

**International Social Power Realignments:
East Asia, Europe and North America**

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Acronyms

APEC	Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASEAN+1 (10+1)	ASEAN Plus One (ASEAN plus individual Dialogue Partners)
ASEAN+3	ASEAN Plus Three
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
CAEC	Council for Asia-Europe Cooperation
CER	Australian-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
EAEC	East Asia Economic Caucus
EAEG	East Asian Economic Grouping
ASEM	The Asia-Europe Meeting
EAS	East Asia Summit
EASG	East Asia Study Group
EAVG	East Asia Vision Group
EC	European Community
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EEC	European Economic Community
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
EU	European Union
EURATOM	European Atomic Energy Community
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FTA	Free Trade Areas
FTAA	Free Trade Area of the Americas

GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IAI	Initiative for ASEAN Integration
IGO	Intergovernmental Organization
LCD	Least Developed Countries
UCFTA	United State Canada Trade Agreement
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Area
NATA	National Association of Testing Authorities
NICs	Newly Industrialized Countries
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
SOM	Asian Senior Officials Meetings
UN	United Nations
U.S.	United States
WTO	World Trade Organization

Abstract

This thesis determines the viability of “the power realignment” model in explaining the increasing tensions among emerging East Asia, Europe and North America. Directing at study of power redistribution, this paper proposed a mixed power analysis model, “power realignment”, based on emerging power, from a operated emerging collective unit, through “co-governance ” and lastly into “possible pathways”- a study of dynamic balance. The study involves regional and supra-regional government, civil society and multilateral cooperation as subsidiary. The integration of East Asia is likely to persist as a result of structural realities in the international system. Only if the capability of East Asia begins to converge with its international role will the regulative order in this tri-lateral relationship likely cease.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

1. Waves of Change in Contemporary Power System

Question about the power realignment is to discuss reasons of change for linking causes and effect. Waves of change in power system are the basic knowledge to analyze the power realignment.

The history of world politics is usually told as a story of the rise and decline of different countries and regions. The motion was evidenced among the Greek city-states during the time of Herodotus, who observed that “the cities that were formerly great, have most of them become insignificant; and such as are at present powerful, were weak in olden time.”¹ We can also describe the period between the Congress of Westphalia in 1648 and the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815, when Spain, the Netherlands, and Sweden fell from the top tier of power, and France, Britain, Prussia, Austria, and Russia emerged as great powers².

No such wheel existed during the 19th and 20th century. Since 1945, no new power has been able to vault into the great category, though one fell from the ranks. Whether structural transformation is dramatic or smooth, the important point is that the countries or regions have continually changed in the pecking order. Since the 21st century is entering into a complex world order, so some issues become fuzzier: how has the international system adjusted to the rising of new power? how has the rising power managed peacefully into the existing international order? Moreover, how does the rising power reflect a new international order?

¹ Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1982.) P.1.

² Randall L. Schwelle, “Managing the Rise of Great Powers: History and Theory” in Engaging China: Managing a Rising Power, Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert Ross, eds (London and New York: Routledge Press, 1999).

We can compress two waves change the contemporary power system. First, globalization changes the pattern of interaction. In this contemporary age of globalization, interdependent relationships have become a general rule outlining the changes of system/order and governance structures. The logic of governance under globalization affects the governance of states. Globalization brings new concepts, new power, and new governance. The change has led states to try to loosen a part of sovereign rights in order to accelerate influence by shaping of integration. As Wagstaff noted that in examining the relationship between the nation-state and the European Union, the view that the nation-state is too small for the big problems and too big for the small problems has led to a growing awareness of the power and potential influence of regions within the European Union³. The regions have an evolving role stemming from these changes. Globalization and regionalization become the new international order in which the changes of governance also involve with the changes of the actors; state is not only actor in international relations. Multilevel, cross-border and cross-regional governance are normal in structure of interaction, and competition becomes a pattern of cooperation.

Secondly, the altering actors in uncertain system. From the above narration, we understand some main transformations: interest beyond the nation-state, multicultural and multi-polity cooperation. While realist/neorealist assumptions have persisted, there has been a steady but gradual movement away from the dominant model of black-boxed states. Many students have acknowledged that the conception of national interest is inherently subjective and needs to be reinforced. Recent efforts to rescue the idea of the unitary state-as-actor at least have begun to differentiate the state from

³ P.Wagstaff, "Introduction: Region, nation, identity" in Regionalism in Europe, (London: Intellect Books, 1994.)

society⁴. While the globe is becoming smaller and interdependent, it is also breaking relations between states, beyond state boundaries. Crossing boundaries brings transnational exchanges, but also strengthens and actually initiates the region's guiding principles.

2. Objective and Structure

2.1 Chapter Outline

For studying of power redistribution by rising and decline of emerging power in international relation this paper will address a model, "power realignment". The process starts from an operated emerging-Complex through mechanism of "power realignment" to treat of "possible pathways" (the process of dynamic balance). It involves in regional government organizations. The history and reality in integration and development of East Asia proves the rationality of model.

This research is divided into six chapters (Figure 1: Dissertation framework). In the introduction, I state the research motivations, purposes, methods, and procedures. In addition, I will lay out a brief introduction of fundamentals. We discuss relevant articles of changing world system to understand and delineate the system structure; and cross-regional governance that are mentioned in international relation theories. Chapter 2 surveys theory building of power realignment with special emphasis on the conception of dynamic balance. The question that we must consider next is intension of changed power structure; we explain the idea by theory of co-governance. Lastly, we examine how the model of power realignment in interregional governance cooperation could be kept in balance.

⁴ Yale H. Ferguson and Richard W. Mansbach, Politics : Authority, Identities, and Change. (Columbia: Univ. of South Carolina Press. 1996)pp.17-8.


Chapter 3 analyzes the influence and position of the emerging East Asia in the dynamic system, the shifting geopolitical role and new order. An emerging regional organization accounts for a new geopolitical space, no longer dominated by any associated hegemony or monolithic security. The special attractions and influence result from its special culture, security, economy, and system, causing a new world order. East Asian integration has been breaking international order on issues such as emerging political economy, interregional cooperation and power re-distribution.

Chapter 4 will embark from attraction and influence of East Asian integration, to analyze the attempt and policies of EU and North America. In addition, we compare ASEM and APEC regarding the pull and drag of power. We address their interaction pattern, competition under a cooperational style. Here we clarify the relations between East Asia, North America, and the European Union as core-periphery or core-core relationships and compare the differences between cross-regional cooperation organizations such as APEC and ASEM. In short, the main question addressed in this study is if the geographic-historic path of East Asia may condition supra-regional cooperation.

Followed by the analysis of the characteristic of East Asian influence and comparison of interregional cooperation in Chapter 3 and chapter 4, we examine path of power realignment by analyzing tree blocks' attempts, within the context of interregional governance. The connotations of interaction in the power structure and if is under- or counterbalance, are examined. The relationship between regionalization and civil society will be a key point in participating in international society. Following this is a clarification of the idea of governance in the model of handling international affairs, and discussing the general principles of evaluation regarding power analysis in international relation theories.

First, in chapter 5, we analyze the governance of cooperation in both multi-level systems; second, we divide the topic into two parts to probe into the power structure of interaction: material structure and the structure of ideation (civil society); third, we deal with power realignment among two cross-regional organizations (including three regions organizations: North America, EU and East Asia) and emphasize policy viewpoint to explain the possible pathway of power realignment among actors. Chapter 6 summarizes the outcome of the research and offers suggestions regarding future trends and following researches.

Figure 1: Dissertation Framework



Sources: the Author

2.2 Methodology

In order to link the theoretical and practical aspects of this project, it has been necessary to employ a combined methodological approach. In this paper, we use document analysis that contains a great deal of the collective knowledge on the subject. To be able to use documents effectively, the information structure in the documents should be carefully planned. International political researches have to define document structures and actuality carefully; those consequences will prove setting argument. In the analysis, there are overlapping organizations and complex competition in East Asia. Current documents and document management practices should be studied and described before developing new article structures and article management practices⁵. Typically, one has to deal with different sources of knowledge like syntactic knowledge, semantic knowledge or strategic knowledge guiding the analytical process⁶.

For theoretical building, there is a collection of arguments regarding power analysis and regional cooperation from past documentations. The theoretical building that is suitable for utilization in this dissertation will be concluded from the collection of relevant documentations, the analysis and collation of context, and the result of probing into documents. The theoretical building will then become the fundamental blueprint by which to analyze the power distribution in cross-regional competition and pathway of power realignment.

⁵ Airi Salminen, Katri Kauppinen and Merja Lehtovaara, "Towards a Methodology for Document Analysis" *Journal of the American Society for Information Science*. Vol. 48, no. 7, (1998.) pp. 644 - 655

⁶ K. H. Blasius, B. Grawemeyer, I. John, N. Kuhn, "Knowledge-based document analysis". This paper appears in: *Document Analysis and Recognition, 1997, Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference (Germany, Ulm, 18-20 Aug, 1997.)*

There are three stages to analyze this paper. The first of is the assessment of the theoretical literatures on power theory. This serves as a basis for judging the utility of this particular model and understanding the increasing tensions in the triangle relationship (East Asia, Europe, and North American). The second stage is the analysis of past and present positions in the East Asia, in addition to emerging streams of thoughts. The third stage is the study of policy statements and regional strategic policy.

2.3 Limiting Scope of Topic

In an international system, cognition means an actor's degree of psychological functions which explains why and how does the system changes and how to keep the balance. Action refers to the inner interaction within an international structure namely external reaction.

In this 21st, international organizations play a greater role than they ever had in history⁷. The actors in international relation always mention that regional government, civil social organization and nation-states are typical representative of power redistribution. On the basis of the limitation, this paper discusses the cooperation and competition among regional organizations, and civil society and nation-states are subsidiary, without much discussion on NGOs and transnational corporations.

This paper focuses on the cooperation and competition among IGOs and asks the question of how does the rudiment of East Asia community (causing by rising integration in East Asia has building) change the interaction of supra-regional organizations. We can probe into the process of power transformation through

⁷ Paul. F. Diehl, The Politics of Global Governance: International in an Interdependent World. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996) pp.3.

supra-regional organizations, which displays the trend of power change and also apply historical recall to explore possible development pathways. This paper, it only confers the supra-regional organizations after rudiment of East Asia community.

3. Theories of Change System

In this section, we would like to arrange the theories of changing system. It starts from dynamic space to describe different theoretical perceptive, following probe into variant dimension of uncertain system.

3.1 Feature of World System

3.1.1 Dynamics Space- Regions and new geopolitical relation

There is an obvious continuity in the exploration of the new geopolitical relations in a number of ways. According to the “period”, John Agnew simplifies geopolitics in three ages⁸. One is in the late eighteenth century civilization geopolitics, another is naturalized geopolitics, and third is ideological geopolitics. A ‘periodization’ of geopolitical discourse simplifies a more complex flow of representations and practices; the issue addresses dominate trends, comprehension, actors and the difference over time.

The civilization geopolitics of the early nineteenth century gave way to the naturalized geopolitics of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. After the Second World War, an ideological geopolitics was constituted on the basis of the new geopolitical “realities” of the time. After ideological geopolitics, conceptions of relative decline, state-centered competition and hegemony laid up a global basis, and

⁸ John Agnew, Geopolitics: Re-visioning World Politics, (Routledge: London and New York, 2003.). P. 86-121.

economic globalization, provide the opportunity for most forms of political activity. However, how could we explain the new geopolitical relations in culture or ideology? The problem involved is twofold. First, what are the driving forces and actors behind the phenomenon of globalization? It is result of power relationships; the driving forces may be resource needs, political predominance or military superiority. Furthermore, in the globalization age, the actors become multiple. The “relativization of scale” is attested to by the emergence of global city networks, cross-board, regional block formations, international NGOs and other forms of boundary-transcending exchanges⁹. Similarly, a new geopolitical space could emerge under global order in the sense that it is no longer dominated by any single hegemony or super state or by monopolized security.

Second, what roles do actors play in shaping the world order? In the general system, the role of actors indicates influential ability. Nevertheless, in uncertain system, the role of actors indicates the gap with power that comprehends and account how the structure was getting transition, how security and interests change in relative comparative power and how actors deal with the capability is equal to the foreign policy role. As Doran observed, bargaining occurs between state and system in terms of the power a state attains (in rough analogy to “supply”) and the role that the system is willing to ascribe to the state (“demand”), where the “price” is the probability of war¹⁰. Actors’ power and its role constitute the underlying dynamic of how international political roles cause changes to the new world order. To know the change of role is to know possible ways for power adjustment, because a change in relative

⁹ Bob Jessop, “The Political Economy of Scale”, In Globalization, Regionalization and Cross-border Regions: Scales, Discourses and Governance, Perkmann and Sum eds, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002).

¹⁰ Doran Charles, “Economics, Philosophy of History, and the "Single Dynamic" of Power Cycle Theory: Expectations, Competition, and Statecraft.” *International Political Science Review*, Vol. 24, No. 1, 2003. pp. 13-49.

capability determines the future possibilities of each nation, as seen against the background of what is demanded in international politics¹¹.

In summation, each period has its particular combination of elements. Notably, the new geopolitical relation is close to “the geographic dimension”. Differing from the past three ages, the new reveals regional blocks as actors in cooperation and competition. Regional blocks have “dimension” in a physical space conception to define the space of interaction by their relevant dimensions, and use the space as a framework. Global complex interdependence challenges blocks’ flexibility of response and breaks the traditional political limit. During this period, it is not only simple market requirement or political power, but also includes a conception of complex security, which wrestles over the ration of cost and interest. Each block is like an agency, a collective unit and competitor in that space. Under the global order, regional blocks’ power is connected from up to down (from global level to state level, even to individual level) and horizontally. As it unfolds, it shows that it needs a more coordinated and collaborative ability because of the complex governance and interdependence. The increasing flow of information, technology, people, goods and notions around the world create uncertain phenomena. Compared with the past actors, the new actors face a more treacherous world.

3.1.1.1 New Geopolitical Relation within Globalization

As argued above, the new geopolitical relation unfolds a phenomenon related to geographical features. Close geographical relations strengthen cooperation of regional countries. One compelling question that emerges from these observations is which

¹¹ Franz Kohout “Cyclical, Hegemonic, and Pluralistic Theories of International Relations: Some Comparative Reflections on War Causation.” *International Political Science Review*, Vol. 24, No. 1, 2003. pp.51-66.

relationship to interlock among the factors of new geopolitical relations, regionalism and globalization. In short, globalization brings a different circumstance that extends regionalization to change its form to respond to unmanaged and uncertain transformations. A serial activity of regionalization reveals the new geopolitical relationship. After the Cold War, the political condition shaped the concept of globalization in international society, because economic development, political interaction and technological advancement reduced transactions costs during the Cold War. Globalization, however, has brought success and wealth, transforming the international economy from state-oriented to market-oriented, indicating that sovereignty was experiencing a corrosive crisis. Globalization's program can be defined as the vision of a borderless world.

The changing structure of the world system provides room for regional actors' maneuvering. The regions can be defined as groups of countries that build associations around a set of common interests¹², and regionalism seems to be the only activity by which to confront Globalization. Although the region is slowly becoming an actor on its own terms, the nation states typically still conceive of it as an arena where so-called "national interests" could be promoted, and these interests are, of course, differently conceived by different social groups in society. Whereas certain groups may find it rewarding to move into the supranational space, others cling to the national space where they have vested interests to protect. Regionalization thus creates its own counter-forces¹³.

At the same time, regional actors in the process of regionalization constitute a

¹² James Wesley Scott. "The Northern Dimension" In Cross-border Governance in the European Union. Kramsch, Olivier Thomas and Hooper, Barbara eds., (London; New York: Routledge 2004) pp.135-157

¹³ Björn Hettne. Globalization, the New Regionalism and East Asia. In Globalism and Regionalism Toshiro Tanaka and Takashi Inoguchi.. Hayama,eds. (Japan:United Nations University,1996), p 10.

structural change towards multi-polarity. The development of these regional associations has prompted much discussion over shifting scales of governance and the changing role of nation-states in the world-system¹⁴. It affects and is affected by many levels of the world system: the system as a whole, the level of interregional relations, and the internal structure of the single region. It is not possible to state which of these levels comes first or which is the more important since changes on the various levels interact. There are also different dimensions of the process that relate to each other.

Facing the complex structures of regionalization and globalization, actors will try to seek a new balance situation. Emerging power must be concerned about the hegemonic regional dangers to avoid vassal status while seeking an advantage by following the process. Existing power will regard itself as a regulator for the management of disequilibrium and will be concerned about the share of the costs to supply a collective good. In the absence of strong institutions, the stability and manageability of international society constitutes the cardinal aspiration of the power-holder, with reference to relative power decline and power share. The subjective sense of geographical distance is dramatically changed; some even speak of “the end of geography”¹⁵. New geopolitical relations, however, elucidate the conflict between the logic of globalization and regionalization which attempts to cushion the effect. For distinct geographical features, derived from specialty customs and convention, there are separate regional and foreign maneuvers in each block. The interregional cooperation is one way to attenuate the cost of translating systemic structure.

¹⁴ Perkmann, M. and Sum, N, Globalization, Regionalization and Cross-border Regions: Scales, Discourses and Governance. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002).

¹⁵ Björn Hettne. Globalization, the New Regionalism and East Asia. In Globalism and Regionalism Toshiro Tanaka and Takashi Inoguchi, Hayama, eds. (Japan: United Nations University, 1996), p 4-5.

3.1.1.2 Actors' Opportunity

In the age of speedy information and technology flow, “the nation-state is too small for the big problems” has led to a growing awareness of power and potential influence of regions. Regions need more than hinterland but rather faithful partners, neighboring and developing countries; for creating high-speed connections the network is the best choice; therefore, cross-boundary cooperation has become very important. Regions provide a new place for the construction of politics and political symbolism in the global order. The state itself is being transformed and in the process is losing its former ability to manage spatial changes and developments. Its power and authority have been eroded from three directions: from above, by internationalization; from below by regional and local assertions; and laterally, by the advances of market and civil society¹⁶. The state has lost the monopoly power and parts of its ability to control the common interests. Regions are like agencies in terms of political symbolism cooperation and competition with other regions or supranational organizations.

Regionalization refers to regional processes that lead to different patterns of cooperation within a specific geographical area, and also refers to a body of ideas, values and objectives that are aimed at creating, maintaining or modifying different goals within a particular region¹⁷. However, a very substantial conception of state-specificity exists concerning aspects of culture, history, economics, politics, and geography and so on in the regions. The collapse of the Cold War order has led to many different issues related to the creation of a new order and the position of regions such as Europe or Asia-Pacific within the new order. Even though the EU has high

¹⁶ M. Keating. The New Regionalism in Western Europe: Territorial Restructuring and Political Change. (Edward Elgar, 1998) P.72-73

¹⁷ Petri Virtanen, “Euregions in Changing Europe: Euregion Karelia and Euroregion Pomerania as Examples ” In Cross-Border Governance in the European Union, OT Kramsch, B Hooper, Eds.(Routledge, 2004). pp.121-134.

degree of integration diversity clearly still exists; Asia-Pacific, from social, political and economic perspectives, is highly diverse.

Appreciably, integration always begins from an economic spillover to other levels. As Philip Cerny stated, whatever the specifics of globalization may be, one of its most important qualities in terms of public policy is its service as a powerful discourse that shapes domestic and international debates, a process which may change the state's role to one of an "enforcer of decisions and/or outcomes which emerge from world markets."¹⁸ Globalization redounds to new actor's turning point but new challenge. Globalization re-identifies the territoriality, monopolistic control of the means of violence, an impersonal structure of power that provide actors get new role through numerous global processes. However, indistinct world order reveal desire to claim to legitimacy¹⁹. Economic, political, and social groups unfold unprecedented close-combinations, which relate to the development of technology and connection in which actors and makers earn a profit from easy cross-nation operation, while increasing uncertainty and risk, e.g., countries lose control of their economic or political operation because when policy-choice as a key policy tool cannot be used, it must be solved through integration to relax in highly transformation.

Transitional structure brings new challenges and gives peripheral actors a new opportunity to advance by existent advantages. In addition, to control the internal part and international affairs creates a situation where the same region can belong to more than one group of people. There are many different groups of "us" and "them" within the same region.

¹⁸ Philip Cerny, "Paradoxes of the Competition State: The Dynamics of Political Globalization". *Government and Opposition*, Vol. 32 No.2, 1997. pp. 258, 251–74.

¹⁹ D Held, A McGrew, D Goldblatt, J Perraton. "Global Transformations: Political, Economics and Culture". (Cambridge: Polity, 2003) pp. 45-49

3.1.2 Power beyond State—New Geopolitical Relations and Global Governance

In this paper, we deal with the structure of governance under space dynamics in two parts, empirical administration and social ideology. Notwithstanding some scholars considering that after the Second World War, it was not only the ending of the European-power period in the world, but also the ending of geopolitics. In 1994, Kissinger indicated that the new world order would be shared by six major powers²⁰ demonstrating that the leadership and rules were changing. In the new world order, we are one part of an interdependent system. In the new geopolitical relationships, developments of inter-region interactions exemplify a transition to greater multi-polarity in the world system, characterized by more cooperation agendas, multi-actor policy arenas and development of a transnational civil society. After the Cold War, geopolitics was back, in a new way Vis-à-Vis the global order.

3.1.2.1 Changing Concepts in International System

A fluctuating international system has changed actors' cognizance of societal order and the past thinking of hierarchical politics. New interaction relations have also changed actors' cognizance of power, where and how to build a new role, how to reinforce strength and how to communicate with others, all interaction-level, with the process of negotiation much different from that of the past. Following, we will discuss some changing concepts: War, Risk and syncretic dilemmas.

²⁰ The six major powers: USA, EU, China, Japan, Russia and India. Henry Kissinger (1994) *Diplomacy*. New York: Simon and Schuster.

- War

War is a key element of power shift, but not essential. New international actors and the new order have changed the ideal of massive destruction, creating a new layout. War in past periods constituted a critical point to change the power distribution. War accounted for a horrid cost more than interests served. However, war's position in international politics remains a controversial issue. "Whether international society changes according to the scale of war", some scholars cite major war as the critical point of the causal impact. In long cycle theory, each cycle is born in major warfare; the military power is able to support its economic goals, especially benefiting from world trade that it more or less monopolized²¹.

Gilpin, a hegemonic theory scholar, developed a concept of hegemonic stability. The most important insight in hegemonic theory is that war and change were initiated in order to expand the rising or dominant state's influence to the limits of its new capability²². War, in terms of systemic stability, is an unavoidable process for states to maintain their relative power. Nevertheless, in the past cold war, such realism had been challenged by the balance of power, and contemporary versions of the conflict do not focus only on military and aircraft but also on "soft" power, especially in economic interests.

War is seen as a selection process for finding a new leading power. In particular, after serious destruction, actors have learned the cost of re-establishment; in facing the adjustment of power, it is important to control conflict degree.

²¹ G. Modelski and W.R. Thompson. Seapower and Global Politics, 1494-1993. (London: Macmillan, 1988.)

²² R. Gilpin. War And Change in World Politics. (Cambridge University Press, 1981)

- Risk

Because of the changes in the new way of thinking of war, aspirations of economic development and maintenance of order stability, actors must use multifarious strategies to fuse multilateral diversity in order to avoid war or serious conflict. They will look at every event at the worst and calculate any incidence of risk. New geographic-basis interaction applies that we regard the region as united, when we relax the assumption that states are the only actors; “supra-regional” applies. With a region as a unity, there is more difficulty in estimating complex interdependence.

Power must involve a series of competing activities. Interdependence causes international cooperation, wherein we cannot be sure concerning the possibility of beguilement leaving cooperative relations unstable on both sides. The new international system has created a new structure of competition and cooperation. New networks create a new complex relationship as well. It is seen as an extreme conception of competition, when a common consensus exists in a new network. It is not a balance of horror as in the Cold War; the new relations give actors in conflict the possibility of integration and cooperation.

An actor in the international society who gets into a dilemma when cooperating and competing with other actors must undergo circumstantial decision-making and risk-disposition. In the early 20th century, the international society required more streamlined international integration and cooperation. Accompanying the new challenges of globalization led the policy-makers to try to find a new pattern or pathway for administration. The global whirlpool swept away all members (it is not only state, but also international organizations, NGOs and regional blocks etc...). All actors are politicians, barnstormers, and arguers in the same time. Regional governors

have stepped into the international game inchmeal and played important roles, giving rise to conflicts. In this game, an actor's behavior involves a series of decision-making processes. When considering decision-making from a normative perspective, it is important to remember that the outcome of a decision is not simply made at the moment individuals decide to do one thing rather than another, but is determined by a whole series of factors.

The risks involved the exploitation of their prime resources; the replacement of local energy resources and the potential destruction of regional governance, not to mention that increasing dependence upon foreign influence was often understated for the sake of short-term economic gains that could bolster the power position of regional block in the sharing gain of the international system. The ability of risk management for the multilateral/bilateral interaction is high relative to the country/region if competition is low, if information is opaque, and if the importance of transactions is high cost. On the other hand, countries/regions can be expected to have high bargaining power if competition is high, if information is anticipatable, and if transaction costs are low.

