1945 till 1955, with rather limited success of such parties. The second wave took place from 1955 to 1980, seeing ‘right-wing populist flash parties’ (Mudde 2020). The third wave from 1980 until 2001 gave rise to the Front National (FN) in France, the FPÖ in Austria and the Lega Nord (LN) in Italy. The fourth wave is characterized by a heavily growing electoral support of Radical Right-wing Parties and also the successful establishment of such parties in former exceptional cases such as Germany and Sweden (Arzheimer and Berning 2019; Rydgren and van der Meiden 2019). This fourth wave was accompanied by increasing scholarly interest in this party family. The studies presented in this work also focus on this time frame and mainly on the time after the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015, which is regarded as yet another catalyst for the party family (Mudde 2020).

Organizational forms of Right-Wing Populism

Although public and scholarly interest has focused on parties, these are not the only form of occurrence of Right-wing Populism. Movements also transport these concepts and can be classified according to their ideology, similar to parties. Researchers have noted that Right-wing Populist Parties may often be characterized as ‘Movement Parties’. This terminology takes account of the empirical observation, that such parties sometimes display characteristics of movements and parties alike

(Minkenberg 2018, Pirro 2019). For this study, we define parties as political actors that compete for electoral support in elections. If they do not run for elections and resort to ‘street politics’, we define them as movements (Kitschelt 2009, p. 3). Examples of such movements included, for example the *Identitarian Movement* (Mlejnková 2021) or Pegida, a xenophobic German movement which is also analyzed in this study. Right-wing Populism may also spread to public debates and society through NGOs, like political foundations, think tanks and media-outlets which are also promoting Right-wing Populist narratives and provide a platform for contemporary figures of the Far-right outside the party context. Examples for these organizational forms in Germany would be the (AfD-associated) *Desiderius-Erasmus-Stiftung*, the *Institut für Staatspolitik*, the weekly newspaper *Junge Freiheit* or the TV station *ServusTV* (Czymara and Bauer 2023; Borgers 2022). Contemporary advocates for the ideology of the Far-Right would include Götz Kubitschek, Michel Houellebecq or Éric Zemmour (Ågerup 2019; Kämper 2018).

However, in order to influence policies directly in their preferred way, the most important organizational form remains the political party, with the above-mentioned other structures mostly supporting the efforts of Right-wing Populist Parties to gain electoral support and governmental representation. As discussed above, Right-wing Populist Parties in Europe are of different age and historical background. Their organizational structure is equally diverse. Recently, scholars made attempts to identify common facets of this party family (Albertazzi and van Kessel 2021, 2023) going beyond existing case studies (Art 2008; Heinze and Weisskircher 2021; Höhne 2023).

Theoretical approaches

Several theories attempt to explain success of the Far-Right in post-war Europe. They vary considerably in their level of conclusiveness and are sometimes also labelled as ‘arguments’, ‘theses’ (Eatwell 2003), ‘deep explanations’ or, if they recur to a single variable or indicator, simply as ‘factors’ (Arzheimer 2018). They can further be grouped in demand-side, focusing on the perspectives of voters, and supply-side, highlighting the programmatic offers by parties, or – relatedly – in micro (the level of individual persons), meso (party characteristics or facets of the party system) and macro level (institutional factors or national statistics) factors (Arzheimer 2018). The most prominent micro-based theories are ‘protest vote’, ‘personality traits’ and various types of ‘group threat’ theory, including ‘losers of modernization’. Meso-level and thereby mostly supply-side explanations include arguments related to a diversely defined ‘political opportunity structure’. These can be ‘polarization’ of the party system and ‘relative distances’ between established parties as well as structure, organization, history and public appearance of the Radical Right-wing Populist party itself. For example, it has been contested, whether a constitutive feature of such parties is a ‘strong leader’ (van der Brug and Mughan 2007). Macro-level arguments consider – on the one hand – ‘institutional’ factors like the electoral system, the welfare state and (de)centralization (Arzheimer 2018). On the other hand ‘structural/context-related factors’ (Amengay and Stockemer 2019, p. 30) are investigated, mostly economic or societal indicators like economic growth (Sipma and Berning 2021), unemployment (Sipma and Lubbers 2020), crime (Burscher, van Spanje et al. 2015) or immigration (Amengay and Stockemer 2019). Another strand focuses on the media as an explanatory variable (Schroeder 2019; Sheets, Bos et al. 2016).

The chapters of this study mostly focus on individual attitudes in the tradition of group threat theory (Blumer 1958, Blalock 1967, Stephan and Stephan 2017, Obaidi et al. 2018). It is based on the perception, that perceived threats, resulting from the competition of majority and minority group members for scarce material resources (e.g. on the labor market or for political influence) and immaterial issues (e.g. language or religion) leads to higher anti-immigration attitudes. Chapter 4 also considers the meso-level variable of the parliamentary status of European Radical Right-wing Populist Parties to explain effect differences on the individual level. Two chapters also include political dissatisfaction as an explanatory variable. However, it should be noted, that political dissatisfaction is explicitly or implicitly understood as a result of economic deprivation and therefore as a consequence of perceived or real competition for scarce resources rooted in group threat theory.

Empirical findings

As the previous section already signalized, a broad range of predictors on the individual level were tested for their empirical power in explaining support for the Radical Right. These ranged from basic sociodemographic variables, such as gender and education (Stockemer et al. 2018; Spierings and Zaslove 2017) and personality traits like authoritarian attitudes (Dunn 2015; Lubbers and Coenders 2017) to political attitudes, such as distrust of politics and attitudes towards specific policies (Bowler et al. 2017; Rooduijn 2018; Muis et al. 2021). However, certain factors stand out in their frequency of usage and ability to explain sympathy for the Radical Right on the individual level. Among the most important factors are *anti-immigration attitudes* (Oesch 2008; Rydgren 2008; Berning and Schlueter 2016;

Golder 2016; Lubbers and Coenders 2017; Schmitt-Beck 2017; Spierings and Zaslove 2017; Arzheimer 2018; Goerres et al. 2018; Hambauer and Mays 2018; van Hauwaert and van Kessel 2018; Rama Caamaño and Cordero 2018; Rooduijn 2018; Schröder 2018; Stockemer et al. 2018; Kleinert 2021; Muis et al. 2021; Savage 2023); *economic deprivation* (Lux 2018; Sthamer 2018; Tutic und von Hermann 2018; Arzheimer 2018; Gidron and Hall 2017) and *political dissatisfaction* (Klein, Heckert, and Peper 2018; Rippl und Seipel 2018; Bieber et al. 2018). As discussed above, this study is set out to investigate well-known and influential variables to explain sympathy for right wing Populism in more detail. We will thus focus on these three variables as major theoretical perspectives of this study.

We generally define these variables as follows. Despite their prominent use in many studies and the diverse set of operationalizations (Stockemer et al. 2018), anti-immigration attitudes are rarely explicitly defined. For this study, we define this term as explicit and implicit negative evaluations of immigrants or immigration. Our concept of economic deprivation, we define as a disadvantaged socioeconomic positioning believed to be unjustified (Klandermans 2004; van Stekelenburg et al. 2019). Political dissatisfaction is defined as the attitudinal expression of dissatisfaction with the performance of the government (Torcal 2011). In chapter 4, we further introduce a concept labelled ‘parliamentary status’, which represents a party’s degree of inclusion in national decision-making processes split in three categories: Isolation (also labelled ‘cordon sanitaire’ or ‘pariah status’ (Moffitt 2022), prior governmental participation and to-date governmental participation.

Scientific aims

The aim of this dissertation is to demonstrate how innovative methodologies can be applied to the study of Right-wing Populism in order to extend our empirical understanding of its' micro-level predictors. Rather than investigating 'new' variables that might add explanatory power, the objectives of the present work are guided by previous findings and threefold in that regard. First, we attempt to integrate (Jaccard and Jacoby 2010) well-known influential factors in a coherent framework, which applies to Right-Wing Populist movements (chapter 2). This theoretical schema is then tested empirically against multiple datasets to further assure of the accuracy of our findings. The second objective picks up the most influential and popular factor within this schema. This second study investigates in detail the relationship between the most important explanatory variable (anti-immigration attitudes) and sympathy with Right-wing Populism by testing the influence of measurement biases (chapter 3). More precisely, biases through social desirability and avoidance of cognitive dissonance are investigated. We also extend the scope of this work by turning from movements to Right-wing Populist Parties, investigating sympathy for the AfD in Germany. Third, the perspective is broadened again as it focuses on the European level in order to investigate how the parliamentary conditions Right-wing Populist Parties face in their national context may alternate micro-level effects (chapter 4). As Right-wing Populist Parties are completely isolated by other parties in some countries and actively governing in others, correlations of this factor with individual attitudes are analyzed. The following sections explain in more detail, which theoretical considerations and

particular research questions guided these chapters. A subsequent section discusses the data and methods employed in each chapter in comparative perspective.

Research questions and structure of this study

Each chapter of this study encompasses one scientific article that answers a particular research question. These chapters and research questions are:

Chapter 2 Why and when do citizens support populist rightwing social movements? Development and test of an integrative theoretical model

Right-wing Populism is not limited to political parties. The first article investigates sympathy with Pegida, a Right-wing Populist movement. Micro-level research on such movements are usually based on interviews with participants of demonstrations (Reuband 2015; Vorländer, Herold, and Schäller 2015). However, this chapter adopts a different approach. By drawing on general survey data, we are able to relate common explanatory factors of sympathy with Right-wing Populist Parties to sympathy with this Right-wing Populist movement among the general public, not only participants. The research questions of this chapter reads:

What are the microlevel mechanisms that explain citizens' support of populist social movements? How are these factors inter-related?

An integrative theoretical model is developed, which highlights the key roles of anti-immigrant attitudes and political dissatisfaction mediating the effect of socioeconomic deprivation on citizens' sympathy with Pegida. Additionally, the model suggests that political dissatisfaction moderates the effect of anti-immigrant

attitudes on the dependent variable. Combined, this approach advances scholarly understanding of not only why, but also how and under what conditions citizens support extra-parliamentary Right-wing Populist actors exemplified by Pegida. Seven independently collected cross-sectional general population surveys are analyzed through Structural Equation Models (SEM) to test the model and especially its mediating and moderating components empirically. The discussion focuses on the reliability of the proposed moderated mediation and discusses its implications.

Chapter 3 Reconsidering the Relationship between Anti-Immigration Attitudes and Preferences for the AfD Using Implicit Attitudes Measures

In empirical research on the Radical Right, anti-immigration attitudes are probably the most widely-used factor in quantitative analysis. However, the often robust effect of this variable on sympathy for the Radical Right overwhelmingly rests on explicit self-reports. These are prone to well-known biases. Two that appear especially relevant in the context of Right-Wing Populism, due to its wide spread stigmatization in society and rigorousness of its core identity are social desirability bias and avoidance of cognitive dissonance. Social desirability bias, meaning that respondents' adjust their answers according to assumed or real social standards (Chung and Monroe 2003), may actually have lowered the impact of anti-immigration attitudes on sympathy for a Right-wing Populist party. Avoidance of cognitive dissonance on the other hand may have artificially pushed the correlation between these variables, as respondents may have given answers perceived as a harmonic match, rather than their true – less coherent – ideology in order to avoid cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1957; Harmon-Jones and Harmon-Jones 2007). The research question therefore is:

How do social desirability and avoidance of cognitive dissonance affect the relationship between Anti-immigration attitudes and sympathy for the AfD?

It is argued, that implicit attitudes may be able to circumvent these biases as they recur on unconsciously activated attitudes (Bos et al. 2018). Thus, it is theorized that a comparison between the effect sizes of implicit and explicit attitudes in explaining sympathy for a Right-wing Populist Party can give an estimate of the extent of these biases. Using the AfD as a test case, this study therefore assessed implicit and explicit self-reports within one survey. The analysis investigates the differences in effect sizes between these variables and relates the findings back to its' research question and hypotheses.

Chapter 4 Parliamentary Status and Drivers of Sympathy for the Radical Right

While macro-level factors, for example immigration rates (Arzheimer 2009) have received considerable attention in contemporary studies on Right-Wing Populism, meso level factors that consider the degree of parliamentary inclusion of Right-wing Populist Parties in their national parliament are rare. This chapter focuses on how the supply-side feature of the parliamentary status of a radical Right-wing Populist Party can affect micro-level factors explaining support for such parties. The level of parliamentary inclusion of a party, which can range from current governmental participation over inclusion in previous coalitions up to isolation (cordon sanitaire) is theorized to affect how political dissatisfaction and anti-immigration attitudes

distinctly and jointly explain sympathy for these parties. The research question guiding this chapter therefore reads:

How does the parliamentary status of Radical Right Parties affect microlevel factors of support?

Drawing on different theoretical and empirical foundations, it is expected that political isolation reinforces a main motive – anti-immigration attitudes – particularly for those who are dissatisfied with current politics. The empirical analysis uses 15 national samples from two distinct data sets to test these premises. The discussion reflects on the studies implications on mainstream parties’ strategies in dealing with parties of the Populist Radical Right.

Research designs, data and methods of data analysis

This study employs advanced statistical methods to test its hypotheses. Table 1-1 lists the various data sets and designs this study employs when answering the specific research questions. These are briefly summarized in this section.

Chapter 2 employs several high-quality Germany-based survey data sets: four waves of the GLES *Langfrist-Online-Tracking*, two rounds of the *Deutschland-Trend* and one round of the *Politbarometer*. Each of these encompass more than 1000 respondents, which were selected as representative samples of the German public and interviewed via telephone or web-based applications. The selection of these data sets was based on the availability of certain variables necessary to conduct the analyses. However, since sampling procedures and wording of our main variables

Chapter 1 Introduction

Chapter and Title	Chapter 2: Why and when do citizens support populist rightwing social movements? Development and test of an integrative theoretical model	Chapter 3: Reconsidering the Relationship between Anti-Immigration Attitudes and Preferences for the AfD Using Implicit Attitudes Measures	Chapter 4: Parliamentary Status and Drivers of Support for the Radical Right
Author(s)	Manuel Kleinert, Elmar Schlüter	Manuel Kleinert	Manuel Kleinert
Geographical Scope	Germany	Germany	Europe
Object under study	Movement	Party	Party Family
Method	SEM with moderated mediation	Multi-group Regressions with moderations Sensitivity and Multiverse Analysis	Regressions with moderations Sensitivity Analysis
Data type	Surveys	Survey and Experimental data	Surveys and Parliamentary data
Data source	Secondary	Primary	Secondary
Data name	Deutschland-Trend, GLES, Politbarometer	PAIED	RECONNECT, CSES
Data scope	7 surveys with ~1000 persons each	Survey + Implicit Association Tests (IATs) of ~400 persons	15 national samples with ~1000 persons each
Main dependent variable(s)	Sympathy for Pegida	Ex- and implicit Sympathy for AfD	Sympathy for an European Radical Right Party
Main independent variables	Economic Deprivation, Political Dissatisfaction, Anti-immigration Attitudes	Ex- and implicit Anti-immigration Attitudes	Anti-immigration Attitudes, Political Dissatisfaction, Parliamentary status (meso)
Research Question	What microlevel mechanisms explain citizens' support of Pegida?	How do social desirability and avoidance of cognitive dissonance affect the relationship between Anti-immigration attitudes and sympathy for the AfD?	How does the parliamentary status of Radical Right Parties affect microlevel factors of support?
Publication	Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 2020	Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 2023	Swiss Political Science Review, 2024

Table 1-1: Overview of chapters and studies

vary considerably between these data sets, each of these samples serves as a cross-validation of the achieved results. The analysis conducted in this chapter employs Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) in combinations with moderated mediations.

This allows us to conduct a targeted test of our theoretically developed schema, which includes moderating and mediating relationships, with each of our data sets. The results provide the backdrop for the subsequent analyses in chapter 3 and 4, which transfer selected theoretical elements to the realm of Right-Wing Populist Parties.

Chapter 3 continues the efforts of chapter 2 in investigating predictors for sympathy with Right-wing Populism. However, instead of a movement, it focuses on the AfD as a Right-wing Populist Party and a particularly strong explanatory factor in research on the Radical Right in general and especially the AfD: Anti-immigration attitudes. This chapter looks at this variable through the lens of implicit attitudes. By employing experimental data from two Implicit Association Tests (IAT) within an online survey, it goes beyond usual explicit measurements. Implicit attitudes allow for an ‘automatic, unconsciously activated’ (Bos et al. 2018, p. 70) assessment of the respondent’s attitude towards an object. However, other than previous studies employing such implicit attitudes, this study collects these attitudes at both ends of the statistical equation, at the independent and the dependent variable. A powerful, yet parsimonious multi-group design with interaction terms allows the test of potential biases distorting the relationship between anti-immigration attitudes and sympathy for the AfD. A sensitivity analysis and a multiverse analysis reaffirm of the achieved results. The data for these analyses is primary data, collected on an

online sample of nearly 400 persons, closely representing the German population in terms of gender and age. Data collection and analyses were conducted as described in a pre-registered report published prior to data collection. The data set was published along with the findings to allow for smooth replication efforts.

Chapter 4 broadens the perspective on Radical Right-wing Populist Parties from the national level to the European level. From two international data sets, the *RECONNECT* and the *CSES* surveys, a total of 15 national samples, encompassing more than 1000 respondents each, are analyzed. Again, the empirical findings of chapter 2 inspired the approach of this chapter. However, instead of an integrated theoretical model (chapter 2) or a single variable (chapter 3), this chapter investigates an interaction term in more detail: the interdependence between anti-immigration attitudes and political dissatisfaction. To do so, additional meso-level data is collected: The parliamentary status of a Radical Right-wing Populist Party in its respective country. It is then theorized, that this parliamentary status may influence the mathematical sign and statistical significance of the interaction effect. A multi-group OLS-Regression model is employed to test for this expectation. Additional sensitivity analyses support the findings.

As becomes evident from these cursory descriptions of the methodologies of the individual chapters, this study investigates different entities of the Radical Right (movements and parties) at different geographical levels (Germany and European countries), uses a broad range of data sets (secondary, primary, experimental and meso-level data) and employs various statistical methods (Structural Equation Modelling, Regressions, Multi-group and interaction analyses) to test its research

questions. It also adheres to current standards of open science and reproducibility by transparently describing the steps of all analyses, pre-registering analyses, sharing collected data and code for preparation and conduction of analyses, as well as providing empirical estimates of limitations through multiverse and sensitivity analyses. However, it deliberately focuses on a relatively small range of investigated independent variables and one core dependent variable it seeks to explain, which is sympathy for the Radical Right. Thereby, rather than further widening this scientific field, the approach of this study enables the various chapters to inform each other and deepens empirical knowledge on the Radical Right through innovative methods.

References

- Ågerup, Karl. 2019. The Political Reception of Michel Houellebecq's Submission. *European Review* 27(4):615–35. DOI: 10.1017/S106279871900019X.
- Albertazzi, Daniele, and Stijn van Kessel. 2021. Right-Wing Populist Party Organisation Across Europe: The Survival of the Mass-Party? Introduction to the Thematic Issue. *Politics and Governance* 9(4):224–27. DOI: 10.17645/pag.v9i4.5002.
- Albertazzi, Daniele, and Stijn van Kessel. 2023. Why Do Party Elites Incentivise Activism? The Case of the Populist Radical Right. *Party Politics*. DOI: 10.1177/13540688231189362.
- Amengay, Abdelkarim, and Daniel Stockemer. 2019. The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Meta-Analysis of Structural Factors. *Political Studies Review* 17(1):30–40. DOI: 10.1177/1478929918777975.
- Art, David. 2008. The Organizational Origins of the Contemporary Radical Right: The Case of Belgium. *Comparative Politics* 40(4):421–40. DOI: 10.5129/001041508X12911362383318.
- Arzheimer, Kai. 2009. Contextual Factors and the Extreme Right Vote in Western Europe, 1980-2002. *American Journal of Political Science* 53(2):259–75. DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00369.x.
- Arzheimer, Kai. 2018. Explaining Electoral Support for the Radical Right. Pp. 143–65 in *The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right*. Vol. 1, edited by J. Rydgren. Oxford University Press.
- Arzheimer, Kai, and Carl C. Berning. 2019. How the Alternative for Germany (AfD) and Their Voters Veered to the Radical Right, 2013–2017. *Electoral Studies* 60. DOI: 10.1016/j.electstud.2019.04.004.
- Berning, Carl C., and Elmar Schlueter. 2016. The Dynamics of Radical Right-Wing Populist Party Preferences and Perceived Group Threat: A Comparative Panel

- Analysis of Three Competing Hypotheses in the Netherlands and Germany. *Social Science Research* 55:83–93. DOI: 10.1016/j.ssresearch.2015.09.003.
- Bieber, Ina, Sigrid Roßteutscher, and Philipp Scherer. 2018. Die Metamorphosen der AfD-Wählerschaft: Von einer euroskeptischen Protestpartei zu einer (r)echten Alternative? *Politische Vierteljahresschrift* 59(3):433–61. DOI: 10.1007/s11615-018-0103-y.
- Blalock, Hubert M. 1967. *Toward a Theory of Minority-Group Relations*. New York: Wiley.
- Blumer, Herbert. 1958. Race Prejudice as a Sense of Group Position. *The Pacific Sociological Review* 1 (1): 3–7. DOI:10.2307/1388607.
- Borgers, Michael. 2022. Das umstrittene Medienerbe des Red-Bull-Chefs. *Deutschlandfunk*, October 24th.
- Bos, Linda, Penelope Sheets, and Hajo G. Boomgaarden. 2018. The role of implicit attitudes in populist radical-right support. *Political Psychology* 39(1):69–87. DOI:10.1111/pops.12401.
- Bowler, Shaun, David Denemark, Todd Donovan, and Duncan McDonnell. 2017. Right-Wing Populist Party Supporters: Dissatisfied but Not Direct Democrats. *European Journal of Political Research* 56(1):70–91. DOI: 10.1111/1475-6765.12166.
- Burscher, Bjorn, Joost van Spanje, and Claes H. Vreese. 2015. Owing the Issues of Crime and Immigration: The Relation between Immigration and Crime News and Anti-Immigrant Voting in 11 Countries. *Electoral Studies* 38:59–69. DOI: 10.1016/j.electstud.2015.03.001.
- Carter, Elisabeth. 2018. Right-Wing Extremism/Radicalism: Reconstructing the Concept. *Journal of Political Ideologies* 23(2):157–82. DOI: 10.1080/13569317.2018.1451227.
- Castelli Gattinara, Pietro. 2020. The Study of the Far Right and Its Three Es: Why Scholarship Must Go beyond Eurocentrism, Electoralism and Externalism. *French Politics* 18(3):314–33. DOI: 10.1057/s41253-020-00124-8.

- Chung, Janne, and Gary S. Monroe. 2003. Exploring Social Desirability Bias. *Journal of Business Ethics* 44(4):291–302. DOI: 10.1023/A:1023648703356.
- Czymara, Christian S., and Leo Bauer. 2023. Discursive Shifts in the German Right-Wing Newspaper *Junge Freiheit* 1997–2019: A Computational Approach. *German Politics* 1–28. DOI: 10.1080/09644008.2023.2231353.
- Donovan, Todd. 2020. Misclassifying Parties as Radical Right / Right Wing Populist: A Comparative Analysis of New Zealand First. *Political Science* 72(1):58–76. DOI: 10.1080/00323187.2020.1855992.
- Dunn, Kris. 2015. Preference for Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties among Exclusive-Nationalists and Authoritarians. *Party Politics* 21(3):367–80. DOI: 10.1177/1354068812472587.
- Eatwell, Roger. 2003. Ten Theories of the Extreme Right. Pp. 45–70 in *Right-wing extremism in the twenty-first century, Cass series on political violence*, edited by P. H. Merkl and L. Weinberg. London; Portland, Or: Frank Cass.
- Festinger, Leon. 1957. *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance*. Stanford University Press.
- Gidron, Noam, and Peter A. Hall. 2017. The Politics of Social Status: Economic and Cultural Roots of the Populist Right. *The British Journal of Sociology* 68 S1:57–84. DOI: 10.1111/1468-4446.12319.
- Goerres, Achim, Dennis C. Spies, and Staffan Kumlin. 2018. The Electoral Supporter Base of the Alternative for Germany. *Swiss Political Science Review* 24(3):246–69. DOI: 10.1111/spsr.12306.
- Golder, Matt. 2016. Far Right Parties in Europe. *Annual Review of Political Science* 19(1):477–97. DOI: 10.1146/annurev-polisci-042814-012441.
- Hambauer, Verena, and Anja Mays. 2018. Wer wählt die AfD? – Ein Vergleich der Sozialstruktur, politischen Einstellungen und Einstellungen zu Flüchtlingen zwischen AfD-WählerInnen und der WählerInnen der anderen Parteien. *Zeitschrift Für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft* 12(1):133–54. DOI: 10.1007/s12286-017-0369-2.

- Harmon-Jones, Eddie, and Cindy Harmon-Jones. 2007. Cognitive Dissonance Theory After 50 Years of Development. *Zeitschrift Für Sozialpsychologie* 38(1):7–16. DOI: 10.1024/0044-3514.38.1.7.
- Heinze, Anna-Sophie, and Manès Weisskircher. 2021. No Strong Leaders Needed? AfD Party Organisation Between Collective Leadership, Internal Democracy, and “Movement-Party” Strategy. *Politics and Governance* 9(4):263–74. DOI: 10.17645/pag.v9i4.4530.
- Höhne, Benjamin. 2023. How Democracy Works within a Populist Party: Candidate Selection in the Alternative for Germany. *Government and Opposition* 58(3):478–96. DOI: 10.1017/gov.2021.33.
- Jaccard, James, and Jacob Jacoby. 2010. *Theory Construction and Model-Building Skills. A Practical Guide for Social Scientists*. New York: Guilford Press (Methodology in the social sciences).
- Kämper, Gabriele. 2018. Hart am Wind. Rechte Lektüren zwischen Untergang und Offensive. *Feministische Studien* 36(2):251–68. DOI: 10.1515/fs-2018-0051.
- Kitschelt, Herbert. 2024. *Handbook of Party Politics* (By pages 278-290). SAGE Publications Ltd. DOI: 10.4135/9781848608047.
- Klandermans, Bert. 2004. The Demand and Supply of Participation: Social-Psychological Correlates of Participation in Social Movements. In *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, vol. 19, edited by David A. Snow, Sarah Anne Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi, 360– 379. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publ (Blackwell companions to sociology).
- Kleinert, Hubert. 2018. *Die AfD und ihre Mitglieder: Eine Analyse mit Auswertung einer exemplarischen Mitgliederbefragung Hessischer Kreisverbände*. 1. Auflage 2018. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH.
- Kleinert, Manuel. 2021. Abgehängt, fremdenfeindlich, oder einfach nur unzufrieden?: Entwicklung und Test eines theorieintegrierenden Modells zur Erklärung von Sympathie mit der AfD. Pp. 97–118 in *(In)Toleranz in der Einwanderungsgesellschaft?*, edited by S. Schulz, P. Siegers, B. Westle, and O. Hochman. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden.

