



Media Frames of Climate Justice in China

Dissertation

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by
Yan Cheng

Supervised by:
Prof. Dr. Jörn Ahrens
Prof. Dr. Andreas Langenohl

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Abstract

This study is motivated by the pivotal role of media in shaping public discourse on climate issues and China's evolving position in global climate governance. Timely and effective climate action is unlikely to be achieved without China's active participation in international cooperation. However, a critical challenge of this lies in defining the historical, current, and future responsibilities of nations and individuals in addressing climate change. These determinations are deeply intertwined with the concept of climate justice. This research seeks to address the following questions: (1) What media frames of climate justice emerge from the analysis of Chinese newspapers? (2) Are there notable similarities or differences in how climate justice is framed across different newspapers? (3) What are the social and political implications of these similarities and differences in media framing? To address these questions, this study employs a multidisciplinary theoretical framework combined with a linguistically grounded critical discourse analysis method.

The findings reveal that media frames of climate justice in China predominantly reflect elite discourses, emphasizing climate diplomacy and consistently advocating for principles such as distributive justice, the historical responsibility principle, the equal per capita emissions principle, and the right to development. While China firmly upholds these principles, it also demonstrates a willingness to engage in international cooperation, particularly in areas such as technology transfer and emission reductions based on the carbon intensity principle. Energy security emerges as a cornerstone of China's national climate policy and diplomatic stance, shaped by its cultural context and modern historical trajectory. China's self-identification in global climate politics is notably ambiguous, oscillating between portraying itself as a developing nation and asserting its role as a responsible major power. This duality reflects both China's shifting position within the global system and its internal tension between maintaining the status quo and assuming greater responsibility.

While the media frames of climate justice across different outlets exhibit significant similarities, differences in framing are observed between state-owned and market-oriented media, with the latter taking a more bottom-up perspective. This study moves beyond the prevailing nation-state prism in conceptualizing climate justice and instead advocates for a more cosmopolitan perspective that foregrounds the individual's role both as an autonomous agent and as a member of a collective entity. Ultimately, the research underscores the significant potential of Chinese media to influence public discourse and calls for its more effective and professional utilization in fostering a nuanced understanding of climate justice and promoting collective action.

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Declaration of Originality

I hereby declare:

I have written the submitted dissertation independently, without unauthorized external assistance, and only using the resources specified in the dissertation. All passages that are quoted verbatim or paraphrased from published sources, as well as all information based on oral communications, are clearly identified as such. In the research I conducted and referenced in this dissertation, I have adhered to the principles of good scientific practice as outlined in the *Regulations of Justus Liebig University Giessen for Ensuring Good Scientific Practice*.

Date:

Signature:

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List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

ACSA	Abstract Collective Social Actor
ADP	Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action
AIJ	Activities Implemented Jointly
AISA	Abstract Individual Social Actor
AMCEN	African Ministerial Conference on the Environment
AOSIS	Alliance of Small Island States
APP	Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate
ATP	Ability to Pay Principle
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa
CAHOSCC	Committee of African Heads of State and Government on Climate Change
CANGO	China Association for NGO Cooperatio
CAS	Chinese Academy of Sciences
CASS	Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
CAST	China Association for Science and Technology
CBDR	Common But Differentiated Responsibilities
CBH	21st Century Business Herald
CBN	China Business News
CCAN	China Climate Action Network
CCEER	China Center for Energy Economics Research
CCSA	Concrete Collective Social Actor
CCTV	China Central Television
CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
CDM	Clean Development Mechanism
CEES	Chinese Ecological Economics Society
CEN	China Environment News
CERs	Certified Emission Reduction units
CISA	Concrete Individual Social Actor
CMA	China Meteorological Administration
CNKI	China National Knowledge Infrastructure
CNS	China News Service
COP	Conference of the Parties
COSTIND	Commission for Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense
CPC	Communist Party of China
EO	The Economic Observer
FON	Friends of Nature
FYP	Five-Year Plan
GAPP	General Administration of Press and Publication
GDR	Greenhouse Development Rights
GHG	Greenhouse Gas
GLOBE	Global Legislators Organization for a Balanced Environment
IEA	International Energy Agency
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INDC	Intended Nationally Determined Contributions
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
ISES	International Solar Energy Society
JI	Joint Implementation
LDCs	The least developed countries

MEE	Ministry of Ecology and Environment
MEP	Ministry of Environmental Protection
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MOST	Ministry of Science and Technology
MRV	Measurement, Reporting, and Verification
NAMAs	Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions
NASA	National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NCCP	National Climate Change Programme
NCSC	National Center for Climate Change Strategy and International Cooperation
NDRC	National Development and Reform Commission
NEA	National Energy Administration
NEPA	National Environmental Action Plan
NPC	National People's Congress
NRTA	National Radio and Television Administration
NYT	New York Times
OAPEC	Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPEC	Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
PD	People's Daily
PPP	Polluter Pays Principle
PSC	Politburo Standing Committee
RTS	Radio and Television Station of Shanghai
SEPA	State Environmental Protection Administration
SMA	State Meteorological Administration
SMD	Southern Metropolis Daily
SMN	Southern Metropolitan Newspaper
SOD	Scientific Outlook on Development
SOE	State-owned Enterprise
ST	Sample Text
STD	Science and Technology Daily
SW	Southern Weekly
TODA	Textually-Oriented Discourse Analysis
TRIPs	The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
UN	United Nations
UNCM	UN Climate Mechanism
UNDESA	UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNESCAP	UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
WB	World Bank
WMO	World Meteorological Organization
WRI	World Resources Institute
WWF	World Wide Fund for Nature

Chapter 1: Introduction

The introductory chapter of the dissertation explains the motivation for focusing on the media's role in communicating climate justice in China. It then argues the necessity and significance of conducting this research. Finally, it briefly introduces the content of each subsequent chapter.

Climate change is a global issue that necessitates global cooperation. The key challenge in such cooperation is defining the extent of each country's historical, current, and future responsibility when addressing climate change. These decisions are often closely tied to the concept of climate justice.¹ Justice, broadly speaking, "implies greater legitimacy and can persuade parties with conflicting interests to cooperate more closely on collective actions" (Grasso 2011: 361). However, social and political positions on climate change vary between interest groups and within the same group of actors (Chatterton et al. 2013). To combat climate change globally, it is vital to create a relatively just solution to burden-sharing and climate governance acceptable to as many countries as possible. This necessity has driven scholars to explore the diverse notions of climate justice held by different actors.

China is an attractive subject for such research due to its status as the largest developing country in transition. Its economic and social development has undergone unprecedented changes over the past four decades. Concurrently, the international political economy and global order have evolved. These internal and external changes place China in a complex position within global climate governance. On the one hand, studying China is crucial for international climate governance because it is now the world's largest carbon emitter. Therefore, its participation in global climate cooperation is essential. On the other hand, the climate issue is complex since "any decision or process might be considered just by some and unjust by others, either because they prioritise different justice dimensions or they attach different principles to them" (Martin 2013: 99). As argued, "the differences between (and within) the distinct approaches to justice [...] will start to have significant practical implications for specific actors, and so complicate efforts to make progress" (Gardiner 2011: 316). Thus, researchers must explore which justice principles China adheres to. This research will aid in understanding China's climate policy and diplomacy, thereby contributing to the effective inclusion of China in global climate governance.

To achieve this goal, this dissertation analyzes the media frames of climate justice in Chinese newspapers. Within the global response to climate change,

¹ Some scholars prefer using the term "equity," but they convey a similar concept: "If we are to have any hope of pursuing equitable cooperation, we must try to arrive at a consensus about what equity means" (Shue 2010: 101). However, this project does not aim to delineate the philosophical differences between "justice," "equity," or "fairness."

various social and political actors compete to frame climate justice by issuing official documents, disseminating information through the media, or organizing actions and protests. The media's role in communicating climate change is highlighted because, as Schäfer and Schlichting argue (2014: 143), "climate change and its manifold implications are not directly and easily perceivable" and most citizens learn about it from the media, which is the main source of information about the issue for "lay" people, stakeholders, and decision-makers. Carvalho also contends that the media is an important agent in the production, reproduction, and transformation of the meaning of climate change (Carvalho 2005, 2010). Indeed, scholars in media and communication studies and those from other disciplines, such as sociology and politics, are increasingly recognizing the role of the media in this context. Beck (2010) claims that the media is a battlefield of different discourses fighting to define the meaning of climate politics. Moreover, framing analysis significantly influences the impact of communication. Entman posits that the frame of a news segment can be enlarged so that media reports may penetrate the consciousness of the public *en masse* that is minimally aware of most specific issues and events. Conversely, the frame can also be shrunk to miniaturize an event, diminishing the amount, prominence, and duration of media coverage and, thus, public awareness (Entman 1991: 9-10).

Climate justice has emerged as a new meta-frame (Goodman 2009). While scholars from various fields, such as philosophy, politics, economics, sociology, law, and environmental studies, have discussed climate justice, contributions from media and communication scholars are lacking, particularly on the media frames of climate justice in China. To contribute to the discussion on climate justice from a communication and media studies perspective, this dissertation explores the following questions:

- (1) Which media frames of climate justice are identified through the newspaper analysis carried out within the dissertation?
- (2) Are there any similarities or differences in the media frames of climate justice used in different newspapers? If so, what are they?
- (3) What are the social and political implications of those similarities and differences in media framing?

Although researching media frame of climate justice in China is necessary and meaningful, there is a dearth of relevant studies. A meta-analysis of media representations of climate change indicates that most studies have concentrated on developed Western countries. While there has been a slight increase in research interest in the media coverage of climate change in Asian, Latin American, and African countries, it remains insufficient. Schäfer and Schlichting argue (2014: 156) that "a stronger diversification of current research in terms of the countries and media analyzed is needed" and "more diverse scholarly research may help to properly grasp the varying understandings of, and perspectives on, climate change

that exist around the globe and to feed them into political decision-making” (Schäfer and Schlichting 2014: 154). More details about the current scope of research in the field are presented in the following chapter. This dissertation aims to enrich the diversification of available research by focusing on the media coverage in China in order to contribute to academic discussions on climate change in general and climate justice in China specifically.

Moreover, the research also holds practical significance since it generates knowledge on China’s role in global climate governance, satisfying growing Western interest² in China as a significant player in global affairs. The results of the analyses in the dissertation and the subsequent discussions might also be helpful to policymakers.

The following chapter outlines academic discussions on media framing, climate justice, international political economy, cosmopolitan perspectives on climate justice, and climate politics in China. Thus, this chapter provides the theoretical framework and an explanation of any concepts necessary to answer the research questions. The chapter on methodology describes critical discourse analysis as the analytical tool and argues for applying a language-based discourse analysis. The fourth chapter presents brief quantitative analytical results from a broader sample corpus and comprehensive qualitative analysis results based on a narrow sample corpus. The fifth chapter contains a summary and comparison of all analytical results. The sixth and final chapter concludes the dissertation with reflections on the analysis and the research. Furthermore, in this chapter, suggestions are offered for potential further academic study and practical action.

² According to an article published in RUGlobal, the official magazine for Roskilde University in Denmark, a field trip to Brussels for individuals interested in operational procedures was arranged. Politicians from European Union institutions met with the trip participants. The magazine article states, “...there were also a number of areas that all participants touched upon, including COP15 and the impacts of global warming, the future role of China ...” (Anne Frida Christiansen, What is actually going on “down in the EU”? In: RUGlobal: Information and debate from Roskilde University, Number 13, June 2010, pp. 36-39)

Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework

This chapter outlines academic discussions on media framing, climate justice, international political economy, cosmopolitan perspective on climate justice, and climate politics in China. It is expected to provide the theoretical framework and an explanation of concepts necessary to answer the research questions. To be specific, theoretical discussions on media framing and climate justice help to identify the media frames of climate justice in the newspapers studied in the analysis section of the dissertation. Academic discussions on international political economy, cosmopolitan perspectives on climate justice, and climate politics in China serve as guidelines to explain the social and political implications of the identified media frames of climate justice, also considering the Chinese characteristics of these media frames. At the end of this chapter, there is a summary from a sociological perspective.

2.1 Media and Framing Theories

Since this dissertation explores the media frames of climate justice in China, it is necessary first to introduce some theoretical discussions on media and framing analysis.

2.1.1 The Media's Role in Communicating Climate Change

2.1.1.1 The Media's Role in Communicating Climate Change as an Environmental Problem

As McQuail (2000: 416) wrote, "The entire study of mass communication is based on the assumption that the media have significant effects." In modern societies, the news media plays a central role in raising awareness and disseminating information. "Not only do the news media largely determine our awareness of the world at large, supplying the major elements for our pictures of the world, they also influence the prominence of those elements in the picture!" (McCombs 1994: 4). Anderson (2011: 535) argues that the "public draws most of its knowledge" about the issue from the mass media. Although climate change has evolved into a meta discourse, it was initially regarded as an environmental issue. Studies in environmental communication have shown that "social concern for specific environmental problems does not depend on the objective severity of each problem but on the level of media attention devoted" (Lopera and Moreno 2014: 5). Therefore, the present research highlights the role of the media in communicating climate change in general and climate justice specifically.

In the past decades, media coverage of climate change has dramatically increased in many countries, especially developed ones. For instance, during the period from 1975 to 1987, German media showed a “low but continuous level of attention to anthropogenic causes of climate change,” and “[the] peak of attention was reached in 1992, the year of the UNCED conference in Rio de Janeiro.” (Weingart et al. 2000: 276) In comparison, Carvalho discovered that in the British media, “between January 1985 and December 2000 the three newspapers³ published 3697 articles in which climate change was the main or one of the main themes (and over 9000 articles with the keywords ‘climate change’ or ‘global warming’ or ‘greenhouse effect’)” (Carvalho 2005: 3-4). In accordance with the increase in media coverage of climate change, research on climate change communication has also burgeoned. Scholars (Shrestha et al. 2014: 162) have summarized that the focus of these studies varies from media framing (Antilla 2005; Doultou and Brown 2009; Nisbet and Mooney 2007; Peters and Heinrichs 2008), to perceptions of climate change (Weingart et al. 2000), emotion attached to climate change discourses (Höjjer 2010), ideological influences (Carvalho 2007), and media reporting and public understanding of climate change (Bell 1999), as well as correlation between climate change coverage and public concern (Sampei and Aoyagi-Usui 2009).

2.1.1.2 The Media’s Role in Communicating Climate Change as a Global Crisis

Due to its enormous impact on almost all aspects of the human world, climate change is more and more perceived as a global crisis. Today, global crises are publicly defined, legitimated, and mobilized as “global crises” by the world’s news media (Cottle 2009: 495). The best example may be the United Nations (UN) climate conferences. They constitute crucial defining, legitimating, and mobilizing events when it comes to the global understanding of climate change and climate politics.

Although global crises call for global cooperation, the problem is that the national outlook tends to be taken for granted as a journalistic norm and ideological framework (Berglez and Olausson 2011; Olausson and Berglez 2014), and the traditional national outlook is not particularly suitable for today’s globalized society and the proliferation of global crises and threats. Therefore, scholars advocate that a global outlook is increasingly needed in today’s journalism (Olausson and Berglez 2014: 259-260). In Berglez’s (2007: 151) words a global outlook “makes it into an everyday routine to investigate how people and their actions, practices, problems, life conditions etc. in different parts of the world are interrelated.” In order to facilitate a certain degree of interconnectedness, global crises need to be staged in the media to become “cosmopolitan events” (Beck 2010: 260). When the global public has an awareness of interconnectedness, it becomes a “cosmopolitan public”

³ The Guardian, The Independent, and The Times.

(Chouliaraki 2008). As a member of the cosmopolitan public, the media audience sees themselves not only as a part of their own communities but also as a part of the world confronted with risks. Drawing upon the theoretical discussions on the media's role in communicating climate change as a global crisis, this dissertation examines whether the Chinese news media report on the climate issue from a purely national outlook or a more cosmopolitan outlook.

2.1.1.3 A Critical Approach Focusing on Power Relations between Social Actors

Because of its presumed influence, the media is “a site on which various social groups, institutions, and ideologies struggle over the definition and construction of social reality” (Gurevitch and Levy 1985: 19).

Social actors compete to get their voices represented. Dominant groups in society reproduce their social and political power through material and intellectual means, by the production and diffusion of ideas that allow them to maintain their hegemonic positions. As a dominant cultural system in present societies, “mass media function as a key channel through which this process takes place” (Maesele 2011: 86). In this process, two issues are central to explore: “who gains access to media representation; and what overall themes emerge in the media treatment of an issue” (Trumbo 1996: 270). In other words, media is “an arena of competition between actors who claim to say what is and what should be” (Mormont and Dasnoy 1995: 61). Among all actors in the arena of competition, journalists are the first to be considered. As argued by Gamson and Modigliani (1989: 2), “public opinion is part of the process by which journalists and other cultural entrepreneurs develop and crystallize meaning in public discourse.” They not only communicate information but also “represent” the public interest (Mormont and Dasnoy 1995: 63). Although journalists play an important role in constructing the media discourses on an issue, they do not work alone but rather in media institutions at meso-level and in a society with specific cultural and political characteristics at macro-level. Influenced and constrained by the media institutions and broader social, cultural, and political conditions, journalists tend to trust news releases and other easily accessible materials originating from the government and other powerful claim-makers (Anderson 2009). Regarding climate change communication, Olausson (2009) explores how mass media coverage of climate change issues is largely consonant with the concerns of policymakers. A good example of the correlation between media attention to climate change and policymakers can be found in the substantial media coverage of the documentary “An Inconvenient Truth” produced by former U.S. Vice President Al Gore. Therefore, when analyzing media samples, the present research pays special attention to the background of journalists, the institution they work for, and the broader social and political context in which the event took place.

Journalists and media institutions construct the world in specific ways rather than presenting a neutral picture. As Carragee and Roefs (2004: 223) note,

examination of the relationship between hegemony and framing also draws attention to the uncontested realm of media discourse; within this realm, particular frames so dominate the discourse that they are taken as common sense or as “transparent descriptions of reality, not as interpretations.” Therefore, to identify the overall themes in the media coverage of an issue, it is essential to scrutinize media content carefully by taking power relations into consideration. Climate change affects everyone on Earth, particularly those with the least power. In light of this, scholars recommend that “future media discourse studies on climate change to a greater extent take a critical approach and investigate how power and power relations are (re)produced through the media by using sourcing procedures and other journalistic routines adapted to the new conditions of journalism, powerful lobbyists operating in the field of climate politics, as well as ideological language” (Olausson and Berglez 2014: 252). In response to this critical approach to media studies on climate change, the present dissertation applies critical discourse analysis in the analysis chapter. The approach will be outlined in the methodology chapter below.

2.1.1.4 State of Mass Communication Research on Climate Change in China

In the following paragraphs, I present the state of research on media representation of climate change and climate justice in China in both Chinese and Western language academia. Those who are Chinese but do research in English are categorized into the latter.

While climate change has been intensively reported on in developed countries, especially those where the public has been long informed of climate issues by the media, such as Germany and Sweden, climate change is a relatively new term in the Chinese public sphere. Not until recent years has the Chinese government realized the importance of addressing the climate issue and actively participating in the global climate negotiations. Before the climate issue was put on the political agenda, the Chinese media seldom reported on it. I conducted a brief data search in the database *cnki*,⁴ which is the largest Chinese academic database, including journals, newspapers, degree dissertations, etc. I searched articles under the thematic terms “climate change” (qihou bianhua) and “global warming” (quanqiu biannuan) in the “China Core Newspapers Full-text Database” (zhongguo zhongyao baozhi quanwen shujuku) from 1975 to 1999. The result was zero. No media reports of climate change in 25 years. From 2007 media reports of climate change in China began to rise sharply. Carvalho checked the *China Daily*, which suggested that climate change did not gain prominence in the public sphere until 2007. There were 15 articles in the *China Daily* containing the phrase “climate change” in 2001. This number rose to 117 in 2006 and dramatically increased to 635 in 2007 (Carvalho 2008). Although this is a micro trend of media representation of climate change in

⁴ CNKI's overseas version of the database can be accessed here <https://oversea.cnki.net/index/> (accessed 16 November 2024)

the *China Daily*, it reflects, to some extent, the general media landscape in relation to climate change communication in China. I searched media articles again under the thematic terms “climate change” in the “China Core Newspapers Full-text Database” from 2000 to 2009. The data showed that the number of journalistic reports increased from 6 in 2000 to 343 in 2006 and rising considerably to 1525 in 2007. This is consistent with the pattern found in Carvalho’s research. In 2008 the number rose steadily to 1628 and then dramatically to 4632 in 2009 when the Copenhagen Summit was held.

In accordance with the lack of media reports on climate change in China, research on media representation in China is also scarce. Research on climate communication began after the 2009 Copenhagen Conference (Zheng and Yang 2019; Yuan 2014). Regarding climate communication in China, Chinese scholars have indicated (Yang et al. 2010: 209; Lan 2012) that the quantity of climate reporting has increased, especially since the 2009 Copenhagen Conference. Moreover, the content of the reports has expanded from a single environmental issue to a meta-issue that encompasses economic, political, and social issues. Additionally, the subjects of the reporting have become more diversified, ranging from print media to include newspapers, television, the internet, and other forms of media. However, scholars have also pointed out problems in China's climate change communication. They generally believe that despite great progress, China's climate change communication lacks professionalism and continuity (Tao 2011; Jia 2007). The media often focused on climate conferences instead of paying enough attention to the daily lives of ordinary people. Some scholars have pointed out that Chinese journalists did not interview domestic scientists frequently (Ji and Liu 2013; Jia 2007; He 2007: 58), and the voices of the public were somewhat absent (Jia 2007). Although some scholars have stressed that the government plays the leading role in climate change communication (Zheng 2014: 22; Zheng et al. 2010; Wang 2013), other scholars have noted that the media's climate reporting agenda is too influenced by the government's agenda-setting (Ye 2011; Ji and Liu 2013). The media's subject consciousness in climate reporting is weak, and it tends to passively "act on behalf of the government." That is to say, the media simplifies climate issues as a form of political propaganda or a task assigned by higher authorities (Yang et al. 2010: 211). The media reporting was criticized for being predominantly eulogistic (Ye 2011). Although most media did not question the scientific nature of climate change, and some scholars have proposed to "promote scientific consensus on climate change" (Zheng 2014: 22), some scholars have criticized that China's climate change communication lacks reporting on the essence of science (Ji and Liu 2013). "Chinese reports mostly take climate change as a fact, while foreign reports focus more on reporting controversies" (He 2007: 58). Some experts have pointed out that there have always been different voices on the issue of climate change

internationally, and that the “mainstream opinion” does not necessarily represent the “correct opinion” (Tan 2011: 65).

Research on climate change reporting in Chinese academia has several characteristics. Many studies have analyzed the communication of climate change within the context of international diplomacy (Li 2011; Wang 2010), with a particular focus on media communication at UN Climate Change Conferences, such as the Copenhagen Conference (Chen and Xu 2010; Yuan 2011), Bonn Conference (Qin 2018), and Durban Conference (Tao 2012; Zheng and Gong 2012).

In terms of theory and methodology, many Chinese scholars have drawn upon frame analysis theory (Li 2013) and often used quantitative content analysis and textual analysis methods. The most frequently analyzed newspapers are the *People's Daily* (Hu 2018; Chen and Xu 2010; Liu 2013; Jiang and Lei 2010; Zheng and Yang 2019; Jia 2007; Yuan 2011; Zeng et al. 2014), *Southern Metropolis Daily* (Ji and Liu 2013; Zeng et al. 2014), and *Science and Technology Daily* (Jia 2007; Zeng et al. 2014).

Regarding research themes, a particularly notable characteristic is that many studies have focused on China's national image in climate change communication (Qin 2018; Zheng and Gong 2012; Zhang 2013; Ji and Liu 2013; Yuan 2011; Zhang 2010, 2014; Liu 2010; Zhang 2012). Some of these studies compared the construction of China's image by domestic and foreign media (Jiang and Lei 2010) and some by different Chinese newspapers (Chen and Xu 2010; Jiang and Lei 2010). A common point of these studies is that the image of China in the eyes of foreign media tended to be negative. In contrast, Chinese media often constructed China as a responsible major country that has been actively addressing climate change. Some scholars believe that this discrepancy is due to "the biased information provided by Western media to the public on China's role in climate change" (Zhang 2010: 19). However, other scholars have pointed out that despite some negative reporting, foreign media generally adhered to the principle of objectivity (Hao and Hao 2010). At the same time, some scholars have argued that the image of China in Chinese media was somewhat "self-aggrandizing" (Yuan 2011).

The vast majority of scholars have argued that climate reporting in Chinese media emphasizes the reasonableness of China, as a developing major country, facing the tasks of developing the economy and improving the standard of living for its people. However, an increasing number of scholars have also proposed that climate change reporting should transcend national boundaries (Zheng and Li 2010: 35; Yuan 2013) and avoid the old thinking of "confrontation between developed and developing countries" (Yuan 2014: 25). Domestic emission reduction issues should be viewed from a global governance perspective. Zhang Xiaoying pointed out that China needs to construct and shape a role as a "designer or planner of the future international order" to avoid arousing aversion and controversy (Zhang 2012: 41).

A few scholars have also noticed deeper issues in China's climate communication, such as global political and economic inequality (Jiang 2010; Yu 2010), ecological debt (Yang 2008), and transferred emissions (Yang 2008). Some scholars hold a "conspiracy theory," believing that the European Union and the United States have raised an environmental banner as a political tool with motives that are not "pure" (Yang 2008). In response to this conspiracy theory, there are also critical voices. He Gang has suggested that China currently talks more about the impact of global climate change on itself and less about China's impact on the global climate. He argues that this situation needs to change. In his view, by not discussing the impact of China's development on the world, it makes it difficult to communicate with the West. Climate change is a shared responsibility of developed and developing countries, and China should take a more proactive stance in bearing global responsibilities in order to gain the recognition and support of the international community (He 2007: 58).

This is the state of climate communication and research on climate communication in China. Unfortunately, discourse related to "climate justice" seldom appears in media reports on climate change, and scholars also rarely use the climate justice framework to analyze media texts when studying media reports on climate change (Ji and Chen 2016: 60). However, this is why the present research can contribute a lot to the landscape of media and communication research on climate change in China.

In contrast to the shortage of climate change research in Chinese academia, much research has been carried out on the media discourse of climate change in international academia⁵ (Boyce and Lewis 2009; Carvalho⁶ 2005, 2007a, 2007b; Eide et al. 2009; Weingart et al. 2000). When it comes to China and climate change, Western scholars tend to examine energy policy or the CDM (Clean Development Mechanism) in China. Most of such research has been done from the perspectives of political science⁷ or natural science.⁸ Instead, this research explored climate change in China in the domain of media and communication studies. In recent years some communication researchers have paid attention to the media representation of China in relation to climate change and the climate negotiations. Eide and her colleagues (Eide et al. 2009) carried out an international collaboration that took Chinese media into consideration. They have carried out a project focusing on the

⁵ The special issue of "Environmental Communication: A Journal of Nature and Culture" (Vol. 3, Issue 2, 2009) was about discursive constructions of climate change.

⁶ She is also in charge of a project called "The Politics of Climate Change: Discourses and Representations," which is available here <http://www.cecs.uminho.pt/disclimate/indexi.htm> Her team published the research results here http://www.lasics.uminho.pt/ojs/index.php/climate_change (both accessed 16 November 2024)

⁷https://www.polsoz.fu-berlin.de/polwiss/forschung/grundlagen/ffn/forschung/alle_projekte/09_renergo.html (accessed 16 November 2024)

⁸ <http://www.asia-europe.uni-heidelberg.de/de/forschung/c-health-environment/c8.html> (accessed 16 November 2024)

performance of mainstream journalism in covering the “climate summits” in Bali in 2007. This research used content analysis rather than discourse analysis as an approach. Its aim was to examine if climate change opens up an opportunity for forming a global public sphere rather than to explore China's role in the climate politics represented by the media. Wu contributed to filling the gap in research on media representations of China's image in news coverage of global climate change (Wu 2009). In the article “The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: Framing of China in News Media Coverage of Global Climate Change” (Wu 2009), she compared how different media outlets depicted China in relation to climate change. The research is generally a journalistic study of China's representation in news media. My research, however, draws upon critical discourse analysis and social theories, which provide researchers with a broader perspective on the media's representation of China's role in global climate change and explore the social and political implications of this representation. Similarly, no research on the communication of climate justice in Chinese media has been found in non-Chinese academia.

It has to be pointed out that journalists and media are constrained by the social, political, and cultural conditions of the society within which the framing process takes place. In terms of political conditions, the media in China have long been torn between disparate and often conflicting obligations: representing the official voice of the Chinese Communist Party and government; maintaining a unitary political tone; and controlling the political opinion of the masses throughout the country (Xin 2006: 49; Tilt and Xiao 2010: 228). Theoretically speaking, all Chinese media outlets are under the control of the government, whether at the central or provincial levels. However, since the Reform and Opening-up in the 1980s, China's news and information sector has undergone marketization and consolidation (Zhao 1998). Therefore, major media outlets remain under the control of the Party while also increasingly catering to audience demands and consumer choices (Tilt and Xiao 2010: 228). There is always a tension between political control and marketization. To which degree the state controls the media is often determined by who rules the government and its policies of media regulation. In the analysis to come the present research takes this political condition in China into consideration. As far as social conditions are concerned, climate change was not quite familiar to the Chinese public and was not well perceived as a threat in the past. China is one of the most populous countries in the world, and different social groups in the country vary in their abilities and opportunities to get access to knowledge of climate change and social resources to deal with it. The present research not only bears these social differences in mind but also pays attention to the correlation between cultural characteristics and media framing. Journalists write based on their own ideology and understanding of concepts such as justice, which are influenced by a country's cultural and historical experience. In return, what is represented is also a reflection of the culture within which the framing takes place.

2.1.2 Framing Analysis in Media and Communication Studies

Research on framing has been described as suffering from "theoretical and empirical vagueness," as Scheufele (1999: 103) observes. He attributes this problem primarily to the lack of a cohesive theoretical framework within framing studies. These conceptual ambiguities, in turn, create operational challenges, ultimately limiting the comparability of research methodologies and outcomes. In spite of this reality, it is not the aim of the present research to clarify theoretical and empirical vagueness.

According to media and communication theorists mass media have an enormous impact by constructing social reality, namely by framing images of reality (McQuail 2000). The framing concept is considered "a particularly fruitful means to investigate and reveal how media content works ideologically to reinforce dominant ideas, beliefs, and interests by legitimizing and naturalizing them through their media representations as natural and unavoidable (or "common sense")" (Maesele 2011: 86). The concept of framing has been gradually accepted as a distinct theory or research paradigm. In the following paragraphs, I briefly describe the application of framing analysis in media and communication studies, the definition of framing, the influence factors of framing, and the power issue in framing.

2.1.2.1 Definition and Core Concepts of Framing

Sociologist Erving Goffman (1974) is often seen as the one who initially created the concept of "frame" and developed the approach to analyze the organization of social experience. There are several areas in which frame analysis has been developed since Goffman: management and organizational studies, social movement studies, media studies, etc.

Goffman's main work entitled *Frame Analysis* was first published in 1974. It was selected into a serial as one of the key works for journalism and communication studies. However, Dahinden (2006: 51) pointed out in his meta-analysis of framing research that only a few communication and media researchers explicitly draw upon Goffman's framing theory. As Dahinden argued, Goffman's empirical interests did not lie within the field of mass media but within interpersonal and direct daily communication. He concluded that Goffman presented "a fascinating syntax of framing process which is, however, not complemented or completed by a similar necessary frame semantics"⁹ (Dahinden 2006: 51). For this reason, many communication and media studies either completely ignore Goffman's thoughts on the frame concept or only cite him as the "creator" of the frame concept. Frame analysis was extended by Entman's valuable work. His concept of informative framing serves to illustrate the power of written communication (Entman 2004). Therefore, his framing theory has been widely accepted in media and

⁹ This is my translation of the quote from German to English.

communication research and is also drawn upon in my research. Entman viewed the conceptualization of frames as being deliberately adopted and manufactured by emphasizing the intentional selection process, as demonstrated in the classical quotation:

To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation (Entman 1993: 52).

To be more specific, to frame is to “*define problems*---determine what a causal agent is doing with what costs and benefits, usually measured in terms of common cultural values; *diagnose causes*---identify the forces creating the problem; *make moral judgments*---evaluate causal agents and their effects; and *suggest remedies*---offer and justify treatments for the problems and predict their likely effects” (Entman, 1993: 52). Later in his career, Entman interpreted his classic definition of framing as the “process of culling a few elements of perceived reality and assembling a narrative that highlights connections among them to promote a particular interpretation” (Entman 2007: 164). In other words, framing essentially involves *selection* and *salience* (Trumbo 1996: 271).

Many other scholars held similar ideas and highlighted another dimension, namely *exclusion* and *inclusion*, to Entman’s definition. For example, Gitlin concluded that media frames are “persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation, and presentation, of selection, emphasis, and exclusion” (Gitlin 1980: 7). When considering framing, it is essential to identify not only what is being framed and how, but also who or what is not being framed or misframed (Fraser 2008).

2.1.2.2 Media Frames

Framing is important because it has the power to influence the effect of media communication.

Entman stated that the frame of a news portrait can be enlarged so that media reports may penetrate the consciousness of a mass public that is minimally aware of most specific issues and events. The frame can also be shrunk to miniaturize an event, diminishing the amount, prominence, and duration of coverage and, thus, mass awareness (Entman 1991: 9-10). Frame analysis assumes that the press not only sets an agenda in terms of what issues are salient or important for the public but also significantly and critically influences how readers may define problems, attribute causes, evaluate solutions, and act upon the issues that confront them (Entman 1993). News is a prominent discursive site for media and communication researchers to understand what framing is and how framing works (D’Angelo and Kuypers 2010: 1). Boykoff and Smith (2010: 213) also argued that mass media

coverage of climate change has served to “frame” environmental issues for policy actors and the public.

Some researchers of media framing have distinguished between “news frames that are constructed by media personnel and issue frames that emanate from other communicator sources and are conveyed or reported in mass media coverage” (Reber and Berger 2005: 187). Other communicators include government officials, scientists and experts, NGO representatives, other media sources, public voices, and so on. Sometimes, media personnel draw upon other social actors and integrate the issue frames of other social actors into news frames. Sometimes, they apply the issue frames to their reports by partly quoting other social actors or even creatively changing issue frames from other social actors in order to form their own news frames. It has to be pointed out that my research does not differentiate between these two frames in the analysis. Both news frames and issue frames are regarded as media frames. However, my research particularly focuses on how media personnel draw upon other social actors and examine if media personnel creatively change discourses on climate change and climate justice by bringing other social actors into their own discourses. In order to do so, my research appropriates the analytical tool “intertextuality,” which will be discussed in the following chapter.

Not only are media and communication scholars interested in frame analysis of climate change, but scholars from other disciplines are also more and more aware of the media's role in framing climate change in general and climate justice specifically. Caney, one of the leading moral philosophers in climate justice, wrote that “it is vital that those who can and do play a role in communicating the causes, nature, and impacts of climate change—political leaders, climate scientists, journalists, and teachers—‘frame’ the issues surrounding climate change in ways that speak to everyday citizens. This requires, for example, attention to the language used and the norms invoked and it speaks to the role of rhetoric” (Caney 2016: 21). Caney stressed the natural connection between frame analysis and language use. The importance of applying a language-oriented analytical tool to the research will be illustrated in the chapter on methodology.

It has to be pointed out that frames are not transitory or occasional. Instead, frames are “persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation, and presentation, of selection, emphasis, and exclusion, by which symbol-handlers routinely organize discourse.” (Gitlin 1980: 7). Reese made a similar statement, “frames are organizing principles that are socially shared and persistent over time, that work symbolically to meaningfully structure the social world” (Reese 2003: 11). Based on these characteristics frame analysis is very suitable for my research which analyzed the media frames of different newspapers over a period of nine years.

2.1.2.3 Influence Factors of Framing and Power Issues in Framing

In order to analyze media frames, we have to know the influence factors of framing.

Starting from the micro level, the first source of influence is journalists. As the direct social actors of news production, journalists make sense of incoming information and construct frames of the issue reported. The framing process is unavoidably influenced by their ideology, attitudes, and professional norms. The second influence factor is journalistic routines that are internalized in the reporting habits of journalists. For example, the media tend to report bad news or news with conflicts in order to attract the attention of the audience. The third factor influencing news framing is the choice of frames, which is shaped by elements such as the medium's type or political orientation. The political orientation of a media institution is mainly shaped by shareholders who, in many cases, have greater power to influence the news production process and, thus, the framing process. The fourth factor of influence is external sources of influence, such as political actors, authorities, interest groups, and other elites (Scheufele 1999: 115). Among all actors in the framing process, governments can play a large role in how an issue is presented to their citizens since the media privilege interpretations are sponsored and/or disseminated by the government (Zaller and Chiu 1996). The fifth and last source of influence at the macro level is social norms and values that decide which frames are available to journalists and most accepted by the public.

Although the five factors are interrelated, different researchers may emphasize one or more aspects of them. News researcher van Dijk (1985) highlights the influence of the social and professional routines of journalists on the way news is framed. Scheufele emphasizes the influence of both journalists and the institutional characters of the media, writing that "the key question is what kinds of organizational or structural factors of the media system, or which individual characteristics of journalists, can impact the framing of news content" (Scheufele 1999: 115). Gamson and Modigliani (1987: 166) argue that the formation of frames can be explained by an interaction of journalists' norms and practices and the influence of interest groups.

In my opinion, the five factors are only orientation for researchers doing an analysis. Although all of them should be taken into consideration, which of the factors should be paid attention to and to which degree depends on the media text under examination as well as the broader social background within which the media text is produced. For example, when analyzing a journalistic text from countries where the media is strongly influenced by interest groups, such as the U.S., researchers could be more interested in analyzing how interest groups channel information and influence the framing process. In terms of this research, the influence of the media system, government, and social norms and values on the framing process could be more relevant and interesting since, in China, the media practice is more constrained by the state and its social norms and values.

The last, but not the least, point of frame analysis involves power and hegemony issues. Media frames do not develop in a political vacuum but are shaped by competing stakeholders or claims-makers such as politicians, organizations, social

movements, and journalists themselves. The power distribution among these actors is uneven, thus enabling the more powerful among them to first define the issue. Frames are often taken for granted, not subject to questioning, and, therefore, invisible in everyday practice. One major criticism about frame analysis is that very little attention has been given to power issues. Media researchers have stressed that “recognizing the power of and struggle between various stakeholders and their influence on the process of framing a certain issue is vital and is a central component of the analysis of frames in their totality” (Olausson 2009: 423). A study of media frames needs to be located within a network of cultural, economic, and political factors since “frames, as imprints of power, are central to the production of hegemonic meanings” (Carragee and Roefs 2004: 222). Thus, the analysis not only focuses on the type of frames that may emerge from the corpora but also investigates whether there is room for “a heteroglossic environment” (Lam 2016: 143). This research, therefore, aims to investigate whether there are alternative frames from the text. In order to explore the role of power and hegemony imposed by dominant social actors, the present research appropriates the analytical model for critical discourse analysis from Norman Fairclough. This model will be discussed in the chapter on methodology.

2.2 Discussions of Climate Justice in Political and Moral Philosophy and Economics

Climate change is not only a transdisciplinary issue, but the issue of climate justice also involves many disciplines, such as law, philosophy, ethics, economics, and so on. This chapter primarily focuses on the academic discussions of climate justice within political philosophy, moral philosophy, and economics. It begins by establishing that climate change is fundamentally a justice issue and then provides a brief overview of the general discourses on climate justice. The core of the chapter is dedicated to exploring the academic discourse on climate justice in political and moral philosophy. This exploration includes the various domains in which climate justice is discussed and the different types of climate justice, with a particular emphasis on discussions of distributive justice and the foundational principles of climate justice. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the economic perspective of climate justice, a topic that is also frequently addressed by philosophers.

2.2.1 Climate Change as a Justice Issue and Some Main Discourses

At the very beginning, climate change was almost purely regarded as a scientific issue. Since it has entered the political agenda on a global scale, the justice issue of climate change has been receiving more and more attention (Bulkeley et al. 2013).

Philander stated that the theoretical discussion over climate justice “stems primarily from the literature in environmental justice, which began in earnest during

the 1980s, as political theorists and environmental activists grew concerned enough to widen the focus of environmental ethics” (2012: 287). Baer stated that “the problem of equitably allocating mitigation responsibilities or emissions rights has been a primary focus of the climate policy literature since the late eighties, starting well before any philosophers got involved” (Baer 2011: 328). Even the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) “does conceptualise climate change as a problem of justice” (Bell 2010: 426). However, a criticism is that “very few moral philosophers have written on climate change” (Gardiner 2010a: 3)¹⁰. Other scholars have commented that by 2007 climate change “is still framed as an environmental problem”¹¹ and that “the institutionalised, mainstream discourse on climate change has not recognised it as an issue” that we should take “responsibilities to one another, to other species and to future generations” into consideration (O’Brien et al. 2010: xiii). “As we approach 2010, the time has come to recognize that climate change is as much an ethical issue as it is a ‘scientific’ issue” (O’Brien et al. 2010: xiv). Gardiner claimed that although “climate change is a complex problem raising issues across and between a large number of disciplines, “ethics does seem to play a fundamental role” (Gardiner 2010b: 87). He appealed that the ethical dimension of climate change “should be of serious concern to both moral philosophers and humanity at large” (Gardiner 2010a: 3). Jamieson explicitly stated that “it is a plain fact that climate change poses moral questions.” In his opinion, “rejecting the moral framing of the climate-change problem and instead approaching it from the perspective of self-interest does not lead to solutions” (Jamieson 2010: 277). Bell wrote (2010: 423) that “global climate change should be understood as a moral problem or a problem of justice.” As far as I have observed, by 2010, a consensus on the importance of the justice issue of climate change seemed to emerge. While scholars writing before 2010 tried to point out the deficit of researching climate change as an ethical issue and argued for the importance of doing so, authors writing after that seemed to accept the fact that climate change is essentially an ethical issue. For example, Siegel and Jørgensen (2013: 16) asserted that “climate change is often presented as a social justice [...] issue.”¹² In an article published in 2015, Moellendorf asserted that “climate change gives rise to many concerns of justice” (Moellendorf 2015: 173).

Like climate change debates, climate justice itself is a terrain of contestation (Hulme 2009). Sometimes, it is referred to as the climate justice civil movement; sometimes, it is used in a broader sense, including not only the grassroots social movement but also the academic discourse on justice and ethics in climate change,

¹⁰ Gardiner critiqued the research before 2010 when his article was finally published.