- Syncretic Dilemmas

In the bipolar age, hegemonic control led to the toleration of different cultures and religions in the same region by obeying superpower. In globalization, regional integration combined in a respect-way. Complex interactions demonstrate high degree of sensitivity and vulnerability. Administration of blurring policy in interdependence²³ displays a compelling question about fusion of different culture and moral. The world map is filled with different culture blocks, which leads to conflicts between diverse

²³ Joseph S. Nye. Power in the Global Information Age: From Realism to Globalization. (London; New York : Routledge,2004).pp.155-158.

cultures. However, regional integration attempts to be a fusion of these differences. The fusion of different cultures changes the other actors' thought and challenges the existing interaction relationships, for example, western individualism and eastern community. Mary Douglas argued that culture involves risk perception; a culture bias is a point of view with its own framing assumptions and readily available solutions for standardized problems²⁴. Supra-region communications will affect different people in a common arena and will create different patterns of moral consciousness. The globalization of nations diminishes ideology and traditional value systems to provide social cohesion. Therefore, Douglas also argues that modern societies support a combination of cultures, with the major power axis extending from the high group, high grid or hierarchical quadrant to the low group, low grid or individualistic quadrant²⁵. It explains that major power's culture will extend to rising power (group) but does not cover its culture. Culturally distinct regions have in recent years been attempting to develop a model of regional economic development where their cultural distinctiveness is regarded as a competitive advantage over their competitor²⁶. In other words, major powers must embrace emerging diversity to meet the challenges.

With supra-regional activity increasing, actors become more sensitive to one another, which may lead the elite to increase their efforts to control non-governmental behavior. Face-to-face communications often transmit more information, which can affect policy exceptions and preferences. The new order issues lead negotiating institutions overlapping, and issue spillovers make it hard to enforce. When problems happen, the policy of central executives is often unclear on detail; policy-estimation

²⁴Mary Douglas. (1999)The Depoliticisation of Risk. In Implicit Meanings : Selected Essays in Anthropology. M. Douglas (Ed.) pp 225. 218-230.

²⁵ H.Susan MacDonald.“Globalization and Risk: a Contingent Responser for Democratic Governance.” *Administrative Theory and Praxis*. Vol.24(1),2002 P.43. 31-54.

²⁶ Michael Keating and John Loughlin. “Introduction”. In The Political Economy of Regionalism. Michael Keating and John Loughlin. Eds. 1996. p.3. 1-13.

must take notice of different things at different level, and even different organization. The blurring policy means a buffer time to seek next step. “One man’s policy is another man’s tactics.”²⁷

3.2 Divergent Approaches to Power System Analysis

It is important and notable that power structure changes from bipolar to multi-polar, when the international society shifts into the post Cold-War era. Here will probes into power transformation theory and power balance theory, and forms system level to apprehend that divergent approaches to power system.

Realist emphasizes that nation-states lead balance of international order. Power magnitude determines a state’s action in the international organization which operation and establishment only reflect freehearted international politics and power structure²⁸. Structure of power redistribution in international society decides the order and steady in the international system. Hegemony depends on interest and preference to construct international order under which the feature of regional organizations is that states seeking to increase individual power, instead of forge a new alliance resisting hegemony and keeping balance. Christopher Layne held that unipolar derives from hegemony. Any state increasing its power would need to find a way to balance the existing power, even challenge, aiming to achieve the predominant position under the assumption that power structure in system will change to bi- or multi-competition.

Liberalism emphasizes that institute, competition and cooperation coexist in a regime.

Neoliberalism suggests that regimes and rules in an international organization can

²⁷ Raymond Bauer, The Study of Policy Formation, (New York, 1968).p.2.

²⁸ Joseph M. Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism” *International Organization*, vol. 42, No. 3, 1989, pp. 485-507

change the action and interest of states²⁹. States are influenced mainly by basic institutes and rules, instead of the operation of international power structure. Benefit trade-off model indicates that whether regional cooperation is successful depends on whether the leader state(s) is willing to accept responsibility. In present studies, potential benefits are restricted by factor endowments, as well as the limit of economies of scale or uncertain long-term formulation³⁰. Many attempts of regional cooperation have failed due to restraint of potential benefit. External element offers benefit trade-off at an absolute critical point. Dependence of finance and security and satisfaction of external beneficiary, all influence the ways and possibility of cooperation. International power from regional hegemony to balance mechanism ally with external states and restrain external hegemony.

Constructivism claims that ideal is more important than matter, regardless of the power distribution or the magnitude of a states, and power operation determines on ideal and through. Society establishes community as one of its conceptions. “Safe community” proposed by Karl Detusch³¹ claims that the logic of community has displaced the logic of anarchy, and it clearly explains the change way of power worming for nation-states in framework of globalization that coordinate with the transformation of regionalism turn into a intermediate zone facing globalization. This external power drives order in hegemonic region, and the process of benefit trade-off fills with power abridgement and asymmetric. An unbalance system is bound to be challenged from the region seek regional impendence, widespread cooperation and

²⁹ Robert Keohane, “Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge after the Cold War,” in Neorealism and Neoliberalism, David A. Baldwin eds., (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.)

³⁰ Walter Mattli, The Logicoregional Integration:Europe and beyond, (Cambridge university press,2001),p60. Hal Hill, “Challenge in ASEAN Economic Cooperation: and Outside’s Perspective” in ASEAN at Crossroads, Institute of Strategic and International Studies, Noordin Sopiee, Chew Lay See and Lim Siang Jin, eds., (Kuala Lumpur, 1987,) pp. 81-89.

³¹ Karl Deutsch., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area—International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957).

power equality. A.F.K Organski's advanced Power-transition theory suggests that conflict and war occur when emerging power access or exceed existing power since emerging power has confidence to challenge, and existing power anticipate avoiding other emerging power. Contrary to the traditional "Balance of power theory", with its power parity hypothesis, which claims that an equality in power is conducive to peace, "Power transition theory" reach the opposite conclusion claiming the probability of war between the rising challenger and the dominant state that peaks near the point of power transition between them³².

3.2.1 Problems-

From above theories, some ideas are proposed herein to modify power theories::

1. Study of the linkage between emerging actors and safe is not compact enough, thus resulting that the statement of "motivation" is not insightful.
2. In different phases of power distribution, it is lack of systemic analysis on actors' connections.
3. Predominate states and hegemony has been emphasized excessively, while neglecting the importance of civil society and spillover from market interest.
4. Adopting non-historical approach namely applies certain models in similar structure in all time and ways, while neglecting diverseness of interaction in specific historic background.

To overcome those insufficiencies, Chapter 2 proposes an analysis framework of "power realignment" analyzes the process of power realignment in East Asia integration and interacting with North American and Europe.

³² Organski, A.F.K. World Politics, 3. Auflage, New York, 1969 (Erstausgabe 1958)

3.3 Identify-The Feature of New Governance

3.3.1 Multi-Polarity

Historical examples of hegemonic stability with a stable international order based on the leadership of a dominate hegemony are no longer adequate for representing international relations in the 1990s and beyond³³. America is becoming a superpower when Soviet Union collapsed, greatly influenced world economy, politics and military. However, unipolarity means that the U.S. must spend a lot to maintain the order in its design and to build mechanisms for increasing their interests. The cost of public goods and transformations result in new actors entering the world system in other patterns.

New international order brings many new opportunities, but changes the model of leadership position of states in the international arena. Inter-regional cooperation is one of the new models. According to the geographical region, regional hegemonic attraction increases regional coherence. Regional organizations build associations around a set common interest. The development of regional associates has promoted much discussion over shifting scales of governance and the change role of nation-states in the world-system. The role of states progresses from regional state to regional governance. Transformation of the world system offers emerging actors the opportunity to join in international affairs and play a key role. The EU has experienced new thinking and engaged in activities in other regions including building institutions; further, the U.S. has been increasing relative power, resulting in invigorated collective power.

³³ Paul Parker, Japan and the Global Environment: Leadership in Environment Technology. In Global Geopolitical Change and the Asia Pacific Region, pp. 94.

Whether hierarchical erosion occurs through interdependence? In globalization, the key phenomena regarding major economic changes as noted above, have been the transformations of authority relations and political practices within and across national jurisdictions³⁴. Generally, we identify that an international society has no central government and lacks absolute power, which cause contention (or war) according to changing situations. In the international social order, however, anarchy exists, governance without government. Unclear leader has yet emerged to set a new path for the international order. Seeking a powerful ally in the center of an interest-sharing system is a way for strengthening power. Coalition-building weakens government but enhances common aspirations.

Power has always been an elusive concept in international affairs; it has become increasingly slippery in interdependence and hierarchy is not absolute to have possession of power. As Nye argued, there are three conditions for the use of force in interdependence: (1) risks of nuclear escalation; (2) uncertain and possible negative effects on the achievement of economic goals; and (3) domestic opinion opposed to the human costs of the use of force³⁵. This all explain the change in uncertain system has broke “Hegemonic Stability” increasing the possibility of multi-leader in contemporary age.

3.3.2 Multilateralism, Multi-level

The rationale behind development multi-polarity conceptualization of world order is to be found in the specific regional problems characterizing each region. This is true not only because hegemonic power has declined, but because much of the agenda is

³⁴ Mark Beeson. “Globalization, Governance, and the Political-Economy of Public Policy Reform,” in East Asia. Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration, vol.14, No. 4. 2001. pp. 485,

³⁵ Nye. pp. 159-160.

concerned with organizing collective action³⁶. Cultural and socio-economic heterogeneity exist in different regions; a specific danger was identified in the close linkages among population, resource, technology and the environment. The enlargement (like the EU) and integration (like East Asia) have strengthened a co-operating sense of economic, social and environment interdependence. In other words, the geographic dimension in the new regionalism increases cooperation but contains competition in the work countering fears of possible instability from world's political and economic problems. While these conceptual concerns are articulated by national governments, local and regional actors are linked by the vast issues at stake.

Relationships between formal administrative governance structures of state and more informal collaborative mechanisms of policy-formulation make for a high level of contingency within different regional contexts³⁷. Development perspectives for these often far-flung communities will depend on effective networking and thus on the improvement of physical communications and interstate political relationships³⁸. As the geopolitical situation changes, an early response is new regime building and taking advantage of new opportunities for political dialogue. It encourages multilateral cooperation, focusing on economic and environmental issues.

From the regional geopolitical perspective, the creation of supra-regional agendas began well before the international system could become stable. With the appreciation of distinct features within different regions, the process of trust-building partnerships becomes more possible, as many strategic issues emerge. The role of region as actor is not only about military power or so-called high level political hegemony, but also

³⁶ Nye. 160

³⁷ James W. Scott. "The Northern Dimension." in Cross-border governance in the European Union. Olivier Thomas Kramsch, Barbara Hooper eds. (London : Rutledge, 2004) pp. 139.

³⁸ Ibid. pp.142

other issues (such as public goods' protection). Supra-regionalism operates both in theory and in practice on the basis of multilateral agendas and multilevel trans-boundary cooperation among different actors and regions. For Castelles, globalization is stratifying, diversifying, exclusionary, and-to that extend-exploitative, inherently unstable, with potential for the reordering of shifting relationships of power³⁹. Supra-region as platform was established to focus the various goals and operating framework. Among supra-regional cooperation actors, from purely state agencies to a variety of organizations, financial institutions and the private sector are seen to be important actors for achieving the success of stabilizing the world system.

In terms of agenda-setting, the national and regional policy-making elites try to maintain a commanding role. Protection against threats will remain a major foreign policy problem in operating under one global organization, like the WTO. In the absence of effective third-party enforcement, agreements must be self-enforcing; that is, agreements may still be based on self-help, but cooperation requires a stronger governance structure. Self-enforcement requires issue linkage so that benefits of cooperation to each party offset the costs, thereby deterring opportunism⁴⁰. To avoid any unfair distribution of benefits-cost many new agenda items will pursuit of legality.

3.3. 3 Civil Society

Supra-regional interaction problem in the construction of structures involves the changing contours of the territory. National and local governments are quite unable by themselves to effectively regulate phenomena like global mass media, global ecological problems, and global finance. Trans-border flows can not be tied to a

³⁹ Manuel Castells. The Rise of Network Society. (Cambridge, ma:Blackwell publisher,1996). pp.95-99.

⁴⁰ Beth Yarbrough and Robert Yarbrough. "Regionalism and Layered Governance: The Choice of Trade Institutions." *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 48, 1994. pp. 170-193.

strictly delimited territorial space over which a state might endeavor to exercise unilateral full control,⁴¹ given that many people's loyalty supplements and in some cases even overrides state-centered nationalism. In addition, many people in the contemporary globalizing world have become increasingly ready to acknowledge 'supra-territorial values'. This changing contour of the demos reveals that civil society might contribute to global governance.

These structural problems are evident in democratic deficits that have been still further diluted in intergovernmental governance mechanisms. Given the democratic deficits outlined above and the inadequacy of state mechanisms to resolve them, it is understandable that increasing numbers of citizens have considered civil society as a way to enhance public participation, consultation, transparency and accountability in global governance. Civil society might enhance democracy in global governance through public education activities and might make positive contributions to democratic global governance by giving voice to stakeholders⁴².

Yet it also means that civil society is a kind of power that can influence international relations. Telò instanced Europe as an incipient, collective civilian power moving towards a multi-polar world. The EU contributes to global governance by collectively encouraging states in other continents to deepen regional cooperation. The EU has developed a new dimension in international relations⁴³. We can compare civilian power with Joseph Nye's "soft power". Civilian power has defended and championed the institutional strengthening of those international organizations, while promoting the continuation of new global regimes. It is a kind of power to influence international

⁴¹ Jan Aart Scholte. "Civil Society and Democracy in Global Governance." Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation (CSGR) Working Paper No. 65/01. University of Warwick, Coventry. pp10.

⁴² Ibid. pp.16-17

⁴³ Telò, Mario. *Europe: A Civilian Power? : European Union, Global Governance, World Order*. Houndmills [u.a.]: (Palgrave Macmillan. 2006) pp. 50-55.

relations. It is a useful instrument for affecting others and changing decision-making before enforcement.

4. Regions and Supra-Regions

Regions in this paper indicate that political geography regions in international politics, which tend to be based on political units such as multinational groupings, including formally defined units such as the European Union, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and NATO. Supra-regions in this paper indicate organizations cooperate from cross political geography regions such as APEC and ASEM.

4.1 Regions:

4.1.1 ASEAN, ASEAN+3, East Asia Summit

United States has been viewed as a single hegemony after the Cold War in the world system, but could has to face the ascendancy of China in economics and politics, ASEAN independence in East Asia region, and EU positive diplomacy in Europe. Under the development of power interaction, East Asia is viewed as a forming actor because of ASEAN+3 and East Asia summit are considered as an effective instrument, and East Asian countries have a consensus to build a community. ASEAN+3 is the axis of the integration of East Asia, albeit it is confronted with difficulties. ASEAN plays a key position in East Asia integration, and is the Presidency of East Asia summit, so that we will discuss the history and foreign policy of ASEAN, as well as the form and operation of ASEAN+3 and East Asia summit.

4.1.1.1 ASEAN

Historical Overview and ASEAN Foreign Relations

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations or ASEAN was established on August 8, 1967 in Bangkok by the five original Member Countries, namely, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Brunei Darussalam joined on January 8, 1984, Vietnam on July 28, 1995, Lao PDR and Myanmar on July 23, 1997, and Cambodia on April 30, 1999.⁴⁴ ASEAN stated that “Bangkok Declaration” for advancing regional economics grows by equal spirit and cooperation. ASEAN had three features in its infancy: 1.) blurry goals and lack of operating mechanism; 2.) highlight the form of cooperation but not achievements; 3.) more successful political cooperation than economic ones. ASEAN was established in 60’s Cold War era to united new independent countries to confront communism and seek stability. After the Cold War, the bipolar power in Southeast Asia collapsed, and political structure changed, while the economic remained the same. The change was due to the power adjust of the United States, emerging China, economic crisis, and anti-terrorism, but the most important thing was that the power structure change in East Asia to build common view. ASEAN has transformed to as unit of economic priority to maintain competitiveness ability between Asian power countries. On November 20, 2007, on the 40th anniversary of ASEAN, the Heads of State/Government of ASEAN Member Countries gathered in Singapore for the 13th ASEAN Summit and signed an “ASEAN Charter” for building an “ASEAN Economic Community” on 2015. ASEAN has become an entity on law; it means ASEAN increases self-ability.

⁴⁴ Association Of Southeast Asian Nations - Overview <http://www.aseansec.org/64.htm>

4.1.1.2 ASEAN+3 Summit⁴⁵ and East Asia Summit⁴⁶

Historical Overview

The idea of creating a forum of East Asian countries was first introduced and promoted by the Malaysian Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohamad, at the occasion of a state visit to the Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng in December 1991. The East Asian Economic Grouping (EAEG) envisioned by Mahathir was to form the basis of an East Asian economic bloc as an answer to the uncertain outcome of the Uruguay round of the GATT and plans of economic bloc-building in North America and Western Europe (NAFTA and the European Community). At the same time, just one year after the Tianmen massacre, the proposal was a political signal to the world that Malaysia intended to act as a bridge in ASEAN for a constructive relationship with China.

The Fifth Summit was held in Bangkok, Thailand in December 1995. To strengthen regional development and cooperation, the ASEAN Leaders contributed to Japan as center. In addition, EAEG advanced by Malaysia transformed from East Asia Economic Caucus (EAEC). Although economic crisis was severe, ASEAN was resumed and increased its influence by economic liberalization and political integration. The role of ASEAN in East Asia is critical to China and Japanese leadership.

The Thirtieth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting was held in Subang Jaya, Malaysia on July 24–25, 1997. In this meeting, they looked forward to the convening of Summit meetings between the Heads of State/ Government of ASEAN and the Heads of State/Government of the People's Republic of China, Japan and the Republic of Korea

⁴⁵ ASEAN + 3 Countries: ASEAN, Japan, China, Republic of Korea.

⁴⁶ East Asia Summit: ASEAN + 3 Countries, New Zealand, Australia and India. Russia has applied for membership and as of 2005, attends on observer status.

on the occasion of the Commemorative Summit. Because this summit was held after the “ASEAN+3 Summit” in Kuala Lumpur, the East Asia Vision Group (EAVG) was initiated by Korean President Kim Dae-jung at the ASEAN+3 Summit in Hanoi in 1998 to discuss long-term cooperation in the region.

In 1999, the ASEAN Summits were broadened to include not only heads of government of “the 10+3”, but also their foreign, finance, and trade ministers as well. This came in addition to the meetings of these groups held at other points during the year. An unprecedented joint declaration, “Joint Statement on East Asia Cooperation”, on the future of East Asia by ASEAN, Japan, Korea, and China pledged cooperation on economic and social development, politics, and security⁴⁷.

In the November 2000 Summit, ASEAN Leaders agreed to launch the Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI). The IAI is intended to provide a framework for regional cooperation through which the more developed ASEAN members could help less developed members. It would focus on education, skills development and worker training. The Leaders of ASEAN, China, Japan and South Korea emphasized the importance of closer cooperation among East Asian countries. They supported the proposal by South Korean President Kim Dae Jung for an East Asia Study Group (EASG) (which was established in March 2001). The purpose of the study group is to assess the recommendations of the East Asia Vision Group (EAVG) and explore the idea and implications of an East Asia summit. The 14-member study group is consisted of 13 senior officials from the ten ASEAN members plus China, Japan and Korea along with the Secretary-General of ASEAN. A Working Group of the East Asia Study Group has been set up to assist the senior officials.

⁴⁷Association Of Southeast Asian Nations- <http://www.us-asean.org/ASEANOverview/asean+3.asp>.

The 2002 report of the East Asian Study Group, established by the ASEAN Plus 3 countries, was based on an EAS involving ASEAN+3, not involving Australia, New Zealand or India. The Japanese and the 10 ASEAN Leaders attended the two-day ASEAN-Japan Summit on December 12, 2003. The Summit marked Japan's three decades of ties with ASEAN and was the first meeting of 10 ASEAN Leaders held in a non-member country. At the end of the summit, the leaders signed the Tokyo Declaration for the Dynamic and Enduring Japan-ASEAN Partnership in the New Millennium, and pledged the creation of an East Asian community to enhance cooperation. ASEAN would also work with its other dialogue partners -- China and South Korea -- to develop the East Asian community.

The ASEAN+3 Summit was held successfully on November 29, 2004 in Vientiane. The Leaders of the +3 countries supported ASEAN Leaders' decision to convene the first East Asia Summit (EAS) in Malaysia in 2005. The ASEAN+3 Summit exchanged views on regional and international political and security, as well as economic issues. We also discussed ways and mechanisms to strengthen the ASEAN+3 cooperation and its future direction⁴⁸.

The following EAS was held on December 13, 2006 in Metro Cebu, Philippines. After the confidence building of the inaugural EAS, the 2006 EAS aimed to help to defining the future role of the EAS, its relationship with ASEAN+3, and the involvement of Russia in EAS. However, due to Tropical Typhoon Utor, the summit was post-poned

⁴⁸ Chairman's Statement of the 10th ASEAN Summit Vientiane, 29 November 2004.
<http://www.aseansec.org/16631.htm>.

until January 2007⁴⁹. After the EAS was established concerning the issues of whether any future East Asia Community would arise from the EAS or ASEAN+3⁵⁰.

4.1.2 EU⁵¹

4.1.2.1 Historical Review

In 1950, the French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman proposed integrating the coal and steel industries of Western Europe. As a result, in 1951, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was set up, with six members: Belgium, West Germany, Luxembourg, France, Italy and the Netherlands. For centuries, Europe was the scene of frequent and bloody wars. In the period 1870 to 1945, France and Germany engaged in wars three times, with terrible loss of lives. A number of European leaders became convinced that the only way to secure a lasting peace between their countries was to unite them economically and politically⁵².

The ECSC was such a success that, within a few years, these same six countries decided to go further and integrate other sectors of their economies. In 1957 they signed the Treaties of Rome, creating the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and the European Economic Community (EEC). The member states set about removing trade barriers between them and forming a "common market".

In 1967, the institutions of the three European communities were merged. From this point on, there was a single Commission and a single Council of Ministers as well as

⁴⁹ Bangkok Post - Asean summit may be reset for Jan 8-13 Sun Star - Asean summit shelved 'effectively'?

⁵⁰ Report of the East Asian Study Group.

⁵¹ The European Union currently has 27 independent sovereign countries which are collectively known as member states: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. European Countries. European Commission.

⁵² European Economic and Trade Office,
<http://www.deltwn.ec.europa.eu/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=63>

the European Parliament. Originally, the members of the European Parliament were chosen by the national parliaments, but in 1979, the first direct elections were held, allowing the citizens of the member states to vote for the candidate of their choice. Since then, direct elections have been held every five years.

The Treaty of Maastricht (1992) introduced new forms of cooperation between the member state governments - for example on defense, and in the area of “justice and home affairs”. By adding this inter-governmental cooperation to the existing “Community” system, the Maastricht Treaty created the European Union (EU).

Economic and political integration between the member states of the European Union means that these countries have to take joint decisions on many matters. So they developed common policies in a very wide range of fields - from agriculture to culture, from consumer affairs to competition, from the environment and energy to transport and trade.

In the early days, the focus was on a common commercial policy for coal and steel and a common agricultural policy. Other policies were added as time went by, and as the need arose. Some key policy aims have changed in the light of changing circumstances. For example, the aim of the agricultural policy is no longer to produce as much food as cheaply as possible but to support farming methods that produce healthy, high-quality food and protect the environment. The need for environmental protection is now taken into account across all of EU policies.

The European Union's relations with the rest of the world have also become important. The EU negotiates major trade and aid agreements with other countries and is developing a Common Foreign and Security Policy.

4.1.2.2 Members-The Growing Family

The EU has grown in size with successive waves of accessions. Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom joined in 1973 followed by Greece in 1981, Spain and Portugal in 1986 and Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995. The European Union welcomed ten new countries in 2004: Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. Bulgaria and Romania joined in January 2007. Turkey, Croatia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia are also candidate countries. To ensure that the EU can continue functioning efficiently with 27 or more members, its decision-making system must be streamlined. That is why the Treaty of Nice lays down new rules governing the size of the EU institutions and their operation. It came into force on February 1, 2003.

4.1.2.3 Forging Relations with East Asia

The European Union wants to prevent conflicts. The EU is the biggest donor of financial assistance to troubled places in the world. It is active in peacekeeping and peacemaking actions, and it runs many projects that help to make human rights and democracy succeed in practical terms.

The sheer size of the European Union in economic, trade and financial terms makes it a world player. The EU has a web of bilateral and multilateral agreements covering most countries and regions of the globe. The biggest trader and home to the world's second currency, the Euro, the EU is also the world's largest contributor in assistance projects. Handling the Union's external relations is literally a global responsibility.

To expand and deepen relations with other countries and regions, the EU holds regular summit meetings with its main partners like the United States, Japan, Canada

and, more recently, Russia, India and China, as well as regional dialogues with countries in the Mediterranean, the Middle East, Asia and Latin America. Although these relationships focused mainly on trade issues at the beginning, they have expanded over the years to cover investment, economic cooperation, finance, energy, science and technology and environmental protection, as well as political matters such as the global war on terror, international crime and drug trafficking, and human rights.

Besides bilateral relations, the European Union is intensifying relations with international organisations (including the UN, Nato and the Council of Europe) and regional groupings around the world. In this way, the Union promotes trade and investment flows between it and the regions concerned, particularly in Latin America and Asia. With its Asian partners, the EU has moved away from a strategy based on trade and aid to what it calls enhanced partnerships reflecting a better balance between the economic, political, social and cultural elements of their relations.