- Kleinert, Manuel. 2023. Reconsidering the Relationship Between Anti-immigration Attitudes and Preferences for the AfD Using Implicit Attitudes Measures. *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*. DOI: 10.1007/s11615-023-00500-3.
- Lubbers, Marcel, and Marcel Coenders. 2017. Nationalistic Attitudes and Voting for the Radical Right in Europe. *European Union Politics* 18(1):98–118. DOI: 10.1177/1465116516678932.
- Lux, Thomas. 2018. Die AfD und die unteren Statuslagen. Eine Forschungsnotiz zu Holger Lengfelds Studie Die „Alternative Für Deutschland“: Eine Partei Für Modernisierungsverlierer? *KZfSS Kölner Zeitschrift Für Soziologie Und Sozialpsychologie* 70(2):255–73. DOI: 10.1007/s11577-018-0521-2.
- Minkenberg, Michael. 2019. Between party and movement: Conceptual and empirical considerations of the radical right’s organizational boundaries and mobilization processes. *European Societies*, 21(4), 463–486. DOI: 10.1080/14616696.2018.1494296.
- Mlejnková, Petra. 2021. The Transnationalization of Ethno-Nationalism : The Case of the Identitarian Movement. *Intersections* 7(1):136–49. DOI: 10.17356/ieejsp.v7i1.572.
- Moffitt, Benjamin. 2022. How Do Mainstream Parties ‘Become’ Mainstream, and Pariah Parties ‘Become’ Pariahs? Conceptualizing the Processes of Mainstreaming and Pariahing in the Labelling of Political Parties. In *Government and Opposition*, 57(3), pp. 385-403. DOI:10.1017/gov.2021.5.
- Mudde, Cas. 2004. The Populist Zeitgeist. *Government and Opposition* 39(4):541–63. DOI: 10.1111/j.1477-7053.2004.00135.x.
- Mudde, Cas. 2020. Riding the Fourth Wave. *IPPR Progressive Review* 26(4):296–304. DOI: 10.1111/newe.12175.
- Muis, Jasper, Tobias Brils, and Teodora Gaidytė. 2021. Arrived in Power, and Yet Still Disgruntled? How Government Inclusion Moderates “Protest Voting” for Far-Right Populist Parties in Europe. *Government and Opposition* 1–30. DOI: 10.1017/gov.2021.46.

- Odmalm, Pontus, and Jens Rydgren. 2019. Introduction: Comparing and Reconceptualising the (Populist) Radical Right. *European Political Science* 18(3):373–78. DOI: 10.1057/s41304-018-0158-7.
- Obaidi, Milan, Jonas R. Kunst, Nour Kteily, Lotte Thomsen, and James Sidanius. 2018. Living Under Threat: Mutual Threat Perception Drives Anti-Muslim and Anti-Western Hostility in the Age of Terrorism. *European Journal of Social Psychology* 48 (5): 567–584. DOI:10.1002/ejsp.2362.
- Oesch, Daniel. 2008. Explaining Workers Support for Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe: Evidence from Austria, Belgium, France, Norway, and Switzerland. *International Political Science Review* 29(3):349–73. DOI: 10.1177/0192512107088390.
- Pirro, Andrea L. P. 2019. Ballots and barricades enhanced: Far-right ‘movement parties’ and movement-electoral interactions. *NATIONS AND NATIONALISM*, 25(3), 782–802. DOI: 10.1111/nana.12483
- Pirro, Andrea L. P. 2023. Far Right: The Significance of an Umbrella Concept. *Nations and Nationalism* 29(1):101–12. DOI: 10.1111/nana.12860.
- Rama Caamaño, José, and Guillermo Cordero. 2018. Who Are the Losers of the Economic Crisis? Explaining the Vote for Rightwing Populist Parties in Europe after the Great Recession. *Revista Española de Ciencia Política* (48):13–43. DOI: 10.21308/recp.48.01.
- Reuband, Karl-Heinz. 2015. Wer demonstriert in Dresden für Pegida? Ergebnisse empirischer Studien, methodische Grundlagen und offene Fragen. *Mitteilungen des Instituts für Parteienrecht und Parteienforschung* 21: 133–143.
- Rippl, Susanne, and Christian Seipel. 2018. Modernisierungsverlierer, Cultural Backlash, Postdemokratie. *KZfSS Kölner Zeitschrift Für Soziologie Und Sozialpsychologie* 70(2):237–54. DOI: 10.1007/s11577-018-0522-1.
- Rooduijn, Matthijs. 2018. What Unites the Voter Bases of Populist Parties? Comparing the Electorates of 15 Populist Parties. *European Political Science Review* 10(3):351–68. DOI: 10.1017/S1755773917000145.

- Rooduijn, Matthijs, Stijn van Kessel, Caterina Froio, Andrea Pirro, Sarah Lange, Daphne Halikiopoulou, Paul Lewis, Cas Mudde, and Paul Taggart. 2019. *The PopuList: An Overview of Populist, Far Right, Far Left and Eurosceptic Parties in Europe*.
- Rama Caamaño, José, and Guillermo Cordero. 2018. Who Are the Losers of the Economic Crisis? Explaining the Vote for Rightwing Populist Parties in Europe after the Great Recession. *Revista Española de Ciencia Política* (48):13–43. DOI: 10.21308/recp.48.01.
- Rippl, Susanne, and Christian Seipel. 2018. Modernisierungsverlierer, Cultural Backlash, Postdemokratie. *KZfSS Kölner Zeitschrift Für Soziologie Und Sozialpsychologie* 70(2):237–54. DOI: 10.1007/s11577-018-0522-1.
- Rooduijn, Matthijs. 2018. What Unites the Voter Bases of Populist Parties? Comparing the Electorates of 15 Populist Parties. *European Political Science Review* 10(3):351–68. DOI: 10.1017/S1755773917000145.
- Rooduijn, Matthijs, Stijn van Kessel, Caterina Froio, Andrea Pirro, Sarah Lange, Daphne Halikiopoulou, Paul Lewis, Cas Mudde, and Paul Taggart. 2019. *The PopuList: An Overview of Populist, Far Right, Far Left and Eurosceptic Parties in Europe*. www.popu-list.org.
- Rydgren, Jens. 2007. The Sociology of the Radical Right. *Annual Review of Sociology* 33(1):241–62. DOI: 10.1146/annurev.soc.33.040406.131752.
- Rydgren, Jens. 2008. Immigration Sceptics, Xenophobes or Racists? Radical Right-Wing Voting in Six West European Countries. *European Journal of Political Research* 47(6):737–65. DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-6765.2008.00784.x.
- Rydgren, Jens, and Sara van der Meiden. 2019. The Radical Right and the End of Swedish Exceptionalism. *European Political Science* 18(3):439–55. DOI: 10.1057/s41304-018-0159-6.
- Savage, Lee. 2023. Preferences for Redistribution, Welfare Chauvinism, and Radical Right Party Support in Central and Eastern Europe. *East European Politics and Societies: And Cultures* 37(2):584–607. DOI: 10.1177/08883254221079797.

- Schmitt-Beck, Rüdiger. 2017. The “Alternative für Deutschland in the Electorate”: Between Single-Issue and Right-Wing Populist Party. *German Politics* 26(1):124–48. DOI: 10.1080/09644008.2016.1184650.
- Schröder, Martin. 2018. AfD-Unterstützer sind nicht abgehängt, sondern ausländerfeindlich. *SOEPpapers on Multidisciplinary Panel Data Research* (975).
- Schroeder, Ralph. 2019. Digital Media and the Entrenchment of Right-Wing Populist Agendas. *Social Media + Society* 5(4): 205630511988532. DOI: 10.1177/2056305119885328.
- Sheets, Penelope, Linda Bos, and Hajo G. Boomgaarden. 2016. Media Cues and Citizen Support for Right-Wing Populist Parties. *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* 28(3):307–30. DOI: 10.1093/ijpor/edv014.
- Sipma, Take, and Carl C. Berning. 2021. Economic Conditions and Populist Radical Right Voting: The Role of Issue Salience. *Electoral Studies* 74:102416. DOI: 10.1016/j.electstud.2021.102416.
- Sipma, Take, and Marcel Lubbers. 2020. Contextual-Level Unemployment and Support for Radical-Right Parties: A Meta-Analysis. *Acta Politica* 55(3):351–87. DOI: 10.1057/s41269-018-0120-2.
- Spierings, Niels, and Andrej Zaslove. 2017. Gender, Populist Attitudes, and Voting: Explaining the Gender Gap in Voting for Populist Radical Right and Populist Radical Left Parties. *West European Politics* 40(4):821–47. DOI: 10.1080/01402382.2017.1287448.
- Stephan, Walter G., and Stephan, Cookie W. 2017. Intergroup Threat Theory. In *The International Encyclopedia of Intercultural Communication*, vol. 39, edited by Young Yun Kim, 1–12. Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell (The Wiley Blackwell - ICA).
- Sthamer, Evelyn. 2018. Die AfD-Wahl als Antwort auf Statusängste? *Zeitschrift für Sozialreform* 64(4):563–91. DOI: 10.1515/zsr-2018-0026.

- Stockemer, Daniel, Tobias Lentz, and Danielle Mayer. 2018. Individual Predictors of the Radical Right-Wing Vote in Europe: A Meta-Analysis of Articles in Peer-Reviewed Journals (1995–2016). *Government and Opposition* 53(03):569–93. DOI: 10.1017/gov.2018.2.
- Torcal, Mariano. 2011. Dissatisfaction, Political. In *International Encyclopedia of Political Science*, edited by Bertrand Badie, Dirk Berg-Schlosser, and Leonardo Morlino, 689–691. Los Angeles: SAGE Publications.
- Tutić, Andreas, and Hagen von Hermanni. 2018. Sozioökonomischer Status, Deprivation und die Affinität zur AfD – Eine Forschungsnotiz. *KZfSS Kölner Zeitschrift Für Soziologie Und Sozialpsychologie* 70(2):275–94. DOI: 10.1007/s11577-018-0523-0.
- van der Brug, Wouter, and Anthony Mughan. 2007. Charisma, Leader Effects and Support for Right-Wing Populist Parties. *Party Politics* 13(1):29–51. DOI: 10.1177/1354068806071260.
- van Hauwaert, Steven M., and Stijn van Kessel. 2018. Beyond Protest and Discontent: A Cross-National Analysis of the Effect of Populist Attitudes and Issue Positions on Populist Party Support. *European Journal of Political Research* 57(1):68–92. DOI: 10.1111/1475-6765.12216.
- van Stekelenburg, Jacquélien, Bert Klandermands, and Stefaan Walgrave. 2019. Individual Participation in Street Demonstrations. In *The Wiley Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, vol. 67. 2nd ed., edited by David A. Snow, Hanspeter Kriesi, Holly J. McCammon, and Sarah Anne Soule, 369–391. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons Inc (Wiley Blackwell companions to sociology).
- von Beyme, Klaus. 1988. *Right-Wing Extremism in Western Europe*. Hoboken: Taylor and Francis.
- Vorländer, Hans, Maik Herold, and Steven Schäller. 2015. Wer geht zu PEGIDA und warum? Eine empirische Untersuchung von PEGIDA-Demonstranten in Dresden. *Schriften zur Verfassungs- und Demokratieforschung* 1: 1–80.

Chapter 2 Why and when do citizens support populist rightwing social movements? Development and test of an integrative theoretical model

Co-Authored by Elmar Schlüter

This is an original manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* on 14 May 2020 available at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2020.1763788>.

Kleinert, M; Schlüter, E. 2020. Why and when do citizens support populist right-wing social movements? Development and test of an integrative theoretical model, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 48:9, 2148-2167.

Abstract

What are the microlevel mechanisms that explain citizens' support of populist social movements? We address this question by focusing on the 'PEGIDA' (Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the Occident) protest groups in Germany, which became particularly prominent by attracting large numbers of attendees in street protests during the years 2015/16. We develop and test an integrative theoretical model that points to the key roles of anti-immigrant attitudes and political dissatisfaction as mediators linking subjective socioeconomic deprivation with citizens' support of the 'Pegida'-movement. Equally important, this model holds that citizens' political dissatisfaction moderates the nexus between anti-immigrant attitudes and support for 'Pegida'. The results based on data from seven cross-sectional general population surveys provide clear support for these predictions. Combined, these efforts help to advance scholarly understanding of not only why, but also how and under what conditions nonactivist citizens support anti-immigrant collective action as exemplified by the 'Pegida' movement.

Introduction

On 20 October 2014, Germany witnessed the gathering of approximately 350 citizens in the city of Dresden for the first public protest organised by PEGIDA (Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the Occident). This populist right-wing social movement immediately became known for its harsh anti-immigrant stances coupled with explicit expressions of political discontent. Yet little hinted that only three months later in January 2015, the weekly ‘Pegida’-demonstrations in Dresden would mobilise up to 17.000 citizens protesting mainly against a perceived ‘islamization’ of the West, nor that the ‘Pegida’ movement would soon inspire similar protests across European nation states (Berntzen and Weisskircher 2016). Whereas the number of protest participants dropped to 2.000–3.000 weekly participants in 2016 and 2017 (Berger, Poppe, and Schuh 2016), ‘Pegida’ attracted unprecedented large numbers of attendants from all over Germany.¹ Moreover, ‘Pegida’ is seen to have affected the public discourse on issues such as immigration and political dissatisfaction, and to possibly have fostered the success of populist right-wing political parties in the German political space. Given these influential social and political consequences, it comes as no surprise that researchers soon initiated efforts to uncover the sources underlying citizens’ participation in ‘Pegida’ protest events. Doubtlessly, these studies – typically conducted in situ during ‘Pegida’ protests (Reuband 2015; Vorländer, Herold, and Schäller 2015) – identified important micro-level factors associated with citizens’ actual participation in such events. However, without discouraging that line of research, to date it remains unclear to what extent the insights gained from those studies focusing on protest participants apply to the German general population’s attitudes towards ‘Pegida’. In

addition, most previous research in this field considers the factors associated with citizens' participation in 'Pegida'-protests in isolation. Consequently, this strand of studies has left largely unexamined the possibility of integrating different theoretical rationales presumed to shape citizens' attitudes on 'Pegida'. Indeed, perhaps one of the strongest challenges to researchers is to develop theoretical models and research designs that allow not only a better understanding of why, but also under what conditions citizens tend to support radical-right wing movements as exemplified by 'Pegida'. The present study just does that. In doing so, we aim to improve existing knowledge in this field by making four main contributions. First, on a theoretical level, we develop a concise theoretical model that specifies not only direct, but also indirect and interactive relations among key predictors of citizens' attitudes towards radical right-wing movements. In brief, we suggest that there is one important, but yet under-researched route via which subjective economic deprivation leads to stronger radical right-wing preferences, and that is through increasing anti-immigrant prejudice. Equally important, we then offer theoretical arguments that citizens' political dissatisfaction importantly moderates this mediating process. Second, on a methodological level, we take advantage of conditional indirect effect analysis (Preacher, Rucker, and Hayes 2007). Departing from most previous analyses in this field, this method enables us to examine the mediating and moderating relations implied by our theoretical expectations simultaneously, yielding adequate estimates and test statistics. Third, as an empirical contribution, along with Blee and Creasap (2010) we believe that the study of non-activists' attitudes towards right-wing movements deserves enhanced research attention. Four arguments support this view. First, nearly all existing studies on citizens' support for the 'Pegida'-movement restrict their focus to activists that participate in actual street demonstrations.

Consequently, we currently do not know whether findings from previous research generalise to the non-activist public. Second, various theoretical perspectives converge in suggesting that citizens' individual attitudes towards protests will importantly affect their actual protest participation (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975; Sweetman et al. 2019; van Stekelenburg, Klandermans, and Walgrave 2019). Third, when considered in its aggregate, citizens' attitudes towards the Pegida-protests might contribute to a 'climate of opinion' (Jeffres 2008) which, in turn, signals normative expectations about appropriate conduct towards the movement.² Fourth, citizens' attitudes may also be taken to indicate policy and voting preferences (Burstein 2003), hence public opinion towards the Pegida movement is of potential major relevance for the political realm. Thus, by investigating the preferences of non-activist citizens concerning the 'Pegida'-movement, we move that research into uncharted territory where there is considerable potential for advancing our understanding of the topic. Unlike much conventional research in this field, we also demonstrate the robustness of our findings by taking advantage of seven independent cross-sectional surveys of the German general population totalling $n = 7238$ respondents. Using such a broad empirical source is beneficial, for it decreases the risk of sampling error and thereby helps to establish the generalizability of our findings across different samples and operationalizations (Silberzahn et al. 2018).

Theoretical framework

What micro-level factors shape citizens' support of 'Pegida'? Given the scarcity of prior research on non-activists' attitudes towards populist right-wing movements, we synthesise three complementary sources to develop testable hypotheses for

answering this question. First, we draw on existing knowledge on the factors associated with citizens' actual participation in 'Pegida' protest events (Reuband 2015; Rehberg, Kunz, and Schlinzig 2016). Second, we consider the literature on microlevel sources underlying citizens' preferences for populist right-wing parties (Rydgren 2007; Muis and Immerzeel 2017; Arzheimer 2018). Third, we take advantage of previous theory and research on peoples' attitudes towards social movements (Snow and Soule 2010; van Stekelenburg, Klandermans, and Walgrave 2019) and right-wing movements more specifically (Blee and Creasap 2010; Caiani 2017). From these approaches we identify (1) relative socioeconomic deprivation, (2) anti-immigrant attitudes and (3) political dissatisfaction as key factors for understanding why and when citizens express attitudinal support to the far-right Pegida movement.

Relative socioeconomic deprivation

The first line of research that we consider here centres on people's relative socioeconomic deprivation (Runciman and Bagley 1969). Commonly defined as a disadvantaged socioeconomic positioning believed to be unjustified, feelings of relative deprivation feature prominently in grievance-based explanations of people's inclination to protest against authorities (Klandermans 2004; van Stekelenburg, Klandermans, and Walgrave 2019). By positing that citizens' populist political preferences centrally result from a disadvantaged socioeconomic positioning believed to be unjustified (Rydgren and Ruth 2011; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2018), the relative deprivation-account resembles related lines of argumentation (e.g. ethnic competition theory) that focus on citizens' socioeconomic positioning as indicated by, for example, individual unemployment (Rydgren and Ruth 2011). Implicit to this

account is the contention that the positive impact of relative socioeconomic deprivation on support for far-right collective actions results in part from heightened anti-immigrant attitudes and political dissatisfaction. However, these indirect relations are only rarely explicated and systematic empirical tests are largely missing. Yet empirically, a disadvantaged socioeconomic positioning ranks among the most prominent factors presumed to increase citizens' support of far-right-wing political actors (Arzheimer 2018).

Anti-immigrant attitudes

Another useful theoretical lens with which to approach the question for the drivers of citizens' preferences for populist social movements is group threat theory (Blumer 1958; Blalock 1967; see Stephan and Stephan 2017; Obaidi et al. 2018). At the microlevel, the vantage point of this perspective is that perceived threats from minority groups relating to scarce resource (e.g. labour market opportunities or political power) and/or symbolic issues (e.g. language, religion or norms) lead majority group members to express greater anti-minority attitudes. There is unequivocal evidence that perceived threats and anti-immigrant attitudes more generally rank among the most robust predictors of citizens' far-right populist party affiliations, voting intentions or manifest voting behaviours (Rydgren 2007; Arzheimer 2018). Presumably, because right-wing populist political parties pursue explicit anti-immigrant agendas, citizens support such collective actors in order to secure or restore the dominant status of their national in-group (e.g. Berning and Schlueter 2016). Consistent with this rationale, Kende, Lantos, and Krekó (2018) document a strong association between negative attitudes towards ethnic minorities and majority members' inclination to participate in anti-minority collective action. In

following this line of reasoning, we apply the same logic to explain citizens' preferences for the extra-parliamentary 'Pegida'-movement, which is well-known for its harsh anti-immigrant stances (Rehberg, Kunz, and Schlinzig 2016).

Political dissatisfaction

A third theoretical framework often employed to predict citizens' right-wing populist preferences centrally refers to citizens' political dissatisfaction (Rydgren 2007; Arzheimer 2018), broadly defined here as attitudinal expression of dissatisfaction with the performance of the government (Torcal 2011). Underlying the presumed association between citizens' dissatisfaction with the political system and their political preferences is the notion that right-wing political parties – in addition to adopting pronounced anti-immigrant positions – commonly portray themselves as parties protesting against established political collective actors. According to the theory, these self-portrayals make right-wing populist parties an attractive choice for those citizens' who feel politically dissatisfied. Similarly, unwelcomed policies have long been identified as motivational sources of citizens' participation in social movements (Kriesi et al. 1995; Meyer 2004). Given the strong protest agenda of the 'Pegida'-movement (Rehberg, Kunz, and Schlinzig 2016), it seems plausible to expect that citizens' political dissatisfaction will also shape their preferences for this relatively novel collective political actor outside the party sphere.

Developing an integrative theoretical model

The predictions of the three approaches above for explaining citizens' support of populist social movements are not mutually exclusive. Curiously, however, to date little is known about how socioeconomic relative deprivation, anti-immigrant

attitudes and political dissatisfaction might piece together. To improve upon this state of research, we develop below an integrative theoretical model that helps to understand how and under what conditions deprivation, anti-immigrant attitudes and political dissatisfaction shape citizens' preferences for radical right-wing movements. Figure 2-1 visualises the conceptual relations underlying this integrative model by means of a path model. At its core, the model rests on a sequential ordering such that economic deprivation affects both anti-immigrant attitudes (path a1) and political dissatisfaction (path a2), which themselves predict the dependent variable (path b1 and path b2). This end-to-end integration (Jaccard and Jacoby 2010; Krohn and Eassey 2014) is supported by existing theory and research. For example, ethnic conflict theory considers greater anti-immigrant attitudes to result from greater socioeconomic deprivation (Scheepers, Gijsberts, and Coenders 2002). Underlying this prediction is the proposition that majority members compete with immigrants for scarce resources on the labor- or housing market. Because most immigrants occupy relatively low socioeconomic positions, majority members with a similar socioeconomic positioning as immigrants will experience greater socioeconomic deprivation and thus express greater anti-immigrant attitudes. Likewise, previous research argues, that citizens' political dissatisfaction results in part from their perceived socioeconomic deprivation (Lubbers, Gijsberts, and Scheepers 2002). According to the literature, the socioeconomically worse-off tend to attribute their disadvantaged situation to the policies of the government and therefore show greater political dissatisfaction. Thus, both anti-immigrant attitudes respectively political dissatisfaction appear as theoretically distinct routes via which relative socioeconomic deprivation affects citizens' support for radical right-wing movements. Notice that treating deprivation and political dissatisfaction as sources

underlying far-right street protests corresponds to the concept of ‘mobilising grievances’ from the neighbouring body of research on social movements (van Stekelenburg, Klandermans, and Walgrave 2019, 376f.). Interestingly, there are strong theoretical arguments to expect that anti-immigrant attitudes and political dissatisfaction affect the dependent variable also in an interactive fashion. Developing and testing a moderating relation of that kind is beneficial, because it allows for a more comprehensive understanding of the situational conditions (Harris 1997) that shape negative citizens’ support of the ‘Pegida’-movement. Why, then, should we expect to find an interactive relation between anti-immigrant attitudes and political dissatisfaction? Recall that a primary objective of many populist social movements is to protect the interests of the national in-group vis-à-vis immigrants and immigration (Blee and Creasap 2011). As outlined above, to achieve these goals those citizens harbouring substantial negativity towards immigrants presumably express greater support of such movements. Yet at the same time, citizens differ in their level of political dissatisfaction. Specifically, for those harbouring substantial anti-immigrant attitudes, but feeling relatively satisfied with the political system, the need to support extra-parliamentary right-wing political actors should appear relatively low. In contrast, if the same citizens’ dissatisfaction with the government increases, supporting anti-immigrant social movements should appear as a promising opportunity to realise their populist political preferences. This means that the relative importance of citizens’ anti-immigrant attitudes for predicting their support of the ‘Pegida’-movement should be contingent on their level of political dissatisfaction (path b3). Notice that the logic underlying the hypothesised interaction between attitudes and political dissatisfaction also holds if we reverse the point of view. To illustrate, imagine a citizen who feels comparatively dissatisfied with the

government, but has no bias towards immigrants. Apparently, for this actor the need to support anti-immigrant social movements is relatively low. However, if the same actor's anti-immigrant attitude increases, then the importance of political dissatisfaction clearly should increase.




Figure 2-1. Conceptual diagram of the theoretical model. Rectangles denote the theoretical constructs, arrows denote presumed directions of influence. The black dot symbolizes the interaction between political dissatisfaction and anti-immigrant attitudes.