¹¹ The sample texts in my analysis in this dissertation showed that the media reported on the justice issue in climate change in 2007. O’Brien and co-authors published their research in 2010. It could be that at the time of their research, climate change was still framed as an environmental problem in academia. It is quite common that academic research lags behind reality.

¹² Although justice is only one part of ethics, it is often considered to be ‘the first virtue of social institutions’ (Rawls 1999). Therefore, it is not strange that researchers made the assertion.

as well as policy discourse on fair allocation of burdens and benefits of dealing with climate change. The research presented in this dissertation uses the concept of climate justice in its broader sense. The following part of this chapter briefly introduces different discourses on climate justice.

Many authors have discussed discourses on climate justice and made their own categories (Baer 2011; Bond and Dorsey 2010; Chatterton et al. 2013; Dobson 2014; Schlosberg and Collins 2014). I have summarized their discussions and roughly divided them into three categories. First, there is a philosophical discourse based on ideal theory. The focus is on arguing for a justice principle that can be applied universally and accepted, ideally, by as many as parties involved as possible (Baer 2011; Schlosberg and Collins 2014). Second, there is a political discourse on fair climate governance, especially globally. Climate justice is primarily considered as a political and diplomatic struggle between global Northern and Southern states within the UNFCCC process (Chatterton et al. 2013). Third, there is a public and civil discourse on climate justice. Some believe that the origins of climate justice “lie with non-governmental organisations and environmental campaigners” (Dobson 2014: 2). Baer (2011: 324) differentiates a public discourse on the poor as victims of climate change from that of a more radical discourse put forward by civil society coalitions. Some divide it further into mainstream NGO discourse and grassroots movement discourse of climate justice (Schlosberg and Collins 2014). An argument is that transnational climate activism began as an elite activity with a focus on influencing policymakers and processors rather than originating and developing from grassroots movements (Schlosberg and Collins 2014: 365).

The positions between the more elite mainstream NGOs and the grassroots civil movements differ in some respects. The latter rejects capitalist solutions to climate change, such as carbon markets, and foregrounds the uneven and persistent patterns of eco-imperialism and “ecological debt” as a result of the historical legacy of uneven use of fossil fuels and exploitation of raw materials, offshoring, and export of waste (Chatterton et al. 2013: 606). Bond argues that there are at least five climate justice positions of elite NGOs that are not oriented to movement building; these include a Rawlsian “Greenhouse Development Rights” technical calculation of per capita GHG emissions, an emphasis on North-South justice within interstate diplomatic negotiations, an orientation to the semi-periphery’s right or need to industrialize, the use of climate justice rhetoric by former UN Human Rights Commission director and Irish president Mary Robinson, and attempt to incorporate within climate justice politics a commitment to carbon markets. For example, the climate justice discourse used by the former UN Human Rights Commission director and Irish politician Mary Robinson is a market environmentalist rhetoric and appears solely situated within the elite circuitry of global governance. Bond and Dorsey criticize that the interpretation of climate justice by the Mary Robinson Foundation is located within a discourse of development policy and that development and human

rights tend to promote versions of climate justice that leave the entrenched vested interests unchallenged (Bond and Dorsey 2010: 293-294).

2.2.2 Domains and Varieties of Climate Justice

All the above-mentioned discourses will be discussed further later in this theoretical chapter. The present subchapter focuses on the philosophical discourse on climate justice. The first two parts introduce the domains and varieties of climate justice. Since distributive justice is the variety of climate justice given the most attention, and a field of contestation, a separate third paragraph describes the discussions on different first principles of distributive justice. Finally, criticisms of justice principles represented in the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol are presented.

2.2.2.1 Domains of Climate Justice

Climate justice is concerned with many domains of human life, and climate change challenges traditional theories of justice. The most discussed three domains are the international domain, intergenerational domain, and environmental and ecological domain (Gardiner 2011; Philander 2012; Rowlands 1997).

In the international domain, the main focus of the discussion of climate justice is the significant differences in national emission levels and how to handle them fairly at the global level. For example, per capita emissions in the U.S. are significantly higher, with an average American producing as much carbon as multiple individuals from other countries, including several times the emissions of a Chinese citizen, many times that of an Indian, and vastly more than a Bangladeshi. Traditional theories of justice have tended to address justice claims within states, where moral standing is established by membership in a well-defined community. However, the global reach of climate change raises international questions related to legitimate jurisdiction, governance, and so on (Philander 2012: 288). Responding to this challenge, many philosophers proposed solutions, which are discussed later in this chapter

Climate change also raises issues of intergenerational justice because climate impacts caused by the high concentration of carbon emission—such as sea-level rise—usually play out over centuries. According to National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), carbon dioxide emissions remain in the atmosphere for up to 300 to 1000 years¹³. If our current prosperity is achieved at the expense of the climate, through the environmental degradation caused by the activities of the present generation, this constitutes a profound injustice. Howarth has reviewed three different approaches (presentism, utilitarianism, and rights-based ethics) to address intergenerational justice. Presentism is an ethical framework that emphasizes the

¹³ <https://science.nasa.gov/earth/climate-change/greenhouse-gases/the-atmosphere-getting-a-handle-on-carbon-dioxide/> (accessed 01 January 2025)

interests of present generations while denying that future generations have full moral standing. Presentists note that the present generation holds an altruistic concern for its children, grandchildren, and subsequent descendants. Advocates of classical utilitarianism argue that equal weight should be attached to the welfare or rights of both present and future generations. In the context of climate change policy, advocates of rights-based ethics argue that future generations are entitled to protection from harm or that the natural environment is the shared property of both present and future generations (Howarth 2011: 345-348). The discussions on intergenerational ethics focus on the choice of the discount rate, a parameter used in economic analysis to compare changes in consumption occurring in different years (Davidson 2015). Since the ethical issue of intergenerational justice is so closely related to the discount rate the discussion on the economic perspective of climate justice is put together with the philosophical discussion on climate justice in this chapter. While the discussion of climate justice in the international domain is relatively dominant and intensive, discussions of climate justice in the intergenerational domain are underdeveloped. For example, Rowlands (1997: 3) proposed that intergenerational aspects of climate change are closely related to sustainable development. Moellendorf (2015: 174) stated that mitigation is “importantly a matter of intergenerational morality or justice, perhaps not exclusively but mostly.” The correlations between intergenerational justice and sustainable development, as well as mitigation, are not well discussed.

The third domain of climate justice is concerned with the relation of climate change to nature. On the one hand, environmental injustice refers to the unequal distribution of environmental harm or unfair relationships among humans, mediated through the natural environment (Shrader-Frechette 2002). Poorer communities and ethnic minorities often reside in areas with significantly higher environmental risks, which may be exacerbated by climate change. These groups are typically the most vulnerable to such risks and often lack the resources to address them effectively. This form of injustice is already evident in both domestic and international contexts. On the other hand, climate change will impact not only the global human population but also a broader range of stakeholders, including animals and ecosystems. As highlighted in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report (2022), climate change threatens the integrity and functionality of ecosystems, potentially endangering numerous species of plants and animals. It seems unjust that the human activities that cause climate change have negatively impacted on the ecosystem. This raises “interspecies” justice issue (Rowlands 1997: 3; Philander 2012: 288). However, as previously pointed out, this issue is “not widely discussed and is under-theorized and defended” (Jamieson 2010: 443).

Besides the most discussed three domains, Gardiner added the so-called national domain (Gardiner 2011). Climate justice in the domestic context concerns the issue of sharp differences in individual emissions within countries. More often the

climate justice is also related to the economic inequality, class, gender, and race within individual countries. It has been widely observed that climate justice is mostly discussed from a collective nation-state-based perspective. When it comes to individual carbon emissions, different and alternative insights can be obtained. Although average Chinese per capita emissions are low by international standards, some Chinese emit at higher levels that are much more comparable to those in developed countries. Harris has concluded that there is “a Germany in China” (Harris 2010). Another example is India’s Ambani Family. They lived in an ultra-luxurious skyscraper in Mumbai. Ironically, this building is located near one of the world’s most notorious slums Dharavi. I will elaborate further on the understanding of carbon emissions from an alternative perspective in the subchapter on cosmopolitan justice.

2.2.2.2 Varieties of Climate Justice

Combining the categories by Gardiner (2011), Sabbagh and Schmitt (2016), and Okereke (2010), I list three varieties of climate justice, namely distributive justice, procedural justice, and compensatory (Okereke 2010) / corrective (Gardiner 2011) / restorative (Sabbagh and Schmitt 2016) justice.

Distributive justice refers to the perceived justness of the principles and rules that regulate the distribution of resources and burdens. In the context of climate change, distributive justice is concerned with the past, present, and future responsibilities of carbon emission reduction. In order to combat climate change, strict limits have to be imposed on unconstrained carbon emission. This then raises questions about who should be allowed to emit both in the short and long run, to what extent, and with what justification. Researchers have proposed many different principles that will be discussed later in detail.

Procedural justice focuses on the “processes” rather than the “outcomes” of the distribution of benefits and burdens. The procedural justice of climate change refers to the adoption of fair procedures and inclusive frameworks in the process of reaching decisions in international negotiations between nation-states. There are three principles of procedural justice (Grasso 2011: 366). The first one, recognition, is the foundation of procedural justice. Martin (2013: 100) has pointed out that the global social movements have given rise to the language of “recognition” within social justice theory and as a new dimension of environmental justice thinking. It entails the effective inclusion on the grounds of equality and fairness of all countries, including the most vulnerable ones, which are usually without a voice, in all decision-making on important issues of climate change. The second principle is participation, which encompasses the involvement, the right to information and to be heard in policymaking, and the right to a general view of the enforcement of laws. The final principle concerns the distribution of power, which should ensure that every party in negotiation has the knowledge and skills necessary to take an active part in planning, decision-making, and governance.

Okereke (2010) calls the third variety of climate justice compensatory justice, Gardiner (2011) corrective justice, and Sabbagh and Schmitt (2016) restorative justice. In my opinion, despite different names, they are similar regarding their focus on dealing with the negative outcomes of climate change. To be specific, it emphasizes that some actors may owe restitution because of their roles in past failures, and therefore, they have to make the compensation.

Among these varieties of climate justice, the lion part of the attention has been given to distributive justice. Current climate justice theorizing has mostly focused on distributional justice, especially on the sharing of benefits and burdens. This is true in the research on climate mitigation and in adaptation research, where contributions have had a distributional orientation (Kortetmäki 2016: 321-322). This trend has been challenged. Researchers such as Nussbaum (2007), Fraser (2008), and Young (1990, 2000) have criticized the idea that justice is merely (or even foremost) about distribution. For example, Fraser (2008: 3) pointed out that movements demanding economic redistribution often clash not only with defenders of the economic status quo, but also with movements seeking recognition of group specificity, and with those seeking political representation. Young (1990: 15) asserted that “[While] distributive issues are crucial to a satisfactory conception of justice, it is a mistake to reduce social justice to distribution.” These scholars proposed a concept of “broad justice,” (Kortetmäki 2016) which includes three dimensions: distribution, recognition, and representation. Kortetmäki (2016: 322) wrote that “distribution usually refers to the economic and material dimensions of justice, recognition concerns the social and cultural issues (such as equal respect), and representation covers the political and participatory aspects of justice.” In my opinion, the dimensions of recognition and representation are covered by procedural justice. It is very important to pay attention to the aspects of recognition and participation. It will help us to understand why some countries do not want to cooperate, even though some climate deals do not seem unfair to them from a distributive justice perspective.

2.2.2.3 First Principles of Distributive Climate Justice

It is good to see that the academic discussion on varieties and dimensions of climate justice has been challenged and broadened. However, it is important for us to understand the principles of distributive justice in climate change. Scholars hold different opinions about what principle should be the first principle of how to distribute burdens and benefits. The following part presents the most discussed first principles of distributive climate justice.

Polluter Pays Principle (PPP) and Grandfathering

A key issue in the discourse on climate justice is whether individuals or nations that have historically contributed to greenhouse gas emissions should be held

accountable for their pollution. The idea of assigning responsibility to nations for their past emissions has been widely discussed in academic literature. For instance,

Peter Singer has stated the idea as follows:

[T]o put it in terms a child could understand, as far as the atmosphere is concerned, the developed nations broke it. If we believe that people should contribute to fixing something in proportion to their responsibility for breaking it, then the developed nations owe it to the rest of the world to fix the problem with the atmosphere (Singer 2010: 190).

Henry Shue regards the PPP as a first principle of climate justice:

“When a party has in the past taken an unfair advantage of others by imposing costs upon them without their consent, those who have been unilaterally put at a disadvantage are entitled to demand that in the future the offending party shoulder burdens that are unequal at least to the extent of the unfair advantage previously taken, in order to restore equality.” (Shue 1999: 534)

Shue supports the argument that industrialized countries have caused global climate change and, therefore, they should bear the burden of the consequences of climate change. In addition to Shue, others, such as Neumayer (2000), Caney (2005), and Meyer (2012), have argued that the costs of global climate change should be determined according to “historical accountability.”

However, there are also criticisms of the PPP. A general problem with the PPP is that it is silent on permission to emit GHG emissions in order to fuel poverty-eradicating economic growth. The PPP appears insensitive to this concern of global justice (Moellendorf 2012: 136). Caney (2005: 755-767) comprehensively analyzed the possible problems of the PPP from many angles.

(1) Most who support a PPP approach to climate justice appear to treat countries as the relevant unit of responsibility. For one thing, much of the damage to the climate was caused by the policies of earlier generations. If the polluter is no longer alive, it is hard to answer who pays. For another, if we take a collectivist route and make the countries accountable for the climate damage, this can be considered unfair to individuals who did not make those decisions and might have objected to them.

(2) Many who have caused GHG emissions were unaware of the effects of their activities on the climate;

(3) The PPP principle is incomplete, for it requires a background theory of justice and, particularly, an account of persons' entitlements. What we need, then, is

an account of what rights, if any, people have to emit greenhouse gases. Is there no right to emit? Or is there a right to emit a certain fixed amount?

(4) The PPP assigns primary responsibilities. The polluter bears the primary responsibility to bear the burden. Often, however, primary duty-bearers fail to comply with their duties.

In response to the first critique, it has been suggested that individuals in industrialized nations can be held accountable because they reap the benefits of high living standards enabled by historical emissions. This concept, known as beneficiary responsibility, represents another no-fault approach to responsibility that remains linked to past emissions (Moellendorf 2012: 136).

The second critique about ignorance deals with another principle of distributive justice, namely grandfathering. Though it is agreed that the developed nations contributed the most to global climate change, it might be argued that at the time when the developed nations emitted the GHGs, they did not know of the limits to the capacity of the atmosphere to absorb those gases and the severe impact of the emissions on the global climate. Therefore, it would be fairer to make a fresh start now and set standards that look to the future rather than the past. Some call it the time-slice principle (Singer 2010: 190).

The arguments about how to define the baseline year are at the core of the different arguments about grandfathering. The supporters of PPP believe that it has been known that fossil-fuel consumption causes global climate change, at least in recent modern times. For Peter Singer, the objection of ignorance is inapplicable for post-1990 emissions (Singer 2002: 34). For Neumayer, the relevant cut-off point is the mid-1980s (Neumayer 2000). Moellendorf set the relevant point to the late 1980s or early 1990s. He even supported a conception of strict liability, which holds agents responsible if they caused the problem, regardless of whether they acted with knowledge (Moellendorf 2012: 135). As he pointed out, one reason grandfathering matters morally is that the baseline year determines the total reduction commitment in the context of rising emissions. The later the index year—the closer it is to the present—the less the state will be required to reduce from present levels. He stated that “a more fundamental moral issue with the practice of grandfathering is that it gives states an entitlement to some of their historical emissions” (Moellendorf 2012: 137), which is questionable since the practice rewards high-emitters.

While critics often contend that the grandfathering approach is morally questionable and rooted in the political power dynamics of the international system, it nonetheless reflects at least three interpretations of justice. First, entitlement theories of justice, whether libertarian or Marxist, assert that individuals have a right to what they have created. In the context of climate change, grandfathering aligns with this idea by recognizing each nation's inherent right to emit carbon dioxide. Second, grandfathering embodies the principle of proportional equality, which acknowledges that nations are unequal and should therefore be treated differently. Finally, it reflects

a pragmatic principle: solving the problem, even imperfectly, brings us closer to justice than pursuing an idealistic but unworkable plan that achieves no progress.

In my opinion, the third and fourth critiques apply to other principles as well. For example, Caney claimed a human rights perspective on climate justice, which will be discussed later. It can also happen that the parties do not comply with their duties to obey fundamental human rights.

Ability to Pay Principle (ATP)

Although Caney criticized the PPP, he did not completely deny this principle. His key point is that the PPP needs to be supplemented, and “it does so by ascribing duties to the most advantages (an ‘ability to pay’ approach).” In his opinion, the most advantaged can perform the roles attributed to them, and it is reasonable to ask them rather than the needy to bear this burden since they can bear such burdens more easily. Some may not have caused the problem, but this does not mean that they have no duty to help solve it (Caney 2005: 769).

Moellendorf argued that there are two reasons to support the “ability to pay principle” for climate change. First, global justice theories that condemn severe poverty or deep inequalities between people worldwide might be enlisted to support the fairness of the PPP. Second, there is a basis for such a principle in the UNFCCC convention’s norms. It recognizes the “differentiated responsibilities” as well as the “respective capabilities” of various parties, which “suggests something like an ‘ability to pay’ conception of responsibility for mitigation and the financing of adaptation to climate change” (Moellendorf 2012: 136).

A commentator also points out that the “ability to pay” argument should not focus on the traditional view that parties who have the most resources should be held responsible. It would become ethically sounder if it were grounded on a sufficientarian view, according to which parties with more than enough resources should be considered the most proper duty bearers (Grasso 2008: 185).

Although most philosophers agree that developed countries are held responsible for climate change, they differ in their focus on the agent of responsibility. While some (Shue 1993; Neumayer 2000) have defended broad “historical accountability,” by which nation-states as a whole are held as the agents, others (Caney 2005; Harris 2010) have argued that such collective, historical accounts are problematic and that obligations should also instead be based on the ability to pay, which focuses on individuals. This argument is consistent with the fundamental principle of a cosmopolitan approach, which will be discussed in the following subchapter.

Equal per capita emissions principle

Since the atmosphere has a limit on absorbing GHG emissions before a dangerous scenario occurs, it is an ethical concern how this absorptive capacity, in terms of emissions permits, should be divided between people.

Supporters of the equal per capita principle believe that everyone should have an equal share of the available emissions permits (Baer et al. 2000; Singer 2002; Moellendorf 2009).

Singer suggested the following:

I propose, both because of its simplicity and hence its suitability as a political compromise, and because it seems likely to increase global welfare, that we support the second principle, that of equal per capita future entitlements to a share of the capacity of the atmospheric sink... (2002: 43)

The intuition behind this principle is that “[i]t seems obvious that no one in the world has a stronger claim to this resource [i.e., permits to emit greenhouse gas] than anyone else, so it should be divided equally between people” (Broome 2012: 70). Odenbaugh (2010: 1-9) divided the supporters into two groups with different foci. One is the “sustainable per capita” approach (Singer 2002, Jamieson 2006), and the other is the “subsistence per capita” approach (Shue 1993; Baer et al. 2008, 2010). The sustainable per capita approach claims that a fair distribution of global GHG emissions is achieved by allocating sustainable total emissions per capita. For example, Singer has suggested that a fair approach would be to reduce our per capita emissions globally to 1 metric ton per person per year (Singer 2002: 35). The subsistence per capita approach argues that a fair distribution of global GHG emissions should allocate emissions based on the minimum amount needed for survival per person. Under this model, every individual is entitled to at least the level of emissions necessary for their basic subsistence, while any emissions beyond this threshold can be distributed equitably and regulated through a cap-and-trade system. One of the representatives of this approach is the Greenhouse Development Rights, developed by Baer, Anthanasiou, Kartha, and Kemp-Benedict (2008). It defines obligations with regard to a development threshold. Individuals earning below a designated “development threshold” are generally exempt from bearing financial responsibilities for mitigation and adaptation efforts. For those above this threshold, obligations are determined uniformly, applying equally to affluent individuals in poorer nations and wealthy individuals in richer countries. The two approaches share several key similarities. For example, both prioritize the needs of the most vulnerable and those whose basic survival is most at risk. Both acknowledge that the concept of subsistence is fluid and context-dependent. Additionally, both approaches affirm that every individual on Earth holds equal rights to the global atmosphere, and thus, emissions allocations should be determined on a per capita basis. Per capita proposals, however, place wealthy nations at a significant disadvantage, as most

already exceed the stabilization target by a wide margin. In contrast, poorer nations stand to benefit substantially from a per capita distribution of carbon entitlements, as their current levels of income and industrialization typically fall well below the one metric ton threshold.

The equity per capita principle has as many opponents (Hayward 2007; Caney 2011; Blomfield 2013) as proponents. There are some objections and criticisms to the per capita principle. First, if a country has a larger population size, then they are entitled to a larger share of total emissions. Thus, it would give countries an incentive to maximize their population in order to receive more emissions credits. In response to this objection, proponents of this principle propose indexing population figures for each country to a certain time. For example, Jamieson proposes a 1990 baseline, and Caney 2050. Singer (2002: 43) proposes that equal per capita future entitlements to a share of the capacity of the atmospheric sink should be tied to the current UN projection of population growth per country in 2050. A second objection is that it would allow the industrialized countries to reduce their emissions so much that they were not producing more than their share, on a per capita basis, of some acceptable level of GHGs. To respond to this problem, Singer (2002) and Jamieson (2006: 220-226) propose a cap-and-trade mechanism. If a country's emissions are above their per capita share, they must purchase credits from those countries whose per capita emissions are below their total per capita shares. This will allow developing countries to utilize these funds to increase their own development on the one hand, and emissions from different countries will converge over time as credits are reduced through time on the other.

If these objections to the per capita principle can be dissolved by setting an indexing year or complementing it with some mechanism, other criticisms seem to put proponents into difficulty. One such criticism is that the per capita principle "fetishizes emissions." Egalitarian concern should be about persons or their well-being not about emissions (Caney 2011). Hayward (2007) explicitly opposed the idea of regarding per capita emission entitlement as a basic right. In his opinion, it can only motivate the countries to increase their emissions instead of solving the fundamental problem: decreasing the GHG emissions. A second objection is that the approach is insensitive to different human needs, the satisfaction of which might require differential emissions. The per capita proposal does not take into account the fact that emissions may play very different roles in people's lives. In particular, some emissions are used to produce luxury items, whereas others are necessary for most people's survival (Gardiner 2010a: 16). This criticism is related to the criticism against Shue's subsistence emission per capita. It is very difficult to determine what counts as subsistence needs and, thus, as subsistence emissions. "One might deny that there is some objective measure of basic subsistence with regard to GHG emissions" (Odenbaugh 2010: 10). Traxler defined subsistence emissions in terms of physiologically and socially necessary emissions but characterizes social necessity

as “what a society needs or finds indispensable in order to survive” (Traxler 2002: 106). Gardiner thinks it is problematic. On the one hand, much depends on how societies define what they find indispensable. He takes former U.S. President George H. W. Bush’s comment as an example. In 1992, the elder Bush said that “the American way of life is not up for negotiation” (Gardiner 2010a: 17). A car, even an SUV, may be regarded as indispensable by Americans, whereas it may be a luxurious good in the least developed countries. On the other hand, it appears to envisage that the climate-change problem can be resolved by appealing to some notion of social necessity that is independent of moral assessment.

Right to sustainable development

Compared to other justice principles, it seems that “[T]here is a fairly broad consensus among both the philosophers who write about climate change and the majority of the climate-policy community that efforts to reduce greenhousegas emissions [...] should not harm the ability of poor countries to grow economically and to reduce as rapidly as possible the widespread poverty their citizens suffer” (Baer et al. 2010: 215).

This principle has an intuitive attractiveness, as expressed by Baer, that since the industrialized nations build their economies on high levels of fossil fuel consumption, the developing countries were expecting to do likewise, and it is plainly not fair to demand that emissions be frozen at the existing unequal levels (Baer 2013: 61). Besides, the principle is supported by moral ideas. Shue argues that “[T]hose living in desperate poverty ought not to be required to restrain their emissions, thereby remaining in poverty, in order that those living in luxury should not have to restrain their emissions” (Shue 2010: 202). Moellendorf has also argued that a more direct way to address the need to permit human development is to affirm a principle recognizing the right to sustainable development (Moellendorf 2011). Like Shue, Moellendorf agreed that developing nations need emissions for poverty eradication. Thus, climate change mitigation would require developed countries either to make emissions reductions sufficient to offset emissions growth in developing countries or to subsidize the use of renewable energy in these countries so that increased energy costs do not slow economic growth (Moellendorf 2015). Not only do philosophers agree on the right to sustainable development, but the UNFCCC has also affirmed this principle. The convention recognizes this right, asserting that economic development is essential for addressing climate change (Singer 2010: 184).

Although scholars agree on the principle of the right to (sustainable) development, there is criticism against the state-centric approach of this principle. For example, Harris argued that the statism approach would allow the rich people in poor states to hide behind the poor in those states and thus escape from the obligations of climate change mitigation (Harris 2010). In order to avoid this problem, Baer and his colleagues have proposed the Greenhouse Development Rights (GDR).

They have argued that the GDRs framework is designed to distribute the costs of extremely rapid reductions as well as costs for adaptation in a way that protects a “right to development” by linking obligations to capacity and responsibility. This proposal pays extra attention to the distribution of income *within* countries and the definition of a “development threshold” relative to the income of *individuals* instead of the per capita income of countries. Therefore, this approach could address some critical problems. First, the average citizen of the industrialized countries could be assured that they were not paying higher bills for climate policy than the small but significantly wealthy minority in the developing countries. Second, including all countries under a similar global framework would reduce and potentially eliminate the problem of “leakage” of pollution, production, and employment from industrialized to developing countries. In addition, this approach identifies the obligations of those in poor countries who meet or exceed rich-world levels of consumption and pollution. It could, on the one hand, include the poor countries in dealing with climate change and, on the other, exempt the poor majority in those countries (Baer et al. 2010: 216).

Human rights principle

Discussing climate justice from a human right¹⁴ perspective has figured prominently in the recent research literature. If I am allowed to say there is a turn toward climate justice in climate change research, then there is a turn toward a human rights-based approach to climate justice research. This approach is regarded as the least controversial approach to justice that could form the basis of a fair climate treaty (Shue 2009).

It has been argued that there are many advantages to a human rights-based approach. First, it challenges the focus on who pays, which dominates international climate negotiations. Instead, it asks us to consider who suffers as a result of climate change and how their suffering might be prevented. Second, it rejects the aggregative consequentialist assumption, which underpins cost-benefit analysis, that the optimal climate policy might allow some to suffer very great harm if others benefit more. Third, it does not deny that we need an account of how the costs of mitigation and adaptation should be distributed. Instead, it has two aims. First, it aims to explain what we should do collectively about climate change. Second, it aims to provide a compelling reason why each of us should bear our fair share of the costs of mitigation and adaptation. If we do not, we will contribute to violating someone’s human rights (Bell 2013: 159-160).

Though many scholars have argued for a human rights approach, they differ from each other in terms of what should be regarded as rights that cannot be violated. For example, some claim that there is a human right to a stable climate associated with Steve Vanderheiden (2008, 2016). Others view environmental

¹⁴ Human rights are discussed here in a moral and political context instead of a legal context.

security as “the guaranteed access to natural resources and environmental services” for humans to pursue a decent life with dignity. They believe this is a universal human right (Martinez-Alier 2002; OHCHR 2009; Sachs 2008). Bell (2013: 159) has argued that the right to emit greenhouse gases is also a human rights-based approach. This includes two proposals: the human right to equal per capita emissions and to subsistence emissions. Caney has advocated another human rights principle. Since this approach has caused wide discussion, the following paragraphs will focus on the human rights approach represented by Caney.

Caney argued that climate change violates basic human (negative) rights to life, health, and subsistence (Caney 2009a, 2009b). The human rights approach is attractive because, as Caney argued, human rights (i) are grounded in persons’ “humanity,” (ii) represent moral thresholds, (iii) respect each and every individual, and (iv) take general priority over other values (Caney 2010: 164). He argued that applying a human rights approach to the impacts of climate change carries several important implications. First, it necessitates a more discerning evaluation of climate change effects, focusing specifically on those that directly violate human rights. Second, this approach challenges us to rethink how we assess the costs of mitigation and adaptation. If climate change indeed violates human rights, then traditional cost-benefit analyses become inadequate. Third, if climate change is recognized as a violation of human rights, it follows that those whose rights have been infringed are entitled to compensation. The conventional framework for addressing climate change typically limits responses to mitigation and adaptation, but this is too restrictive. Insufficient mitigation or adaptation can lead to violations of fundamental human rights, such as the rights to life, health, and subsistence. In such cases, compensation becomes a necessary response. A human rights approach not only generates duties of mitigation and adaptation but also establishes obligations for compensation. Fourth, this approach influences how we consider the infliction of harm on others and the role compensation should play in ethical decision-making. Fifth, a human rights perspective not only guides the assessment of climate change impacts but also shapes the distribution of responsibilities to protect the rights threatened by climate change. It helps determine who should bear the costs of mitigation and adaptation. Finally, this approach offers a valuable lens for interpreting Article 2 of the UNFCCC, which aims to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations at a level that prevents “dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system” (Caney 2010: 171-2).

Although Caney has made a comprehensive argument for a human rights approach, there are many criticisms against this approach. According to Caney’s formulation, climate change threatens several fundamental interests of future populations, including their food supply, their access to land, and their health. These interests are weighty enough to impose obligations on others, which by definition allows corresponding rights to be established. And these rights must not be violated.

However, Caney's approach falls into difficulty if mitigation of climate change would also violate human rights in one form or another. Moellendorf pointed out that there is a problem with the approach if no climate change policy does not violate human rights, either by insufficiently mitigating or by producing harm (Moellendorf 2015: 177). Dietz, moreover, stated that Caney did not have empirical evidence—it is necessary to evaluate whether some human rights, somewhere, are violated due to mitigation. This reveals a general problem with a right-based approach, where rights might conflict (Dietz 2011: 303).

Caney argued that “climate change will lead some to die because of an increase in the frequency and in the intensity of freak weather events. In particular, hurricanes, storm surges, and extreme precipitation will lead to direct loss of life.” (Caney 2009: 230) Karnein commented that “concentrating on human rights violations, at least as understood by Caney [...] identifies only very extreme cases in which climate change ends up unstoppably causing people to lose shelter, fall ill or die in the future” (Karnein 2015: 61).

Despite criticisms, the human rights approach, which focuses on individual rights and duties, has been favored by many cosmopolitan thinkers. They have emphasized the significance of human rights in contrast to assertions that states have absolute sovereign control over matters within their borders. Therefore, Moellendorf has concluded that “an account of the moral problems of climate change in terms of the threats that it poses to human rights is consistent with a broadly cosmopolitan approach to global justice” (Moellendorf 2012: 134).

2.2.3 Economics of Climate Justice

Various normative frameworks have been employed to think about climate change. Since the 1990s, the dominant approach to assessing how we tackle climate change has been cost-benefit analysis (Nordhaus 1991; Cline 1992). It proceeds by comparing the costs and benefits associated with anthropogenic climate change with the costs and benefits of a program for combating climate change. On this basis, it has been argued that an aggressive policy of mitigation and adaptation is justified (Caney 2010: 163). Both opponents and advocates of urgent climate actions have used cost-benefit analysis to support their positions. Bjorn Lomborg has famously employed it to argue against “heroic CO₂ cuts” (Lomborg 2001). The famous Stern Review (2007) employed it to argue for immediate action to tackle climate change. According to Stern, the costs of combating climate change are quite low, but the costs of “business as usual” would be considerable.

The cost-benefit analysis is grounded in a utilitarian ethical theory. The goal of this analysis is to maximize the weighted sum of individual utilities. It centers on identifying the solution that generates the greatest overall net happiness for everyone involved—where net happiness is calculated by subtracting the suffering

caused from the happiness achieved. Singer called it “the greatest happiness principle” of climate change (Singer 2010: 193). The main strength of the economic approach contends to be the “formal framework through which it is able to compare human well-being across time, space, and states of nature, under alternative courses of action” (Dietz 2011: 305).

Economists would argue that any analysis is better than none. However, the economic approach has also been widely criticized, especially by moral philosophers. Bell said that cost-benefit analysis “is grounded in a utilitarian ethical theory which does not recognise the idea of injustice.” (Bell 2010: 424) Similarly, Singer wrote that “classical utilitarians would not support any of the principles of fairness discussed so far” (Singer 2010: 193). This approach highlights the value of efficiency. However, it is argued that there are other values in many areas of life. Values other than economic efficiency should take precedence. Another problem with applying the economic approach to climate change is that climate change will have impacts that are so broad, diverse, and uncertain that conventional economic analysis is practically useless (Jamieson 2010: 80).

It is also criticized that the utilitarianism suffers from two major ethical flaws (Bell 2010). First, it treats all preferences alike. This is a form of economic reductionism. However, preferences differ from each other.

As Shue has argued:

Some so-called preferences are vital, and some are frivolous. Some are needs, and some are mere wants (not needs). The satisfaction of some “preferences” is essential for survival, or for human decency, and the satisfaction of others is inessential for either survival or decency (Shue 1993: 55).

Shue further commented that “[T]o suggest simply that it is a good thing to calculate cost-effectiveness across all sources of all GHGs is to suggest that we ignore the fact that some sources are essential and even urgent for the fulfillment of vital needs and other sources are inessential or even frivolous. What if, as is surely the case, some of the sources that it would cost least to eliminate are essential and reflect needs that are urgent to satisfy, while some of the sources that it would cost most to eliminate are inessential and reflect frivolous whims?” (Shue 2010: 211). The “essence of cost-benefit analysis is to refigure citizens as consumers” (Barry 1995: 154). It is similar to what Dietz has pointed out: namely, that the main weakness of cost-benefit analysis “is the substance of that comparison—utility, as the satisfaction of preferences for the aggregate consumption of goods and services” (Dietz 2011: 305).

The second ethical shortcoming of utilitarianism—and cost-benefit analysis—is its reduction of all costs and benefits to a single metric: money. By focusing on aggregation, it pushes us to adopt policies that maximize monetary value, regardless

of other considerations. This approach can lead to deeply unjust outcomes, where the trivial desires of a large group are weighed against—and may even outweigh—the essential needs of others. In the context of climate change, this means the luxury-driven demands of the affluent, which often require high greenhouse gas emissions, are pitted against the basic needs of others for food, water, disease prevention, and protection from extreme weather events.

Due to the ethical flaws, some argue that “justice requires that we reject the economic approach to climate change and adopt a justice or rights-based approach” (Bell 2010: 425). Some have proposed a balanced solution. For example, Dietz suggested that “the formal aggregative framework be retained, but that the monistic measure of utility be replaced by a pluralistic “vector” of factors affecting human well-being, which might well include income, but also education, health, environmental quality, and so on. He believed such a vector is capable of being sensitive to moral considerations such as basic needs and rights” (Dietz 2011: 305).

2.2.4 UNFCCC Justice Principles and Criticisms

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is the most widely accepted multilateral agreement combating climate change. It is necessary to understand which justice principles are stipulated in the convention, which generally reflects at least four justice principles.

The UNFCCC report from 1992¹⁵ acknowledges that the global nature of climate change calls for the widest possible cooperation by all countries and their participation in an effective and appropriate international response, in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities and their social and economic conditions. Accordingly, then, the first principle is that developed countries should take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof. It is normally called “*common but differentiated responsibilities* (CBDR).” Moellendorf argued that the CBDR “suggests something like an ability-to-pay conception of responsibility for mitigation and the financing of adaptation to climate change” (Moellendorf 2012: 136).

Secondly, as discussed earlier, not only do philosophers have a consensus on the *right to sustainable development*, but it is also a principle affirmed by the UNFCCC. Article 3, para. 4 states that: “The Parties have a right to, and should, promote sustainable development. Policies and measures to protect the climate system against human-induced change should be appropriate for the specific conditions of each Party and should be integrated with national development programs, taking into account that economic development is essential for adopting measures to address climate change” (UNFCCC 1992).

¹⁵ The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change <https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf> (accessed 15 November 2024)

Thirdly, some scholars argue that the UNFCCC also reflects a *human rights-based justice principle* because its objective is to achieve a “stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.” A dangerous climate would threaten food production, which violates basic human rights (Caney 2010: 171-72).

Fourthly, since the Kyoto Protocol, adopted in 1997, is the extension of the UNFCCC framework and is the only legally binding international treaty to combat climate change, the justice principle of the Kyoto Protocol is discussed here as well. The primary objective of the Kyoto Protocol was to regulate emissions of key anthropogenic greenhouse gases in a manner that accounts for underlying disparities among nations in terms of GHG emissions, wealth, and capacity to reduce emissions. This aligns with the UNFCCC's principle of Common But Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR). In other words, the Kyoto Protocol incorporates the 'ability to pay' principle. Additionally, 1990 serves as the baseline year for measuring a nation's carbon emissions under the protocol. Setting a baseline year reflects the justice principle, namely *grandfathering*. As Moellendorf points out, one reason that grandfathering matters morally is that in the context of rising emissions, the baseline year determines the total reduction commitment. The later the index year—the closer it is to the present—the less the state will be required to reduce from present levels (Moellendorf 2012:137).

Although the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol are widely applauded by developing countries, and the justice principles implied in both agreements are justified, they have received much criticism. Rowlands commented that “there is no guidance” as to how the objectives of the UNFCCC “might be fulfilled.” “Since 1992, it has been left to the negotiators ... to think about how these demands might be operationalised” (Rowlands 1997:4).

Several scholars have explicitly claimed that the Kyoto Protocol is a failure (Rosen 2015; Gardiner 2010a: 19-21). Rosen commented that the design of the Kyoto Protocol bears substantial blame for its failure. The flaws include its short timeframe for action, binding targets, emission reduction measures, and provision for future commitment periods (Rosen 2015: 30). Gardiner outlined a comprehensive criticism of the Kyoto Protocol (Gardiner 2010a: 20-21). According to him, the first problem is that the agreement does very little to limit emissions. Gardiner drew upon data from Babiker and co-authors (2002: 202) and pointed out that even full compliance by its signatories would result in an overall increase in their emissions of 9% from 2000 to 2010. That is to say, the emission cut target stipulated in the treaty is not realistic. Gardiner's second criticism is that it contains no effective compliance

mechanism¹⁶. On the one hand, enforcement is not binding for any country that fails to ratify the amendment (Barrett 2003: 386). On the other hand, the penalties for failure to do so take the form of more demanding targets in the next decade's commitment period. However, parties can take this into account when negotiating their upcoming targets. In any case, a country is free to exit the treaty with one year's notice, three years after the treaty has entered into force (UNFCCC 1992: article 25). Gardiner's argument that the Kyoto Protocol is a failure is based on a set of complex reasons. These include the political role of energy interests, confusion about scientific uncertainties and economic costs, and the inadequacies of the international system. Moreover, he highlighted two further reasons. The first is the role of the U.S., which with 4% of the world's population, emits roughly 25% of global greenhouse gases. From the early stages and on the most important issues, the U.S. effectively molded the agreement to its will, persistently objecting when other countries tried to strengthen it. But then the U.S. government abandoned the treaty, seemingly repudiating even those parts to which it had previously agreed. This behavior has been heavily criticized for being seriously unethical (Harris 2000). Gardiner's second further reason for the failure of the Protocol is its intergenerational aspect, which is an important dimension of climate change (Gardiner 2001).

The advantages of burning fossil fuels are primarily realized in the short to medium term, benefiting the current generation, while the costs are deferred to the long term, burdening future generations. Gardiner further contends that as long as high energy consumption remains closely tied to self-interest, the present generation will have strong, self-serving motives to overlook the most severe consequences of climate change. Moreover, this issue is cyclical: it resurfaces with each successive generation as they gain the authority to decide whether or not to take action. Gardiner argued that the intergenerational difficulty suggests that the global warming problem has a seriously tragic structure (Gardiner 2001).

2.2.5 Discussion of Climate Justice in Chinese Academia

I conducted a search on "Wenjin," the search engine of the National Library of China, using "climate justice" as the main search term. The search was limited to the period from 2000 to 2016. A total of 32 relevant journal papers were obtained. The statistics show ten papers were published in 2011, nine in 2010, four in 2009, 2012, and 2013, respectively, and one in 2007. This pattern aligns with media reports on climate change in China. The fact that more than half of the papers were published in 2010 and 2011 can be attributed to the significant impact of the 2009 Copenhagen Summit. A scholar explicitly noted that the "Copenhagen Accord focused on the ethics of

¹⁶ Barrett (2003: 385-386) listed five design faults with the compliance mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol: (1) the punishment prescribed by this mechanism is forever delayed; (2) the magnitude of the penalty depends not just on the compliance failure and the penalty rate, but on the emission limit for the follow-on control period; (3) the proposal relies exclusively on self-punishment; (4) the agreement ignores the participation problem; (5) the compliance mechanism is not legally binding.

climate change and the environment, which sparked a debate on environmental ethics among Chinese scholars” (Qian 2010: 58).

Statistics regarding the academic backgrounds of the authors reveal that research on climate justice is highly multidisciplinary. The researchers come from various fields, including Law Studies (16), Philosophy/Ethics (9), Political Science (6), Sociology (5), Development and Environmental Studies (3), Economics (3), and Public Affairs (2). It is noteworthy that the majority of the published papers were the research results of funded projects. Fourteen of the papers received funding from a total of 17 different sources. In addition, seven papers were financially supported by two separate funding sources. Among the 17 funding sources, five were national research foundations, eight were from national ministries, three were from provincial departments of education, and one was from a university.

Almost all scholars agree that climate change is now an ethical issue (Li 2010; Qian 2010) and that addressing climate justice is crucial, as it is “the basis of climate governance” (Zhang 2010: 39; 2011: 285). Only one paper I found (Mao and Li 2007) argues that climate change is not as urgent as other global issues, such as poverty and war. This paper was published in 2007. Perhaps Mao had not paid enough attention to this issue at the time. However, the situation changed after 2009. Qian pointed out that the Copenhagen Summit influenced Chinese scholars to pay increased attention to the ethical issues surrounding climate change (Qian 2010). Yang (2009: 10) even declared that “2009 was a year of climate change.”