4.1.3 North America- NAFTA⁵³

4.1.3.1 Historical Review

As Seyom Brown stressed, some neighboring countries tend to regional integration cause from attack of environment and for increasing ability so that cooperation for challenge⁵⁴. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)faced the pressure of Europe and urged U.S. President Reagan to abandoned traditional liberalism to protectionism on regional policy. In 1985, Canadian Prime Minister Mulroney held Quebec Summit, and set up United State Canada Trade Agreement (UCFTA) in 1987. In 1990, U.S. and Mexico proceeded bilateral trade.

⁵³ Members: Canada , Mexico, United States.

⁵⁴ Seyom Brown, International Relations in a Changing Global System.(Blouder, Westview Press,1922):28.

NAFTA have been initial ceremony in October 1992. NAFTA called for immediately eliminating duties on half of all U.S. goods shipped to Mexico, and gradually phased out other tariffs over a period of about 14 years. Restrictions were removed from many categories, including motor vehicles and automotive parts, computers, textiles, and agriculture. NAFTA has been controversial since it was first proposed. Transnational corporations have tended to support NAFTA in the belief that lower tariffs would increase their profits. Labor unions in Canada and the United States have opposed NAFTA for fear that jobs would move out of the country due to lower wage costs in Mexico. Some politicians, economists, and policy experts have opposed free trade for fear that it will turn countries, such as Canada, into permanent branch plant economies. NAFTA is different from EU and does not overtop government and law. The Parties to this Agreement are consistent with national treatment, most-favored-nation treatment and transparency⁵⁵.

Since NAFTA was signed, it has been difficult to analyze its macroeconomic effects due to the large number of other variables in the global economy. Various economic studies have generally indicated that rather than creating an actual increased trade, NAFTA has caused trade diversion, in which the NAFTA members now import more from each other at the expense of other countries worldwide. Some economists argue that NAFTA has increased concentration of wealth in both Mexico and the United States.

4.1.3.2 Forging Relations with East Asia

Comparing with European integration, the members in North America and Asia-Pacific are overlapping, and in which US is the most powerful country. North

⁵⁵ North American Free Trade Agreement. Article 101 and 102.

America and Asia-Pacific have closer relation, because North America is led by the U.S. participating in Asia-Pacific positively and Asia-Pacific adopting “openness”. Even in economic crisis, East Asia is an important trade partner and still maintains high exportation. Canadian investments in East Asia were growing after 1990. Furthermore, the interaction between Canada and East Asia was more than EU. The relation between Mexico and East Asia was in competitive situation, because of similar developing economic unity, technology and industry.

4.2 Supra-Regions:

4.2.1 EU—East Asia : ASEM⁵⁶

Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), an intra-government forum, was brought up in France by Singapore’s prime minister, on October 1994. While burgeoning Asian countries wanted to search for new partnerships, a positive Europe wanted to be concerned in Asian affairs, the idea that has been actively advanced. In the post-Cold War world, Europe is attempting to return to East Asia on a larger scale. It’s bargaining power vis-à-vis the US, East Asia and APEC has expanded, mostly because investments in Europe and exports to Europe have gained importance for the East Asian countries. Europe had to advance relations with East Asia to impede US unilateralism and to break “bi-grip policy”.

On other hand, in facing the challenges of globalization and avoiding being crowded out, Asian countries have to increase competitiveness and reduce dependence on the US, hence to actively seek cooperation with EU. Both the “Asians” and the

⁵⁶ The 45 members of the ASEM cooperation are Japan, China, India, Mongolia, Pakistan, South Korea, the 10 states in the ASEAN alliance (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei Darussalam, Viet Nam, Myanmar, the Lao People's Democratic Republic and Cambodia), the ASEAN General Secretariat as well as the 27 European Union Member States and the European Commission.

EU-Europeans embarked on efforts to strengthen the weak links in trade; trade and investment figures indicate that “Europeans” matter greatly in Asia's economies. Equally important is the regulatory framework which the EU and the East Asian countries devised for managing their respective regionalism and the regulatory dialogue between the EU and Japan since 1994⁵⁷.

The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) attempted to build a relationship between the two regions and needs to be strengthened, reflecting the cooperative structure for responding to the fluctuations in international society and an uncertain new century. It displayed European ambitious to return in the international arena. Before Singapore proposed an EU-Asia summit meeting, in July 1994, the European Commission had already published “Towards a New Strategy for Asia”, stressing the importance of modernizing relationships with Asia, and of reflecting properly its political, economic and cultural significance. The inaugural Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) Summit was held in Bangkok on 1st & 2nd of March 1996 and was attended by the Heads of State and Government from ten Asian nations and 15 European nations, with the Head of the Government of Italy also acting as President of the Council of the European Union, and the President of the European Commission⁵⁸. The Commission Communiqué of September 2001 (“Europe and Asia: A strategic framework for enhanced partnerships”) reaffirmed co-operational objectives.

Accordingly, the EU and members of ASEM have become as crucial as the transatlantic (North America-EU) agendas and APEC for the redefinition of commercial codes needed for “orderly conduct” of transactions between the advanced-industrial nations, required to smooth the passage of “transformation

⁵⁷ J.Pelkmans and A.Balaoing. “The EU's New Asia Policies: Twinning European and Multilateral Interests.” In Towards Rival Regionalism? J. van Scherpenberg and E.Thiel, eds. (Baden-Baden:1998). pp. 205.

⁵⁸ <http://www.aseminfoboard.org/Summits/ASEM1/>

societies” into some form of market economy⁵⁹. Up to now, ASEM has been held six times and expanded one time in 2004, with ten new EU Member States (Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia) as well as three plus ASEAN(10+3) countries for a total of 39 partners.

4.2.2 North American— East Asia :APEC⁶⁰

At the end of WWII, the U.S. dominated the world in every tier of industry, ranging from the most technologically sophisticated down to the most standardized low-productivity industries, simply because the rest of the industrialized world lay in ruins. The U.S. stood on top of the world, enjoying an absolute advantage in every single manufacturing industry, as well as in agriculture, forestry, and mining (including oil)⁶¹. At the beginning of the post-Cold War decade, the thinking behind US initiatives for FTA (free trade areas) in the Americas and with willing partners in the Near and Far East again assumed that a “large regional market will provide new incentives for domestic reforms. By identifying trade and investment obstacles in the domestic system the NAFTA could help promote institutional reform . . .”⁶² Although most members of the East Asian community are developing countries, this block will not shock the US economy directly, but the political impression and the indicators of East Asian FTA would become factors reducing US influence. For the US, since East Asia is building an FTA that excludes the US, it will reduce the US’ relative influence. Hence, the US paid too much attention to bilateral agreements with East Asian

⁵⁹ Gustav Schmidt. “Asia, Europe, North America and the “Asian Capitalist Miracle”: Changing “Power Cycles” and Evolving Roles in Regional and International Structures” *International Political Science Review*, Vol. 24, (1), 2003, pp. 74-76.

⁶⁰ APEC has 21 members. Australien, Brunei, Chile, Volksrepublik China, Hongkong, Indonesien, Japan, Kanada, Südkorea, Malaysia, Mexiko, Neuseeland, Papua-Neuguinea, Peru, Philippinen, Russland, Singapur, Republik China (Taiwan), Thailand, USA und Vietnam

⁶¹ Terutomo Ozawa “Pax American-led Macro-clustering and Flying-geese-style Catch-up in East-Asian: Mechanisms of Regionalized Endogenous Growth”, *Journal of Asian Economic*. Vol. 13, 2003: 705.

⁶² E.Thiel. (1998). “Ambitions and Ambiguities in Current Economic Regionalism.” In Towards Rival Regionalism? J. van Scherpenberg and E.Thiel, eds. (Baden-Baden:1998). pp. 66.

countries. Furthermore, the US with American countries set up APEC with East Asia, one reason being fear that deviation of existent interactional regulations from East Asian integration. The other is fear of European influence rising in Asia. Depending on interdependence of East Asia and North America, APEC is an organization, a communicative arena and tool for cooperation. US influence extends not only to NAFTA but also deep into the Asia area, APEC. Now, APEC has 21 members⁶³, referred to as “Member Economies,” which account for approximately 40% of the world's population, approximately 56% of world GDP and about 48% of world trade.

APEC is the premier forum for facilitating economic growth, cooperation, trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific region, and is the first inter-governmental grouping in the world operating on the basis of non-binding commitments, open dialogue and equal respect for the views of all participants. Unlike the WTO or other multilateral trade bodies, APEC has no treaty obligations required of its participants. Its goals, liberalization and high-speed trade and investment, will be achieved in 2020, through the “Bogor goals”. However, gaps between members emerged in the 2004 “mid-term socktake” for context, form and operational approach as well as the conservative attitude in FTAAP⁶⁴. APEC has no choice but to acknowledge the multiplicity and diversity among its members and to emphasize voluntary negotiation. It has caused lock of peremptory regime for slowing the liberalization process as well as economic and technological cooperation.

Before the East Asian Community was evident, some Asian countries focused on

⁶³ APEC's 21 Member Economies are Australia; Brunei Darussalam; Canada; Chile; People's Republic of China; Hong Kong, China; Indonesia; Japan; Republic of Korea; Malaysia; Mexico; New Zealand; Papua New Guinea; Peru; The Republic of the Philippines; The Russian Federation; Singapore; Chinese Taipei; Thailand; United States of America; Viet Nam.

⁶⁴ FTAAP (Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific), Two Reasons: A Fear That a Limited Move on the Doha Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations in the World Trade Organization and EU Developments.

APEC. Facing feckless APEC, all members advanced reformative plans, changing policy-making approaches from top to bottom, and valuing the summit meetings. However, North America offered Mexico and South American countries special trade conditions obstructing Asian production, thereby changing the flow of international capital and Asia's dependency tendencies. Among members, although operating on the basis of non-binding commitments, political competition still exists. Indeed, economic cooperation and multilateral or bilateral conferences are all politicized activities. From the US-Japan alliance or liberal forms of economic regionalism to rising Chinese power and forming "ASEAN+3", economic cooperation always presents a field for political wars. Interaction in international relations has many types of effects in that "spill-over" affects the behavior in reaching objectives. In neo-functionalist logic, it implies that conflicts can be overcome by bringing actors to cooperate on functional matters, a process leading to a change in preferences and ultimately in individual "allegiances."⁶⁵

To probe in depth into the East Asian perestroika of the international system, consolidating East Asian power and departing from colonial shackles are the main directions. The pattern of ASEAN+3 stand out the pattern of APEC⁶⁶, although North America still strongly argues about APEC's predomination. With the new situation, APEC is extending economic cooperation to political issues and "APEC Structural Reform". 1999 dealt with East Timor informally, setting a precedent. Following this, anti-terror and anti-nuclear security issues entered into formal discussions. In 2006 the Six-Party Talks resumed on a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. In structure, in 2004

⁶⁵ Ernst B Haas, "Does Constructivism Subsume Neofunctionalism?" In The Social Construction of Europe, edited by Thomas Christiansen et al. (London: Sage. 2001) pp. 22-31

⁶⁶ Asia Regional Integration has been proceeding always towards between East Asianism and Asia Pacificism. Those two ways symbolize directly Association of South East Asian Nations, (ASEAN) and Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, (APEC).

APEC “One Community, Our Future” emphasized multilateral culture, in 2005, “Promoting Community Linkages” and in 2006 and 2007 enhancing Human Security. In addition, after the Asian crisis world organizations insisted that East Asia must structure reforms. The 2003-2006 APEC “Leaders' Agenda to Implement Structural Reforms” through “tailor-made”, “policy-advice” and “ability-building” provides a cross-cutting perspective and synergy possibility ⁶⁷. As 2007’s APEC title “Strengthening our Community, Building a Sustainable Future” indicates, a series of action plans are for strengthening members’ relationships.

Europe, America, and Asia-Pacific are the most obvious regions in the world. But compare with integration of Europe and North America, East Asia or Asia-Pacific seemed to be slowly. For heterogeneity and looser membership in East Asia, Europe and North America stipulated the right of members and discrimination. Regards to East Asia-31.14 hundred million populations (EU-4.4 and NAFTA-4.3 hundred million populations) imply conflict, regional complex and historical complication that explain East Asian open regime of regional cooperation.

⁶⁷ Taipei APEC Study Centers. APEC Structural Reform: Behind-the-border-issues.

Chapter 2: The Utility of Power Realignment

1. Introduction

The overall aim of this chapter is to propound a theory of international social power realignment. From the review of the literature on interregional cooperation, we can learn power transformation throughout the research of rising and decline in actors, which as the essential concept to reinforce the theory construction. Following part identifies typical power changes, particularly international power realignment, to interregional co-operation. We propound a competition and cooperation of “realignment” for power redistribution in actors’ interaction. Power realignment explain power change come from external challenge, willing to against existing arrangement, the changing situation and causing a co-governance. In power realignment, power must be through a serial communicative structure, and adjust by international order inertia. Moreover, a concept arrangement of system. System change offer actors an opportunity to reach new roles. The system existing order and status quo (limit-unlimited) influence information is controlled or feedback and cooperation or isolation of actors. Second section explains that power realignment: with globalization and the changing world order, power will have new forms of demonstration within dynamic space. The following section is process of equilibrium (or unequilibrium). Balance could result from coordinate or exchange form. The reasons (market, resource and rules) behind power realignment, supporting the solution to the problems related to interregional power pathways. The final section is the conclusion.

2. The Concept of “Realignment”

The power realignments in political science are utilized to analyze and explain party regrouping and government coalitions or adjustments in public policy. For instance, Fred Barnes, Deacon wisely and Rocket Man⁶⁸ argues that a Republican realignment has occurred in the American electorate, by examining whether the Republican party has become “dominant” in terms of voter party identification and officeholders. James L. Sundquist pointed out that the realignments around the slavery issue in the 1850s and the New Deal in the 1930s were considered as the classic examples of realignment.⁶⁹ Power realignments have involved a reorientation of fundamental convictions. Power realignments sometimes refer to “critical” events because “critical” implies a “crisis”.

On the international level, the conception of power realignment is utilized in analyzing how an emerging actor makes realignment and shifts its interactive behavior in the international system. This research defines and analyzes the context of power realignment as the ‘periodization’ of power in international politics in order to discriminate power shifting from the past. There are four views and opinions to express power realignment. First, power realignment implies renewed ascendancy that involves “challenging” the fundamental precepts of administration's foreign policy, diplomatic maneuvers, regional forms and even the world order. Rustow regard of realignment in Middle East⁷⁰ was not that of the soldier, but of the diplomat and the politician: new relationships formed, and new foundations laid, that will decisively

⁶⁸Fred Barnes. The (Finally) Emerging Republican Majority. Weekly Standard. October 27, 2003. And, what is realignment? <http://www.powerlineblog.com/archives/004889.php>

⁶⁹ James L. Sundquist. Dynamics of the Party System: Alignment and Realignment of Political Parties in the United States. Brookings Institution Press. (1973)

⁷⁰ Dankwart A. Rustow. “Realignments in the Middle East”. *Foreign Affairs*. 7. February, 1984.

shape the Middle Eastern constellation to come. William J. Lahneman⁷¹ argued that misalignment in contemporary world politics means there states rise or decline depending on their power structure reaching power-role equilibrium. Both explain that the process of realignment throughout a chain of reorientations and readjustments. In other words, power realignment is a challenge of the past, not only on the surface, but also in the root principles and beliefs, striking at major superpowers in the system. It usually represents emerging minatorial events or actors⁷² that drive the necessary conversion of major powers because power is realigned through power sharing.

Second, the characteristic of power realignment is that its outcome usually goes against actors' arrangements. Events continuously extended from a historical path and broke historical rules contrarily.⁷³ Event continuity leads to radical changes, even foreshadows a realignment of power in the world. In the world order, the practice of power balancing follows a pattern of history from ancient Greece to the modern era, such as Britain confronting France and Britain confronting Germany, and all the countries joining the United States to confront the Soviet Union.⁷⁴

Third, power realignment drags in actors' attitudes to the changing situation. Actors will recalculate reactions that might sometimes break its former will and principles. For example, there were two different voices in Washington regarding the rise of China- competitor or cooperator. However, after 911 the role of China shifted from that of a competitor to that of a partner.⁷⁵ In addition, the rising of India also indicates

⁷¹ William J. Lahneman. "Changing Power Cycles and Foreign Policy Role-power Realignments: Asia, Europe, and North America". *International Political Science Review*, Vol. 24, No. 1, 2003. pp. 97-111.

⁷² The minatorial[0] events or actors in this paper indicate that those could change power distribution, or cause other actors to establish new foreign policy.

⁷³ To differentiate between realignment and shifts in world order, realignment stress on actors' behavior and alignment, involving less in great ideology ; Power shift is characterize by cognitive analysis and events' involvement is not aimed at actors.

⁷⁴ Stanley Kober. The Realignment of the World. South China Morning Post, April 3. 2003

⁷⁵ Jia Qingguo. One administration, two voices: US China policy during Bush's first term. *International Relations*

a desire to unite the major countries of Eurasia into a common security organization. As P. B. Mehta explained, it results in a greater anti-Americanism around the world and may even occasion a more concerted effort to build coalitions to challenge American hegemony⁷⁶.

Fourth, power realignment refers to modes of governance that center on studying how to build and maintain governing coalitions. Alan DiGaetano lays out a theoretical framework for modes of governance, which draws on regime theory but goes beyond its conception of power structures.⁷⁷ The realignment was agonizingly slow in sinking actors' roots. Actors have to study different institutions and identify policies to make strategic decisions. Some decided to bind themselves closely to the major powers and considered a major power as their security guarantee. Other countries adopted a different approach by declaring that it would prevent the creation of any opposing power by employing preemptive strikes.

2.1 Communicative Structure

Apart from the concept and explanation of power realignment, "Communicative structure" and "Alienability" are critical operational structure and feature of power realignment, respectively. Operation of power realignment results from the social system, which is not an entity existing factually in the real system, and is efficacious only in the same system. Cooperation and competition are a kind of communicative structure. Perceivably, power realignment and competition are a coin with two sides. Interest actors have to operate within the wider context of power relations in society. Meanwhile, they calculated the reactions of other actors in order to influence their

of the Asia-Pacific. Vol.6 (1) 2006. pp. 23-36.

⁷⁶ Ibid 5

⁷⁷ A DiGaetano. "Urban Governing Alignments and Realignments". in Comparative Perspective Urban Affairs Review, Vol. 32, No. 6, 1997. pp.844-870

strategies.⁷⁸

In history, “power” has remained the most important goal and tool all the time. The winner can become the dominator in this world after getting “power.” Realists, especially Morgenthau, believe that politics aspires to preserve power (to maintain the status quo), to enlarge it (by imperial policy, noting that weak states may represent a challenge which strong states can hardly resist) or to demonstrate it.⁷⁹ However, since a realist separates power from the system, he is attracted by the dilemma in trying to express the interdependent international system. “Power” always happens via the process of interaction. In the contemporary world system, actors have no regard to ignore the predominant process of influence among states’ interactions, when actors enter in the system and structured hierarchy.

In summation, power is not a position but a hinge, which means that power will happen only through the interaction. We can recognize from the above that in the system of power realignment, the hinge structures communicate with, and influence, each other. This is a kind of dependence. When one actor is overly dependent on others, it becomes highly sensitive and fragile. The ability of negotiation and bargaining power becomes low. Nevertheless, the original limitations still remain in the anarchic international society, the visible law and invisible agreement (an unspoken consensus) effect the capability of cooperation and competition of the actors.

⁷⁸ Hilmar Rommetvedt. “Private and Public Power at the National Leave” in Power in Contemporary Politics: Theories, Practices, Globalizations. Henri Goverde, Philip G.Cerny, Mark Haugaard, Howard H. Lentner. Eds. (London Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications 2000.) pp. 117.

⁷⁹ Isakovic Zlatko. Introduction to a Theory of Political Power in International Relations. (Aldershot: Ashgate2000) pp. 138-140.

2.2 Alienability

Although power is a kind of interaction of a hinge system, the hinge system is not of a specific shape, but is bound to influence one another in a kind of connected relationship. From a historical perspective, however, power always links with interest and preferences so that actors are limited to the lowest alienating power. Even though power is assignable, it does not mean that the hinge system can control the power. Power in the connected structure is always in an ascendant position. Generally, the power in this analytic system is standard and comprehensive power, which is different from political or economical system. The interaction in the international system, post Cold War, peters out the unstable relationship in military and politic. High and low politics became blurry, the political and economic systems are integrating, and international society is in a transformed structure. Actors have new regulatory policy behavior for the international system (power is goal), and the interaction among actors is changing.

How will the system change with the power being incalculable. A unit will increase its share when its absolute growth rate is greater than the systemic norm. However, when the absolute power changes, the relative growth will accelerate or decelerate is incalculable, even when the absolute power does not change. No matter whether power means tools, goals or a conception; it radiates invisibly but doubtfully and uncontrollably. The complexity of power is arguable in terms of either quantity or quality. The international system is holism. Although actors have respective power in the system, this increases complexity in a multilateral connection structure. When two actors have a conjoint channel, there are two choices: competition and cooperation. Actually, the interaction is not so easy to be forecasted in the international system. The amount of actor statements is not in direct ratio to the scale of structure if actors

can influence diverse issues and most members (even those directly joined in interactive behavior), or the level and duration.

The quality of power signifies acquirement and balance. The outcome of actors' behavior must be considered multilateral, drawn by interior and exterior forces. Roughly, the product of interior behavior is foreign policy which is influenced by interior history, interest and the unwritten pact of both sides. The exterior is influenced by restraints of the international system. According to the complexity of power, we can learn that power is doubtful and uncontrollable. Therefore, stability and transition are important connotations of quality. Both the stability and transition involved in actors' power operations are known easily, the connected process of informational dealings. The balance is covert meaning of power, where knowing how to balance is the important interaction behavior.

In summation, power realignment is not a tempestuous process of change, but a judgment on structure. The power realignment is a dynamic process in which power is pulled and dragged by power owners; any win-win solution is relative between actors. In a vertical structure, power realignment would undergo a series of historical trajectories with learning and self-controlling from past and future development estimates. In the horizontal structure, units are interrelation. When systemic change abruptly, actors will make use of adapted or conflicting policy in which power is realigning.

3. Pressure for Change

Judging from the above, power realignment will undergo a series of vertical and horizontal developments. It is also a process of systemic change. The change is not only allied to geographical structure, but also to the context of global governance's

increasing complexity. After we understand the context of the governance structure in power realignment, in this section our concern is to consider the pressure for changing the power realignment.

3.1 Interior Cognition

Roughly speaking, power change motivation can be classified according to two forces. The first force is the interior structure involving cognition, i.e., interior ideology and the process of calculation. It includes historical inertia, learning and self-control. Actors will adjust cognition when transformation of the system occurs. It does not signify a world without world order. Global governance is emerging in international political issues and signifies the world order's existence depending on actors' (dominant states) willingness to manage this complex situation. Hegemony is still in contemporary world? Governance predicates that rules and regulations are implemented. Robert Gilpin emphasized the significance of hegemony, but in "Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order" he stressed multilateral actors and regional economic organizations playing an important role in governance structure. It means that actors have started to adjust the viewpoint of hierarchic politics, and also that relative and absolute power change of these components in changing the structure of the system reflects each state's rise and decline in terms of systemic share.

Owing to the changing hegemonic structure, actors are confronted by a changing ideology. The changing ideology, however, is always embedded directly in the internal political system. Particularly, interdependent interaction will break out between various cultures and identities to which they are linked; it threatens rooted

identity, culture, political ideology and religion⁸⁰. Mainstream ideology as an integration process fused with different cultures in a common arena contributed to the lightning development of communications in terms of rapprochement of cultures and peoples. To the contrary, its input to global governance might have negative consequences for stability when domestic elements become constrained, losing their previously highlighted positive potential to stimulate debate and provide space for dissent, creating serious conflicts of different ethnicities, religions and ideologies.

Cognition and self-control are the key points for forming collective-cognition from the inherent conditions. Since satisfying self-interest is normal complex behavior, the actors must calculate the cost and method to do so easily. The international society is complex, so the question arises as to how the actors could prevent potential dangers. Actors are like complex persons willing and trying to judge the situation where they exist. They find the experience from international history that is similar to their distress or they search the empirical strategies from other actors in the contemporary scene. In addition, they acknowledge and remember the dangerous events of past ages. They learn apologues and try to avoid catastrophes from occurring. If an actor desires to struggle for power/interest without limit, the international society falls into a disordered and discomposed situation. Observing the behavior of the actors in the interaction process who do not base their hypotheses on realism (rational and selfish) only on seeking power, contrarily control themselves when they can get more power and interest.

⁸⁰ Isakovic Zlatko (2000). Introduction to a Theory of Political Power in International Relations. (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate). pp.245-247.

3.2 Exterior Challenge

As Marx said, the element of internal motivation is productivity; the conclusive factors are production and reproduction in real life. The development of productivity determines relationships based on human necessity. The competition among actors in international relations is a contradiction in the system and a kind of motivational force for promoting system development. An actor carries out some policies and acts in a kind of synergy. Like North explained, “Institutional changes in organizational economics, the direction of change includes both external sources of change and unanticipated consequences of internal policies, which may weaken the power of existing organizations, strengthen or give rise to organizations with different interests and change the path”⁸¹. Both explain that systemic adjustment involves internal ideation and exterior competition.