Hypotheses

We formulate three hypotheses to test the integrative theoretical model formulated above. First, focusing on the processes via which subjective states of socioeconomic deprivation might affect citizens' attitudes towards 'Pegida', we anticipate that anti-immigrant attitudes (hypothesis 1) and political dissatisfaction (hypothesis 2) will mediate the initial direct association between individual economic deprivation and attitudes towards 'Pegida'. Note that implicit to this hypothesis is the expectation that stronger subjective economic deprivation will be associated with greater anti-immigrant attitudes as well as greater political dissatisfaction, and that greater anti-immigrant attitudes, respectively political dissatisfaction, will be associated with

more positive attitudes towards ‘Pegida’. Considering the boundary conditions of the mediation process, we contend that political dissatisfaction moderates the association between anti-immigrant attitudes and ‘Pegida’-related attitudes. Second, we expect that the association of anti-immigrant attitudes with ‘Pegida’-related attitudes – and, by implication, the mediational process specified above – will be stronger for citizens expressing greater political dissatisfaction (hypothesis 3).

Data

One key limitation of survey-based studies relying on a single empirical source is that it remains unclear if using different survey data might alter the studies’ conclusions, e.g. due to systematic or random measurement error, variation in sampling frames or timing of the survey. Fortunately, the availability of multiple independently collected surveys containing adequate measures of our study variables offers a promising opportunity to overcome this limitation. Using multiple independent datasets is beneficial, for it helps to establish the reliability and generalizability of our findings across different stimuli and samples.

Inclusion criteria

We used three inclusion criteria to locate survey data sets suitable for hypothesis testing. The first criterion was that the study questionnaire had to contain adequate measures of respondents’ attitudes towards the ‘Pegida’-movement and of their self-reported economic deprivation, anti-immigrant attitudes and political dissatisfaction plus control variables. The second criterion was that, congruent with our focus on German citizens’ attitudes towards the ‘Pegida’ movement, the survey

data had to be collected among the general population. The third and final criterion was that the complete raw data had to be available for testing our models.

Data search

We used two main strategies for identifying suitable datasets. We began by searching the data catalogue of Gesis (DBK) (GESIS 2019) using combinations of the keywords Pegida and islamfeind* [anti-islam]. We then performed a complimentary search in combining the keywords from this initial search with the keywords Umfrage [survey], Befragung [poll] and Studie [study]. A total of $k = 7$ independent survey datasets met the inclusion criteria and were deemed eligible for the present research. Table 2-1 describes these datasets along with information on data collection modes, sampling, sample sizes and duration of the field phases:

Indicators

Table 2-2 and Appendix Table 2-A1 present the main variables and their exact wording in the study questionnaires. Below, we briefly comment on and illustrate the different operationalizations using selected indicators.

Evaluation of the ‘Pegida’-movement

Each study used a single indicator to assess respondents’ evaluation of the ‘Pegida’-movement. Representing evaluative statements, we take all of these indicators for assessing the dependent variable to represent attitudes. For example, in the GLES 27 study (Roßteutscher et al. 2015) respondents were asked: ‘In general, what do you think of the protest marches of the ‘Pegida’ movement?’ The Likert-type response

Data set	Sampling & mode	Sample size	Field phase	% Female	Age	Education (%)	Left-Right
D-Trend 1/2015	Dual-Frame, representative random, CATI	1.006	05.-06.01. 2015	46.7	53.42 (16.26) [18–95]	19 (low) 32 (mid) 50 (high)	n.a.
D-Trend 11/2015	Dual-Frame, representative random, CATI	1.003 *	02.-03.11. 2015	47.8	52.52 (16.20) [18–92]	16 (low) 34 (mid) 50 (high)	n.a.
Politbarometer	Quota sample (gender, age, education), partial random digit dialling, CATI	1.521	13.-15.01. 2015	47.7	n.a.	20 (low) 36 (mid) 45 (high)	5.42 (1.84) [1-11]
GLES 27	Quota online sample (gender, age, education), German citizens who use the internet for private purposes at least once a week	1.029	27.02.-13.03. 2016	48.8	42.88 (14.81) [18–101]	30 (low) 41 (mid) 29 (high)	5.56 (1.98) [1-11]
GLES 32	Quota online sample (gender, age, education), only German citizens using the internet for private purposes at least once a week	1.023	03.-17.06. 2016	47.5	45.31 (15.28) [18–86]	27 (low) 36 (mid) 38 (high)	5.34 (2.01) [1-11]
GLES 36	Same as GLES 32	1.084	16.-30.06. 2017	48.0	44.75 (15.28) [19–88]	26 (low) 38 (mid) 37 (high)	5.54 (2.09) [1-11]
GLES 37	Same as GLES 32	1.085	12.-23.09. 2017	47.4	44.60 (15.01) [18–92]	26 (low) 37 (mid) 37 (high)	5.41 (2.05) [1-11]

Table 2-1: Key facts of the data sets and descriptive statistics of the control variables. * Only half of the sample was asked questions related to the respondent's economic situation, thus our sample is reduced to about 490 persons. n.a.: not available.

Chapter 2 Why and when do citizens support populist rightwing social movements?

Dataset	Variable	Mean	SD	Min./Max.
Attitudes towards Pegida				
D-Trend (1/2015)	In general, do you have [great understanding], [moderate understanding], [few understanding] or [no understanding at all] for the protest marches of the 'Pegida' movement?	1.77	.86	1-4
D-Trend (11/2015)		1.64	.81	1-4
Politbarometer	Do you think the Pegida movement is [rather good] or [rather bad]?	1.18	.38	1/2
GLES 27	In general, what do you think of the protest marches by the Pegida movement? Please state your answer using this scale from +5 [strongly like] till -5 [strongly dislike].	4.06	3.38	1-11
GLES 32	Please indicate whether you [strongly support], [support], [oppose] or [strongly oppose] each of the following groups: (K) anti-Islam groups e.g. PEGIDA	1.44	.77	1-4
GLES 36		1.54	.84	1-4
GLES 37		1.45	.79	1-4
Socioeconomic Deprivation				
D-Trend (1/2015)	When you think about your own economic situation. Would you say your personal economic situation is [very good], [good], [rather not good] or [bad]?	1.90	.72	1-4
D-Trend (11/2015)		2.12	.64	1-4
Politbarometer	How would you assess your own economic situation today? Is it [good], [partly good, partly bad] or [bad]?	1.39	.59	1-3
GLES 27	Regarding your economic situation. How would you assess your own current economic situation?	2.51	.84	1-5
GLES 32		2.40	.82	1-5
GLES 36		2.35	.81	1-5
GLES 37		2.32	.82	1-5
Anti-immigrant attitudes				
D-Trend (1/2015)	Do you think it is [right] or [not right], that Germany accepts refugees, who ... Fled from war or civil war. Are facing prosecution based on political or religious reasons. Are facing prosecution based on their ethnicity. Have fled because they have no job and livelihood in their home country. Fled from their home country because of hunger and natural disasters. (Cronbach's Alpha: .62)	2.00	1.12	1-6

Chapter 2 Why and when do citizens support populist rightwing social movements?

D-Trend (11/2015)	What is your general opinion on Immigration: Has Germany rather [advantages] or [disadvantages] from immigration? *spontaneous: [both / neither nor] (coded as center category)	1.98	.93	1-3
Politbarometer	When you think of foreigners living in Germany: Taken all together, are they rather [advantageous], [disadvantageous] or [equally from both] (coded as center category) for Germany?	2.14	.93	1-3
GLES 27	Do you agree with the following statement? Immigrants should be obliged to adjust to German culture.	3.65	1.07	1-5
GLES 32		3.82	1.06	1-5
GLES 36		3.85	1.07	1-5
GLES 37		3.76	1.09	1-5
Political dissatisfaction				
D-Trend (1/2015)	Now you will hear some frequently stated opinions on politics and society. Please tell whether you [rather agree] or [rather disagree] with these statements. A) The government cares about the citizens` interests. B) Citizens have very limited influence on politics. C) Politics are too complicated for normal citizens to understand what is going on. (<i>Cronbach`s Alpha: .57; Note: Given the dichotomous scale of these items, we used tetrachoric correlation (Brown 1977) to calculate Cronbach`s Alpha.</i>)	2.96	.96	1-4
D-Trend (11/2015)	How satisfied are you with the national government? Are you [very satisfied], [satisfied], [rather not satisfied] or [not at all satisfied]?	2.68	.74	1-4
Politbarometer	How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the performance of the national government, consisting of CDU/CSU and SPD? How satisfied are you with the performance of the CDU/CSU within the government? How satisfied are you with the performance of the SPD within the government? (<i>Cronbach`s Alpha: .87</i>)	4.93	2.19	1-11
GLES 27	Are you rather satisfied or rather dissatisfied with the performance of the national government consisting of CDU/CSU and SPD?	6.07	2.20	1-11
GLES 32		6.45	2.28	1-11
GLES 36	When looking at each party of the government separately, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with their performances? (a) CDU (b) CSU (c) SPD (<i>Cronbach`s Alpha: .86, .84, .84, .85</i>)	6.13	2.29	1-11
GLES 37		5.93	2.34	1-11

Table 2-2. Descriptive statistics of the variables used. *Note:* For the analyses, all variables were standardized on a scale from 0 to 1. Socioeconomic deprivation, anti-immigration attitudes and political dissatisfaction were mean-centered.

options for this item ranged from 1 = 'strongly like' to 11 = 'strongly dislike'. We coded all indicators such that higher scores indicate a more positive attitude towards 'Pegida'.

Relative socioeconomic deprivation

From each survey dataset a single measure was available to assess respondents' perceived relative socioeconomic deprivation. To illustrate, one variant of these indicators for measuring the independent variable read: 'How would you assess your own current economic situation?' Response options were given on a 5-point Likert-type scale using the endpoints 1 = 'very good' and 5 = 'very bad'. Higher scores indicate greater socioeconomic deprivation.

Anti-immigrant attitudes

Both single and multiple indicators were at our disposal as approximate measures of respondents' anti-immigrant attitudes. In the Deutschland-Trend (1/2015) (ARD-Landesrundfunkanstalten and Infratest dimap 2015) survey, respondents were asked to indicate their position on the item: 'Do you think it is right or not right that Germany accepts refugees, who fled from war or civil war?' and four other items, each listing other reasons of migration. Cronbach's Alpha for all multiple item scales was good (see Table 2-2), indicating sufficient reliability to treat them as reflective indicators of a common construct. We created an index from the multiple indicators that is the average of the single items, with higher scores representing greater anti-immigrant sentiment. Note that the relative support of restrictive migration policies need not reflect anti-immigrant attitudes per se. Yet, research accumulates in demonstrating that greater negativity towards immigrants positively covaries with

congruent political claims (Ceobanu and Escandell 2010; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014). We take this evidence to justify the present use of this statement as proxy-measure of respondents' attitudes towards immigrants. For all the GLES-surveys (Roßteutscher et al. 2015, 2016, 2017, 2019), we chose respondents' agreement with the statement 'Immigrants should be obliged to adjust to German culture.' to assess anti-refugee sentiment. Answers were given on a 5-Point-Likert-Scale ranging from 1 'strongly disagree' to 5 'strongly agree'.

Political dissatisfaction

Political dissatisfaction was measured in a variety of ways, using both single and multiple indicators. For example, in the Politbarometer survey (Forschungsgruppe Wahlen 2016) respondents were asked 'How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the performance of the national government, consisting of CDU/CSU and SPD?' This item was then followed by similar ones regarding the separated performance of CDU/CSU and SPD in the government. Answer reactions were assessed on an 11-point Likert-type scale ranging from -5 = 'completely dissatisfied' to 5 = 'completely satisfied'. Cronbach's Alpha for all multiple item scales was good (see Table 2-2). From the multiple indicators, we created an index that is the average of the single items, with higher scores representing greater political dissatisfaction.

Control variables

Given the correlational nature of our data, we included several control variables to reduce the risk of third variable bias among the variables under study. Political self-orientation was measured on an 11-point rating scale with the endpoints 1 = 'left' and 11 = 'right'. Unfortunately, this variable was not available in both Deutschland-

Trend surveys. Gender was assessed in two categories (0 = 'men' and 1 = 'women') while age was measured in 10 grouped categories for all datasets as there was no other format available in the Politbarometer survey. Finally, we accounted for educational attainment, measured in three categories: 'low', 'medium' and 'high'. Descriptive statistics for each of the control variables in our model are shown in Table 2-2.

Method

We employed path analyses (Kline 2016) to accurately test our predictions for or all $k = 7$ data sets. This approach is particularly well-suited for the present purposes as it allows the simultaneous estimation of the mediating (i.e. the indirect paths from socioeconomic deprivation via anti-immigrant attitudes and political dissatisfaction to 'Pegida'-related attitudes) and moderating relations (i.e. the interaction between anti-immigrant attitudes and political dissatisfaction) among the variables under study. Such path analyses are known as moderated mediation or, synonymously, conditional indirect effects analyses (Kline 2016, 434; Preacher, Rucker, and Hayes 2007; Baron and Kenny 1986). Technically, before hypotheses testing, we first examined the presence of a direct association between citizens' relative socioeconomic deprivation and their 'Pegida'-related attitudes, holding all other variables constant. Next, we examined the presence of significantly positive indirect slopes for the paths from relative deprivation via attitudes and political dissatisfaction on positive attitudes towards the 'Pegida'-movement. Finally, we tested for the presumed moderating relation between anti-immigrant attitudes and political dissatisfaction. All analyses reported here are based on bootstrapped

parameter estimates and standard errors estimated routine implemented in Lavaan,³ version 0.6-5 (Rosseel 2012) and were conducted separately for each survey dataset.⁴

Results

All results referred to hereafter are depicted in Figure 2-2. Our first hypothesis predicts that anti-immigrant attitudes mediate the positive association of relative socioeconomic deprivation with attitudes towards the ‘Pegida’-movement. To examine the empirical adequacy of this expectation, we regressed attitudes towards the ‘Pegida’-movement (dependent variable) and anti-immigrant attitudes (mediating variable) on relative socioeconomic deprivation (independent variable), while simultaneously regressing the dependent variable on the mediator. Additionally, all control variables were held constant. In line with the theoretical expectations, the slope coefficients indicating the association between relative socioeconomic deprivation and anti-immigrant attitudes (path a1) were in six out of seven datasets significantly positive ($p < .05$). This means that those respondents who evaluated their socioeconomic situation as more negative showed greater anti-immigrant attitudes. The data also showed uniformly significant positive slope coefficients of anti-immigrant attitudes with attitudes towards the ‘Pegida’-movement (path b1). As expected, this indicates that those respondents who express stronger anti-immigrant attitudes evaluate the ‘Pegida’-movement more positively. Most importantly, the indirect association between individual economic deprivation and attitudes towards the ‘Pegida’-movement via anti-immigrant attitudes (path $a1 \times path\ b1$) turned out to be consistently significantly different from zero, while the direct coefficients (\hat{c}) were not significant in any model. Given that the data across all surveys revealed

such a significant mediating relation, we take these results as clear support for hypothesis 1.

Testing hypothesis 2 required essentially the same statistical tests as before, but here we focused on political dissatisfaction as the presumed mediating variable. Accounting for the control variables, for all samples the data revealed a significantly positive slope for the association between socioeconomic deprivation and political dissatisfaction (path a2) as well as for the association between political dissatisfaction and citizens' support of 'Pegida' (path b2). Further, consistent with our expectations, political dissatisfaction proved to mediate the association between relative socioeconomic deprivation and attitudes towards the 'Pegida'-movement (path $a2 \times path\ b2$). This indirect effect turned out to be significantly positive for all samples, which we take as clear support for hypothesis 2. Do higher level of political




Figure 2-2: Forest-Plots of bootstrapped standardized regression coefficients. Circles describe point estimates, and bars describe 95% confidence intervals.

dissatisfaction amplify the importance of anti-immigrant attitudes for expressing support to the ‘Pegida’-movement, as hypothesis 3 leads us to expect? The results suggest an affirmative answer to this question: The samples showed a significantly positive slope associated with the anti-immigration attitudes \times political dissatisfaction interaction term (path b3). Notably, this relation remained intact for six of the seven samples.⁵ To illustrate, if we were to move from the politically most satisfied to the politically most dissatisfied respondents in the Deutschland-Trend (11/2015) sample, the estimated parameter for having strict anti-immigration attitudes would rise from .05 to up to .45 points on the 0–1 ‘Pegida’ scale. We therefore conclude that political dissatisfaction robustly and importantly moderates the positive association of anti-immigrant attitudes with citizens’ attitudes towards the ‘Pegida’-movement. To foster a visual understanding of the nature of this interaction, Figure 2-3 plots the predicted values of respondents’ attitudes towards ‘Pegida’ for values one standard deviation below and above the mean of their political dissatisfaction respectively their anti-immigrant attitudes. The figure shows that for those citizens with relatively low levels of political dissatisfaction ($-1SD$), anti-immigrant attitudes was only modestly associated with their ‘Pegida’- related attitudes. However, for those citizens with relatively high levels of political dissatisfaction ($+1SD$), the slope of anti-immigrant attitudes gained considerably in strength. For completeness, Figure 2-4 shows Hayes’ (2015) index of moderated mediation. Essentially, this index comprises of the multiplication of the mediating (a_1 , a_2) and moderating paths (b_3). Accounting for the role of socioeconomic deprivation, these results reconfirm the interactive nature of the nexus between anti-immigrant attitudes and political dissatisfaction.

Discussion

Using Germans' attitudes towards the 'Pegida' social movement as empirical test case, this study sought (a) to elaborate the mediating mechanisms that explain support of populist collective action among the general population and (b) to shed new light on the situational circumstances under which such right-wing support increases. Combined, these efforts provide a more comprehensive picture of the relationships among relative socioeconomic deprivation, anti-immigrant attitudes and political dissatisfaction for predicting populist support. Before discussing the contributions of this research to existing knowledge as well as directions for future research, two words of caution are in order. First, we stress that this research relies on concurrent associations based on cross-sectional data only. Therefore, the present findings cannot confirm the directions of the statistical relations found. Rather, the sequential ordering of the constructs we advanced in this study was solely guided by existing theory and research.

Consistent with our expectations considerable evidence conceives of both anti-immigrant attitudes and political dissatisfaction as a function of relative economic deprivation (Goldstein and Peters 2014; Stockemer, Lentz, and Mayer 2018). Although we believe it is not very likely that attitudinal constructs referring to interethnic relations (i.e. anti-immigrant attitudes) or evaluative aspects of the government (i.e. political dissatisfaction) might predict peoples' self-reported relative socioeconomic standing (i.e. relative socioeconomic deprivation), the relation between anti-immigrant attitudes and support of the populist 'Pegida'-movement merits further attention. Conceivably, peoples' identification with the

Chapter 2 Why and when do citizens support populist rightwing social movements?




Figure 2-3: Interaction effect of anti-immigrant attitudes on attitudes towards Pegida for different levels of political dissatisfaction (blue = arithmetic mean, red = - 1SD, green = + 1SD). For the Deutschland-Trend (1/2015) and Deutschland-Trend (11/2015) datasets, the interaction effect is visualized for all four levels of the political dissatisfaction-variable.




Figure 2-4. Index of moderated mediation for both mediators. Circles describe point estimates, and bars describe 95% confidence intervals.

‘Pegida’-movement might itself enhance their negative attitudes towards immigrants or foster their dissatisfaction with the government. Longitudinal studies could help testing such alternative – albeit not necessarily contradictory – reciprocal relations (e.g. Berning and Schlueter 2016; Stephan and Stephan 2017), but such data seems unlikely to become available in the near future. Due to the observational character of our data we also cannot exclude the risk that some third undetermined factor is causing both anti-immigrant attitudes and attitudes towards the Pegida-movement. However, we were able to account for important control variables known from previous research, and find unequivocal support for our conclusions across seven independent large-scale survey studies. Second, this research shares the limitation of many secondary analyses of survey data, such that the indicators available were not optimal for the study purposes (Kiecolt and Nathan 1985). For example, some constructs could be assessed only by using single indicators, which might increase the influence of random measurement error. However, the convergence of results from hypothesis testing across multiple operationalizations and including multi-item scales testifies to the generalizability of our findings. Having discussed these caveats, we believe our findings offer two key contributions to the study of Germans’ attitudes towards the ‘Pegida’-movement and non-activists citizens’ support of populist social movements more generally. Empirically, to the best of our knowledge, this study is the first that describes and explains attitudes to the ‘Pegida’-social movement using general population samples. Thus, the present research helps to reduce the risk of inadequate generalisations from selective protest survey data (Walgrave and Verhulst 2011).⁶ However, due to data limitations we could not examine differences between participants and non-participants in actual street protests (e.g. Klandermans and Oegema 1987), which certainly represents a

profitably avenue for future research. Further, this study deviates from convention by utilising an unusually large number of independent survey data. Thus, the fact that we could test our predictions using multiple data sets adds to the generalizability of our conclusions. On a theoretical level, the sequential integration of well-established theoretical constructs yielded new insights on the mediating and moderating roles of anti-immigrant attitudes and political dissatisfaction. First, the results from hypotheses testing showed that it is adequate to conceive of citizens' negative attitudes towards immigrants as well as of their dissatisfaction with the government as mediating variables. This evidence helps us in understanding how citizens' supportive attitudes towards populist protest movements are shaped by their relative socioeconomic deprivation. Second – and equally important – the empirical results also provided firm evidence that the impact of people's anti-immigrant attitudes on their support of populist social movements is greater when feelings of political dissatisfaction become salient. This underlines how the predictive value of intergroup attitudes is contingent on the political environment. Combined, we take these results to indicate that citizens' support of populist social movements results as much from indirect influences of more distal factors (i.e. relative deprivation) as from the interaction of proximal factors (i.e. anti-immigrant attitudes and political dissatisfaction). Moving forward, it will be important to explore the validity of the conceptual model developed here for explaining related phenomena of populist collective action in alternative political and social contexts.

Notes

1. See <https://durchgezaehlt.org/pegida-dresden-statistik/> for data about the numerical size of the Pegida-Protests in Dresden and Leipzig in 2014–2016.
2. See Berning (2016) for evidence that aggregate threat perceptions contribute to radical right wing voting preferences in addition to individual threat perceptions.
3. For ease of interpretation and consistency with the remaining samples, we chose to model the dichotomous dependent variable in sample ‘Politbarometer’ using a linear regression model (Hellevik 2009).
4. It seems tempting to summarise the results from the single analyses using meta-analytic modeling strategies. Yet meta-analytic procedures for data collected using non-randomized research designs seem still in a relatively nascent stage. In fact, scholars are still actively debating how to treat standardised slope coefficients from multivariate regression models (Aloe and Becker 2011), let alone from models including indirect and interactive relations (i.e. conditional indirect effect models, Preacher, Rucker, and Hayes 2007). We therefore decided to refrain from putting our major empirical focus on conducting a meta-analysis.
5. We were curious whether the differences in the parameters estimates of the three GLES studies using identical indicators reflect sampling variation or indicate substantial differences. To examine this issue, we conducted a multi-group analysis of the three datasets (Kline 2016). According to the results, the parameter estimates show no significant differences. Results are available in tabulated form upon request.
6. Of course, survey data based on sampling frames of the general population face their own selection biases.

References

- Aloe, Ariel M., and Betsy Jane Becker. 2011. Advances in Combining Regression Results in Meta- Analysis. In *The SAGE Handbook of Innovation in Social Research Methods*, edited by Malcolm Williams, and W. Paul Vogt, 331–352. London: SAGE Publications.
- ARD-Landesrundfunkanstalten, and Infratest dimap. 2015. ARD-DeutschlandTrend 2015. ZA6229 Datenfile Version 1.0.0 GESIS Datenarchiv, Köln. DOI:10.4232/1.12654.
- Arzheimer, Kai. 2018. Explaining Electoral Support for the Radical Right. In *The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right*. Vol. 1., edited by Jens Rydgren, 143–165. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Baron, Reuben M., and David A Kenny. 1986. The Moderator–Mediator Variable Distinction in Social Psychological Research: Conceptual, Strategic, and Statistical Considerations. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 51 (6): 1173–1182. DOI:10.1037/0022-3514.51.6.1173.
- Berger, Roger, Stephan Poppe, and Mathias Schuh. 2016. Everything Counts in Large Amounts Zur Problematik der Zählung von Demonstrationsteilnehmern. In *PEGIDA – Rechtspopulismus zwischen Fremdenangst und ‚Wende‘-Enttäuschung? Analysen im Überblick*, edited by Karl-Siegbert Rehberg, Franziska Kunz, and Tino Schlinzig, 113–131. Bielefeld: transcript (X-Texte zu Kultur und Gesellschaft).
- Berning, Carl C. 2016. Contextual Perceived Group Threat and Radical Right-Wing Populist Party Preferences: Evidence from Switzerland. *Research & Politics* 3 (1): 1–7. DOI:10.1177/ 2053168016635670.
- Berning, Carl C., and Elmar Schlueter. 2016. The Dynamics of Radical Right-Wing Populist Party Preferences and Perceived Group Threat: A Comparative Panel Analysis of Three Competing Hypotheses in the Netherlands and Germany. *Social Science Research* 55: 83–93. DOI:10.1016/ j.ssresearch.2015.09.003.