There is consensus among scholars that climate justice is primarily concerned with distributing climate responsibilities among different countries. This represents a climate justice discourse in the international domain. Some scholars also focused on climate justice across different generations (Shi et al. 2013; Chen 2013; Li 2010). While some claimed that “intragenerational justice is the prerequisite for addressing intergenerational justice” (Shi et al. 2013: 16), others criticized people’s tendency to prioritize the interests of the current generation over those of future generations (Li 2010: 46). Therefore, the climate justice is also discussed in the intergenerational domain.

A notable feature that drew attention is that Chinese scholars emphasized the ethical aspect between humans, the environment, and other species (Qian 2010; Li, C. 2010¹⁷; Li, Y. 2010; Cao 2011; Zhang, R. 2011). Li Chunlin argued that climate justice is, by nature, an ecological justice (Li, C. 2010: 46). Zhang proposed establishing a new worldview and ecological perspective, stating that, “we do not have the right to harm or deprive other inhabitants of their right to exist, including citizens of other countries as well as all animals, plants, mountains, rivers, lands, and

¹⁷ Two cited authors, Li, C. and Li, Y., share the same last name and published their articles in the same year. To prevent confusion in citations, their initials are included in the in-text references. The same approach is applied to Zhang, R. and Zhang, J. in the following text.

even the atmosphere in nature” (Zhang, R. 2011: 48).

As is the case in Western academia, Chinese researchers have not extensively discussed the issue of climate justice within the national domain. In the material I studied, only two scholars (Hong and Luo 2011: 8) acknowledged that within a country, there are divergent understandings of differentiated and shared responsibilities among people living in different areas with varying levels of development. However, they stressed that divergent understandings about the shared but differentiated responsibilities mainly exist between developed and developing countries.

Following the earlier discussion on varieties of climate justice, distributive justice seemed to be the default synonym of climate justice. However, scholars also discussed intergenerational justice (Shi et al. 2013; Chen 2013; Li, C. 2010), as well as compensatory and corrective justice (Zhang, R. 2011; Cheng 2010; Wang 2011a). Rather than framing compensatory and corrective justice as monetary compensation, Chinese scholars framed it differently. For example, Cheng stated that there are two ways to correct past wrongs: first, developed countries should commit to binding emission targets while developing countries make voluntary commitments; second, developed and developing countries should cooperate, with the former providing financial and technical support (Cheng 2010: 34). It is a common position that developed countries should bear historical responsibilities, which reflects the PPP. Chinese scholars have also supported the justice principles of ‘right to development’ (Yang 2009; Chen 2012; Wang 2011b; Cheng 2010), ‘right to subsistence’ (Yang 2009; Zhang 2010; Wang 2011b; Zhang Rongnan 2011; Cheng 2010), and the human rights approach (Chen 2012; Zhou 2011). The emphasis on the ‘right to subsistence’ by many Chinese scholars aligns with calls to focus on vulnerable groups (Shi et al. 2013: 16; Hong and Luo 2011; Wang 2010).

In terms of global climate governance, it seems to be a common view among scholars that developed countries, especially those that have benefitted from excessive emissions, should take the lead. While some maintained that China is still a developing country, no one denied that China should take part in global climate governance. Many scholars believe that China should actively address climate change and seek cooperation with developed countries (Zeng 2012; Wang 2011a; Zhang, J. 2011; Xue 2012; Cheng 2010). Some predicted that in the post-Kyoto period, developing countries like China, India, and Brazil would assume more emission obligations (Yan 2010: 24). Therefore, China “must have clear awareness and forward-looking arrangements” (Cheng 2010: 35).

At a time when the mainstream political discourse about climate justice was totally against binding obligations, one scholar even argued that if developing countries replicate the high-emission industrial development model of developed countries in the name of global distributive justice, and the latter are unwilling to change the high-emission living style, the result could be a climate disaster (Shi,

2011:78). Instead of arguing against dealing with climate change, many Chinese scholars were very optimistic and saw climate change as an opportunity (Wang 2010). Unlike the Chinese official position against binding targets, Cheng (2010: 35) suggested that by committing to binding emission reductions, China could promote corporate innovation and master advanced energy-saving and emission-reduction technologies, thus gaining an edge in low-carbon economic development. Indeed, scholars highly supported the view that China should develop a low-carbon economy. Some even equated dealing with climate change to developing a low-carbon economy (Hong 2010).

It is striking that many Chinese scholars recognized the limitations of a statism perspective and advocated for a cosmopolitan view influenced by Ulrich Beck. Li Yuan (2010: 46) criticized nation-states' uncooperative attitude as manifestations of human selfishness. Yang (2009: 12) identified the "prisoner's dilemma" as the greatest challenge to international cooperation. Therefore, dealing with climate change requires us to "get out of the box of narrow notion of rights and justice" (Shi 2011: 78), "break the national borders" (Qian 2010: 58), "foster a global public political culture centered on cosmopolitan ideals" and "cultivate world citizens with a cosmopolitan sentiment and global responsibility awareness" (Yang 2009: 12). Since cosmopolitan ideals value the power of individuals, scholars claimed that "cultivating climate morality should start from individuals" (Li, C. 2010: 50). However, one scholar, Dai, reviewed Beck's risk society theory and compared his thoughts on climate politics with that of Giddens and argued that Beck's framework is profound but lacks practicality, given the various interests and political struggles involved (Dai 2011: 174). Dai wrote that it is difficult for different parties to abandon their own interests and political positions for the sake of so-called green modernity. While Beck's sociological theory of risk society helps us to better understand the conflicts related to climate change, his proposed solutions have an ethereal utopian quality. Giddens' framework may not be that profound, but it appears more pragmatic and feasible. After all, the state remains the primary decision-maker over long historical periods. The most effective way to address carbon emissions is through market guidance and regulation, as economic profit is the most powerful driver of social transformation and the building of a green economy.

It is similarly striking that quite a lot of Chinese scholars held a radical position on the ultimate solution to climate change, arguing that the problem facing humanity lies not in nature, but in our systems of governance, value systems, and cognitive style (Li, C. 2010: 50). They called for reassessing existing modes of production, lifestyles, and value systems (Sun and Zhong 2013: 89), and changing luxurious living modes and consumption habits (Wang 2010: 89; Sun and Zhong 2013: 89), a change to the treatment of other people, other countries, and nature (Li, Y. 2010: 49). In order to solve the problem ultimately, China should develop not only a low-carbon economy, but also low-carbon politics, low-carbon life, and low-carbon culture (Hong

and Luo 2011: 9). In Zhang Rongnan's words, China should try to build an ecologically based nation, and each Chinese citizen should endeavor to be as ecologically responsible as possible.

Some scholars noted the broader structural problem of climate change. For example, Hong and Luo (2011: 5) pointed out that still more scholars are applying world-system theory to analyze climate change. Zhang Rongnan (2011: 49) paid attention to the ecological debt the developed countries owed. It was agreed that the climate change crisis is not a single problem but one of a "cluster of problems," and building a more just international new order is the prerequisite for achieving global environmental justice (Yang 2009: B15). -

Through my research, I investigated the media's role in framing climate justice in China. Chinese scholars took notice of the role of media. Sociologists Hong Dayong and Luo Qiao (2011: 5) argued that "faced with issues such as global climate change, we need to focus on various actors within the global society, such as governments, business, media, the technology sector, civil organizations, and the public." They claimed that social research limited to the national perspective could not scientifically reveal the social dynamics of global climate change. However, I did not find research on the media's role in framing climate justice.

Through my study, I observed that many Chinese papers heavily referenced Western scholars, and four papers were translations of works by non-Chinese researchers. While Chinese scholars were influenced by Western academia, their work on climate justice is distinct in two ways: first, as discussed before, many of them emphasized the need to address nature in discussions of climate justice. They advocated for building an "ecological civilization" (shengtai wenming). Some even predicted that if countries in the world do not work together, what awaits us could be a climate disaster (Shi 2011: 78). Second, quite a lot of Chinese scholars adopted a cosmopolitan view. They hoped people from different cultures could finally deal with climate change together.

In my opinion, the emphasis on "ecological civilization and community with a shared future for mankind" has both cultural, social, and political roots. The cultural and social roots are that Chinese culture bears a profound imprint of the philosophy of "harmony between heaven and humanity" (tianren heyi)¹⁸ Qian Mu (1895-1990), one of modern China's most celebrated historians and philosophers, emphasized in an article published shortly before his death that the philosophy of "harmony between heaven and humanity" is the greatest contribution of Chinese culture to humanity (Qian 1990). Ji Xianlin (1911-2009), a modern "academic giant,"¹⁹ agreed and stated that a fundamental point of Eastern philosophical thought is "harmony

¹⁸ This concept can be also translated into "harmony between nature and man," "Unity of heaven and humanity," etc.

¹⁹ Ji Xianlin's entry on the China Culture website http://en.chinaculture.org/library/2008-01/09/content_71811_3.htm (accessed 16 November 2024)

between heaven and humanity.” To him, “heaven” is “nature” (Ji 1993). This philosophical thought has also influenced China’s diplomacy, stressing harmony between countries. That is so-called ‘harmony in diversity.’ The political root is the influence of the Communist Party’s ideology. During the presidency of Hu Jintao (2002-2012), the Party’s guiding ideology was “Scientific Outlook on Development.” One of the four elements of this ideology is sustainable development. His successor, Xi Jinping (2012-), has, on many occasions, advocated for similar thoughts on China’s path to ecological civilization, and these thoughts were compiled into a book (Central Committee Research Office for Literature 2017).

2.2.6 Brief Summary

This subchapter introduced the academic discussion on climate justice, primarily from political philosophy and economics perspectives. It is evident that climate justice has been predominantly discussed in the international domain, although an increasing number of scholars are focusing on the ethical issue of climate change in national, intergenerational, and ecological domains. The most widely discussed variety of climate justice is distributive justice, while intergenerational justice, procedural justice, and corrective justice have received less attention, particularly the last two.

A significant portion of this subchapter is devoted to the debate over which principle is the first principle for justice in general and distributive justice specifically. Additionally, I presented the economic perspective on climate justice, not only because economic logic is often criticized from the standpoint of political philosophy but also because these perspectives are interrelated. For instance, a key concept in the cost-benefit analysis is the discount rate. Future generations have no economic influence on today’s policy decisions and are forced to bear the costs of overconsumption if this generation underprices environmental goods. Whether and how to choose a discount rate is, in fact, a moral question of intergenerational justice. Although economic considerations and moral perspectives may seem opposed, they intersect in the context of climate justice (Kanbur 2015).

Given the numerous proposals for the first principle of distributive justice, some scholars have attempted to categorize them using different criteria. Rowlands (1997: 5-7) applied two ordering devices. The first ordering device concerns history. It considers which first principles of justice give weight to what has transpired in the past. Among those historical proposals, a further distinction can be made between reactive and proactive approaches. The *reactive historical* approach asserts that past usage and customs have established one’s present and future rights. In other words, because an entity has done something in the past, it can justly continue to do so in the future. This is sometimes referred to as the “grandfathering” principle. Conversely, the *proactive historical* approach accepts that the past should be

considered but argues that future actions should redress injustices from the past instead of ignoring the past emissions. Those who have used up a disproportionately large share of a global resource have fewer rights to future emissions. This is often referred to as the historical responsibility principle.

In contrast, the ahistorical approach posits that actors were unaware of the potential impacts of their activities and, therefore, should not be held responsible for them. Countries with high historical emissions often employ this position of ignorance in international climate negotiations, but political philosophers widely criticize it. In academic discussions, it is generally accepted that a baseline year, such as the 1990s, should be established to account for historical responsibilities. In this case, it reflects a grandfathering principle, which is a historical approach.

According to Rowlands, the second ordering device is to consider the balance struck between equality and efficiency. On the one hand, equality implies that all individuals should be treated equally. In the context of global resources, this suggests that each entity should have one right, a principle which is usually expressed as “every person in the world has the right to an equal amount of the global resource.” Efficiency, on the other hand, signals that rights should be allocated to those who can use resources most efficiently. That is, to those who can generate the most benefit from it. This is utilitarianism (Rowlands 1997: 6-7).

If we categorize the first principles of justice discussed above using Rowlands’ ordering devices, then the ‘polluter pays’ principle can be regarded as proactive historical, as it focuses on what has happened in the past, identifies culpability, and demands that wrongdoers compensate for their culpability. The ‘ability to pay’ principle argues that those with means should do something, aligning with considerations of efficiency. The cost-benefit analysis, on which the economic perspective of climate justice is based, highlights efficiency as the first fairness principle. Within the understanding of the other three principles that have been discussed above, namely equal per capita emissions, right to (sustainable) development, and human rights, equality is noted as the first principle of fairness. The following table provides a summary of these categorizations.

Table 1: Categorization of Justice Principles

	Historical	Ahistorical	Equality	Efficiency
Polluter Pays Principle	x			
Grandfathering	x			
Ability to Pay		x		x
Equal per Capita Emissions			x	
Right to (Sustainable) Development			x	
Human Rights			x	

Cost-Benefit Analysis				x
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Although scholars have argued for their own first principles, the differences between them are not as significant as they may initially seem when examined closely. For example, both the PPP and ‘grandfathering’ are fault-based justice principles, meaning wrongdoers should compensate for their past wrongdoings depending on the baseline year defined. Similarly, the principles of the ‘right to (sustainable) development’ and human rights are both rights-based, differing only in their focus on which fundamental rights cannot be violated. The ‘ability to pay’ principle and the ‘cost-benefit analysis’ share a common emphasis on efficiency.-

One example is that Baer supported the equal per capita emission approach and proposed, together with his colleagues, the “Greenhouse Development Rights (GDRs)” framework, which is a rights-based approach. This indicates that a scholar can simultaneously support different principles. Another example is Caney (2005). He argued that a pure PPP approach is incomplete. He maintained that a hybrid account is necessary. This account should not only be diachronic (concerned with actions over time and who caused the problem) but also synchronic (concerned with how much people have now and who can bear the sacrifice) (Caney 2005: 772). This hybrid account actually combines the PPP and the ‘ability to pay’ principle. In fact, Caney is not the only scholar who has proposed a hybrid account. Scholars like Sagar (2000), Moellendorf (2002: 97-100), and Baer et al. (2008, 2010, 2013) have also advocated for a hybrid account. For instance, Baer noted in a recent publication that the rights-based principle of GDRs is “based on a combination of responsibility (contribution to the problem) and capacity (ability to pay)” (Baer 2013).

As it has been unfortunately pointed out, while the largely philosophical conceptions of justice are important and have indeed informed the thinking of policymakers, they are often used instead to justify countries making demands that derive from practical considerations and genuine feelings of injustice (Harris 2003: 29). Therefore, it has to be mentioned that this project's task is not to argue which principle should be the first principle of climate justice. Rather, the discussion in this subchapter aims to provide the following analysis of sample texts with a guideline to identify which principles are (or are not) represented by Chinese media in the samples and, thus, to explore how China has argued for its own positions on climate justice and with what justifications.

2.3 Global Inequality and Unbalanced Power Relations in World-System

Resolving the climate change crisis fundamentally depends on achieving a commonly accepted understanding of fairness. Different nations hold divergent principled beliefs on fairness, making global cooperation on climate change seem

nearly impossible, even though climate change is life-threatening and demands global cooperation. To understand why nations struggle to reach an agreement, I draw upon discussions of climate change politics and international political economy (Paterson 1996; Roberts and Parks 2007; Roberts and Parks 2010; Parks and Roberts 2010; Christoff and Eckersley 2011; Hurrell and Sengupta 2012). It is argued that a nation's understanding of fairness, its position, and its motivation in addressing climate change is determined by its position in the international political economy and world system. Global inequality is seen as the fundamental cause of mistrust between the North and the South, creating the greatest obstacle to global climate change cooperation. As some large countries move from the periphery to the center of the world system, the old arrangement is challenged. However, global inequality persists. It is argued that rich and developed nations can and should play the leading role in building mutual trust in order to convince poor and developing nations to join the effort to combat climate change.

2.3.1. A Nation's Position in the International Political Economy and Its Influence on the Understanding of Fairness

The most widely accepted principle of fairness regarding the climate change issue is the "common but differentiated responsibility" principle. This principle states that nation-states have different responsibilities in combating climate change based on their historical contribution to carbon emissions and their respective capabilities of dealing with it. However, this principle is understood and interpreted very differently by nations.

Developing nations argue that they are unfairly bearing the brunt of the excessive consumption patterns of wealthier countries in the Global North. They contend that they have the right to pursue affordable economic growth by utilizing fossil fuels and other available natural resources, just as now-affluent nations did during their own developmental stages. On the other hand, many wealthy nations assert that any climate agreement excluding developing countries would be both unjust and ineffective, given that emissions from non-Annex I countries are projected to rise significantly in the coming decades. Some developed nations even use this reasoning to justify their own lack of action, treating the involvement of developing countries as a prerequisite for their own commitments. While some wealthy nations may recognize the right of developing countries to pursue growth temporarily, they argue that expecting them to shoulder the burden of sustaining global economic growth and financial stability while simultaneously demanding drastic and immediate cuts in carbon emissions is neither fair nor feasible. Additionally, oil-exporting countries emphasize that without legal provisions ensuring compensation and support for transitioning to less carbon-intensive industries, their participation in any agreement is unreasonable. Meanwhile, small island nations and the least

developed countries hold a starkly different perspective. They advocate for a fair agreement that prioritizes immediate climate stabilization, addresses their fundamental economic needs, and acknowledges their heightened vulnerability to climate-related stresses and extreme weather events. Similarly, nations in colder climates with higher energy demands for heating, as well as countries with vast land areas, argue that their unique "national circumstances" must be factored into any equitable global climate agreement.

Different understandings of fairness make it challenging to reach an agreement. As noted, we live in a morally ambiguous world where social understandings of fairness are "configurational," depending on countries' position in the global hierarchy of capitalist economy and political power (Roberts and Parks 2007: 136-137; Christoff and Eckersley 2011: 443).

In China's case, the situation is more complicated. Since the Opening of China at the end of the 1970s, industrialization has been worshipped as the path to development and prosperity. In just two or three decades, China has become the world factory. On the one hand, the production of manufactured goods has brought great success, as manufacturing promotes backward and forward linkages and leads to higher levels of internal economic integration. The diversification into manufacturing has provided a solid foundation for the domestic economy. Compared to economies reliant on the exports of primary goods, those specializing in manufacturing can command higher and more stable prices for their exports. Therefore, fiscal volatility is less severe. However, on the other hand, countries of this type are on a high carbon development trajectory. Research reveals that "each increment of manufacturing in developing countries is yielding less value-added in the South and more in the North" (Wade 2004: 175) even though their share of the global manufacturing market grows. It is suggested that countries that specialize in the export of manufactures, therefore, may not fit the expected relationship that emissions first rise and then decline as development proceeds (Roberts and Parks, 2007: 175). Being in this position, China has a right to development imperative (Giddens 2009; Beck 2010) on the one hand. On the other hand, the country faces greater and greater international pressure due to its carbon emissions dramatically increasing due to manufacturing.

2.3.2 Global Inequality and Its Influence

Different positions in the global capitalist economy and power system result in heterogeneous understandings of justice of climate change, making it difficult to agree on fairness. What exacerbates global climate governance is global inequality and mistrust between the North and the South (Roberts and Parks 2007, 2010; Parks and Roberts 2010). Global inequality directs attention to the root causes of political conflict in international environmental relations. Because global inequality

promotes a social distribution of economic benefits and environmental burdens that offer advantages to rich countries and disadvantages to poor ones, it also creates political conflicts of an intrinsically structural nature (Parks and Roberts 2010: 145). The persistence of the North-South inequality also fosters structuralist worldviews and causal beliefs (Roberts and Parks 2007).

2.3.2.1 Global Inequality in International Political Economy

Regarding the climate issue, global inequality is starkly reflected in global climate negotiations. The ability of countries to attend international conferences and participate in international organizations is impacted by their overall economic and political power (Roberts and Parks 2007: 14). Some island nations, for instance, cannot afford to send delegations to UNFCCC climate conferences. During these conferences, many different issues are often negotiated simultaneously in different meetings, putting smaller delegations “at a sharp disadvantage” (Roberts and Parks 2007: 16). Climate negotiations are highly technical and science-based. Developing nations often lack the necessary knowledge to develop a strong bargaining position. Once again, global inequality has significant effects (Roberts and Parks 2007: 18). For example, it was reported that out of 512 WGI authors in 1995, 212 were from the U.S., 61 from the UK, and only 12 authors came from India and China combined (Roberts and Parks 2007: 18). All in all, global inequality heavily influences the ability to participate in global climate governance. As Eckersley (2012: 34–35) observes, vulnerable and less powerful nation-states often have fewer delegates and fewer technical resources, and they are excluded from many crucial backroom meetings. The issue here is not purely distributional: obstacles to equal participation are not only economic but also power-related and are built in the hierarchies of state relations (Kortetmäki 2016: 324).

Global inequality not only impacts climate negotiation but is also rooted in the structure of the world system. According to Wallerstein (2004), the global economy is an interconnected system divided into core, periphery, and semi-periphery regions. Nations can shift positions within this hierarchy, moving from the periphery to the core or vice versa, within the international division of labor. Wallerstein argues that this hierarchical structure perpetuates global inequality. Roberts and Parks emphasize that “the inherently unequal structure of the world system remains intact largely because of structural barriers: unstable commodity prices, declining terms of trade, domestic political unrest, high levels of social inequality, and feeble postcolonial political institutions” (Roberts and Parks 2007: 30). These issues, as Paterson (1996: 172) notes, “all reflect the structural inequality in the world political economy.”

Roberts and Parks (2007) provide examples of how the powerful Global North constrains the development of the disadvantaged Global South through unequal arrangements in the world system. In a 2005 *Foreign Affairs* article, Nancy Birdsall,

president of the Center for Global Development, Harvard economist Dani Rodrik, and IMF (International Monetary Fund) division chief Arvind Subramanian illustrate this dynamic: “In the context of international trade agreements in particular, developing countries have been asked to take on obligations that have been clearly inimical to their development interests. Perhaps the most egregious example of this in recent times has been the WTO’s intellectual property agreement, TRIPs [The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights]. ... In other words, TRIPs will entail a pure transfer of rents from poor to rich” (Roberts and Parks 2007: 13). Through mechanisms such as international financial institution (IFI) conditionality, bilateral reprisals, tariff escalation policies, restrictive trade and investment agreements, and so-called “expert advice,” poor nations have been pressured to align their development strategies with their comparative advantage.

Robert Wade (2003) describes this phenomenon as a “shrinking of development space,” arguing that “the rules being written into multilateral and bilateral agreements actively prevent developing countries from pursuing the kinds of industrial and technology policies adopted by the newly developed countries of East Asia, and by the older developed countries when they were developing” (Wade 2003: 622). Similarly, Birdsall et al. (2005) highlight how the actions of Western governments—often callous and at times opportunistic—have made upward mobility in the international division of labor difficult. Other scholars of international political economy have pointed out that the governance structures of international financial institutions like the IMF and the World Bank marginalize their primary clients (developing countries) by denying them significant voting power (Woods 1999: 42; Wade 2003).

These inequalities of opportunity indirectly but significantly influence how developing countries approach global environmental negotiations. As Porter, Brown and others observe, “the developing nations’ perceptions of the global economic structure as fundamentally inequitable often shape their policy responses to global environmental issues” (Porter et al. 2000: 175). Roberts and Parks further argue that when powerful states disregard the positions of weaker states in the international division of labor—particularly in areas where they hold structural power, such as international economic regimes—they risk provoking weaker states to “reciprocate” in policy areas where they possess greater bargaining leverage, such as international environmental regimes (Roberts and Parks 2010: 73).

2.3.2.2 Ecologically Unequal Exchange and Ecological Debt

The intellectual origins of ecological debt and ecologically unequal exchange are rooted in world-system theory. The international division of labor functions such that core wealthy nations import raw materials and export high-value services and industrial manufactures while controlling powerful financial institutions. Poor, peripheral nations export their natural resources and provide cheap labor for

manufacturing. Semi-peripheral middle-income nations are somewhere in the middle, with some industry, higher-value services, and a partially diversified export structure. In the view of world-systems theorists, then, a few nations move up, but the relations of extraction, production, and consumption between core and semi-peripheral nations have changed but not reversed since colonial times (Roberts and Parks 2007: 165-6).

Around the 2000s, a group of scholars noticed the inequality in the international political economy and its implication for ecological issues in developing countries. They contributed to research on “ecologically unequal exchange” (Andersson and Lindroth 2001; Giljum and Eisenmenger 2004; Hornborg 1998a, 1998b; Muradian and Martinez-Alier 2001a, 2001b; Muradian et al. 2002). Parks and Roberts have summarized the central empirical findings from this literature. The research suggests that when nations exchange goods, the market prices of primary products are often undervalued, and in the course of extracting, moving, and processing products for export, there is a massive transfer and degradation of materials and energy that goes unnoticed. Consequently, trade relations between wealthy and less developed nations remain deeply unequal, as poorer countries export significant volumes of underpriced goods. From the standpoint of materials flow analysis, this dynamic reveals that core economies are effectively depleting ecological capacity from resource-rich regions. By importing resource-intensive products and exporting waste, these wealthier nations shift environmental burdens to the Global South, perpetuating a pattern of ecological and economic imbalance (Parks and Roberts 2010: 142-3). Global climate change is also an important area where ecologically unequal exchange appears to be in effect. Statistical findings have suggested that participation in international trade increases emissions in poorer countries but lowers them in wealthier countries, as illustrated in the following paragraph about emission transfer.

The idea of “ecological debt” and “ecologically unequal exchange” is very attractive to developing nations. For instance, the Chinese government and the G-77 declared at the 2000 “South Summit”: “We believe that the prevailing modes of production and consumption in the industrialized countries are unsustainable and should be changed, for they threaten the very survival of the planet...We advocate a solution for the serious global, regional and local environmental problems facing humanity, based on the recognition of the North’s ecological debt and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities of the developed and developing countries” (G-77 2000). Therefore, scholars argue that efforts to forge an effective North-South climate pact will likely require acknowledgment and significant efforts to address it (Parks and Roberts 2010: 139).

China’s position within the world system has changed over time. Half a century ago, China was a semi-peripheral nation. However, since the Opening, it has moved closer to the center in terms of economic development and political power, a process

that has accelerated since 2007-2008. Ironically, China is now critiqued by the same dependency theory it once used to criticize the rich North (Liu 2014: 121). Due to the change in China's status in the international division of labor, China may have different understandings of fairness and positions of global climate governance. Therefore, the historical change that China has undergone should be considered in the analysis to follow below.

2.3.2.3 Emission Transfer

Emission transfer, recently discussed in international climate politics, is closely linked to ecological debt. Statistics suggest that some developed countries have reduced or stabilized their GHG emissions since the 1990s. However, scholars have expressed doubt whether such statistics truly indicate a shift from high-carbon to low-carbon economies and lifestyles. Interestingly, various research has suggested that many "service-exporting" OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries, which specialize in banking, tourism, advertising, sales, product design, procurement, and distribution, are often "net-importers" of carbon-intensive goods coming primarily from developing countries. As such, they do not necessarily emit less; they may simply displace their emissions (Heil and Selden 2001; Machado et al. 2001; Muradian et al. 2002). This changing pattern of production and consumption has gone unnoticed.

In order to quantify the growth in emission transfers via international trade, scholars developed a trade-linked global database for CO₂ emissions covering 113 countries and 57 economic sectors from 1990 to 2008. It figures revealed that the emissions from the production of traded goods and services increased from 4.3 Gt CO₂ in 1990 (20% of global emissions) to 7.8 Gt CO₂ in 2008 (26% of global emissions). Most developed countries have increased their consumption-based emissions faster than their territorial emissions, and non-energy-intensive manufacturing played a key role in the emission transfers. Net emission transfers via international trade from developing to developed countries increased from 0.4 Gt CO₂ in 1990 to 1.6 Gt CO₂ in 2008, exceeding the Kyoto Protocol emission reductions. The results indicate that international trade is a significant factor in explaining the change in emissions in many countries from both a production and consumption perspective. Thus, it is suggested that countries monitor emission transfers via international trade, in addition to territorial emissions, to ensure progress toward stabilizing global greenhouse gas emissions (Peters et al. 2011: 8905). Roberts and Parks also developed models to study the relations of national economies' structural features to world trade. The analysis shows that nations that had high shares of their total exports in manufacturing were higher emitters in all four measures of responsibility (Roberts and Parks 2007; Parks and Roberts 2010). These findings are very relevant to explaining the emission change in China.

Researchers have applied different approaches to understanding the relevance of China's emissions to its participation in international trade. Lin and Sun (2010: 620) used I–O analysis and found that in 2005, China generated around 5458 million tons of CO₂ from domestic production, and the consumption-based CO₂ emissions were approximate 4434 million tons. About 3357 million tons CO₂ emissions were embodied in the exports and the emissions avoided by imports were 2333 million tons. Being a net exporter of CO₂ emissions, China's emissions embodied in international trade balance were around 1024 million tons, accounting for 18.8% of the domestic production.

Similarly, Yan and Yang (2010: 350) estimated the amount of CO₂ embodied in China's foreign trade during 1997-2007. They found that 10.03–26.54% of China's CO₂ emissions were produced during the manufacture of export goods for foreign consumers, while CO₂ embodied in China's foreign trade during 1997—emissions in China's imports accounted for only 4.40% in 1997 and 9.05% in 2007. The rest of the world avoided emissions of 150.18 Mt CO₂ in 1997 by importing goods from China rather than manufacturing the same type and quantity of goods domestically. This figure increased to 593 Mt in 2007. Weber et al. (2008: 3572) have found that in 2005, around one-third of Chinese emissions (1700Mt CO₂) were due to production of exports, and this proportion had risen from 12% (230Mt) in 1987 and only 21% (760 Mt) as recently as 2002. They argued that it is likely that consumption in the developed world has driven this trend and that a majority of these emissions have largely escaped the scrutiny of the “carbon leakage” debate due to the narrow definition used.

Research (Peters et al. 2011: 8906) shows that Chinese emissions accounted for 55% of the growth in global CO₂ emissions from 1990 to 2008 and the production of Chinese exports accounted for 18% of the growth in global CO₂ emissions. The production of Chinese exports later exported to Annex B countries accounted for 75% of the growth in Annex B consumption-based emissions. The U.S. has shown rapid growth in imported emissions, largely because of China and other developing nations. Other statistics shows that of the 4.2 million megawatt hours of electricity that China produces each year, more than 80% comes from coal-fired power stations that emitted a staggering 6.1 billion metric tons of carbon dioxide in 2010. Some of this pollution has resulted from the displacement of polluting industries to China from developed countries (Harris et al. 2013: 298-299).

As Tsang and Kolk (2010: 191-2) noted, regardless of the methodology employed, there is broad consensus that the net carbon emissions embedded in China's exports constitute a substantial share of its domestic emissions. This finding remains a central argument for Chinese negotiators in international climate discussions, reinforcing the country's position against accepting emissions caps. It is also used to emphasize the need for developed nations to assume greater responsibility for reducing emissions in the global effort to address climate change.

2.3.3 A Changing International Political Economy

For much of modern history, industrial nations have held dominance over international politics and the global economy. The Anglo-American and European-led global order, established in the 19th century, laid the foundation for the development of key frameworks, including power-political structures, the international legal system, and mechanisms of global economic governance (Hurrell and Sengupta 2012: 463). However, since the 1990s, there has been a growing perception of a shift in global power dynamics. Emerging powers, particularly the BRICS group (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), are increasingly seen as playing a more prominent, active, and influential role in shaping the international order (Hurrell and Sengupta 2012: 463). The 2011 World Economy Forum in Davos clearly stated that emerging economies play a greater role in world mechanisms such as the G20.²⁰ This historical change has influenced the global order in general and global climate politics specifically.

Due to their fast and steady growth in conjunction with their population size and vast territory, fewer and fewer countries see the big developing countries as “developing” countries. Instead, a new term, “emerging countries,” has been created. Faced with this historical change, the nations at the core of the old global order tend to regard the rise of emerging powers as a problem. One reason for this is that emerging powers are believed to seek not just material power and economic development but also status and recognition. In addition, they are playing an increasingly central role in the global capitalist system because of their high growth rates and rapid development. Global capitalism is transforming from an old core that is centered on the advanced Western industrialized economies into a far more global and transnationalized capitalist order (Hurrell and Sengupta 2012: 464-5).

The stance of emerging countries toward the evolving global landscape appears to be mixed. On one hand, they take pride in their economic accomplishments and aspire to compete with industrialized nations on a more advanced level. Their goal is to bridge the gap with the developed world within a few decades, and they appear to embrace their growing recognition as key players in international affairs. As the Indian scholar Dubash (2013) observed, India, alongside other rapidly industrializing nations, has reaped the benefits of sustained high economic growth even during a global slowdown and “is more assertively claiming a seat at the global high table” (Dubash 2013: 193). The scholar further noted that while India shares more similarities with least developed countries in terms of per capita economic indicators or greenhouse gas emissions, its negotiation strategies and external image are increasingly aligned with those of emerging industrializing economies rather than with the former. On the other hand, nations such as China and India remain heavily economically reliant on industrialized countries within the global capitalist system. A

²⁰Agenda for the 2011 World Economy Forum <https://www.weforum.org/stories/2010/12/agenda-for-davos-2011/> (accessed 16 November 2024)

clear example is China's economic growth, which is largely driven by exports. While these countries reap economic benefits, their pursuit of growth often comes at the cost of environmental degradation and the unsustainable exploitation of natural resources, undermining long-term sustainability. Additionally, the carbon emissions generated by industrial production create a dilemma: it is difficult to assign responsibility solely to the producers (developing countries) or the consumers (developed countries) who commission these goods. Despite their remarkable economic achievements, China and India still lack proportional influence in Northern-dominated institutions like the IMF and World Bank. As some scholars argue, emerging powers must first gain recognition from established powers before being accepted into the elite circle of global influence (Kopra 2019). Yet, while their economic rise is undeniable, it has not translated into a corresponding elevation of their status in the international political economy. Moreover, they appear reluctant to take on the additional responsibilities that other nations expect of them.

Global climate governance has also been characterized by the transformation happening in the global order. In the past 30 years, climate change has been widely understood through the prism of North-South relations and framed in a way that foregrounds the problem of global inequality (Roberts and Parks 2007; Collier 2008). However, the rise of big developing countries makes the notion of the Third World or the Global South complicated and vague. This has been underscored by the rise of emerging powers, the tremendous macroeconomic gap between them and other developing countries, and their different power-political, military, and geopolitical opportunities (Hurrell and Sengupta 2012: 480). Some even claimed that 2009 saw the end of what was known as the "Third World" (Zoellick 2010). In this changing situation, emerging powers are expected to act as "responsible stakeholders."

In this context, China is especially in focus. Since the global financial crisis in 2007, China has received increasing attention in global affairs. At the UNFCCC climate summit in Copenhagen in 2009, China was kept in the foreground. Never before has China drawn so much attention at an international conference, and never before has China been so closely bound with the U.S. Most of the media coverage concentrated on the dynamics between China and the U.S. The discourse of G2 regarding climate change is strongly implied in the climate talks (Cheng 2014: 48-49). G2 refers to the U.S. and China. The discourse of G2 in terms of climate change is strongly implied in the climate talks. In 2010, China surpassed the U.S. in carbon emissions, according to data from the International Energy Association. Following the increase in carbon emissions, China's GDP jumped to the world's second position in 2010, following the U.S. The two countries have never been so similar or comparable in GDP and carbon emissions in history. The amount of carbon emissions has become the standard for measuring a country's obligation to climate change. The scale of the economy is regarded as the capacity of a country to deal with climate change. Under these standards, China and the U.S. are seen as

belonging to the same group. Some even concluded that as the EU is increasingly sidelined, leadership in climate governance “now needs to come from the G2, the U.S. first and China second” (Cléménçon, 2010: xxix). However, China maintains that its overall level of development remains comparable to that of many other developing countries. Objectively speaking, China is not yet a global powerhouse on par with the United States, and its achievements are accompanied by significant risks and challenges. China has formally dismissed the notion of a G2 (Group of Two) partnership with the U.S., opposing the idea of being framed as an equal counterpart to the U.S. in global discourse. While China has long-term ambitions to surpass the U.S., it recognizes that it is not currently prepared to assume such a role on the world stage.

Due to their increasing importance in the global capitalist system, emerging countries have gained more power in discourse. In some issue areas, such as climate change, emerging powers have achieved a “veto-player” status (Hurrell and Sengupta 2012: 481). “Veto players are individual or collective actors whose agreement (by majority rule for collective actors) is required for a change of the status quo.” (Tsebelis 1995: 289) However, scholars argue that while the “power shift” needs to be recognized, the power shifts in emerging powers’ climate change politics are far more complicated. There is a “mismatch between existing global economic governance arrangements and the distribution of power among those with actual and effective power” (Hurrell and Sengupta 2012: 481). They stated that emerging powers certainly remain at the top table of climate change negotiations, but their capacity to actively shape the agenda has been limited and even, in some respects, declined (Hurrell and Sengupta 2012: 481). First, global inequality remains at the heart of global climate politics. Indeed, the emerging powers have benefited from participation in the global order. However, their development is based on a high-emission path, which has resulted in ecological destruction. As discussed earlier, (semi)peripheral nations experience great ecological debt, and a significant amount of emissions originate from exporting goods to developed countries. Second, the emerging powers’ development level per capita is still low. For example, the emissions of even the richest 2 to 10% of India’s population are still lower than those of America’s poorest 10% (Hurrell and Sengupta 2012: 482). Against this argument, a widespread saying is quoted by the Chinese media. It originates from Chinese climate negotiators in Copenhagen in 2009. It says: Western people have driven cars for many decades, but only in the last ten years have the Chinese people been able to afford to buy cars and enjoy the benefits of driving. Requiring the Chinese not to drive is obviously unfair. Indeed, the rise of emerging countries complicates the simple picture of a world divided between a rich and powerful North and an impoverished and marginalized South. Nevertheless, the rise is “hardly revolutionary” (Hurrell and Sengupta 2012: 483). For one thing, the soaring GDP of the South is obtained largely by sacrificing the environment. If the environmental cost is counted,

the economic development of emerging powers is not as fast as it appears to be. Another serious problem is that the gap between the rich and the poor in those countries has been growing. While some benefited from the opening-up policy, others became deprived. The ever-enlarging gap between the rich and the poor is a potential fuse for more serious social conflicts. It has recently been observed that many rich people in China and India immigrate to or at least have residences in developed countries. Even though they have accumulated considerable wealth in the last decades within their own countries, they do not want to stay there. All these phenomena reflect how unstable and risky the development of emerging powers is. Additionally, despite their enhanced economic and political power, emerging countries are still game players and not game changers. “Developmental policy space remains restricted by the current rules of the global game” (Hurrell and Sengupta 2012: 483).

2.3.4 Missing Role Model and Alternative Development Path

Confronted with the changes and transformations in the international political economy, both developed and developing countries need to reflect on their climate change policy choices. Have developed countries really done enough to convince developing countries to join in the climate change fight? Are developing countries really determined to abandon the cheap development path and pursue a clean energy one despite obstacles in the near future?

The fact is that most countries in the Global North countries have not fulfilled their commitments. Under the Kyoto Protocol, “Annex I” (developed) countries committed to a 5.2% (average) reduction in greenhouse gas emissions (below 1990 levels) by 2012. However, with the exception of several European countries, greenhouse gas emissions have risen significantly throughout the industrialized world since 1990. Moreover, Northern governments are trying to convince the Southern governments that they need to rein in their greenhouse gas emissions (Roberts and Parks 2010: 69-70). It is observed and commented that comparing Rio 1992 with more recent developments—especially in the period since 2009—the striking feature is the extent to which the U.S. and other Western industrialized states have succeeded in unpicking many of the essential elements of what was agreed upon at and after Rio. The U.S. has maintained its position without making any substantial concessions (Hurrell and Sengupta 2012: 466). Kartha (2011: 510) holds similar opinions, writing that the North was half-hearted in meeting Kyoto’s commitments and failed to provide technological and financial support for mitigation and adaptation in the South. Therefore, it is understandable that the South’s distrust of binding mitigation commitments is directly linked to the North’s inattention to its own emission constraints.

That said, it is justified and imperative that they develop their economy and improve the living standard of their citizens (Giddens 2009; Beck 2010). The question is what kind of development path they should follow. Take China, one of the emerging countries, as an example: in the 1980s, China opened up to the world and has actively been integrated into the global capitalist economy. By the 2000s, China had established a comprehensive manufacturing system and slowly became the factory of the world. The GDP increased at a speed of two digits between 1990 and 2010. However, this development is highly labor and resource-intensive, resulting in tremendous environmental and ecological problems. With that in mind, it is understandable that in 2003, the Chinese Communist Party (CPC) proposed the Scientific Outlook on Development to guide China's economic and social development. This principle highlights the importance and necessity of sustainable development, which can be seen as a response to the increasingly severe environmental problems and a side effect of unconstrained economic development in the past decades. At the 17th CPC National Congress in October 2007, the Scientific Outlook on Development was written into the Constitution of the CPC. At the 18th CPC National Congress in November 2012, the Scientific Outlook on Development, together with Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, and the Theory of Three Represents, was designated as long-term guiding thoughts of the Party. At the First Session of the 13th NPC in March 2018, it was written into the Chinese Constitution and reconfirmed as the guideline for political and social life in China. It takes 15 years for the Scientific Outlook to go from being an initiative to becoming a national policy. During this period, China's economy followed more or less the same development path characterized by prioritizing the economic interests to environmental protection, although it has to be acknowledged that China has implemented stronger climate policies and achieved a lot in terms of environment and climate protection.

China's inertia in pursuing unsustainable development is not only its own problem but also a global issue faced by all nations, especially developing countries. The industrial development has been almost entirely fueled by fossil energy. Since the 1970s, the industrialized world has realized this problem but has not demonstrated enough willingness to chart out and seriously pave an alternative course. Therefore, it is argued, why should the countries of the South sign away their rights to follow along this proven pathway? (Kantha, 2011:510). Wheeler and Ummel also note that policymakers need to be disabused of "the notion that the South can utilize carbon-intensive growth to dramatically increase incomes." (Wheeler and Ummel 2007: 9). It is pleasant to see that some developed countries such as Germany, Denmark, and Sweden have pioneered in pursuing the low-carbon development path. A typical example is the "Energiewende" in Germany. Although there is widespread discussion on the issue, with various different opinions and expected scenarios, it seems that the country is prepared to accept the possible

economic costs and social transformations. We will see if these pioneering countries can offer an attractive alternative to the wider world.