The second force involves the external competition and conflict of states in an interdependent world which is without international sovereignty and therefore without a proper Hobbesian social contract to ensure stability, peace and the progress of civilization. Its lack of a world government or sovereign power, may actually be transformed someday into real, violent, chaotic anarchy should the tenuous and fragile existing balances of power among potentially hostile states deteriorate. Such a condition would undermine states from within as well as from without by destroying their integrity and stability⁸². How could they operate and manage the complex and inharmonious relationships among actors? We interpret it from two points: one is interest-seeking, and the other, conflict-management.

⁸¹ North D.C.” Institutional Change: A Framework of Analysis” in *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*, (Cambridge University Press, 1990): pp. 5.

⁸² Henri Goverde, Philip G.Cerny, Mark Haugaard, Howard H. Lentner. “General Introduction: Power in Contemporary Politics.” in Power in Contemporary Politics: Theories, Practices, Globalizations, Henri Goverde, Philip G.Cerny, Mark Haugaard, Howard H. Lentner. Eds. (London Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2000)

Interest seeking is the actors' goal in international politics. The interest is to satisfy the requirements for the actor to exist and develop; these are a fundamental motivator and direct goal, as well as the start and end result for an actor joining in the world order. The capabilities that allow great powers to compete with each other are tied to cycles of technological and economic development⁸³. Some scholars classify the interest according to different aspects relating to importance, sub-divided into fundamental-interest and common-interest; with time divided into long-interest and short-interest; space is sub-divided into internal-interest and external-interest. In addition, some scholars consider, like realism, relative power/interest affects the actors acting; some scholars consider, as with liberalism, that absolute interest is the standard. After all, it is involved in capability parity and leadership. As the system changes and leadership is contested, new priorities emerge.

For controlling conflict, it is necessary to reduce the degree of severity, meaning that actors' influence. Diez, Stetter and Albert conceptualize an ideal-typical model of conflict stages⁸⁴, each stage represents degree securitization of conflict. From the desire for stability, in conflict, actors construct and communicate their identities and interests in relation to other actors, the overall identity or interests of which are seen as compatible and conditioned with that of another group. However, with overlapping zones on a continuum, conflicting episodes increase the difficulties of management. The impact operates most efficiently in situations of membership negotiations, while it loses much of its power without such concrete offers and once membership has been attained.

⁸³G. Modelski. *Long Cycles in World Politics*. (London : MacMillan. 1987) .

⁸⁴ The model of stages of conflict is formed with four stages (1) conflict episode (2) Issue conflict (3) Identity conflict (4) subordination conflict. Thomas Diez, Stephan Stetter and Mathias Albert (2006). *The European Union and Border Conflicts: The Transformative Power of Integration*. Cambridge University Press. pp.567-569.

4. Actors' Interaction and Adjustment

4.1 Gap- Changing Perception

Regarding of the above discussion, we may argue that power realignment is a conception of power-roles. Foucault considered that power consists in how they operate and manage the complex and essentially disharmonious relationship between the individual and society. Robert Dahl developed a language of power analysis which contained a number of concepts including the difference between power and resources. Power is synonymous with the exercise of power as manifest in the decision-making process in which identifiable actors are observed to prevail over others⁸⁵. It explains that power must be acquired and can alter some episodes, behaviors and decisions. Power can be viewed as a contestation concept, goal or tool. We can be aware of the behavior of power by which actors want to reach out to such an extent that they can obtain something they want. Therefore, power is not equal to wealth but rather approximates a kind of influence, a kind of control and force and a kind of the ability to satisfy interests.

As compared with power, role is similar to a kind of characterization, the actor makes some policies, which unfold in the activities that it wants in the world. Role is foreign policy behavior that the system has allowed the state to achieve⁸⁶. Therefore, the role involves the concerns and ends of statecraft. Like power, role is necessary in the system, determined primarily by what a government itself does; a role exists only if the other governments accept this informal legitimization process⁸⁷. In fact, the

⁸⁵ Henri Goverde. *Power in Contemporary Politics: Theories, Practices, Globalizations*. (London ; Thousand Oaks, Calif. : SAGE,2000). pp.25

⁸⁶ Holist, K.J. *Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order: 1648-1989*. (Cambridge: Cambridge university press. 1991)

⁸⁷ Charles F. Doran. "Economics, Philosophy of History, and the "Single Dynamic" of Power Cycle Theory:

components of a unit's role and power are interdependent with those of other states because each state's role and power component contribute to the total amount of role or power in the system⁸⁸. Power and role both have to be calculated and understood in determining what may accrue or prove to be a fault (gap) in power realignment. Dorn's power-role gap explains how the differential absolute growth of the units (states) creates the single structural dynamic of the system, and, consequently, the relating structure and agency of a state's relative power trajectory as well as its associated foreign policy (systemic) role expectations⁸⁹.

4.2 Critical Point

The adjustment of international order faces single or a series of episodes that break out in critical points. "Whether dose the international society that must change through a destructive event, like the scale of war?" is an emphasized issue in international relations. As argued above, transitional ideology and cognition change conflict management medium. Some scholars see the causal impact of the critical point on major wars; in long cycle theory, each cycle is born in major warfare; the military power is able to support its economic goals, especially benefiting from world trade that it more or less monopolized⁹⁰. War signifies annihilation while interdependent interactions reduce certain war incidence; in other words, actors have show prudence regarding war happening as the consequences are so serious. In the past cold war, the realism had been challenged by the balance of power and the ideal

Expectations, Competition, and Statecraft" *International Political Science Review/ Revue Internationale de science politique*, (Vol. 24, no.1 2003) pp. 30.

⁸⁸ William J. Lahneman.. "Changing Power Cycles and Foreign Policy Role-Power Realignment: Asia, Europe, and North American." *International Political Science Review*, (Vol.24, no.1, 2003) pp. 102

⁸⁹ Patrick James and Michael Lustig. "The US Power Cycle, Expected Utility, and the Problem Future of FTAA" *International Political Science Review/ Revue internationale de science politique*, (Vol. 24, no.1, 2003):84. And Charles F. Doran. System in Crisis: New Imperatives of High Politics at Century's End. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1991).

⁹⁰ G. Modelski and W.R. Thompson. Sea power and Global Politics, 1494-1993. (London: Macmillan. 1988)

of war; the contemporary version of conflict does not focus only on military and aircraft but also on the “soft” power, especially economic interest.

If war is not the only critical point, how does the realignment happen? Although, war is not the only point for adjusting structure, it doesn't mean order won't change. There are many factors hidden in the circulation of international relations. The different interests and unequal distributions among actors, imbalanced political and economic development among states or regions, will cause the international powers to change. Actors start to care about relative power in relation to other actors, as with the power cycle theory argument. The non-line happened unexpectedly and suddenly, and actors experienced security and interests changing in relative comparative power. Finally, actors sought capability equal to their foreign policy role, and then acted. Each relative power rising and declining meant one critical point was ready to occur.

4.3 Attempts

The changing power-role relation increases or declines gap among states in international system, which also change states' perception of power orientation. In different period actors have to build a set of political behavior model to calculate and choice ration action. For example, in the past military superiority was the only way to gain power. If power as for behavior expansion, however, prestige or tool of interest goal that might be weaken in interdependent system, so that economic demand, welfare and satisfied becomes more important. With emancipation of non-politic and soft power (social-economic), military power has become relativity in dominant position, which even appeared in other aspect, traditional power has been expressed in power projection forces⁹¹. Different power forms would not disappear but adjustment

⁹¹ Ulrich Albrecht. Internationale Politik. (München: Oldenbourg, 1992). pp. 167.

of relative ratio, for which actors have to change its cognition and attempts.

Facing complexity of political and economic transformation and eventual openness actors will make new alternative policies. In Manfred Knapp' study⁹² about relation United State-Germany explored that it was hard to deduce that dependence and interdependence among states, but expressed the gap of power lead multidirectional dependent relation among hegemonic and weaken states which forming "interdependence of interdependences". It means in first leave exists dependent network which forming another interdependence- "Delta-interdependence" of which existing asymmetric relation and difference-interdependence. For the complex interdependent situation, actors have to find a compromise to avoid incorrect adjustment.

5. Counterbalance

The process of realignment is a series of dynamic adjustments. International society, however, goal of absolute balance is unapproachable. Each realignment as a balance process involves history and reality, intrinsic and extrinsic contradictions that lead to more difficulties in maintaining balance.

5.1 Process of Balance

The existing institution offers actors a channel to accomplish their interests. With the anarchy, collapse of bipolarity and transformation of ideology, international society needs a manageable mechanism for a more stable situation. Actor interacts by institution that we can regard as a kind of game where loss and win be viewed in

⁹² M. Knapp. Politische und Wirtschaftliche Interdependenzen im Verhältnis USA- Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1945-1975. In Manfred Knapp, Werner Link, Hans-Jurgen Schroder & Klaus Schwabe (Eds.), *Die USA und Deutschland 1918-1975*. (München: Beck. 1978) pp. 213-214.


terms of cost and profit. If the structure of interaction is a kind of game, how can the transformation be made stable and coordinated, not subject to collapse and apprehension.

Figure 2 shows the strategic choices an actor faces in a changing international society: processing cost, international tendencies, and connective technology⁹³ may impact changes in diplomatic policy. If actors can accept the change, it becomes easy to achieve balance. If the cooperation entails higher price and the bargaining strength is unaffected⁹⁴, actors tend to label it as unacceptable policy. No matter whether it be negotiation, cooperation or competition, existing bias and interests of power constitute the important motivation. As realist insist on power that is the essential tool for accomplishing goals. Maintaining power is gaining interest. For reasons mentioned above, actors will choose which paths are better for keeping power. After negotiations, if actors can successfully conclude, it tends towards balance. By contrast, negotiations may break down and countries colliding will engage in conflict.

⁹³ Spencer, S.Price. Determination in the Australian Food Industry, Report for the Australian Government Department of Agriculture. (2004)

⁹⁴ Edward Oczkowski. "Nash Bargaining and Cooperatives." *Australian Economic Papers*. Vol.45 no.2, 2006, pp. 89–98

Figure 2: Actors' Strategic Choices



Source: the Author

Generally, stability is the goal that international actors want to gain, but fluctuation is the normality in international society; institution building is apodictic but existing inertia is the other problem. Actors face the question as to which condition they must create or which institute to change, which motivation they need in order to change it. Institution is a public good is lack of power so that need some selected motivation to stimulate actors to increase innovation. The limiting of interest is important; for example, the control power of rules to restrain potential competitors to avoid easy free-riders. Free-riders hide from operating and innovating. Furthermore, ideology,

which exists or changes, would influence whether or not the institute will be successful. Due to the ideological divergence making international society constantly experience uncertainty, but priority countries are able to permit changes.

5.2 Co-Governance

When world entered into Millennium, international society has become more incalculability, across boundary and multidimensional governance, in United Nations “Millennium Declaration” has reveled placing importance on cooperation and good governance. There are three main contexts in this declaration: 1.) uphold the principles of human dignity, equality and equity at the global level. 2.) Building cooperation and governance between states and civil society aim to develop civil society. 3.) Advancing international cooperation from developed countries support economic resources, sharing experience of political development which promoting modernization in developing countries⁹⁵. Founding on connotation of “Millennium Declaration”, we advance “co-governance” in this paper to explain cooperation in interaction and try to “good governance” in competition, across boundary and multidimensional situation.

Prakash and Jeffrey considered that transformation of governance cone from competition of technologic transformation, expanding market regime, inner politic and government, and then lead globalization for which is not only variable of governance transformation, and also depend variable of technologic transformation, expanding market regime, inner politic and government⁹⁶. Globalization regards liberalism and individualism as core ideology, which viewing world as a single unity.

⁹⁵ United Nations Millennium Declaration, General Assembly resolution 55/2 of 8 September 2000.

⁹⁶ Aseem Prakash and Jeffrey A. Hart.(Eds.), Globalization and Governance. (London: Rutledge.1999) pp. 1-24

It also tells us external element might change the role of nation-states, anthropogenic political boundary and forming barrier-free environment for international interaction that change the past pattern of interconnection. In contemporary age, globalization stimulates economic market, politics, society, and culture....etc. in the world, causing the tendency of government reform⁹⁷.

Co-governance moves transformation of traditional governance pattern through global cross-boundary relation to political integration that includes global civil society. According to Rhodes' study⁹⁸ pointed out governance as a socio-cybernetic system that reflect social power from state to society meaning re-thinking of states-society and stressing the sharing power between government and civil society. In Co-governance, no matter European concept or liberalism of civil society place emphasis on an independent situation opposite to politics. It involves in certain elements: 1.) Global issues. 2.) Inter-connection of cross-boundary. 3.) International organization. 4.) Multidimensional linkage⁹⁹. Therefore, we can explain co-governance cause from global issues, dealing with inter-connection of cross-boundary and be a long-term action. Co-governance combines with different arena, level and issues, from domestic issues to global issues (global issues are also domestic issues).

In sum, internal affairs is common and been considered by countries and organizations. In theory, those issues solved by game theories or framework of sovereignty would be insolubility. Co-governance tries to find a new regime to arrange multifarious network, through state and solidarity of regional countries

⁹⁷ Ali Farazmand. "Globalization and Public Administration". *Public Administration Review*, vol 59, no. 6.1999, pp. 509-522.

⁹⁸ R.A.W Rhodes. "The New Governance: Governing without Government". *Political Studies*, vol. 8.1996. pp. 652-667.

⁹⁹ Scholte, Jan Aart.. *Global Civil Society: Changing the World?* Centre for the Study of Globalization and Regionalization Working Paper No.31/99. 1999.

seeking cooperated and coordinated governance.

5.3 Counter-Line

Whether International society appears pareto-inferior or Nash equilibrium, it must pass through the rational-choice process; it is still possible to maintain equilibrium within predicaments. At each time point in history, there is the “record” of each actor’s clearly defined past trajectory, on which the diplomats depended, to estimate the yet-to-be-determined future trajectory vis-à-vis the system. In addition to interdependent and complete international relations, the next step became multiform. In general, the critical point resulted in ideology transition or the international situation changing so that actors became aware of the role and power gap. The balance always stays in the situation with tolerance of different belief systems as its ideology. Actors will protest against the attacker when ideology is challenged. The ideology cannot be aggressed; nevertheless, the states try to negotiate before the critical point becomes out of control. The actors would try to adjust to structural change at the critical point that is strained by the power-role gap, which is suddenly squeezed to the surface of foreign policy consciousness and appears formidable indeed, as the state and system try to cope with the shifting tide¹⁰⁰.

In new institutionalism, the process of change is determined by path dependence. North¹⁰¹ recognized that growth and improvement are not inevitable, however. Path dependence can also lead to stagnation or decline. This is because institutions are not established for their social efficiency. When the event happens, they will be

¹⁰⁰ Charles F. Doran. "Economics, Philosophy of History, and the "Single Dynamic" of Power Cycle Theory: Expectations, Competition and Statecraft" *International Political Science Review/ Revue internationale de science politique*, Vol. 24, No.1.2003. pp:25-26.

¹⁰¹ William M. Dugger "Douglass C. North's new Institutionalism", *Journal of economic issues*. Vol. 29, (2): 1995. pp. 456-457

established to serve the interests of those who are powerful enough to establish them. As new institutionalism argues, uncertainty leads dominant states to weigh their interest and loss; if the event is great enough to change the distributions among the states, they will start to solve the gridlock. It is not only rules and organization but also informal communication, which can mitigate ideological conflict.

In summation, the line of the international system shift was full of intrusion and counter-lines, which were difficult to forecast, and which resulted from a critical point. On the change of power, the sudden critical point is the key element; unanticipated change by which the projection of future relations, hence of future security and foreign policy role, changes abruptly.

6. Conclusions

The purpose of this section is to theorize for this paper's analytic model. Under the international order of globalization, the essence of power did not change, but it still needs a connective structure to appear. Power complex cannot be absolutely revealed by quantification. The paper stresses rethinking past power analyses; power realignment has to go through a long-term communicative process for sharing power. This series within the process has cultural conflict, historical trajectory, divergent foreign policies and mutual agreement.

In international society, power changing bounds to a rising actor or an awakening existing power. Globalization offers the chance for followers to get into the international social core where they can influence international rules. Globalization affords states new thinking, to raise collective power beyond the states. The process of policy-making for collective power is full of regional special behaviors. Foreign policies are different from the international order that the west is building. Dynamic

space is being shaped. Each actor is a point connected to other actors, framing an interacting system. This system is involved in the conception of governance. Conception of governance offers an analyzable viewpoint to understand actors' changing ideology, roles and diplomatic policy. It can also understand which tendencies will be adopted when actors face change.

Whether power is always balanced must be contingent on the outcome of actors' attitudes and co-governance. International politics is, however, incalculable and the order change is dilatory. With actor's cognition under a transpicuous information communication and cognition of ability and roles, it is unlikely that divergences will cause an unbalanced status. Under this situation, actors have to take notice of fluctuations in international society and engage inappropriate behavior to avoid unbalance. This is the conception of dynamic balance.

Chapter 3: East Asia's Historical Sphere of Influence

1. Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to discuss East Asian development and causing a new order. We are interested in knowing if East Asian involvement in international and interregional institutions has affected its foreign policy behavior. There are three parts in this chapter concerning the analysis of East Asian integration and influence. The first is what is the history and influence of East Asia? The second concerns more fundamental changes in East Asia and how the emerging East Asia has caused a changing order? The third part of the analysis calculates interests and strategies of East Asian conception in international politics.

Here we have to define subjects in this research, East Asia community is planned an “open” regional organization, but it regards ASEAN + 3 countries as core, and ASEAN, Japan, China and South Korea have been key roles in East Asian history. Therefore, we only discuss about relation among those countries.

The most outstanding element of East Asia emerging is the international social transformation which offers chances for new challenges is more difficult than it was in the bipolar-age, because actors must be more careful in interdependent relations. The new order is a symbol of a new start but it does not mean disengagement from past historical processes, which have remained and continue to proceed. East Asia had held an important role relation to its geographical features and history in which there are different power bases. In other words, geographical features and history is namely internal willing (regional inertia) affect policy-making.

2. The Development of East Asia and Political Economic Regimes

2.1 The Development of East Asia -The Historical Review

East Asia's civilization is one of the oldest in the world and plays an important role in world history. From the 16th century, Spain, Portugal and the Netherland started to communicate with East Asia directly and established sea-trade and import. Cash crops and weapons influenced East Asia the most (especially China and Japan) in terms of food supply and military capability. The influence unconsciously changed the historical trajectory. The development of international politics started in Europe and moved across all of civilization. The Far East trade demand had supplied an inducement for European forces to develop colonialism, and gave rise to capitalism and the industrial revolution. East Asia underwent the period of European enlargement in the past.

Uncertain international society, interaction among states and cooperation among regions had been written in history. The development of international order account that why and when to change; historical trajectory appear that how to develop and who will be the key role. In the 19th century the development of Europe and East Asia had revealed an enormous gap and material superiority of the emerging powers; Britain, France and the U.S. oppressed China, Japan and Korea, the three oldest "Kingdoms" to become incorporated into a European-core international political and trade system. East Asia was undergoing transition. East Asia's entering into present international order is emerging. The importance of politics and the economy are increasing.

East Asian development and the Asian miracles are incredible with the U.S. as the hegemony of market capitalism. The U.S. has created and maintained a global environment for trade, investment, and structural upgrading for those countries that

are willing to follow its leadership by adopting a regime of market democracy. Pax Americana “hegemony-led macro-clustering” had disseminated technology, knowledge, skills, market information, and demand (via access to the hegemony’s home markets) contributed to some higher level countries’ labor productivity and efficiency ; the low-development countries can “free ride” on the stimuli in East Asian. The process of hegemony-led industrial development is the so-called “flying-geese” theory, in which a certain industrial sector can be identified as the main engine of structural transformation into a higher value-added level¹⁰².

The U.S. was the first goose to lead East Asia into following countries evolving post-war economic development. The U.S. stood on top of the world, enjoying an absolute advantage, which was an effective tool in all industries and assisted other countries, especially East Asia in the context of the U.S. Cold War diplomacy. The U.S. always regarded East Asia as an important strategic region. Japan in particular benefited enormously from this American trade policy and came to play the second important role for East Asia’s catch-up industrialization. Japan’s step-by-step industrial upgrading has had an impact on the industrialization pattern of other East Asian countries.

In economy and science and technology Japan still has the prominent position. Currently, China has been getting a strategic and economical advantageous position, and Korea has a key position in the world system. There are indications that the trend shows that Northeast Asia has the capability to become a new inner circle in world, but roughly, those countries’ division and cooperation of labor and trade integration are tightly controlled under the framework of WTO (World Trade Organization) and

¹⁰² Terutomo Ozawa. “Pax Americana-led Macro-clustering and Flying-geese-style Catch-up in East Asia: Mechanisms of Regionalized Endogenous Growth.” *Journal of Asian economics*. 2003. pp.699-703 (699-713)

APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) .

In terms of political security, regional historical problems cause certain political interpretations in some countries and latent consciousness of strategic competition. Even though the cold war had ended, the U.S. and Russia still have a certain influence in the region that connects these regional affairs with complex world strategy international networks. In other words, this region was divided by different colonial powers and by ideology, as well as ethnicity, religion, and culture¹⁰³. The characteristics of Southeast Asia, after World War II, was always conflict, turmoil and political instability. In Northeast Asia Japan, Korea and Taiwan continuously developed economical and political structure, but the Korean Peninsula and cross-strait tensions are obvious political problems; some countries have experienced national friction after WWII. At the same time, China and North Korea played the role of dangerous actors.

Although the ideological confrontation of the Cold War blocks ended in 1980s, the U.S. bilateral treaty-based alliance system lives on, serving different situations. It was quite obvious that many Asian countries depended on U.S. defense. However, the United States defense capabilities have worn thin over time, especially concerning Iraq and Asian states faced with America's primacy and shows of force, have sometimes emphasized regional cooperation. In February of 1995, the U.S. Department of Defense issued a report on the United States security strategy for East Asia, to the effect that American forces would have to stay in Japan and Korea until at least the year 2015. It indicates that the U.S. has had to rethink its East Asian policy. Chalmers Johnson argued that the future is clear for both Korea and Japan,

¹⁰³ Diane Mauzy. "ASEAN: Challenges of Regional Political and Economic Cooperation." In The Asia-Pacific in the new Millennium: Geopolitics, Security, and Foreign Policy. Shalendra D. Sharma. (Berkeley Calif.: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 2000). pp. 258.

neither of them will depend any longer on American troops for their security¹⁰⁴. Still, China as a “strategic competitor” has played a vital role. Chinese views of world order, and its stated preference for a multi-polar world, cause its support for the United States to be more equivocal in East Asia’s policy¹⁰⁵.

Indeed, East Asian countries also pay attention to the UN. The UN is not inconsequential to Asians. Many Asian states have offered peacekeeping forces and other support to the UN. The Chinese government uses its position as permanent member of Security Council to protect its national interest with increasing deftness¹⁰⁶. The Japanese government’s support for the UN is deeper than that of other Asian states, to increase its ability and position in international society to maintain security.

With the end of the Cold War, international relations were no longer based on the polarizing confrontation between two superpowers, giving regional organizations an opportunity to take a leading role in conflict management. Geographic proximity to the conflicts provided strong incentives to re-establish peace and security in this region; the role of regional organizations in conflict settlement also went beyond simply providing disputants with good offices¹⁰⁷. In another opinion, when global order is transforming, this gives sub-regions or sub-organizations the chance to create new ambitions and new roles. In transitional international society, the EU’s experience has shown that a regional organization could take a more effective and active role in the international system. In this condition, East Asia has obtained a new entrance ticket for re-establishing new influence and roles.

¹⁰⁴ Chalmers Johnson “Korea and our Asia Policy”, *The National Interest*, No. 41. Fall. 1995. pp. 76.

¹⁰⁵ Simon S.C. Tay. “Asia, U.S. Primacy and Global Governance”. *Global Governance*, Vol. 10, 2004. pp.139-147. 142.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid. p.143.

¹⁰⁷ Thi HaiYen Nguyen (2002). “Beyond Good Offices? The Role of Regional Organizations in Conflict Resolution.” *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol.55,No.2. 2002. Columbia University in the City of New York. pp. 464-465.

2.2 Features of Development

In many countries, the economy cannot be separate from political, colonial and international aid influences. In Northeast Asia, Japan and Korea intimate the U.S.A; Hong Kong intimates Britain. Coalitions and breakups relied on colonization as well. In South-East Asia, the British colonies of Singapore, Sarawak and Sabah joined Malaya to form the enlarged Federation of Malaysia. Due to subsequent political disagreements, Singapore separated from Malaysia in 1965.

However, East Asian characteristics appeared little different from Western ones. As compared with the individualism in Western culture, East Asian's political and economical regimes are nearer to Community, which is not equated to corporatism¹⁰⁸. In other words, the behavior in west culture is guided by the pervasive sense of right and wrong, which is a guilt culture. Contrariwise, East Asia belongs to a shame culture. Especially in Japan's society, the shame culture is expanded, because the individual efficiency-maximizing is less important than communality.

The general features of East Asian development are well known; fast economic growth over three decades has been accompanied by a very rapid pace of capital accumulation and a strong rise in exports as a share of output, which together have helped shift the dynamic fulcrum of the economy towards industrial activity. While this strong economic performance suggests a shared experience among countries in the region, there has been a growing awareness of differences among the countries of

¹⁰⁸ Corporatism is a political system in which legislative power is given to civic assemblies that represent economic, industrial, agrarian, and professional groups. The concept is equated with organized capitalism, according to Rokkan after World War 2, Schmitter spread it. It took a critical role in the decision-making process. The achievements failed in the issue related to ideology (ex. political policy, eventment policy), but is successful in the economic cooperation. In sum, guilt culture is from the original sin in the religion and the person admits faults from heart avoid cognitive dissonance. Shame culture, the honor and disgrace depend on other's evolution. http://www.doceo.co.uk/background/shame_guilt.htm

East Asia in terms of the specific policies and institutions used to accelerate industrialization and achieve rapid economic growth¹⁰⁹.