- Berntzen, Lars Erik, and Manès Weisskircher. 2016. Anti-Islamic PEGIDA Beyond Germany: Explaining Differences in Mobilisation. *Journal of Intercultural Studies* 37 (6): 556–573. DOI:10.1080/07256868.2016.1235021.
- Blalock, Hubert M. 1967. *Toward a Theory of Minority-Group Relations*. New York: Wiley.
- Blee, Kathleen M., and Kimberly A Creasap. 2010. Conservative and Right-Wing Movements. *Annual Review of Sociology* 36 (1): 269–286. DOI:10.1146/annurev.soc.012809.102602.
- Blumer, Herbert. 1958. Race Prejudice as a Sense of Group Position. *The Pacific Sociological Review* 1 (1): 3–7. DOI:10.2307/1388607.
- Brown, Morton B. 1977. Algorithm AS 116: The Tetrachoric Correlation and its Asymptotic Standard Error. *Applied Statistics* 26 (3): 343. DOI:10.2307/2346985.
- Burstein, Paul. 2003. The Impact of Public Opinion on Public Policy: A Review and an Agenda. *Political Research Quarterly* 56 (1): 29–40. DOI:10.2307/3219881.
- Caiani, Manuela. 2017. Radical Right-Wing Movements: Who, When, How and Why? *Sociopedia.isa*, 1–15. DOI:10.1177/205684601761.
- Ceobanu, Alin M., and Xavier Escandell. 2010. Comparative Analyses of Public Attitudes Toward Immigrants and Immigration Using Multinational Survey Data: A Review of Theories and Research. *Annual Review of Sociology* 36 (1): 309–328. DOI:10.1146/annurev.soc.012809.102651.
- Fishbein, Martin, and Icek Ajzen. 1975. *Belief, Attitude, Intention and Behavior. An Introduction to Theory and Research*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley (Addison-Wesley series in social psychology).
- Forschungsgruppe Wahlen. 2016. Politbarometer 2015 (Kumulierter Datensatz inkl. Kurzbarometer). ZA6700 Datenfile Version 1.0.0. GESIS Datenarchiv, Köln. DOI:10.4232/1.12649.

- GESIS Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften. 2019. Datenbestandskatalog DBK. Version 2.2. <https://dbk.gesis.org/dbksearch/about.asp?db=e>.
- Goldstein, Judith L., and Margaret E Peters. 2014. Nativism or Economic Threat: Attitudes Toward Immigrants During the Great Recession. *International Interactions* 40 (3): 376–401. DOI:10.1080/03050629.2014.899219.
- Hainmueller, Jens, and Daniel J Hopkins. 2014. Public Attitudes Toward Immigration. *Annual Review of Political Science* 17 (1): 225–249. DOI:10.1146/annurev-polisci-102512-194818.
- Harris, William A. 1997. On ‘Scope Conditions’ in Sociological Theories. *Social and Economic Studies* 46 (4): 123–127. Hayes, Andrew F. 2015. “An Index and Test of Linear Moderated Mediation.” *Multivariate Behavioral Research* 50 (1): 1–22. DOI:10.1080/00273171.2014.962683.
- Hellevik, Ottar. 2009. Linear Versus Logistic Regression when the Dependent Variable Is a Dichotomy. *Quality & Quantity* 43 (1): 59–74. DOI:10.1007/s11135-007-9077-3.
- Jaccard, James, and Jacob Jacoby. 2010. *Theory Construction and Model-Building Skills. A Practical Guide for Social Scientists*. New York: Guilford Press (Methodology in the social sciences).
- Jeffres, Leo W. 2008. Climate of Opinion. In *The International Encyclopedia of Communication*, vol. 26, edited by Wolfgang Donsbach. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Kende, Anna, Nóra A. Lantos, and Péter Krekó. 2018. Endorsing a Civic (vs. an Ethnic) Definition of Citizenship Predicts Higher Pro-Minority and Lower Pro-Majority Collective Action Intentions. *Frontiers in Psychology* 9: 1402. DOI:10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01402.
- Kiecolt, K. Jill, and Laura E. Nathan. 1985. Secondary Analysis of Survey Data. 1. Print. Beverly Hills: Sage Publ (*Sage University Papers, Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences*, 53).
- Klandermans, Bert. 2004. The Demand and Supply of Participation: Social-Psychological Correlates of Participation in Social Movements. In *The*

Blackwell Companion to Social Movements, vol. 19, edited by David A. Snow, Sarah Anne Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi, 360– 379. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publ (Blackwell companions to sociology).

Klandermans, Bert, and Dirk Oegema. 1987. Potentials, Networks, Motivations, and Barriers: Steps Towards Participation in Social Movements. *American Sociological Review* 52 (4): 519. DOI:10.2307/2095297.

Kline, Rex B. 2016. *Principles and Practice of Structural Equation Modeling*. 4th ed. New York: Guilford Press (Methodology in the social sciences).

Kriesi, Hanspeter, Ruud Koopmans, Jan Willem Duyvendak, and Marco Giugni. 1995. *New Social Movements in Western Europe. A Comparative Analysis*. Minneapolis, MN: Univ. of Minnesota Press.

Krohn, Marv, and J. M. Eassey. 2014. Integrated Theories of Crime. In *The Encyclopedia of Theoretical Criminology*. 1 Auflage, edited by J. Mitchell Miller. New York, NY: Wiley, J.

Lubbers, Marcel, Merove Gijsberts, and Peer Scheepers. 2002. Extreme Right-Wing Voting in Western Europe. *European Journal of Political Research* 41 (3): 345–378. DOI:10.1111/1475- 6765.00015.

Meyer, David S. 2004. Protest and Political Opportunities. *Annual Review of Sociology* 30 (1): 125–145. DOI:10.1146/annurev.soc.30.012703.110545.

Mudde, Cas, and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser. 2018. Studying Populism in Comparative Perspective: Reflections on the Contemporary and Future Research Agenda. *Comparative Political Studies*, 001041401878949. DOI:10.1177/0010414018789490.

Muis, Jasper, and Tim Immerzeel. 2017. Causes and Consequences of the Rise of Populist Radical Right Parties and Movements in Europe. *Current Sociology. La Sociologie Contemporaine* 65 (6): 909–930. DOI:10.1177/0011392117717294.

Obaidi, Milan, Jonas R. Kunst, Nour Kteily, Lotte Thomsen, and James Sidanius. 2018. Living Under Threat: Mutual Threat Perception Drives Anti-Muslim and

Anti-Western Hostility in the Age of Terrorism. *European Journal of Social Psychology* 48 (5): 567–584. DOI:10.1002/ejsp.2362.

Preacher, Kristopher J., Derek D. Rucker, and Andrew F Hayes. 2007. Addressing Moderated Mediation Hypotheses: Theory, Methods, and Prescriptions. *Multivariate Behavioral Research* 42 (1): 185–227. DOI:10.1080/00273170701341316.

Rehberg, Karl-Siegbert, Franziska Kunz, and Tino Schlinzig, eds. 2016. PEGIDA – Rechtspopulismus zwischen Fremdenangst und ‘Wende’-Enttäuschung? Analysen im Überblick. *Public Sociology Forum; Public Sociology Forum der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Soziologie*. Bielefeld: transcript (X-Texte zu Kultur und Gesellschaft).

Reuband, K.-H. 2015. Wer demonstriert in Dresden für Pegida? Ergebnisse empirischer Studien, methodische Grundlagen und offene Fragen. *Mitteilungen des Instituts für Parteienrecht und Parteienforschung* 21: 133–143.

Rosseel, Yves. 2012. Lavaan: An R Package for Structural Equation Modeling. *Journal of Statistical Software* 48 (2): 1–36. <http://www.jstatsoft.org/v48/i02/>.

Roßteutscher, Sigrid, Rüdiger Schmitt-Beck, Harald Schoen, Bernhard Weißels, Christof Wolf, Melanie Dietz, Ina Bieber, and Philipp Scherer. 2019. Langfrist-Online-Tracking T37 (GLES). GESIS Datenarchiv, Köln. ZA6817 Datenfile Version 2.0.1, DOI:10.4232/1.13295.

Roßteutscher, Sigrid, Rüdiger Schmitt-Beck, Harald Schoen, Bernhard Weißels, Christof Wolf, Simon Henckel, Ina Bieber, Melanie Dietz, and Philipp Scherer. 2017. Langfrist-Online- Tracking T36 (GLES). GESIS Datenarchiv, Köln. ZA6816 Datenfile Version 1.0.0, DOI:10.4232/ 1.12872.

Roßteutscher, Sigrid, Rüdiger Schmitt-Beck, Harald Schoen, Bernhard Weißels, Christof Wolf, Simon Henckel, Ina Bieber, and Philipp Scherer. 2015. Langfrist-Online-Tracking T27 (GLES). GESIS Datenarchiv, Köln. ZA5727 Datenfile Version 1.1.0. DOI:10.4232/1.12282.

Roßteutscher, Sigrid, Rüdiger Schmitt-Beck, Harald Schoen, Bernhard Weißels, Christof Wolf, Simon Henckel, Ina Bieber, and Philipp Scherer. 2016.

Langfrist-Online-Tracking T32 (GLES). GESIS Datenarchiv, Köln. ZA5732
Datenfile Version 1.0.0 (2016), DOI:10.4232/1.12625.

Runciman, W. G., and C. R. Bagley. 1969. Status Consistency, Relative Deprivation,
and Attitudes to Immigrants. *Sociology* 3 (3): 359–375.
DOI:10.1177/003803856900300305.

Rydgren, Jens. 2007. The Sociology of the Radical Right. *Annual Review of
Sociology* 33 (1): 241–262. DOI:10.1146/annurev.soc.33.040406.131752.

Rydgren, Jens, and Patrick Ruth. 2011. Voting for the Radical Right in Swedish
Municipalities: Social Marginality and Ethnic Competition? *Scandinavian
Political Studies* 34 (3): 202–225. DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9477.2011.00269.x.

Scheepers, Peer, Mérove Gijsberts, and Marcel Coenders. 2002. Ethnic Exclusionism
in European Countries. Public Opposition to Civil Rights for Legal Migrants as
a Response to Perceived Ethnic Threat. *European Sociological Review* 18 (1):
17–34.

Silberzahn, R., E. L. Uhlmann, D. P. Martin, P. Anselmi, F. Aust, E. Awtrey, et al.
2018. Many Analysts, One Data Set: Making Transparent How Variations in
Analytic Choices Affect Results. *Advances in Methods and Practices in
Psychological Science* 1 (3): 337–356. DOI:10.1177/2515245917747646.

Snow, David A., and Sarah Anne Soule. 2010. *A Primer on Social Movements*. New
York, NY: Norton (Contemporary societies).
Stephan, Walter G., and Cookie White Stephan. 2017. Intergroup Threat Theory. In *The International
Encyclopedia of Intercultural Communication*, vol. 39, edited by Young Yun
Kim, 1–12. Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell (The Wiley Blackwell - ICA).

Stockemer, Daniel, Tobias Lentz, and Danielle Mayer. 2018. Individual Predictors of
the Radical Right-Wing Vote in Europe: A Meta-Analysis of Articles in Peer-
Reviewed Journals (1995–2016). *Government and Opposition* 53 (03): 569–
593. DOI:10.1017/gov.2018.2.

Sweetman, Joseph, Gregory R. Maio, Russell Spears, Antony S.R. Manstead, and
Andrew G Livingstone. 2019. Attitude Toward Protest Uniquely Predicts
(Normative and Nonnormative) Political Action by (Advantaged and

Disadvantaged) Group Members. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 82: 115–128. DOI:10.1016/j.jesp.2019.01.001.

Torcal, Mariano. 2011. Dissatisfaction, Political. In *International Encyclopedia of Political Science*, edited by Bertrand Badie, Dirk Berg-Schlosser, and Leonardo Morlino, 689–691. Los Angeles: SAGE Publications.

van Stekelenburg, Jacquélien, Bert Klandermans, and Stefaan Walgrave. 2019. Individual Participation in Street Demonstrations. In *The Wiley Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, vol. 67. 2nd ed., edited by David A. Snow, Hanspeter Kriesi, Holly J. McCammon, and Sarah Anne Soule, 369–391. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons Inc (Wiley Blackwell companions to sociology).

Vorländer, Hans, Maik Herold, and Steven Schäller. 2015. Wer geht zu PEGIDA und warum? Eine empirische Untersuchung von PEGIDA-Demonstranten in Dresden. *Schriften zur Verfassungs- und Demokratieforschung* 1: 1–80.

Walgrave, Stefaan, and Joris Verhulst. 2011. Selection and Response Bias in Protest Surveys. *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 16 (2): 203–222. DOI:10.17813/maiq.16.2. j475m8627u4u8177.

Chapter 3 Reconsidering the Relationship between Anti-Immigration Attitudes and Preferences for the AfD Using Implicit Attitudes Measures

Published as:

Kleinert, M. 2023. Reconsidering the Relationship Between Anti-immigration Attitudes and Preferences for the AfD Using Implicit Attitudes Measures. *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*. Springer. DOI:10.1007/s11615-023-00500-3.

Abstract

The study of demand-side factors for the success of radical right-wing populist parties has highlighted anti-immigration attitudes (AIA) as a particularly important predictor. However, these findings have relied heavily on direct self-report measures. This preregistered study theorises that direct measures may have underestimated, through social desirability bias, or overestimated, through cognitive dissonance avoidance, the relationship between AIA and support for the German radical right-wing party Alternative for Germany (AfD). A direct questionnaire and two Single-Category Implicit Association Tests were administered to a stratified sample of the German population (N= 369) to measure both explicit and implicit preferences for the AfD and AIA. Results reveal that the firm relationship between AIA and AfD voting intentions is strongest in an all-explicit setting, reduced in mixed analyses, and eliminated in the all-implicit model. This provides evidence that the need for respondents to report consistent ideologies may be a more serious threat to valid results in political attitudes research than is generally assumed. Social desirability seems to be less of an issue when assessing the strength of the correlation between right-wing attitudes and AfD preferences. Thorough robustness checks confirmed the reliability of these findings.

Introduction

The rise of radical right-wing populist parties (RRP) has been the subject of much discussion and debate among scholars. One can divide this debate into supply-side research, which emphasises factors such as party ideology and policy strategies, and demand-side research, which argues that considerations such as economic and attitudinal factors are key to understanding support. The existing demand-side literature mostly relies on direct self-report measures of these variables, which may be prone to two biases in particular: social desirability and avoidance of cognitive dissonance.

It has been shown that citizens may hide or mitigate socially stigmatised opinions, known as social desirability bias (Chung and Monroe 2003; Janus 2010). To circumvent this issue, researchers have developed methods to assess attitudes in a more ‘automatic, unconsciously activated’ (Bos et al. 2018, p. 70) way, labelled as implicit attitudes (Greenwald et al. 1998; Payne et al. 2005). Indeed, techniques such as the Implicit Association Test (IAT) have shown that the relationship between anti-immigration attitudes (AIA) and RRP support may be biased at both ends, meaning that both variables may suffer from underreporting (Bos et al. 2018; Tutić and Grehl 2021; Maier et al. 2022). In parallel, research on political ideologies and polarisation has long considered cognitive dissonance as an influence on citizens’ reported attitudes (Festinger 1957; Harmon-Jones and Harmon-Jones 2007). More recent research suggests that implicit attitudes may also circumvent this phenomenon (Breithaupt et al. 2020).

The current study aims to bridge the gaps between these different strands of literature. Drawing upon their findings and theoretical arguments, grounded hypotheses were formulated to capture the potential influence of social desirability bias and cognitive dissonance avoidance on the association between AIA and RRP support. The preregistered¹ research design of this study relies on implicit and explicit ratings of the independent variable (AIA) and the dependent variable (RRP sympathy), enabling distinct assessments of the proposed hypotheses. The test case for this study is the German party Alternative for Germany (AfD).

This study advances existing knowledge in several ways. First, it adds empirical evidence to the relationship between AIA and support for an RRP, making a unique contribution by assessing both variables explicitly and implicitly. This approach allows estimation of the effect size in all possible combinations of these variables, enabling the testing of specific hypotheses regarding social desirability bias and cognitive dissonance avoidance. Second, this study advances theoretical understanding by integrating two previously separate strands of research in a combined setting and analysis. By drawing on theoretical and empirical knowledge from both strands, it establishes a solid theoretical foundation for the empirical analyses. Third, at the conceptual level, it uses a stratified quota sample, which allows for better generalisation than common convenience samples in social psychology (Gawronski and Strack 2004; Friese et al. 2007).

Biases in the Association Between Anti-immigration Attitudes and Sympathy for the AfD

The AfD – A Radical Right-wing Populist Party

Radical right-wing populist parties have entered most European parliaments. In the last decade, previously exceptional cases such as Sweden (Rydgren and van der Meiden 2019) and Germany (Arzheimer and Berning 2019) have also seen the successful establishment of such parties. Although this family of parties has attracted considerable scholarly attention (Golder 2016; Mudde 2019), the lack of a universally accepted definition has led to a wide range of interpretations. The often-cited definition by Mudde (2007) emphasises the element of ‘identity’ in politics, whereas more recent studies seek to identify several relatively well-defined criteria, which may include, for example, whether ‘the electorate sees the party as far right’ (Donovan 2020). Alternatively, some researchers split the term, defining ‘populist’ and ‘radical/extreme right’ separately and then identifying parties that meet both criteria (Rooduijn et al. 2019). Despite this lack of an accepted definition, there is ‘a near consensus on which parties should be included in the party family’ (Rydgren 2007), which has allowed scholars to identify common explanatory factors for their success.

These factors can be grouped into contextual (Knigge 1998; Han 2016; Amengay and Stockemer 2019), supply-side (Werkmann and Gherghina 2018; Heinze 2018), and demand-side factors. Commonly considered individual demand-side predictors include, but are not limited to, sociodemographic variables, such as gender and education (Spierings and Zaslove 2017; Stockemer et al. 2018); attitudes towards

politics and the political system, such as dissatisfaction with and distrust of politics and politics (Bowler et al. 2017; Rooduijn 2018; Muis et al. 2021); populist attitudes (van Hauwaert and van Kessel 2018; Hawkins et al. 2020); nationalist or authoritarian attitudes (Dunn 2015; Lubbers and Coenders 2017); and individual economic situations/attitudes (Golder 2016; Rama Caamaño and Cordero 2018; Savage 2023). Among these factors, AIA stand out due to their frequent consideration and consistently strong results (Rydgren 2008; Oesch 2008; Lubbers and Coenders 2017; Spierings and Zaslove 2017; Arzheimer 2018; van Hauwaert and van Kessel 2018; Rama Caamaño and Cordero 2018; Rooduijn 2018; Stockemer et al. 2018; Muis et al. 2021; Savage 2023).

Many of these common predictors also reliably predict support for the party examined in this study, the AfD. Men, the less educated, the politically disaffected, and citizens from eastern Germany are more likely to express support for the AfD (Klein et al. 2018; Arzheimer and Berning 2019; Weisskircher 2020; Peshty et al. 2021). There is considerable scholarly debate regarding the relationship between economic disadvantage and support for the AfD, with some arguing that education and AIA mediate this association (Klein et al. 2018; Lengfeld 2018; Lux 2018; Rippl and Seipel 2018; Schröder 2018; Tutić and von Hermann 2018). However, scholars mostly agree that sociocultural issues, especially AIA, are crucial for understanding support for this party (Goerres et al. 2018; Steiner and Landwehr 2018; Hansen and Olsen 2019; Franzmann et al. 2020; Wurthmann et al. 2021). The remainder of this study will focus on this explanatory factor in particular.

Although today's AfD is almost unanimously seen as an RRP party and shares core characteristics with other parties in this family, this was not always the case. When it was founded only a decade ago as a more or less single-issue party focused on the Euro and European politics, it was regarded more as an ordo-liberal, conservative challenger party with populist elements (Grimm 2015; Franzmann 2016; Schmitt-Beck 2017). However, even in its formative years, its electorate held the typical AIA (Schwarzbözl and Fatke 2016) and was seen by some as an RRP or 'functional equivalent' (Arzheimer 2015; Berbuir et al. 2015; Lewandowsky et al. 2016). In the course of the so-called refugee crisis and the change of party leadership, the party completely transformed into a radical right-wing populist party (Jankowski and Lewandowsky 2018; Arzheimer and Berning 2019; Atzpodien 2022).

The unique setting of German politics and the history of the party make it a perfect test case for the present study. First, the German setting is particularly interesting for the study of social desirability bias—one of the two biases that this paper seeks to investigate. Due to the history of a fascist regime and the Holocaust, openly racist opinions were heavily and promptly sanctioned in public debates. This contributed to both a long-standing German exceptionalism with regard to the presence of radical right parties in national politics and social desirability biases with regard to AIA the main independent variable of this study (Art 2006; Berbuir et al. 2015). Second, compared to other European RRP, the AfD is a relatively young party, founded only a decade ago, and was not generally considered racist or anti-immigration per se until the so-called refugee crisis (Arzheimer and Berning 2019). This distinguishes it from parties in culturally or historically similar neighbouring countries, which have a much longer tradition of anti-immigrant and partly racist positions, such as the Lega

(Nord) in Italy (Richardson and Colombo 2013), the SVP in Switzerland or the FPÖ in Austria (McGann and Kitschelt 2005). Particularly as this study attempts to use implicit – ‘automatic, unconsciously activated’ (Bos et al. 2018, p. 70), this temporal distinction is advantageous as it allows to examine associations with the AfD that are based solely on the party’s recent years, rather than decades-old associations or prominent historical figures.

Issues with the Use of Self-reports in Studying the Effect of AIA On AfD Sympathy

Although extensive literature has revealed a clear pattern regarding the impact of AIA on support for the AfD, these findings are mostly based on direct self-reports. These direct measures are prone to bias. Participants may—consciously or unconsciously—deviate from their ‘true’ opinion on an issue, which ultimately distorts the analysis of such variables and the relationships between them. In this study, two biases are discussed that may have particularly distorted results in the past: social desirability bias and cognitive dissonance avoidance.

Social desirability bias, which means that respondents may hide—or at least mitigate—their opinions if they are perceived as ‘undesirable’, may have biased previous, fully explicit results, on the relationship between AIA and AfD sympathy. Issues of migration have become highly controversial and emotional in recent years, especially since the European refugee crisis, so respondents may have learned to take softer positions in this context, even if their ‘true’ opinion is more pronounced, in order to avoid confrontation. Previous research suggests, that direct measurements indeed underestimate the extent of AIA among citizens (Janus 2010; An 2015;

Creighton et al. 2015; Bazo Vienrich and Creighton 2018; Maier et al. 2022) and particularly among sympathisers of right-wing parties (Carmines and Nassar 2021). With respect to the research topic of this study, social desirability may actually lead to flawed direct measures at both ends of the relationship. Similar to open AIA, radical right parties face considerable opposition in Germany, as in many other European countries. Involvement or sympathy for such parties can cause serious problems with one's social environment. Therefore, social desirability bias may also lead to an underestimation of reported support for the AfD (Bos et al. 2018; Gschwend et al. 2018).

The possibility of underestimating anti-immigrant attitudes and sympathy for the AfD in direct measures introduces a potential bias in the distribution and levels of these variables, potentially impacting their relationship. Specifically, the influence of AIA on AfD sympathy may have been underestimated if individuals with simultaneous attachment to both opted for lower ratings on the relevant scales, despite holding more extreme views towards both. Thus, the correlation and ultimately the effects between these variables may be lower than they would be without social desirability bias. Consequently, the following hypotheses are formulated, capturing the anticipation that the underestimation of the relationship between these variables is a result of social desirability bias in the explicit measurement of one or both of them.

H1a) Using explicit measures of both concepts underestimates the relation of AIA to AfD sympathy because of social desirability bias in the measurement of AIA.

H1b) Using explicit measures of both concepts underestimates the relation of AIA to AfD sympathy because of social desirability bias in the measurement of AfD sympathy.

Another factor, albeit less prominent, that may introduce bias in drawing conclusions is respondents' tendency to avoid cognitive dissonance. According to Festinger (1957), individuals often strive to avoid holding contradictory opinions. When confronted with conflicting attitudes towards two objects, people may attempt to resolve the contradiction by adjusting their evaluation of one of the objects to harmonise their ideology.² This phenomenon has been extensively documented across various domains (for a summary, see Harmon-Jones and Harmon-Jones 2007) and is vital in recent publications on, e.g., technology adoption (Marikyan et al. 2023), leadership–employee relations (Mesdaghinia et al. 2019), and eating habits and health (Ong et al. 2017; Rothgerber and Rosenfeld 2021; Stiglbauer et al. 2019). Regarding political attitudes, researchers have shown that individuals tend to 'stick to their vote' (Mullainathan and Washington 2009) after an election, adjusting their attitudes (Vecchione et al. 2013) and even perceptions of economic performance (Sorace and Hobolt 2021) to avoid cognitive dissonance.

The presence of cognitive dissonance avoidance is also likely to be significant in this study. Given the highly polarised discourse surrounding migration, individuals may feel compelled to maintain a high level of consistency in their political stance, leading them to align their attitudes with the appropriate political parties,³ even if their true ideology is less coherent (Mullainathan and Washington 2009; Levendusky 2010; Vecchione et al. 2013). This alignment could potentially inflate the correlation

between the two concepts, resulting in an overestimation of the relationship between AIA and AfD sympathy when assessed through direct self-report measures. Consequently, the following hypothesis is formulated:

H2) Using explicit measures of both concepts overestimates the relation of AIA to AfD sympathy because of avoidance of cognitive dissonance by the respondents (leading them to give answers that fit well together).

Implicit Attitudes as a Possible Way to Detect Such Biases

It can be inferred from the preceding discussion that the use of explicit attitudes is not ideal for evaluating citizens' attitudes and their interrelationships. Social psychology has proposed alternative indirect measures to assess so-called implicit attitudes (Greenwald et al. 1998). The aim of this paper is to compare the assessment of attitudes using both direct and indirect measures, with particular focus on examining the associations between them. By doing so, this empirical study contributes to the ongoing discourse on predictors of sympathy for RRP and the current debate on implicit attitudes within political sociology (Tutić and Grehl 2021; Maier et al. 2022). To this end, it is crucial that terms are clearly defined and used consistently. This study adheres to the definition of implicit⁴ attitudes as a measurement of an 'automatic, unconsciously activated component' (Bos et al. 2018, p. 70) of attitudes, drawing upon the dual-process model (Smith and DeCoster 2000; Greenwald et al. 2009). Stated differently, 'what differs [between explicit and implicit attitudes] is just that there are factors that influence explicit (verbal) responses that don't influence implicit (non-verbal) ones, and vice versa' (Carruthers 2018, p. 70).