2.3.5 Building Mutual Trust and Who Takes the Lead

So, the precondition of agreeing on a shared vision is how the North-South impasse on global climate policy can be broken. Scholars, such as Roberts and Parks, argue that the most important thing is to break through the cycle of mistrust that plagues the North-South relations (Roberts and Parks 2007, 2010). On the one hand, the North sees the South as a climate villain that misuses its bargaining power and is also afraid of the possible threat of their unconstrained development, and on the other, the South sees the North as attempting to use the banner of environmental protection to stall the development of the South and perpetuate existing inequalities and patterns of colonial domination, which has been instrumental to the present prosperity of the North (Benton 1999; Guha and Martinez-Alier 2006).

Some argue that, in line with common conceptions of fairness and to break the evil circle, developed countries should act first and aid developing countries (Harris, 2008: 484). To be specific, the North needs to set an example, offer the South a new global bargain, and signal its commitment to a new “shared vision” through a series of confidence-building measures (Roberts and Parks 2010: 74). Developed countries need to reduce their own emissions, since “the expansion of energy consumption in the emerging economies is only environmentally sustainable if consumption in high-income countries is reduced” (Kaplinsky 2008: 75). In addition, the confidence-building measures should provide opportunities for developing countries to transition towards less carbon-intensive development pathways and clearly signal a desire to reverse long-standing patterns of global inequality (Roberts and Parks 2010: 76).

In this course, the most important element could be clean technology. As early as in 1990s there was already opinion claiming that it is not impossible for developing countries to take stronger actions if the North can offer better bid for technology transfer (Paterson, 1996: 75). One concern is more efficient technology (Lewis 2007: 165-7). More and more scholars hold similar ideas: that better conditions for technology transfer would motivate developing countries to take more ambitious actions (Okereke 2010; Roberts and Parks 2007, 2010). China’s overarching concern should be addressed in order to increase its international commitment to climate action. A recent study on international climate governance shows that despite the repeated emphasis throughout the climate agreement, capacity building and technology transfer remain underdeveloped (Okereke and Conventry 2016: 838).

Moreover, industrialized nations should make a clear and deliberate effort to acknowledge the “structural obstacles” that developing countries face. One example is the practice of tariff escalation, which reinforces the structuralist view that wealthy

nations are preventing poorer countries from attaining prosperity through the same strategies they themselves employed during their development. Similarly, the WTO's intellectual property agreement, TRIPs (The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights), produces comparable effects (Wade 2003; Shadlen 2004; Birdsall et al. 2005). Historically, rich nations enjoyed full policy autonomy in this area, granting patents to promote industrial transformation.

Besides the mutual material interests that developed countries could offer, recognition and respect play an important role in breaking the impasse, which seems to be underestimated by many observers. Hurrell and Sengupta have discussed this, arguing that emerging countries want a seat at the global high table as their economic power increases (Hurrell and Sengupta 2012). Kaplinsky has pointed out that China and India account for almost 40% of the global population and are entering the league of the world's largest economies. Brazil, with almost 200 million people, may follow in their wake. Emerging economies need to be drawn into the discussions and institutions of global governance. However, he has also noted that the institutions of global governance are not changing rapidly enough to reflect this altering balance of global economic power. This affects not only the appointments of the Head of the World Bank (privileged as a U.S. nomination) and the IMF (privileged as a European nomination) but also the substance of the policies promoted by these international financial institutions (Kaplinsky 2008: 67-76). Scholars have warned that in global environmental politics, developing countries have unprecedented leverage (Goodman 2009). When powerful states consistently treat weaker states like second-class nations, they run the risk of weaker states "reciprocating" in policy domains where they possess greater bargaining leverage (Roberts and Parks 2010: 76).

A China expert once concluded that "[E]ffectively engaging Beijing will only be possible if developed countries lead by example" (Lewis 2007: 168). Effectively engaging developing and emerging countries will only be possible if the developed countries take the lead as role models. Of course, this does not mean that developing and emerging countries should just wait. On the contrary, trust building is mutual. While developed nations signal their willingness to cooperate, developing countries, especially emerging economies, should also demonstrate that they are willing to shift to the low-carbon development path and prepared to assume more responsibilities within their capacities.

2.4 Swaying between Collective / Statism and Individual / Cosmopolitanism

Academic discussions on climate justice have been swaying between two dichotomies: collective statist and individual cosmopolitanism. This subchapter presents the central tenets of both approaches to climate justice and briefly

describes how the trend has developed and changed in past decades. With different approaches to understanding climate justice, the prescribed actions against climate change vary. However, in this dissertation, I will argue that the ideal, practical, and efficient way to deal with climate change is to combine both approaches and apply them to different societies according to their specific economic, political, and cultural conditions.

2.4.1 The Established Collective Approach to Climate Justice

Our current value system evolved in small communities where relations of proximity were the norm and adapted to deal with paradigm moral problems, such as cases where an individual directly harms another individual. This value system is sometimes referred to as “common sense morality.”

Since climate change is a large-scale collective action problem, a moral paradigm reliant on the agency and actions of individuals does not seem applicable. A collective statist approach to climate justice has been established both in academic discussion and climate regime. Advocates of the so-called institutional approach of justice (for example, John Rawls) claim that justice is inherently a quality of institutions. The justice principle should only apply to a self-contained national society represented by a territorial state. It should not be contingent on individual action. In this view, justice is a collective project that transcends the sum of individual actions (Tan 2015: 136; Neuteleers 2010). The current global climate regime is grounded on nation-states. As shown in the previous subchapter about climate justice, academic discussions mainly focus on the international justice dimension, i.e., the justice issue among nations.

In terms of the climate regime, the current widely accepted ideas are still nation-state-based. Climate negotiations are carried out by nation-states or blocs of nation-states with similar interests. The typical representation is the UNFCCC mechanism. Responsibilities, obligations, and rights are often discussed in collective terms: the nation-state. It has been three decades since the foundation of the UNFCCC in 1992. However, the world has seen the failures of climate change premised on prevailing interstate doctrine. This suggests “that an alternative concept is needed to underlie the climate change regime” and “what is needed is a reconceptualization of climate governance away from the state and toward cosmopolitan values and interests” (Harris 2011: 639).

It may be argued that NGOs and civil society can look beyond national borders and pay more attention to the individual’s and locals’ justice claims than the established institutions. However, empirical investigations show that civil society has been integrated into the United Nations Climate Regime in the form of a “Climate Ethics Consensus” through a hegemonic process. Consent is created, shaped, negotiated, and maintained via the acceptance and internalization of a set of values

and world views that reinforce established power relations (De Lucia 2009: 235-236). The civil society working on issues related to climate change has mainly adopted the values of the institutions of power.

2.4.2 From Collective Statism to Individual Cosmopolitanism

2.4.2.1 Failure of Collective Statism

The previous chapter described the political and philosophical discussion of climate justice. It revealed that the discussion focused too much on justice among nation-states.

More than ten years ago, scholars investigated the statist approach and asked: “*Are states the relevant units of analysis in the study of climate justice?*” (Parks and Roberts 2006: 347). Cosmopolitan scholars argued that “the notion of the nation-state contributing to, being vulnerable to, and responding to climate change may obscure crucially important intra-country distinctions” (Parks and Roberts 2006: 347). As O’Brien and co-authors pointed out, in terms of climate justice, less attention is paid to equity issues within national boundaries or those that manifest at diverse scales and units of analysis. These analytical variables include race, gender, caste, ethnicity, and class. The inequities associated with climate change are closely linked to existing inequities, and they cannot be divorced from the very processes that create these in the first place (O’Brien et al. 2010: 8). Take class as an example. It is a fact that more people in developing countries have become richer, and their consumption has increased dramatically in the past decades. The resulting emissions from their consumption cannot be ignored. However, due to the large number of the poor in their countries, they are exempt from the obligations of the people in developed nations. Likewise, it has been proved that the gap between the poor and the rich in developed countries has widened over the past decades (Piketty 2013). Although it is not wrong to require developed countries to take more action, it seems unfair to ask the poor in those countries to take on inappropriate obligations.

The statist approach is no longer suitable for discussing distributive justice and is thus necessary to move beyond the dichotomy between developed and developing countries. Some scholars have argued that “A non-statist approach makes it possible to reconcile these simple facts by highlighting the role of individuals rather than being obsessive about the role of states. Unlike the current approach to climate change policy, which dictates that rich and poor alike should carry the same burden merely because of the arbitrary fact of the country in which they happen to live, a non-statist approach highlights the capabilities of each individual” (Harris et al. 2013: 301). The collective statist approach had played its function. However, the fact that the statist-based climate regime fails to deliver a widely accepted climate deal urges people to reflect on this approach. Therefore, a cosmopolitan view of climate justice has attracted much attention.

2.4.2.2 Cosmopolitan Approach

Climate change challenges the statist perspective to understand justice issues in two ways: the temporal and spatial aspects.

Due to these two challenges, climate change “is a matter of cosmopolitan justice” and “cries out for a cosmopolitan response” (Harris 2011: 643-650). In terms of the spacious aspect, climate change is a global issue with a global impact going beyond state borders. Some believe that climate change represents the most globalized impact of humanity on nature in history. To very varying degrees, all human societies contribute to the causes of global warming through emissions, agricultural practices, and deforestation. People everywhere will feel the consequences, and contributions from all are needed, sooner or later, to prevent catastrophe (Lever-Tracy and Pittock 2010: 5). As Meyer and Sanklecha (2016) have discussed, the scope of social justice is influenced by globalization and extended from contemporaries in a particular society to a global space. Steve Vanderheiden pointed out that “insofar as a justice community develops around issues on which peoples are interdependent and so must find defensible means of allocating scarce goods, global climate change presents a case in which the various arguments against cosmopolitan justice cease to apply. All depend on a stable climate for their well-being, all are potentially affected by the actions or policies of others, and none can fully opt out of the cooperative scheme, even if they eschew its necessary limits on action. Climate change mitigation therefore becomes an issue of cosmopolitan justice by its very nature as an essential public good” (Vanderheiden 2008: 104). Therefore, in the context of globalization, an appropriate analysis of justice issues needs “to address whether the kinds of principle that should be adopted at the domestic level should also be adopted at the global level” (Caney 2005: 749).

In terms of the temporal aspect, climate change is an intergenerational collective action problem. Until recently, we could talk in both moral and practical terms about climate change as a problem caused by the world's developed countries and the citizens living there. Developed countries were by far the primary source of GHG pollution and, thus, (if we focus on national causality) responsible for ending that pollution, making amends for it, and aiding those who will suffer from it. The climate change regime, insofar as it acknowledged this responsibility, is premised on the notion that developed states—and indirectly—their people and commercial entities—have primary responsibility for addressing this problem (Harris 2011: 643). But this argument is becoming problematic because those responsible for the emissions in the past are now dead. Likewise, people presently causing future global warming may no longer live exclusively within the states where they historically caused the problem.

All this makes the collective statist approach unconvincing. On the contrary, a cosmopolitan conception of who is most important in world affairs is more suited to the realities of climate change, modernity, and globalization than extant forms of

justice premised on the morality of states (Harris 2011: 640). According to statism, international justice considers national borders to be both the practical and ethical foundation for justice. However, cosmopolitan justice recognizes the rights, obligations, and duties of individuals regardless of nationality. While cosmopolitan justice recognizes that national borders have practical importance, Harris has commented that cosmopolitan supporters envision an alternative way of ordering the world, in contrast to the Westphalian norms that have guided and defined the international system for centuries (Harris 2011: 642). Stressing individual rights and responsibility, the cosmopolitan approach does not undermine the role of states. Instead, the process of making both persons and states objectives of the climate change regime is a central tenant of a cosmopolitan corollary (Harris 2011: 646).

Individualism of Cosmopolitan Approach

In Pogge's view, one of the three core elements of cosmopolitanism is individualism. Cosmopolitans take human being, or persons, not states, to be "the ultimate units of moral concern" (2008: 175) for moral consideration. A cosmopolitan approach places rights and obligations at the individual level, discounting the importance of national boundaries. Cosmopolitanism is not only about the rights of people everywhere, but also their duties.

In this context, philosophical reflection on climate ethics has also changed in recent decades. Fragnière (2016: 798) pointed out that in the 1990s, climate ethics emerged as a new investigation field for practical philosophy against the background of the international negotiations for a global climate treaty, namely the UNFCCC. This has given rise to a vast amount of philosophical literature on the fairest way to share the costs and benefits of GHG emissions (Moellendorf 2012). A criticism of the bulk of literature on justice and climate change is that it speaks of the obligations of states to act, while there is little discussion about the obligations of individuals (Harris 2008: 482). However, Fragnière pointed out that a different but not wholly separate line of reflection has emerged about the responsibilities and duties of climate change. He proposed to refer to this line of reflection as *individual climate ethics* (italics in the original). "This debate has been mainly focused on what morality requires from individuals in the absence of a collective global agreement on emission reductions and in the absence of incentivizing or coercive abatement schemes at the state level" (Fragnière 2016: 798). While this line of reflection stresses individual responsibility, it differs from the "common sense morality" referred to above. That is to say, it is not confined to individuals in small communities where relations of proximity are the norm. Instead, it focuses on the individuals on a global scale, which I would call it *individual cosmopolitanism* of climate ethics. Some scholars advocating this idea include Paul Harris (2008, 2011, et al. 2013), Simon Caney (2005, 2006, 2010) and Peter Singer (2002, 2010).

Cosmopolitan scholars agree on the moral claim that individuals are the focus of moral consideration and that principles of justice apply beyond national borders. However, “their interpretation of the action required by this moral claim is likely to differ depending on their specific theoretical approach” (Nelson 2015: 17). For instance, Peter Singer, a prominent scholar of utilitarian cosmopolitanism, has famously argued that “if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it” (Singer 1972: 231). Utilitarian approaches to cosmopolitanism aim to maximize global utility. The morally correct balance is found in requiring those with more to share with those who have less. Helping the poor does not decrease overall utility since it does not require the sacrifice of anything of “comparable moral importance.” Along with utilitarian approaches, there is also a deontological approach which emphasizes “the rights and (especially) obligations we have under the moral law” (Rengger 2003: 324). Thomas Pogge is one of the proponents. He has argued for institutionally bound negative duties to alleviate “severe poverty,” which is a human rights violation (Pogge 2007; Campbell 2007). Some scholars also applied the cosmopolitan approach highlighting human rights to climate change. Simon Caney argued that even using minimal conceptions of human rights, anthropogenic climate change violates human rights (Caney 2009a: 75).

Individual Responsibility and the Role of Affluent People

Regardless of different approaches to cosmopolitan climate justice, proponents are often confronted with the criticism of whether an individual emitter has an ethical responsibility to stop contributing to harm. The main argument of the critics is that individual contribution is too small to influence global climate change and personal ability is too weak to make any significant change (Cuomo 2011). Philosopher Derek Parfit has argued that it is a “mistake in moral mathematics” to assume an act cannot be wrong because it has an imperceptible effect or because it makes only a tiny contribution to cumulative harm (Parfit 1984: 75-82).

The present dissertation generally supports the idea of cosmopolitan justice. But it has to be pointed out that the social inequality among individuals should be considered. While each individual has an ethical responsibility toward protecting against climate change, their capabilities differ greatly. Most cosmopolitan scholars believe that affluent and capable individuals should take moral responsibility. Dale Jamieson has claimed that “those who are in a position to prevent or mitigate climate change are responsible for doing so regardless of their causal contributions,” and they “should seek to stabilize climate, and they should also do what they can to help those who are most vulnerable to the change that may already be occurring” (Jamieson 1997: 118). In the context of climate change, it suggests that the world’s affluent and influential individuals have an obligation to act unless one assumes that

the luxurious lives of affluent people are more important than human survival and basic needs.

Paul Harris has extended this idea further. While he pointed out that it is no longer very controversial to require the well-off people in affluent countries to take the “obligations to the poor and destitute of the world” (Harris 2008: 491), he also paid attention to the wealthy people in the poor developing countries, something I have touched on very briefly above. He has argued that the rich people in poorer countries are expanding so much and so quickly that the ethical and practical importance for them to take responsibility and act accordingly can no longer be ignored. There might be a counterargument that affluent people in developed countries should have long since taken on the moral and practical initiative to reduce their emissions. But Harris has argued that “the fact that they have largely failed so is no excuse for affluent people elsewhere to do what is morally right” (Harris 2008: 492). While the developing countries have the “development imperative” (Giddens 2009; Beck 2010), their well-off citizens should not hide behind their poor and less privileged and, thus, escape their obligation.

Many of the world’s wealthy and privileged individuals often claim that climate change is not their responsibility, insisting that their personal contribution to the issue is minimal. They are reluctant to take greater action to address a problem they believe was primarily caused by earlier generations. Additionally, they may contend that they lack the influence or ability to drive meaningful reform within the global system. However, this argument is criticized by cosmopolitan thinkers. For example, Pogge noted that “[E]ven if each privileged person typically bears only one billionth of the moral responsibility for the avoidable underfulfillment of human rights ..., each of us would still be responsible for significant harms” (Pogge 2002: 192, n. 41). He also sharply pointed out that trying to deny their responsibilities “is an implausible line of argument, entailing as it does that each participant in a massacre is innocent, provided any persons he killed would have been killed by others, had he abstained” (Pogge 2002: 170).

From a cosmopolitan view of climate justice, we see that the global rich, to some degree, share more similarities with each other than they do with their own poor countrymen. If the most capable and privileged individuals do nothing, how can the world expect the poor and less privileged to sacrifice their basic rights to combat climate change?

2.4.3 Implication of Cosmopolitan Justice for China

Cosmopolitan justice is very relevant to China, which is already the world largest emitter and second-largest economy and a country with serious social inequality.

As discussed in the previous subchapters, the Chinese government has consistently emphasized that China’s historical contribution to climate change is

relatively small and that its per capita carbon emissions remain comparatively low. China identifies as a developing nation based on its average GDP and income levels. It has also reasonably argued that developed countries bear the primary responsibility for the majority of historical greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, possess greater financial resources to cover mitigation costs, and have a moral obligation to act before expecting China to take significant steps. On the diplomatic front, major polluters, particularly the United States, are unwilling to commit to new binding agreements to reduce their own GHG emissions without a credible and substantial commitment from China. This is, in fact, a statist framing of climate justice, which has been argued above to be ineffective in promoting global cooperation.

China indeed has a development imperative to improve the lives of its poor people. Its principled positions may have made sense decades ago from most perspectives on climate justice. The problem is that it becomes difficult to justify these positions when the living standard has improved a lot and poverty elimination has made great progress. Moreover, the emerging upper and upper-middle-class consumers are living an energy-intensive lifestyle. A burgeoning middle and upper class hide behind this average (Harris 2008: 492). At present, they face few, if any, legal obligations to mitigate the harm they do to the global environment, and they have so far escaped moral scrutiny (Harris 2011: 645). These changes all weaken the moral justifications of China's stance on climate change. With the growing discrepancy between China's historical state responsibility and the country's current emissions, China's statist stance is becoming increasingly difficult to reconcile with the realities of climate change (Harris et al. 2013: 300).

Evidence suggests that China is not unaware of the social inequality within its borders. As scholars have noted, "Chinese officials generalize these internal national disparities to a single sovereign Chinese state even as they emphasize disparities in development within China to justify the country's inability to undertake further commitments" (Harris et al. 2013: 300). Both diplomats and some Chinese scholars acknowledge this intra-state inequality. For instance, Pan (2003) explored the equitable distribution of emissions rights for disadvantaged populations across both wealthy and poorer nations, while Hu and Guan introduced an intra-state Human Development Index tailored to China. Their research revealed that China displays a "pattern of one country, three worlds" in terms of human development levels (Hu and Guan 2017: 80). Based on this finding, they recommended that provinces with very high human development levels should commit to unconditional emissions reductions. However, similar perspectives on individual or intra-state climate justice are not reflected in China's diplomatic stance.

Being trapped by the statist approach to climate justice, China cannot participate actively in climate mitigation. However, an individual cosmopolitan justice can help break the impasse. It is suggested that China can "maintain its resistance to binding emissions targets for the state as a whole (i.e., no mandatory emissions limitations

or cuts for sovereign China), yet at the same time make real progress toward climate change mitigation by taking steps that would limit and soon reduce GHG pollution from the country's affluent classes" (Harris et al. 2013: 301). It offers an opportunity for China, as well as the governments of other big developing countries, to join in GHG limitations without having to take on new ethical or legal burdens. They can do this by demanding that affluent polluters within their national borders behave as affluent polluters everywhere should behave. Implementing cosmopolitan justice means that the obligation to act on climate change and to aid people harmed by it would apply to all affluent polluters regardless of nationality (Harris 2011: 645).

According to Harris (2010b), adopting this approach offers at least two practical advantages for China. First, by tailoring climate obligations according to wealth, China could make significant contributions to global climate mitigation efforts. Simultaneously, it could address the severe issue of wealth inequality, which is already a pressing social challenge within the country. Second, this strategy would allow China to exert moral pressure on developed nations and their affluent populations. Governments and citizens in the West, particularly in the U.S., would no longer be able to argue that China is not pulling its weight, as millions of wealthy Chinese individuals would be taking actions that no developed country has yet implemented. To those in the West who demand, "you go first," China could respond by demonstrating that a portion of its population is already leading the way—without compromising China's justified stance against accepting new legal obligations at the state level.

2.4.4 Critiques of Individual Cosmopolitanism

Although the individual cosmopolitanism perspective of climate justice has received much support, there are also critiques, mainly from two sides: against cosmopolitanism and individualism, respectively.

Opponents of cosmopolitanism are skeptical about whether that the moral principles that govern domestic relationships within a society can be extended to govern relationships between societies. Armstrong has categorized the line of thoughts as "Minimalists" (Armstrong 2009, 2012). This approach ranges from a "radical rejectionist" view to a more "moderate nationalism." The former rejects any notion of justice in international relations, while the latter supports a limited form of cross-border justice focused solely on poverty alleviation through charitable means. Minimalists argue that moral obligations to fellow citizens are far stronger than those to foreigners, as the sense of solidarity needed to sustain social transfers within communities is absent on a global scale. Unless a world government with a "centralized authority" (Nagel 2005: 116) and legal system emerges, it is impossible to achieve and enforce social justice among different individuals who do not share a common political framework. Most proponents of this line of thought owe its

intellectual foundations to Rawls. Rawls advocated for the idea that redistribution should only apply to a self-contained national society represented by a territorial state and rejected extending egalitarian principles of distributive justice to the global level (Rawls 1999).

Some critics accept a qualified ethical cosmopolitanism and agree that “in many domains, resources should be redistributed from rich nations and rich people to poor nations and poor people” (Posner and Sunstein 2008: 1571). However, they also emphasize that there are two dimensions of the problem of climate change that make the problem particularly difficult to solve. The difficulty is labeled “a perfect moral storm” (Gardiner 2010b). The first is the global dimension of climate change. It has global causes and consequences, which makes it hard to define the agencies that should deal with the problem. The second dimension is an intergenerational dimension. While the potential costs of moving from a carbon-based economy to one based on renewable energies have to be borne by the world’s present generations, the primary beneficiaries of abatement measures will be future generations. One of the most perplexing issues within a welfarist approach to this question is the issue of future discounting—that is, whether and to what extent future benefits and costs should be discounted in compared to present benefits and costs.

In response to the Minimalists’ claim, cosmopolitan proponents have argued that globalization has put nations in a new relationship with people throughout the world, and that these relationships generate stronger duties of justice (Mandle 2006: 107). Consequently, the obligation to address the needs of the disadvantaged—regardless of their location—can no longer be confined to a narrow “obligation of charity.” For example, Darrel Moellendorf contends that “duties of distributive ... arise out of economic associatoin. As capitalism globalizes, it makes more sense to take the primary locus of duties of distributive justice to be the planet rather than the state” (Moellendorf 2002: 72). Within the relational perspective, Thomas Pogge challenges the Minimalists’ assertion that there is no global political framework requiring the equal distribution of opportunities among all people (Pogge 2008). He highlights three features of the framework that shape global relationships: (1) The ways through which global networks of market trade and diplomacy have an impact on the lives of the poor, how affluent countries have been using their power to shape the rules of the world economy according to their own interests and thereby have deprived the poorest populations of a fair share of global economic growth (Pogge 2008: 205–207). (2) The advantages rich societies and global elites enjoy through unilateral appropriation of disproportionate shares of the world’s resources (Pogge 2008: 208). (3) The remnants of a violent history, including long periods of conquest and colonization, destroyed not only native cultures and institutions but also deprived these societies of human and natural resources (Pogge 2008: 209). The existence of these realities, Pogge argues, serves as evidence of our collective moral failure and obligates us to take action to achieve social justice on a global scale.

Opponents of individualism cast doubt on the climate duties each individual should take. They believe that nation-states are still the leading agency of climate action. Sinnott-Armstrong (2010) explicitly argued that addressing climate change is the responsibility of governments and professional politicians, not individuals. Supporters of the institutional approach to justice assert that justice is fundamentally a characteristic of institutions and should not depend on individual actions. Justice, they argue, is a collective endeavor that goes beyond the cumulative efforts of individuals. Kopra has pointed out that sovereignty is not the principal reason that international society has failed to respond to climate change, for any other universal political order, whether some sort of world government or cosmopolitan world society, would face the same problems. In addition, no evidence suggests that such a world government or society would be more solidaristic or egocentric than today's state-centric ones. In any case, it would be similarly shaped by the power struggles and calculations of self-interest among individuals. If relatively small units such as states find it challenging to agree on effective political actions, then how would larger units be able to make any difference? (Kopra 2019: 157).

Some mild opponents have claimed that individual efforts, such as reducing personal consumption and transportation, are insufficient for adequate mitigation (Cuomo 2011: 701), even if individuals and households are ethically imperative to do so. It is also argued that widespread disempowerment accompanies personal and household efforts to address climate change, as many individuals have limited control over their energy consumption options. Popular environmentalist discourse often focuses on personal responsibility or the need to shift consumer behavior on the demand side when proposing actions for those concerned about climate change. However, immediate alternatives to existing technologies, materials, and transportation systems are not universally accessible. Cuomo further suggested that the public's lack of trust in higher-level decision-makers exacerbates the issue. This sense of disempowerment, combined with the realization that individual actions are insufficient, often leads people to adopt coping mechanisms such as denial or avoidance in response to cognitive dissonance or overwhelming information about situations they feel powerless to change. Cuomo further criticized the irresponsible behaviors of the meta-level emitters and decision-makers such as governments, industries, and cooperations. Corporations can be found culpable, but only regulatory and enforcement agencies can effectively force accountability. Culpable governments can be identified, but economically powerful nations cannot be forced to act, and it seems they are immune to ethical persuasion unless appearing to do the right thing serves their own interests. Nation-states can pressure other nations through sanctions and military threats, but in this case, the wealthiest and most powerful nations seem to hold all the cards (Cuomo 2011: 701-5). While arguing that individual actions are insufficient, Cuomo did not deny the responsibility of each individual. What she stressed is that instead of focusing on the change of personal

lifestyle the better way for those who care about climate change and climate justice to participate is to pressure and influence decision-makers at the higher levels, where actions can be carried out with significant and immediate effects on emission levels and matters of social justice (Cuomo 2011: 707-9).

The opinion of mild opponents of individualism even shares some commonality with the proponents of individualism. Fragnière (2016: 799) has pointed out that the discussion on the duty to reduce one's carbon footprint "has taken the lion's share of the discussion so far" and the discussion on the duty to promote and support collective action against climate change "is currently gaining more philosophical attention." He has argued that it is natural to consider a duty of the second kind not directed toward individual behavior changes but toward promoting action at the collective scale since climate change is a collective action problem (Fragnière 2016: 807). He has described two ways to approach collective action against climate change: a bottom-up approach that focuses on changing lifestyles and social norms and a more top-down approach that focuses on institutional solutions. Fragnière has discussed the opinions of different authors and concluded that in spite of some disagreements on the stringency of duties, most writers agree that individuals have a duty to take at least some steps to reduce their GHG emissions, be it for their own sake or instrumentally with the aim of promoting collective action. It is equally clear that citizens also have a duty to act toward an institutional solution to the problem, as Fragnière (2016: 809) has advocated.

It seems that the opponents of individualism do not completely deny the individual duty to climate mitigation, and the proponents of individualism also believe in the power of institutions and advocate that each individual must promote collective action. The key difference of opinion between the two sides seems to lie in the question of who should play the leading role in climate mitigation. In my opinion, defining who should take the lead is extremely difficult and may not be necessary. Let us imagine two scenarios. If the nation-state should take the lead, then we imagine the most affluent people, such as Jeff Bezos, do little to deal with climate change, while the island country Tuvalu, which is struggling for survival because of severe climate impact, is asked to reduce emissions. This seems unfair. If each individual should take the lead, then what is the point of the existence of the nation-states upon which the current system is grounded? Dealing with climate change cannot wait until the current established norm is changed. It is crucial to move beyond the zero-sum mindset, dismantle the rigid dichotomy between developed and developing nations, and encourage everyone to embrace their roles and responsibilities—whether as independent individuals or as members of a collective entity. Efforts can begin with ordinary individuals striving to reduce their carbon footprints in everyday life. However, greater impact can be achieved by high-level officials who have the influence and authority to drive policy changes. Additionally, organizations that operate between the nation-state and the individual, such as

environmental NGOs, play a vital role in fostering collective action and amplifying efforts to address global challenges.

2.4.5 Cosmopolitan Corollary

The primary issue with current global climate governance is that discussions have far outpaced tangible action. A new perspective is needed—one that transcends the traditional nation-state framework to drive meaningful progress. A "cosmopolitan corollary" has been proposed to address this gap (Harris 2011).

Cosmopolitanism prioritizes human beings, emphasizing their rights, responsibilities, needs, and capabilities, while treating states as secondary since they are merely the structures within which people live. That said, cosmopolitanism does not dismiss the role of nation-states entirely. Some cosmopolitans believe that adopting the assumptions of cosmopolitanism need not stop us from "using states as our point of reference...because...states remain the entities most able to represent the individuals that constitute them and because they are currently the most relevant units in the context of global attempts of curbing GHG emissions" (Gosseries 2005: 280). One of the most passionate advocates of cosmopolitanism in relation to climate justice, Paul Harris has never denied the necessity of an existent climate regime. He has acknowledged that even if a bottom-up transformation with states being guided by cosmopolitan ethics is desirable and ideal, it would come much too late. Therefore, he would rather propose a more realistic "cosmopolitan corollary" than a "wholesale change" (Harris 2011: 646). He has argued that a cosmopolitan corollary to extant global climate governance would be principled, practical, and politically viable.

It is more principled and just because it attaches duties to those who cause global climate change and advances the rights of those who suffer the most from it, regardless of their nationality (Harris 2011: 648). Promoting cosmopolitan principles means putting people at the center of global governance. Diplomats can direct more attention to the causes and consequences of climate change and less to how traditional state-centric policies present problems for states' perceived interests and long-held positions in the international relations of climate change.

A cosmopolitan corollary to the doctrine of international environmental justice is not only practical but also addresses the growing influence of millions of newly affluent individuals in the developing world. It fully includes most people in industrialized nations while acknowledging that many poorer individuals contribute relatively little to climate change and lack the capacity to take on related obligations. Harris argues that even if cosmopolitanism is seen as idealistic in other areas of human activity, in the context of climate change, it is both practical and essential. This cosmopolitan corollary is also politically feasible because it is not designed to replace the doctrine of international justice but to complement and build upon it.

Such an approach is less likely to face strong opposition from people and governments, as it avoids proposing radical, wholesale changes. Moreover, by integrating the world's new consumers into the climate change regime—as the corollary suggests—affluent individuals in poorer countries would also take action. This would make it easier for governments in developed nations to gain public support for climate policies. Simultaneously, governments in developing countries could agree to limit the greenhouse gas emissions of their wealthier citizens without compromising their longstanding demands for international justice. Importantly, this approach does not require developing nations to adopt mandatory national commitments to reduce emissions (Harris 2011: 648-9).

The cosmopolitan corollary by Paul Harris is very plausible. It helps to break the mindset of statist perspective and tries to go out of the trap of developed-developing dichotomy. What's more, it is action-oriented and possible to be implemented. These two merits are the most needed in the current global climate regime. As long as the rigid mindset is broken, we could expect, as Harris has positively described, that diplomats from developing states can go home and say that they have not compromised on their demands for international justice, and diplomats from developed states can go home and claim that people in the developing countries have finally agreed to take on new commitments to cut their GHG emissions. "This gives an important political concession to the developing countries, and it gives the developed countries what they want and that which is required - involvement of the developing world in emissions cuts" (Harris 2011: 650).

2.5 Climate Politics in China

As early as the 2000s, scholars argued for the importance of China's participation in global climate governance, even though climate change at that time was not even on the national political agenda (Hatch 2003; Zhang 2003). They believed that the greenhouse gas emissions would come from the developing world, especially the most populous China, and that the industrialization processes would heavily rely on fossil fuels. China was expected to take over the United States as the world's largest emitter of GHGs "in the next twenty years or so" (Zhang 2003: 66). In fact, China became the largest emitter as soon as 2007. Over time China is becoming more and more aware of its importance to the global climate regime and is gradually regarded as one of the key actors in the success of global climate change mitigation (Teng and Jotzo 2014: 37). The first part of the present subchapter gives an overview of climate politics in China, in which actors that influence the domestic climate policy-making process are highlighted. Then it illustrates the characteristics of the Chinese governmental structure and problems related to it. Attention is also given to the National Climate Programs. The second part of the subchapter deals with China's climate diplomacy, focusing on the period from 2007 to 2015. The third part

summarizes the academic discussions on the driving forces of China's climate politics.

2.5.1 Overview of Climate Politics in China

2.5.1.1 Involved Actors of Climate Governance

China's climate change policy is shaped by the interests and priorities of a few key actors, with input from several less influential actors (Heggelund 2007: 169-174).

Climate change is, first of all, seen as a scientific issue. Thus, it was at the beginning governed by the science and technology-related governmental departments such as the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST), the State Environmental Protection Administration²¹ (SEPA), the China Meteorological Administration (CMA) and the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS). The MOST was a key ministry in climate governance. It established a research program on climate change in the 1990s, and its officials have traditionally been sympathetic to environmental concerns (Heggelund 2007) and have played a central role in the development of CDM projects in China. The first agency dealing with climate change in China was the National Coordination Group on Climate Change, established in 1988 with an office in the China Meteorological Bureau (later CMA).

Although the SEPA has participated in climate change work since the 1980s (Heggelund 2007), it has been regarded as a weak administration. However, its role was strengthened due to the restructuring process in 1998, when it was upgraded from agency to administration. In addition, the SEPA is a member of the CDM Approval Board.

Prior to the 1998 restructuring, the CMA held primary responsibility for coordinating climate change efforts. Alongside the CAS, the CMA was a key player in scientific discussions on climate change. The CMA represented China in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), and its administrator, Qin Dahe, served as co-chair of IPCC Working Group I. Overall, Chinese scientists were deeply concerned about the effects of climate change on the country and emphasized the need for measures to address domestic challenges.

It is a general trend that the influence of the CMA and scientists is diminishing with the climate moves swiftly toward economic impact. In addition, economists from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), Tsinghua University, and Renmin University have become increasingly involved in climate change work. This reflects the growing attention given to the economic aspects of climate change (Heggelund 2007: 170).

With scientists, scholars, and researchers from various disciplines involved in climate change, information and knowledge of climate change were produced at a

²¹ In 2008, the name was changed to Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP).

rapid pace in China. In this process, think tanks at research institutes, academies, and agencies emerged.

In China's domestic decision-making process on climate issues, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) stands out as one of the most influential actors. Historically central to the planned economy, the NDRC remains responsible for overseeing economic development, even as China has transitioned to a market-oriented economy. It continues to play a key role in drafting the country's five-year plans for economic and social development. Although the NDRC entered the climate change policy-making arena relatively late, its significance has grown as economic and energy issues have risen on the domestic agenda. Its role was further strengthened after the March 2003 restructuring, when it absorbed the responsibilities of the former State Economic and Trade Commission. The Climate Change Office, which serves as the secretariat to the National Climate Change Coordination Committee, is effectively the primary body responsible for climate-related work in China. Its scope and influence have expanded alongside the increasing focus on climate change, particularly through initiatives like the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). Beyond economic matters, the NDRC also oversees energy policy. Since 2003, the Energy Bureau within the NDRC has managed China's energy industry, focusing on energy supply, while energy consumption and efficiency fall under the purview of the Department of Environment and Resources Conservation. To emphasize the growing importance of energy issues, the Office of the National Energy Leading Group was established in 2005 at the ministerial level. These institutional developments have elevated energy concerns to the highest levels of political decision-making in China.

Delegating the responsibility to the NDRC signified that climate change was no longer perceived solely in scientific terms but increasingly in political and economic terms. Moreover, it signified that the domestic discussion about China's potential contribution to the international efforts to combat climate change had taken a moderate, not very proactive, direction (Heggelund 2007: 171).

Another influential ministry in decision-making is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). It ensures that China's political and economic interests are served in international negotiations. The MFA has had an important role in the international political process on climate change. The MFA has generally been more in line with the NDRC's position in climate policy-making to ensure China's development needs. With the MFA representing the Chinese government as head negotiator, climate change is seen as a foreign policy issue. The role of the MFA in climate politics will be discussed in the coming paragraph about climate diplomacy.

Some of these actors, such as MFA, NDRC, and the former Ministry of Energy, prioritize economic development and the use of fossil fuels over environmental

protection²². More environmentally proactive agencies are MOST, SEPA, and CMA (Harris 2003; Hatch 2003; Kobayashi 2003; Zhang 2003).

It should be highlighted that the person in charge of the ministry and agency can sometimes play a very important role in improving the influence of the ministry on policy-making. For example, the SEPA was more vocal when Pan Yue served as its vice minister, mainly due to his personal charisma and his willingness to approach the media. Another example is Xie Zhenhua, who led the negotiation delegation at the UNFCCC climate summits and supervised the most recent report commissioned by the government (Heggelund 2021: 17).

Lastly, scientists from prestigious universities and research institutes also play a significant role in policy-making. In July 2008, Professor He Jiankun from Tsinghua University and Professor Luo Yong from the National Center for Climate Research were invited to present their expert insights on climate change to the Politburo. During this session, President Hu Jintao underscored the importance of addressing climate change, further elevating its priority on China's policy agenda. This meeting also marked the formal integration of climate change initiatives with the central government's energy-saving policies. In February 2010, top central government leaders gathered all provincial governors and party secretaries in Beijing for a week-long conference dedicated to low-carbon development. The program included lectures from senior officials, such as the President, Vice President, Premier, and Vice Premier, as well as presentations by professors and experts from leading universities and research institutions. The main goal was to urge provincial leaders to accelerate the transition to a new economic model focused on resource conservation and environmental protection. Within three weeks, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party held its 19th session of collective study, again focusing on combating climate change. Two experts—one from CASS and another from the NDRC Energy Research Institute—were invited to contribute to the discussions (Qi and Wu 2013: 305-306).

2.5.1.2 Top-down Policy-making Process and Governance Structure

China is often regarded as inflexible and persistent in its positions of climate negotiation. For instance, China has been refusing the MRV (measurement, reporting, and verification) mechanism at the UNFCCC climate summits. In order to understand this phenomenon, we have to look at its policy-making process and special governance structure.

Within the Chinese political system, the central government makes major policies and subnational and local governments implement them (Qi and Wu, 2013: 301). This power model builds a consensus on certain issues among central government policy-makers, especially emphasizing the centrality of individual or

²² This was the ministry's name from 1988 to 2003. Later, it was renamed the National Energy Bureau and, since 2008, the National Energy Administration (NEA).

factional power struggles among the top leaders of the Communist Party of China (CPC). Once consensus is reached at the highest level, a national policy will be made accordingly through legislation and national planning and implemented through the apparatus of the governmental hierarchy. In this top-down policy-making process, the central government can execute its “bringing-to-bear” full political power on lower-level authorities (Qi and Wu 2013: 310).

The key actors in the policy-making processes at the highest level in China are the National People’s Congress (NPC), the State Council, and the Communist Party of China (CPC). The NPC is the nation’s top legislative body with the highest authority. The State Council, also referred to as the central government, is the leading administrative unit responsible for implementing the laws and policies of the NPC. The CPC influences the law-making process “by controlling appointments to key legislative and administrative posts” (Ma and Ortolano 2000: 14).

The highest-ranking units under the State Council are the comprehensive commissions, such as the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). These units have responsibilities that cut across economic sectors and geographic regions. Ministries are outranked by the commissions. A ministry has the same administrative rank (*buji*) as a provincial-level government. Following the ministry in rank are, in descending order, the vice-ministry (*fubuji*) and bureau (*juji*) within a ministry. A bureau is equivalent to a department within a provincial government. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) also have an administrative rank. An SOE supervised by a state industrial bureau will generally outrank one supervised by a provincial-level industrial bureau. The rank of an SOE signals the political and social status of its managers and workers, and SOEs with high ranks often offer relatively good wages and fringe benefits. A higher rank of SOE also means greater bargaining power with other governmental units, e.g., for tax reductions and subsidies. Ranks are significant because governmental units holding the same rank cannot issue binding orders to each other. Operationally, this means that no ministry (e.g., the MEP) can issue a binding order to provincial governments (Ma and Ortolano 2000: 34–36).

Illustrating the two-dimensional governance structure (Figure 1) (Tsang and Kolk 2010: 184) is necessary to understand how policies are made and implemented in China. At the township level and above, government organs are interconnected both vertically (*tiao*) and horizontally (*kuai*). The *tiao* relationship refers to the vertical (functional) lines of authority from central government ministries reaching down to various provincial and local agencies. The *kuai* relationship refers to the horizontal (geographical) level of authority exercised by territorial government on agencies of various functions within their area of jurisdiction. Therefore, each work unit (*danwei*) within the administrative system reports to both an upper-level department in the same functional area and the government of a geographical area (Ma and Ortolano 2000: 36; Tsang and Kolk 2010: 183-184).

The *tiao* coordinates according to function and the *kuai* coordinates according to the needs of the locality that it governs. Since the Reform and Opening policies began in the late 1970s, the horizontal line of authority (*kuai*) has been prioritized over its vertical counterpart (*tiao*). In China, this shift is encapsulated in the phrase “making *tiao* serve *kuai*,” which results that territorial governments have become more powerful and the central-level functional units have had their wings clipped (Lieberthal 1997: 4).