The different development experience and interrelationships between Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia were obvious. Northeast Asia stayed in the first-tier; it paid attention to establishing policy mechanisms and institutions, management of economic rents etc. The size and non-rural economic structure have been distinct influences on the scope of industrial diversification, reliance on FDI and infrastructural needs in Hong Kong and Singapore¹¹⁰. But striking institutional and structural differences also exist among the three economies whose development paths share the closest resemblance, namely Japan, Korea and Taiwan.

All of the Northeast Asian governments tried to guarantee certain basic conditions for investment by maintaining political stability and creating a “pro-investment” macroeconomic climate. “Pro-investment” is a better description of East Asian macroeconomic policies than stable or low-inflationary, because some of these governments were willing to tolerate a fair degree of inflationary pressure for the sake of boosting investors' confidence. Southeast Asia was second-tier and many of these measures were first employed in agriculture; public investment in agricultural infrastructure and services, favorable incentives, including subsidized credits, and agricultural research have played an important role in facilitating investment in agriculture and improving productivity¹¹¹. Their development strategy relies on raising investment rates while attracting foreign capital through domestic and international financial liberalization. The resulting capital inflows, and the wide array

¹⁰⁹Yilmaz Aky, East Asian development: new perspectives, (London Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1999) pp. 6.

¹¹⁰There have, of course, been important differences between these two island economies. In particular, Hong Kong's more *laissez-faire* policy stance has led to weak structural change within industry along with a rapid shift to services. UNCTAD, (1996). Trade and development report New York and Geneva: United Nations. 1996.

¹¹¹Yilmaz Aky, East Asian development: new perspectives, (London Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1999) pp. 19.

of projects that these funds finance, produce a boom in the economy, providing an aura of long-lasting, if not ever-lasting, growth.

The East Asian crisis destroyed the East Asian miracle; the Thailand economic collapsed abruptly influenced Asian countries (except Taiwan). The crisis was evidence of: macroeconomic volatility, lack of corporate and bank transparency, incompetent management of the maturity and currency composition of bank assets and liabilities, inadequate regulatory and supervisory institutions, moral hazards, bank fragility and political interference in bank management in most East Asian countries. The event is important because most developing economies are plagued by domestic distortions. They can be in the form of market imperfections or government-generated protectionism. They can be associated with imperfect or asymmetric information in financial markets, or with negative externalities in goods markets.

In East Asia, Japan and least-developed countries (LDC) of Southeast Asia produced something unique; however, the difference between Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia is one reason why integration is difficult, but it is also an inducement to cooperate. In 1995, for the first time ASEAN, China, Japan and Korea, met in Malaysia and produced the “Declaration for the 21st Century” which was the new start to improving East-Asian cooperation, via the “10+3” cooperation mechanism. It elucidate that cooperation could also be complementary and equal, even though they are in different developmental level. It is necessary to know that this cooperation has geographical strategy, which enough to neglect culture diversity.

2.3 Sinking or Rising

East Asia had been built on sand, and rapid development resulted in economic crisis in mid-1970. The rapidity and severity of the crisis caught both academics and

policy-makers by surprise. East Asia was weakened by the economic crisis. It gave, however, a chance to reconstruct the structure of East Asia and rethink the necessity for East Asian integration. The first start of the East Asian economic cooperation followed the Asia financial crisis in 1997. The region had experienced phenomenal economic growth in preceding years, leading many scholars to proclaim that the twenty-first century would belong to Asia. As economist Colin Bradford demonstrated, the East Asian NICs (Newly Industrialized Countries) are not simple models of pro free market, neoclassical liberalism, but are complex mixes of market forces, public policies, and government intervention, that is, successful development based both upon import substitution (state) and export promotion (market) forces working together consistently¹¹².

As argued above, the East Asian crisis destroyed East Asian growth. It is the first critical point. Subsequently, Japan's economic recession and a rising China all changed the trajectory of East Asian development. In the process of East Asian industrialization, Japan had been always the locomotive since the early 1970's; Japan started to move the labor-intensive industries to Asia's four tigers, because of local labor wages uptrend, problem of burgage and environmental protection, etc. Japan thus influenced countries' economic growth.

The regional role of Japan has changed since the mid-1980s. The strong appreciation of the yen, emergence of new competitors in labor-intensive manufactures, protectionist pressures in the other major industrial countries and domestic macroeconomic pressures led to a significant increase in Japanese FDI in the region: a

¹¹² Colin I. Bradford, "East Asian 'Models': Myths and Lessons," in Development Strategies Reconsidered John P. Lewis and Valeriana Kallab, eds., (Overseas Development Council Publication) New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1986, pp. 115-28. And see: Robert Wade, "What Can Economics Learn from East Asian Success?," in *77ze Annals*, 505, Sept., 1989, pp. 68-79.

first wave going to the first-tier NIEs after the yen appreciation in 1985, followed by a new wave in the early 1990s to the second-tier NIEs and, in particular, to China¹¹³.

If there is superpower in one region, the region should not be doing badly. By contrary, if there are only destitute countries in the region, it is very difficult to gain enrichment. In history, world economic development always strings along with some superpower, because the pulling force can promote the development of surroundings. Without Japan's irradiating action, East Asia could not develop so rapidly. Japan plays an important role in the development path in East Asia, and may be viewed as both conductor and transmitter. China, however, has risen abruptly and Japan's economic recession has reversed the normal or measurable pathway, while neighbors have changed some policies to catch the free-driver wave with China to enhance their interests.

On the other part, the U.S., upon which East Asian countries depend, has overlooked and absented itself from the ASEAN cooperation mechanism, giving China a chance to expand its influence in East Asia by the foundation of ASEAN cooperation mechanism utilizing "10+1" and "10+3" dialogue mechanism and become the main force to predominate within East Asia integration. Once U.S. power moderates in East Asia, Japan's economic leadership position will be affected.

In East Asian integration, China has been a positive participator and an important propellant. China is the first to make the free-trade area push forward to other countries which adopt more a positive attitude for free-trade security. Also, China had negotiated with Japan and Korea and announced a trilateral joint declaration. At the

¹¹³Yilmaz Akyuz, Ha-Joon Chang and Richard Kozul-Wright, "New Perspectives on East Asian Development," (Routledge .1998).

same time, China and Asia's volume of trade reached 2.729 trillion dollars, increasing by 42.4%, for the most part dealing with the East Asian area. According to China's foreign policy, China wants to delve deeply into international affairs in order to establish its role of world power. International structure changing regional organization plays a crucial role which is China's important tool and policy to connect international level.

If the ASEAN-China free-trade area materialized, there will be an economic arena with 2 billion populations and over 2 million total productive values. In population, it will be extreme as a free-trade area; in economic scale, it is inferior to NAFTA and the EU. If the ASEAN-China free-trade area, however, integrates with Japan and Korea, it will further build up the "East Asian free-trade area" which will become one of triangle-power competitors with North America and the EU in politics and economy; China can spring up in international political and economic roles by leading east-Asian integration.

The Western polarization of ideology between pro free market (liberalism) and government intervention (economic nationalism) does not fit here anymore than it does in the corporatist political economies of Northern Asia. Rather, the terminology of collective learning and positioning theory is useful here in distinguishing between the "stabilization" policies critical for an effective maintenance base (consensual agreements among government, labor, and corporate management) and the export promotion and innovative sector targeting and adaptation policies that make up the entrepreneurial side of the dynamic NICs economy (forming a "maintentrepreneurial" synthesis, the most advanced form of which is, no doubt, the Japanese example)¹¹⁴.

¹¹⁴Robert A. Isaak International political economy: managing world economic change.__(Englewood Cliffs,

Regarding security, as argued above, China's rising power has changed the calculated path. In combination with a presumed U.S. strategic withdrawal, it could in turn provide the impetus for Japan to adjust its security doctrine, with repercussions for the remaining states in the region¹¹⁵. That Chinese leaders have shown greater commitment to multilateral security organization is surprising given the core values that tend to be associated with the country. In addition, some East Asian states were fearful of America's superiority having tended towards regional cooperation.

3. Integration of East Asia and the New Order

Changing international society offers a chance for actors to develop but with greater complexities. Is the integration of East Asia is a kind of regionalization or a kind of transformation of ideology, or both? International society is a correlated system in which actors have learning and self-control abilities. For example, in our case, the integrating of the EU has played a role in transforming the international order by enhancing high unitization with other regions; regionalization, NAFTA and East Asian integration have been deeply affected. In the past, East Asia has experienced glory, but also downfall. Learning from international society, East Asia has started to change. However, what is the central ideology of the pattern of East Asian integration that is different from past regionalization? Will it lead to a new international order? In the present age, European and American hegemonies have compelled East Asia to receive exotic culture and international order, but oriental inherent culture has created a divergent development path from that of the west.

3.1 Regionalization or 'Asian-ization'?

NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1991), pp. 220.

¹¹⁵ Shalendra D. Sharma, The Asia-Pacific in the New Millennium: Geopolitics, Security and Foreign Policy. (Berkeley, Calif.: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley. 2000) pp. 312-313.

In the past, East Asia was regarded as a geographical conception. In general, it includes Northeast and Southeast Asia's 10 countries. From a social, political and economic viewpoint, the Asia-Pacific region is highly diverse. Some writers find that not only is any geographical definition of the region inevitably somewhat arbitrary, but so too its name¹¹⁶. Above all, in order to analyze influence of East Asia's integration and cooperation, we must qualify the traditional geographical description of "region", avoiding the problem of conceptualizing a regional definition.

There has been an increasing emergence, and perception, of East Asia (Asia-Pacific) as a region. This geographical definition has been conceptually portrayed in response to changing economic circumstances as well as to individual or cultural bias. The concept "Pacific Century" emerged during the 1970s and 1980s when U.S. trade with Asia exceed trade with Europe. The term "Pacific Asia" (Appendix 1: Pacific Asia) appears to be a regional descriptor used both by Asians and Anglo-Americans; the term "Asia-Pacific" (Appendix 2: the Asia-Pacific region), on the other hand, is used principally within the region¹¹⁷. In this paper, the region will be referred to the opening regional organization and ASEAN, with Japan, Korea and China as the axis.

With the end of the Cold War and increasing economic globalization, there has been a burgeoning of international groupings, for instance trade blocks such as the EU and NAFTA¹¹⁸. Additionally, increasingly complex international interaction promotes the integration of East Asia. As in the integrated processes of the EU and North America, there are central leader(s) who guide regional development for cohering centripetal

¹¹⁶ Shibusawa, M. Ahmad, Z.H. and Bridges, B. (1992) *Pacific Asia in the 1990s*, Londres: Rotledge.

¹¹⁷ Rumley, D. *The Asia-Pacific and Global Geopolitical Change: Definitions, Issues and Options*, International Geographical Union Commission on the World Political Map. pp.17-31. p. 18.

¹¹⁸ Diane Mauzy "ASEAN: Challenges of Regional Political and Economic Cooperation." In *The Asia-Pacific in the New Millennium: Geopolitics, Security, and Foreign Policy*. Shalendra D Sharma, (Berkeley, Calif.: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley. 2000) pp. 259..

force and identification. However, the roles influencing East Asia are complex. In East Asian arena, two major powers in Asia, namely China and Japan, one superpower-U.S. and one regional organization-ASEAN compete for leadership.

ASEAN had been weakened by the problems associated with its increased membership, leadership and self-confidence as a result of the economic crisis. The ASEAN has been called, however, “one of the most constructive and consequential groupings in the world.”¹¹⁹ ASEAN is not strongly integrated and can hardly be seen as a happy family or even achieving internal agreement. The ASEAN states do not always share the same views or interests, and bilaterally there are numerous unresolved disputes between the members, even including territorial claims. In function of regional cooperation, ASEAN is like a buffer arena and linkage point. Even if there is some disputed territory between the ASEAN states and China, it is trying to develop a positive relationship with China. ASEAN with its “soft power” diplomacy between Beijing and Washington, supported China’s entry into the WTO¹²⁰. In addition, it follows Japan’s development policy: support resources and get technology. In this environment, the once nearly dormant ASEAN has become increasingly pro-activist in the 1990s, e.g., Malaysian prime minister Mahathir Mohamad brought up the establishing of an East Asian economic conference (EAEC); in 1995, ASEAN addressed the conception of ASEAN+3 (China, Japan and south Korea).

With U.S. help in attaining growth and following U.S. policy, Japan has always paid attention to their relationship with the U.S. more than with East Asia. Now the

¹¹⁹ Greg Sheridan, *Tiger* (St. Leonards, NSW: Allen and Unwin, 1977). pp. 91.

¹²⁰ Ha Huong. “ASEAN’s Position in the new Asian Order after the Economic Crisis.” In The East Asian Development Model: Economic Growth, Institutional Failure and the Aftermath of the Crisis, edit. Frank-Jürgen Richter. (New York: St. Martin's Press: Macmillan; in association with GERPISA. 2000)

situation is changing; world economic and political affairs are bringing change to Asia. Increasing trade and investment and economic blocks are established, in comparison with the past, this region is more unique. During the past three decades, East Asia has already had development; Japan cannot but turn back Asian regionalism and draw up a new regional policy. However, Japan has always regarded its relationship with the U.S. as mirror-like activity; the sense of existing in Asia was very weak. Even ten years ago, Japan was the big power in this region, but it still could not advance an efficacious economic policy, after the economic recession.

Although the world economic focus has been on bringing transformation to East Asia, it is not easy to build a political community that because of diversity, besides U.S. interference. It is an important point that U.S. superpower plays a key role in Asia, but has challenged ASEAN's proprietary role in ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum, ARF) and Chinese diplomatic policy. The U.S. is not one of Asian countries, but one that is interfering. The U.S. did not hope that a political community would be built that may lose influence at East Asian countries. Japan selected and adopted a passive position that led to China as a rising potential economic and militarily superior power uniting East Asian power.

After undergoing economic reforms, China actively sought a big power position in international society. Strengthening the relationship with neighboring states is the first policy. A rising China was also like an economic sponge sucking in foreign resources and finances. Japan was in economic recession, and meantime China was a new head of the geese. Furthermore, facing challenges of global order and the mighty influence of economic blocks, East Asian regionalization is not only outward regional organization, but also a process of Asian-izing, characterizing East Asia geographically and historically.

From major world tendencies, after the mid 1990s, the East Asian situation been changed substantially. The US introduced new “East-Asian strategies”, and the Russia stopped tending to the Western “Atlanticism” and moved to the “Anti-Westernism”. The attitude toward Russia share the ideology with non-Western countries. In addition, because of the bubble economy, Japan lost confidence, while China, since 1992, enjoyed economic development that attracted the world’s eyes. The West has chronically interfered in East Asia, yet eastern countries adopted straight independence and considered principles. With time, although East Asia was involved in Western forged affairs, East Asia started to strengthen relations among one another, forming a ring of multi-polar strategy. Especially China, aware of the world’s misgivings concerning “China’s threat”, evolved the “smile policy”. China’s neighboring policy was identified. Although, there are many versions of East Asian integration strategy, and as argued above, ASEAN is not strong enough to be a leader, but ASEAN as a center comes into view and China, Japan and Korea as sub-center. This pattern (Figure 3) was designed by China and ASEAN¹²¹. In addition, this pattern slots in India, New Zealand and Australia, the three related geographic countries. It is initiative conception, this “loose” organization will slot in other related members.

¹²¹ At 2002, ASEAN cooperated “the comprehensive economic cooperation construction agreement” which signed with China, stipulated both sides to launch the consultation starting from the next year, in the predetermined ten years established cover 1,700,000,000 populations, the trade total amount amount to 1.2 trillion US dollars “ASEAN- China free trading area”. The analyst pointed out that, east cooperates the leader to believe, reaches the free trade agreement with China, although can appear the trade deficit, is actually the increase exports and marches the Chinese market important pipeline. In addition, in East Asian conformity process, also integrates in the economical launching India. China the action which cooperates with the east also affects the value which Japan, Han Duidong cooperates. China, ASEAN, India and so on conclude FTA the movement. Feeling isolated Japan and the hesitated South Korea to be able not but to accelerate the FTA strategic movement.




Figure 3: The Pattern of East Asian Integration

By: Author

* Russia has applied for membership as a observer status on 2005.

3.2 Asian-izing Integration

East Asian integration is not yet very well developed, though it is deepening rapidly. East Asia still lacks some important content that is necessary for broad integration. Here, there are certain views of European and American experiences that are indeed available for East Asians pursuing this goal. In the first half of the 19th century the US economy was poorly integrated. Mountains, settlement gaps (empty geographical spaces bounded by “the frontier”), and a lack of navigable rivers kept markets quite separate from each other¹²². A sketch of the content of US market integration begins with a fragmented economy and the promising but ambiguous institutional framework of the Constitution. The US authorized states to maintain distinct regulations and improved technology and infrastructure accompanied the growth of cross-frontier and “national” trade. In mechanisms, this regional block emphasized pluralism. Open,

¹²² C Parsons, D Richardson., “Lessons for Asia? European Experiences in American Perspective in legitimizing market integration”. *Journal of Asian Economics*. vol.14 (6) 2004. pp. 885-907 pp. 890-891.

flexible democracy enables bargaining and policy response that redistribute these gains adequately enough to enlist the legitimate consent of most of the populace. The European Coal and Steel Community (ESCE), set up in 1952, gave birth to an institutional centralization. Until now, Europe appears as a single unity including political and economy aspects. The dominant view, in European integration, is pluralistic and liberal. Elaborate institutions were required to pay off the losers and to make credible long-term commitments to openness and cooperation¹²³. The EU institutional framework was the result of a series of ancillary bargains that were politically necessary to satisfy interest-groups, market integration or to be better insulated by its effects-delivering side-payments and enhancing the credibility of policy cooperation¹²⁴. In addition, the EU framework is a calculated mechanism to foment “ever deeper” regional market integration.

American and European histories are mostly context-specific, unsuitable for comparison with each other. Yet their self-image as “the West” suggests the core content of an agenda for socially-embedded and regional integration. East Asian cooperation is different from EU and North American forms. In the globalization age, regional interests are expressly for providing the protection and enlargement of “public goods” among the members, frequently viewed as a kind of “collective power”. On one hand, it provides impetus to the balance of sharing interest globally; on the other, the members expect interests from the world redistribution by its integration. For these reasons, East-Asia has adopted “open cooperation”; the process aims at regime-making and interest-gaining. In terms of the historical and internal factors, East Asia has developed in a different way from that of the EU, to preserve

¹²³ A Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht, (NY: Cornell University Press 1998).

¹²⁴ C. Parsons, D. Richardson., “Lessons for Asia? European Experiences in American Perspective in Legitimizing Market Integration.” *Journal of Asian Economics*, vol. 14 (6). 2004 pp.895.

specialty regional interests. Facing inner differences and EU experience, the integrated pattern of East Asia adopted concentric circles and “loose” regionalism. On the one hand, strengthening economical power of “ASEAN+3” attracts other actors’ cooperation and increases negotiation capabilities. The economic base provides a prop for political and military power; however, in this age, mighty economic capability represents the pre-eminent political position.

In the process of EU integration, the philosophy towards integration has reflected shifting attitudes among member nation authorities toward the efficacy of centralized supranational and state institutions for resolving pressing political, economic and social problems¹²⁵, and East Asia has tried to be accordance with western order incorporated into characteristic Asian cultures. Pan-Asian culture and civilization are as real as the concept of pan-European culture and civilization¹²⁶. Also, as Jacques Delors described European civilization¹²⁷, authorities have also maintained the usefulness of common policies to establish cohesion. An instrument is not merely to promote economic development, but also to create a supranational social body. The process of East Asian integration would be able to maintain the culture identity of Asian civilization against the capitalist threats of North American and EU.

By political fragmentations and external interference, the East Asian integration has tended to dominate each system within a hierarchical authoritarian political structure with a strong preference for maintenance of political stability and continuity. However, Institutional adoption to the “loose” and “openness” pattern of East Asian integration has alleviated political shock for differences in social systems. ASEAN, as an

¹²⁵ J. Angresano. “European Union Iintegration Lessons for ASEAN+3: The Importance of Contextual Specificity.” *Journal of Asian Economics*. vol.14. 2004. pp. 912.

¹²⁶ M. Dutta. “Asian Economic Community: Intra-Community Macro-and-Micro-Economic Parameters.” *Journal of Asian Economics*, vol.13 (4) 2002. pp. 447-491(45)

¹²⁷ V.C. Price. *Whose European?* (London: the institute of economic affairs.1989) pp. 40.

administrative body, means that East Asian integration has been quite decentralized so as not to interfere with member nations' desire for political independence¹²⁸.

3.3 Towards to a Community

In reality, here has 200 million populations, occupy one-third in this world, GDP is about 7 trillion foreign exchange reserves reach half those of the world, and it is the biggest one of the three economic blocks. This holds infinite potential. Nowadays, East Asia is the most Cynosure in this world. The rising China, the second economic power Japan, and consolidated ASEAN have constituted a highflier market, leaving a notable fingerprint in the international pattern of the rising East-Asian area. In this process, the East-Asian economy is developing and integrating rapidly at the same time. Cooperation in the East-Asian arena is an expected tendency.

East Asian countries have continued to follow an integrated approach in their attempts to stimulate their economies, and then increase cohesion in order to expand influence in the international society. Even though the road to catch-up may be very long, it is apparent that the new transformation of international society is emerging. East Asian integration is changing the Asian role from follower to stakeholder. The potential of East Asia is intrinsically unlimited. In 2007 leaders of ASEAN+3 will advance the blueprint of the ASEAN Charter to be like that of the EU and a political community. For population, the East Asian economic region will be the biggest free-trade area. For trade, it will be the third FTA following the EU and NAFTA. The East Asian arena is going to be a competitor in the international power structure. It signifies that East Asia's role has changed from follower to a positive actor and balancer.

¹²⁸ F. Frost, "Introduction: ASEAN since 1967—Origins, Evolution and Recent Development." in. ASEAN into the 1990s, A. Broinowski, eds (London: Macmillan, 1990), pp. 2-5.

The changing role indicates changes to the rule of international interaction. There are abundant natural resources and rich sources of manpower with hard-working spirit in many of the economies of East Asia¹²⁹. It attracts internal and external cooperation. America, Japan and China, the three powers, all want to reach the leadership position in the Asian arena that relates to power contention in international society. In the prospective future, East Asia will try to increase its “Asia-ness” and be free from the influence of US in policy-making. Japan possesses elemental economic power, but its Asian neighbors have challenged the ‘western-oriented’ foreign policy. By dint of rising economic and military power, China is standing up on the international stage. As stated above, anti-American (western) influence, related to the spirit of independence of Asian affairs, is deep-rooted in this region. A new East Asian spirit is emerging in an interactive structure.

4. East Asia’s Perception

4.1 Who is the Leader in East Asia?

¹²⁹ Yu T-s.. “Can East Asia rise again?” *Journal of Asian Economic* vol.13, 2003. pp.725.

Power in reality, briefly, who get power? Who has influence? And, who is in leadership? Power politics in East Asia has always been an unavoidable contention about leadership. When East Asia integrates, it implies that the “leader” influences of the external superpower and East Asian trend. Here we would like to rearrange the concept of “who is the leader in East Asia” from above.

In Robert Ross’ study, China has played a dominated position with influence on politics and economic, getting maximum interest when power vacuum for Soviet Union abdicate Vietnam and unite US didn’t make up for in time no matter in Northeast or Southeast Asia¹³⁰. From political culture, China has emphasized a hegemonic position as diplomatic policy aimed to rebuild a might in Asia and expand in all the world finally. From economic, China has strong economic potential threaten Japan economic authority in East Asia, increasing fluctuant crisis in Asia-Pacific¹³¹. Recently, China has been getting cauterization of politic and economic in Asia.

Japan has faced China politic and economic challenge started to construct a political economic alliance in East Asian development. Doubtless, “U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security: Alliance for the 21st Century” is Japan core regional strategy in East Asia, improving diplomatic relation with China and political economic relation with ASEAN. Since 1990 Japan had the burst of economic bubbles declining dominated position had influence not only in East Asia and other regions. For reversing economic declining tendency, Japan has moved northeast Asian Economic Caucus, the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC), and Japan-ASEAN free tread

¹³⁰ Robert Ross. “The Geography of Peace-east Asia in the Twenty-first Century.” *International Security*, 1999. pp.83.

¹³¹ Denny Roy. “Hegemony on the Horizon? China’s Threat to East Asia Security,” *International Security*, 1994 pp.149-168.

arena or free trade agreements with other East Asian countries, through alliance strengthen influence in East Asia.