Despite the documented advantages of implicit attitudes in the field of demand-side predictors, particularly in assessing socially undesirable views such as AIA in voting preferences (Friese et al. 2007; Arcuri et al. 2008; Rocco and Zogmaister 2010; Ditonto et al. 2013), the method is still used relatively rarely. In the German research context, however, there has been a recent resurgence of interest in this topic, exemplified by the works of Tutić and Grehl (2021) and Maier et al. (2022). The former discovered relatively weak correlations between explicit and implicit racism, and no significant impact of implicit attitudes on explicit AfD voting intentions. Likewise, in the study by Maier et al. (2022), the explanatory power of implicit AIA, based on Muslim/Islam primes, in predicting AfD sympathy was found to be quite limited. The literature on assessing implicit attitudes towards an RRP is even scarcer. As of now, the study by Bos et al. (2018) is perhaps the only publication that examines implicit attitudes toward a specific party, namely the Dutch PVV.

Although these recent findings concerning the explanatory power of implicit attitudes in predicting voting intentions are somewhat discouraging (Tutić and Grehl 2021; Maier et al. 2022), they converge on the notion that implicit attitudes have the potential to mitigate or at least minimize the influence of social desirability. Furthermore, previous research suggests that implicit attitudes may also circumvent the issue of cognitive dissonance avoidance. While explicit attitudes can be manipulated by inducing cognitive dissonance, implicit attitudes appear to remain unaffected (Breithaupt et al. 2020; Gawronski and Strack 2004). A compelling example of this is the study by Swanson et al. (2001), in which stigmatized individuals (smokers) tended to report highly consistent views about their

stigmatised behaviour, despite having rather inconsistent implicit attitudes. The same may be applicable to the examination of support for the AfD, potentially leading to an overestimation of the true relationship between AIA and sympathy for this party.

These facets of implicit attitudes form the basis of this study's research design. Assuming that social desirability bias and avoidance of cognitive dissonance are factors that 'influence explicit (verbal) responses [but] don't influence implicit (non-verbal) ones, and vice versa' (Carruthers 2018, p. 70), their differences in empirical explanatory power are expected to provide a measure of the extent of these factors. The subsequent section outlines the approach taken to quantify and assess the significance of these differences.

Analytic Strategy to Test for Significant Differences Between Implicit and Explicit Relationships

The primary focus of this study is to examine whether prior findings on the association between AIA and sympathy for the AfD have been influenced by social desirability bias and avoidance of cognitive dissonance. In order to accomplish this, it was investigated whether there were significant variations in the impact of AIA on AfD sympathy when different combinations of direct and indirect measures were employed in the analyses. Table 3-1 presents the specific combinations used in the study, with groups A to D representing distinct combinations of measures. The dataset contains both implicit and explicit measures of both variables for each respondent, which have been transformed into a long format. Each respondent is thus represented by four entries, corresponding to the different combinations of explicit and implicit measurements. The implicit and explicit measures of AfD sympathy and

AIA have been collapsed into one column each. The group variable (A, B, C, or D) is used to differentiate the combinations, indicating whether none, one, or both variables were measured implicitly for a particular entry in the dataset.

The experimental design enables the testing of the aforementioned hypotheses. A preregistered analytical and inferential strategy was employed as follows: Hypothesis 1a, which assumes a bias resulting from social desirability bias in AIA, will be supported if the effect of AIA is significantly greater when AIA is measured implicitly and AfD preferences are measured explicitly (B) compared to when both variables are measured explicitly (A). Hypothesis 1b, which posits a social desirability bias in AfD sympathy, will be supported if the effect of AIA is significantly larger when AfD sympathy is measured implicitly and AIA explicitly (C) than when both are measured explicitly (A). Hypothesis 2, which captures the expectation of avoidance of cognitive dissonance bias, will be supported if the effect of AIA on AfD sympathy is significantly reduced when both variables are measured implicitly (D) compared to when both are measured explicitly (A).

		Anti-immigration attitudes (AIA)	
		Explicit	Implicit
AfD sympathy (AfD)	Explicit	Group A Explicit AfD / Explicit AIA	Group B Explicit AfD / Implicit AIA
	Implicit	Group C Implicit AfD / Explicit AIA	Group D Implicit AfD / Implicit AIA

Table 3-1: Illustration of combinations of implicit and explicit variables and the associated group label.

Methods

Description of the Survey, Data Collection, and Cleaning Process

Data collection for this study was carried out via an online access panel provider (mingle, a Bilendi platform). Invitation and access to the survey followed stratification based on census data for sex and age.⁵ The panel provider was instructed to invite only participants who were permanent residents of Germany and had proficient command of the German language. Individuals with severe visual impairments, including partial or total blindness, were excluded from participating in the survey.⁶

Within the survey, participants were initially requested to provide information regarding their sociodemographic characteristics. Subsequently, they were presented with anti-immigration items, questions related to party sympathies, and two Single-Category Implicit Association Tests (SC-IATs). These SC-IATs are adaptations of the original Implicit Association Test (IAT) developed to measure implicit attitudes (Greenwald et al. 1998). Although the IAT is considered ‘the most frequently used and most carefully tested technique’ (Arcuri et al. 2008) in that regard, it has also encountered criticism (see Jost 2019 for a review and response). The SC-IAT reduces the target categories from two to one (Karpinski and Steinman 2006). Instead of having two poles within one category (e.g., black and white faces), it evaluates implicit positive or negative attitudes towards a single category (e.g., white faces). In brief, participants are presented with visual or verbal primes from three categories: positive, negative, and the target category. They are then required to swiftly sort these primes into the appropriate category by pressing keys on a keyboard. The target

category shares a key either with the ‘positive’ or the ‘negative’ category. If an individual performs better (worse) when the target category is associated with the negative category, it is assumed that they have a more negative (positive) implicit attitude towards the target concept. The questionnaire concluded with an open feedback section and a short debriefing on the SC-IATs. By employing a stratified sample and incorporating the use of SC-IATs, the aim is to leverage the internal validity of an experimental design while enhancing⁷ the generalizability of the study’s findings.

The field phase of data collection commenced with the primary collection period from 20 to 24 April 2022, followed by a supplementary phase from 23 to 25 May 2022. The purpose of the second phase was to address gaps in the intended quotations caused by unevenly distributed error rates observed in the SC-IATs.⁸ A total of 547 individuals completed the questionnaire after both rounds, but approximately 33% had to be excluded due to missing data. A listwise deletion approach was employed to handle missing data, encompassing both the questionnaire responses and the results of the SC-IATs. This decision was preregistered and implemented to reduce potential issues arising from the interaction between responsiveness in the questionnaire and performance in the tests. Within the SC-IATs, participants were excluded based on the routine outlined by Karpinski and Steinman (2006), whereby individuals with an error rate exceeding 20% were not included in the analysis. Following these selection criteria, a final sample of 369 individuals remained for analyses.

This final sample slightly diverges from general population characteristics.⁹ Most notably, the ratio of individuals reporting a higher education degree is 29.5%, which is considerably higher than the approximately 23% in the general population aged 18 years and older (Statistisches Bundesamt 2022a). Men in their 50s and women in their 60s are slightly underrepresented in the sample due to their particularly high failure rates of over 40% among all cases collected, which could not completely be compensated for by oversampling these groups. However, in general, the sample matches age and sex of the general German public relatively closely. In the final sample, women make up about 51% and 61.5% were employed, compared to about 65% in the general population aged 18 years and older (Statistisches Bundesamt 2022b).

Measurements

The study measures four main variables of interest: explicit and implicit AIA (independent variable) as well as explicit and implicit RRP preferences (dependent variable). This section briefly describes these measurements of this survey. For more details, please refer to the Online Appendix.

Explicit Measurements

To assess RRP preferences, this study relies on a ‘sympathy scale’ (‘In general, what do you think of the following parties?’) instead of the traditional voting question (Gschwend et al. 2018). Given that citizens’ voting intentions are influenced by external factors (e.g., thresholds for parliamentary entry, coalition considerations; see van der Eijk et al. 2006), sympathy scales are more suited to capture tendencies

towards a specific party. Wording was adopted from the German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES) Short-term Campaign Panel (GLES 2019).

The direct measurement of AIA is composed of four well-established items. These items aimed to capture respondents' opinions on the economic, cultural, and crime rate impacts of immigration in Germany, as well as their stance on whether immigration to Germany should be facilitated. The wording for the first three items was adapted from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES 2021), and the wording for the fourth item was derived from the GLES Short-term Campaign Panel (GLES 2019). An equally weighted index of the four items was computed. For this index of explicit AIA, Cronbach's alpha shows high reliability (0.90).

Furthermore, participants were asked to report their age, gender, level of education, and employment status within the survey. These variables constitute common covariates in the related literature and are used accordingly.

Implicit Measurements

The core elements of data collection for this study were two SC-IATs, one focusing on indirect attitudes towards migration and the other on attitudes towards the AfD. Verbal primes were used for all categories, drawing on previous research. Positive and negative terms were derived from the German version of the Project Implicit website (Nosek et al. 2007). The terms for 'migration' were informed by Johann and Thomas (2018) and are mostly synonyms or subgroups of the term 'migrants'. Note that, unlike other studies in this field (Tutić and Grehl 2021; Maier et al. 2022), the primes for this study were limited to synonyms of 'migration' and avoid any direct

association with Islam or Muslims, such as Islamic names or images of women wearing headscarves. While acknowledging that the majority of migrants in recent years have come from Islamic countries and that this fact has a prominent role in public debates and strategies of RRP, these are nevertheless distinct concepts and should be studied that way. This is crucial to ascertain the driving factors behind the observed effects, namely opposition to immigration/immigrants, opposition to Islam or Muslims, or opposition to Muslim immigrants. This differentiation also facilitates the applicability of methodology and findings to various contexts, including Christian immigrants or Islamic host countries. However, it remains possible that respondents' associations between Islam and immigration could still exert an influence on the results. The terms used to describe the AfD were developed from scratch, encompassing the party's full name, prominent and leading figures, and the slogan employed during the most recent election, which took place approximately 6 months prior to the data collection phase.

The methodology closely adhered to the guidelines set forth by Karpinski and Steinmann (2006). Each of the two tests comprised four blocks of trials, during which participants were required to swiftly categorise items from the 'positive' and 'negative' categories, as well as from a target category, by pressing the corresponding keys on their keyboard. The first test focused on attitudes towards migration, and the second test targeted attitudes towards the AfD. Following established procedures (Karpinski and Steinman 2006), D-scores were derived from the collected reaction times. These D-scores serve as the implicit measures of attitudes, with higher values indicating higher AIA or sympathy for the AfD.

Results

This section consists of two components. The first part is a descriptive discussion of the results obtained from the SC-IATs. Subsequently, a preregistered multivariate analysis was conducted to test the hypotheses. This study adheres to the most recent standards of open science. All analyses presented in this article were preregistered, and comprehensive robustness checks address important limitations of the obtained results. The dataset and all recoding, analyses, and visualisations are openly accessible, facilitating easy replication of all findings.¹⁰

Descriptive Results

Descriptive Results of Main Variables

Before turning to the multivariate model, the collected data are described, with specific emphasis on the SC-IAT data. Descriptive results of the SC-IATs are reported alongside the corresponding explicit measures. All variables were z-standardised to a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 1.

The AIA measure shows relatively similar distributions for both measures (Fig. 1). The traditional self-report measure shows an overrepresentation of extreme values and a higher concentration around the mean, whereas the implicit measure partially compensates for these characteristics. However, when the measurement of AfD sympathy is examined, notable differences between the two methods emerge. The explicit measurement demonstrates a highly skewed shape with a prominent peak at the lowest value on the scale, indicating that nearly three-quarters of all valid

respondents reported having no sympathy at all for the AfD. In contrast, the implicit attitudes display an almost perfect Gaussian distribution.




Figure 3-1: Density plots of explicit and implicit AIA and AfD sympathy. All variables were z-standardized. All graphs based on n=369 cases.

The skewed sympathy distribution for the AfD is not entirely unexpected, as surveys often find an overwhelming majority of respondents expressing no sympathy towards the party.¹¹ However, the discrepancy between the explicit and implicit assessments raises questions regarding the validity of implicit attitudes and their implementation in this study or the justification of explicit assessments of AfD sympathy. The widely used method of SC-IATs was implemented in this study with great attention, adhering closely to the established guidelines and using face-valid items. If one agrees with the general assumption that implicit measures reflect a distinct yet valid assessment of individuals' attitudes, there is little reason to question the general validity of the present findings. This suggests that common direct measures of AfD party sympathy may indeed be biased. However, the correlations between implicit and explicit measures are remarkably similar for both variables at 0.37 ($p < 0.01$) and 0.38 ($p < 0.01$), which is in line with previous research (Greenwald et al. 2015; Bos et al. 2018), providing evidence that the extreme aversion towards the AfD expressed in direct measures may overestimate its true extent, but the general tendency of

citizens is also reflected in the implicit measure. Consequently, both variables were deemed comparable and used in subsequent multivariate analyses.

Universality of the SC-IAT

Due to unevenly distributed failure rates in the SC-IATs,¹² it was suspected that variations in these results might be related to sociodemographic variables. Figure 3-2 plots the means for AfD sympathy and AIA by method of measurement as well as age and education level. To keep the graphs comparable, the standardised versions of all variables were used; therefore, the overall mean is always zero, and the overall standard deviation is always 1.

Regarding the education variable, the overall pattern and differences between the various education levels remain relatively similar regardless of the method of collection. However, respondents with the lowest level of education move from the far left of the graph (indicating relatively low explicit AfD sympathy and AIA) to the far right in both graphs. It is important to note that the number of respondents in this educational group is small. Nevertheless, this shift may suggest that social desirability is more pronounced within this educational category, leading individuals to report low levels on both variables while holding more right-leaning implicit attitudes. The age variable also exhibits some differences between explicit and implicit attitudes in this respect, although the pattern is less clear. For AIA, the youngest age group has low levels when asked explicitly, which become even lower when assessed implicitly, relative to other age cohorts. On the other end of the scale, individuals in their 60s shift from the lowest to the highest level compared to others when the implicit measure is used. Regarding sympathy for the AfD, the youngest




Figure 3-2: Descriptive statistics for AIA and AfD Sympathy split by means of collection (implicit vs explicit) and age groups or education.

age group switches from the most unfavourable to the most sympathetic position in implicit attitudes. All other groups remain in almost identical positions between the left and right panels, with older respondents having slightly less sympathy for the AfD.

Regarding gender and employment status, the SC-IAT shows slightly lower implicit and explicit AIA among male respondents than in female respondents. However, this and other differences are unlikely to be statistically significant.¹³

These additional insights should not be overinterpreted because most 95% confidence intervals overlap to a great extent. Although this does not per se rule out statistically significant differences between these groups, it does give confidence that the SC-IATs are generally applicable to all societal groups within the variables investigated.

Multivariate Results

To adequately test the hypotheses, this study uses linear regression analyses. Note that the terms ‘effect’ and ‘predictor’ in relation to the coefficients from such regressions are used, as such analyses require the specification of independent and dependent variables. However, this should not be interpreted as implying causality. This analysis is subject to the same caveats as other nonexperimental research designs based on survey data, and findings should be interpreted as solely correlational. In all models, AIA is the independent variable, while AfD sympathy is

the dependent variable. Additionally, all models include covariates, namely age, gender, level of education, and self-placement on the political left–right spectrum.

As a first step, separate ordinary least square models are estimated for the four possible combinations of measures (Table 3-1), employing a multigroup design in which each of the four combinations (A, B, C, D) is treated as a separate group. This approach allows an initial understanding of possible differences in the effect of AIA across the different operationalisations. In a second step, the statistical significance of these differences in effect sizes is estimated. This is achieved by using group dummy variables for the measurement combination as part of interaction terms with the AIA variable, testing their effect on AfD sympathy (with A serving as the reference group). This straightforward approach allows for precise point estimates of the difference between the ‘traditional’ operationalisation A and each alternative option, including confidence intervals for these estimates. Central inferential criteria are the p-values of two-tailed tests within the regression analyses, and null hypotheses are rejected below the high threshold of $p < 0.01$. Standardised regression coefficients are reported. All analyses were conducted as they were preregistered.

Multigroup Analysis

The first conducted analysis is a multigroup analysis (Table 3-2), treating each of the four possible combinations of implicit and explicit dependent and independent variables as a distinct group of data, although using the same cases. Within each group, all variables were z-standardised, which also sets the intercept of each model to zero by default. Model A reflects the ‘traditional’ approach, relying solely on direct questions from the questionnaire. In this model, the effect of AIA on sympathy

for the AfD is strongest, indicated by a standardised beta of 0.55 (0.05). The following two models use implicit measures for either AfD (model B) or AIA (model C), while using explicit measures for the other main variable. In both models, the effect size is more than halved compared to model A. In model D, in which both variables are implicit measures, the effect is close to zero and not statistically significant. Relatedly, the explanatory power of the models, expressed as R², is much higher in model A than in the other groups.

Sociodemographic variables have quite diverse levels of impact on respondents' evaluation of the AfD. Gender and current employment have no significant effect in any model. Interestingly, the effect of a person's age is significantly and strongly

Predictors	Group A (AfD ex/AIA ex)		Group B (AfD im/AIA ex)		Group C (AfD ex/AIA im)		Group D (AfD im/AIA im)	
	std. Beta	p	std. Beta	p	std. Beta	p	std. Beta	p
Anti-imm. Att. (AIA)	.55 (.05)	<.001	.16 (.05)	.002	.25 (.05)	<.001	.00 (.05)	.891
Age	-.13 (.05)	.005	-.05 (.06)	.342	-.21 (.06)	<.001	-.17 (.06)	.002
Female	-.04 (.04)	.397	-.03 (.05)	.565	.04 (.05)	.443	.05 (.05)	.361
Education level	-.03 (.05)	.549	-.15 (.05)	.005	-.11 (.05)	.042	-.16 (.05)	.002
Work status	-.04 (.05)	.400	.01 (.06)	.904	-.02 (.05)	.712	.00 (.06)	.992
Observations	369		369		369		369	
R ² / R ² adj.	.317 / .308		.047 / .034		.107 / .095		.047 / .034	

Table 3-2: Multi-group regression analysis. Standardised beta coefficients are reported with standard errors in brackets. Italics indicate p-values below p<0.1, bolded p-values indicate significance below p<0.01. Intercepts have been deliberately omitted from the table as the prior z-standardisation of all variables sets them to zero within each group. The dependent variable is always AfD sympathy, either explicit or implicit depending on the group.

negatively associated with preferences for the AfD in all models except model B (AfD implicit/AIA explicit). Conversely, the education variable reaches levels of statistical significance in all models except model A (AfD explicit/AIA explicit). These patterns may reflect the limited interaction effects between the mode of data collection and the sociodemographic variables discussed in the descriptive results.

So far, the groupwise analysis has revealed notable differences between the various model/measure combinations. Regarding the study's hypotheses, the results seem to falsify the expectations of social desirability bias, as the effects of models involving implicit attitudes are significantly lower compared to the explicit–explicit model A, but they support the notion of avoidance of cognitive dissonance. However, it has not yet been assessed whether these differences are statistically significant. The next analytical step is to do precisely that. As described in the analytical strategy above, a multivariate regression was conducted using interaction terms between the groups and AIA.

Combined Analysis

Table 3-3 presents the results of a combined analysis. All variables were z-standardised within each group, resulting in a default intercept and group dummies' effects of zero by default. The sociodemographic variables now capture an overall effect across all combinations of measures. The AIA variable is included, both as it is and as an interaction term with each group dummy. The overall base effect thus reflects the standardised effect for group A, and the interaction terms capture the difference from A. These effect sizes are identical to the differences between each group and model A in the groupwise model above. However,

modelling these as interaction effects allows a statistically sound test of the significance of these differences.

The results confirm the previously described patterns: Although AIA is strongly related to sympathy for the AfD in group A, which uses only explicit measures, all interaction effects are negative, meaning that the positive effect of AIA is reduced in all groups compared to A. These differences are statistically significant ($p < 0.001$), meaning that whenever one or both of the main variables are assessed implicitly, the relationship between AIA and sympathy for the AfD is significantly lower compared to an all-explicit measure. Note that this analysis does not allow testing for significant differences between models that use at least one implicit measure. As no

Combined Model		
Predictors	Estimates	p
Anti-imm. Attitudes (AIA)	.55 (.05)	<.001
Age	-.14 (.03)	<.001
Female	.00 (.02)	.842
Education level	-.11 (.03)	<.001
Work status	-.02 (.03)	.551
AIA * B (AfD im/AIA ex)	-.39 (.07)	<.001
AIA * C (AfD ex/AIA im)	-.30 (.07)	<.001
AIA * D (AfD im/AIA im)	-.54 (.07)	<.001
Observations	1476	
R ² / R ² adjusted	0.122 / 0.116	

Table 3-3: Combined regression model of all groups. Intercepts and group dummy variables (although included) have been deliberately omitted from the table as the prior z-standardization of all variables sets them to zero. Dependent variable is AfD sympathy.

specific theoretical implications for such differences were specified, these tests were not conducted. The following section discusses the results in light of the theoretical assumptions set out at the beginning of this paper.

Discussion

How do these findings relate to the initial, preregistered hypotheses? The discussion focuses on two major theoretical issues that could bias explicit measures: social desirability and cognitive dissonance avoidance. Strategies were designed to test the presence of these phenomena. Regarding hypotheses 1A and 1B, it was stated that a stronger effect in the explicit–explicit model compared to the mixed models would confirm the presence of social desirability bias in the explicit measurement of the main concepts. The results regarding AIA indicate a significantly stronger effect of explicitly assessed AIA on explicit AfD sympathy compared to implicitly measured attitudes (comparing group A to B). This finding implies falsification of hypothesis 1A, which proposed a stronger effect in the partly implicit model due to socially desirable underreporting in explicit AIA. Similarly, when comparing explicit and implicit measures of AfD sympathy, the effect is stronger when the concept is assessed explicitly rather than implicitly (compare A with C). Hence, hypothesis 1B, which postulated a stronger effect for the implicit measurement due to socially desirable underreporting of explicit AfD sympathy, is also rejected.

Hypothesis H2 predicted that the relationship between AfD sympathy and AIA would be more pronounced in the explicit model compared to the implicit model, due to respondents' tendency to report a coherent ideology, i.e., to report high sympathy

for the AfD if they also report high AIA, and vice versa to avoid cognitive dissonance. Results support this hypothesis, as the relationship between sympathy for the AfD and AIA is significantly lower when implicit measures are used compared to when explicit statements are used (comparing A to D). In fact, not only is the effect reduced, but the relationship is essentially zero in the all-implicit model.

Taken together, these findings suggest that social desirability bias appears to be less of an issue, both in the direct measurement of sympathy for the AfD and in AIA. This conclusion depends on the premise that implicit attitudes can circumvent the issue of social desirability and that a comparison between a partially implicit and a fully explicit model can thus estimate the extent of social desirability in the respective variable.

Conversely, the results suggest that avoidance of cognitive dissonance appears to be a real threat to valid results in the context of this study. When asked directly, respondents reported much more consistent ideologies (high sympathy for the AfD along with high AIA and vice versa) compared to indirectly measured attitudes. This finding is based on the assumption that implicit attitudes may circumvent the phenomenon of cognitive dissonance avoidance, and a comparison between an all-implicit and an all-explicit model using the same variables can thus reveal its extent.

Robustness Checks

Although the above results appear to provide strong (counter)evidence for the hypotheses of this study, these findings are subject to the typical caveats of

correlational studies, and the implications should be treated with caution. This section therefore discusses the robustness of these results. These tests were not preregistered.

Selective Covariates Bias – Specification Curve

Researchers have considerable freedom in the specification of their models. The set of covariates included in the model, or the coding of their main variables, can have a significant impact on the results. One way to address this issue and test for the influence of such ‘researcher’s degrees of freedom’ is to perform what is known as a multiverse analysis. In this analysis, the researcher determines all possible combinations of different crossroads during the formulation of the model, runs the analysis for all of them, and reports all of them to transparently show how specific choices affect the results. As shown above, the type of measurement




Figure 3-3: Multiverse analysis for the results obtained in Table 3-3. The top part (A) shows the point estimate for the effect of AIA on AfD sympathy for each model configuration. The lower part (B) shows information on which covariates were included in the model (model) and which group (see Table 3-1) was analysed (subsets).

(implicit/explicit) can interact with sociodemographic variables. Do these interactions bias the results in Table 3-3? This was tested using a multiverse approach (Masur and Scharkow 2020). Figure 3-3 presents the specification curve, which illustrates the effect of AIA on sympathy for the AfD across all possible sets of covariates.

Although the point estimates are ordered by effect size, they strictly resemble the order of the groups, with no overlap between them. This suggests that the choice of covariates has no relevant effect on the differences between the groups in terms of the effect of AIA on AfD sympathy. In all cases, group A has significantly higher estimates compared to any model of the other groups, while the estimates of group D are always statistically insignificant.

Omitted Variable Bias – Sensitivity Analysis

The combined analysis revealed statistically significant differences for the effect of AIA on AfD sympathy depending on the collection method. However, the analysis of observational data always suffers from a potential omitted variable bias. This means that an unobserved variable could make an effect insignificant once it is included in the model formula. However, sensitivity analysis allows estimation of the strength of such an unobserved variable that would be required to change the conclusion drawn from the observed variables.

Table 3-4 presents the results of the sensitivity analysis conducted for the three interaction effects as shown in Table 3-3. The first row concerns the statistically

Outcome: AfD-Sympathy

Variable	Coefficient			Sensitivity		
	Est	S.E.	t-value	$RV_{q=1}$	$RV_{q=1, \alpha=0.05}$	$R^2_{Y \sim D X}$
AIA*B (AfD im/AIA ex)	-0.39	0.07	-5.537	13.5\%	8.9\%	2.1\%
Note: df = 1464; Bound (10x Education): $R^2_{Y \sim Z X,D} = 13.5\%$, $R^2_{D \sim Z X} = 5.5\%$						
AIA*C (AfD ex/AIA im)	-0.30	0.069	-4.368	10.8\%	6.1\%	1.3\%
Note: df = 1464; Bound (10x Education): $R^2_{Y \sim Z X,D} = 13.3\%$, $R^2_{D \sim Z X} = 0\%$						
AIA*D (AfD im/AIA im)	-0.54	0.07	-7.785	18.4\%	14.1\%	4\%
Note: df = 1464; Bound (10x Education): $R^2_{Y \sim Z X,D} = 13.5\%$, $R^2_{D \sim Z X} = 5.5\%$						

Table 3-4: Results of sensitivity analyses testing the interaction effects of AIA with group dummies (see Table 3-1). The table lists the tested estimate (see also Table 3-3), its standard error (S.E.), t-value and sensitivity measures (Cinelli et al. 2020).