This two-dimensional governance structure is highly complex. Scholars (Tsang and Kolk 2010: 184) argue that it leaves much room for political interference as conflict and divergent views seem built into it. Tensions between national and provincial authorities are common and are vividly captured in Chinese sayings, such as, “There are policies from above, and countermeasures from below.”

Figure 1: Two-dimensional Governance Structure




Figure 2. Partial structure of China's administrative system
Source: adapted from Ma and Ortolano (2000), p. 39.

It is widely accepted that this top-down decision-making process and the *tiao-kuai* governance structure “may have been effective” but “may not be efficient” (Qi and Wu 2013: 310). It is also the main reason for the difficulty of implementing climate policies in China (Grumbine 2014; Heggelund 2021; Qi and Wu 2013; Tsang

and Kolk 2010). The climate policy implementation is based on a so-called “target responsibility system,” which allocates targets among all levels of local governments and related enterprises. Since the local governments also prioritize economic development over environmental protection, they are not willing to take proactive measures to deal with climate change. Local enterprises face high costs in meeting climate targets and often do not want to reduce their emissions without enough policy support. Additionally, the top-down approach can create opportunities for lower-level governments and businesses to “game” the implementation of policies. A common issue is the tendency of local governments and businesses to over-report their achievements, especially when actual performance falls short of expectations. For instance, in 2011, most provinces claimed to have met or surpassed the national target of reducing energy intensity by an average of 3.6%, despite evidence suggesting that their actual performance may not have been as strong as reported. However, the NRDC recognized an average of only 2.01% after verification—far less than the reported figures (Qi and Wu 2013: 311).

Although the government structure and political conflicts between central and local governments explain the difficulty of policy implementation, scholars suggest that the lack of capacity for competent implementation should also be considered (Qi et al. 2008). One weakness of climate governance is the quality and transparency of energy data. In developing countries, resource constraints result in limited data quality, and inventories of national greenhouse gas emissions are notoriously inexact. The lack of competence in data production and management is regarded as one reason for China’s hesitance to make international commitments (Lewis 2007: 164). Some argued that this unwillingness prohibits a proactive commitment to ambitious targets at local levels (Heggelund 2007: 155).

Within China’s two-dimensional governance structure and top-down decision-making framework, the central challenge in crafting and implementing climate policy lies in balancing economic growth with environmental protection. This challenge is particularly critical in the dynamics of central-local political interactions. However, the development of clean energy has been viewed as a “win-win” strategy, offering a way to harmonize economic development with efforts to mitigate climate change. This may explain why clean energy technology has been developing so fast in the past three decades and why China is the biggest host country of the Clean Development Mechanism.

2.5.1.3 Five-Year Plans (FYPs) and National Climate Change Program

Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the CPC has governed the Chinese economy through central planning carried out by the Party’s Central Committee and national congresses.

The first Five-Year Plan was made in 1953 under the rule of President Mao Zedong. The FYP sets growth targets, arranges national key construction projects,

maps the direction for economic and social development, launches reforms, and serves as guidelines for the whole country. "China's FYPs are windows through which one can explicitly see the weights assigned to issues on the Chinese policy agenda" (Qi and Wu 2013: 304). Following the 11th Five-Year Plan (2006–2010), the term was changed to "Five-Year Guideline." This shift has been seen as symbolic of China's evolution from a Soviet-style command economy to a system of socialism with Chinese characteristics. For practical purposes, this research will continue to use the abbreviation FYP to refer to the Five-Year Guidelines. Since the dissertation covers the period from 2007 to 2015, the discussion will focus on the 11th FYP (2006-2010) and 12th FYP (2011-2016).

Scholars have pointed out that "climate change has never been a standalone issue on the national policy agenda." Although it is part of the national policy agenda, it has never been a priority (Tsang and Kolk 2010: 191). Compared to serious environmental issues such as air and water pollution, greenhouse gas mitigation issues have not been high on the political agenda in China (Cai et al. 2008). The words for climate change (Qihou Bianhua) and global warming (Quanqiu Biannuan) were mentioned for the first time in the 11th FYP.

The 11th FYP covers almost all aspects of climate policies, ranging from energy efficiency, renewable energy, environmental and ecological protection, energy supply and pricing, and technological aspects (11th FYP²³). However, the focus is on energy-related issues such as energy conservation, high-efficiency utilization, and increased energy-saving potential. During that period, the National Climate Change Programme (NCCP) was issued on June 4, 2007. It was one of the most critical milestones of climate governance in China and was established under the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). It was the country's first global warming policy initiative. The objective was to allow the government to swiftly adopt measures, ranging from laws to the economy, administration, and technology, which would combine to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and imbue the country with a flexible approach to climate change (see NCCP).

Attention to climate policy continued to increase in the 12th FYP. Some targets were in line with those in 11th FYP, and some new aspects were introduced. The targets were aimed at reducing fossil energy consumption, promoting low-carbon, sustainable development, and reshaping China's economy by establishing a carbon trade market (Lewis 2011; Heggelund et al. 2019). Key targets outlined in the plan included: (1) 16% reduction in energy intensity (energy consumption per unit of GDP), (2) Increasing non-fossil energy to 11.4% of total energy use, and (3) 17% reduction in carbon intensity (carbon emissions per unit of GDP).

It was not until the adoption of the 12th FYP, covering the period from 2011 to 2015, that climate change was an explicit component of national objectives. In fact,

²³ https://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2006/content_268766.htm (accessed 04 January 2025)

the 12th FYP dedicated a whole chapter to detailing national plans for concrete action on low-carbon development. Therefore, the 12th FYP is a landmark in China's national policy-making on climate change (Qi and Wu 2013: 304). China's FYP represents many ambitious climate and energy goals, but some of the targets will undoubtedly prove challenging to implement (Lewis 2011: 3). It is reported that preferential policies to the coal sector continued, pushed by state-owned enterprises and supported by local governments due to local economic interests (CREO 2018) (Heggelund 2021).

In the 12th FYP, two important government guidelines for dealing with climate change were announced. One is the China's Policies and Actions for Addressing Climate Change, issued in November 2011. This document stated that China was aware that climate change is a shared global concern.²⁴ The other guideline was the Enhanced Actions on Climate Change: China's Intended Nationally Determined Contributions. It was announced in June 2015 prior to the Paris Climate Summit. In this document, China continues to emphasize that climate change is a global issue that requires the collaboration of the international community. It is worth mentioning that China's decision to act on climate change in terms of mitigation and adaptation is not only driven by China's domestic needs for sustainable development but also by its sense of responsibility to fully engage in global governance, to forge a community of shared destiny for humankind, and to promote common development for all human beings²⁵.

2.5.2 China's Climate Diplomacy

After discussing China's national climate politics, special attention should be given to its climate diplomacy. In the following part of the dissertation, I present China's basic positions and principles in the climate negotiations, its policy preferences in international climate politics, as well as how climate change is treated as a diplomatic affair.

2.5.2.1 Climate Change as a Diplomatic Affair

In academic discussions, there seems to be a consensus that climate change is more closely related to Chinese foreign-policy (Hatch 2003; Heggelund 2007; Kobayashi 2003; Zhang 2003).

Hatch (2003: 44) argued that it was external pressures that pushed global warming on to the domestic agenda in China (Hatch, 2003: 44). Regarding external

²⁴ Full text of China's Policies and Actions for Addressing Climate Change (2011) <https://policy.asiapacificenergy.org/sites/default/files/China%27s%20Policies%20and%20Actions%20for%20Addressing%20Climate%20Change%20%282011%29%20%28EN%29.pdf> (accessed 16 November 2024)

²⁵ Full text of Enhanced Actions on Climate Change: China's Intended Nationally Determined Contributions http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/2015-07/01/content_35953590.htm (accessed 16 November 2024)

pressures it does not only refer to the climate negotiations but also to the difficult diplomatic situation in the late 1980s when China was diplomatically isolated. The climate change issue came into focus at the same time, serving as an ideal tool for China to regain its international position (Kobayashi 2003: 91).

As I mentioned above, at the beginning of the 2000s, China's environmental policy exclusively focused on local environmental problems, and national environmental policy and climate change policy have been two largely separate tracks of policymaking, involving distinct objectives, processes, institutions, and analytic frameworks (Zhang 2003: 70). In the decade before then, the Chinese government formulated a National Environmental Action Plan (NEPA) (1991–2000), which identified seven priority areas of major environmental concern, including water pollution, urban air pollution, industrial toxic wastes, water shortages, soil erosion, deforestation and grassland degradation, and reduction of ecosystems and biodiversity. Climate change was not mentioned until years later. While domestic environmental policy is increasingly integrated into the national economic policy framework, the formulation of international environmental policy, particularly climate change, has been strongly influenced by foreign policy considerations.

This is reflected in China's climate governance. As mentioned above, science-related governmental agencies were responsible for climate issues initially. Later on, the power shifted to the agencies that focused on the economy and foreign affairs. The delegation to climate negotiations has been led by the NDRC, and the lead negotiator is often from the Department of Treaty and Law within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) (Heggelund 2007: 174). The MOST, CMA, and SEPA play a consulting role by providing technical advice, scientific assessments, and response measures.

Compared to the domestic environmental policy that was integrated into the national economic policy framework at an early stage, it takes a longer time for climate change to be integrated into the comprehensive development strategies. The 12th FYP is a landmark in China's national policy-making on climate change. Since FYPs are reviewed, debated, and voted on at the National People's Congress, they are, in fact, part of national legislation. Therefore, it is not until the 12th FYP that the climate issue is officially part of the national legislation (Qi and Wu 2013).

2.5.2.2 Basic Positions of Climate Negotiations

The following paragraphs summarize the academic discussions (Hatch 2003; Zhang 2003; Harris et al. 2013; Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2015) on China's negotiating positions and basic principles that China has insisted on from the 1990s to 2015.

The first long-standing position, as I showed above, is that China insists that developed countries take the lead in combating climate change. This position, however, varied over time. In the early 1990s, China was open-minded about the obligations of developed countries, although it explicitly opposed any obligations of

developing countries. As China's delegate said at the 1990 Second World Climate Conference: "Regarding the suggestion that developed states should take the lead in cutting emissions, I should not oppose nor overemphasize this point in the convention formulation. However, I should oppose any proposed emissions-cutting requirements on developing states (Harris et al. 2013: 298). Scholars pointed out that this diplomatic strategy is because China tried to keep a low profile on the matter in order to avoid drawing attention to its own responsibility (Harris et al. 2013: 298). In 1997, the Kyoto Protocol was agreed upon at the UNFCCC climate conference. The common but differentiated responsibility principle was established. It is assumed that because of this principle, China emphasized the importance of developed countries' leading role (Zhang 2013). Then, in 2007, China surpassed the U.S. and became the world's largest GHG emitter, which brought enormous international pressure on China. As a result, some Chinese scholars proposed that China should make decisive decisions and try to take a leading role in addressing climate change (Hu and Guan 2008). This pressure peaked before the opening of the climate conference in Copenhagen in 2009. At G2 discourse emerged that put China and the U.S. in one group based on their total emissions and stressed their leading roles in the climate negotiations (Cheng 2014). Since 2007, when the first national climate change program was announced, China has been dealing actively with climate change. However, the government's unambiguous statements against any international obligations appear to indicate that China has not been ready to take responsibility for climate change (Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2015: 507).

The second long-standing position is that China believes that developed countries are the principal emitters of GHGs due to the historical emissions during their industrialization. Thus, they should be responsible for the problem they caused. Although China's annual emissions have been rising rapidly since the 1980s, its historical contribution to accumulative GHGs emissions is relatively low, especially compared to the U.S. (at least before 2007), not to mention at the per capita level.

The third long-standing position is that developed countries are more capable of dealing with climate change both financially and technically, and they are obliged to undertake transfers of advanced, environmentally friendly technologies and provide new and additional funding to developing countries. This position also changes. For example, China presented a serious pledge regarding emissions intensity at the Copenhagen summit that was not conditional on external financial support (Conrad 2012). These arguments are compatible with many positions of climate justice as discussed previously, such as the "polluter pays principle" and "the ability to pay" principle.

The fourth position is that China is unwilling to accept absolute emission reductions. This position is compatible with the climate policies regulated in the 11th and 12th FYPs, which continuously highlight the importance of energy efficiency, energy conservation, renewable energy, and low-carbon technology. In its first

national climate change program in 2007, China stated that improvements in energy efficiency and conservation were fundamental to its mitigation ambitions.

The fifth position is China's persistence in its right to development. Compared with the other four positions, China's insistence on the right to development is not negotiable. One of its strongest arguments for this position is that China is still faced with poverty alleviation. Poverty eradication and economic development are China's overriding priorities (Zhang 2003: 68). According to a recent World Bank Report "Four Decades of Poverty Reduction in China," between 1978 and 2019, the proportion of people living in poverty—as per the national 2010 standard—fell from 97.5% to 0.6% of the rural population. The poverty headcount dropped from 770 million to 5.5 million people, that is, 765 million fewer poor people after four decades (World Bank 2022: 1). The report acknowledges that it was "China's sustained fast growth that was unusual by international standards and that makes its poverty reduction record stand out" (World Bank 2022: 6). Without continuous economic development, the achievement will not be accomplished. By insisting on its right to development, China can avoid taking on binding emissions reductions targets, which will constrain its further development.

Although China has maintained these positions during negotiations, it does not mean that China is not flexible. An in-depth analysis of the Chinese policy considerations suggested that China's position on the implementation of the climate change treaty is not immutable; it has been evolving over time (Zhang 2003: 66). For instance, China resisted the Clean Development Mechanism when it was introduced but later became active participants (Michaelowa et al. 2003). For instance, the 12th FYP on energy released put a cap on the total energy consumption of 4 billion tons of coal equivalent by 2015. If the target was achieved, energy-related carbon emissions would be limited. This is a major shift in China's national policy and international commitment, a shift from a relative, intensity target to a control of absolute amount (Qi and Wu 2013: 311). Chinese diplomats also expressed at the 2011 climate conference in Durban that China would accept binding commitments sometime after 2020 on the condition that developed countries meet all of the obligations they have repeatedly failed to fulfill. At the Paris Climate Summit in 2015, China announced that it would provide \$3 billion in climate financing, which shows its increased willingness to take more responsibility. It seems plausible that China is prepared to accept binding targets and an emission cap at some point. With its economic power rising, China is also willing to provide funding for climate mitigation and adaptation instead of solely demanding that developed countries offer financial support.

2.5.2.3 Principles and Strategies of Climate Negotiations

The most striking principled position China has taken is that the negotiations should take place within the UNFCCC framework and adhere to its principles of equity, mainly the “common but differentiated responsibility” (CBDR).

The UNFCCC stipulates in its Article 3 that the Parties should protect the climate system on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof (Art. 3.1). Moreover, the specific needs and special circumstances of developing country Parties should be given full consideration (Art. 3.2). Policies and measures should consider different socio-economic contexts (Art. 3.3). In addition, the Parties have a right to, and should, promote sustainable development (Art. 3.4). The Parties should cooperate to promote a supportive and open international economic system that would lead to sustainable economic growth and development in all Parties, particularly developing country Parties (Art. 3.5). It is clear from this that two of China’s long-standing positions are closely related to the principles of UNFCCC. One is China’s insistence on the leadership of developed countries in combating climate change. The other is its claim on the right to development.

Among the five principles of the UNFCCC, the most frequently referred to principle is the CBDR. The responsibility principle reflects the ‘polluter-pays’ principle. It can take the form of historic responsibility (emissions since an agreed start date), current responsibility (total emissions per year), and future responsibility (emission projections until an agreed date) (Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2015: 501). The CBDR adopts the historic responsibility. In the early 2000s, when it was acknowledged that the historical emissions from developed countries are the main reason for climate change and emissions of developing countries, including China, were still low, this principle was accepted by many developed countries. They agreed that it is only fair that developed countries take the lead in combating climate change and provide financial assistance to developing countries (Zhang 2003: 79). However, as it has been said above, China became the world’s largest GHG emitter in 2007 and has continued to grow fast. This makes it difficult for China to defend its positions on the historic emissions.

Since the UNFCCC’s equity principle favors developing countries, China has been persistently emphasizing the importance of the CBDR. This principle is also reflected in the Kyoto Protocol’s categorization of Annex I and Annex II Parties. Therefore, China makes frequent references to the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol and calls upon developed countries to adhere to established principles (Zhang 2003: 81).

2.5.2.4 China and the G-77

As mentioned previously, the UNFCCC framework and the Kyoto Protocol are in the interest of developing countries. It has also been China's negotiation strategy to work with G-77, the largest intergovernmental organization of developing countries in the UN.

Members of the G-77 recognize their limited influence when acting individually and instead strive to develop unified positions through the G-77 framework. This platform enables them to articulate and advance their shared economic interests, strengthen their collective bargaining power on major international economic issues within the United Nations, and foster South-South cooperation for development. From its inception, solidarity has been a key strategy for influencing climate change negotiations, despite the economic disparities and differing climate policy priorities among its member states (Lewis 2007: 162). The G-77 not only fights for the interests of developing countries but also pursues compromise where necessary. As Hatch wrote, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which was signed at the Earth Summit in June 1992, reflected the compromises required between (and among) the most important developed and developing countries (Hatch 2003: 51).

China is not officially a member of G-77 but has associated itself with G-77. Although China carries enough weight to act alone (Lewis 2007: 162), it is strategically a good move to join the group. To some extent, China plays a leading role among developing countries (Zhang 2003: 79; Kobayashi 2003: 88; Lewis 2007: 162) due to its size, overall power, and status as a permanent member of the UN Security Council. In the negotiations at the UNFCCC and the COP (Conference of the Parties) sessions, China and the G-77 acted along the traditional North-South line, emphasizing that the developed world caused the climate change problem while developing countries are the victims. They also refuse binding targets to reduce their GHG emissions, arguing that their per capita emissions are still low and that they need to develop in order to improve the living standards of their citizens. By consolidating a coalition around itself, China ensured that its interests would be better supported and that it would gain international prestige in being proactive in environmental protection (Kobayashi 2003: 88). Furthermore, by positioning itself as the leader of developing countries, China underlines its identity as a developing country, making its claims on right to development more legitimate.

Despite the strategic advantages of aligning with the G-77, China is encountering growing challenges within the group. One major issue is that while the G-77 shares some common interests, its members often have divergent priorities. The group includes a wide range of countries, from the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) to major emerging economies like China and the Asian "Tigers." It also comprises the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), forest-rich nations such as Brazil, the Congo, and Indonesia, and oil-rich OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum

Exporting Countries) countries. For instance, some tropical forest nations, including Brazil, along with a coalition of 32 rainforest countries like Costa Rica and Papua New Guinea, have expressed a willingness to adopt voluntary avoided-deforestation targets in exchange for compensation (Lewis, 2007: 163). Historically, voluntary international targets of any form have not been part of the G-77 position. Due to these differences in interests, China can only adopt a “middling stances” (Chayes and Kim 1998: 515) between different positions in the group. For another thing, China’s GHGs emissions grow so fast that its interests may go against those of other developing countries. The least developed countries (LDCs) and small island nations are among the most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, leading them to advocate for more ambitious greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reductions to limit global temperature rise as much as possible. For these countries, survival needs take precedence over the right to development, which stands in contrast to China’s primary focus on economic growth and development as fundamental priorities.

2.5.2.5 China vs. the U.S.

China does not only unite the G-77 to enhance its negotiating lever but also to orient itself toward the U.S.’s position. In return, the U.S. also refers to China. While the Chinese official position defined the American withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol as “irresponsible behavior” (Heggelund 2007: 177), the most often quoted excuse for the U.S.’s inaction is that developing countries, especially those like China, do not take on any commitments. The first Bush government once branded it as unfair. The play between China and the U.S. over the international climate change regime deserves special attention (Miao and Lang 2010: 412). This particular installment of the climate negotiations can be partly ascribed to the finger-pointing between the two largest GHG emitters.

In the same logic, the climate negotiations progress if these two countries choose to cooperate. For instance, at the COP8 in New Delhi in 2002, the U.S. suddenly changed its rhetoric and alliances and supported the G-77 in its rejection of discussing post-2012 commitments (Heggelund 2007). China and the U.S. are also members of the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP). It was founded in July 2005 by Australia, Canada, China, India, Japan, South Korea, and the U.S. Together, these countries account for over 50% of the world’s GHGs, energy consumption, GDP, and population. The partnership is a non-binding framework for international cooperation to facilitate the development, diffusion, deployment, and transfer of cleaner and more efficient climate technologies and practices. Although it is criticized for being a non-legally binding framework, it brings the U.S. and China into one framework and working together on climate solutions.

It has to be pointed out that despite China’s importance in climate politics, scholars agree that the U.S. should take the lead. Effective engagement with Beijing will only be possible if the major emitting developed countries lead by example, and

serious U.S. engagement will likely be a precondition to China's engagement in any international climate effort (Lewis 2007: 170). Once the U.S. is on board, it will have every reason to drag China into the fight (Miao and Lang 2010: 417).

2.5.3 Driving Forces of Climate Politics in China

To better understand climate politics in China, it is necessary to explore the driving forces behind it. Six factors must be considered: economic interests, concerns about national sovereignty, energy security, the economic and social impact of climate change, external forces, and considerations of international image.

2.5.3.1 Economic Interests

Every country is faced with the dilemma between economic development and climate protection. The Chinese leaders seem to consider the former more pressing (Tsang and Kolk 2010). Climate change has not surpassed economic development as a policy priority (Lewis 2007). The political legitimacy of the CPC is largely based on economic performance (Hatch 2003: 55). Lewis argued that continued growth in the prosperity of the population is viewed as fundamental to maintaining political stability. (Lewis 2007: 155) Kopra also asserted that China's climate policy is mainly driven by the Communist Party's concerns with its legitimacy (Kopra 2019: 159).

The government must prove that it can provide people with a good life.²⁶ One of the biggest targets is to eradicate poverty. As the World Bank report "Four Decades of Poverty Reduction in China" shows, high-speed economic development has ensured significant poverty alleviation in the past 40 years.²⁷ Putting economic interests first explains why China consistently emphasizes the principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities" during international climate negotiations (Tsang and Kolk 2010: 194). Since economic development is regarded as so important to the CPC, it is clear that China's engagement in combating climate change relies on whether political leaders can reduce their dependency on short-term economic development as a source of legitimacy (Tsang and Kolk 2010: 194).

Nevertheless, prioritizing economic development does not mean that the government ignores climate protection. On the contrary, China pays much attention to limiting emissions. During the 1980s and 2000s, the Chinese economy grew on average almost 10% a year. This growth has been associated with increased energy use, mostly coal. However, the growth of energy use is only responsible for half the rate of economic growth. At the very beginning of the international climate negotiations, China refused to consider demands for action from developing

²⁶ 'Prof. Eberhard Sandschneider, political scientist and China expert, analyses China's rise and Europe's decline' (2020)

<https://www.ardmediathek.de/video/swr1-leute/prof-eberhard-sandschneider-oder-politikwissenschaftler-und-china-experte-oder-analysiert-chinas-aufstieg-und-europas-abstieg/swr/Y3JpZDovL3N3ci5kZS9hZXgvczEyMDU3MjY> (TV clip accessed 16 November 2024)

²⁷ See section 2.5.2.2 Basic positions of climate negotiations in this dissertation

countries, including the joint implementation (JI) and CDM mechanism. CDM is intended to assist developed countries in achieving compliance with their obligations under the Kyoto Protocol. In return, developing countries get environmentally friendly technologies and financial support for their sustainable development. China was doubtful about this mechanism, because it was concerned that developing countries may not have enough space for emissions reductions in the future. However, China became an active player in the cooperation. A scholar once estimated that the value of the CDM market would be between \$457 million and \$4.5 billion in 2010 under various trading scenarios, and China would capture 60% of the CDM market (Zhang 2003: 73).

China has also actively participated in international environmental cooperation, both at the official level and the non-governmental level. China was one of the first countries to ratify the agreement of the UNFCCC 1992, the Kyoto Protocol, and the Paris Agreement. Since the 2000s, international NGOs have experienced booming development in China. Some of them, such as the WWF, even established a local office in Beijing. The Beijing office can set its own policies and strategies, rather than acting as a branch of the international head office and can focus more on working within the reality in China. It can even fundraise in line with its own strategy.²⁸ It has been argued that China can benefit from participation in international cooperation both tangibly and intangibly. Tangible benefits include external financial and technical assistance, transfer of advanced, environmentally friendly technologies, foreign investments, and management know-how. Intangible benefits are the possibility to create an image as an environmentally responsible nation and use climate change to further its foreign policy goals (Zhang 2003: 73).

However, some scholars believe China's active participation in international climate governance is based on a so-called "no regrets" policy (Hatch 2003; Zhang 2003; Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2015). A "no regrets" policy means that China takes action, regardless of whether the threat of climate change is real. In its fast development process, China is faced with many economic and environmental problems and related social problems, such as energy shortage, atmospheric pollution, acid rain, soil erosion, air pollution-related lung cancer diseases, and so on. In order to deal with these problems China has taken actions that have consequently reduced emissions. A study of climate change mitigation in six developing countries revealed that their mitigation efforts have significantly reduced growth in their GHG emissions; however, these efforts have been driven not by climate concerns but by imperatives for development, poverty reduction, local environmental protection, and energy security (Chandler et al. 2002: 52). There is even a conclusion that China's

²⁸ "Between the global and the local: Lu Sicheng's view on China's environmental protection over the past 20 years" (2020)
<https://chinadialogue.net/zh/6/68160/> (accessed 16 November 2024)

achievements in curbing the growth of GHG emissions have been realized through “no regrets” strategies (Zhang 2003: 72).

This may be true for the policy taken until the middle of the 2000s. The central government internalizes environmental objectives as part of the performance evaluation of political leaders. The local leaders can no longer ignore their responsibility to protect the environment while promoting local economic development. Scholars think this partly overcomes potential conflicts due to the two dimensional (tiao-kuai) administrative system. Moreover, the emissions reduction targets stipulated in the 11th FYP seem to have shifted some of the CPC’s focus from pure economic development to reducing emissions (Tsang and Kolk 2010: 194). With the environmental problems becoming increasingly serious, the central government is encouraged to take stronger actions. Since President Xi Jinping assumed office in November 2012, he has emphasized the importance of protecting the environment. He developed his environmental thoughts as early as the 2000s when he governed the Zhejiang Province. He proposed that clear water and green mountains are as valuable as gold and silver mountains, which has been labeled “the two mountain” theory. This theory stresses the importance of economic development and emphasizes that protecting the environment is crucial for economic development. Since Xi was selected as the CPC general secretary in 2012, his ideas have been propagated, extended domestically and internationally, and intergrated into the CPC’s “ecological civilization” guideline (Pan et al. 2019). However, in October 2013, Northeastern China was hit by severe smog, and two months later, it happened in Eastern China. Beijing experienced the same problem in 2015 and 2016. When the environmental problems become so severe, the government cannot pursue GDP numbers without thinking of the serious impact of environmental deterioration on the economic and social activities. Once the impact is severe enough to impede the economic development and social stability, it weakens the legitimacy of the CPC.

2.5.3.2 National Sovereignty

China is especially sensitive to the issue of sovereignty. Apprehension over interference by other countries with China’s internal affairs is deeply rooted in the Chinese foreign policy community due to its semi-colony history (Harris 2003; Kobayashi 2003; Zhang 2003).

The Chinese delegation has repeatedly stated that China is willing to participate in the climate change regime and will continue to make efforts to limit GHG emissions but only according to its own policy agenda. There is research to show that the timetable that China has set for itself is that it will not take on binding obligations until the Chinese economy and standard of living are comparable to that of mid-level developed countries (Zhang 2003: 77). It is out of the deep concerns over sovereignty that China refused international climate change cooperation at the

early stage of climate negotiations. For example, the first COP to the UNFCCC in Berlin in 1995 introduced a program called Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ). This initiative allowed greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction projects to be conducted through partnerships between investors from developed countries and hosts from developing countries. The program aimed to facilitate the transfer of climate mitigation technologies from developed to developing nations and to gather insights into the opportunities and challenges of joint policy implementation. The experience gained from AIJ was intended to inform the design of project-based mechanisms outlined in Article 6 and Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, known as Joint Implementation (JI) and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), respectively (Barrera and Schwarze 2003: 823). As previously discussed, China initially opposed these cooperation mechanisms in the 1990s, fearing that they would allow donor governments to interfere in domestic affairs and influence the host country's environmental policies (Zhang 1999: 200). However, it is noteworthy that the Chinese government shifted its stance over time, transitioning from opposing the CDM to becoming the largest host country for CDM projects globally.

Zhizhong Zhang (2003) has analyzed two divergent theories about the relationship between sovereignty and international environmental cooperation and proposed that Litfin's (1998) idea of sovereignty best explains China's practice in relation to climate politics. Scholars who argue for the erosion of sovereignty believe that state sovereignty and environmental integrity are fundamentally at odds, as environmental issues often cross borders, and addressing them inevitably challenges the exclusivity of nation-states and their territorial boundaries. They contend that global ecological interdependence has made traditional claims of state sovereignty outdated, suggesting that the nation-state system will, or should, be replaced by some form of supranational governance. On the other hand, scholars who advocate for the fortification of sovereignty argue that state sovereignty is essential for strengthening a nation's ability to tackle environmental challenges. Zhang (2003) critiques both perspectives, noting that the erosion-of-sovereignty and fortification-of-sovereignty theses tend to rely on a simplistic, one-dimensional view of sovereignty. They fail to account for the complex and dynamic interactions between sovereignty claims and the politics of environmental issues at both domestic and global levels (Zhang 2003: 75-77).

Instead, Litfin (1998: 4) suggested that sovereignty can be understood "as a socially constructed institution that varies across space and time, with multiple meanings and practices that are not set in stone." The definition of sovereignty, therefore, should be unbundled into overlapping, socially constructed elements such as territory, autonomy, non-intervention, recognition, authority, and popular sovereignty. Such a conceptualization is useful in understanding the sovereignty-environment nexus and is particularly pertinent in analyzing China's sovereignty concerns and its invocation of sovereignty over a wide range of foreign policy issue

areas, including climate change. Zhang has claimed that engaging China in the policy-making process is essential to building an effective climate change regime because it contributes to building confidence (2003: 77). In doing so, it induces China to become a willing and active participant in the regime. Thus, the erosion of sovereignty and international cooperation is not inherently contradictory for China; being treated respectfully as an equal partner is just as important. China is willing to “play the game” as long as it is involved in making the rules.

2.5.3.3 Energy Issue

Since economic growth and improvement in living standards are the priorities of the government and the CPC, the most important task is to provide economic and social development with enough stable energy. For a long time, energy supply, especially oil, has been considered central in China’s energy policy to develop the economy as fast as possible.

This policy focus is related to China’s very inefficient energy use pattern. For instance, in the mid-1980s, the ration of energy consumption to GDP was about five times higher than that of Japan, about 2.5 times that of the U.S, and about 1.8 times that of India (Capannelli and Shrestha 1993: 7). However, in 2004, China experienced an energy demand shock, which started more serious changes in thinking on energy security. In the 11th FYP, there was a new focus on changing energy consumption patterns. More attention has been paid to reducing energy consumption and improving energy efficiency, and, thus, reducing the energy intensity of the GDPs. In March 2006, Wen Jiabao, the Prime Minister, emphasized at the National People’s Congress (NPC) that energy efficiency was a key measure of economic growth, and a 4% reduction in energy intensity for 2006 was proposed (Heggelund 2007: 162).

Since 2006, the energy consumption per unit of output for all regions and major industries has been made public on an annual basis. Energy efficiency was also a major objective in the 11th FYP. The aim was to reduce the ratio of total energy use to GDP by 20% in 2010 compared to 2005. The 12th FYP (2011-2015) continued this policy (Nyman and Zeng 2016). Energy efficiency is increasingly viewed as a key element of the country’s energy security (Heggelund 2007). Besides energy efficiency, energy-use changes are also “promoted through new energy laws and regulations, specific conservation plans, implementation of new technologies, research and development and policies favoring energy conservation, energy efficiency standards, and labeling” (Garrison 2009: 112). A report²⁹ listed that since 2012, energy consumption per unit of GDP has been reduced by 24.4%, which is equivalent to reducing energy consumption by about 1.2 billion tons of coal. While the average annual growth of the national economy is 6.4%, the average annual

²⁹ Information from the Chinese National Energy Administration website http://www.nea.gov.cn/2022-01/07/c_1310413762.htm (accessed 16 November 2024)

growth in energy consumption is only 2.7%. Furthermore, China is the leading player in renewable energy.

Although energy has been considered a security issue in the official discourse since the early 2000s, the focus is more on oil supply, which shows that the government takes a more traditional national security approach with less connection with climate change. For instance, during the UN Security Council's first debate on climate change and conflict in 2007, China openly opposed the narrative of securitization of climate change and insisted that climate change is a development issue, though it did recognize that climate change could have implications for national and global security.

In the "Enhanced Actions on Climate Change: China's Intended Nationally Determined Contributions" announced in June 2015 it mentioned that to act on climate change in terms of mitigating greenhouse gas emissions and enhancing climate resilience, is driven by China's domestic needs for sustainable development in ensuring its economic security, energy security, ecological security, food security as well as the safety of people's life and property and to achieve sustainable development³⁰. Scholars point out that the terms like "sustainable security", "environmental security" and "ecological security" are commonly used in China rather than explicitly labeling climate change a security issue (Nyman and Zeng 2016: 309).

It may not be important to identify climate change as a security issue or development issue. It is, however, agreed that the energy issue is the core of climate policy in China. Heggelund wrote that energy is a common denominator in the climate change discussion for China and, in a certain sense, China's energy policy is the country's climate policy (Heggelund 2007: 158-161). At the same time, China's climate strategy remains at the center of its energy development plan (Lewis 2007: 155). The National Energy Administration (NEA) has always been a critical player in climate change governance in China. That is to say, the energy and climate policies serve the same economic goal, and the ultimate aim is to secure the nation (Tsang and Kolk 2010: 180).

2.5.3.4 Social-economic Impact of Climate Change

Another driving force of China's climate policy is the social-economic impact of climate change (Harris 2003; Zhang 2003). China's environmental problems emerged as early as the 1990s, before the country realized their severity, due to how fast the country developed since the Reform and Opening.

According to the 1997 report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), China is identified as one of the countries most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change globally. The direct consequences of climate change

³⁰ Full text: Enhanced Actions on Climate Change: China's Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (2015)
http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/2015-07/01/content_35953590.htm (accessed 16 November 2024)

include significant disruptions to hydrology, water resources, and natural terrestrial ecosystems. In temperate Asia—encompassing Japan, the Koreas, and most of China—average annual temperatures have risen by more than 1 degree Celsius over the past century, with the majority of this increase occurring since the 1970s. Further substantial warming is projected for this century. Rainfall patterns in the region are also expected to shift, with significant declines anticipated across much of China, particularly in the northern provinces. Additionally, permafrost in northeast China is predicted to disappear, releasing methane and contributing to greenhouse gas emissions, while glaciers are expected to continue melting. Water resources systems in the northern parts of China are more vulnerable and more sensitive to climate change (Ying 2000: 189) and “would cause economic losses of US\$50–800 million (constant 1999 values) in a normal year and US\$230–2,270 million in a very dry year”³¹.

Indirect socioeconomic impacts also include effects on agriculture, forestry, and human settlement. Northern China is likely to experience changing agricultural yields, with many crops likely to see reductions and a northward movement of crop zones and anticipated shortages of roundwood (partly due to increased demand). Climate change may cause severe problems due to sea-level rise in the Delta coastlines in China, the most populated and economically developed area. Hotter weather will increase heat-related mortality, as indicated by historical studies from China that show a strong correlation between peak summer temperatures and death rates (World Bank 1997)

Ten years later after the 1997 IPCC report China announced its first national climate change programme in 2007. In this report (2007: 16-17) some impact of climate change on China was mentioned. Climate change has already had a certain impact on China’s agriculture, animal husbandry, forests, ecosystems, and coastal environment. It has also changed the distribution of water resources in China and may increase the frequency and intensity of heat waves. As a result, the number of deaths and serious diseases caused by extreme heat events will increase, according to the report. It was also concluded that China would be among the countries most severely impacted by climate change (Qi and Wu 2013: 304). From the repeated usage of “a certain” and the modal verb “may” as well as “would” in the reports, it seems that the impact of climate change in China is neither very severe nor urgent. As Zhang has argued, China’s sense of urgency to tackle the problem was perhaps less strong than other, more vulnerable developing countries despite its claim as a victim of global climate change (Zhang 2003: 82). However, the sense of urgency escalated in the 2011 China’s Policies and Actions for Addressing Climate Change documents. Here, the narrative is more affirmative, stating that China has a complex climate and a fragile eco-environment, which makes it one of the most vulnerable

³¹ <https://archive.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/sres/regional/277.htm> (accessed 04 January 2025)

countries to the adverse effects of climate change. This tone is confirmed in the 2015 “Enhanced Actions on Climate Change: China’s Intended Nationally Determined Contributions,” which refers to China as among those countries that are most severely affected by the adverse impacts of climate change. It is noted in that action plan that China’s vulnerability to the impact of climate change is one of the driving forces for its climate policies (Perlmutter and Rothstein 2011; Schreurs 2011; Grumbine 2014).

2.5.3.5 External Influence

The next driving factor of China’s climate policy comes from external forces. Climate change began to develop into an important international issue in the late 1980s, attracting increasing attention from scientists, the public, media, and policymakers from many countries, especially the developed ones. From 1988 to 1990 the IPCC conducted scientific studies on climate change, its potential impacts and possible response strategies. It “was a major issue for China” to decide whether to participate in this work. Chayes and Kim stated that “after internal study and evaluation, the government finally decided to do so in 1988” (Chayes and Kim 1998: 513).

In the process leading up to the climate change negotiations in 1992, China had begun to monitor developments in climate change, primarily as a consequence of the attention devoted to the climate change issue within the scientific community (Hatch 2003: 48) which was influenced by the international scientific community. China has also been an active participant in the IPCC. Chinese scientists were not left out in the production of IPCC scientific reports, even though the scientifically advanced countries of the North led negotiations before the UNCED, while developing countries, such as China, were busy catching up and reliant on the North for scientific information and data (Kobayashi 2003: 91-92). The first institutional response to climate change was the National Climate Committee, established in 1987, with its secretariat located in the Ministry of State Meteorological Administration (SMA). In the same year, the CAS entered into a collaborative research agreement with the U.S. Department of Energy to investigate the impacts of rising CO₂ emissions on climate change at global, hemispheric, regional, and local scales. Interdisciplinary research on global climate change was also initiated under the leadership of the CAS and the SEPA. Additionally, as the IPCC began its work in the late 1980s, Chinese involvement was coordinated by the SMA. These efforts fostered a growing awareness within China’s scientific community about the potential consequences of global warming for the country (Hatch 2003: 48-49). In the previous discussion on the actors engaging in climate policy in China, we pointed out that the science and technology-related ministries and research institutions, such as SMA, SEPA, and CAS, played a crucial role at the beginning of climate politics before the climate issue became more politicized. These agencies are often influenced by the international scientific community.

If the international scientific community exercised its influence on the Chinese high-level policy-makers from the top down, then the international non-governmental organizations played an active role in developing environmental and climate protection in China from the bottom up. Since the 1990s, the environmental NGOs have had a booming development in China. Before that the concept and idea of environmental NGOs was a foreign thing to the Chinese. As early as 1992, the China Association for NGO Cooperation (CANGO) was founded. Since its foundation, it has maintained a cooperative relationship with non-governmental organizations and multilateral and bilateral institutions engaged in development and economic and technological exchanges around the world.³² In 2007, the China Climate Action Network (CCAN) was established under the umbrella of CANGO to strengthen capacity building, international exchanges, and collaboration among Chinese civil organizations on climate change.³³ On March 31, 1994, China's first legal environmental NGO, Friends of Nature (FON), was officially registered as the Green Culture Institute of the International Academy of Chinese Culture under the Ministry of Civil Affairs. Although it is a local NGO, it was able to work internationally. For example, in 1998, FON worked with the WWF to protect the Tibetan antelope. The founder of FON, Liang Congjie, submitted an open letter to then-British Prime Minister Tony Blair regarding the same issue, which attracted a lot of media attention.

In short, the domestic political process was driven by the need to respond to an international agenda pushed initially by transnational actors and international organizations (Hatch 2003: 61).

2.5.3.6 International Image

The last driving force under discussion is China's consideration of its international image (Hatch 2003; Zhang 2003; Heggelund 2007; Schreurs 2011; Qi and Wu 2013). It is worth noticing that "enhancing China's international image and elevating its international stature are important goals of Chinese foreign policy" (Zhang 2003: 78). In foreign affairs, China views itself as a major world power and wants to be seen as a responsible and constructive member of the world community (Hao 1992: 32-33; Perlack et al. 1993: 86; Johnston 1998: 559-566; Oksenberg and Economy 1999: 21-22). Compared with most countries, China is particularly sensitive to external criticisms of its policy and behavior in international regimes and will go out of its way to avoid diplomatic isolation and international censure (Zhang 2003: 78).

In an analysis of China's foreign policy towards arms control, Johnston argued that "China's concern to preserve a favorable international image as a responsible major power is a critical variable determining the cost-benefit analysis behind international cooperation. All things being equal, the greater the image costs of unilateral or low-commitment strategies, the more likely China will take incrementally

³² <http://www.cango.org/plus/list.php?tid=90> (accessed 30 September 2022)

³³ <http://www.cango.org/plus/view.php?aid=215> (accessed 30 September 2022)

cooperative measures” (Johnston 1998: 559), therefore China decided to participate in arms control negotiations and cooperation because Chinese leaders “are concerned to project an image of a responsible major power” (Johnston 1998: 560). This theory also applies to the climate issue. As we have seen earlier in this chapter, it has been said that climate change has provided the Chinese government with an unprecedented opportunity to play such a role (Hatch 2003; Zhang 2003). On the one hand, China attempts to lead developing countries in climate negotiations by maintaining solidarity with the G-77. In doing so, it can be boosted. On the other hand, China uses the climate issue to enhance its relationship with developed countries by showing a willingness to cooperate. More recently, in the Enhanced Action on Climate Change submitted prior to the Paris Climate Summit, China explicitly stated its action on climate change is not only driven by China’s domestic needs but also by its sense of responsibility to fully engage in global governance, to forge a community of shared destiny for humankind, and to promote common development for all human beings³⁴.

The concern for the international image also partly explains why China’s position changed over time. However, maintaining a good international image for China seems more and more difficult. Since it has become an economic superpower and the largest GHG emitter despite of relatively low per capita emissions, the pressure to take on commitments is intensifying (Heggelund 2007: 178). Because it is so powerful and its actions ripple throughout the international economic and political systems, China no longer has the luxury of making its policies in isolation from the rest of the world (Perlmutter and Rothstein 2011: 207).