China and Japan have intention to be a leadership in regional development, but intertwined conflict and regional steady both dedicate contended leadership to ASEAN. After Cold War, ASEAN has held more politic and economic counter than past. In politic, ASEAN has advanced leadership in regional affairs, ASEAN regional forum (ARF) is the mechanism dealing with East Asia security affairs; in addition, all Southeast countries joined in ASEAN which increasing importance in East Asia by unity. Likewise, ASEAN's economy has developed swift giving them more confidence to manage regional affairs and increase the right to speak and determinate that independent on United States' military protection, weaken United States' power in Southeast Asia. ASEAN utilize ARF to control regional security affairs through inviting other superpower in region discussing political and economic issues that lead multilateral safe system in Southeast Asia¹³². This transformation not only symbolize increasing the right of ASEAN but manifest ASEAN desire to expand dialogs of regional security consolidating political influence. ASEAN has predominated over ARF and East Asian Summit to avoiding regional hegemonies and external interference hinder position of East Asia integration, withal ASEAN can be a role in power structure. In fact, as above, for avoiding conflict of power, ASEAN as a center and China, Japan and Korea as sub-center is a better way which an outcome of mutual respect for each other and peaceful coexistence.

4.2 East Asian Attempts in the Geopolitical System and the International Order

East Asian integration mainly aims at against west European and American regional

¹³² Rober Scalapino, 1995. "The US commitment to Asia," The Journal of Strategic Studies 18. pp. 76.

blocks. Asia-Pacific countries proceed bi-, multi-lateral and multi-channel regional unite, seeking economic and political relative ascendancy those phenomenon is so-called “regional regionalism”. The most political-meaning is political economic integration of East Asia region emphasizing alliance of East Asianess exclude non-East Asia countries from region. In other words, it hope to exclude American-leading Western power from region, thus China and Japan can build association in East Asia region. Other East Asian countries also hope to unite in different economic and political level, dialogs with regional partner and advancing global influence by East Asian integration.

Among regional economy would have certain competition and learning to build external interaction and inner consolidation of economic foundation. Emerging East Asian economic power lesson from power blocks could compete on equal terms with Europe and north America which could stand a new position in APEC and other international organization. In addition, by economic globalization East Asian countries took a broad view in world market and an overall arrangement in global governance to connect with world economy.

In global co-governance, the importance of East Asia rising is obvious. Its distinct internal and external parts have, however, far outpaced their anticipations. They remain internally distinct; Higgott observed that there is no sense of community in a linguistic, religious, cultural, political or ideological sense nor is there much evidence of some form of regional consciousness¹³³. Kahler even said that “Asia” does not represent a common culture. Differing perceptions and expectations arising from diverse political and economic systems and divergent economic performances

¹³³ Higgott Richard. “APEC: A Skeptical View” in Pacific Cooperation: Building Economic and Security Regimes in the Asia Pacific Region, Andrew Mack and John Ravenhill (eds.) (Allen and Unwin, 1994.).

between developed and developing members constrain institutional development in Asia¹³⁴. Even so, East Asian governments show that a desire to sustain domestic political stability and national unity as well as an aspiration to reorient its international role toward an “Asian way” in East Asian integration and development¹³⁵. As European integration was an economic instrument for solving a political problem, a common market to end the threat of war¹³⁶, East Asia has emphasized the economic benefits; the political determination to end the threat of war made an important contribution to the success of the project.

The evolution of East Asia’s interregional cooperation is also seen as part of wider ideological interflow. Extending internal diversity, East Asia has a characteristic foreign behavior, going from a follower to a facilitator, but not a leader. Facilitator implies that it keeps its characteristic through coordination and intercommunication continuously. All Asian countries in the early Post Cold-War period were more tied to the US than to each other. Deep mutual mistrust led to rather weak interactions. This is in line with expectations from the realist school of international relations: states mistrusting each other will prefer non-binding agreements, not putting all their “eggs in one basket”. This helps to explain the multitude of such weak, overlapping cooperation schemes in East Asia¹³⁷. It also explains that East Asian countries feared “interference” in their own affairs. East Asia’s interregional cooperation emphasizes a greater flexibility and displays a greater willingness to enter into joint ventures with

¹³⁴ Miles Kahler, “Institution-building in the Pacific” in Pacific Cooperation: Building Economic and Security Regimes in the Asia Pacific Region, Andrew Mack and John Ravenhill (eds.) (Allen and Unwin, 1994).

¹³⁵ The idea of a distinct “Asian way” might have lost flavor in the aftermath of the Asian crisis. But the growth of a notion of an Asian identity no matter how loose has significance to the extent that other countries might feel obliged to define their policies vis-a-vis East and Southeast Asian countries in regionalist terms. John Lawrence Avila. “Regional Cooperation in APEC and ASEM: An Institutional Perspective.” A paper presented at the 1999 Conference of APEC Study Centre Consortium. In Auckland, New Zealand. p.6.

¹³⁶ Erik Jones and Michael G. Plummer; EU-Asia: links and lessons. *Journal of Asian Economics*. Vol.14. 2004. pp.838.

¹³⁷ Steve Chan, “Liberalism, Realism, and Regional Trade: Differentiating APEC from E.U. and NAFTA,” *Pacific Focus*, Vol. XVI, No. 1 (Spring 2001), pp. 5-34.

government in the face of market opportunities and change in East Asia than in European and North American contexts¹³⁸.

East Asian development facilitates the regional role of international society, especially if the “creation” of comparative advantage is stronger in the East Asian region than in Europe and North America. We cannot ignore that there are many obstacles facing East Asia that will need to be rapidly overcome. The financial system and management processes are important, but there are political confrontations within and between economies. From economic issues spilling-over to security issues the importance of this region increases for the other two blocks. Multi-issues is able to cope with the new era of economic liberalization and political globalization.

5. Conclusions

Power studying, via historic and multicultural perspectives, is the only way to overcome time-bound tunnel vision. In Michael Mann’s words: “Through historical comparisons, we can see that the most significant problems of our time are novel. That is why they are difficult to solve. They are interstitial to institutions that deal effectively with the more traditional problems for which they were set up¹³⁹.” This history and unique culture gave modern international society the new interaction state. We will look at the future from the perspective of the past, to build a new process of power redistribution.

This section puts emphasis on geopolitical, cultural and historical elements, as well as international political principles for interactions and to act as an extension to East Asia. The historically most significant consequence of the rise of new great powers is

¹³⁸Richard Stubbs. “ASEAN Plus Three: Emerging East Asian Regionalism?” *Asian Survey*, Vol. 42, No. 3. 2002. pp. 440-455.

¹³⁹ Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, (Cambridge University Press, 1981) pp.6-8.

international political change¹⁴⁰. East Asia is viewed as a rising great power, an emerging and integrating region, and the temptation is for other great powers to adopt new strategies. The basic argument is that growth in a nation's population density and advances in technology generate demands for larger amounts and wider ranges of resources, which often cannot be met by the state's domestic resource endowments¹⁴¹. Facing globalization, the nation-states find that they cannot deal with all these elements. Regions have now emerged as new places for the construction of policies, as systems of action, and as actors themselves in the global order¹⁴².

A geopolitical-historical view of East Asia has been influenced by its earlier colonial relationship with Europe and the USA¹⁴³. In terms of bipolarity, communalism led by western influences has taken notice of the circumstances of East Asia. From the "cold war" period, the U.S. has had alliances in East Asia. During the last decades, the world has gone through several major changes including the collapse of the Soviet Union, the fall of the 'Iron Curtain'. The role of the region has brought dramatic developments in different spheres of political and economic interactions.

East Asia's role, however, has remained stable in the changing world order links to the strengthening relationships with North American and EU developing¹⁴⁴. East Asia's growth and economic experience, as well as those of Japan and China after 1949, exemplify the importance of historical legacy and the country-specific socioeconomic

¹⁴⁰ Randall L. Schweller. "Managing the Rise of Great Powers: History and Theory," in Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross, eds. (London: Routledge, 1999) pp. 6.

¹⁴¹ *ibid.* pp. 4.

¹⁴² Petri Virtanen.. "Euregious in changing Europe: Euregio Karelia and Euroregion Pomerania as Examples" in Gross-Border Governance in the European Union, Olivier Thomas Kramsch (London: Routledge 2004). pp. 123.

¹⁴³ The post-war structure and the "Internalization" of American in East Asia were not only simply aggressive and unipolar colonization. For example, US occupation of Japan caused the integration from different dimension in Japanese society, increasing Japanese internal demand. With regard to "Internalization" of American was an alterant-colonized process.


¹⁴⁴ Jae-Seung Lee. "Talking Security in the APEC." Presented for the APEC study center consortium conference/PECC Trade Forum (Korea, Juju, May 23rd, 2005)

conditions within which unique principal institutions and their corresponding working rules are established; some countries (c.f. Japan and China) have borrowed and purchased Western technology freely, but have grafted this technology carefully onto their cultures without simultaneously adopting Western values¹⁴⁵. However, it has an obvious developing process that borrows policy, technology and intellect from developed countries.

East Asia's rise may be due to the rearrangements made after economic recessions, but behind the inner economic integration and external cooperation there is deeper political competition (Figure 4: Coopetition in East Asia). We define the members and systems in this research, and discuss the cooperation-competition relationship among three actors and two sides. This section uses the cooperation between regional bodies as a research subject. The development in East Asia is the variable that leads to the competitions among cooperation organizations of regional bodies and results in the procedure of power realignment.


¹⁴⁵ Angeresano James. "European Union Integration Lesson for ASEAN+3: The Importance of Contextual Specificity" *Journal of Asian Economics*, vol.14. 2004. pp. 916.

Figure 4: Coopetition in East Asia




Sources: the Author

Appendix 1: Pacific Asia



Source: Rumley, D. *The Asia-Pacific and Global Geopolitical Change: definitions, issues and options*, International Geographical Union Commission on the World Political Map.p.19

Appendix 2: The Asia-Pacific Region



Source: Rumley, D. *The Asia-Pacific and Global Geopolitical Change: definitions, issues and options*, International Geographical Union Commission on the World Political Map.p.21.

Chapter 4: East Asian Strategy of North American and Europe

1. Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to discuss East Asian engagement with North American and Europe to be the foundation for the next chapter. From regional or actors geographical and historical factors, we learn that a rising power has intrinsic characteristic strategies for creating a calculated development pattern; in addition, the transformation of the international social order offers chances for new actors to enter the competition arena. In Chapter 3, East Asia's rise is viewed as a major element to change system balance. East Asia's rise has resulted from a changing global environment; likewise, it had a chance to take advantage of its potential economic power in the system. After the financial crisis, East Asia had to confront global competition with a "block" pattern in the system; in addition, the emerging cognition of common interest caused cooperation within the East Asian community.

The EU and North America have regarded the rising East Asia as a major cooperator and agency of checks-and-balances. The vertical and horizontal alliance is not only for managing unknown development resulting from a rising East Asia. For the new challenges of globalization at the beginning of the 21st century states ask for effective international cooperation, while policy makers try to find new models with which to manage those new challenges. New problems are derived from new management mechanism, for example, which can permit actors to enter into the competition arena.

In this chapter, we have analyzed different contexts of the two biggest interregional organizations. Beginning from East Asia's influence, we move to analyzing other two regions' attempts at cooperation, which will help us to explain the power-role gap and the analysis of interregional cooperation is examined to estimate possible pathways in

relation to the power structure of co-governance, both will be fundamental in any analysis of power realignment for next chapter.

The power rising and decline is external challenge cause co-governance and change foreign policies. Europe and North American started to make other policies confronted the regional rising, forming triangle cooperation and competition. Potentially, it would be a competition, which is, taken in the third area.

2. North American and Europe Incursion into East Asia Development

2.1 Conception of East Asia's Role in Geopolitical System

United States has been regarded itself as establisher in East Asian order and securities. North American countries have been conducted by United States stepping in East Asian affairs and play an impeller for economic integration in East Asia. With East Asian integration, Western is exclusion from it that changing North American Conception of East Asia's role. Firstly, the East Asia will become a collective political player in the region. It is destined to change as the regional political environment changes. Just as the end of the Cold War made it possible for the US during the last decade forward-deployed in Asia, East Asian integration appear the changing global situation. Through its network of bi- and multi-lateral relation, and thanks to the fact that relations among the East Asia build common view, it is able to exert considerable influence.

In the current international situation, the US has dominated globalization. However, in May 2004, the EU's enlargement added 10 countries to reach 25 members. The total population has reached 450 million, GDP has reached 9.2 trillion dollars, with the EU becoming the biggest world economic block. It has framed a European

economic-society model enacting EU constitution and challenging US leadership. The US was not about to let itself be outdone. The FTAA displaced NAFTA. NAFTA's total population reached 360 million, and GDP reached 6.5 trillion dollar. After 2005, FTAA's total population reached 800 million and GDP reached 13 trillion dollars.

Relying on pivotal geography, rich resources, enormous dimensionality, population, and transformation of international order, East Asia has already turned into an influential regional organization, and the colossal regional economic and political organization. Since the East Asian Community is established, the total population has reached 3.1 billion and GDP has reached 10.7 trillion dollars. Accordingly, the EU and North American cannot depart from this region. Interregional interaction becomes ever more important, complex, and arresting. For the intense economic reasons mentioned above, the EU and North America cannot neglect the emerging threat of East Asia. For EU, although the EU's new strategy centers on economic issues, political and security issues have appeared on the ASEM agenda. Most Asian countries have strong security link with US, and, the US remain the key player in this region. Secondly, East Asia is a major economic player. It is the most important trading partner of EU and North American.

The dynamic economic development in East Asia explains the increasing important role of this region in world trade and investment and its ever-increasing significance for Europe¹⁴⁶. East Asia has recently surpassed NAFTA to become Europe's main trading partner, accounting for a third of Europe's total trade flows. Moreover, European FDI in East Asia amounts to a third of European investment abroad, and is growing.

¹⁴⁶ Matthias Dembinsiki, Cooperation or conflict? : Transatlantic Relations in Transition, (New York : St. Martin's Press, 1998) pp. 183.

2.2 Strengthening the East Asia

2.2.1 North American

Are North American and European with the nations of East Asia likely to be characterized by power politics, competition, or cooperation? The answer is with a mixture of all of these. Competition remains unavoidable, especially but not exclusively in economic relations. The challenge for North America and the EU is to contain or manage their competition in order to minimize its impact on overall relations. North America and the EU will remain committed to East Asia-politically, economically, and militarily-because it is in its vital regional interest to remain fully engaged in this vibrant region. It was North America and the EU's vital interests that brought it to East Asia in the first place, and it is North America and the EU's vital interest that will keep it fully engaged there in the future¹⁴⁷.

Politics-cooperation in Asia-Pacific had stayed in forum (the foundation). Multilateral organizations in North America-East Asia reflect North America's viewpoint: no matter what kind of organization in Asia, which cannot arrive at European ability and cohesion, but it should be regarded as a tool to avoid breakup of current security system. However, North America who is exclusion and anxious about isolation from regional cooperation of East Asia, before APEC United States held "six-party talks".¹⁴⁸ Members include the most important countries in Asia and regional security. From long-term, the political environment would change, especially alliance in Northeast Asia. Besides APEC United States held "six-party talks" to strain East Asian politics.

¹⁴⁷ *ibid.* pp. 156-157.

¹⁴⁸ The Six-Party Talks concerning the DPRK's nuclear program involve the United States, North Korea, China, Japan, Russia and, South Korea. involve the United States, North Korea, China, Japan, Russia and, South Korea.

U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick stressed that Regional free trade agreement have great political aim. Facing East Asia integration and anti-Americanness North American have to afforce APEC structure and purpose. 1.) The basic development of APEC will not change, but it could be part of alteration under mission statement, including encouragement of structure reform of members. 2.) APEC was established for promoting regional trade cooperation whose issues excess economics. On the one hand, it insist on “Bogor goal”-free open trade; on the other hand, it starts to facing some un-economic security issues, e.g.,. Human right, terrorism and the DPRK’s (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) nuclear crisis those challenge economic development and be brought into APEC program. 3.) APEC strengthen East Asian countries economic relation by as a single mechanism of trade and invest liberalization in Asia-pacific which still hard to replace.

2.2.2 Europe

At 1994, EU announced “Towards a New Asia Strategy”, but after ten years, EU’s East Asian policy was limited by internal and international politics. Euro-Asia relation always based on real economic interest. Following eastern enlargement and terrorism EU got entangled in an unparalleled split. In addition, not having any direct security-interest in Asian region, the EU was looking for a role to play in the security arena. Again, one motive for this is the wish to offset at least to some degree the overwhelming presence of the USA both in Europe and in Asia¹⁴⁹.

Until 2005 EU started to respect East Asian affairs, the level of interdependence is now at unprecedented levels, and strengthening EU-Asia relations is thus one of the EU’s external policy priorities. The EU is consequently fostering dialogue and cooperation

¹⁴⁹ Ifri, Europe-Asia: strengthening the informal dialogue, 3.

with all our Asian partner countries: 1.) after 911, atmosphere in the world economy drop to new low, only China and India high-speed development lead EU cannot but consider both emerging. 2.) EU strengthened its competitive ability by “Euro” in circulation and broaden and deepen to transform Central and Eastern Europe into modern. 3.) EU was getting lift spilt from China arms ban stands out coherence of common East Asian policy. In economic and trade policy, to meet the development challenges that lie ahead and further deepen EU-Asia relations, the European Commission has adopted 18 individual country strategies and a regional strategy, covering cooperation with Asia for the period 2007-2013, for which an amount of some € 5.2 billion has been earmarked¹⁵⁰. To further strengthen political and economic relations, regular summits take place with individual countries in the ASEM framework. Regular political and sectoral dialogues are vital so that we can constructively engage on issues of mutual interest. Furthermore, the European Commission is moving to negotiate Free Trade Agreements with South Korea, India and ASEAN, as well as Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with Asian partners.

Economic and trade policy is the main shaft , but it is obvious towards to political, security, human right and environmental protection. Furthermore, the maintenance of peace and stability based on regional security-arrangement has a direct bearing on European companies who invest in Asian markets and are averse to any kind of risk. Closer economic relations between Europe and Asia therefore also have a security dimension¹⁵¹. The challenges are not only economic affairs, attract for EU interest, democratic and human right system, and threaten global sustainable development. After 2005, EU decided to build Asia-Europe free trade agreement before “Doha

¹⁵⁰ http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/asia/index.htm

¹⁵¹ Rueand, the Asia- Europe meeting (ASEM): Towards a new euro-Asian relationship? Communication from the commission to the council - COM(94) 314 final, Brussels, 13.07.1994 pp. 46.

Agenda". In security, EU Commission detailed scholars and explores to comprehend Cross-Strait relations and DPRK's nuclear crisis. EU is different from American view make the most of poverty and inequality social problems in developing countries, emphasizing domestic mosaic culture and international multi-regime those view will influence the region by EU's East Asian policy.

3. Supra-Regional Cooperation

3.1 Comparison and Triangle Strategy

Essentially, the process of APEC is like supra-regionalism, a structural attempt to combine a range of states within a coherent unified framework. Regardless of differences between regions or among members there is unity in a common organization. Under APEC, there are NATA (National Association of Testing Authorities), ASEAN and CER (Australian-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement) etc. with the motive of developing the liberalization of investment and trade. In contrast, inter-regionalism is a process of ASEM, explicitly setting one region in a dialogue (or potentially a conflict) with an 'other'. The rhetoric of 'equal partnership' espoused at ASEM is quite different from the group of interests voiced within APEC. The idea of ASEM as a regional integrator, contributing to the building of an East Asian identity has been put forward or mentioned by several people. For instance, Hanns Maull and Akihito Tanaka at one Council for Asia-Europe Cooperation (CAEC) suggested that 'ASEM could serve as a kind of regional integrator because it is a bilateral process between two regions, which requires a modicum of coordination on both sides'¹⁵².

¹⁵² CAEC (1997), *The Rationale and Common Agenda for Asia-Europe Cooperation*, Tokyo: Japan Centre for International Exchange, 1997.

Fundamental to an inter-regional engagement is the basic building bloc of identifying the 'regions' in question. In the unique framework of inter-regionalism, states to behave as if they were a region in the face of what they perceive to be a similar, definable, other. In the case of ASEM, the "Asian Ten" which did not then exist as such, met at least three times in the form of Asian Senior Officials Meetings (SOM), to decide on the format and agenda for the first ASEM Leaders Summit. All these meetings and consultations that took place prior to the inaugural meetings were consolidated and institutionalized after the Bangkok meeting¹⁵³.

The essence here is different, albeit the operation is similar. APEC and ASEM are both channels of dialogue between regions. For long-term operation, the meetings are assorted according to different issues and make changes according to the fluctuating situation. It aims to strengthen the relationship between regions, and build identity. In the other opinion, economical regime spill-over leads to political conflict and its attendant transformations; a common target stimulate a regional great power to employ absolute power in order to promote the relative power of collectivity in the system.

Behind it, rational thinking and strategic choice show that cooperation is the important armaments for conflict with other power states or organizations. Facing globalization, regionalization is another form for handling new challenges; it can be a stumbling block or stepping stone. Regions-linkage reveals the changing relationship among Europe and the US the two existing powers, and the rising power, East Asia. With Japan's economic recession, North America, the EU and East Asia regionalization a

¹⁵³ J. Gilson. Defining Inter-Regionalism: The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM). Presentation for the University of Sheffield School of East Asian Studies. (University of Birmingham, UK 2002)

“new Triad” replacing the US, Europe and Japan, the “old Triad”¹⁵⁴. We can indicate this in Figure 5, Comparison between APEC and ASEM




Figure 5: Comparison between APEC and ASEM

By: the Author

In those three regions, Euro-Asia compares with American-Asia is flimsiness in which American-Asia has predominated over the Asian environment. However, ASEM’s enlargement implies that the relationship between East Asia and Europe is being strengthened. In a political-military regard, ASEM can aid Euro-Asia to build an equal-partnership strategic relationship and elevate the East Asian international position and influence. In addition, Europe got a foothold in Asia and that aided the EU to get an advantageous position to check and balance the US hegemony-caused multipolar structure of international power. ASEM should not stand for “Asian security, Europe missing”, but could be “another major step in a strategy to shape a balance of power in the region in which the US will play a less dominant, though still

¹⁵⁴ Heiner Haenggi, “ASEM and the Construction of the new Triad,” *Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy* Vol.4, no.1, 1999. pp. 56-80.

important, role”¹⁵⁵. Even the most forceful advocates of a major security dimension in ASEM explicitly recognized the US as the predominant security provider in East Asia. ASEM’s security dimension would enhance the American perception of burden-sharing rather than free-riding¹⁵⁶. Competition between Europe and the US to get benefits from East Asia cannot be denied.

For both Asian and European governments the main purpose is economic. ASEM can aid Europe and Asia to communicate, reconcile disputes, open markets and administer multilateral market policy. According to international trade statistics 2006, North America was still the biggest trade partner for East Asia in 2005¹⁵⁷ ; Compared with 2003, it is obvious that in the value of interregional trade North America-Asia is in recession and Euro-Asia grows up¹⁵⁸. The EU with non-Japan Asia had already been increasing faster than that of the US or Japan in the 1988-94 period. EU exporters surpassed those of the US, and were projected to far surpass those of the US in the early parts of the next century¹⁵⁹.

Regarding US opinion, American political and business elites would not find ASEM to be troubling. On political-military issues, the American desire for regional and global military stability could benefit from Euro-Asia validation and practical help. A similar opinion for security agenda, including trans-national crime, money-laundering, terrorism and trafficking in drugs can permit burden-sharing through ASEM agreement and cooperation. The economic issues are probably the most important for the US. As the US hoped, help from ASEM would certify American centrality in the

¹⁵⁵ Francois Godement and Gerald Segal. “An European Security Role in Support of East Asian Stability.” International Herald Tribune, July 6.1996. pp. 6.

¹⁵⁶ Hans W. Maull and Akihiko Tanaka, ASEM: The Geopolitical Dimension. The Rationale and Common. CACE. 1997.

¹⁵⁷ http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2006_e/its06_byregion_e.htm.

¹⁵⁸ www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2004_e/section3_e/iii03.xls

¹⁵⁹ Xinhua English Newswire. 1996. EU president on increased Asia-Europe economic links. March 1.


world economy by the ASEM investment Promotion Action Plan and Trade Facilitation Action Plan fitting the bill. It's clear that the US was not alone in pressing for further Asian options in goods and services, stronger foreign investor protection, and willingness to use anti-dumping instruments. Even with US or North America still a leader in East Asia, China and the EU's sweeping-partnership in ASEM, cannot be neglected if Euro- Asia continues to improve relations and reduce dependence on North America, above all, dollar unlinking. It will revise the tendency towards North America.

3.2 Attempts of Interaction

Realignment resulting from certain transformations of the power structure is probably due to the decline and rise of actor(s) in the system or an emerging power reaching for center stage. In Figure.4 of the last chapter, we presented evidence that globalization offers a chance for East Asia to shape an interregional cooperation and competition with North American and EU. Stretching the conception of the last chapter, I try to re-order the attempts at interaction by the three actors and two interregional organizations, as in Table 1. After WWI, international society began paying close attention to finding ways to create a peaceful world. Churchill considered that regional organizations could promote world peace. Afterwards, the Cold-War period, the UN's peace-keeping and globalization were not accomplished; at the same time, Europe reconstructed in a rapid process through which we discovered that the development and existence of states needs cooperation with other states. In the transformation of international order, we could suppose a region as a single actor would want to utilize "spill-over" to communicate experiences, ideas, policies and capabilities to solve discrepancies and draw a beneficial framework.