Figure 3-4: Sensitivity plots for the interaction terms between AIA and group dummies (see Table 3-1). The top row shows the value of the actual coefficient ('Unadjusted', black triangle) and compares it to its hypothetical value ('10xedu', red diamond) if there were an unobserved confounder in the model that was ten times as strongly correlated with the interaction effect and the dependent variable as the education variable. The bottom row shows the corresponding t-values for the same scenario. Crossing the dashed red lines would indicate a zero effect (top row) and an insignificant effect (bottom row).

significant difference between groups A and B. The analysis reveals that an unobserved confounder would need to account for 13.5% of the total variance of both the interaction effect and AfD sympathy to bring the interaction effect exactly to zero, while 8.9% would be sufficient to reduce the interaction effect to a nonsignificant level ($\alpha = 0.05$). In an extreme scenario in which an unobserved confounder would explain all the remaining variance in the dependent variable, AfD sympathy, this confounder would also need to explain 2.1% of the variance in the interaction term in order to set it to zero. The other rows of the table can be interpreted accordingly for the interaction effects of groups C and D.

These values are challenging to evaluate because the likelihood that such confounders exist cannot be estimated. However, they can be put in context by comparing them with multiples of the variables present in the model. Figure 3-4 displays the remaining effect size (top row) and the t-value (bottom row) for all interaction effects (columns), assuming the presence of a confounder ten times as strong as the education variable in the model. This 10×education variable would then explain 13.5% of the residual variance of AfD sympathy and 5.5% of the first interaction effect, reducing it to an effect size of -0.149 (red diamond in the upper left window; see also Table 3-4) and a t-value of -2.22 (red diamond in the lower left window; see also Table 3-4). Therefore, such a confounder would not render the effect nonsignificant ($\alpha = 0.05$) or reduce it to zero. The same applies to the other two interaction effects (middle and right columns in Figure 3-4).

Given the strong negative influence of education on sympathy for the AfD in the models of this study, which is also in line with findings in the related literature, it

appears rather unlikely that there is a confounder more than ten times as influential. However, the possibility that such a confounder exists cannot be completely dismissed.

Conclusion

In this study, the aim was to reconsider the relationship between AIA and sympathy for RRP by combining direct and indirect measures. In doing so, the present study attempted to fill a gap in previous research. Despite the ability of implicit attitudes to circumvent cognitive biases in explicit attitudes, researchers have only used implicit attitudes at one end of their models (Bos et al. 2018; Maier et al. 2022). The research design of this study included them at both ends: AIA as the independent variable and sympathy for RRP as the dependent variable are measured as explicit and implicit attitudes. This allows assessment of the strength of the relationship depending on the type of measurement used to collect these variables. The study adhered to open science principles, with the entire project being preregistered, including hypotheses, survey details, and analyses, prior to data collection.

To assess implicit attitudes, the study employed two SC-IATs, one with primes for the AfD, the most relevant RRP party in Germany, and another with synonyms for migrants. These tests were complemented by an explicit survey on the same constructs. In order to enhance the generalisability of the findings compared to using convenience samples (Gawronski and Strack 2004; Friese et al. 2007), a stratified sample based on age and gender was collected.

First, and consistent with previous research, the results provide clear evidence that implicit political attitudes can influence explicitly reported attitudes (Friese et al. 2007; Bos et al. 2018). Regression analyses reveal significant effects for implicit AIA in predicting explicit AfD sympathy, as well as for explicit AIA predicting implicit AfD sympathy. Further findings align with previous studies by indicating that partially implicit models (using one implicit and one explicit variable) yield significantly lower effect sizes than the fully explicit model (Tutić and Grehl 2021; Maier et al. 2022). The conclusion drawn from these insights is that social desirability may actually be less of an issue in distorting the relationship, as measures that avoid this issue tend to result in lower effect sizes than those that account for it.

Second, going beyond previous research, the relationship between these variables was examined in an all-implicit model. It was found that implicit AIA had no impact on implicit AfD sympathy. This outcome supports the expectation of a cognitive dissonance bias in the relationship between these two variables. When giving explicit answers, respondents may match answers (high AIA, high AfD sympathy, and vice versa) in order to project a highly consistent political ideology. However, the findings indicate that their implicit beliefs are less coherent. Consequently, the results suggest that the avoidance of cognitive dissonance may threaten valid results in attitudinal political science research, in the sense that attitudes that appear to be ‘good matches’ may be artificially overreported by participants in such surveys.

Robustness checks provide evidence that these results are resilient to changes in covariates, and sensitivity analyses suggest that unmeasured confounders are unlikely to overturn them. Nevertheless, it is important to stress the limitations of this

study. First, although this study achieved a stratified sample by matching age and sex to population statistics, and the sample also approximates the general distributions of education and employment status, it does not claim to use a representative sample of the German population. Therefore, this study underpins the necessity already described by other scholars to include implicit attitudes in permanent, representative panels (Tutić and Grehl 2021). Second, the selection of primes for this study's SC-IATs was based on sound theoretical considerations, deliberately limiting them to 'migration', as such avoiding any direct association with Islam. However, public images of terms such as 'refugee' and 'asylum seeker' are likely to be associated with the Islamic religion. This is difficult to disentangle in designs like the one in this study, and results may therefore be influenced by this bias. Nevertheless, the use of such formally neutral terms allows for the best approximation of a distinct, religion-neutral, implicit anti-immigration attitude. Third, this study cannot claim to predict vote choice for the AfD or electoral potential. Although there is evidence that the use of a sympathy scale rather than reported voting intentions is better suited to assessing citizens' attitudes towards parties, there is still a significant gap between attitudes and actions (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975) that deserves further research, especially with regard to implicit attitudes (Greenwald et al. 2009).

Taken together, the results of this study point to the relevance of implicit attitudes in shaping party preferences. Compared to the broader debate on demand-side versus supply-side factors, the field of unconscious explanations for the rise and support of RRP has received relatively little attention. Scholars have started to develop a research agenda in this regard in recent years (Bos et al. 2018; Tutić and Grehl 2021; Maier et al. 2022), and this study attempted to contribute to this strand. However,

there is a need for further exploration of the combined explanatory power of implicit and explicit attitudes, the implications of their differences, and the contextual factors that influence their impact on citizens' preferences and actions. Future research in this domain is crucial for a comprehensive understanding of people's support for right-wing populism.

Notes

1. See the declarations at the end of this paper for information on the preregistered report, data, and code availability.
2. In this study, the term ‘ideology’ is used to describe the sum of respondents’ positions towards the two main variables, sympathy for the AfD and anti-immigration attitudes. The term ‘consistent ideology’ is used if high (low) levels of sympathy match with high (low) levels of anti-immigration attitudes.
3. This implies that in order to develop cognitive dissonance, citizens need to have general knowledge about which party suits their attitudes. However, there is convincing evidence that people are not aware of contradictions in their political ideology (Otjes 2016). In the case of this study, it is assumed that respondents are aware that strong anti-immigration attitudes are generally seen as compatible with the AfD. An analysis of data from the GLES Panel (GLES 2023a, 2023b) supports this assumption: 90.5% (in 2021) and 91.4% (2023) of a representative sample believed that the AfD strongly opposes immigration. More details on this analysis can be found in the Online Appendix.
4. Recently, debate has evolved around the concept and terminology of implicit attitudes (Greenwald and Banaji 2017; Jost 2019; Corneille and Hütter 2020; Greenwald et al. 2021). It has been suggested that scholars should generally avoid the term ‘implicit’ in order to avoid confusion between different definitions (Corneille and Hütter 2020). While definitional clarity is desirable, complete neglect of the term ignores its tradition in the field of social psychology and hinders the linking of new findings with established ones. In this paper, therefore, the terms ‘indirect’ and ‘implicit’, as well as ‘direct’ and ‘explicit’, are considered and used as synonyms. In this study, ‘implicit/indirect (explicit/direct) measures’ are those that assess ‘implicit/indirect (explicit/direct/self-reported) attitudes’.
5. Due to an uneven distribution in error rates and item nonresponses, the final sample diverges slightly from the planned quotation. Details of this can be found in the Online Appendix.
6. In general, it would be highly desirable to include these people. However, the reactivity of the participant and the test itself, which loads a new prime/word as soon as a key is pressed, make it difficult to predict how blind people, even when using reading programs, would perform on such tests and whether their results would be comparable to those of nonblind people.
7. It is important to stress that this sample is not a completely representative sample of the general German public. It is generally questionable whether this could be achieved by an all-online access panel at all.

8. For a detailed discussion of this issue, please refer to the Online Appendix.
9. For more details on this issue, please refer to the Online Appendix.
10. See the declaration section at the end of this paper for further information.
11. In fact, the jointly collected respective explicit items for the Christian Social Union in Bavaria, the Greens, and the Left Party all have their modus on the first value, although to a far lesser extent.
12. For a more detailed investigation of failure rates in the SC-IATs, please refer to the Online Appendix.
13. Please see the Online Appendix for more details.

Funding

The Leibniz Institute for Psychology funded and supported this study. The author expresses his immense gratitude for their support. Open Access funding enabled and organized by Projekt DEAL.

Conflict of interest

M. Kleinert declares that he has no competing interests.

Availability of data and material

The preregistered report and the data file are available through the Leibniz psychology data repository.

Kleinert, M. 2022. Reconsidering the Relationship between Anti-Immigration Attitudes and Radical Right-Wing Party Preferences Using Implicit Attitudes Measures. PsychArchives. DOI: 10.23668/psycharchives.5392

Kleinert, M. 2022. Party sympathy and anti-immigration attitudes measured implicitly and explicitly dataset (PAIED), PsychArchives, Trier. DOI: 10.23668/psycharchives.8148

Code availability

Code is available through the online supplementary appendix.

References

- Amengay, Abdelkarim, and Daniel Stockemer. 2019. The radical right in western Europe: a meta-analysis of structural factors. *Political Studies Review* 17(1):30–40. DOI:10.1177/1478929918777975.
- An, Brian P. 2015. The role of social desirability bias and racial/ethnic composition on the relation between education and attitude toward immigration restrictionism. *The Social Science Journal* 52(4):459–467. DOI:10.1016/j.soscij.2014.09.005.
- Arcuri, Luciano, Luigi Castelli, Silvia Galdi, Cristina Zogmaister, and Alessandro Amadori. 2008. Predicting the vote: implicit attitudes as predictors of the future behavior of decided and undecided voters. *Political Psychology* 29(3):369–387. DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9221.2008.00635.x.
- Art, David. 2006. *The politics of the Nazi past in Germany and Austria*. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Arzheimer, Kai. 2015. The AfD: finally a successful right-wing populist Eurosceptic party for Germany? *West European Politics* 38(3):535–556. DOI:10.1080/01402382.2015.1004230.
- Arzheimer, Kai. 2018. Explaining Electoral Support for the Radical Right. In *The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right*, Vol. 1, ed. Jens Rydgren, 143–165. Oxford University Press.
- Arzheimer, Kai, and Carl C. Berning. 2019. How the Alternative for Germany (AfD) and their voters veered to the radical right. *Electoral Studies*, Vol. 60, 2013–2017. DOI:10.1016/j.electstud.2019.04.004.
- Atzpodien, Dana Siobhan. 2022. Party Competition in Migration Debates: The Influence of the AfD on Party Positions in German State Parliaments. *German Politics* 31(3):381–398. DOI:10.1080/09644008.2020.1860211.
- Bazo Vienrich, Alessandra, and Mathew J. Creighton. 2018. What’s left unsaid? In-group solidarity and ethnic and racial differences in opposition to immigration

in the United States. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 44(13):2240–2255. DOI:10.1080/1369183X.2017.1334540.

Berbuir, Nicole, Marcel Lewandowsky, and Jasmin Siri. 2015. The AfD and its Sympathisers: Finally a Right-Wing Populist Movement in Germany? *German Politics* 24(2):154–178. DOI:10.1080/09644008.2014.982546.

Bos, Linda, Penelope Sheets, and Hajo G. Boomgaarden. 2018. The role of implicit attitudes in populist radical-right support. *Political Psychology* 39(1):69–87. DOI:10.1111/pops.12401.

Bowler, Shaun, David Denemark, Todd Donovan, and Duncan McDonnell. 2017. Right-wing populist party supporters: Dissatisfied but not direct democrats. *European Journal of Political Research* 56(1):70–91. DOI:10.1111/1475-6765.12166.

Breithaupt, Lauren, Paige Trojanowski, and Sarah Fischer. 2020. Implicit and explicit anti-fat attitude change following brief cognitive dissonance intervention for weight. *Stigma. Obesity* (Silver Spring, Md.) 28(10):1853–1859. DOI:10.1002/oby.22909.

Caamaño, Rama José, and Guillermo Cordero. 2018. Who are the losers of the economic crisis? Explaining the vote for rightwing populist parties in Europe after the Great Recession. *Revista Española de Ciencia Política* 4(8):13–43. DOI:10.21308/recp.48.01.

Carmines, Edward, and Rita Nassar. 2021. How social desirability bias affects immigration attitudes in a Hyperpolarized political environment. *Social Science Quarterly* 102(4):1803–1811. DOI:10.1111/ssqu.12982.

Carruthers, Peter. 2018. Implicit versus explicit attitudes: differing manifestations of the same representational structures? *Review of Philosophy and Psychology* 9(1):51–72. DOI:10.1007/s13164-017-0354-3.

Chung, Janne, and Gary S. Monroe. 2003. Exploring social desirability bias. *Journal of Business Ethics* 44(4):291–302. DOI:10.1023/A:1023648703356.

- Cinelli, Carlos, Jeremy Ferwerda, and Chad Hazlett. 2020. Sensemakr: Sensitivity Analysis Tools for OLS in R and Stata. *SSRN Electronic Journal* DOI:10.2139/ssrn.3588978.
- Corneille, Olivier, and Mandy Hütter. 2020. Implicit? What do you mean? A comprehensive review of the delusive implicitness construct in attitude research. *Personality and Social Psychology Review* 24(3):212–232. DOI:10.1177/1088868320911325.
- Creighton, Mathew J., Jamal Amaney, and Natalia C. Malancu. 2015. Has opposition to immigration increased in the United States after the economic crisis? An experimental approach. *International Migration Review* 49(3):727–756. DOI:10.1111/imre.12091.
- CSES—The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. 2021. CSES module 5 third advance release [dataset and documentation]. July 20, 2021 version
- Ditonto, Tessa M., R. Lau Richard, and David O. Sears. 2013. AMping racial attitudes: comparing the power of explicit and implicit racism measures in 2008. *Political Psychology* 34(4):487–510. DOI:10.1111/pops.12013.
- Donovan, Todd. 2020. Misclassifying parties as radical right / right wing populist: a comparative analysis of New Zealand First. *Political Science* 72(1):58–76. DOI:10.1080/00323187.2020.1855992.
- Dunn, Kris. 2015. Preference for radical right-wing populist parties among exclusive-nationalists and authoritarians. *Party Politics* 21(3):367–380. DOI:10.1177/1354068812472587.
- van der Eijk, Cees, Wouter van der Brug, Martin Kroh, and Mark Franklin. 2006. Rethinking the dependent variable in voting behavior: On the measurement and analysis of electoral utilities. *Electoral Studies* 25(3):424–447. DOI:10.1016/j.electstud.2005.06.012.
- Festinger, Leon. 1957. *A theory of cognitive dissonance*. Stanford University Press.

- Fishbein, Martin, and Icek Ajzen. 1975. *Belief, attitude, intention and behavior. An introduction to theory and research*. Addison-Wesley series in social psychology. Reading, Mass.. Addison-Wesley.
- Franzmann, Simon T. 2016. Calling the ghost of populism: the AfD's strategic and tactical agendas until the EP election 2014. *German Politics* 25(4):457–479. DOI:10.1080/09644008.2016.1201075.
- Franzmann, Simon T., Heiko Giebler, and Thomas Poguntke. 2020. It's no longer the economy, stupid! Issue yield at the 2017 German federal election. *West European Politics* 43(3):610–638. DOI:10.1080/01402382.2019.1655963.
- Friese, Malte, Matthias Bluemke, and Michaela Wänke. 2007. Predicting voting behavior with implicit attitude measures: the 2002 German parliamentary election. *Experimental psychology* 54(4):247–255. DOI:10.1027/1618-3169.54.4.247.
- Gawronski, Bertram, and Fritz Strack. 2004. On the propositional nature of cognitive consistency: Dissonance changes explicit, but not implicit attitudes. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 40(4):535–542. DOI:10.1016/j.jesp.2003.10.005.
- GLES. 2019. Wahlkampf-Panel (GLES 2017) ZA6804 Datenfile Version 7.0.0. DOI:10.4232/1.13323.
- GLES. 2023a. GLES Panel 2016–2021, Wellen 1-21 ZA6838 Datenfile Version 6.0.0. DOI:10.4232/1.14114.
- GLES. 2023b. GLES Panel 2023, Welle 24 ZA7730 Datenfile Version 1.0.0. DOI:10.4232/1.14141.
- Goerres, Achim, Dennis C. Spies, and Staffan Kumlin. 2018. The Electoral Supporter Base of the Alternative for Germany. *Swiss Political Science Review* 24(3):246–269. DOI:10.1111/spsr.12306.
- Golder, Matt. 2016. Far right parties in Europe. *Annual Review of Political Science* 19(1):477–497. DOI:10.1146/annurev-polisci-042814-012441.

- Greenwald, Anthony G., and Mahzarin R. Banaji. 2017. The implicit revolution: Reconceiving the relation between conscious and unconscious. *The American psychologist* 72(9):861–871. DOI:10.1037/amp0000238.
- Greenwald, Anthony G., Debbie E. McGhee, and Jordan L.K. Schwartz. 1998. Measuring individual differences in implicit cognition: the implicit association test. *Journal of personality and social psychology* 74(6):1464–1480. DOI:10.1037//0022-3514.74.6.1464.
- Greenwald, Anthony G., T. Andrew Poehlman, Eric Luis Uhlmann, and Mahzarin R. Banaji. 2009. Understanding and using the Implicit Association Test: III. Meta-analysis of predictive validity. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 97(1):17–41. DOI:10.1037/a0015575.
- Greenwald, Anthony G., Mahzarin R. Banaji, and Brian A. Nosek. 2015. Statistically small effects of the Implicit Association Test can have societally large effects. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 108(4):553–561. DOI:10.1037/pspa0000016.
- Greenwald, Anthony G., Miguel Brendl, Cai Huajian, Dario Cvencek, John F. Dovidio, Malte Friese, Adam Hahn, Eric Hehman, Wilhelm Hofmann, Sean Hughes, Ian Hussey, Christian Teri A.Kirby Jordan, Calvin K. Lai, Jonas W.B. Lang, Kristen P. Lindgren, Dominika Maison, Brian D. Ostafin, James R. Rae, Kate A. Ratliff, Adriaan Spruyt, and Reinout W. Wiers. 2021. Best research practices for using the Implicit Association Test. *Behavior research methods* DOI:10.3758/s13428-021-01624-3.
- Grimm, Robert. 2015. The rise of the German Eurosceptic party Alternative für Deutschland, between ordoliberal critique and popular anxiety. *International Political Science Review* 36(3):264–278. DOI:10.1177/0192512115575384.
- Gschwend, Thomas, Sebastian Juhl, and Roni Lehrer. 2018. Die „Sonntagsfrage“, soziale Erwünschtheit und die AfD: Wie alternative Messmethoden der Politikwissenschaft weiterhelfen können. *Politische Vierteljahresschrift* 59(3):493–519. DOI:10.1007/s11615-018-0106-8.

- Han, Kyung Joon. 2016. Income inequality and voting for radical right-wing parties. *Electoral Studies* 42:54–64. DOI:10.1016/j.electstud.2016.02.001.
- Hansen, Michael A., and Jonathan Olsen. 2019. Flesh of the Same Flesh: A Study of Voters for the Alternative for Germany (AfD) in the 2017 Federal Election. *German Politics* 28(1):1–19. DOI:10.1080/09644008.2018.1509312.
- Harmon-Jones, Eddie, and Cindy Harmon-Jones. 2007. Cognitive Dissonance Theory After 50 Years of Development. *Zeitschrift für Sozialpsychologie* 38(1):7–16. DOI:10.1024/0044-3514.38.1.7.
- van Hauwaert, Steven M., and Stijn van Kessel. 2018. Beyond protest and discontent: A cross-national analysis of the effect of populist attitudes and issue positions on populist party support. *European Journal of Political Research* 57(1):68–92. DOI:10.1111/1475-6765.12216.
- Hawkins, Kirk A., Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, and Ioannis Andreadis. 2020. The Activation of Populist Attitudes. *Government and Opposition* 55(2):283–307. DOI:10.1017/gov.2018.23.
- Heinze, Anna-Sophie. 2018. Strategies of mainstream parties towards their right-wing populist challengers: Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland in comparison. *West European Politics* 41(2):287–309. DOI:10.1080/01402382.2017.1389440.
- Jankowski, Michael, and Marcel Lewandowsky. 2018. Die AfD im achten Europäischen Parlament: Eine Analyse der Positionsverschiebung basierend auf namentlichen Abstimmungen von 2014–2016. *Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft* 12(3):567–589. DOI:10.1007/s12286-018-0394-9.
- Janus, Alexander L. 2010. The Influence of Social Desirability Pressures on Expressed Immigration Attitudes. *Social Science Quarterly* 91(4):928–946. DOI:10.1111/j.1540-6237.2010.00742.x.
- Johann, David, and Kathrin Thomas. 2018. Need for support or economic competition? Implicit associations with immigrants during the 2015 migrant crisis. *Research & Politics* 5(2):205316801876813. DOI:10.1177/2053168018768136.

- Jost, John T. 2019. The IAT Is Dead, Long Live the IAT: Context-Sensitive Measures of Implicit Attitudes Are Indispensable to Social and Political Psychology. *Current Directions in Psychological Science* 28(1):10–19. DOI:10.1177/0963721418797309.
- Karpinski, Andrew, and Ross B. Steinman. 2006. The single category implicit association test as a measure of implicit social cognition. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 91(1):16–32. DOI:10.1037/0022-3514.91.1.16.
- Klein, Markus, Fabian Heckert, and Yannic Peper. 2018. Rechtspopulismus oder rechter Verdruss? *KZfSS Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie* 70(3):391–417. DOI:10.1007/s11577-018-0564-4.
- Knigge, Pia. 1998. The ecological correlates of right-wing extremism in Western Europe. *European Journal of Political Research* 34(2):249–279. DOI:10.1111/1475-6765.00407.
- Lengfeld, Holger. 2018. Der „Kleine Mann“ und die AfD: Was steckt dahinter? *KZfSS Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie* 70(2):295–310. DOI:10.1007/s11577-018-0536-8.
- Levendusky, Matthew S. 2010. Clearer Cues, More Consistent Voters: A Benefit of Elite Polarization. *Political Behavior* 32(1):111–131. DOI:10.1007/s11109-009-9094-0.
- Lewandowsky, Marcel, Heiko Giebler, and Aiko Wagner. 2016. Rechtspopulismus in Deutschland. Eine empirische Einordnung der Parteien zur Bundestagswahl 2013 unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der AfD. *Politische Vierteljahresschrift* 57(2):247–275. DOI:10.5771/0032-3470-2016-2-247.
- Lubbers, Marcel, and Marcel Coenders. 2017. Nationalistic attitudes and voting for the radical right in Europe. *European Union Politics* 18(1):98–118. DOI:10.1177/1465116516678932.
- Lux, Thomas. 2018. Die AfD und die unteren Statuslagen. Eine Forschungsnotiz zu Holger Lengfelds Studie Die „Alternative für Deutschland“: eine Partei für

Modernisierungsverlierer? *KZfSS Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie* 70(2):255–273. DOI:10.1007/s11577-018-0521-2.

Maier, Michaela, Ines C. Welzenbach-Vogel, Clara Christner, Erik R. Tillman, Axel Zinkernagel, and Manfred Schmitt. 2022. Implicit and explicit populist and anti-immigrant attitudes and their explanatory power for populist radical-right party support. *Acta Politica* DOI:10.1057/s41269-022-00255-6.

Marikyan, Davit, Savvas Papagiannidis, and Eleftherios Alamanos. 2023. Cognitive dissonance in technology adoption: a study of smart home users. *Information systems frontiers: a journal of research and innovation* 25(3):1101–1123. DOI:10.1007/s10796-020-10042-3.

Masur, Philipp K., and Michael Scharkow. 2020. *specr: Conducting and Visualizing Specification Curve Analyses (Version 1.0.0)*. <https://CRAN.R-project.org/package=specr>.

McGann, Anthony J., and Herbert Kitschelt. 2005. The radical right in the alps. *Party Politics* 11(2):147–171. DOI:10.1177/1354068805049734.

Mesdaghinia, Salar, Anushri Rawat, and Shiva Nadavulakere. 2019. Why moral followers quit: examining the role of leader bottom-line mentality and unethical pro-leader behavior. *Journal of Business Ethics* 159(2):491–505. DOI:10.1007/s10551-018-3812-7.

Mudde, Cas. 2007. *Populist radical right parties in Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mudde, Cas. 2019. *The Far Right Today*. Newark: Polity Press.

Muis, Jasper, Tobias Brils, and Teodora Gaidytė. 2021. Arrived in power, and yet still disgruntled? How government inclusion moderates ‘protest voting’ for far-right populist parties in europe. *Government and Opposition* DOI:10.1017/gov.2021.46.

Mullainathan, Sendhil, and Ebonya Washington. 2009. Sticking with your vote: cognitive dissonance and political attitudes. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics* 1(1):86–111. DOI:10.1257/app.1.1.86.