This chapter first illustrated the development of climate politics in China and highlighted the involved agencies and actors in the policy-making process. In the beginning, it was the science and technology-related ministries and institutions that played an important role in bringing climate change onto the political agenda. The power slowly shifted to the ministries and agencies focusing on economy, energy, and diplomacy. In the Chinese political system, policy can be very efficiently made. The FYPs and national climate change programs are guidelines for addressing climate change in China. However, the dual governmental structure makes the implementation of climate policies challenging. Nonetheless, both the central and the local governments work together to reach an agreement to develop renewable energy.

The second part of this chapter pointed out that climate change is regarded as foreign affairs and discussed China's basic positions in the global climate regime. China has insisted that developed countries take the lead in taking action because

³⁴ Full text: Enhanced Actions on Climate Change: China's Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (2015)
http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/2015-07/01/content_35953590.htm (accessed 16 November 2024)

climate change is mainly caused by their historical accumulative GHG emissions, and they are better equipped to deal with the problem. China has also refused to accept an emission cap. Instead, it focuses on the reduction of carbon intensity. The fundamental position is to claim its right to development. Regardless of these principled positions, China shows flexibility and is prepared to change to facilitate international cooperation. With regard to the negotiation strategies, China has strictly followed the UNFCCC framework and its CBDR principle. Uniting the G-77 is also an important strategy to strengthen its position against the U.S. China's basic positions, principles, and strategies are driven by economic interests, concerns of national sovereignty, energy security, an increasingly serious social-economic impact of climate change, pushes from external forces, and China's concern for its international image.

2.6 Summary and Sociological Reflections

This theoretical chapter outlined academic discussions on media framing, climate justice, international political economy, cosmopolitan perspective on climate justice, and China's climate politics. The theoretical framework is multidisciplinary. In fact, justice research has "historically developed within a multidisciplinary framework" (Sabbagh and Schmitt 2016: 2). The framework serves to help answer the research questions within the dissertation. Theoretical discussions on media framing and climate justice help to identify the media frames of climate justice in the newspapers I studied for the analysis. Concepts on international political economy, cosmopolitan perspectives on climate justice, and China's climate politics serve as guidelines to explain the social and political implications of the identified media frames of climate justice, also considering the Chinese characteristics of these frames.

Although the theoretical framework is multidisciplinary, this dissertation uses a sociological perspective to understand climate change and climate justice by highlighting two concepts: social actor and social inequality.

In order to identify media frames of climate justice, it is necessary to figure out "who speaks for the climate" (Boykoff 2011) in general and for climate justice in particular. The Media is an arena of discourse battles among different social actors. Media representations of climate change are not random assemblages of articles; rather, they are manifestations of dynamic and contested relationships between various social actors, such as scientists, policymakers, and the public (Boykoff and Smith 2010: 216). One of the essential concerns of media framing analysis is "inclusion" and "exclusion." It does not only include the investigation of what is included and excluded in the media framing but also who is included and excluded in the framing process. The media itself is also an important social actor whose role in the framing process should be taken into consideration. Within the philosophical and economic discussions of climate justice, the social actor is relevant especially in

terms of intergenerational justice and discount rate. Choosing between the interests of current and future generations determines the philosophical standpoint of the justice principle and the choice of discount rate. In the discussions of the cosmopolitan perspective of climate justice, the social actor is concerned with identifying whether the collective or individual social actor is accountable for climate justice. Discussions on climate politics in China also paid attention to the social actors who play a determining role in domestic climate change politics. In the context of China's climate politics, important social actors can be institutional government bodies and influential individual politicians.

The other concept is social inequality. For sociologists, social inequalities and climate change are two sides of the same coin. One cannot conceptualize inequalities and power without taking the consequences of climate change into account, and one cannot conceptualize climate change without considering its impacts on social inequalities and power (Beck 2010). This dissertation draws upon ideas and concepts from world-system theory. As Roberts and Parks argued, this is "a sociologically informed branch of political economy" (Parks and Roberts 2007: ix). According to academic discussions on the international political economy, global inequality and mistrust between the North and the South have worsened global climate governance (Roberts and Parks 2007, 2010; Parks and Roberts 2010).

In the ideal philosophical discussions of climate justice, one of the major concerns is that the impact of climate change is disproportionately distributed worldwide and within national borders. Quite often, the groups that suffer from social inequality in economy, gender, race, and so on are affected the most by the adverse effects of climate change. In addition, philosophical discussions on justice principles cannot avoid taking social inequality into consideration. Social inequality is also a concern of the critical approach to media framing analysis, as socially disadvantaged groups often lack the social resources and power to be represented in the discursive battle through media. From a cosmopolitan perspective, social inequality is no longer constrained within national borders. Instead, it has been globalized and radicalized (Beck 2010). Applying a sociological perspective to the concept of justice is suitable for this dissertation, as it is not meant to develop normative ideals of justice or argue for or against the understanding and principled beliefs of climate justice in China. Instead, a sociological perspective focuses on "how justice is perceived by different societies or stakeholders" (Schmidt and Schäfer 2015: 536). This dissertation aims to reveal how different groups in China understand and believe in the principles of climate justice and how they are represented in the media.

Chapter 3: Methodology

This chapter first explains why qualitative critical discourse analysis was chosen as the primary method for analyzing the textual materials. Then, it introduces the reasons for selecting a textually oriented discourse analysis and its analytical tool. This is followed by a description of data collection and an introduction to the selected newspapers.

3.1 Applying Critical Discourse Analysis to Framing Theory

The present research employs framing theory, though, as Olausson (2009) notes, the theory offers limited guidance on specific analytical methods. This ambiguity is well captured by D'Angelo and Kuypers (2010: 2), who describe framing as a multifaceted concept—ranging from a theory and approach to a paradigm and multiparadigmatic research program. While much framing research relies on quantitative methods to analyze media frames, this study primarily utilizes qualitative text analysis. This approach allows for a context-sensitive and in-depth exploration of meaning construction, making it particularly well-suited for understanding how frames are developed and interpreted.

Journalistic discourse has “some very specific textual characteristics, some very specific methods of text production and consumption, and is defined by a particular set of relationships between itself and other agencies” (Richardson 2007: 1). Critical discourse analysis (CDA) offers “*interpretations* of the meanings of texts rather than just quantifying textual features and deriving meaning from this; situates *what* is written or said in the *context* in which it occurs, rather than just summarizing patterns or regularities in texts; and argue that textual meaning is *constructed* through an interaction between producer, text, and consumer rather than simply being ‘read off the page by all readers in exactly the same way” (Richardson 2007: 15). By using CDA, researchers gain deeper insights into journalistic articles and a better understanding of the social relations and cultural values embedded in media reports.

Framing research has been criticized for concentrating on media impact while neglecting power issues. Carragee and Roefs (2004) emphasized that the questions of power, which are highly relevant to the media input, should be examined using framing theory. CDA centers upon everyday media discourse and is based on diverse theoretical and methodological traditions, from hermeneutics and critical theory to socio-linguistics. The aim of CDA is to reveal the implicit or taken-for-granted values, assumptions, and origins of a seemingly neutral, self-evident, and objective news text, and relate it to structures of dominance and power. Therefore, it is reasonable to use CDA to analyze journalistic articles. CDA, advocated by Norman Fairclough (1992, 1995, 2001, 2003, 2010, 2015; Fairclough and Wodak 1997) has been chosen for this dissertation because of its “constructionist, socio-

cognitive, and critical epistemological pillars that harmonize well with framing theory [...]” (Olausson 2009: 424).

3.1.1 A Textually-Oriented Discourse Analysis (TODA)

Before discussing the details of CDA as a method, it is necessary to clarify why this interdisciplinary study determined a textually oriented form of discourse analysis (TODA), to which CDA belongs.

As Norman Fairclough (1992: 1-5) pointed out, language studies were isolated from other social sciences. Linguistics was dominated by formalistic and cognitive paradigms on the one hand, and there was a traditional lack of interest in language in social sciences on the other. However, as boundaries between social sciences were weakening, a greater diversity of theory and practice developed within disciplines. These changes were accompanied by a “linguistic turn” in social theory. He argued that the value of discourse analysis as a method in social research would be increased by giving greater attention to texts and language analysis. Caney, a leading moral philosopher in climate justice, wrote that “it is vital that those who can and do play a role in communicating the causes, nature, and impacts of climate change—political leaders, climate scientists, journalists, and teachers—‘frame’ the issues surrounding climate change in ways that speak to everyday citizens. This requires, for example, attention to the language used and the norms invoked and it speaks to the role of rhetoric” (Caney 2016: 21). Caney also stressed the natural connection between frame analysis and language use. My analysis focuses on written texts in Chinese. By using CDA, my analysis can better attend to the details and fineness of Chinese language use in the text under scrutiny.

As a linguist, Fairclough has noted that previous linguistically oriented approaches to discourse analysis did not give sufficient attention to important social aspects of discourse. That is why it is necessary, in his view, to draw upon social theory. My research not only seeks to analyze news frames of climate justice in China but also aims to explore the broader social and political implications of these news frames. CDA helps to achieve this. Fairclough sought to integrate the “more social-theoretical sense of ‘discourse’ with the ‘text-and-interaction’ sense in linguistically-oriented discourse analysis” (Fairclough 1992: 4). This concept of discourse and discourse analysis is *three-dimensional*. Any discursive “event” (i.e., any instance of discourse) is seen as simultaneously a piece of text, an instance of discursive practice, and an instance of social practice. The “text” dimension attends to language analysis of texts. The “discursive dimension,” like “interaction” in the “text-and-interaction” view of discourse, specifies the nature of the processes of text production and interpretation, for example, which types of discourse (including “discourses” in the more social-theoretical sense) are drawn upon and how they are combined. The “social practice” dimension attends to issues in social analysis, such

as the institutional and organizational circumstances of the discursive event, how that shapes the nature of the discursive practice, and the constitutive/constructive effects of discourse referred to above (Fairclough 1992: 4). His aim was to bridge two traditions of discourse analysis and develop a different approach by integrating the strengths of both.

Since philosopher and historian Michel Foucault's approach to discourse analysis is widely referenced by social scientists, Fairclough dedicated a chapter to discussing the differences between Foucault's discourse analysis and that of TODA. Firstly, Foucault was concerned with the discourse of the human sciences, such as medicine, psychiatry, economics, and grammar. TODA is concerned with any sort of discourse—conversation, classroom discourse, media discourse, and so forth. Secondly, whereas the analysis of spoken and written language texts is a central part of TODA, it is not a part of Foucault's discourse analysis. His focus is the domains of knowledge constituted by "rules of formation" (Fairclough 1992: 38). Nonetheless, Fairclough acknowledged Foucault's contributions to a social theory of discourse, particularly regarding the relationship between discourse and power, the discursive construction of social subjects and knowledge, and the functioning of discourse in social change, and so on. In these areas, linguistically-oriented approaches were weak and undeveloped. However, there were "certain difficulties for TODA in Foucault's work, such as his neglect of textual analysis, and his view of discourse as constitutive. These problems seem to be connected with the absence of a concept of practice in Foucault's analyses, including the absence of text and textual analysis." Fairclough's final reservation about Foucault relates to his valuable insights into the constitutive properties of discourse. While he accepted that "objects" and social subjects are shaped by discursive practices, he argued that these practices are constituted by preconstituted 'objects' and preconstituted social subjects. Fairclough argued that TODA could strengthen social analysis by ensuring that attention was paid to concrete instances of practice and the textual forms and processes of interpretation. Such attention to the details of particular cases can help social analysts avoid schematism and one-sidedness (Fairclough 1992: 57-61).

This approach to discourse analysis was not only theoretically well developed and practiced (Fairclough 1992, 1995, 2001, 2003, 2010, 2015; Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999) but has also been enriched by many researchers over the decades (Richardson 2007; Wodak and Chilton 2005; Wodak and Meyer 2001). In addition, this approach provides researchers without a background in linguistics access to it by using the three-dimensional analytical model developed by Fairclough. The model will be explained later in this chapter.

Jørgensen and Phillips (2002: 60) conducted detailed research on different branches of discourse analysis and concluded that Fairclough's approach represents "the most developed theory and method for research in communication, culture and society." Although this study is essentially an interdisciplinary exploration, it works

intensively with journalistic media texts in a highly communicative context shaped by their cultural, social, and political realities. Therefore, Fairclough's CDA is very suitable.

3.1.2 Social Change and Power Relations

Fairclough draws upon the systemic functional linguistics proposed by Halliday, which emphasizes the functions of language. On the one hand, language reflects people's understanding of the world. Fairclough stated that "a real process may be signified linguistically in a variety of ways, according to the perspective from which it is interpreted" (Fairclough 1992: 179). On the other hand, according to functional linguistics, a language is shaped (even in its grammar) by the social functions it has come to serve (Halliday 1985). The key point of language in use is that language matters. Discursive practices linguistically produce, distribute, and consume texts through various channels.

The analysis of discourses of social change is given a lot of attention in Fairclough's CDA model. The model has been employed to analyze many social and cultural processes. As Jørgensen and Phillips noted, research in critical discourse analysis has covered areas such as organizational analysis, pedagogy, mass communication and racism, nationalism and identity, mass communication and economy, the spread of market practices and mass communication, democracy and politics (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002: 61). For my research, understanding climate change and climate justice is influenced by many factors, such as China's economic and social development, its culture and history, and international political economy. All these factors are an ongoing process. This is especially relevant for China, whose economy and society have undergone unprecedented transformation and whose international status is evolving. Fairclough's CDA highlights the changes in contemporary social life and investigates how semiosis presents in the process of change and the "shifts in the relationship between semiosis and other social elements within networks of practices." He further stressed that we cannot take the role of semiosis in social practices for granted; it has to be established through analysis. In some social practices, semiosis may be more or less important or salient than in others. In addition, semiosis may change in importance over time (Fairclough 2001: 123).

CDA is critical because it is not politically objective but aims to reveal the unequal power relations in the social world and in social relations. It also "reveals the role of discursive practice in the maintenance of the social world" (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002: 63). Although theorists' belief in post-structuralist approach diverge considerably, they agree on "the omnipresence of power" (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 2007: 89). Fairclough argues that mass media discourse "is interesting because the nature of the power relations enacted in it is often not clear, and there

are reasons for seeing it as involving hidden relations of power” (2015: 78). Climate justice is not only an ethical issue, but, to some extent, also a social, political, and economic issue. To explore power relations, many questions can be asked, for example: Whose voices are included and excluded? Who can get access to the media? Who defines the meaning of justice? Which aspects of climate justice are highlighted and underrepresented?

3.1.3 Fairclough’s Three-dimensional Model

One advantage of Fairclough’s CDA is that he has developed an accessible analytical model for both researchers specializing in linguistics and those with no background in it (Fairclough 2003).

CDA deals with language and its use. Researchers from different disciplines have different traditions of using discourse analysis, each with its own focus. The tool adopted for analysis for my research is the three-dimensional model. It focuses on (1) the linguistic features of the text, (2) processes relating to the production, distribution, and consumption of the text (discursive practice), and (3) the wider social practice to which the communicative event belongs (social practice) (Fairclough 1992: 72-73).

3.1.3.1 Text

The four levels of the analysis of *discourse as text* are vocabulary, grammar, cohesion, and text structure (Fairclough 1992: 75-78, 1995: 57-58). Vocabulary involves individual words and can be examined through wording. Fairclough claimed that analysis should focus on alternative wordings and their political and ideological significance. Another focus is word meaning, and particularly how the meanings of words come into contention within wider struggles. In addition, analysis of vocabulary should pay attention to metaphors, the ideological and political importance of particular metaphors, and conflicts between alternative metaphors.

Grammar deals with words combined into clauses and sentences; Fairclough’s model focuses on the analysis of clauses. Every clause is a combination of ideational, interpersonal (identity and relational), and textual meanings (Fairclough 1992, 1995, 2001). When analyzing a clause, one has to investigate whether the clause is passive or active (Fairclough 2015: 130), if the agent is deleted because it is unknown or already known but judged as irrelevant, or if it is deleted in order to leave agency and responsibility vague. The analysis is “sensitive to absences as well as presences in texts - to representations, categories of participant, constructions of participant identity or participant relations which are not found in a text” (Fairclough 1995: 58).

There are many social actors that contribute to constructing the ethics and politics of climate change. Among them, I first emphasize the role of the media.

Social actors compete to be represented by the media. The media has its own logic and standard for selecting news (constitutive), and meanwhile, broader socioeconomic and cultural factors influence the selection (*constituted*) (Anderson 1997). What we construct, interpret, and discuss has all kinds of consequences. People's perception of fairness is influenced by what the media choose to tell or stress. Media reports indicate which social actors are prioritized over others. Does the media cover grassroots movements' voices besides the authorities' opinions? As pointed out, "[A]s a social construction, climate change is no one thing. Instead, it is an ensemble of constitutive processes, yielding an ever changing panoply of agents and institutions" (Richardson 2007: xv). The media framing is, on the other hand, constituted by the social and political conditions in which issues are located. When analyzing sample texts attention will be paid to other social actors and explore how they get their voices channeled through the media.

Cohesion refers to how clauses are linked together into sentences and how sentences are in turn linked together into larger units in text. The last analytical concept is text structure. It also deals with architecture of texts, but a higher-level design feature of different types of text. Fairclough suggests two types of text: monologue and dialogue. Analysis of text structure gives insight into the systems of knowledge and belief and the assumptions about social relationships and social identities (Fairclough 1992: 77).

3.1.3.2 Discursive Practice

The second level of the Fairclough model is *discursive practice*, referring to the process of text production, distribution, and consumption. These three stages are different in different social contexts. A newspaper report is produced according to journalistic conventions and professional guidelines. What is regarded as newsworthy and in which section it is placed in the newspaper are probably different from editor to editor.

Fairclough pointed out that production and interpretation are constrained by the available members' resources. On the one hand, these resources are constitutive in the production, distribution, and consumption of texts; on the other hand, they are constrained by the nature of social practice in which the process of text production, distribution, and consumption is located. Based on the function of discursive practice as a bridge between texts and wider social practices, Fairclough states that it is a major feature of the three-dimensional framework to explore these constraints, especially the second (Fairclough 1992: 80).

An important tool for analyzing discursive practice is intertextuality. Individual texts always relate to past and present texts. Intertextuality focuses on how, in the production and interpretation of a text, people draw upon other texts and text types that are socially and culturally available to them. Intertextuality exists in the production, distribution, and consumption of the discursive process. An intertextual

analysis looks at the text from the perspective of discursive practice and the traces of the discursive practice in the text. It aims to unravel the various genres and discourses. My research examines what kinds of text the media reports draw upon and whether and how reports interactively draw upon texts. Fairclough differentiated between normative and creative discursive practices. Creative discursive practices organize discourses and genres in a new and mixed way. As “media texts constitute a sensitive barometer” (Fairclough 1995: 52) of cultural change, creative discursive practices become “both a sign of, and a driving force in, discursive and thereby socio-cultural change” (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002: 73).

Discourse representation is a form of intertextuality in which parts of other texts are incorporated into a text and usually explicitly marked as such, with devices such as quotation marks and reporting clauses (e.g., “she said” or “Mary claimed”). “In indirect discourse, the quotation marks disappear and the represented discourse takes the form of a clause grammatically subordinated to the reporting clause, a relationship marked by the conjunction ‘that’. [...]. The voices of reporter and reported are less clearly demarcated, and the words used to represent the latter’s discourse may be those of the reporter rather than those of the reported” (Fairclough 1992: 107).

3.1.3.3 Social Practice

Social practice consists of the third level of the three-dimensional model. According to CDA, language affects ideas, values, and norms of society. Thus, language, or text as a form of language, is constitutive of social practices. However, language and text are also constituted by broader social practices. To some extent, critical discourse analysis should dig into wider social-cultural practices rather than solely focus on linguistic analysis in a narrower sense.

The analysis of social practices “may be at different levels of abstraction from the particular event: it may involve its more immediate situational context, the wider context of institutional practices the event is embedded within, or the yet wider frame of the society and the culture” (Fairclough 1995: 62). In order to analyze social practices, we have to ask what a text says about the society in which it is produced and the society that it is produced for, what influence or impact we think that the text may have on social relations, will it help to continue inequalities and other undesirable social practices, or will it help to break them down? “It is at this point that discourse analysis becomes critical discourse analysis” (Richardson 2007: 42).

In Chapter 4, I will analyze the texts using the three-dimensional model by focusing on the second level, namely the discursive practice, because it acts as a central point. It can mediate the relationship between the dimension of social practice and text: “it is the nature of the social practice that determines the macro-processes of discursive practice, and it is the micro-processes that shape the text” (Fairclough 1992: 86). Additional attention will also be paid to text analysis with a

focus on wording, transitive, clause, and so on, as well as an analysis of social practice by drawing on the social theories discussed in Chapter 2.

3.2 Research Design

Although the research in this dissertation mainly applied a qualitative method, it did not entirely abandon quantitative analysis. As Deacon and his colleagues said, "... virtue lies in combining various distinct approaches, drawing on their relative strengths and attempting to make their different contributions analytically complementary" (Deacon et al. 1998: 183). Of the 51 research samples, 27 were chosen for a comprehensive qualitative critical discourse analysis. Additionally, a brief quantitative analysis of all 51 samples was conducted, focusing on the morphological characteristics of the texts and media representations of different actors. This approach to social actors is crucial because they are, in Dryzek's words, "agents of justice" (2015: 362), and the "who" question of justice concerns inclusion and exclusion (Kortetmäki 2016: 323).

3.2.1 Focusing on a Single Country

Numerous studies have examined media coverage of climate change, though the majority are single-case analyses (Schäfer et al. 2014). Schmidt and colleagues note that these studies have generated data for specific countries, including Australia, Canada, Finland, Germany, India, Switzerland, the UK, and the U.S.³⁵ However, these studies predominantly focus on industrialized nations, with only a few exceptions, such as research on India and Peru³⁶ (Schmidt et al. 2013: 1234).

³⁵ For additional insights into the case studies mentioned, please consult the following articles.

Farbotko, C. (2005) Tuvalu and climate change: constructions of environmental displacement in The Sydney Morning Herald. *Geografiska Annaler: Series B, Human Geography*, 87(4), pp. 279–293.

Ahchong, K. and Dodds, R. (2012) Anthropogenic climate change coverage in two Canadian newspapers, the Toronto Star and the Globe and Mail, from 1988 to 2007. *Environmental Science & Policy*, 15(1), pp. 48–59.

Young, N. and Dugas, E. (2011) Representations of climate change in Canadian national print media: the canalization of global warming. *Canadian Review of Sociology/Revue canadienne de sociologie*, 48(1), pp. 1–22.

Lyytimäki, J. and Tapio, P. (2009) Climate change as reported in the press of Finland: from screaming headlines to penetrating background noise. *International Journal of Environmental Studies*, 66(6), pp. 723–735.

Weingart, P., Engels, A. and Pansegrau, P. (2000) Risks of communication: discourses on climate change in science, politics, and the mass media. *Public Understanding of Science*, 9(3), pp. 261–283.

Jogesh, A. (2012) A change in climate? Trends in climate change reportage in the Indian print media. In: Dubash, N.K. (ed.) *Handbook of Climate Change and India*. London: Earthscan, pp. 266–286.

Besio, C. and Pronzini, A. (2010) Unruhe und Stabilität als Form der massenmedialen Kommunikation über Klimawandel. In: Voss, M. (ed.) *Der Klimawandel*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, pp. 283–299.

Boykoff, M.T. and Mansfield, M. (2008) 'Ye Olde Hot Aire': reporting on human contributions to climate change in the UK tabloid press. *Environmental Research Letters*, 3(2), pp. 1–8.

Liu, X., Lindquist, E. and Vedlitz, A. (2011) Explaining media and congressional attention to global climate change, 1969-2005: an empirical test of agenda-setting theory. *Political Research Quarterly*, 64(2), pp. 405–419.

³⁶ Takahashi, B, Meisner M 2012, Climate change in Peruvian newspapers: the role of foreign voices in a context of vulnerability. *Public Understanding of Science* 22(4): 427–442.

Research on media representations of climate change in China remains scarce, and comparative analyses between China and other countries are even more limited.

Climate justice as a concept has a relatively recent history, moving quickly from social movements and radical NGOs into the public debate. Research focusing on climate justice is emerging (Baer 2011; Barabanova 2013; Schlosberg and Collins 2014; Kortetmäki 2016; Scandrett 2016). These studies emphasize climate justice discourse in environmental movements rather than how the media plays a role in framing climate justice. As far as I can tell, no research project has focused on the media framing of climate justice in China. In my opinion, it is important to conduct a case study first.

Comparative analysis is always interesting. In media and communication studies, scholars have attempted to do comparative analyses on climate change communication (Schmidt et al. 2013; Eide et al. 2009). These collaborative projects involved scholars worldwide. Each scholar is an expert in climate change communication in their respective countries. These research projects rely on international cooperation and academic networks. At this time, I do not have the capacity to do a comparative analysis. But it is a possibility for future studies in this field.

3.2.2 Data Collection

There are many reasons to set the time frame for data collection from 2007 to 2015. It has already been pointed out that media attention in China peaked during reports of the IPCC (Feresin 2009). Cottle (2009) argued that the release of the fourth IPCC report in early 2007 proved to be a transforming moment in the media coverage of climate change. In addition, both the IPCC and former U.S. Vice President Al Gore received the Nobel Peace Prize for their work on climate change that year. Since then, the amount of attention paid to climate change has increased dramatically (O'Brien et al. 2010: xiii).

Since the research projects mentioned above were focused on non-Chinese countries, I conducted a brief data search on media reports in China about climate change using the database cnki,³⁷ the largest Chinese academic database, which includes journals, newspapers, and degree dissertations. I searched for articles using the terms “climate change” (qihou bianhua) and “global warming” (quanqiu biannuan) in the “China Core Newspapers Full-text Database” (zhongguo zhongyao baozhi quanwen shujuku) from 1975 to 1999. The result was zero. No media reported on climate change for 25 years. I then searched again, now using the term “climate change” in the same database from 2000 to 2009. The data shows that the

³⁷ CNKI's overseas version of the database can be accessed here <https://oversea.cnki.net/index/> (accessed 16 November 2024)

number of journalistic reports increased from 6 in 2000 to 343 in 2006 and rising considerably to 1525 in 2007. The number rose to 1628 in 2008 and then dramatically to 4632 in 2009. Similarly, Carvalho (2008) has conducted research on the *China Daily* newspaper. He found that climate change did not gain prominent status in the public sphere until 2007. Although this reflects a micro trend of media representation of climate change in *China Daily*, it represents, to some extent, the general media landscape of climate change communication in China. Much evidence indicates that from 2007, media reports of climate change in China rose sharply.

Coincidentally, some significant events happened in China also in 2007. Between May and June, tens of thousands of citizens of Xiamen protested the local government due to the construction of a Taiwanese-backed paraxylene (PX) petrochemical plant in the city. The provincial and municipal governments bowed to public pressure. The Xiamen case is often referred to as “the milestone in public participation in China” (Huang and Yip 2012). Moreover, China’s National Climate Change Program was released for the first time in June 2007. According to Hu Angang (2016), China’s path to becoming an ecological civilization was first initiated at the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China. This idea was further developed by Xi Jinping (Central Committee Research Office for Literature 2017).

Another important year for media communication of climate change in China was 2009. It was reported that around 50 media institutions from China covered the Copenhagen Climate Summit by sending journalists to Denmark. More than 5,000 media professionals from all over the world were registered to report from the conference. On the contrary, there were only 2,000 reporters covering the G20 summit held in April of the same year (Yang Chuanmin 2009). In the theoretical chapter, it was pointed out that scholars agreed on the role the Copenhagen Summit played in communicating climate change in China. After “the dream crashed at the 2009 Copenhagen Climate Change Conference” (Jamieson and Di Paola 2014: 105), the public worldwide seemed to be disappointed by climate politics for a while. Franzen and Vogl (2013: 1007) observed a decrease in interest in their data. They explained that one reason for the decrease could be public fatigue with a problem that had been on the agenda for a long time. Another explanation could be that climate change skeptics, reports of scientific misconduct, inaccuracies, and exaggerations³⁸ have introduced more confusion into the public debate. Furthermore, the banking crisis that started in 2008 and the debt crisis that followed have increased the concern over future economic perspectives, pulling attention away from environmental issues. However, the attention was drawn back to climate change before the 2015 Paris Climate Change Conference. This conference was widely considered a milestone in the history of global climate governance. Therefore,

³⁸One example could be the Climate Gate in 2009. See e.g., Robert McKie, ‘*Climategate 10 years on: what lessons have we learned?*’ The Guardian, November 2019 (accessed 17 November 2024)

the timeframe for data collection for the analysis in this dissertation was set from 2007 to 2015.

3.2.3 Choices of Media and Newspapers

The empirical materials for this research are derived from eight mainstream newspapers in China from 2007 to 2015. These include *People's Daily* (renmin ribao), *Science and Technology Daily* (keji ribao), *China Environment News* (zhongguo huanjingbao), *21st Century Business Herald* (21 shiji jingji baodao), *The Economic Observer* (jingji guanchabao), *China Business News* (diyi caijing ribao), *Southern Weekly* (nanfang zhoumo) and *Southern Metropolis Daily* (nanfang dushibao).

The selection was made with the aim of covering a broad spectrum of newspapers to avoid bias from any single publication while offering a comparative perspective. Focusing on printed media is due to the following considerations. In the digital age, the newspaper is still regarded as more official and serious media. Although many mainstream newspapers in China have a digital presence, the online content is mainly drawn from the printed version. In addition, the printed media has an authoritative status in the Chinese media landscape and plays a crucial role in mainstream media discourse. Whereas newspapers are widely regarded as not as important as before, the Chinese government/Communist Party has been enhancing the control of newspapers rather than radio and TVs that are normally regarded to be more capable of reaching more audiences. The printed media is administrated by the General Administration of Press and Publication (GAPP), which was a department of the State Council until 2018. Since 2018, GAPP has been under the direct control of the Publicity Department of the Communist Party of China, which is an internal division of the Communist Party of China in charge of ideology-related work. In contrast, the National Radio and Television Administration (NRTA) is still an agency under the administration of the State Council. Newspapers are, to some extent, a barometer of ideology, social values, and propaganda in China. Another reason for emphasizing printed media is that compared to government proclamations, discourses represented by newspapers are much more diverse and can reflect a broader range of discourses on climate justice in China. Of course, it is meaningful to draw attention to how the newspaper draws upon government proclamations in the analysis. The last reason may be pragmatic but also realistic for academic practice. Researchers have relatively easy access to the data from newspapers. At the moment, existing media analysis research on climate change also mainly focuses on printed media (Carvalho 2005, 2008, 2010; Eide et al. 2010; Schmidt et al. 2013). Inquiry into other types of media, such as broadcast news, internet blogs, and films, would also be interesting. However, it is beyond the scope of this dissertation.

People's Daily (PD), founded in 1948, is the official newspaper of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. It is published worldwide and has a circulation of 3 to 4 million copies. The newspaper is widely regarded as one of the most important information channels on the policies and viewpoints of the Chinese government. It is one of the most analyzed newspapers by researchers. It also has an overseas edition. However, I only focused on its national edition.

Science and Technology Daily (STD) is jointly established and published by the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST), the Commission for Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND), CAS, and the China Association for Science and Technology (CAST) in 1986. Its daily circulation is 0.3 million copies worldwide. It is a comprehensive daily newspaper with a clear emphasis on technology.

China Environment News (CEN) is the official newspaper of the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP). The first issue came out in 1984. With its 0.2 million circulation, 45 offices nationwide, and more than 200 journalists and editors, it is considered the foremost media source of environmental journalism.

21st Century Business Herald (CBH) is one of the most influential and acknowledged economic-focused and market-based newspapers. It was founded in 2001 by Shen Hao³⁹, a former journalist and manager of the Southern Media Group. The circulation is more than 0.75 million copies.

Economic Observer (EO) entered the market as a weekly newspaper in 2001. It is owned by the Shangdong Sanlian Group. The newspaper has a circulation of 0.22 million copies and is considered to take an independent approach to reporting news in China. Its slogan is "rationality and constructiveness."

China Business News (CBN) was established in 2004 by three major media groups in China: Radio and Television Station of Shanghai (RTS), Guangzhou Daily Newspaper Group, and Beijing Youth Daily. It is the first market-oriented, cross-regional, and cross-media business newspaper in China, distributed to the country's three most important economic regions. Its slogan is "being responsible for the era." The target groups are claimed to be the most influential people in China.

The *Southern Weekly (SW)* was launched in 1984 and is a sister publication of the *Southern Daily*, the official Guangdong Communist Party newspaper. Its head office is in Guangzhou, and news offices are in Beijing, Shanghai, and Chengdu. The readership reaches 1.7 million. Southern Weekly is distributed to all parts of the Chinese mainland. This weekly newspaper is regarded as the most influential liberal newspaper in China and said to contribute to public democratic debate and the formation of civil society.

³⁹ <https://cpj.org/data/people/shen-hao/>, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/arrest-of-inspirational-editor-shen-hao-marks-end-of-an-era-for-chinese-journalism/2015/01/09/4e7e9ece-8924-11e4-ace9-47de1af4c3eb_story.html (accessed on 17 November 2024)

Founded in 1997, the *Southern Metropolis Daily (SMD)* is a daily tabloid newspaper published in Guangzhou with a circulation of 1.7 million copies. Although it belongs to the Southern Daily Group, its political position is liberal, and its investigative reporting often gets it into trouble with local authorities and the central government. The readers mainly come from the Pearl River Delta area, including Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Hong Kong, and Macau.

The chosen newspapers share some common characteristics. First, due to their quality and wide circulation, they are all very influential on the public and political debate in China. For instance, the *People's Daily* reflects the voice of the central government, with its circulation ranking first among party newspapers on the mainland. At the same time, it serves as "both the mouthpiece of the party and the voice of the people." Due to its special status, it has a guiding effect on mainstream newspapers in mainland China. The *Southern Metropolis Daily* is an emerging media outlet born out of the demand for media marketization reform and is regarded by journalism scholars as the inheritor and leader of the concept of journalistic professionalism in mainland China (Tong 2006). Media researcher Tang Shubiao (2011: 25) argued that *China's Business News* has many good journalists who have produced professional reports, earning praise from peers. They belong to the leading newspapers in China that report climate change issues. *The Southern Weekly* was the first media outlet in China to establish "green reporting" on 8 October 2009. Some of the selected newspapers are also well known by their Western media fellows. For example, the *Southern Metropolis Daily* and the *Economic Observer* are the only two Chinese newspapers to co-publish an editorial, with 55 other newspapers around the world calling for action from the world leaders gathering in Copenhagen for the UN's climate change summit in 2009.

3.2.4 Collecting Samples

Most newspapers can be searched within the database "cnki" (China National Knowledge Infrastructure).

The first step in obtaining data from each newspaper was to enter the keyword "qihou bianhua (climate change)" as the search term in full text. This resulted in a very large corpus of texts. The second step was to extract target texts concerned with justice issues. Obviously, keywords like justice (*zhengyi/gongzheng*), fairness (*gongping/zhengyi*), equality (*pingdeng*), equity (*gongping/gongzheng*) are directly relevant. It has to be stressed that I did not distinguish between justice, fairness, equality, and equity. Baer (2011: 337) pointed out that the terms "justice," "fairness," and "equity" are used interchangeably in debates about climate change. For example, Harris (2003: 28) wrote that "philosophers can help us understand the meaning of international justice (and similar concepts, such as equity and fairness)." Anyway, "it is hard to imagine that an institution or an outcome could be considered fair but not

just, or just but not equitable” (Baer 2011: 337). Since “responsibility is the most strongly institutionalised notion linked to climate justice” (Audet 2013: 376) and “considerations of justice directly raise questions of responsibility” (Moellendorf, 2015: 173), I chose to narrow down the corpus by also entering keywords such as responsibility (*zeren/dandang*), commitment (*chengnuo*) and obligation (*yiwu*).

After identifying these two categories of keywords, I searched among the large corpus for articles whose titles contained at least one of the keywords from either the first or the second category. To be specific, if the title of an article included one of the words from justice/fairness/equality/equity or one of the words from responsibility/commitment/obligation, then the article was selected. Special attention was paid to the samples from *People’s Daily*, as the corpus remained very large after the second round of selection. For this newspaper, the articles with titles containing at least one keyword from the first category and at least one keyword from the second category were selected. In order to ensure a more accurate corpus, the final step was to review the selected articles to verify whether the main topic of each article was indeed climate change. The *Southern Metropolitan Daily* is not digitally available in “cnki.” The official e-version of this newspaper can be found from 2009 onward on its website. The data from previous years was obtained from an archive trip to the China National Library. Data collection from this newspaper was challenging because the target texts could not be selected by entering keywords. The only way to locate the relevant articles was to read the newspapers page by page. These articles were then reviewed again to check if they addressed the justice issue. In total, there were 51 sample texts, among which 27 were chosen for qualitative critical discourse analysis.

Chapter 4: Analysis

This chapter focuses on the comprehensive qualitative analysis of the 27 selected samples. Prior to this, a preliminary quantitative analysis of all 51 samples was conducted to identify general patterns in the data and provide complementary insights for the qualitative examination.

4.1 Brief Quantitative Analysis

This initial quantitative analysis focuses on the date and location of the sample texts, as well as the representation of different social actors within them.

4.1.1 Date and Location of Sample Texts

For this dissertation, I examined samples extracted from reports published between 2007 and 2015. The results showed that 17 samples were published in 2009 and 10 in 2007, meaning that more than half were published in those two years. These dates coincided exactly with two important UNFCCC climate events the Copenhagen Summit and the Bali Climate Change Conference.

It is interesting to find that a considerable number of samples were also extracted from reports in 2010 (8) and 2008 (7). If we consider these 15 media reports from 2010 and 2008 as directly influenced by the aforementioned climate change events, then 25 samples were related to the Copenhagen Summit and 17 to the Bali Summit. Only 3 samples were found between 2011 and 2013. Then, there was a slight increase in 2014 and 2015, with 3 samples in each year. This rise may be related to the Paris Conference.

Although the UNFCCC climate change conference takes place every year, the statistics revealed that the media impact of each conference was enormously different. For Chinese media, the Copenhagen Summit clearly played a significant role in communicating the climate issue.

Table 2: Date and Location of all Sample Texts

	Code of Sample	Date of Publication	Location of Sample		Code of Sample	Date of Publication	Location of Sample
1	PD1	2007-05-16	007 International	27	STD6	2009-12-17	003 Roundup
2	PD2	2007-10-09	010 International	28	CEN1	2008-04-18	005 Global
3	PD3	2008-07-	003	29	CEN2	2009-06-	002 Opinion

		07	International			23	
4	PD4	2008-07-11	003 International	30	CEN3	2009-07-07	004 Global
5	PD5	2009-07-23	014 International Weekly	31	CEN4	2009-10-22	007 Global
6	PD6	2009-08-27	003 Top News	32	CBH1	2007-06-07	004 Comment
7	PD7	2009-12-13	002 Top News	33	CBH2	2007-06-11	008 Politics and Economy
8	PD8	2009-12-19	002 Top News	34	CBH3	2008-09-29	036 Xin Bai Jia
9	PD9	2009-12-27	003 Top News	35	CBH4	2009-09-23	008 Public Affairs
10	PD10	2010-01-07	023 International	36	CBH5	2010-07-20	024 Carbon ^o Pioneer
11	PD11	2010-01-02	003 Top News	37	EO1	2007-06-11	007 Economy
12	PD12	2010-07-04	002 Top News	38	EO2	2007-12-03	004 News from Beijing
13	PD13	2010-09-19	001 Top News	39	CBN1	2010-03-11	C04 AD
14	PD14	2011-11-23	002 Top News	40	CBN2	2010-08-30	A07 Column
15	PD15	2011-12-16	003 Top News	41	CBN3	2015-12-01	A04 International
16	PD16	2013-05-06	022 International	42	SW1	2007-06-14	C23 Specials
17	PD17	2014-12-05	003 Top News	43	SW2	2007-12-13	B11 Politics
18	PD18	2014-12-09	003 Top News	44	SW3	2009-11-19	C10 Environment
19	PD19	2014-12-12	003 Top News	45	SW4	2009-11-19	C10 Environment
20	PD20	2015-07-01	022 Roundup	46	SW5	2009-12-17	C14 Copenhagen
21	PD21	2015-07-02	021 International	47	SW6	2010-01-21	C09 Green
22	STD1	2008-04-	003	48	SMD1	2007-06-	A02

		21	Roundup			05	Comment
23	STD2	2008-04-23	003 Roundup	49	SMD2	2007-12-15	A26 International
24	STD3	2009-03-13	002 International	50	SMD3	2008-01-02	A02 Comment
25	STD4	2009-10-09	002 International	51	SMD4	2009-12-07	A02 Comment
26	STD5	2009-12-08	002 International				

In media practice, where a report is published matters. The location of the report reveals how the journalist and editor categorize the issue and how much importance they attach to it. Among the 51 samples, 16 were published on the “International”/“Global” page, 12 on “Top News,” and 7 on the page for opinion pieces. Furthermore, 4 samples appeared on the pages reserved for special topics (36, 42, 46, 47). The remaining samples were published on the pages with news related to the economy, politics, the environment, and public affairs. The fact that more than one-third of the samples were published in sections dedicated to international or global affairs suggests that the media represented the climate issue mainly in *the international domain* rather than the national domain, which indicates that the climate issue was primarily framed as an international issue.

The 12 samples published as top news are also noteworthy. Interestingly, all these 12 samples were from *People’s Daily*, showing that this newspaper attached *significant importance* to climate issues. Quite a few samples were *opinion-based* journalistic pieces, and even some samples not located on the “Comment” or “Opinion” pages were still opinion-based. Media is a battlefield of discourse. The pages where opinion-based pieces are published are the hottest spots. Compared to *People’s Daily*, there were not many samples from *Southern Metropolis Daily*. However, 3 of 4 samples of SMD were comments explicitly expressing positions on climate issues.

Overall, there are 21 samples from *People’s Daily*, accounting for about 40% of all samples. Together with 6 samples from *Science and Technology Daily* and 4 from *China Environment News*, there are 31 samples from newspapers directly owned by the party or the state. Another 10 samples were extracted from newspapers focusing on economy and business, while the final 10 samples were from more liberal and market-based newspapers. The fact that about 60% of the samples were from *party-owned and state-owned newspapers* indicates that the party and the state *dominated* the media framing of climate issues.