Table 1: Attempts of Interactions among East Asia, EU and North American

East Asia	EU	North American
1. Asian aspiration	1. toward a world key role	1. retain existing benefit (retain leadership)
2. cooperation on security and economic issues	2. Near East—Far East	2. manage rising power
3. multilateral regime and partner(self-determined operation)	3. check and balance for APEC	3. security issues (anti- terrorism)
4. role-reorientation		



Manageable international order

By: the Author

3.2.1 EU's Attempts

In the post-Cold War world, Europe is attempting to come back to East Asia on a large scale. The Commission first set out an overall framework for EC relations with Asian countries in its 1994 Communication “Towards a New Asia Strategy”. The present Communication updates that strategy, taking account of key developments in the intervening years, and establishing a comprehensive strategic framework for our relations with Asia and its sub-regions in the coming decade. It was a first effort to take an integrated and balanced view of the relations between the EU and its Asian partners. Much of this is still broadly valid, but at the same time much has changed in both regions since then¹⁶⁰.

Unlike APEC, ASEM explicitly has included a political and security dimension from the beginning, thus enabling members in principle to bring up security issues¹⁶¹. ASEM agenda is the reform of the United Nations (UN). The representatives of ASEM partners, reflecting various cultural, religious, and faith heritages, gathered in Nanjing, China on June 2007 at the Third ASEM Interfaith Dialogue¹⁶², to reinforce the multilateral system and promote an Asia-Europe dialogue on key-issues. It is observed that East Asia's rising is important for Europe, yet it is also observed that Europe values security in new Asian strategy. In 2002, the ASEM Copenhagen Declaration on Cooperation against International Terrorism and the ASEM Copenhagen Cooperation Programme on “Fighting International Terrorism,” were adopted. In addition, in 2005 the Commission of the European Communities put out a “Strategy Paper and

¹⁶⁰ Commission of the European Communities. Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnerships. COM (2001) 469 final. Brussels, 4.9.2001

¹⁶¹ H.W. Maull, N. Okfen.. Inter-regionalism in international relations: Comparing APEC .Asia Europe Journal. Vol. 1(2). 2003. P.243.

¹⁶² Commission of the European Communities. Nanjing statement on interfaith Dialogue- Third ASEM interfaith Dialogue. 19-21.Juni. 2007.

Indicative Programme or Multi-Country Programmes in Asia” emphasizing the importance of environment security which plays a main position in the ASEM Trust Fund. Resulting from the EU’s “Enlargement”, the European Commission published a report on progress, together with recommendations about how the policy could be further strengthened. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) not only strengthened the economy and politics, but also the civil society dimension¹⁶³. In acknowledging that diversity, the EU would set one clear core objective to guide the future development from East Europe to central Asia, and in the future, far Asia. The EU has moved from a strategy based on ‘aid and trade’ towards recognition of the importance of a fast developing Asia for the EU. The new strategy encompasses and strikes a better balance between the economic, political, social and cultural elements¹⁶⁴.

From the analysis of European attempts mentioned above and Chapter 3, we have good reason to think that while broadening the eastern scope, Europe has strengthened not only intrinsic regional dominion, but crossing the borderlines of neighbors through co-governance from central Asia to far Asia, whereupon it was observed that we can find Europeans participating in East Asian issues, such as the Korean Peninsula and East Asian integration. This is a manifestation of the ambition of Europe to play a key role in international relations.

¹⁶³ See, Commission of the European Communities. (2006). Communication from The Commission to the Council and The European Parliament on Strengthening The European Neighbourhood Policy. Brussels, 4 December 2006 COM(2006)726 final. And, Expanding on The Proposals Contained in the Communication of the Council and The European Parliament on “STRENGTHENING THE ENP” – COM (2006) 726 Final of 4 December 2006

¹⁶⁴ Communication from The Commission (2001). Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnerships. Brussels, 4.9.2001 COM(2001) 469 final

3.2.2 North America's Attempts

Preponderance in economic power and military might are certainly characteristics of American leadership. The US currently enjoys a well-balanced, clearly dominant international political role, associated with an ascription of leadership by many of its strongest allies. As APEC's eminent Person Group Report noted, "the US, the traditional leader of the global trading system, may be going regional or at least hedging its bets"¹⁶⁵. APEC's institution is also seen as part of the wilder "ideas battle" between Asians and North Americans concerning varieties of capitalism. In East Asian integration, North American/ US leading power is the first challenge. East Asia is moving towards to an "Asian-izing" path, obeying a self-determined policy, but an American preference is for a state-centered power-based approach to economic relations rather than a rules-based system so important to smaller states in the international economy, that is different from the cooperation approach of EU.

US role and power result in part from the misalignment in other countries, especially Germany, Japan and China. The most significant systemic changes in international political roles over the next 20 years will involve regional cooperation- EU and emerging East Asia, increasing interregional interaction. Those developments could diminish the US's international political role. After 1993 North America had made the most of the economic growth potential from the "goose-model" and strategic value of East Asia was counterpoised with that of the EU, giving an active impetus to APEC. It made use of the "claw-policy" to check-and-balance the EU. It revealed that retain leadership attempt. For North American policy, ASEAN countries had not dared to go against North American (especially the US) leadership, because their exports

¹⁶⁵ APEC. A Vision for APEC: Towards an Asia Pacific Economic Community, Report of the Eminent Persons Group to APEC Ministers, Singapore: APEC Secretariat. 1993.

depended on the North American market.

After the 9.11 terrorist attacks, one of the most visible changes in recent years was the diminishing salience of economic and trade issues in APEC while non-economic issues, especially security issues, were getting more attention. APEC Agenda is at the crossroads of enlargement and concentration. The rise of non-traditional security issues has been evident in recent years. Economic security and human security were getting more attention, especially in the aftermath of 9.11 terrorist attacks.¹⁶⁶. Geopolitical security issues had an explicit section in APEC's official communiqués.

In summation, North America is always the stakeholder in the process of East Asian development; keeping its leadership and balancing the emerging power seem to be its cardinal goals. In addition, there are indications that some APEC member governments did indeed seek to use interregional cooperation to “check and balance” other players, to promote national and regional stability and prosperity, and to foster the formation of regional collective identities¹⁶⁷.

4. Conclusion-Potential for Future

Facing East Asia integration causing new order, APEC and ASEM include corresponding powerful East Asian countries those influence political, economic and social cooperation and negotiations. Nevertheless, APEC and ASEM, one is transregion and another is interregion, still insist on some functions or adjusts some acts.

¹⁶⁶Jae-Seung Lee .Talking Security in the APEC. presented at the APEC Study Center Consortium Conference / PECC Trade Forum, Korea. 23 May 2005.

¹⁶⁷ H.W. Maull, N. Okfen.. “Inter-regionalism in international relations: Comparing APEC.” *Asia Europe Journal*. Vol. 1(2). 2003.p.247.

- APEC

1. APEC already towards to multilateral cooperation regime of economy and trade, it seems that APEC become discussed regime for economic and relative security issues, its function and importance extending security issue is the vital policy. APEC is a platform for Asia-Pacific countries to Counseling and cooperation.

2. APEC is unavoidable faces structure strain by extending regional issues. How to advancing policy benefits management is the rooted reasons to reform.

3. APEC is a multilateral cooperation regime advancing from coast-to-coast, but new regional development will promote APEC transformation or consolidation, even weaken those have to observe carefully.

- ASEM

ASEM is a political forum between Asia and Europe, aim to political dialogue, economic cooperation and social-culture connection to promote trust and comprehensive partner. The EU is working for the removal of internal Asian barriers-such as legal, administrative or policy practices-that put a damper on foreign policy. ASEM provided a tradition forum in which an economic dialogue on reducing Asia's barriers could be conducted; the European commission had to rely solely on its economic diplomacy with East Asian countries. Some Asian representatives urged the EU to increase its involvement in security issues to demonstrate to the US that "its role and functions can potentially be taken over by another willing and able player, namely, Europe."¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁸ Singh. The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEAM): A Search for a new Order or Balance of Power? pp. 10.

While ASEM has been identified by some as a potential source of EU-north American tension, it also has many positive aspect. To the extent that these issues remain on the ASEM agenda and on the agenda of the various EU states individually, it helps to send a coordinated message and keeps up the pressure on Asian states to reform. It also takes some heat off North American.

In sum, both APEC and ASEM built a regime and common norms under which individual countries can self-making and seeking self-interest. In addition, economic unities share information through regional cooperation. Regional policy dialogues and supervisal mechanism benefit for interconnection.

Chapter 5: Creating a Balance

1. Introduction

Globalization stimulates regionalization, through regional alliance advancing ascendancy in global system. Trisection in global economic dominion, NAFTA, EU and East Asia community, also form world political trigonometry. In triangle politics, North American and Europe influenced the East Asia political economy through APEC and ASEM; furthermore, depending on economic ability of NAFTA and EU maintain political and economic interest when East Asia integration¹⁶⁹.

In fact, likely Euro symbolize a political willing only strengthening European integration could enhance speaking right in the world and reducing American influence, East Asia through “ASEAN+3 Summit” as core hold “East Asia summit” to plain “East Asian community” cohere “East Asianess” not only economic relation, but also diplomatic relations in Asia-Europe and in Asia-North American¹⁷⁰.

2. The Power Structure of Co-governance

Before we come to power realignment among East Asia, Europe and North America, one more point of the power structure of co-governance must be clarified that will help us to arrange possible paths of power realignment. In the preceding chapter, I pointed out that the attempt by the global triad for pre-eminent international roles and power, as well as the strategies chosen by existing power regarding a rising power. For reasons mentioned above, the cooperation and conflict among the three regions

¹⁶⁹ Peter Drysdale and David Vines, eds., *Europe, East Asia and APEC: A Shared Global Agenda?* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), part I, pp. 1-70.

¹⁷⁰ Nuraina Abdul Samad, “Strong Asia-Europe Bond Relevant in World Today,” *New Straits Press*, October 21, 2000, pp.2; Wim Stokhof and Paul van Velde, eds. *ASEM: the Asia-Europe Meeting—A Window of Opportunity* (London: Kegan Paul International, 1999)..

possess such behavior from geographically, culture and history. In cooperation with East Asia, North America has affected Asia deeply; and Europe as a collective power, has tried to check-and-balance North America by being up-and-coming in international society. A changeful international order is not, as in past, only manifested through real conflict. New governance rules have been increasing the variability of power realignment. In accordance with power realignment, we must understand the power structure of co-governance in the global order.

2.1 Global Governance without Government

Rosenau described global societal order as “governance without government”, exploiting two meanings: the first, it is characterized by multiple centers of authority and influence. The process of governance cannot be understood simply as a function of state action. In globalization, actors engaged in a continuing attempt to maintain or encourage order in terms of multi-subjects, regime and issues. The second is fragmentation of the international order. Hollingsworth and Boyer suggested the “social system of production” and Rhodes argued about “differentiated polity”; both show that functional and institutional specialization and the fragmentation of policies and politics¹⁷¹. In addition, Governance has, in the “analytical” sense, the merit of providing a conceptual framework within which diverse forms of political and economic organization can be compared and contrasted¹⁷². Theoretical knowledge of systems of governance developments have examined institutional structures, their effectiveness and failures, and prescribed various ways of ameliorating the problems

¹⁷¹ R. A. W. Rhodes, Understanding Governance: Policy Networks, Governance, Reflexivity and Accountability. (Buckingham: Open University Press.1997). JR Hollingsworth, R Boyer.1997. “Coordination of Economic Actors and Social Systems of Production.” In Contemporary Capitalism: The Embeddedness of Institutions, (Cambridge University Press, 1997)

¹⁷²Mark Beeson, “Globalization, Governance, and the Political-Economy of Public Policy Reform in East Asia,” *Governance*, 14(4), 2001. pp. 487.

of collective action that international affairs pose.

From an “institutionalism” perspective, APEC and ASEM are potentially important contributors to enhanced international cooperation and “global governance”. Both APEC and ASEM have indeed tried to make such contributions, notably with regard to the international trading order¹⁷³. APEC’s programmatic concept of “open regionalism” was presented, by its promoters, as an important addition to the existing international trading order. “Open regionalism” was said to advance global trade negotiations more rapidly and ensure a more effective implementation of WTO agreements on a non-discriminatory basis¹⁷⁴. However, APEC’s operation was too cumbersome and too slow. In the fact, APEC has little contributed in any significant way to effective global governance, but it has advanced cooperation structure.

ASEM, too, presented itself as an element in a system of “global governance”¹⁷⁵, that is, as part of the multitude of formal and informal arrangements through which states and/or non-state actors cooperate and settle common problems. The agenda of the ASEM process includes many of the core challenges to global governance, such as the implications of migration, environmental destruction or international terrorism. From its inception, ASEM has also tried to involve business and civil society in its dialogue programs. In terms of the substance of the ASEM agenda, but also because of its road-based, open, democratic and informal procedures and its strong emphasis on dialogue and mutual understanding, ASEM seemed well-placed to fit the model of global governance through public-private policy networks as a complement to

¹⁷³ H.W. Maull, N. Okfen. “Inter-regionalism in International Relations: Comparing APEC.” *Asia Europe Journal*. Vol. no.2. 2003. pp. 244.

¹⁷⁴ Drysdale P, Elek A, Soesastro H (1998) “Open Regionalism: The Nature of Asia-Pacific Integration,” In: Europe, East Asia and APEC. A Shared Global Agenda? P.Drysdale, D.Vines eds. (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998) pp.103–135, here: pp. 112.

¹⁷⁵. M.Reiterer (2001) ASEM - The Third Summit in Seoul 2000: A Roadmap to Consolidate the Partnership Between Asia and Europe, *European Foreign Affairs Review*.

traditional ways of tackling the challenges of globalization¹⁷⁶.

Power structure in “without government” of the international order may account for leadership competition existing always, but the way is different. To know the pattern of power competition is to know possible ways of power operation. Therefore, we must be clear about the structure of interaction. The relations among the system and actors are composed of material and cognitive structures. Material structure includes rules, institutions “affecting” and common standards; cognitive structure is cognition extending from ideology and beliefs. A system facing balance or troubles must understand the role and power of actors’ by their attempts, and whether material and cognitive structures can operate in coordination.

2.2 Material Structure

The material structure of governance like cognitive structures comes from the individual history, culture and geographic characteristics and so on. But the material structure explanation is the systematic concrete attribute. The system in the process of transformation, if it does not encounter war or large scale collapse, usually changes gradually. The unstable security (contains economic and political complex security) lets the actors unceasingly carry on the balance in not an unwritten rule search. We may delineate the power structure of co-governance as in Table 2.

¹⁷⁶ H.W. Maull, N. Okfen.2003. Inter-regionalism in International Relations: Comparing APEC. Asia Europe Journal. Vol. 1(2). pp.245.

Table 2: Power Structure of Co-Governance

	Model
System	existing ascendance
Power	asymmetry
Value	tools
Fact	Multilateral governance /regime/ security
Cooperation pattern	competition /dialogue
Cooperating issues	plurality
Addition	Regional cohesion /civil society

By: the Author

The system is consecutive and relative; a power rising implies that power must be shared. In the past, political power gained from violence showed ascendancy in international society, but it was uncertain and generally illegal. For steady political power and gaining identification from large public hegemony through the establishment of a set of laws and rules to confirm and protect its role and power, are required. This set of laws and rules restricts the operation of political power; if disobeyed, its members can turn against the leader. However, it still cannot eliminate superiority within the system. In the cooperation among three regions, although the operating framework and even institutions are loose, disobeying the rules entails losing an advantageous position. There is an existing ascendance in system; it means that power relation is asymmetrical, which leads the weaker tries to seek balance. As EU cooperation with East Asia, this intention certainly lurked behind the frequently presented view that ASEM represented a response to a fundamental imbalance in the triangular relationship between three majors regions: ASEM was to answer the

perceived “shift in US policy towards Asia”¹⁷⁷.

The value of interregional cooperation is its use as a tool, for East Asia fitting in with the “West” orderly integration within diversity. Furthermore, it is also for EU and North America to drive rising East Asia to correct its development to avoiding divergence. The EU and North American regional cooperation held a lesson for East Asian countries to communicate with each other and form common values, when their misery derives from obeying several policies from the process of collectivization. The common value shows a massed pressure changing regulatory and harmonious ability in regional cooperation. The rising collective power make given powers reduce political cooperation, so that given powers will seek a propitious regime and governance model for advancing cooperative density among members, that raise East Asia’s role and achieves an objective of balance in- or visibly.

Most East Asia countries were dependent on North American aid from which they got benefits. Under globalization, North America has confronted the challenges, economic and military from the emerged Europe. Entering the 21st century, the emerging East Asia is re-challenging North America and Europe. Compared with past relations of competition and independence, the complexes in East Asia with the existing power calculate the path to be more difficult. In addition, East Asia is conscious of increasing power namely increasing bargaining power from a rising power’s challenge to exist.

A political system must have high legitimacy to reduce the cost of governance advancing efficiency, stabilizing political situations and avoiding crises. From the mid-1980s onwards, under the impact of a “New Regionalism“, there has been a

¹⁷⁷ Cf. European commission: Towards a New Asia Strategy, com (94) 314 final, Brussels, 13.07.1994.

proliferation of regional organizations which now extend far beyond the confines of the Triad which had previously been the core of international institution-building¹⁷⁸. As Rüländ argued, differentiation of international institutions is taking two directions; it proceeds laterally through regime formation in narrowly defined issue areas and vertically through a multilayered institutional system ranging from global multilateral forums down to the conventional bilateral state-to-state relationships¹⁷⁹. In interregional cooperation, three regions based on different cooperation relations have different institutional characteristics. Yet on the different paths, all show multilateral regime and agenda-setting. Therefore, we can say that governance efficiency in globalization has to consider distinct political culture; a multilateral regime seems a useful approach.

For real cooperation status, regimes be set for practicable governance; security is not only a traditional concept. Multilateral security includes economic, social and cultural conceptions, and is the kind of “soft” security. At the beginning of ASEM, the issues didn’t only include economic ones. By contrast, the economy was a key issue in APEC, yet APEC incorporated the military issue following terrorist threats and the North Korea security issue, e.g., it held a series of “APEC Leaders' Statement on Fighting Terrorism and Promoting Growth and North Korea”.

In its model of operation and scope of work, ASEM has mimicked APEC¹⁸⁰. Institutional structure and mechanisms in ASEM have been followed by APEC. However, ASEM adopted a model of coordination, while APEC is an embedded

¹⁷⁸ Norman D Palmer,.: The New Regionalism in Asia and the Pacific, (Lexington: Lexington Books. 1991).

¹⁷⁹ J Rüländ.(2002). “ASEM and the Emerging System of Global Governance.” Paper prepared for the Meeting in Conjunction, „Round Table: Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), at the Annual Meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, 4-7 April 2002, Washington, DC, USA. pp. 2

¹⁸⁰ Singapore PM Goh proposed that Asia established “pacific-style” ties with Europe when he proposed the idea of ASEAN in October 19954.

model. Cooperation and regime formation also proceed due to strategic reasons. Both forums were attempts at engaging major powers in an institutional framework as well as to manage inter-state relations. Although patterns of cooperation are different, the competition among the three regions has always existed. ASEM always said: this was more hope than reality, and disliked the fact that APEC had fundamental institutionalization, yet both used dialogue to reconcile disputes from competition. As mentioned in Chapter 3 and chapter 4, every region attempts to obtain what it wants. In terms of regional benefits, regions cannot be stand-alone islands in an interdependent international order; nothing but entering the control center can provide power. In the world order, establishing a manageable international environment and avoiding big-clashes are front burner issues.

2.3 Cognitive Structure

In the international system, a harmonious structure is a normal phenomenon involving relative power among actors and explaining the rules of power realignment. Cognitive structure is involved in political culture (common knowledge). Meaning needs to be conferred via a harmonious cognitive structure. Actors' common concepts are obtained through interactions. The international system's culture is a common concept to be distributed in international society, to form a cognitive structure of international society. Particular cognitive structures afford particular implication for a harmonious structure.

In interregional interactions, cognitive structure seems to be viewed as an ideological power playing a dominant role during the rise of the world regions. It is different from military and political power. According to Mann, this kind of power includes

“territorial centralization” and “geographical diplomacy”¹⁸¹. He argues that geographical diplomacy was the main organizing factor in forming integrative Europe. Geography is deeply interconnected with other dimensions of social relations: culture, economics, politics, psychology, and time¹⁸². Regional integration and competition offers regions a strengthened concept of increasing bargaining power, and not only in government. Civic society is like a mediator linking interregional governance. Telò advanced that the EU as a civilian power is a long-term trend, and epoch-making in the development of the international identity. In addition, the increasing civilian power of the EU reduces the soft power of the US¹⁸³. Civilian power is a characteristic loop through structure specialty and culture represents that regional absolute cultural hegemony. My contention similar to Telò’s civilian power of the EU, East Asia as a new evolving international actor needs to assert itself by focusing on and promoting its own particular priorities and interests. Multilateral interaction has proved East Asia is a collective, civilian power increasingly evolving a system of values, ideology, and planning. Civil society in Western emphasizes “individual” civil virtue, which coheres through circulation of organization and institution, and then forms a specific political process. Civil society in Western also provides a mechanism to answer quick transformation of globalization readily. Furthermore, it is a part of governance to cushion external stimulation through civil learning. Compare with Western, there is different developed model in East Asia. In Northeast Asia, Confucian has influenced the development of civil society that formed a governance model and influenced political development, yet it is not a definite system. In Southeast Asia, civil society has been affected by divergent culture. It requires proper

¹⁸¹ Michael Mann (1986) *The Sources of Social Power*. Cambridge University Press.

¹⁸²JA Scholte (2002). *Civil Society and Democracy in Global Governance*. CSGR Working Paper No. 65/01. University of Warwick, Coventry,uk. pp. 9.

¹⁸³Mario Telò (2006). *Europe: a civilian power? : European Union, global governance, world order*. Houndmills [u.a.] : Palgrave Macmillan. Ch.1.

accommodation to set up a transnational civil society. In fact, civil society is, whether in Northeast Asia or Southeast Asia, a network of interconnection that builds a common consciousness to respond globalization.

In supraregional competition, each region has its distinctive culture and ideology. It is obvious that regions embellish rationality and justice by exporting ideology /soft power/civilian power, because actors will learn from other embedded concepts to distribute public interests equally, while avoiding free-rides. This opportunism proved that actors' power enhance and assist its value.

3. Possible Path of Power Realignment

From the chapter 3 and chapter 4, we know that the three regions attempt to increase interregional interactions, and in this chapter, we analyzed the power structure of co-governance. This section from the gap we will try to analyze the possible paths of powers realignment. According to the above treatment, presuming East Asia has a single voice to base itself in the world, like the EU and North America, as a single entity, it can be in place to fulfill this obligation of "speaking with one voice." Different institutional rules, for decision-making and for delegating negotiation, reveal different capabilities. Fundamental regional flaws and existing international roles generate inter-regional conferences and communication for gaining power and maintaining interests. Actors will calculate a rising power's danger and figure out how to respond and how much can get from the rising power; the absolute interests and relative losses affect the replying policy. In this section, we enter into the issue of possible pathways among the three regions and the response of existing regions.

3.1 Power-Role Gap

First, the power-role gap was explained in Chapter 2 to be the most important motivation for actors changing their behavior and policy, which leads them to devise or adjust original policies. As in the above discussion, we roughly explained the integration of East Asia and supra-regional interaction. Here we expand on the divergence among the three regions, within the East Asia transformation. Making a classification of power and role, we must attend to ascribed and operational power and role. Ascribed power and role correspond to reputation, and to what other actors believe, regarding an actor's capability, position and status. Operational power and role are the announced aim, scope and focus of the state's foreign policy. The credibility of these role estimations, in turn, is based on operational power. Moreover, we explore supra-regional cooperation. The gap in our scheme is the argument that integration leads to increased wealth and power, and that this will permit East Asia to reflect its role and power, and altering their preference structures so that violent conflict is no longer a desirable option.

East Asia's ascribed power is obviously dependent on the desire of the conflicting parties to cooperate with East Asia. The process of cooperation with East Asia is full of carrots and sticks, compelling actors through the mechanisms of integration and association to change their policies vis-à-vis the other party with conciliatory moves, rather than by deepening securitization¹⁸⁴. The carrot of East Asia involves its economic interest. In patterns of negotiation, as well as by setting conditions for the opening of pattern negotiation, East Asia is setting up its legal and normative

¹⁸⁴ Han Dorussen, "Mixing Carrots with Sticks: Evaluating the Effectiveness of Positive Incentives." *Journal of Peace Research* Vol.38. no.2, 2001. pp. 251-62.

framework¹⁸⁵. In this interdependent international relation, East Asia emerges as a formidable economic power with political potential. By contrast, perhaps East Asia's potential economic and political power reveal elemental influences, yet actors always respond to change by making decisions after event has happened. Europe and North America must calculate possible pathways of East Asia's development to avoid any unmanageable situation, or losing their predominance.

Ascribed role relies on the actor's image to other actors in system. East Asian growth changes the equilibrium for ascribed roles. East Asia has started to participate in the competition in the system. In addressing economic issues, the comparative advantages attract foreign investment, and greater competition supports the principles of competitiveness and complementation, the elements of productive interaction that shape the changing of the structure of the system. In conflict situations, East Asia has evolved from follower to competitor. North America and the EU link their political agendas with East Asia and, through references to cooperation, justify de-securitizing moves that may otherwise have not been considered legitimate¹⁸⁶. As mentioned above, East Asia was evaluated as an emerging power; moreover, it was an agency of check-and-balance between the EU and North America. Cooperation with East Asia is not only for increasing benefits and controlling this rising power, but for maintaining a leadership role in the system.

An operational role is the subject's desire; in other words, it is the express goal of foreign policy. It is supported by contact between conflicting and cooperating actors, mainly through direct common activities. Sustained contact within the context of

¹⁸⁵ The framework of negotiation was controlled by developed countries and has observed capitalist road. East Asian changes the rule visibly and invisibly. It exhibited that, as hegemonism, world order always string along with possession of power of actors.