- Nosek, Brian A., Frederick L. Smyth, Jeffrey J. Hansen, Thierry Devos, Nicole M. Lindner, Kate A. Ranganath, Colin Tucker Smith, Kristina R. Olson, Dolly Chugh, Anthony G. Greenwald, and Mahzarin R. Banaji. 2007. Pervasiveness and correlates of implicit attitudes and stereotypes. *European Review of Social Psychology* 18(1):36–88. DOI:10.1080/10463280701489053.
- Oesch, Daniel. 2008. Explaining workers' support for right-wing populist parties in western Europe: evidence from Austria, Belgium, France, Norway, and Switzerland. *International Political Science Review* 29(3):349–373. DOI:10.1177/0192512107088390.
- Ong, Andy Swee-Jin, Lynn Frewer, and Mei-Yen Chan. 2017. Cognitive dissonance in food and nutrition—A review. *Critical reviews in food science and nutrition* 57(11):2330–2342. DOI:10.1080/10408398.2015.1013622.
- Otjes, Simon. 2016. What's right about the left–right dimension? The causes and the consequences of ideological inconsistency on economic issues in Germany. *German Politics* 25(4):581–603. DOI:10.1080/09644008.2016.1223841.
- Payne, B. Keith Clara Michelle Cheng, Olesya Govorun, and Brandon D. Stewart. 2005. An inkblot for attitudes: affect misattribution as implicit measurement. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 89(3):277–293. DOI:10.1037/0022-3514.89.3.277.
- Pesthy, Maria, Matthias Mader, and Harald Schoen. 2021. Why is the AfD so successful in eastern Germany? An analysis of the ideational foundations of the AfD vote in the 2017 federal election. *Politische Vierteljahresschrift* 62(1):69–91. DOI:10.1007/s11615-020-00285-9.
- Richardson, John, and Monica Colombo. 2013. Discourse and politics of migration in Italy. *Journal of Language and Politics* 12(2):180–202. DOI:10.1075/jlp.12.2.02ric.
- Rippl, Susanne, and Christian Seipel. 2018. Modernisierungsverlierer, Cultural Backlash, Postdemokratie. *KZfSS Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie* 70(2):237–254. DOI:10.1007/s11577-018-0522-1.

- Roccatò, Michele, and Cristina Zogmaister. 2010. Predicting the Vote through Implicit and Explicit Attitudes: A Field Research. *Political Psychology* 31(2):249–274. DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9221.2009.00751.x.
- Rooduijn, Matthijs. 2018. What unites the voter bases of populist parties? Comparing the electorates of 15 populist parties. *European Political Science Review* 10(3):351–368. DOI:10.1017/S1755773917000145.
- Rooduijn, Matthijs, Stijn van Kessel, Caterina Froio, Andrea Pirro, Sarah de Lange, Daphne Halikiopoulou, Paul Lewis, Cas Mudde, and Paul Taggart. 2019. The Populist: an overview of populist, far right, far left and Eurosceptic parties in Europe. www.popu-list.org.
- Rothgerber, Hank, and Daniel L. Rosenfeld. 2021. Meat-related cognitive dissonance: The social psychology of eating animals. *Social and Personality Psychology Compass* DOI:10.1111/spc3.12592.
- Rydgren, Jens. 2007. The sociology of the radical right. *Annual Review of Sociology* 33(1):241–262. DOI:10.1146/annurev.soc.33.040406.131752.
- Rydgren, Jens. 2008. Immigration sceptics, xenophobes or racists? Radical right-wing voting in six West European countries. *European Journal of Political Research* 47(6):737–765. DOI:10.1111/j.1475-6765.2008.00784.x.
- Rydgren, Jens, and Sara van der Meiden. 2019. The radical right and the end of Swedish exceptionalism. *European Political Science* 18(3):439–455. DOI:10.1057/s41304-018-0159-6.
- Savage, Lee. 2023. Preferences for redistribution, welfare chauvinism, and radical right party support in central and eastern Europe. *East European Politics and Societies: and Cultures* 37(2):584–607. DOI:10.1177/08883254221079797.
- Schmitt-Beck, Rüdiger. 2017. The ‘Alternative für Deutschland in the Electorate’: Between Single-Issue and Right-Wing Populist Party. *German Politics* 26(1):124–148. DOI:10.1080/09644008.2016.1184650.

- Schröder, Martin. 2018. AfD-Unterstützer sind nicht abgehängt, sondern ausländerfeindlich. *SOEPpapers on Multidisciplinary Panel Data Research*. No. 975.
- Schwarzbözl, Tobias, and Matthias Fatke. 2016. Außer Protesten nichts gewesen? Das politische Potenzial der AfD. *Politische Vierteljahresschrift* 57(2):276–299. DOI:10.5771/0032-3470-2016-2-276.
- Smith, Eliot R., and Jamie DeCoster. 2000. Dual-Process Models in Social and Cognitive Psychology: Conceptual Integration and Links to Underlying Memory Systems. *Personality and Social Psychology Review* 4(2):108–131. DOI:10.1207/S15327957PSPR0402_01.
- Sorace, Miriam, and Sara Binzer Hobolt. 2021. A tale of two peoples: motivated reasoning in the aftermath of the Brexit Vote. *Political Science Research and Methods* 9(4):675–692. DOI:10.1017/psrm.2020.50.
- Spierings, Niels, and Andrej Zaslove. 2017. Gender, populist attitudes, and voting: explaining the gender gap in voting for populist radical right and populist radical left parties. *West European Politics* 40(4):821–847. DOI:10.1080/01402382.2017.1287448.
- Statistisches Bundesamt. 2022a. Bevölkerung im Alter von 15 Jahren und mehr nach allgemeinen und beruflichen Bildungsabschlüssen nach Jahren. <https://www.destatis.de/DE/Themen/Gesellschaft-Umwelt/Bildung-Forschung-Kultur/Bildungsstand/Tabellen/bildungsabschluss.html>. Accessed 21 August 2023.
- Statistisches Bundesamt. 2022b. Arbeitsmarkt. https://www.destatis.de/DE/Themen/Wirtschaft/Konjunkturindikatoren/Arbeitsmarkt/karb811_x13a.html. Accessed 21 August 2023.
- Steiner, Nils D., and Claudia Landwehr. 2018. Populistische Demokratiekonzeptionen und die Wahl der AfD: Evidenz aus einer Panelstudie. *Politische Vierteljahresschrift* 59(3):463–491. DOI:10.1007/s11615-018-0083-y.

- Stiglbauer, Barbara, Silvana Weber, and Bernad Batinic. 2019. Does your health really benefit from using a self-tracking device? Evidence from a longitudinal randomized control trial. *Computers in Human Behavior* 94:131–139. DOI:10.1016/j.chb.2019.01.018.
- Stockemer, Daniel, Tobias Lentz, and Danielle Mayer. 2018. Individual predictors of the radical right-wing vote in europe: a meta-analysis of articles in Peer-reviewed journals (1995–2016). *Government and Opposition* 53(03):569–593. DOI:10.1017/gov.2018.2.
- Swanson, Jane E., Laurie A. Rudman, and Anthony G. Greenwald. 2001. Using the implicit association test to investigate attitude-behaviour consistency for stigmatised behaviour. *Cognition & emotion* 15(2):207–230. DOI:10.1080/02699930125706.
- Tutić, Andreas, and Sascha Grehl. 2021. Implizite Einstellungen, explizite Einstellungen und die Affinität zur AfD. *KZfSS Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie* 73(3):389–417. DOI:10.1007/s11577-021-00803-6.
- Tutić, Andreas, and Hagen von Hermanni. 2018. Sozioökonomischer Status, Deprivation und die Affinität zur AfD – Eine Forschungsnotiz. *KZfSS Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie* 70(2):275–294. DOI:10.1007/s11577-018-0523-0.
- Vecchione, Michele, Gianvittorio Caprara, Francesco Dentale, and Shalom H. Schwartz. 2013. Voting and values: reciprocal effects over time. *Political Psychology* 34(4):465–485. DOI:10.1111/pops.12011.
- Weisskircher, Manès. 2020. The strength of far-right AfD in eastern Germany: the east-west divide and the multiple causes behind ‘populism. *The Political Quarterly* 91(3):614–622. DOI:10.1111/1467-923X.12859.
- Werkmann, Caroline, and Sergiu Gherghina. 2018. Organized for parliament? Explaining the electoral success of radical right parties in post-communist europe. *Government and Opposition* 53(3):461–485. DOI:10.1017/gov.2016.38.

Wurthmann, L. Constantin, Stefan Marschall, Vasiliki Triga, and Vasilis Manavopoulos. 2021. Many losers—One winner? An examination of vote switching to the AfD in the 2017 German federal election using VAA data. *Party Politics* 27(5):870–882. DOI:10.1177/1354068820914959.

Chapter 4 Parliamentary Status and Drivers of Sympathy for the Radical Right

This is the peer reviewed version of the following article:

Kleinert, Manuel. 2024. Parliamentary Status and Drivers of Sympathy for the Radical Right. *Swiss Political Science Review*, which has been published in final form at doi.org/10.1111/spsr.12591.

This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Use of Self-Archived Versions. This article may not be enhanced, enriched or otherwise transformed into a derivative work, without express permission from Wiley or by statutory rights under applicable legislation. Copyright notices must not be removed, obscured or modified. The article must be linked to Wiley's version of record on Wiley Online Library and any embedding, framing or otherwise making available the article or pages thereof by third parties from platforms, services and websites other than Wiley Online Library must be prohibited.

Abstract

Demand-side research on the success of Radical right-wing populist parties (RRPPs) parties has highlighted the crucial role of anti-immigration attitudes, political dissatisfaction and their interaction as drivers of sympathy for them. Supply-side research is highly interested in the isolation that RRPPs face in their respective parliaments. Linking these perspectives, we theorize and test whether cross-country differences in the degree of parliamentary isolation of an RRPP can predict differences in attitudinal associations. We find that, beyond direct links, anti-immigration attitudes and political dissatisfaction vary considerably in their moderated association with RRPP sympathy. This variation is consistent with the status of the RRPP in each country. In parliamentary isolation, anti-immigration attitudes and political dissatisfaction reinforce each other in predicting RRPP sympathy, attenuate each other when the RRPP is in government and are independent when the RRPP has a history of government. We briefly discuss implications of these results.

Introduction

Many studies highlight the importance of anti-immigration attitudes and political discontent in predicting citizens' sympathy for radical right-wing populist parties (RRPPs) (Roodujin 2018). On the supply side, RRPPs face unique challenges in many European parliaments, as they are often isolated by a *cordon sanitaire* imposed by the remaining parties. However, little is known about how this affects voters' attitudes towards such parties. Here, we contribute to filling this gap by drawing on large-scale cross-national survey data. By combining these with data on the parliamentary inclusion of RRPPs, we are able to identify differences in attitudes towards RRPPs across countries.

Beyond the direct association of anti-immigration attitudes and political dissatisfaction with RRPP sympathy, we focus on the moderation between these concepts. Thus, we answer the question how political dissatisfaction is linked to issue-related party sympathy in different political contexts.

Linking demand-side attitudes with supply-side circumstances

On the supply side of party competition, RRPPs face unique challenges in many parliaments. Unlike mainstream parties, which occasionally alternate between opposition and government, RRPPs are sometimes isolated by a *cordon sanitaire* imposed by the rest of the parliament. This means that no other party will form a coalition with them often even refusing informal ties and support. A whole strand of research is devoted to understanding when and how such strategies are pursued by

mainstream parties (Heinze 2018), how they affect RRPPs (Krause et al. 2022; Rummens and Abts 2010), as well as how they affect mainstream parties (Abou-Chadi and Krause 2020; Gessler and Hunger 2021). However, efforts to understand the association of an RRPP's standing with citizens' attitudes and sympathy for these parties on an individual basis rather than aggregated electoral outcomes are largely lacking (for an exception, see Han 2020). This might be the case because the degree of RRPPs inclusion in parliamentary processes varies strongly, which complicates cross-country comparisons. For this study, we propose to break down this variation in a concept labelled 'parliamentary status' with three categories: Isolation (also labelled 'cordon sanitaire' or 'pariah status' (Moffitt 2022), prior governmental participation, to-date governmental participation. We acknowledge that this simplification widely ignores various facets of each category, e.g. whether isolation is limited to no coalition proclaims or also affects committees or media. However, this comparably distinct, universal and accessible reduction allows for clear cross-country comparisons.

At the demand-side, researchers have documented strong correlations between anti-immigration attitudes and sympathy for RRPPs (Rydgren 2007), which is sometimes seen as a core ideology, a lowest common denominator that unites voters behind these parties (Roodujin 2018). Political discontent is mostly linked to RRPPs through the 'protest vote' theory, which argues that citizens' disapproval of current policies makes them more likely to sympathize with RRPPs (Schmitt-Beck 2017; Voogd and Dassonneville 2020). It has also been shown that these factors can reinforce and moderate each other (Kleinert 2021). Theoretically, this is based on the assumption that political issues, such as anti-immigration attitudes, are more salient predictors of

party preferences for citizens who are dissatisfied with the incumbent government. But what if an RRPP is (or at least has been) part of the government? How does this affect these predictors and the interaction between them?

In this article, we link demand-side attitudes and supply-side circumstances to explain cross-country differences in predictors of sympathy for such parties. Following previous research and theory, we expect positive direct links¹ of anti-immigration attitudes with sympathy for RRPPs. However, for the protest vote effect of political dissatisfaction, we expect the link to be positive in countries where such parties are isolated ('protest vote') and negative when the RRPP is part of the government, implying that citizens who are satisfied with the government's performance also give credit to the governing parties. We then pay particular attention to a moderating term between anti-immigration attitudes and political dissatisfaction, which's sign we expect to vary along with the parliamentary status of the RRPP in a given country: These attitudes should be mutually reinforcing when the party in question is isolated. If the party in question has participated in governments before, the interaction may be less pronounced, and finally, in the context of RRPP governments, the terms should attenuate each other.

To illustrate these premises, imagine a citizen with strong anti-immigration attitudes who is increasingly dissatisfied that the current government is not doing enough in his preferred direction. In search for alternatives, our concept of parliamentary status may implicitly be applied. Parties that advocate tough immigration policies *and* appear as the complete opposite of the incumbents (often in their self-portrayal, but also by competitors, which punish them with isolation) may seem like a promising

alternative. However, parties that had been in government before may be less attractive, as high expectations may have been disappointed before. Finally, RRPPs that are currently in government are obviously not the right choice for someone who is disappointed with current policies. Isolated parties may therefore benefit from their status in the sense that political dissatisfaction is associated with greater salience of a main motive - anti-immigration attitudes - for sympathizing with them. For parties that have been part of governments in the recent past, this effect becomes less relevant, and for the currently ruling RRPP, citizens with higher levels of political dissatisfaction should be less likely to sympathize with this party, but also have a weaker link of anti-immigration attitudes in predicting their sympathy for it.

Data and analytic strategy

To test our assumptions, we combine data from different sources and countries. Detailed information on variables, parties and descriptive statistics can be found in the online appendix. Survey data were chosen primarily for the availability of a metric sympathy scale for parties and other items to represent our theoretical constructs. The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES; CSES 2021) and the RECONNECT survey (abbreviated as REC; Plescia, Wilhelm et al. 2020) met our criteria. Combined and filtered for countries where critical items were not asked, we were left with 15 national samples².

The operationalization of our theoretical constructs was guided by theoretical arguments and common practice. Anti-immigration attitudes are an equally weighted index of three items in both datasets. Following common definitions (Torcal 2011),

political dissatisfaction is represented by a single indicator asking about satisfaction with the current national government. In contrast to much of the existing literature, our dependent variable is a sympathy scale for the most relevant RRPP of the respective country. Note that these scales allow the respondent to indicate a general preference for an RRPP, independent of voting intentions (Gschwend, Juhl et al. 2018). As these scales do not force respondents to select only one party, they allow researchers to identify also respondents who would no more or not yet vote for the RRPP but have general sympathy for the RRPP and therefore may be volatile in their reported voting intention. This subtle distinction is useful because it makes the sympathy scale appear more robust to changes in external conditions, which influence citizens' voting intentions (e.g. thresholds, relative strength, coalition signals; cf. van der Eijk, van der Brug et al. 2006). Within our sample, we also witness the case that a party switches from opposition to government between two observations. Along with this change voters may change their voting intention against (as an important hurdle to exerting political influence has been overcome) or in favor of the party (to align with the winners, 'bandwagon effect'), but it appears less likely that their general sympathy changes due to that switch. To identify the 'most relevant RRPP in each country', from PopuList (Rooduijn, van Kessel et al. 2019), we took the one that obtained the largest vote share in the last election before the survey. 'Parliamentary status' was determined using ParlGov dataset (Döring, Huber et al. 2022). In all analyses we also used common socio-demographic variables as controls.

We employ these cross-sectional, cross-national datasets in OLS models. Prior to their estimation, we standardized all variables and computed the index of anti-

immigration attitudes. The models include the interaction term between anti-immigration attitudes and political dissatisfaction and the regression of all variables on the respondent's sympathy for the RRPP.

Results

At the individual level, we find strong support for both of our theoretically relevant variables (Figure 4-1). Association of anti-immigration attitudes with RRPP sympathy is positive in all countries except Poland and Hungary (REC). Although the RRPPs in these countries (PiS and Fidesz) also express strong anti-immigration sentiments, these parties are also majority parties supported by a broad and diverse part of the electorate. Therefore, individual issues may be less relevant for their voters. In general, estimates for anti-immigration attitudes appear stronger in the CSES dataset than in the REC dataset. This may be related to the different items included in the measurement of this construct.

Regarding political dissatisfaction, the results are more stratified, ranging from strong positive to strong negative associations with RRPP sympathy. This variation is in line with our expectations: We find strong positive links for isolated parties, links close to zero when the RRPP used to govern, and negative ones when the RRPP is currently in government. This supports our expectation that satisfaction with the government is strongly associated with sympathy for the governing parties.

We now turn to the interaction term of political dissatisfaction and anti-immigration attitudes predicting RRPP sympathy. The results above suggest it is worth taking the




Figure 4-1: Forest plot of coefficients by variable and country. Order of countries follows parliamentary status and strength of the interaction. Light blue = RRPP is isolated; dark blue = RRPP was previously part of a cabinet or supported a minority government; purple = RRPP is in government. (C) = CSES, (R) = RECONNECT. Generated with ggplot2 (Wickham 2016).




Figure 4-2: Plots showing predicted unstandardized RRPP sympathy (0-10) for different levels of political dissatisfaction and anti-immigration attitudes (blue = arithmetic mean, red = mean-1SD, green = mean+1SD). For Sweden (C), the index is missing one variable, so it has only nine levels, all of which are shown (red = lowest, gray = highest). Countries are arranged in rows according to the status of the RRPP: Top row, A = RRPP is isolated in this country; middle row, B = RRPP was previously part of a cabinet or supported a minority government; bottom row, C = RRPP is in government. (C) = CSES, (R) = RECONNECT. Plotted with sjPlot (Lüdtke 2023).

parliamentary status perspective into account when interpreting cross-country differences. Indeed, we find strong support for our hypothesis that the positive association of the interaction term with RRPP sympathy, varies with the party's parliamentary status. For our sample of countries, RRPPs were isolated at the time of the survey in Germany, France, Sweden, and Spain. It is precisely in these countries - and only in these countries - that we find positive (reinforcing) links of the moderator. This is also depicted in Figure 4-2, where the predictions for different levels of anti-immigration attitudes spread out with higher levels of political dissatisfaction. The RRPPs in Austria, Finland, Denmark and Italy (CSES) were not part of the current government but of previous ones. In this group of countries the interaction term is insignificant. In Norway, Hungary, Poland and Italy (REC) the RRPPs were in government during the field period. Here, greater political dissatisfaction is linked to lower estimates of anti-immigration attitudes and the linear predictions move closer together towards the right side of the graph.

Note that the unstandardized sympathy scales in Figure 4-2 allow interpreting the practical relevance of these results. In the upper row, especially in Germany and France predicted values span across nearly half of the sympathy scale. In the center row differences are comparably weak, while in the lower row, mainly Poland and Hungary, our models yield predictions nearly across the whole spectrum.

The cases of Italy and Denmark are particularly interesting. Italy is the only country for which we can make a comparison between different statuses of the RRPP we are studying. The Lega party was part of previous governments, but not of the current one, when data for the CSES was collected. Shortly thereafter - and during field

phase of the REC dataset - it was a major participant in the government. With this switch from opposition to government benches the moderation term for Italy also moves from narrowly insignificant to strong and significantly negative in our models. Denmark (REC) stands out as a bit odd, fitting our predicted scheme only by a small margin and showing a negative link for political dissatisfaction, implying that those who were more satisfied with the government's performance were also more likely to report positive evaluations of the RRPP. The party in question, 'Dansk Folkepartiet', was not formally part of the government, but informally supported a right-wing government during the period of data collection, and thus has a unique and exceptional status among the parties in our data sets. Therefore, this case fits both theoretically and empirically between the two levels we formally specified (not in government but also not isolated vs. in government).

Taken together, these results suggest that the degree of parliamentary exclusion or inclusion, a supply-side factor, is strongly linked to differences in demand-side predictors of party sympathy. Consistent with previous research, anti-immigration attitudes emerge as nearly universally associated with higher RRPP sympathy. Results for political dissatisfaction are mixed. As expected, RRPP sympathizers also tend to approve of the government when the RRPP is part of it and tend to disapprove when the RRPP is not part of it. We also find that these variables' interaction varies with the party's parliamentary status. Strong political dissatisfaction is linked to greater coefficients of anti-immigration attitudes only in countries where these parties are isolated. When the party is not isolated, but also not part of the current government, these variables are rather independent, resulting in an insignificant moderation term. In countries where the RRPP is in government, higher

dissatisfaction is actually associated with a decrease in the predictive power of anti-immigration attitudes for RRPP sympathy. We conducted sensitivity analyses to test for the potential that unobserved confounders distort our results, which are reported in our appendix in more detail. These analyses show that it appears rather unlikely that our associations are overturned by an unobserved confounder although we cannot completely dismiss this possibility.

Conclusion

We argued that the interaction of well-known demand-side predictors of RRPP sympathy, anti-immigration attitudes and political dissatisfaction, may be correlated with parliamentary status of the RRPP. Our results from two data sets and 15 unique country observations support this view. Political discontent and anti-immigration attitudes reinforce each other in their prediction of sympathy for an RRPP in isolation. However, when the RRPP is in government, the predictors work against each other. When the RRPP was in government before but not at the time, the links are independent of each other. These results add to the vivid and relevant body of research investigating incumbent parties' strategies for dealing with RRPPs in parliament. In line with recent research efforts (Han 2020; Muis, Brils et al. 2021) we show that beyond links of competitors' isolation, adaptation, and accompanying strategies with electoral outcomes at the macro level (Pauwels 2011), they also appear to be linked to individual level attitudes that are highly relevant in predicting RRPP sympathy.

Although our results appear quite robust, we acknowledge the typical shortcomings of cross-sectional analyses, i.e. that we are not able to establish temporal precedence of our concepts. In addition, we strongly simplified parliamentary practice to only three levels and also ignored how competing RRPPs (Gessler, Tóth et al. 2021) affect our results, which might be promising paths for future research.

Notes

1. We acknowledge the limitations of our research design. Our study is based on cross-sectional survey data and all our results correlational only. Yet, our theory suggests temporal sequence. We believe that convincing arguments are given for this expectation, however we cannot rule out risks associated with unmeasured confounders and reversed causality. We therefore refrain from using causal language.
2. For the case of Belgium preliminary analyses reveal, that some parties listed by PopuList are negatively related to anti-immigration attitudes, thereby questioning established characteristics of RRPs. The unique party system of Belgium with its strong regional/autonomy cleavage may overlay the cleavage of immigration. We therefore regard it as justified to exclude Belgium from our analyses.