4.1.2 Quantitative Analysis of Social Actors

Climate change represents an urgent global challenge that demands proactive action. Central to this effort is the concept of climate justice, which seeks to identify and hold accountable the agents responsible for both causing and addressing the crisis. In line with Fairclough's framework of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), it is essential to examine the "choices in the representation of social actors" (2003: 145). This approach underscores the importance of identifying which actors and perspectives are included or excluded in media representations. To this end, a brief quantitative analysis is necessary to systematically evaluate the presence and absence of specific voices in media representation.

Given the diversity of social actors, they were roughly divided into four categories: Concrete Individual Social Actors (CISA), Abstract Individual Social Actors (AISA), Concrete Collective Social Actors (CCSA), and Abstract Collective Social Actors (ACSA). "Voices" in the statistics refer to the quotations of social actors. There are both direct and indirect quotations, meaning that the represented social actor was interviewed by journalists and quoted in the media source, namely the sample text in this dissertation. If the sample text was written by a social actor instead of a journalist, all the sentences in that text were coded as direct quotations from that social actor. For example, Sample No. 30 for the quantitative analysis was a contribution by Xue Huifeng, the Director of the Laws Section of the Environmental Protection and Resources Conservation Committee of the National People's Congress. This sample text contains 71 full sentences, all of which were coded as direct quotations from national politicians based on the coding criteria. The following tables display the statistical results.

CISA: Concrete Individual Social Actor

Concrete individual social actors (CISAs) refer to those individuals who can be clearly identified, such as the Prime Minister of China, Wen Jiabao, or then-UN General- Secretary Ban Ki-moon. In the statistics, the former was labeled a "national politician" and the latter an "international politician."

The table shows that the most frequently represented concrete individual social actors were national politicians (502), international politicians (291), and national scholars (214), accounting for 48.1%, 27.9%, and 20.5% of the total, respectively. In terms of direct quotations, these social actors represented 47.6%, 26.0%, and 27.9%, respectively. The figures were 55.7%, 17.1%, and 10% for indirect quotations. Approximately 68.6% of the concrete individual social actors represented were national politicians and national scholars, with 75.5% of direct quotations coming from these two groups. When considering national business representatives as well, it is clear that the *national social actors* played a crucial role in the media framing of climate change.

Another noticeable point is that politicians dominated the media representation of social actors. Together, national and international politicians accounted for around 76% of media representation, 73.6% of direct quotations, and 72.9% of indirect quotations. While climate change is fundamentally and originally a scientific issue, scientists were not as prominently represented. However, the high percentage of politicians represented in the media samples reflects that climate change has been heavily politicized.

Table 3: Representation of Concrete Individual Social Actors

Concrete Individual Social Actors		Frequency of Representation	Quotation	Purely Represented **	
National Politicians	Zhai Yong	113	113dq	0	
	Xue Huifeng	71	71dq	0	
	Yu Qingtai	63	49dq	14	
	Xie Zhenhua	55	11dq, 42iq	2	
	Lü Xuedu	25	22dq, 1iq	2	
	Xu Huaqing	17	16dq	1	
	Wen Jiabao	15	6iq	9	
	He Yafei	7	7iq	0	
	Others	136	41dq, 61iq	34	
	Subtotal	502	323dq*, 117iq*	62	
International Politicians	UN politicians	Achim Steiner	65	52dq	13
		Ban Ki-moon	63	62dq	1
		Maurice Strong	51	36dq	15
		Other UN politicians	12	4dq, 4iq	4
		Other international politicians	100	22dq, 32iq	46
	Subtotal		291	176dq, 36iq	79
National	Chen Ying	58	45dq,	0	

Scholars			13iq	
	Lin Boqiang	51	50dq	1
	Pan Jiahua	46	42dq, 2iq	2
	Qi Ye	27	27dq	0
	Shen Jiru	23	23dq	0
	Pang Jun	9	2dq, 6iq	1
	Subtotal	214	189dq, 21iq	4
Scholars of international research institutions		10	1dq, 3iq	6
Representatives of international NGOs	Representatives of WWF	28	1dq, 23iq	4
	Representatives of other NGOs	16	5dq, 8iq	3
	Subtotal	44	6dq, 31iq	7
Representatives of international business institutions		5	1dq, 3iq	1
National business representatives		8	5dq, 2iq	1
Representatives of thinktanks		1	0	1
International inventors		1	0	1
Total		1076	701dq, 213iq	162

International politicians were represented 291 times in the selected samples. UN politicians appeared 191 times, with 154 direct quotations, accounting for 65.6% of total representations and 87.5% of direct quotations within its category. Among the most frequently represented and quoted UN politicians were Achim Steiner, Ban Ki-

moon, and Maurice Strong. Steiner served as the Executive Director of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) between 2006 and 2016, and Ban Ki-moon was the eighth Secretary-General of the UN between 2007 and 2016. Maurice Strong served as the Under-Secretary-General of the UN and was the founder of the UN Environment Program. While it is reasonable that the UN Secretary-General and UNEP officials were mostly represented and quoted in media reports concerning climate change, it is noteworthy that the politicians from the *UN system* were so intensively represented and quoted.

Among 502 times of representations of national politicians, the following individuals appeared most frequently in the sample texts: Zhai Yong (113), Xue Huifeng (71), Yu Qingtai (63), and Xie Zhenhua (55). Both Zhai and Xue were officials in the Environmental Protection and Resources Conservation Committee of the National People's Congress. Zhai served as the Deputy Director of the Research Section, and Xue was the Director of the Laws Section of the committee. Zhai and Xue contributed two articles to *China Environment News*. According to the coding standard, all full sentences (113+71=184) were coded as direct quotations, which explains the initially high percentage of quotations from these two officials. However, when excluding the two sample texts authored by Zhai and Xue, national politicians were represented 318 (502-184) times. Of these, Yu Qingtai and Xie Zhenhua were represented 63 and 55 times, respectively, accounting for around 37% of all represented national politicians. After excluding the Zhai and Xue texts, there were 256 quotations (323+117-113-71), and 139 (323-113-71) direct quotations left. That is, quotations by the journalists through interviews. When analyzed this way, interesting data emerged: 39.8% (102 [49+11+42]/256) of quotations came from Yu Qingtai and Xie Zhenhua, and 43% (60 [49+11]/139) of direct quotations came from these two national officials. Yu Qingtai was the Chinese government's special envoy for climate change negotiation and all his quotations related to this subject. Xie Zhenhua led the Chinese delegation to the Copenhagen Climate Summit. *The statistics regarding Yu and Xie suggest that media attention to climate issues was strongly influenced by the UN climate change conference and the most important negotiators*. Surprisingly, the Chinese Prime Minister was not widely represented in the sample texts. The reason could be that during the climate change conference, high-level officials like Yu Qingtai and Xie Zhenhua, instead of the Prime Minister, were primarily responsible for communicating with the media.

Six national scholars were represented 214 times and quoted 188 times in the sample texts. Of all quotations, 145 direct quotations came from five contributions by four scholars: Lin Boqiang, Qi Ye, Shen Jiru, and Chen Ying, which accounted for 67.8% of all quotations. The following table shows the titles of these scholars and the locations of their quotations.

Table 4: Most Frequently Represented National Scholars

Name of Scholars	Title	Location of Quotation
Chen Ying	Deputy Director and Researcher of Sustainable Development of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences	PD3 and PD5
Lin Boqiang	Professor and Director of the China Center for Energy Economics Research (CCEER) at Xiamen University	CBH3 (ST19)
Pan Jiahua	Research Fellow of the Institute of Urban Development and Environment at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences	PD10
Qi Ye	Professor of Public Policy and Management at Tsinghua University ⁴⁰ . Director of the Brookings-Tsinghua Center for Public Policy	SW4 (ST25)
Shen Jiru	Research Fellow of the Institute of World Economics and Politics of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences	PD3
Pang Jun	Professor at the School of Ecology and Environment at Renmin University of China	CBH2

Among the six scholars, Chen Ying, Pan Jiahua, and Shen Jiru were research fellows associated with CASS. It is interesting that all of them were represented and quoted by *People's Daily*. Though CASS is an academic institution, it has strong "state" characteristics. The state-owned *People's Daily* seems to seek scholars from CASS for professional information. Having said that, Lin Boqiang, Qi Ye, and Pang Jun were professors at various top universities in China. They were represented and quoted by the *China Business Herald* (CBH) and *Southern Weekly* (SW). Both CBH and SW are more market-based newspapers, and they seemingly sought information from scholars at universities where the research atmosphere is relatively free.

It is noteworthy that only six national scholars were represented and quoted across 51 sample texts. This indicates that the discourse on climate change and climate justice is not only an elite discourse but also relatively concentrated within a certain group of experts. Opinions from other experts were, to some extent, *excluded* from the media framing process.

Social actors from international NGOs were represented 44 times and quoted 37 times. WWF representatives were most prominent, being quoted 24 times. As one of the most well-known international environment NGOs, WWF was well-represented in the samples. Other international NGOs mentioned were, among others, Oxfam and Greenpeace.

⁴⁰ <http://www.sppm.tsinghua.edu.cn/szdw/qzjs/26efe4891e2a9c84011e391ce0650023.html> (accessed 01 November 2019).

AISA: Abstract Individual Social Actor

Abstract individual social actors (AISAs) refer to individuals who were not clearly identified, such as “each one/person” and “each citizen.” Phrases like “a French modeling expert” and “the foreign minister of a certain country” were categorized into this group. This category of social actors was under-represented in all sample texts, appearing only 19 times, with just 3 direct quotations. Among these, one was made by “one present Chinese representative” and two by “one senior negotiator of Chinese delegation.” It may seem contradictory that the social actor was not identified but directly quoted by the media. The reasons could be that the media either did not know who exactly the Chinese representative and the senior negotiator were, or the media was not allowed to reveal their identities.

CCSA: Concrete Collective Social Actor

The third group of social actors is referred to as concrete collective social actors (CCSAs). These actors can be identified but function as a collective entity. One typical example of CCSA is nation-states, which act as collective identities. In order to have a clearer overview, some similar CCSA were grouped into one sub-category. For instance, countries like China, the U.S., and India were categorized as “nation-states,” and organizations like Greenpeace and WWF were classified as “International NGOs.”

Table 5: Representation of Concrete Collective Social Actors

Concrete Collective Social Actors		Frequency of Representation	Quotations
Nation States	China	511	
	USA	152	
	India	35	
	Germany	23	
	Brazil	21	
	Denmark	13	
	South Africa	13	
	Other countries	47	
	Subtotal	815	
UN and its related bodies	UN	23	
	Annex I Countries of UNFCCC	17	
	UNEP	4	
	UNHSP	1	
	Subtotal	45	
G8		30	

EU	28	
National research/academic institutions	16	2iq
Foreign research/academic institutions	8	2iq
National government bodies	13	
Foreign government bodies	10	
National media	16	
Foreign media	7	3iq
National social/cultural organizations	6	
International NGOs	14	3iq
International business groups	10	1iq
Thinktanks	5	
International (inter)governmental organizations	10	1iq
Total	1033	12iq

Among the 1033 instances of represented and quoted concrete collective social actors (CCSA), nation-states were represented 815 times, making up an extraordinarily high percentage of 78.9%. If we include the G8, a cluster of nation-states, then the percentage of nation-states rises to 83.3%. These statistics indicate that *nation-states have played a dominant role in addressing climate change as collective social actors*. Since this analysis focused on exploring how Chinese newspapers framed climate justice, it is unsurprising that China was the most frequently represented nation-state, with a percentage up to 62.7%. After China, the U.S. was highly represented. This statistic pattern reflects the *discourse of G2*, as discussed in Chapter 2. China was quite often co-related with the U.S. regarding climate change. As members of the BASIC countries, India, Brazil, and South Africa were also well-represented. The reason why Denmark was well-represented was due to the Copenhagen Summit, which took place in Denmark in 2009. This UN climate change conference drew tremendous media attention, and many sample texts were published during the conference. It is surprising that *Germany* was also well-represented. This may be related to the fact that Germany has been playing an active role in addressing climate change among developed countries and within the EU. The UN and its related bodies were also well-represented, which will be explained later in detail.

Two findings have to be stressed. First, among 16 representations of national media, the *Xinhua News Agency* was mentioned 14 times. As noted in the previous chapter, *Xinhua* is the largest state-owned news agency with the broadest reporting network worldwide. It seems that even the state-owned newspapers rely on *Xinhua's* reports, especially for international news. Second, of the 12 indirect quotations, only 2 came from national research/academic institutions. The remaining 10 indirect

quotations were from foreign social actors in academia, business, civil society, and the media. Although climate change and climate justice were framed from a national perspective, voices from international concrete collective social actors were more frequently represented than those from national concrete collective social actors. It could be explained this way: the international concrete collective social actors, primarily organizations and institutions, are well-developed and established and have played a key role in international climate politics.

ACSA: Abstract Collective Social Actor

Abstract collective social actors (ACSAs) refer to collective but vaguely defined entities, such as “developing countries,” “poor countries,” “Europe,” “people,” “each country,” “scholars,” “leaders,” and so on. There were many kinds of abstract collective social actors. To have a better overview, some similar ACSA were grouped together. For example, “developing countries,” “developing economies,” and “poor countries” were classified as “developing world”. Similarly, “people in the world,” “global population,” “human beings” were grouped under the category “people.”

Table 6: Representation of Abstract Collective Social Actors

Abstract Collective Social Actors		Frequency of Representation	Quotations
Developing World	Developing countries/economies, 130 developing countries/vast developing countries	335	
	Big/main emerging/developing countries/economies	21	
	Poorer/least developed developing countries, the poorest region in the world, poor world/countries/regions	17	
	Small/island/pacific countries, less developed and island countries, island developing countries	6	2iq
	Others	4	
	Subtotal	383	2iq
Developed World	Developed countries	316	
	Industrial (developed) countries	18	
	Some/very few /a few / developed countries, certain	11	

	country, few countries		
	European / Western developed countries, the West	8	
	Rich (developed) countries/world / EU members	7	
	Others	3	
	Subtotal	366	
People	(all) people (in the world), global population, and so on	61	
	Human beings	54	
	Chinese, Americans, Europeans, Germans, Japanese, Indians	31	
	Technicians, pupils, students, observers, elites, and so on	16	
	Indigenous people, rich people, poor people, and so on	9	
	Subtotal	171	
Countries/ Continents	African countries/group/continent, Africa, Europe, Asia, and so on	76	1iq
	Each country (in the world)	54	
	Big/small countries, big responsible countries, and so on	26	
	194/193 countries, 190 countries and regions, and so on	10	
	European/non-European countries, and so on	5	
	Subtotal	171	1iq
The World	International community, all members of international community	45	
	The globe	35	
	The world, some parts of the world, all places in the world, all over the world	24	
	Subtotal	104	
National and	Members of politiburo,	46	2iq

foreign politicians	comrades of the central government, Chinese officials, politicians, EU officials, ministers of each country, and so on		
	Negotiation representatives of developing countries, main negotiators, and so on	10	
	Subtotal	56	2iq
Political bodies	Local government, government, ministries at all levels, and so on	54	
Civil society and social organizations	Civil society, organizations of civil society, international public opinions, world citizens, and so on	45	1dq
	Women unions, international organizations, and so on	9	1iq
	Subtotal	54	1dq, 1iq
Experts, scientists, scholars and academia	Experts, experts of BASIC countries, our experts and scholars, academia, universities and colleges, national key labs, scientist, and so on	37	9iq
Business world	Business world, global business, enterprises, market, Chinese companies, and so on	32	1iq
Media	National and foreign media, news media, media professionals from Taiwan, media, and so on	15	2dq
World leading roles	Heads and leaders of 119 countries, leaders of developing countries, leaders in the world, leaders, and so on	14	
The earth, the planet	The earth (village), our planet	13	
Overlapped world between developing and	Global main economies, big economies, countries with similar abilities to developed	7	

developed worlds	countries, and so on		
Total		1477	3dq, 16iq

Table 6 shows that there were numerous types of abstract collective social actors. It is generally challenging to categorize them clearly, with some overlap between categories. For instance, the categories “national and foreign politicians” and “experts, scientists, scholars, and academia” represent specific groups of people. However, they were classified as independent categories rather than placed under the broader category “people.” In doing so, we can get a clearer picture of the rather abstract collective social actors.

As shown, the “developing world” and the “developed world” were the most frequently represented, together accounting for 50.7% of all represented abstract collective social actors. This statistical pattern recalls the *antagonism* between developing and developed countries. Although terms like “certain country” and “few countries” do not contain the word “developed,” they were classified as part of the “developed world” group. According to the context, these terms, in fact, implied that certain developed countries, especially the U.S., were seen as black sheep in the developed world regarding addressing climate change.

Within the category “countries/continents,” Africa and African countries were more highly represented than other continents. There were some sub-categories under “the world.” The distinction between “the world”/ “the globe.” and “international community” lies in the focus of each term, with the former emphasizing geographical solidarity and the latter focusing on social and political solidarity.

“National and foreign politicians,” “political bodies,” and “world-leading roles” were represented 124 times together, making up 8.4% of all ACSAs. In comparison, the percentages for “civil society and social organizations,” “experts, scientists, scholars, and academia,” as well as “business world” were 3.7%, 2.5%, and 2.2%, respectively. This indicates that collective social actors from *politics* were much more represented than those from *civil society*, science, and business, reinforcing the idea that climate change in general and climate justice specifically have been *politicized*.

While experts, scientists, scholars, and academia were highly represented, they were the most frequently quoted ACSAs. Nine quotations from this group came from “experts of BASCI countries,” “analysts,” and “(climate) experts.” None of them were identifiable. However, it is somewhat puzzling that abstract collective social actors were quoted and even directly quoted. Typically, if a social actor is quoted, their identity is expected to be disclosed. However, in journalistic practice, the identity of quoted social actors can remain anonymous if the source’s identity must be concealed for some reason. Another explanation could be that journalists were not able to identify the people they quoted due to access to sources or a tight deadline. Anyway, the fact that the category “experts, scientists, scholars, and academia” was

the most frequently quoted ACSAs implies that this group of social actors is *trusted* by the media and has a certain degree of *discursive power* in framing climate-related issues.

After classifying all the social actors in the sample texts, a brief statistical analysis was conducted to explore how the UN Climate Mechanism (UNCM) was represented. UNCM refers to the UNFCCC, the climate change conferences within the UNFCCC, and significant outcomes from those conferences, as well as the IPCC.

Table 7: Representation of UN Climate Mechanism

UNCM		Frequency of Representation	Quotations
UN Climate Change Conferences	Copenhagen Summit	97	
	Paris Conference	10	
	Others	38	
	Subtotal	145	
Kyoto Protocol		107	
UNFCCC		93	
Results of UN Climate Change Conferences	Bali Roadmap	17	
	Copenhagen Accord	12	
	Green Climate Fund	10	
	Durban Platform	7	
	Others	3	
	Subtotal	49	
IPCC		26	14iq
Total		420	14iq

The most frequently represented UNCM was the climate change conference within the UNFCCC. As discussed in Chapter 2, the theoretical chapter, the *UN climate change conferences* consistently drew media attention worldwide. Between 2007 and 2015, the most important UN climate change conferences were the Copenhagen Summit and the Paris Conference. Unsurprisingly, both conferences were highly represented in all the sample texts. The Kyoto Protocol also appeared very often, likely because it remains the only binding agreement on carbon emission reductions. The Protocol stipulates that Annex-I countries have reduction obligations, from which China is excluded. As a result, China often referenced the Kyoto Protocol to defend its right to development. The UNFCCC was quite well-represented by the Chinese media studied. Although the IPCC was not as prominently represented, all

quotations came from it. As an intergovernmental body of the UN, the IPCC provides advanced scientific knowledge about climate change. Its assessment reports on climate change carry considerable authority and are often drawn upon in decision-making.

After reviewing the statistical characteristics of each social actor category, we gain an overview of the broader distribution.

Table 8: Representation of All Social Actors

Represented Social Actors		Frequency of Representation	Quotations
Concrete Individual Social Actors (CISA)	National Politicians	502	323dq, 117iq
	International Politicians	291	176dq, 36iq
	National Scholars	214	189dq, 21iq
	Others	69	13dq, 39iq
	Subtotal	1076	701dq, 213iq
Abstract Individual Social Actors (AISA)		19	3dq
Concrete Collective Social Actors (CCSA)	Nation States	815	
	UN and its related bodies	45	
	G8	30	
	Others	143	12iq
	Subtotal	1033	12iq
Abstract Collective Social Actors (ACSA)	Developing World	383	2iq
	Developed World	366	
	People	171	
	Countries/Continents	171	1iq
	Others	386	3dq, 13iq
	Subtotal	1477	3dq, 16iq
Total		3605	707dq, 241iq

This table shows that the ACSA was the most frequently represented collective of social actors in the sample texts, followed by CISA, CCSA, and AISA. The collective social actors (CCSA, ACSA) made up 69.6% of all social actors, suggesting that climate responsibility tends to be *ascribed to collective social actors*. Moreover, it is notable that the CISA collective is almost exclusively quoted by the media, comprising 99.2% of direct quotations and 88.4% of indirect quotations. National politicians, international politicians, and national scholars were the most frequently quoted individual social actors. This suggests that *concrete individual social actors dominantly shaped the discourse on climate change and climate justice*

in particular . In other words, a small group of national and international politicians and scholars played a determining role in the media framing of climate change and climate justice in China.

The three categories of “China,” “national politicians,” and “national scholars” were represented 1277 times altogether, making up 34% of all social actors. Climate change is a global problem. However, the Chinese media frames this issue from a *national perspective*.

Among all collective social actors, the most frequently represented were specific countries like China and the U.S. or abstract groups like “developing countries” and “developed countries.” This indicates that *nation-states*, either as concrete entities or as members of an abstract group of countries, were the main social actors in addressing climate change. Besides nation-states, the national and international politicians were represented 793 times, ranking second of all represented social actors. This high percentage of political social actors implies that climate change and climate justice have been deeply *politicized*.

In summary, the quantitative analysis reveals several key findings: (1) *Nation-states*, especially China and the U.S., were the most represented social actors in the media framing of climate change. This reflects the *discourse of the G2*. (2) As clusters of nation-states, developing and developed countries were highly represented. This recalled an *antagonism* between the two blocs. (3) The *politicization* of climate issues is evident not only in the prominence of nation-states but also in the significant representation of individual national and international politicians. (4) From the patterns of quotation, it can be said that discourses of climate change and climate justice were dominantly determined by concrete individual social actors, especially national and international politicians and national scholars. Although these individual social actors were not as frequently represented as collective social actors, they were the most frequently quoted, suggesting that a *group of leading individuals* play a *crucial discursive role* in the media framing of climate issues. (5) The media’s attention to climate issues was strongly influenced by *UN climate change conferences*, particularly the Copenhagen Summit and the Paris Conference. The conferences were the reason that some negotiators, such as Yu Qingtai and Xie Zhenhua, were the most frequently represented concrete individual national politicians. (6) Last but not least, it is significant to find that different media outlets indeed have *preferences in their choice of representing and quoting social actors*. For example, as mentioned above, the state-owned *People’s Daily* tended to rely on research fellows from state-affiliated institutions like CASS for information. This is contrary to more market-based newspapers, such as CBH and SW, that rely more on statements by professors from universities where the research atmosphere is relatively free.

4.2 Qualitative Analysis

This chapter presents the results of a detailed qualitative analysis of selected sample texts by applying the theories discussed in the previous chapter. The method applied is the three-dimensional model developed by Norman Fairclough (1992, 1995, 2001, 2003, 2010, 2015). By combining the more general quantitative analysis and the detailed qualitative analysis, I hope to include more samples in the examination, on the one hand, and to avoid redundancy and repetition on the other. The two methods can be enriched by each other to provide a more comprehensive investigation of the texts. In order to make the analysis easy to read, I will use the abbreviations of the newspaper names. For instance, PD is short for the *People's Daily*. PD1 means that it is the first article to be analyzed from this newspaper. The abbreviations are as follows: *Science and Technology Daily* (STD), *China Environment News* (CEN), *21st Century Business Herald* (CBH), *The Economic Observer* (EO), *China Business News* (CBN), *Southern Weekly* (SW), and *Southern Metropolis Daily* (SMD).

4.2.1 Analysis of People's Daily (PD)

From the database "cnki," I obtained 1063 journalistic articles on climate change (qihou bianhua) from *People's Daily*. 22 articles contain at least one of the following words in their titles: *zhengyi* (justice), *gongzheng* (just, justice), *gongping* (fair, fairness), *pingdeng* (equal, equality), and *zeren/dandang* (responsibility), *yiwu* (obligation), *gongxian* (contribution), *chengnuo/dandang* (commitment), and *fu zeren* (being responsible). 12 articles were chosen for the detailed critical discourse analysis.

4.2.1.1 Analysis of Samples

Text 4.2.1.1-1

Global Warming and the Responsibility of Rich Nations.

Zhao Jinhong⁴¹. 2007-05-16. 007 International (ST1/PD1⁴²)

The analysis started with morphological *textual characteristics*, which involve features relating to form or position, such as page number, section, and size (Carvalho 2005). The report was published on page 7 in the "International News" section, indicating that climate change is categorized as an international issue. That is to say, climate change is discussed in *international domain* in this media piece.

One of the *linguistic characteristics* of this report is *blaming*. In 21 sentences, 17 words and phrases blame the rich countries' irresponsibility. For example, the journalist Zhao used a *metaphor* to describe Margaret Beckett's proposal of

⁴¹ In this dissertation, all Chinese names are written in the conventional form of "Surname + Name."

⁴² ST is short for sample text for the qualitative analysis. PD refers to sample texts from *People's Daily*. ST1/PD1 means it is the first sample text for the qualitative analysis in the whole corpus and the first sample text from *People's Daily*.

securitizing climate issues as a trick.⁴³ The metaphor goes: “a drunk man’s intention is not on the wine.” Normally, it is used in Chinese to express that someone “has an ulterior motive” or “has an axe to grind.” The metaphor was used here to blame the UK for ‘pretending to be drunk,’ namely, to be unaware of its responsibility to combat climate change. Other expressions used to blame and criticize the rich countries, such as the UK and the U.S., include play the “environmental diplomacy card,” press(ing) developing countries, (being the) biggest perpetrator of global climate change, (to) ignore the public opinions, wrangle about responsibility, (to) refuse to carry out... (out of self-interest), (to) destroy the effort of combating climate change, (to) make a bad example, bargaining, etc.

Besides blaming, an *antagonism* between the developed and the developing world was found in the *wording*. Words like “rich nations,” “industrialized countries,” and “Western countries” were used interchangeably. Those concepts are collective. “Rich nations” is a collective concept. Except for the UK, the USA, and Australia, many other rich nations were, in fact, active in addressing climate change, such as Sweden, Denmark, Germany, and so on. However, those climate pioneers were not mentioned. “Developing countries” is another collective identity appearing five times in the text.

The agents of climate politics were divided into “rich” and “poor” or “industrialized” and “developing” groups. In line with the three-dimensional analytical model, the agents are described with antonyms as opposite to each other based on their interests; this categorization strengthens the antagonism among these groups (Fairclough 1992, 2015). From the perspective of *the media’s discursive practice*, it is common for newspapers to employ conflict and antagonism to catch the audience’s attention. In terms of broader *social practice*, this antagonism actually reflects the persistent North-South division and global inequality in the international political economy (Roberts and Parks 2007).

One of the main tasks of analysis is to find out which climate justice is represented by the media. The title of the sample text consists of two phrases: “global warming” and “responsibility of rich nations.” Through this *juxtaposition*, the text highlights the role of rich countries as social actors in climate change, implying the causal relations between climate change and rich nations. It also indicates that climate justice is discussed in the international rather than national domain, with a focus on *distributive justice*.

The title clearly shows that this article focused on the responsibility of rich countries. As discussed in the theoretical chapter, although it is agreed among scholars that the developed nations contributed the most to global climate change

⁴³ Margaret Beckett was the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom from 2006-2007 and Security Council President in April 2007. <https://dam.media.un.org/archive/-2AM9LO06V2P0.html> <https://members.parliament.uk/member/328/career> (both accessed 17 November 2024)

and should be mainly responsible for dealing with it, there are various opinions about what principle should be the first principle of distributive justice. In order to figure it out, attention should be paid to sentences 3 to 6:

[3](...) The IPCC report pointed out that global climate warming in the past 50 years was with more than 90% possibility co-related with the increase in GHG emissions produced by humans using fossil fuels. [4] Who is responsible for this 90% possibility then? [5] Undoubtedly, it is those who consume the most fossil fuels --- industrial developed countries. [6] In fact, since the industrial revolution in the 18th century, Western countries have accumulated a lot of wealth at the expense of the environmental resources shared by mankind.

The journalist drew upon the IPCC report and highlighted the *historical causal relations* between the combustion of fossil fuels and the prosperity of developed countries, criticizing the UK, the U.S., and Australia for their wrongdoings in the past. In addition, he also applied blaming words to criticize the irresponsibility and selfishness of the developed countries throughout the text. According to *text coherence*, this implied that the journalist believed in *historical responsibility* as the first principle of climate justice. As theoretical discussions show, several proposals of climate justice are based on historical responsibility (Caney 2005; Neumayer 2000; Shue 1999; Singer 2010), such as the PPP and grandfathering. The most significant difference between these two principles is their positions on ignorance of the impact of past GHG emissions on the global climate. The former position holds that developed countries should be responsible for the lion's share of causing climate change no matter if they were aware of the capacity of the atmosphere to absorb GHGs and the severe impact of the emissions on the global climate. However, according to the latter position, it is fairer to make a fresh start now and set standards that look to the future. In the main clause of sentence 6, the object is "the western countries," the predicate is in the present perfect tense, the object is "a lot of wealth," and the adverbial modifier is "at the expense of the environmental resources shared by mankind." This grammatical combination creates an affirmatory statement that seems to be a fact. To some extent, it is indeed a fact. However, the other side of the fact is that Western countries did not know that their industrialization would have a severe impact on the global climate due to limitations in knowledge at that time. Therefore, it could be concluded that the first justice principle held by the journalist is the PPP.

Besides distributive justice, *compensatory justice* was highlighted in the text. One of many varieties of climate justice is *compensatory justice*, meaning compensation for past harm. It emphasizes the obligation of those who had a high level of carbon emission in the past to those who were inflicted by the impact caused by the high level of emission. The journalist pointed out that the U.S. was the biggest

GHG emitter but refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, damaging the efforts of other countries. He further wrote that the U.S. set a very bad example, which was followed by Australia, which stayed outside the Kyoto Protocol. The journalist pointed out that the reason for the U.S. refusal to ratify the Kyoto Protocol was that it was not willing to offer the developing countries financial and technical support, meaning the U.S. did not want to compensate for its historical wrongdoings through monetary and technical resources.

According to Fairclough's three-dimensional analytical model (1992), it is important to analyze *intertextuality*. Individual texts always relate to past and present texts. Intertextuality focuses on how, in the production and interpretation of a text, people draw upon other texts and text types that are socially and culturally available to them. This is especially true for analyzing this text because the journalist was not present at the event he reported on. The article was published on 16 May, although the UN thematic debate on energy and climate took place on 17 April. Beckett visited China on 16 May. This article was produced in the context of Beckett's visit to China instead of the UN Security Council's thematic debate. What the journalist wrote about the thematic debate could be drawn only from other sources, for example, *Xinhua News Agency*.

Journalists are the first to be considered among all social actors in the arena of discursive competition. However, they do not work alone; they work in media institutions at the meso-level and in a society with specific cultural and political characteristics at the macro-level. Influenced and constrained by media institutions and broader social, cultural, and political conditions, journalists tend to trust news releases and other easily accessible materials originating from the government, the "public relations industry," and "claim-makers who employ increasingly sophisticated media strategies" (Anderson 2009: 166). In the Chinese media landscape, the state-owned *Xinhua News Agency* has the largest reporting network worldwide and is most capable of covering different topics, especially related to international news. Although the *People's Daily* has a strong reporting network within China, its overseas reporting capability is not comparable with the *Xinhua*. In terms of the UN thematic debate, two *Xinhua* journalists, Wang Xiangjiang and Liu Libin, reported on 17 April that some representatives of the thematic debate doubted if the climate issue should be discussed at the Security Council.⁴⁴ They quoted the opinions of representatives from Pakistan, South Africa, and China and pointed out that bringing climate change into the security agenda was not helpful in addressing climate change, and climate change and energy issues were essentially development issues. However, Wang and Liu also mentioned that UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon stressed the impact of energy and climate change on global security and peace. Two

⁴⁴ <http://www.in-en.com/article/html/energy-82102.shtml> (accessed 06 April 2020)

Xinhua correspondents reported that some representatives present at the thematic debate paid attention to Beckett's proposal and took it seriously.

To frame something is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation (Entman 1993: 52). We can see that the *Xinhua* did not exclude the possibility of *framing* climate change as a *security issue*, although it supported the development discourse of climate change. However, the discourse of security was *excluded* by the *People's Daily*. That is to say, when journalists frame, they make choices about focus.

On the day the *People's Daily* article was published, *China Daily* also reported Beckett's visit to China.⁴⁵ The article reported that Beckett expressed her opinion about climate change and security at the UN Security Council. *China Daily* stressed that Beckett praised China's effort to combat climate change. No negative comment was found in *China Daily's* report.

It was found that when Chinese scholars drew upon the thematic debate, they did not criticize Beckett's proposal as playing tricks (Li 2015; Liu 2017; Zhao 2018). At the time of the publication of their articles, Li Jingkun was an associate researcher at the Institute of European Studies at CASS. Her expertise is politics in the UK and the rest of Europe. Liu Changsong worked at the National Center for Climate Change Strategy and International Cooperation (NCSC). At the time, Zhao Bin was an Associate Professor at the School of Marxism at Xi'an Jiaotong University. He had done postdoctoral research at the University of Edinburgh. All three scholars are experts either in climate politics or British studies. Compared with the attitude expressed in the sample text studied the Chinese scholars seemed to happily accept the UK's initiative and proposal of securitization of climate change. Some (Li 2015; Zhao, 2018) even praised the UK's innovative and active role in securitizing the climate change issue. Liu (2017) drew discourses of security from the EU report titled "Climate Change and International Security"⁴⁶ and the fifth IPCC report (2014), pointing out that addressing climate change also means strengthening national and international security and that climate change should be included into the comprehensive strategic framework of national security.

The *intertextuality* analysis indicates that *People's Daily's* text drew upon the text from the *Xinhua News Agency*, but only partly. It completely *excluded* the framing of climate change as a security issue, which is a *new* and *alternative* discourse. Instead, it only emphasized the *normative* discourse, namely seeing climate change as a development issue.

⁴⁵ 'British Foreign Secretary: New Prime Minister will continue to work with China,' *China Daily*, May 2007 https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/hqzg/2007-05/18/content_875363.htm (accessed 06 April 2020)

⁴⁶ Online available at: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/publications/climate-change-international-security/> (accessed 06 April 2020)

Text 4.2.1.1-2

American Philosophy and Obligation of Carbon Emission Reduction.
Ma Xiaoning. 2007-10-09, 010 International News (ST2/PD2)

Among all social actors in discursive competition, journalists are the first to be considered. As argued by Gamson and Modigliani (1989: 2), “public opinion is part of the process by which journalists . . . develop and crystallize meaning in public discourse.” According to publicly available information,⁴⁷ journalist Ma Xiaoning has worked for People’s Daily since 1991. He specializes in covering international news and foreign affairs. Before joining *People’s Daily*, he studied international relations at Peking University and politics as well as international studies at the University of Warwick. He was one of those who could go to college in the 1980s in China. Not only did he go to one of the best-renowned universities in China, but he also studied abroad, which was quite rare at that time. Obviously, he belongs to the social elite in China. Since September 2007, he has been working as a correspondent in the U.S. for the *People’s Daily*. As the largest newspaper group in China and the official newspaper of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the *People’s Daily* can send well-educated professional journalists abroad and establish its own networks, which other newspapers cannot do in a comparable way. This could be one reason why more sample texts came from *People’s Daily* than from other newspapers.

This article was published on page 10 of International News, indicating that climate change is categorized as an international and *diplomatic* issue. The title displays the report’s theme, namely the U.S. obligations regarding emission reductions. It is again a journalistic piece that focuses on the international distribution of responsibilities regarding climate change. Climate change and climate justice are discussed in the *international domain*.

The background of this article is that the U.S. hosted the Major Economies Meeting on Energy Security and Climate Change in Washington on 27 September 2007. It was the first time that the U.S. called for a meeting on climate issues. Considering that the U.S. had long been passive in addressing climate issues, this meeting drew a lot of media attention. It is worth noting that this article was published on 9 October, almost two weeks after the meeting. To some extent, it is not an instant information-based news report but rather an *opinion-oriented comment*. In the article, Ma criticized the American philosophy of dealing with climate change and explicitly expressed his opinions on what a fair solution should look like.

“It’s our philosophy that each nation has the sovereign capacity to decide for itself what its own portfolio of policies should be,” said James L. Connaughton, the chief environmental adviser to then-President George W. Bush. This philosophy can

⁴⁷ <http://www.people.com.cn/GB/8722/11148/101388/6295192.html> (accessed 06 April 2020)

be interpreted as tackling climate change through volunteer measures rather than binding targets, which was the center of Ma's criticism. He wrote that "behind the ostentatious so-called American philosophy, the United States does not recognize the principle of 'common but differentiated responsibilities' as stipulated in the 'Kyoto Protocol'" (sentence 9) and "the CBDR reflects fairness" (sentence 13). Moellendorf argued that the CBDR "suggests something like an *ability-to-pay* conception of responsibility for mitigation and the financing of adaptation to climate change" (Moellendorf 2012: 136). Therefore, Ma criticized the U.S. for its unwillingness to take on the responsibilities that it can do.

Ma further pointed out that "the greenhouse gas emissions produced by the U.S. and European countries since the Industrial Revolution was more than half of the total amount, based on statistics of International Energy Agency." Therefore, the developed countries, in his opinion, should take on more responsibilities and obligations. That is to say, he prioritized the historical responsibility when looking at climate justice. This historical responsibility reflects a fault-based PPP. In Singer's words, "[T]o put it in terms a child could understand, as far as the atmosphere is concerned, the developed nations broke it. If we believe that people should contribute to fixing something in proportion to their responsibility for breaking it, then the developed nations owe it to the rest of the world to fix the problem with the atmosphere" (Singer 2010: 190).

Another argument by Ma is related to *ecological debt*. In sentence 16, he wrote that in economic globalization, developing countries, while assuming the important tasks of economic development and poverty eradication, also objectively bear the environmental costs passed on by developed countries. Empirical studies have pointed out that developing countries traditionally seen as successful, export-oriented economies are suffering huge unrecorded economic and ecological losses (Roberts and Parks 2007: 164-8).

Ma's last argument for climate justice reflects *equal per capita* in sentence 11, in which he stated that the U.S. accounted for more than a quarter of global greenhouse gas emissions. In contrast, the population is only about 4.5% worldwide. Obviously, the average U.S. carbon emission was disproportionately high. The intuition behind the equal per capita principle is that "[i]t seems obvious that no one in the world has a stronger claim to this resource [i.e. permits to emit greenhouse gas] than anyone else, so it should be divided equally between people" (Broome 2012: 70).

An important tool for analyzing discursive practice is *intertextuality*. Individual texts always relate to past and present texts. Intertextuality focuses on how people draw upon other texts and text types that are socially and culturally available to them in the production and interpretation of a text. Creative discursive practices organize discourses and genres in a new way. In his article, Ma explicitly drew upon the *New York Times* (NYT) and mentioned "the international public opinion" many times. Two

reports in the *New York Times* about the same event were found during the database search. The first, "Bush Outlines Proposal on Climate Change,"⁴⁸ by John M. Broder, was published on 28 September 2007, and the other, "Bush to Skip U.N. Talks on Global Warming,"⁴⁹ by Steven Lee Myers, was published on 24 September 2007. Both reports were published before than Ma's article. Let's scrutinize the intertextuality in Ma's text.

[25] The *New York Times* believes that the "PR" show of the Bush administration further underlines the isolated position of the United States in dealing with climate change. (Ma)

This paragraph contains three connotations: (1) The NYT thought it was only a PR action of the Bush administration calling for the meeting; (2) Ma believed that the U.S. was in isolation from international climate politics; (3) Ma thought the PR action did not help. Neither NYT report used the wording "PR" show/action. A different *metaphor* was found in Broder's report. He drew upon one European representative who called the meeting a "game" played by the Bush administration. That is to say, the NYT reporter quoted the metaphor from a source and did not explicitly state that the meeting was a PR show. Regarding the second connotation, Broder wrote that it was a "widespread impression" that Bush's administration was "isolated on the issue of global warming." The *agent* of the widespread impression was, however, not explicitly stated. The fact that NYT represented the widespread impression did not necessarily mean it held the same opinion. The following sentences provide us with more hints to figure out NYT's position:

The president's calls for each country to decide for itself how to rein in pollution and his refusal to embrace mandatory measures have set the United States apart from other countries, and this morning's appearance at the State Department conference probably did not do much to change that situation. (Broder 2007)

We see Bush was still against the mandatory measures that were insisted on by other countries. Broder commented that these positions had set the U.S. apart from other countries, i.e. the U.S. was isolated. He further stated that it was not very possible to change the situation even though Bush attended the meeting. The analysis shows that the second and third connotations of the quotation that Ma drew upon are indeed reflected in the NYT report. However, the "PR show" metaphor is more likely Ma's reconstruction by mixing the NYT's quote from a European representative with his own interpretation and judgment. In doing so, the metaphor of

⁴⁸ <https://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/28/world/28cnd-climate.html> (accessed 06 April 2020)

⁴⁹ <https://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/24/world/24warming.html> (accessed 06 April 2020)

“PR show” becomes the NYT’s opinion, which it is not. In line with Fairclough’s CDA, it is regarded as a *creative discursive practice* by Ma.

Ma also drew upon unidentified sources and labeled them as “(international) public opinion/community.”

[4] However, international public opinion generally believes that the United States is still repeating the old tune and is still reluctant to undertake the obligation to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. (Ma)

[12] But American philosophy is difficult to be accepted by the international community. (Ma)

It is not clear why the sources were not identified. What can be said is that the journalist spoke against the U.S. in the name of the rest of the world to which China belongs, highlighting the U.S. as the biggest obstacle to global climate cooperation. Ma, a long-time journalist with *People’s Daily*, criticized the U.S. position on climate change in this report. He did not make the criticisms on behalf of China or the paper explicitly. Instead, he included China with the international community in order to criticize U.S. climate policy. In doing so, he avoided the *head-on direct blaming*. In the analysis of newspaper commentaries in China and Australia, Wang (2007) observed a similar phenomenon: Chinese newspapers do not tend to make direct criticisms compared with Australian newspapers.