¹⁸⁶ Buzan, Barry, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde.. *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. Boulder, (Colo.: Lynne Rienner 1998)

common projects may however lead to a broader societal effect in the form of social networks through competition, which in turn should facilitate identity change as foreseen within the constructive policy of objective actors. With East Asian cooperation, the cooperative program provides funding for such cross—continent cooperation to promote common interests. East Asia through multilateral co-governance, regimes, and issues, promotes its importance. Furthermore, the dilemma between the EU and North America offers East Asia a chance to re-orient its role as follower.

Operational power is the direct activities of foreign policy. East Asian productivity growth is a kind of operational power. In the economy, productivity growth is essentially the outcome of allowing markets to operate freely to the fullest possible extent; hence the call for rapid domestic liberalization and full integration with the world economy¹⁸⁷. Economic growth (operational power rising) attracts other regions' cooperation. It represents that interest would be shared in East Asia market. The sharing of interests involving a series of negotiations and bargaining positions, will lead to conflict resolution for a certainty. Globalization causes an interdependent international society, but also interactions with regional characteristics. The East Asia characteristic emerges, as European “rule” and North American “hegemony,” a “self-determined” political culture.

Interest has been a traditional concern of international relations theory, which also means power possession. Power tells us how much influence an actor can be expected to have over others; interests tell us how and for what purposes that influence will be used. To get to the bottom of an affair, three blocks' compete for a manageable

¹⁸⁷ Sachs, J. and A. Warner, “Economic Reform and the Process of Global Integration,” *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity*, No. 1. (1995).

international order, besides self-interest. From a risk-management perspective, we learn how two existing regional blocks manage a rising block. As stated above, we make the exploration of the rising East Asian impact and the power-role gap among the three regions in the system. East Asian is an integrating cause variation in the power-role equilibrium of system. System equilibrium expresses, in other words, the changes of system structure. The emergence of a second great power transforms a unipolar system into a bipolar one; the rise of a third great power transforms a bipolar system into a tripolar one. In our case, this is important because the system dynamics (or characteristic behaviors) of unipolar, bipolar, tripolar, and multipolar structures differ significantly from each other.¹⁸⁸ Great power transformation in the political economic system means changing the rations of sharing interests as well. Facing the transformation of the system, the existing power calculates absolute and relative interest changes and designs plans in reaction. The rising power threatening existing power could possibly cause conflict, while cooperation leads the existing power to reduce the cost of conflict and increase the information. Therefore, conflict and cooperation is one coin with two sides.

The East Asian market has the rising explosive force of an emerging market, especially in ASEAN, and the bi-motored induction: China and India, so hot money turn around in the region, every area grows rapidly, causing foreign capital to enter ceaselessly. In 2005, East Asian growth surmounted the average of the world and more than OECD, broadly speaking. A rising East Asia ineluctably shares the interest allocation of the world. According to Classical Realism, a nation's interests are shaped in the first place by its power (measured in terms of material resources and political

¹⁸⁸ Randall L. Schweller "Managing the Rise of Great Powers: History and Theory" in Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power, edited by Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross. (London ; New York : Routledge, 1999)

influence). Specifically, as Martin Wight stated: “It is the nature of powers to expand. The energies of their members radiate culturally, economically and politically, and unless there are strong obstacles, these tendencies will be summed up in territorial growth.”¹⁸⁹

In this view, actors expand when they can; that is, when they perceive relative increases in state power ¹⁹⁰and when changes in the relative costs and benefits of expansion make it profitable for them to do so. Thus, Gilpin wrote: “a state will attempt to change the international system only if it has some relative advantage over other states, that is, if the balance of power in the system is to its advantage.”¹⁹¹

The EU and North America have become aware of the relative advantages changing in the international system; however, the question of how to manage a rising power presupposes that such a situation is dangerous and therefore requires a strategy or plan of action on the part of the established powers. North America has been involved in Asia for a long time as a leader role. It has always allied itself with fellow states (Japan, Korea and Taiwan) to enhance its influence, especially Japan. It hopes that Japan can maintain the strong economic power which, with US military power, can overbear Asia-Pacific. The EU and Asia have close trade relations, the import and export value to Asia being almost a quarter of it all. From 2000 to 2005, EU and East Asian volume of trade (especially China) grew twofold; the EU has become the biggest export market for some East Asian countries. The EU thinks that it is time to

¹⁸⁹ Hedley Bull, Carsten Holbraad and Martin Wight, Power Politics, (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1978), pp. 144.

¹⁹⁰ Fareed R. Zakaria makes an important and often overlooked distinction between national and state power: "Power, for the statesman, must be 'usable' and hence involves not the nation's power but instead the national government's power or 'state power.' The latter can be defined as the central government's ability to extract resources from society and the ease with which central decision-makers can implement their preferences." Fareed R. Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 7.

¹⁹¹ See Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). pp. 54.

open its market and advance the development of the export-economy in East Asian countries; the EU certainly gets interest from it.

Ostensibly, we believe that actors in the world remember history, war experience and peaceful interaction. However, rapid growth requires external expansion to sustain itself; thus, the expansion of powers is the product not only of internal pressure but also of threats and opportunities in the external environment. The EU and North American base their interactions with East Asia on history and experience but now EU and North American argue if the integration of East Asia is dangerous or not via serial knowledge process. With transferability of types of knowledge in codified data actors can easily comprehend and deal with structural shifts; on the contrary, considering ideology or an anthropogenic source (philosophy and thought), it will be more difficult to deal with a contingency.

In general, policy-making and strategic plans involve the collection of data, inner belief and calculation of mutational probability. We analyze power-role, with which it is not difficult to assimilate other actors' ascribed power, but operational power includes potential power which is calculated not only by statistics but also by inertial behavior (philosophical thinking) and bombshell forecasts. Externally, the EU and North America cooperate with East Asia by bi- or multilateralism and inter-regional organization. It is the integration of East Asia that is driving the new wave of economic development from which EU and North America profit; yet it can still be viewed as a conflict in the world. In the international social system, some powerful nations of the integration of East Asia generate new crises. For example, China's getting strong let other East Asian countries change the leader, Japan to China although China is a developing country and Japan is a developed country, China has transcendental economic development and seeks to build up and legitimize its rule.

The EU has expanded the Chinese market, for example, till June 2004, the EU increased export figures of service industry six-fold for China. The EU's enterprises and customers earn profits from products' price competitiveness and consumer goods that damage the manufacturing industry in EU. Actually, it is not only China; in the developing countries in East Asia the problem exists. The EU and North America, on the one hand, maintain a close trade partnership with East Asia (especially ASEAN+3); on the other hand, they request that Asian cut duties to advance fair trade, open markets, supply fair competitive regulations and protect intellectual property.

Let us now return to the international financial system, where Europe and North America's economical trends still play a key role guiding the world's economic development. The EU expands its power by east European enlargement, but North America has intensified its conservatism. Compared with North America, the EU's economic growth rate of 3.8% was higher than the US's 2.6% in 2006. The EU central bank argues that economic resurgence and the foundation of expansion are both based on obtaining greater equilibrium; at the same time, the external environment has become advantageous, and it is no longer necessary to rely on US exports any more. Facing an economic shift, the integrated announcement of East Asia breaks the pattern of competition between the EU and North America. In the integration of East Asia, political problems were viewed as interference in economic integration, religion, disputed territory and economic regime divisiveness, all visualized in political conflict. Based on world pathways, nobody forecast that the political problems would be constrained by economic negotiations.

Historically, the most significant consequence of the rise of new great powers is international political change. As Gilpin pointed out, "a precondition for political change lies in a disjuncture between the existing social system and the redistribution

of power to those actors who would benefit most from a change in the system.”¹⁹² Passing through the process of calculation and though the EU and North America confront a rising East Asia which is not immediately dangerous, however, can cause a realignment in the international system. How do two regions deal with the rising power? Facing the risk, they must set up strategies and policy-making.

East Asia as a rising power alters the configuration of relative power in the system, inevitably presenting the established powers with both threats and opportunities: some stand to benefit by its emergence, others fear that they will be disadvantaged. World powers with substantial interests in the region of the rising power will be affected more than distant powers with minor or no interests in the area of its growth. The EU and North America were affected by the emergence of a new power differing not only in kind but also in degree. Two factors, risk propensity and revisionist aims¹⁹³, largely account for the variety of state responses to rising powers. Furthermore, we can calculate the EU and North America’s response to a rising power. The EU is close to “engagement through strength” for Asia’s anaclisis, while North America is closer to containment/balancing. Nevertheless, their strategic involvement in some of these strategies involve alliances, while others do not; some use alliances for capability-aggregation purposes, others use them as tools of management; some seek security from the rising power, others aim to profit by it¹⁹⁴, so that even their attempts are different.

¹⁹² Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge university press 1981) pp. 9

¹⁹³ For the purposes of analysis, these various state responses may be grouped into six basic policy options: (1) preventive war, (2) balancing, (3) bandwagoning, (4) binding, (5) engagement, and (6) distancing/ buck-passing. see Robert S Ross, *Engaging China*. London; (New York: Routledge, 1999). pp. 8-22.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid, pp. 7.

3.2 Possible Pathway

From the perspectives of geography-history, regional strategy, attempts and power-roles, we have understood North America and EU's perspective concerning rising East Asia power and East Asian system operations. Furthermore, we can comprehend the process of power realignment. In the process of power realignment, the analytic process can be simplified into two elements: 1.) The emerging sense of East Asian community may reinforce the formation of an East Asian bloc, either open or closed. 2.) North American and EU interest in East Asia, meaning that the U.S. and the EU both become exclusively inward-looking. East Asia is, like the European Union, an asymmetrical form of regionalism. There are significant differences in economic and political structure, population, levels of development and degree of integration into the world among East Asia members. We calculate that Northeast Asia is an economic and military entity, yet it needs a strong and broad ASEAN as a provider of club goods. With respect to the likely influence of a prospective "ASEAN plus 3" on either APEC or ASEM, this is one of the most interesting scenarios that calls for further exploration. However, dilemmas have created an impasse over determining priorities pertaining to economic cooperation and territorial disputes¹⁹⁵. Therefore, in which form East Asia will integrate, is the first question that must be clarified.

The specific outcome will be determined by the U.S. and the EU's interest in East Asia as discussed below. EU and North American regional strategies cannot be ignored. Europe and North America simultaneously increase regional influence. The European Union's relationship to Eastern Europe increases economic and technical

¹⁹⁵ Saleem M. Khan and Zahira S. Khan, "Asian Economic Integration: A Perspective on South Asia." *Journal of Asian Economics*. vol. 13(6), 2003, pp. 767-785

cooperation, and is facilitated more freely today than under the communists, increasing a comprehensive relationship and the region's internal economic scale. The European Union's relationship with Eastern Europe concerns the new security situation and the links with NATO¹⁹⁶. The new region-building initiatives in the Americas tries to link Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) with economic liberalization and the new political agenda. We must consider whether two regional organizations add internal region policies which influence East Asian interregional cooperation. We draw the possible pathways in Figure 6.

(I) If an East Asian grouping such as "ASEAN plus 3" is created that proves stable, the growing interconnectedness and the network nature of interstate economic activities may produce an increasing awareness and sense of community among East Asian countries¹⁹⁷. Northeast Asian countries will become more confident in their ability to create their own supra-regional grouping; they might be more willing to extend their institutionalization efforts to the trans-regional level of APEC. Similarly, the increasing sense of community within East Asia could facilitate the ASEM forum, leading to pure Asia-Europe inter-regionalism. In path (I) we can say that If "ASEAN plus 3" is enhanced ceaselessly and both the U.S. and the EU have a high degree of interest in East Asia, both APEC and ASEM might be reinforced, id est East Asia possesses strong operational power and ascribed power and role be characterized attraction. EU and North American will increase its operational role to cooperate with East Asia.

¹⁹⁶ Gamble, Andrew, Regionalism and World Order. (Macmillan. 1996) pp. 78-85

¹⁹⁷ Terada, T "Constructing an "East Asia" Concept and Growing Regional Identity: From EAEC to ASEAN+3", *Pacific Review*, vol.16 (2) 2003. pp. 251-77.

(II) + (III)

In present circumstances, APEC (esp. North American) has influenced real economic conditions and the U.S. has commanded military security rather than ASEM. ASEM as a principle institution between Europe and East Asia might restrain execution of agreements. Facing the ASEM threat, North America will be strengthened by increasingly complex supra-regional relationships and a deep and broad scope of activities across through East Asia within APEC.

By contrast, APEC is weak and ASEM is strong. The logic behind this prediction is that East Asia may choose to either balance American unilateralism with the EU or to bandwagon with U.S. supremacy based on capabilities and their perceptions of threats. If East Asia felt a strong antipathy towards North America, and attempted to enhance a partnership, European and Asian “equals” would finally materialize as the “counterpart coherence” is made comparably equal on the East Asian side¹⁹⁸. In those two paths, East Asia’s operational power is enough strong to make their cooperation parter, or, either North American or EU operational power stronger than another draw East Asia in its side.

(IV) + (V)

Although East Asia has become more confident in its ability, Europe and North America have individual regional organizations. The EU enlarges with East Europe and North America widens from NAFTA to FTAA (Free Trade Area of the Americas) who might re- enlarge regional policy to respective regions. Both APEC and ASEM will be undermined. Its outcome will possibly lead to the Fortress mentality. Other

¹⁹⁸ VK Aggarwal, MG Koo, “The Evolution of APEC and ASEM: Implications of the New East Asian Bilateralism.” *European Journal of East Asian Studies*. vol. 4 (2). 2005. pp. 262.


paths will lead to the same outcome if the East Asian Community has a sense of marginalization. If the U.S. continues its focus on the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) and the EU continues on an eastward and possibly southward expansion path, others may feel excluded¹⁹⁹, leading to a “Fortress Europe” and “Fortress America.” The strategic relationship of East Asia could strengthen internal relationships and build “Fortress Asia” for competition with the rest of world.

(VI) + (VII)

In economic terms, if there is no East Asian Community, Northeast Asia cannot integrate with ASEAN in the minimum and is likely to have strong incentives to secure club goods through bilateral arrangements. World cooperation must depend on economic complementation from individual negotiations under the WTO. If economic complementation is strong, it enhances the institutional strength of the WTO. By contrast, if an individual negotiation has weak economic complementation, it might lead to a weak WTO. In politics, if there is no East Asian Community, North America’s own support would come from most East Asian countries, but there are some power-politic countries in Northeast Asia (especially China) who will experience a parallel situation. Whether the EU can soundlessly face North American predominance in East Asia, is problematic. ASEM has intervened in the Korean Peninsula and East Timor; and APEC has fit security issues into the regime. However, if East Asia cannot integrate into an entity, all issues must remain under the UN. Political issues, like economic issues, need deeper trust; otherwise, it would corrode the institutions in the international order.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid, pp. 261.

Figure 6: Possible Paths of Supra-Regionalism



Source: change from VK Aggarwal, MG Koo, “The Evolution of APEC and ASEM: Implications of the New East Asian Bilateralism.”

European Journal of East Asian Studies. vol. 4 (2). 2005. pp. 259, 233-262(30)

4. Conclusion

Continuing chapter 3 and chapter 4 analysis, in this chapter, we analyze power realignment. We determine the possible pathways of power realignment by the concrete relations of geography-history and co-governance. Economic cooperation is the start of political interaction. A broader look at history suggests that the same Asian goals for an economic and political system existed long before colonial repression²⁰⁰. Existing power and rising power interknit complex international relations. East Asia's emergence and integration have affected the world order change, Europe and the America have their own regional organization, respectively, but the international society is the related company; it is not necessary to remain independent to uphold their superiority in international society. Each power realignment factor will create continuous change. Each individual is like a junction, is connecting the individuals, which mutually affects the constitution of international society, and the construction of the international society movement order. East Asia's emergence also is like this; East Asia has its unique geography, culture and the historical development. North America always sees East Asia as an important exterior region; however, Europe once left East Asia after World War II's revival. The globalization developments, the European and American regional establishment, give East Asia the chance for a world role attempt; such attempt also increased North America and Europe to cooperate with East Asia. Not only is this attempt part of the region's interior common interest, but also the international order's hope for stability.

The attempt has brought the possibility of co-governance. Three regions, two supra-regional organizations different mechanisms and the rules, showed

²⁰⁰ Frank, Andre Gunder. ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1998).

co-governance without government, at the same time that cooperation and competition were occurring. Its power structure may be divided into the material structure and the cognitive structure. The material structure, because of slow system change, was often considered one kind of static process; it explained the government processes' concrete condition. Three regions' co-governance showed that the system has a superior existence. East Asia took the variable of power realignment that changed past states of equilibrium, and emerged seeking the new balance process. Three regions in the globalization development, and its inter-regional organization all unfold multi-dimensionally, unceasing dialogue and communications.

However, the material structure still needed the cognitive structure to give significant support, explaining the actors' ideas which transformed to the system. Regional integration and supra-regional governance allow respective regions to establish their own culture and the special characteristic foreign behavior. It is similar to East Asia, in the process which emerges, unceasing adjustments as the characteristic which has to fuse capitalism and the international order. In addition, establishment and intercommunication of citizen culture, also gave the government cooperation another pipeline, in cushion politics and the economic frontage conflict. From East Asia's historical and geographic characteristics, East Asia is at variance with the characteristics of Western culture. Analyzing the three regions regarding the cooperation characteristic, the European Union rules the system; North America takes the leading position and the benefit, while East Asia emphasizes independence, looking for a suitable "Asia-ness". But one may realize, with a succession of regional conformity and in the inter-regional system process, that East Asia belongs to its own citizen culture (as with the European Union and North America). As Samuel Huntington said it might become the civilized conflict, also as Rosenau to think is one

kind of news transmission the difference easy to make the cushion for the government.

From the above power structure, we may extend the authority and role analysis; this analysis makes us to understand regional cooperation, and the difference which it produces. The balance in international relations, seem a supply and demand condition, unceasingly seeking the possibility of balance. In a stable international system, role-power misalignment would not exist, so all states would possess a role-power misalignment factor of zero. East Asia when emerging, because of potential power search and the reorientation of role, can panic existing powers; seeking to balance the process, may provide East Asia and the existing power with two aspects to seek the pathway of power realignment.

Which way is most possible? The East Asian region integration process is one kind necessary tendency, but for internal political subjects involving economics, the economic subject pulls is lifting the political subject, like the “spaghetti bowl”, although so far it has not led to a serious conflict, but time is needed for forgiveness. Externally, the European Union and North America have respective hopes, the region is unable to resist the strength of globalization, because the international politics’ mutual effects, but the European Union and North America still could strengthen their own region organization ability. Region organization in international society is overlapping and nested. An international politically organization, the UN and economic organization, the WTO, was still the global behavior body competition field territory under such rules, causing diverse possible pathways for the power realignment.

No matter what kind of way is taken, we all believe in the international relations

conflict viewpoint; actors in favor of a peaceful resolution often, in setting up regimes, or official and informal communication, are the main means. East Asia and its partners are widely seeking an overarching goal; actors can use the legal and normative framework of the cooperation to substantiate their claims and de-legitimize previously dominant positions. If used by governments, this path relies on what is otherwise seen as a problematic feature of actors' governance, its tangled interest, in that political leaders use the cooperation framework to push through policies in peaceful negotiations.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

1. Power Realignment of International Competition

1.1 Power Realignment is a System Analysis

A system is established by some interacting units²⁰¹. A useful theory must deal with both systems and units in same way, so the question is how best to proceed.²⁰² However, a useful theory also needs a hypothesis to circumscribe its field. Power realignment is similar to simple analysis but actually involves a series of dynamic transformations, affected by the internal capability and cognition of external actors. The adjustment of the power constrains itself from historical reversibility. On the one hand, the current stakeholder does not want its power or interest to be threatened or weakened, and the followers do not want to be changed, either.

The events that will direct the future are not always attainable via the hegemony method. The unpredictability of transformation concludes in the inertia of history. That is the reversibility in power adjustment. What we can do instead, is to make predictions and suggest what information and conditions could be followed. In order to estimate the power realignment, we have to limit the system we discussed, and set up the number of actors we researched, as well as the critical key elements. We can understand the changing conditions by probing into the changes of an individual actor. By probing into all the actors, we can understand the changes in the system. The inaccuracy of estimation comes from the simplification of element configuration and the unpredictability of an individual actor.

²⁰¹ N. Waltz Kenneth. 1979. *Theory of International Politics*, (McGraw-Hill Higher Education), pp. 40.

²⁰² M Brecher. 1999. "International Studies in the Twentieth Century and Beyond" *International Studies Quarterly*, vol.43, no.2, pp. 213-263.

1.2 Power Realignment is for Seeking Potentiality

A useful theory must provide recommendation for future. The study of international realignment has to stress reification and empiricism: the study of power is its represent motive of self-interest, and to achieve the maximum satisfaction. Events such as the occurrence of competition and cooperation represent the actors' intentions. The study of events surpasses in value those on language. It does not, however, deny the value of nominalism. Actors' language represents what it wants and what caused its role. Positive behaviors reveal capability (or power). The critique of positivism purports that the social world can be shown to be a composite of a number of behavioral regularities which could eventually be described by social law akin to that of natural science²⁰³. Knowledge is identifiable only by reliable empiricism. Essentially comparing East Asian development to international interaction tends towards realism and positivism.

The rising of East Asia and convergence of foreign policies are the result of a series of historical processes, each event point changing East Asia, with existing powers causing the international order to change gradually through inter-communications and interactions. East Asia participates in the operation of existing powers and is causing international power realignment as can be recognized by D. Easton's systematic analysis²⁰⁴. For political phenomenon, it adopts an approach of integration that

²⁰³Sayer R. Andrew, Realism and Social Science. (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2000).

²⁰⁴ Actor changes its policy for external pressure. The output of policy and action will become a input after the influence in environment through feedback. The rising East Asia is a element moves EU and North America to correct Asia's policy, which is a output but a inducement to demand East Asia intregation or corss-regional cooperation.

emphasizes that society tends toward order and integration. Actors grope after stability and convergence. Learning, for actors, is an important process of cognition in moving toward co-ordination and consensus.

2. Equilibrium in the 21st Century East Asia

“Power realignment” tried to explain rising power seeks possible ways to jump into international arena when system changes. Rising power brings a new order through intrinsic characteristic, at the same time international system feedback continual adjustment by existing power. East Asia is the region with the greatest movement on the power realignment. From power change within the process of authoritative reorganization, we may discover several characteristics in East Asia.

1. Contradiction between pluralism and the hegemony in the process of realignment.

The international society of emerging East Asia does not resemble the international environment when Europe emerged. The different developed elements were considered is needs to manage. In the interior, up to now the colonized consciousness in East Asia still could not be completely separated from the economy and the military protection of North American. North America wants the leading position which it already has, Europe to start to actually win East Asia's cooperation; such behavior lets East Asia establish its own political region.




Fig. 7: Environment-Input-Output-Feedback-Modell
David Easton. *A Systems Analysis of Political Life*, New York, 1965. pp. 32.

In the exterior, the global system has an assimilative function, although the interior has the difference. East Asia positive seeks one in the different western culture to advance regional interest by orient foreign behavior.

2. The process of power realignment in East Asian, no longer relies on past confederative relations of power balance. Two supra-regional organizations, also all has the mutual diversion function. Regarding complex vertical and horizontal relations, actually all members in the international society desire international order stability.
3. The pathway of realignment may have different situations occur according to different possibilities. East Asia integration is a necessary tendency but within still has many variables. In East Asia, there are evolutionary gap, diverse culture and political disputes that all affect the speed and model of integration. Furthermore, North America and EU have constantly regional enlargement that will influence the Asian cooperated policy, e.g., investment and technologic training. However, only if East Asia capabilities begin to converge with East Asian international role will regulative order in this tri-lateral relationship likely cease.

3. Critique and Additional Research Question

3.1 Critique

The variable deviation is difficult to control. In the process of power realignment, the independent variable is the gravity of research center, but by no means are other variables in the realistic society are fixed invariables, but for avoiding studying intricately, we simplify many indefinite elements. Furthermore, we all understand the power realignment overweight possibility from foreign policy and statements. “Discordant messages” and “discontinuity of expectations” at critical points, together

with a sense of threat and perceived injustice regarding state demands provoke major change in the movement. This can affect our judgment of realignment; therefore, we only can make the plans for possible pathways.

3.2 Additional Research Question

This article mainly makes a preliminary concept plan for a process of power realignment; this concept need more cases for evidence and revision. Discussions of power realignment may be from vertical and horizontal dimensions, but mainly concerns the main actors in the spatial definition transformation. The power realignment originally was the discussion power change in the system; it has a certain spatial scope hypothesis. Furthermore, the realignment emphasizes balance-seeking that also provides policy-makers guidelines to analyze alternate policies. We acknowledge that the balance is dynamic, instability is normal in international society, although in international politics systemic change, people always argued that it is static because the change is slow. In this paper, the hypothesis is that system is dynamic and offers actors multiform opportunities and challenges. Nevertheless, the external policy has to consider inherent ideology (culture). This provides a research question that is studying in onefold issue. The power realignment proceeds from the historical culture to understand differences between actors' foreign policy behavior, which is alliance or isolation. However, it needs more case studies to prove or correct process of power realignment. Hence, power realignment is a conception in not only international level, but also a peculiar subject when analyzing the redistribution of energy, the economical or the military power.

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