References

- Abou-Chadi, Tarik; Krause, Werner. 2020. The Causal Effect of Radical Right Success on Mainstream Parties' Policy Positions: A Regression Discontinuity Approach. In *British Journal of Political Science* 50 (3), pp. 829–847. DOI: 10.1017/S0007123418000029.
- CSES - The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. 2021. CSES module 5 third advance release [dataset and documentation]. July 20, 2021 version.
- Döring, Holger; Huber, Constantin; Manow, Philip. 2022. Parliaments and governments database (ParlGov): Information on parties, elections and cabinets in established democracies. Development version. Available online at <https://www.parlgov.org>.
- Gessler, Theresa; Hunger, Sophia. 2021. How the refugee crisis and radical right parties shape party competition on immigration. In *Political Science Research and Methods*, pp. 1–21. DOI: 10.1017/psrm.2021.64.
- Gessler, Theresa; Tóth, Gergő; Wachs, Johannes. 2022. No Country for Asylum Seekers? How Short-Term Exposure to Refugees Influences Attitudes and Voting Behavior in Hungary. In *Political Behavior* 44, pp. 1813–1841. DOI: 10.1007/s11109-021-09682-1.
- Gschwend, Thomas; Juhl, Sebastian; Lehrer, Roni. 2018. Die „Sonntagsfrage“, soziale Erwünschtheit und die AfD: Wie alternative Messmethoden der Politikwissenschaft weiterhelfen können. In *Politische Vierteljahresschrift* 59 (3), pp. 493–519. DOI: 10.1007/s11615-018-0106-8.
- Han, Kyung Joon. 2020. Reacting to Isolation: How the Political Exclusion of Extreme Right-wing Parties Changes the Party Support. In *Representation* 56 (1), pp. 71–87. DOI: 10.1080/00344893.2019.1663906.
- Heinze, Anna-Sophie. 2018. Strategies of mainstream parties towards their right-wing populist challengers: Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland in

- comparison. In *West European Politics* 41 (2), pp. 287–309. DOI: 10.1080/01402382.2017.1389440.
- Kleinert, Manuel. 2021. Abgehängt, fremdenfeindlich, oder einfach nur unzufrieden? Entwicklung und Test eines theorieintegrierenden Modells zur Erklärung von Sympathie mit der AfD. In Sonja Schulz, Pascal Siegers, Bettina Westle, Oshrat Hochman (Eds.) *(In)Toleranz in der Einwanderungsgesellschaft?* Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, pp. 97–118.
- Krause, Werner; Cohen, Denis; Abou-Chadi, Tarik. 2022. Does accommodation work? Mainstream party strategies and the success of radical right parties. In *Political Science Research and Methods*, pp. 1–8. DOI: 10.1017/psrm.2022.8.
- Lüdecke, Daniel. 2023. sjPlot: Data Visualization for Statistics in Social Science. Available online at <https://CRAN.R-project.org/package=sjPlot>.
- Moffitt, Benjamin. 2022. How Do Mainstream Parties ‘Become’ Mainstream, and Pariah Parties ‘Become’ Pariahs? Conceptualizing the Processes of Mainstreaming and Pariahing in the Labelling of Political Parties. In *Government and Opposition*, 57(3), pp. 385-403. DOI:10.1017/gov.2021.5.
- Muis, Jasper; Brils, Tobias; Gaidytė, Teodora. 2021. Arrived in Power, and Yet Still Disgruntled? How Government Inclusion Moderates ‘Protest Voting’ for Far-Right Populist Parties in Europe. In *Government and Opposition*, pp. 1–30. DOI: 10.1017/gov.2021.46.
- Plescia, Carolina; Wilhelm, James; Kritzinger, Sylvia; Schüberl, Tanja; Partheymüller, Julia. 2020. RECONNECT 2019 European Parliament Election Panel Survey (SUF edition). With assistance of AUSSDA.
- Rooduijn, Matthijs. 2018. What unites the voter bases of populist parties? Comparing the electorates of 15 populist parties. In *European Political Science Review* 10 (3), pp. 351–368. DOI: 10.1017/S1755773917000145.
- Rooduijn, M.; van Kessel, S.; Froio, C.; Pirro, A.; Lange, S. de; Halikiopoulou, D. et al. 2019. The PopuList: An Overview of Populist, Far Right, Far Left and Eurosceptic Parties in Europe. Available online at www.popu-list.org.

- Rummens, Stefan; Abts, Koen. 2010. Defending Democracy: The Concentric Containment of Political Extremism. In *Political Studies* 58 (4), pp. 649–665. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2009.00809.x.
- Rydgren, Jens. 2007. The Sociology of the Radical Right. In *Annual Review of Sociology* 33 (1), pp. 241–262. DOI: 10.1146/annurev.soc.33.040406.131752.
- Schmitt-Beck, Rüdiger. 2017. The ‘Alternative für Deutschland in the Electorate’: Between Single-Issue and Right-Wing Populist Party. In *German Politics* 26 (1), pp. 124–148. DOI: 10.1080/09644008.2016.1184650.
- Torcal, Mariano. 2011. Dissatisfaction, Political. In Bertrand Badie, Dirk Berg-Schlosser, Leonardo Morlino (Eds.): *International encyclopedia of political science*. Los Angeles: SAGE.
- van der Eijk, Cees; van der Brug, Wouter; Kroh, Martin; Franklin, Mark. 2006. Rethinking the dependent variable in voting behavior: On the measurement and analysis of electoral utilities. In *Electoral Studies* 25 (3), pp. 424–447. DOI: 10.1016/j.electstud.2005.06.012.
- Voogd, Remko; Dassonneville, Ruth. 2020. Are the Supporters of Populist Parties Loyal Voters? Dissatisfaction and Stable Voting for Populist Parties. In *Government and Opposition* 55 (3), pp. 349–370. DOI: 10.1017/gov.2018.24.
- Wickham, Hadley. 2016. *ggplot2: Elegant Graphics for Data Analysis*: Springer-Verlag New York. Available online at <https://ggplot2.tidyverse.org>.

Chapter 5 Summary and Discussion

In its introduction, this study highlighted the ability of micro-level explanations for sympathy with Right-wing populism. However, it often remained unclear how different factors interact with each other in their explanatory power. It was further noted, that innovative methods allow for more targeted analyses of such interdependencies. Therefore, this study built on previous findings of this field, theoretically integrated them in a comprehensive way and tested this scheme on an particularly interesting entity of Right-wing Populism, a movement (Pegida), chapter 2) using multiple datasets. It then investigated in detail potential biases in the crucial relationship between anti-immigration attitudes and sympathy for Right-wing Populism using first-hand experimental data (chapter 3). The last chapter (chapter 4) analyzed how the reinforcing interaction effect between anti-immigration attitudes and political dissatisfaction in explaining sympathy for Right-wing Populism depends on the parliamentary status of the Radical Right-wing Populist party in European countries.

Therefore, rather than broadening the field of research by introducing new variables, the present study attempted to deepen our understanding about well documented findings and how they might relate to each other or how they are altered by biases and contexts. The three research questions guiding this study and the efforts undertaken to answer them are summarized in this chapter. In addition, it will discuss the scientific relevance and societal implications of the results.

Summary

Why and when do citizens support populist rightwing social movements?

Development and test of an integrative theoretical model (Chapter 2)

The first research question addressed the phenomenon of Pegida, a Right-wing Populist movement in Germany, which attracted thousands of citizens in participating in weekly demonstrations in Dresden and other cities, mainly in 2014 and 2015. Departing from the observation that previous research had only investigated motivations and attitudes of direct participants during demonstrations, we attempted to test whether their findings also apply to the non-activist German public. We were also interested in how these factors may influence each other, thus, our research question read:

What are the microlevel mechanisms that explain citizens' support of populist social movements? How are these factors inter-related?

Drawing on existing theoretical and empirical research, we identified three major factors to influence sympathy for Right-wing Populist movements in general and 'Pegida' in particular: 1) socioeconomic deprivation, 2) anti-immigration attitudes and 3) political dissatisfaction. We further argued for an integrative view on these factors allowing them to influence each other. More precisely, we theorized that socioeconomic deprivation may raise anti-immigration attitudes and political dissatisfaction, while the latter two may reinforce each other in their effect on sympathy for 'Pegida'. We tested our hypotheses on a diverse set of seven distinct

data sets using structural equation models with moderated mediations. The results nearly unanimously supported our expectations across different surveys, wordings and codings of our variables. We concluded that the impact of anti-immigration attitudes on people's sympathy for 'Pegida' is strongly related to their level of political dissatisfaction. The results of this chapter guided and inspired the remaining analyses of this study.

Reconsidering the Relationship between Anti-Immigration Attitudes and Preferences for the AfD Using Implicit Attitudes Measures (Chapter 3)

The third research question started from the observation that the previous chapter and an overwhelming share of the literature has found anti-immigration attitudes to significantly predict sympathy for European Right-wing Populist parties in general and the AfD in particular. However, two well-known psychological biases may have distorted this relationship in quantitative analyses. We therefore asked:

How do social desirability and avoidance of cognitive dissonance affect the relationship between Anti-immigration attitudes and sympathy for the AfD?

Social psychology has developed the concept of implicit attitudes, which are regarded to be able to circumvent the biases of social desirability and cognitive dissonance. Therefore, the difference between effects of direct and implicit measurements is theorized to illustrate the extent of these biases. Multi-group analyses, which alternated the measurement types across the different groups, revealed that social desirability appears as less of a problem compared to people's

tendency to avoid cognitive dissonance. Respondents seem to give answers that fit well together, although their implicit ideology is less coherent. Consequently, in statistical analysis, the relationship between anti-immigration attitudes and sympathy for the AfD appears to be more pronounced in an all-explicit setup, compared to all- or partially-implicit data. Several robustness checks were conducted, such as a multiverse and a sensitivity analysis, which unanimously support these findings.

Parliamentary Status and Drivers of Support for the Radical Right (Chapter 4)

In the final chapter, this study also analyzed attitudes towards Right-wing Populist parties. However, the geographical level is broadened to Europe. In this part, one of the components which proved crucial for predicting citizens' attitudes in chapter 2, the interaction between anti-immigration attitudes and political dissatisfaction, was investigated in more detail. More precisely, it was analyzed how this effect is altered under different parliamentary conditions these parties face. The third research question reads:

How does the parliamentary status of Radical Right Parties affect microlevel factors of support?

Radical Right-wing Populist parties face unique challenges in some European countries. Similar to the AfD in Germany, some are isolated through a *cordon sanitaire* imposed on them by the other parties in parliament. However, in other countries, such parties were, or are, involved in governments. OLS regression analysis employing interaction terms, revealed that these circumstances appear to

impact citizens' attitudes towards these parties indirectly. In countries where the Radical Right-wing Populist party was isolated, anti-immigration attitudes and political dissatisfaction reinforced each other in predicting sympathy for these parties. When the party was part of governments in the past, this effect was insignificant and when they were currently part of a government, the effect was reversed, meaning that high levels in one of these variables toned down the effect of the other one in predicting sympathy for the party. As this pattern reproduced across all of the 15 countries investigated, it is concluded that for dissatisfied voters, anti-immigration attitudes as a motive to vote for such parties is stronger in countries where they are isolated, reduced in countries where this party was part of a government and even reversed in countries where it currently governs.

Discussion

Scientific Relevance

Drawing on the above summaries of the study's results, in this section, we will discuss the scientific relevance of these analyses. These advancements will be discussed in terms of theoretical, empirical and methodological progress.

Three interrelated research questions guided this study. These fostered, first, an analysis of the micro-level predictors and their interrelationships in explaining support for Pegida. The second research question investigated how two relevant biases may distort the observed relationship between anti-immigration attitudes and sympathy for the AfD. The third and last research question was based on the findings of the first question. The element of interdependence between political dissatisfaction

and anti-immigration attitudes was transferred to the European level, and asked how parliamentary status of a Radical Right-wing Populist party might relate to it.

Microlevel mechanisms explaining citizens' support of Pegida

On the theoretical level, this chapter developed an integrative framework to explain sympathy for a Right-wing Populist movement. It thereby developed testable assumptions about the interplay of previously identified factors in explaining this dependent variable. The theoretical advantage of such a model is that variables are no longer isolated from each other but instead, it is acknowledged that attitudes reflected in these variables do not appear in a vacuum but within individual contexts and alongside related attitudes (Harris 1997). It therefore allows a more realistic and empirically fruitful view on why, when and how citizens develop sympathy for Radical Right-wing Populism. Looking at our perspective in more detail, we assumed that individual economic deprivation is a crucial factor that may raise levels of anti-immigration attitudes and political dissatisfaction and therefore indirectly increase their effect on sympathy for Pegida. We also hypothesized that anti-immigration attitudes and political dissatisfaction may reinforce each other in their effect on sympathy for Pegida. By formulating these assumptions we integrated various strands of the literature. First, ethnic conflict theory considers higher anti-immigrant attitudes to result from higher socioeconomic deprivation (Scheepers, Gijsberts, and Coenders 2002). Similarly, it has also been theorized before that citizens' political dissatisfaction may result from their perceived socioeconomic deprivation (Lubbers, Gijsberts, and Scheepers 2002). This integration of existing theories and assumptions allowed us to, not only test individual variables, but also their interrelations.

Empirically, this chapter revealed that such interdependencies between the independent variables are indeed crucial for understanding peoples' paths to Right-wing Populism. Higher levels of economic deprivation were shown to increase anti-immigration attitudes and political dissatisfaction. These in turn, predicted citizens' sympathy for Pegida both separately and jointly as moderators. However, once these paths were investigated, the direct effect of economic deprivation on sympathy for Pegida was rather negligible. This finding supports previous literature, which also highlights attitudinal variables vis-à-vis sociodemographic and status variables (Reuband 2015). However, it should be noted, that it also supports the notion that economic deprivation is a relevant factor in explaining this outcome, although rather indirectly than directly. By investigating a right-wing populist movement rather than usual party-focused analyses, we have also shown that common general theoretical patterns and theories explaining the success of right-wing populist parties are also applicable to this type of movement.

On the methodological level this chapter adhered to modern techniques of analysis by using Structural Equation Modelling in combination with components of moderated mediation. This allowed investigation of the interdependencies between common factors in predicting sympathy for Right-wing Populism. In an effort to quantify these effects of moderated mediation and their statistical significance, we computed an index of moderated mediation (Hayes 2015), which underlined the importance of these effects on sympathy for Pegida. This chapter also highlighted the importance of cross-validation of findings by means of other datasets. Seven distinct

datasets were employed to validate the findings. The unequivocal results confirmed the relations found within our statistical model.

The influence of psychological effects on the relationship between anti-immigration attitudes and sympathy for the AfD

Theoretically, this chapter drew on insights from research on the Populist right and social psychology, more specifically the study of implicit attitudes. Combining these strands proved beneficial as it allowed deeper understanding of the psychological mechanisms linking anti-immigration attitudes and sympathy for the AfD. Extending common explicit assessments of anti-immigration attitudes, this study also measured implicit attitudes. Going beyond existing studies which employ implicit attitudes, this study measured implicit and explicit attitudes at both ends of the theoretical relationship, meaning that anti-immigration attitudes, as well as sympathy for the AfD was measured in explicit and implicit fashion. This allows differentiating between distortion caused by social desirability bias and avoidance of cognitive dissonance. Especially the latter one has rarely been formally theorized and analyzed with regard to this relationship, thereby providing new directions in this field. Further research on this issue may elaborate further on the limitations of implicit and explicit attitudes and discuss ways of using and harmonizing both kinds of measurements.

On the methodological level, this chapter drew on the Single-category Implicit Association Test (SC-IAT, Karpinski and Steinman 2006) technique to assess implicit attitudes. However, instead of common, small on-site tested student samples, the procedure was implemented in an online survey, which was distributed to an

online panel of roughly 400 quota-sampled participants. This procedure greatly increases the generalizability of our results to the German public. Furthermore, using an elaborated multi-group design in its empirical models, this chapter was able to conduct targeted tests of its hypotheses, while also benefitting from the robustness and universality of OLS regression models. As this analysis also included interaction terms, it was of particular importance to assess the sensitivity of the achieved results, which was achieved by conducting sensitivity (Cinelli et al. 2020) and multiverse analyses (Masur and Scharkow 2020). These analyses allowed us to estimate how large an unobserved confounder would have to be to overturn the results and how using different sets of covariates would affect the findings. The results provide further assurance of the robustness of the patterns found. Finally, the entire study adhered to up-to-date standards of open science and transparency. All hypotheses and analyses were pre-registered prior to data collection, all files necessary to replicate the results – including the data set and all code – are provided with open access along with the respective publication.

Regarding the empirical level, this study shed new light on the connection between anti-immigration attitudes and sympathy for the AfD, which is often found to be a particularly strong one, from the perspective of implicit attitudes. The results support previous findings with regard to significance and strength on the explicit level. However, when one of these two variables was measured indirectly, the relationship lost explanatory power and when both were measured indirectly, it vanished. This was interpreted as support for the cognitive dissonance hypotheses, meaning that the actual relationship between anti-immigration attitudes and sympathy for the AfD might be overestimated in all-explicit surveys because respondents appear to match

their answers to display more consistent views than their ‘implicit ideology’ suggests. Therefore, future research might be well advised to also consider indirect techniques to assess these political attitudes.

Reinforcing micro-level effects depend on meso-level parliamentary status

Theoretically, this chapter built upon the findings of chapter 2 and investigated the interaction-effect between anti-immigration attitudes and political dissatisfaction in more detail. This time however, the focus was on explaining sympathy for Radical Right-wing Populist parties instead of movements. Our theoretical innovation was to theoretically hypothesize that this moderation is conditioned on the parliamentary status of the party in question. As such parties often face a cordon sanitaire, i.e. isolation, in national parliaments but are regularly part of governments in other countries there is considerable variation in the parliamentary status of this party family in particular. The expectation, that this variation may also explain differences in the interaction effect under study, was based on the idea that political dissatisfaction is often linked to the party in power and that issue identification with a party may hinge on its’ performance in government. Thus, issue identification with a Radical Right-wing Populist party may be reduced and political dissatisfaction increased if expectations of that party’s government have been disappointed before.

To test this hypothesis empirically, we extended the geographical scope of our analyses to European parties. Using 15 distinct country samples from two different data sets, this chapter allowed us to draw reliable results in that regard. These yielded strong support for our previously formulated expectations. We found that the interaction effect between anti-immigration attitudes and political dissatisfaction is

positive, reinforcing, in situations when the Radical Right-wing Populist party in question is isolated from the rest of the party system by a cordon sanitaire. If the party is currently governing, we witness a negative interaction effect, meaning that, instead of reinforcing each other, high values in one of these variables actually reduced the effect of the other. Those cases, where the party governed before but not at the time of the survey, fell in between, meaning that the effect was non-significant in these instances. These insights inform the debate about how established parties should handle Radical Right-wing Populist parties. It shows that parties that are isolated enjoy a particular supporting effect through the reinforcing effect between anti-immigration attitudes and political dissatisfaction. This effect however, decreases significantly once the party was, or is, responsible for government policies. This may be interpreted as evidence that Right-wing Populist parties tend to disappoint their supporter's expectations regarding anti-immigration policies when in government, but may nevertheless be able to create other trajectories for staying in power.

On the methodological level, this chapter employed a multi group OLS regression using interaction terms. This allowed modeling the moderation between the two main variables of interest and their effect in different settings of parliamentary status of the Radical Right-wing Populist party. In addition, we adhered to the highest standards of transparency and open data. First, it tests the reliability of its findings through sensitivity analysis. Thereby, we explicitly stated and also estimated the extent of vulnerability of our findings. Second, all data and code used to generate the results are transparent and easily accessible through the online supplementary material that accompanies the article. The intention behind this approach is not only to enable

researchers to replicate the specific findings of this study, but also to enable them to perform similar analyses or meta-analyses based on this material. We believe that this methodological paradigm should not be seen as self-sufficient, but will help the field to move forward empirically and theoretically.

Applied Relevance

The major goal of this study was to advance our understanding of contemporary Right-wing Populist parties using innovative methods of analysis. We pursued this goal in three distinct, yet connected chapters which build upon each other. However, social scientists do not operate in a vacuum and should therefore specify practical implications from their research for society (Watts 2017). We thus close this work with a summary of potential applications of our findings.

The second chapter introduced our main theoretical model of how different attitudes and perceptions are interrelated in explaining sympathy for right-wing Populism. Our findings highlight economic deprivation as a major driver of support for the Right-wing Populist movement Pegida. This factor mainly influenced sympathy for Pegida indirectly through increasing political dissatisfaction and anti-immigration attitudes, which in turn were strong predictors for sympathy with Pegida themselves. If the aim is to contain the appeal of such movements, there are two main conclusions to be drawn. First, since economic deprivation might mark a starting point in the path to Right-wing movements, it might be a promising path to reduce economic disparity and increase social and economic security nets in order to lower anti-immigration attitudes and political dissatisfaction. Although, our cross-sectional research design

was not able to detect any causal relationships, it appears reasonable to suspect this temporal order, as we also discuss in the related chapter. However, we strongly encourage longitudinal or experimental research on our theoretical schema to help understand this trajectory in more detail. Second, our research shows that such movements are not limited to their public appearance in street demonstrations, but also resonate in the society as entities of the political discourse. We identified a portion of sympathizers with this movement far beyond the fraction one would expect if only those involved in the actual protests were to express sympathy. Therefore, political competitors might be well-advised to accept – and to some extent respect – such large demonstrations as political actors within the society because reducing them to the actual numbers of protesters yields the risk of underestimating their influence on the political discourse.

Our research also reveals that explanatory factors identified as relevant for explaining sympathy for Right-wing Populist parties by previous research also applied to the Radical Right-wing Populist movement we investigated. Thus, these findings suggest that Radical Right-wing Populist parties or movements are manifestations of a broader societal phenomenon. Initiatives to counter such developments might therefore be well-advised to address the sources of sympathy for sympathy with these political actors, rather than the entities themselves. Anti-immigration attitudes, alienation and populist tendencies appear to influence sympathy for Right-wing Populist entities, relatively independent of the particular form of appearance. Based on our analyses, we therefore align with contemporary studies that recommend counter strategies rather than accompanying strategies. Political representatives of the center should aim at regaining trust in them and their

‘original’ programs in order to counter populist narratives, instead of imitating the Radical Right (Kendall-Taylor and Nietzsche 2020; Krause et al. 2022).

Chapter 3 dealt with the explanatory power of implicit attitudes for sympathy with a Radical Right-wing Populist party. The results suggest that the strong connection between anti-immigration attitudes and the AfD is probably overestimated and thus exaggerated in the academic and consequently also the public debate. Although it appears as the most influential factor, the implicit, indirectly assessed, association between these concepts seems not as established as one may assume based on findings from explicit attitudes. On the one hand, this may signal that indirectly activated associations surrounding the AfD are not solid, which may allow competitors to successfully push their own narratives and framing of the AfD into public debates and citizens’ political mindsets. On the other hand, this also implies that people appear to base their sympathy for the AfD on explicit (anti-immigration) attitudes and that these are especially influential if they are made salient in the same context. Thus, election campaigns of other parties that focus on immigration policies appear likely to backfire. Due to the evoked salience of the topic and the strong explicit connection between this issue and the AfD, which we showed that they are aware of, citizens’ may choose to base their voting decision on these factors although, prior to the campaign, other issues may have appeared more important and thus other parties also as a reasonable choice.

The fourth chapter was set on the European level. We found that the parliamentary status has significant effects on the issue-based factors explaining sympathy for Radical Right-wing Populist parties in Europe. This has practical implications for the

strategy of established parties vis-à-vis Radical Right-wing Populist parties. One conclusion might be that center parties face a dilemma: pursuing isolating strategies may have unintended side-effects, in particular, that it may reinforce voters in their commitment for the Radical Right. On the other, as discussed above, accommodation strategies also appear as unsuited to regain vote shares (Krause et al. 2022). Therefore the most promising avenue for other political actors, aiming to lower the appeal of Radical Right-wing Populist parties appears to attempt to change political attitudes in the electorate, namely to reduce political dissatisfaction and anti-immigration attitudes. Although challenging and complex, this appears as the major key to reducing Populist Radical Right tendencies, not only in electoral outcomes, but in society.

References

- Cinelli, Carlos, Jeremy Ferwerda, and Chad Hazlett. 2020. Sensemakr: Sensitivity Analysis Tools for OLS in R and Stata. *SSRN Electronic Journal* DOI:10.2139/ssrn.3588978.
- Harris, William A. 1997. 'On "Scope Conditions" in Sociological Theories'. *Social and Economic Studies* 46(4):123–27.
- Hayes, Andrew F. 2015. An Index and Test of Linear Moderated Mediation. *Multivariate Behavioral Research* 50(1):1–22. DOI: 10.1080/00273171.2014.962683.
- Karpinski, Andrew, and Ross B. Steinman. 2006. The single category implicit association test as a measure of implicit social cognition. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 91(1):16–32. DOI:10.1037/0022-3514.91.1.16.
- Kendall-Taylor, Andrea and Carisa Nietzsche. 2020. Combating Populism: A Toolkit for Liberal Democratic Actors. *Center for a New American Society*. Available at: www.cnas.org/publications/reports/combating-populism.
- Krause, Werner, Denis Cohen, and Tarik Abou-Chadi. 2022. Does Accommodation Work? Mainstream Party Strategies and the Success of Radical Right Parties. *Political Science Research and Methods* 1–8. DOI: 10.1017/psrm.2022.8.
- Lubbers, Marcel, Merove Gijsberts, and Peer Scheepers. 2002. Extreme Right-Wing Voting in Western Europe. *European Journal of Political Research* 41(3):345–78. DOI: 10.1111/1475-6765.00015.
- Masur, Philipp K., and Michael Scharnow. 2020. *specr: Conducting and Visualizing Specification Curve Analyses* (Version 1.0.0). <https://CRAN.R-project.org/package=specr>.
- Reuband, K. H. 2015. Wer Demonstriert in Dresden Für Pegida? Ergebnisse Empirischer Studien, Methodische Grundlagen Und Offene Fragen. *Mitteilungen des Instituts für Parteienrecht und Parteienforschung* 21:133–43.

Chapter 5 Summary and Discussion

- Scheepers, Peer, Mérove Gijssberts, and Marcel Coenders. 2002. 'Ethnic Exclusionism in European Countries'. *European Sociological Review* 18(1):17.
- Watts, Duncan J. 2017. Should Social Science Be More Solution-Oriented? *Nature Human Behaviour* 1(1):0015. DOI: 10.1038/s41562-016-0015.

Specification of the Contributions of Co-authors

Chapter 2, ‘Why and when do citizens support populist rightwing social movements? Development and test of an integrative theoretical model’ is joint work with Elmar Schlueter, Justus-Liebig-University Giessen and has been published in Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, pp. 1–20. DOI: 10.1080/1369183X.2020.1763788.

These are the contributions of both authors in writing this study:

	Tasks	Manuel Kleinert	Elmar Schlueter
1.	Conceptualization and structuring of the article.	20%	80%
2.	Development of the theoretical frameworks.	20%	80%
3.	Compilation of the research literature.	90%	10%
4.	Data collection.	90%	10%
5.	Data preparation.	90%	10%
6.	Empirical analyses.	80%	20%
7.	Discussion of the results.	50%	50%

Erklärung

Ich erkläre: Ich habe die vorgelegte Dissertation selbständig, ohne unerlaubte fremde Hilfe und nur mit den Hilfen angefertigt, die ich in der Dissertation angegeben habe. Alle Textstellen, die wörtlich oder sinngemäß aus veröffentlichten Schriften entnommen sind, und alle Angaben, die auf mündlichen Auskünften beruhen, sind als solche kenntlich gemacht. Bei den von mir durchgeführten und in der Dissertation erwähnten Untersuchungen habe ich die Grundsätze guter wissenschaftlicher Praxis, wie sie in der 'Satzung der Justus-Liebig-Universität Gießen zur Sicherung guter wissenschaftlicher Praxis' niedergelegt sind, eingehalten.

Augsburg, April 2024

Manuel Kleinert