Social practice is the third dimension of Fairclough’s model. The analysis of social practices “may be at different levels of abstraction from the particular event: it may involve its more immediate situational context, the wider context of institutional practices the event is embedded within, or the yet wider frame of the society and the culture” (Fairclough 1995: 62). As for this journalistic article, the immediate situational context is the Major Economies Meeting on Energy Security and Climate Change in Washington on 27 September 2007, which, as mentioned above, was initiated and hosted by the U.S. The broader social and political context of this meeting is U.S. *leadership* in combating global climate change.

In his speech on 23 September, then-UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon called for bold actions and leadership from developed countries on the one hand and reclaimed that the UN was the “ideal framework” for international cooperation on the other. He stressed that the framework served “as a forum for hammering out a meaningful, equitable, and sustainable long-term solution to global climate change.”⁵⁰ According to declassified documents about America’s climate change diplomacy, “there were signs of re-engagement in the last two years of the Bush 43 presidency, as the administration launched a new initiative called the Major

⁵⁰Leadership and Climate Change,’ speech by Ban Ki-moon, September 2007 <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/articles/2007-09-23/leadership-and-climate-change> (accessed 17 November 2024)

Economies Process that worked to bring together the major greenhouse emitters and energy consumers to work in tandem with the UNFCCC on drafting a new post-2012 framework agreement on climate change.”⁵¹ However, President Bush did not attend the events on 23 September, which were attended by many world leaders. Instead, he attended the Major Economies Meeting on Energy Security and Climate Change several days later. This meeting was convened and led by the U.S. It indicated that the Bush government wanted to play a leading role in combating climate change, but did not want to tackle this issue within the UN framework. Furthermore, during Bush’s administration, the U.S. announced its withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol, the only worldwide binding agreement on emissions. This decision destroyed the trust of the international community. It was criticized by NYT’s journalist Timothy E. Wirth, “Unless the United States decides that it wants to be a major and committed leadership player in this and make very specific commitments, much of the rest of the world is effectively going to hide behind the skirts of the United States and not do anything.”⁵² Scholars have pointed out that serious U.S. engagement will likely be a precondition to China’s engagement in any international climate effort (Lewis 2007: 170).

Text 4.2.1.1-3

Africa Asks to Deal With Climate Change Fairly.

Zhan Shiming. 2009-08-27. 003 Top News (ST3/PD6)

The analysis of this sample text starts with *morphological textual characteristics* that involve features relating to form or position, such as page number, section, and size (Carvalho 2005). This article was published on page 3 of “Top News,” indicating that it was very important news. It was located in the upper right corner on the third page. The upper right corner on this page is usually reserved for different types of comments by *People’s Daily*: International Forum (guoji luntan), People’s Forum (renmin luntan), People’s Comment (renmin shiping), Thoughts Across (sixiang zongheng), Voices (shengyin), Today’s Talk (jinri tan), Academic Essays (xueshu suibi), etc. The relatively regular and fixed columns are International Forum, People’s Forum, and People’s Comment. This report is labeled as International Forum, indicating that the climate issue is categorized into the *international domain*. Being different from the news published on the page “International News” (just like the previous sample), this report concerned with international issues seemed to be regarded as more than normal international news due to its location on the top page.

⁵¹Declassified documents show pendulum swings in U.S. policy – from climate commitment, to rejection, and back to engagement under Bush 43,’ National Security Archives, September 2018

<https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/environmental-diplomacy/2018-09-24/us-climate-change-washingtons-see-saw-global-leadership> (accessed 17 November 2024)

⁵² Steven Lee Myers, ‘*Bush to Skip U.N. Talks on Global Warming*,’ *The New York Times*, September 2007

<https://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/24/world/24warming.html> (accessed 17 November 2024)

This article was written by Zhan Shiming. According to public information,⁵³ he is the deputy director and associate researcher of the Journal of West Asia and Africa, which is affiliated with the Institute of West-Asian and African Studies within CASS. He also serves as Secretary-General of the China Asian-African Society. CASS is the most comprehensive national academic research organization in China for the study of philosophy and social sciences. According to the 2015 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report, CASS ranked 31st on the list of “Top Think Tanks Worldwide (U.S. and non-U.S.)” and first among all think tanks in China (McGann 2016: 49). Therefore, Zhan is an expert in African studies at a renowned research institute in China. That is to say, this is a journalistic contribution from the *elite group*.

It is strange to find out that this article was published on 27 August, although the dates of two events mentioned in the article were in May and July. Considering timeliness is one of the most important factors in a fact-based news report, it is unlikely that Zhan’s contribution was a news report of events that took place in May and July. What could be the immediate situational context then? On the same page where this article was published, there was news about the Tenth Session of the Standing Committee of the Eleventh National People’s Congress that was held in Beijing on 24 August. One of the important things on the agenda here was to review the report from the State Council on the progress in addressing climate change.⁵⁴ In addition, the third World Meteorological Organization-convened World Climate Conference took place in Geneva from 31 August to 4 September. China’s Vice Premier Hui Liangyu attended the meeting. On the same page where the sample text was published, there was also a very short message about Hui’s visit. The *morphological textual characteristics* show that this article is more an opinion-based contribution from an expert in African Studies than a news report. It is unclear whether Zhan Shiming was invited to write this article or whether he decided to do so. It is also unclear whether Zhan knew when and on which page his article would be published. However, it is clear that the editor of *People’s Daily* had decided to publish Zhan’s contribution during the time when the National People’s Congress took place and on the page where the national strategy for climate change was highlighted. This *journalistic discursive practice* shows that the immediate situational context of this article is much related to the *national agenda* of climate change.

The analysis of *language use* revealed that this article highlighted *compensatory justice*. The article contains 14 sentences. In sentences 1, 2, 3, 4, and 8, the following words were stressed: “bad effects,” “huge losses,” “snow plus frost,” “hazards,” and “environmental, social, and economic losses.” All these words reflect how badly Africa has been impacted by climate change. Africa’s greenhouse gas

⁵³ <http://www.xyfzqk.org/bjfcView/900/?itemid=6731> (accessed 27 April 2020)

⁵⁴ ‘The 10th meeting of the 11th National People’s Congress Standing Committee,’ published on the Central Government Portal, August 2009 http://www.gov.cn/ldhd/2009-08/24/content_1399770.htm (accessed 17 November 2024)

emissions are small, but the losses it suffers are much greater, which is obviously unfair and unjust. In sentences 8, 10, 11, 12, and 14, the following words were reiterated: “compensation,” “help,” and “support and aid.” These words convey that Africa’s loss should be compensated. Compensatory justice emphasizes the obligation of those who had high levels of carbon emission in the past to those who were inflicted by the impact caused by high emission levels (Okereke 2010).

Another variety of climate justice represented in this report is the *corrective justice*. The claim of corrective justice emphasizes the responsibility of some actors and their failure to commit to binding targets (Gardiner 2011). For example, Zhan criticized in sentence 13 that most developed countries had failed to meet the targets set by the Kyoto Protocol and were ambiguous about future medium-term targets. They had not fulfilled the commitment to offer financial aid either. While the compensatory and corrective justice are highlighted in this sample text, little information is provided about how the present and future responsibilities of carbon emissions reduction should be distributed, who should be allowed to emit in the short and long run, and to what extent. That is to say, distributive justice is *not* the emphasis of this article.

The title is concerned with fairness in addressing climate change. Several justice principles of climate change were represented in the article. Zhan wrote that:

[11] According to relevant international convention and protocol, the assistance provided by developed countries to developing countries, including Africa, is not a charity, but an obligation and an embodiment of the principle of fairness.

The author did not explicitly point out what the “relevant international convention and protocol” refers to. It could be that the convention and protocol are so well known, as the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, in the context of climate change that there is no need to point them out. He argued for the obligation based on the fact that the Kyoto Protocol is the only agreement that stipulates the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by most developed countries. The fact that Zhan failed to refer to the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol explicitly implies that he regarded the UN mechanism as a default justice principle. One of the most essential justice principles of the UN mechanism on climate change is the CBDR. Moellendorf argued that the CBDR “suggests something like an *ability-to-pay* conception of responsibility for mitigation and the financing of adaptation to climate change” (Moellendorf 2012: 136). In sentences 12 and 13, he criticized that the developed countries hadn’t fulfilled their targets in mitigation and assistance, including financial help and technology transfer. In Zhan’s eyes, providing African countries with assistance is a way to achieve justice.

Another principle of climate justice was represented in an indirect quotation. Zhan drew upon claims made at two conferences held by African countries in May

and July 2009, stressing that priority should be given to the need for sustainable development, poverty eradication, and achieving the Millennium Development Goals in Africa. This claim reflects the justice principle of the “*right to (sustainable) development.*” As discussed in the theoretical chapter, compared to other justice principles, it seems that “[T]here is a fairly broad consensus among both the philosophers who write about climate change and the majority of the climate-policy community that efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions [...] should not harm the ability of poor countries to grow economically and to reduce as rapidly as possible the widespread poverty their citizens suffer” (Baer et al. 2010: 215).

In terms of *intertextuality*, direct quotations are not found in this report. Only sentences 8 and 9 are indirect quotations about the African countries’ claims on climate change. There are three parallel sentences in the full sentence 8. Each parallel sentence and sentence 9 are a claim on climate change from African countries. Sources of the quotations were not identified. In sentences 6 and 7, the author Zhan mentioned that African Ministers attended the third special session of the African Ministerial Conference on the Environment (AMCEN) on Climate Change and adopted the Nairobi Declaration on the African Process for Combating Climate Change.⁵⁵ In July 2007, the 13th African Union Summit decided to convene the African Climate Change Summit within the year as preparation for the Copenhagen Summit. Therefore, it can be inferred that the indirect quotations in the article come from the journalist’s summaries of the Nairobi Declaration and the climate change policy announced at the summit. There are 41 items in the resolve of the ministers in the Nairobi Declaration. I compared the content of the author’s indirect quotations with the original texts. I found that sentence 8.1 is identical to item 13, sentence 8.3 items 11 and 12, and sentence 9 item 6 (see table 9). Only sentence 8.2 drew upon 2 different items in the Nairobi Declaration.

Table 9: Indirect Quotations and Original Excerpts of the Nairobi Declaration (1)

[8.1] African countries believe that Africa should receive compensation from developed countries for environmental, social, and economic losses due to climate change;	[Item 13] To reaffirm that Africa, in the context of environmental justice, should be equitably compensated for environmental, social and economic losses ... in accordance with the obligations of the Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol to the Convention;
[8.3] At the same time, developed countries should effectively fulfill their emission reduction obligations and	[Item 11] To urge developed countries to set ambitious targets to reduce their emissions, by 2020, of at least 40 per

⁵⁵Nairobi Declaration on the African Process for Combating Climate Change, May 2009 https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/25791/Nairobi_Decl_climate.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y (accessed 17 November 2024)

provide Africa with financial, technical and capacity-building support in an operational and verifiable manner;	cent below 1990 levels, and, by 2050, by between 80 and 95 per cent below those levels, ... [Item 12] Also to urge developed countries to support Africa by providing finance, technology and capacity-building in a measurable, reportable and verifiable manner;
[9] In addition, African countries are also urging the international community to improve the clean development mechanism so that its projects have a more reasonable geographical distribution, which is conducive to the sustainable development of Africa.	[Item 6] To call for the improvement of the Clean Development Mechanism to ensure equitable geographical distribution of projects contributing to sustainable development efforts on the continent;

Table 10: Indirect Quotations and Original Excerpts of the Nairobi Declaration (2)

[8.2] The new international climate regime negotiations must adhere to the established “common but differentiated responsibilities” principle, giving priority to Africa’s needs for sustainable development, poverty reduction, and achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs);	[Item 2] To agree that the African common position forms the basis for negotiations by the African group during the negotiations for a new climate change regime and should take into account the priorities for Africa on sustainable development, poverty reduction, and attainment of the Millennium Development Goals;
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In sentence 8.2 (table 10), the subject is the new international climate regime negotiations and the principle on which they should be based. However, this is not what is reflected in item 2 in the declaration, in which “the negotiations for a new climate change regime” is only mentioned in the sentence as a prepositional phrase instead of as the subject. The original text of the Nairobi Declaration focuses on African solidarity, i.e., “the African common position,” which prioritizes Africa’s needs for sustainable development, eradication of poverty, and attainment of the MDGs. This implies that prioritizing those needs is Africa’s responsibility. Nevertheless, in the indirect quotation by Zhan, the focus has been quietly switched, and it is “the new international climate regime negotiations” that should be obligated to prioritize Africa’s needs. That is to say, the *agent* of obligations was *transformed* from African countries to the international climate regime of which African countries are a part. This seems to imply that other countries, especially those who play the dominant role

in the international climate regime, namely developed countries, are also agents of these obligations.

At the end of this article, Zhan wrote that “climate change is both an environmental issue and a development issue, especially for African countries.” This framing recalls the discourse on climate change in China’s 2007 National Climate Change Program. At the very beginning of the document, it is stated that climate change is “an issue involving both environment and development, but it is ultimately an issue of development.”⁵⁶ This framing reflects the “*right to industrialize*” (Bond 2012; Chatterton et al. 2013) approach to climate justice. In fact, the expression “climate change is both an environmental issue and a development issue” has been a *recurrent frame* in the official discourse of climate change in China since its creation. What’s new in the article is that the author *creatively* includes African countries in this framing by highlighting the same two issues, namely the environment and development, that both African countries and China are confronted with. In doing so, African countries and China are drawn into the same camp.

Text 4.2.1.1-4

Our representative points out at the Copenhagen Climate Change Summit

The key to negotiation success is that developed countries take the historical responsibility

China does not agree with the view that the Copenhagen Conference will reach a legally binding agreement to replace the "Kyoto Protocol"

Journalists of People’s Daily and Report by Xinhua News Agency. 2009-12-13. 002 Top News (ST4/PD7)

It is unknown who wrote this report. However, both the *People’s Daily* and *Xinhua News Agency* have the best overseas reporting network in Chinese media. It could be a wire by their overseas journalists. This report was published on page 2, “Top News,” on 13 December, which was during the Copenhagen Summit. The headline and subheading above refer to a media briefing of China’s Vice Foreign Minister, He Yafei, during the summit. The subheading refers to a media briefing in New York where Liu Zhenmin, the Ambassador and Deputy Permanent Representative of the Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the UN (2006-2009) briefed journalists on China’s positions and policies on climate change and measures China had taken to tackle the issue. Both media briefings took place on 11 December, two days before the news report was published. Considering the time difference between Beijing, Copenhagen, and New York, this report can be regarded as instant news. The location of this news article in the newspaper indicates the importance of the Copenhagen Summit. As discussed in previous

⁵⁶Text of China’s National Climate Change Program (2007)
<http://www.china.org.cn/english/environment/213624.htm> (accessed 17 November 2024)

chapters, the Copenhagen Summit is a very important *milestone* for media communication and coverage of climate change in China.

The text consists of two parts. There are 14 sentences in the first part and 5 in the second. In journalistic practice, the most important information is normally summarized in the first paragraphs. In the first two paragraphs, it is stated that:

[1]...China's Vice Foreign Minister He Yafei points out that *the key to negotiation success is that developed countries take the historical responsibility*.

[2] He Yafei said that the success of the Copenhagen Conference must reflect the common will of all countries to address climate change. [3] Developed countries should abide by the principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities," fulfill historical responsibilities, undertake medium-term substantial quantitative emission reduction targets, and fulfill their commitments to developing countries in terms of funding, technology transfer, and capacity building commitments, in accordance with the provisions of the "United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change" and the "Kyoto Protocol." [4] This is the key and necessary condition for the success of the Copenhagen Summit.

The opinion expressed in the first sentence reflected China's long-standing position. It is rooted in the principled belief that developed countries are the principal emitters of GHGs due to the historical emissions during their industrialization, as indicated in the title of the sample text. This reflects a *fault-based PPP*. Many scholars, such as Shue (1999), Neumayer (2000), Caney (2005), and Lukas Meyer (2012), have argued that the costs of global climate change should be determined according to "historical accountability."

In addition, the title and the first sentence implied the *leading role* of developed countries in dealing with climate change. In the media representation of the Copenhagen Summit, a discourse of the G2 (Cheng 2014) emerged, which claimed that the U.S. and China are the key players in any successful climate deal. In fact, Vice Foreign Minister He Yafei raised the question of the role of both countries at the media briefing. This part was not included in the present sample text but was reported in the Foreign Ministry's press release.⁵⁷ He said that "the U.S. is a developed country, and China is a developing country... Their responsibilities and obligations are essentially different. There is no legal basis for comparing China and the United States, and it does not conform to the facts." It is a long-standing position from China that developed countries take the lead in combating climate change. Scholars pointed out that the reason for this diplomatic strategy is that China tried to

⁵⁷ Press release from the Foreign Ministry, December 2009 https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/zl_674979/ywzt_675099/2009zt_675493/gebenhagen_675517/200912/t20091212_9285893.shtml (accessed 17 November 2024)

keep a low profile on the matter to avoid drawing attention to its own responsibility (Harris et al. 2013: 298).

In the third sentence, He Yafei referred to the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. In the total 18 sentences in the sample text, the UNFCCC was mentioned 4 times and the Kyoto Protocol 5 times. From the author's perspective, the fairest way to deal with climate justice is within *UN framework*. As discussed before, one of China's most striking principled positions is that the negotiation should take place in the UNFCCC framework and adhere to its principles of equity, mainly the "common but differentiated responsibility" (CBDR). Since the UNFCCC's equity principle favors developing countries, China frequently "references the FCCC and the Kyoto Protocol and calls upon developed countries to adhere to established principles" (Zhang 2003: 80). The CBDR principle also "suggests something like an *ability-to-pay* conception of responsibility for mitigation and the financing of adaptation to climate change" (Moellendorf 2012: 136). This is another long-standing position that China holds: that developed countries are more capable of dealing with climate change both financially and technically, and they are obliged to transfer advanced, environmentally friendly technologies and provide new and additional funding to developing countries.

China's next long-standing position is its persistence on its *right to development*, as expressed in the fourth sentence: "(addressing climate change) must ensure the priority needs of developing countries to develop their economies and eradicate poverty, and not at the expense of the development rights of developing countries." China's insistence on the right to development is, however, more firm and not negotiable. One of the strongest arguments for this position is that China still faces poverty alleviation. Poverty eradication and economic development are China's overriding priorities (Zhang 2003: 68).

The last long-standing position reflected in this text is that China has been focusing on the reduction of *carbon intensity* instead of absolute emission reductions. He Yafei stated that China had announced that by 2020, carbon dioxide emissions per unit of GDP will be reduced by 40%-45% compared to 2005 (sentence 10). This position is compatible with the climate policies regulated in the 11th and 12th FYPs, which continuously highlight the importance of energy efficiency, energy conservation, and renewable energy as well as low-carbon technology. In its first national climate change program in 2007, China stated that improvements in energy efficiency and conservation were fundamental to its mitigation ambitions (Wei 2007) that China has set for itself: it will not take on binding obligations until the Chinese economy and standard of living are comparable to those of mid-level developed countries (Zhang 2003: 77).

It was mentioned many times in the text that developing countries, including China, must not accept binding targets. As discussed in the theoretical chapter, China is especially sensitive to the sovereignty issue. Apprehension over interference by other countries with China's internal affairs is deeply rooted in the

Chinese foreign policy community due to its semi-colony history (Harris 2003; Kobayashi 2003; Zhang 2003). That can explain why Chinese climate change negotiators have resisted any attempt to impose obligations on developing countries, such as binding targets of emissions reductions.

In terms of China's contribution to addressing climate change, He Yafei said:

[12] The Chinese government is fully aware of the seriousness and urgency of the climate change problem, has adopted strong policies, measures, and actions to actively address climate change, and announced the action goal of controlling greenhouse gas emissions. This is not only the policy goal of China's domestic economic development, but also a major contribution to the global response to climate change.

He Yafei's statements can be regarded as credible. Although China's economy experienced high-speed development between 1980 and 2010, China has been confronted with serious social and environmental problems related to climate change. One of the driving forces of China's climate policy is exactly the socioeconomic impact of climate change (Harris 2003; Zhang 2003). Scholars agree that China's vulnerability to the impact of climate change is one of the driving forces for its climate policies (Perlmutter and Rothstein 2011; Schreurs 2011; Grumbine 2014). It has to be pointed out that despite China's active participation in international climate governance, some scholars believe that it does so only out of its "no regrets" policy (Hatch 2003; Zhang 2003; Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2015). In other words, China takes action, regardless of whether the threat of climate change is real, just as indicated in the last sentence of He Yafei's statement.

Journalists from several media outlets attended the media briefing held by Liu Zhenmin. Chinese media outlets such as *People's Daily*, *Xinhua News Agency*, *CCTV (China Central Television)*, *China Radio International*, *Phoenix TV*, and *China Press* were present. Foreign media included *Reuters*, *AFP*, *Bloomberg News*, *Yomiuri Shimbun*, and *Kyodo News*. Besides the *People's Daily* report, the briefing was also reported by the Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN,⁵⁸ Gu Zhenqiu of Xinhua UN,⁵⁹ and Sun Yuting of the *China News Service (CNS)* to the UN.⁶⁰ CNS is the second largest state-owned news agency in China after *Xinhua News Agency*. Reports from 4 channels were analyzed for *intertextuality*.

⁵⁸ <https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/ceun/chn/czthd/t632924.htm> (accessed 23 June 2020)

⁵⁹ 'China's Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations: The Kyoto Protocol cannot be replaced,' published on the Central Government Portal, December 2009 http://www.gov.cn/jrzq/2009-12/12/content_1485763.htm (accessed 17 November 2024)

⁶⁰ 'China's Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations: Copenhagen will become the third milestone,' China News Network, December 2009 <http://news.sina.com.cn/o/2009-12-12/045516759491s.shtml> (accessed 17 November 2024)

Table 11: Titles of Reports from Different Media Channels

Media Channel	Title of the Report
People's Daily	China does not agree with the view that the Copenhagen Conference will reach a legally binding agreement to replace the Kyoto Protocol
Xinhua	Our Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations: Kyoto Protocol cannot be replaced
CNS	Deputy Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations: Copenhagen will be the third milestone
Permanent Mission of China to the UN	Ambassador Liu Zhenmin Holds a Briefing on Chinese and Foreign Media on Climate Change

The title of the report by the Permanent Mission of China to the UN objectively described the facts of Liu's activity. However, reports by *People's Daily*, *Xinhua*, and CNS are more opinion-oriented by drawing upon Liu's opinions in the title. Interestingly, both *People's Daily* and *Xinhua* were interested in Liu's opinion on the Kyoto Protocol. *Xinhua's* correspondent used the phrase "our deputy permanent representative." The same wording, "our," also appeared in the first subtitle, "[O]ur representative points out at the Copenhagen Climate Change Summit," in the *People's Daily* sample text. Pronouns are used to refer to possession and "belonging." News reports are supposed to be neutral. However, by consciously or unconsciously using the possessive determiner "our," *Xinhua* and *People's Daily* identified themselves as part of the Chinese governmental body. The corresponding personal pronoun of "our" is "we," which refers to the journalists and the audience within China. Since there is an "our/we," "others" exist. If "our" representative opposes the idea of replacing the Kyoto Protocol, who are the "others" that support the idea? Obviously, they are primarily the countries that oppose the binding targets stipulated by the Kyoto Protocol, namely many industrialized developed countries. Thus, the wording "our" highlights the *divide* and *conflict* between developing and developed countries.

After comparing the texts from four different sources, it was found that the text of *People's Daily* resembled that of *Xinhua*. For example, the second subheading of this sample text is that China does not agree with the view that the Copenhagen Conference will reach a legally binding agreement to replace the Kyoto Protocol. The same narrative appeared in the report by *Xinhua* but cannot be found in the reports by CNS or the Permanent Mission of China to the UN. The last five sentences of the sample text studied are all similar to those in *Xinhua's* report. The only difference is the sequence of the sentences. On the one hand, the contents of *People's Daily* and *Xinhua* are similar. Quite often, other Chinese media outlets cite *Xinhua's* report directly. On the other hand, it indicates that a journalist from *People's Daily* to the UN also attended the media briefing. It could be that the sample text was written by

People's Daily's journalist at the UN briefing. However, the name of a journalist was not given in this sample. Therefore, we cannot identify whether the last five sentences of this sample text from *People's Daily* were directly drawn from the *Xinhua* report, or they were written by a journalist of *People's Daily* to the UN. What can be concluded is that the sample text of *People's Daily* and the report by *Xinhua* are very similar in terms of *content*, *genre*, and *style*. Both are the most important information channels for the Communist Party.

Frame analysis assumes that the press not only sets an agenda in terms of what issues are salient or important for the public but also significantly and critically influences how readers define problems, attribute causes, evaluate solutions, and act upon the issues that confront them (Entman 1993). All in all, the present sample text is fully dedicated to the diplomatic statements of two national high-level officials. *People's Daily* quoted only their voices. Therefore, it is purely a *normative* mouthpiece report *without any creative discursive practice*. It reflects the majority of the Chinese government's long-standing positions toward climate diplomacy.

Text 4.2.1.1-5

Officials of Developing Countries and International Organizations Applauded China's Commitment and Claims of Addressing Climate Change.

Chen Wenxian, Liu Xiaoyan. 2009-12-19. 002 Top News (ST5/PD8)

This report was published on page 2, "Top News," towards the end of Copenhagen Summit. Although it is international news, the location implies the importance of this news event. This again demonstrates that the Copenhagen Summit is a crucial media event for Chinese media in terms of climate communication. Meanwhile, it also indicates that climate issue was represented and discussed in the *international domain* within the context of this climate change conference.

In order to uncover the media frames of climate justice, it is necessary to look at the first source of influence on framing —journalists. This report was written by journalists Chen Wenxian and Liu Xiaoyan,⁶¹ correspondents with *Xinhua* before and after the 2009 Copenhagen Summit, Chen covered news from London, England, and Liu reported from Brussels, Belgium. The two correspondents collaborated on two articles during the summit. This sample text is one of their collaborative works. It can be inferred that the two correspondents were summoned to Copenhagen from their branch bureaus, which are close to Denmark, the host country of the summit. *Xinhua* News Agency's incomparable network makes it the most resourceful agency in China and the news provider of other Chinese media.

⁶¹ See appendix "Xinhua Journalists"

Media frames do not develop in a political vacuum but are shaped by competing stakeholders or claims makers such as politicians, organizations, social movements, and journalists. This report focused on the international responses to Premier Wen's speech on 18 December at the opening session of the leaders' meeting of the UN climate change conference. It was entitled "Build Consensus and Strengthen Cooperation to Advance the Historical Process of Combating Climate Change." It covered comments and views from international organizations and officials of developing countries about Wen's speech. The report consists of two parts. One part is an interview of officials from developing countries, such as Sergio Serra, Brazil's special ambassador for climate change, and Ronnie Ajero, the Special Assistant to the Minister of Environment of Nigeria. The other is an interview of representatives of international NGOs, such as James P. Leape, the WWF (World Wide Fund for Nature) International Director General, Jeremy Hobbs, the Executive Director of Oxfam International, and Kumi Naidoo, the International Executive Director of Greenpeace International.

The most important message is normally given in the first paragraph of a news report. It is written that some officials from developing countries believed that China's propositions were fair. To understand the justice principles that *People's Daily* presented, it is necessary to analyze the quotations of the interviewees.

It was reported in the very first paragraph that officials from developing countries believed that China's promise was "very strong" and "China's assertions are also very fair." The quotations of interviewees indicate what aspects of climate change were stressed by the developing countries and then represented and highlighted in the Chinese media. Serra commented that "China's commitment to reduce carbon emissions per unit of GDP is of great significance." This comment refers to Wen's statement that China was prepared to make a "tremendous effort" to meet its pledge to reduce carbon intensity by 40% to 45%. It reflects the *carbon intensity principle* of mitigation. Since this principle does not impose a "hard cap" on their total emissions, developing countries widely accepted and welcomed it. As one of the largest developing countries, Brazil officially held a similar position to emission reductions. Significantly reducing the intensity of carbon emissions can make a substantial contribution to emission reductions. Meanwhile, it will not affect the sustainable development of the economy. Reducing carbon emission intensity can also promote the development of the Chinese and Brazilian economies in a more environmentally friendly way. Ajero made it clear that China was a developing country, and like Nigeria, it faced social and economic development issues such as poverty. She stressed that it was unfair that developed countries proposed that developing countries should meet the same emission reduction requirements. In this statement, the *right to development* was highlighted. As discussed in the theoretical chapter, the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs leadership considers climate justice to be linked to the global South's and the semi-periphery's "right to industrialize" or

right to development in a carbon-constrained world. “[T]here is a fairly broad consensus among both the philosophers who write about climate change and the majority of the climate-policy community that efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions [...] should not harm the ability of poor countries to grow economically and to reduce as rapidly as possible the widespread poverty their citizens suffer” (Baer et al. 2010: 215).

Since this news report was based on interviews with international NGOs and officials from different countries, the interviews were conducted in English. In order to explore the *intertextuality*, I examined how the Chinese text “rewrote” the original text. The sentences in the original English report are in the left column of the table. The sentences in the Chinese news report are in the right column. These Chinese sentences were translated into English to be compared with those in the original English text.

Table 12: Comparisons between the Original Interview and the Chinese Report of ST5 (1)

Original Report in English ⁶²	Report in Sample Text
A. "The actions offered by China to reduce emissions are <u>welcome</u> , both in terms of initiatives already underway and future actions planned," said James Leape, director general of the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) for Nature International in an interview with Xinhua.	Sentence Nr.11. In an interview with Xinhua the director general of the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) said that China’s commitment to reducing emissions is <u>admirable</u> , and both ongoing effort and future plan of China’s carbon emission reduction are <u>satisfactory</u> .
B. "To keep the world on track to prevent dangerous climate change," he added, "we need both developed and developing countries to increase their ambition levels."	(dismissed)
C. He said China has indicated that it is ready to do that, "so we hope to see an offer for increased action, to move these talks in Copenhagen forward and ensure success."	(dismissed)
D. The WWF chief also welcomed China's increased willingness to cooperate with the rest of the world in	(dismissed)

⁶² Original text available at: https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-12/19/content_9202631.htm (accessed 17 November 2024)

making emission data transparent.	
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Framing essentially involves *selection* and *salience* (Trumbo 1996: 271). The original report contains three direct quotations (A, B, C) and one indirect quotation (D) from Leape, whereas the Chinese sample text contains only one indirect quotation (Nr. 11). That is to say, only one sentence in the original text was selected, and the rest was excluded. Since the present sample text of *People's Daily* was a report based on the wire written by two journalists from *Xinhua News Agency*, it is difficult to know whether the journalists from *Xinhua* had already excluded quotations B, C, and D when they wrote this wire in Chinese or the editor of *People's Daily* made the decision. It is more important to explore what content was *included* and *excluded*.

The meaning of sentence no. 11 is not exactly what the original quotation was intended to convey. The “welcome” in A was used as an adjective, meaning somebody is “pleased to have, receive, etc.” (Oxford Dictionary 2004: 2002). The adjective “admirable” in sentence no. 11 means “having qualities that you admire and respect,” which conveys a more positive evaluation of China’s actions. While Leape did not express whether he was satisfied with China’s offer and effort to combat climate change in the original text, the Chinese sample text explicitly wrote that the offers were satisfactory. In fact, we see another picture from quotations B, C, and D, which the journalist dismissed in the Chinese sample text. Leape seemed not really satisfied with China’s offers, actions, and plan. In fact, he urged the developing countries to which China belongs to “increase their ambition levels” (B) and was not sure if China could really fulfill its claim by saying “hope to see” (C). According to Fairclough (1992, 1995), the choice of words does matter. The word “welcome” indicates, in general, a positive position, but not as strong as “admirable,” which implies that China’s offer is beyond expectation. Even though the offer is “welcome,” it cannot be interpreted as “satisfactory.” By choosing different words, the author produced different meanings in the Chinese report. The issue of transparency was represented in the original text (D) but dismissed in the Chinese version. Premier Wen actually mentioned this issue in his speech at the summit:

We will further enhance the domestic statistical, monitoring and evaluation methods, improve the way emissions reduction information is released, increase transparency and actively engage in international exchange, dialogue and cooperation.⁶³

Data transparency refers to the “measurable, reportable, and verifiable” (MRV) greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation actions and commitments, as well as support for GHG mitigation actions in developing countries. It was introduced in the Bali Action

⁶³ <http://english.cctv.com/20091218/104913.shtml> (accessed 19 January 2025)

Plan. The main function of MRV is enhancing transparency through the tracking of national GHG emission levels, the tracking of climate finance flows received, or the impact of mitigation actions. China has been seeing this MRV principle as a violation of national sovereignty. However, the developed countries want (the big) developing countries to be more transparent with their emission reduction data.

MRV is a very important aspect of the climate negotiation. Thus, it could be the focus of media reports about the Copenhagen Summit. As the *Guardian* reported, “But Wen said China would improve transparency, echoing the slight softening of language that has been seen on the issue that is of greatest concern to the U.S.”⁶⁴ As it has been mentioned previously, the U.S. and China are the largest GHG emitters. If they could negotiate the issues that are most important to them, it would help break the deadlock in climate negotiations. The media plays an essential role in constructing the audience’s understanding of the issues and, thus, influences public opinion. Premier Wen channeled *new information* about MRV in his speech to the international community. However, it is not clear why the journalists did not report it. If the media excluded the possibilities of cooperation between the two countries, it cannot be expected to help the two biggest emitters to come to an agreement or to break the deadlock.

When analyzing framing, it is essential to identify not only what is being framed and how but also who or what is *not being framed* or *misframed* (Fraser 2008). The linguistic analysis above showed that the content in indirect quotation A could be the journalist’s own interpretation or misunderstanding, and quotations B, C, and D were totally excluded from the report.

Jeremy Hobbs, executive director of Oxfam International, was another interviewee in the news report. The quotations, in the original English and the rewritten Chinese versions, are listed in the following table.

Table 13: Comparisons between the Original Interview and the Chinese Report of ST5 (2)

Original Report in English	Report in Sample Text
E. Jeremy Hobbs, ..., told Xinhua that "we are encouraged by China's determination to combat climate change, especially its unconditional efforts to slash carbon emissions in China, despite huge poverty challenges."	12. Jeremy Hobbs, ..., told reporters that he greatly appreciated China's determination to respond to climate change.
F. He said China's resolve to cut their own emissions regardless to the	13. Faced with the arduous task of developing economy and improving people's livelihood, China took the initiative to reduce the intensity of carbon

⁶⁴Jonathan Watts, 'China 'will honour commitments' regardless of Copenhagen outcome,' *The Guardian*, December 2009 <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2009/dec/18/china-wen-jiabao-copenhagen> (accessed 17 November 2024)

<p>outcome of the summit is exemplary. G. He also supports China's position that dealing with climate change should not undermine efforts to alleviate poverty.</p>	<p>emissions and stated that no matter what goals this meeting reached, it would make its own efforts.</p>
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Sentence 12 in the Chinese text corresponds to sentence F in the original text, in which Hobbs only explicitly referred to China's determination to cut GHG emissions to combat climate change. What was said was not a general positive comment about China's response to climate change. Cutting GHG emissions is only one aspect of combating climate change. Obviously, what is "exemplary" is different from what is "greatly appreciated." The former is an objective description, and the latter is a subjective opinion.

In sentences E and G Hobbs indicated that dealing with climate change in China was not easy due to efforts to alleviate poverty. Sentence 13 in the Chinese text relates to sentence E in the original text, in which Hobbs commented that China had a huge challenge to alleviate poverty. After being rewritten into the indirect quotation, the sample text left the audience with the impression that Hobbs believed China not only has poverty challenges but also the task of developing the economy and improving people's livelihood. In discussions of climate justice, the emissions by the (normally poor) nations, considering the countries' economic development and living standards, are regarded as *subsistence emissions*. The emissions that support the high living standards in wealthy nations are called *luxury emissions* (Shue, 1993). Before economic development can decouple from carbon emissions, eliminating poverty will lead to economic development, thus increasing carbon emissions. Poor countries are justified in increasing carbon emissions to alleviate poverty. However, the task of developing the economy and improving people's livelihood is too general and vaguely formulated. When the purpose is to alleviate poverty, the emissions produced can be called subsistence emissions, which should be accepted as just and fair. When it is aimed at improving the living standards of some interest groups whose living standards are already high, then the increased emissions are luxury emissions, which makes it unjustifiable. By *transforming* the direct quotation into an indirect quotation and making the explicit and clear original information more vague, the discourse of economic development in the Chinese sample text appears to be backed up by an international voice, thus making it more justifiable.

Another interesting point is that "to slash carbon emissions" in sentence E in the original text was *changed* into "to reduce the intensity of carbon emissions" in sentence 13. It is not clear what Hobbs exactly meant by "slash carbon emissions." It can be total carbon emissions or carbon emissions intensity. The two concepts

differentiate greatly. China has long insisted on reducing *carbon intensity* rather than total carbon emissions because its economy is expected to develop further. If total carbon emissions are capped, China's economy will be restrained. That is why developing countries prefer this carbon intensity principle of distributive justice. An added advantage to this approach is that industrialized nations tend to do better with a reduction of carbon intensity since their infrastructure is typically much better than poorer nations. Though China is not a developed country, it has been investing a lot in renewable energy to upgrade its infrastructure and increase its energy security. *Energy efficiency* is a major objective in the 11th FYP, and it was the aim to reduce the ratio of total energy use to GDP by 20 percent in 2010 compared to 2005. The 12th FYP (2011-2015) is a continuation of this policy (Nyman and Zeng 2016). Energy efficiency is increasingly considered a key element of the country's energy security (Heggelund 2007). Therefore, for several reasons, the carbon intensity principle is much preferred by China. This time, the two journalists *transformed* the interviewee's vague expression into clear information supporting China's position. By changing the interviewee's quotations, China's *discourse on carbon intensity* is framed as a general discourse backed up by international NGOs.

Table 14: Comparisons between the Original Interview and the Chinese Report of ST5 (3)

Original Report in English	Report in Sample Text
<p>G. He also supports China's position that dealing with climate change should not undermine efforts to alleviate poverty.</p> <p>H. "Rich countries that are responsible for climate change have a historic responsibility to find a real solution and to do so before it's too late," he said.</p>	<p>14. He said: "We agree that the response to climate change cannot be at the expense of continuing poverty and backwardness in developing countries. (14.1) We need to push rich countries to take historical responsibility. (14.2) As Premier Wen Jiabao called, the international community needs to build consensus and reach an agreement as soon as possible. (14.3)"</p>

Sentence 14 is a full sentence in the Chinese text. In order to have a better reading flow in English, I divided it into three full sentences in the translation. They correspond to sentences G and H in the original interview. Sentence 14.1 was rewritten as a direct quotation from the original text. What Hobbs clearly supported in the original text was China's position. In sentence 14, it was *changed* to the position of the developing countries. China was, in this way, by default, *categorized* with the developing countries. In fact, it becomes more and more difficult for China to justify itself as merely a developing country. Through rewriting the original text, China's *identity* as a developing country was highlighted. Sentences 14.2 and 14.3

corresponded to sentence H. Both sentences 14.2 and H said that rich countries should shoulder their historical responsibilities. Both sentences H and 14.3 were direct quotations from Hobbs. In sentence H, Hobbs didn't draw upon China's Premier Wen's speech. The strange thing is that in sentence 14.3, the journalists *added* "as Premier Wen Jiabao called" in the direct quotation from Hobbs, implying that Hobbs drew upon Premier Wen's speech in his interview with Chinese journalists. In doing so, the text created the impression that "international organizations applauded China's promise and claims of dealing with climate change," as the title read, although it is unclear if Hobbs really referred to Premier Wen in the interview. If not, the journalistic discursive practice *would be a misframing* of information.

The last interviewee was Kumi Naidoo, the Director General of Greenpeace International. There is not much difference between the original English and Chinese texts in this case. The only discrepancy in the information conveyed is that in the original text, developed countries were called upon to "deliver what is needed to save this planet for our children and our grandchildren." However, the Chinese text ended with "saving our planet" without mentioning the purpose of saving this planet. It does matter *why* and for whom we discuss climate change and strive for a solution to combat it. If the current generation does not do enough to tackle this issue and lets the impact of climate change continue or get even worse, it would be unfair for future generations to live in dangerous conditions. It is a question of *intergenerational justice*. It is a pity that this information is dismissed in the Chinese text. That may also reflect that Chinese journalists were not aware of the intergenerational issue of climate change.

Based on the analysis of the original sample texts and their Chinese versions, it was observed that the journalists sometimes *changed* the clear information in the quotation into vague expressions in the reports, sometimes *transferred* the information unexpressed by interviewees into assertions from them, and sometimes even *added* information that did not exist in the original text. These choices are related to which aspects of discourses of climate change and climate justice the journalists want to convey to or hide from the public. By *selecting, changing, highlighting, and omitting* certain words and phrases, the journalists succeeded in framing climate change and climate justice by mixing their own understandings with interviewees' opinions and positions. Thus, China's positions seemed more justifiable because they were seemingly widely backed up by international voices.

As Entman has stated, the "process of culling a few elements of perceived reality and assembling a narrative that highlights connections among them to promote a particular interpretation" (Entman 2007: 164). In this case, a particular interpretation is that China's contribution to climate change negotiations was praised by many developing countries and international NGOs. If only the praise from the

international community were reported, it seems to the national audience that nothing more should be done to address climate change from China's side.

Text 4.2.1.1-6

Deputy director of the National Development and Reform Commission Xie Zhenhua pointed out in an interview with the media that China Has Made Important Contributions to the Achievements of the Copenhagen Conference

The attempts of developed countries to evade their obligations have led to too little progress in the negotiation of many key issues; Copenhagen Summit achieved two important results

Jiang Guocheng. 2009-12-27. 003 Top New. (ST6/PD9)

The analysis starts with morphological *textual characteristics* that involve features relating to form or position, such as page number, section, and size (Carvalho 2005). This news report was published on the third page of "Top News," where the important international news is normally located. It consists of three parts. They are all based on an exclusive interview with Xie Zhenhua but with different foci. The first part includes the first 14 sentences of the sample text; sentences 15 to 27 make up the second part, and the third part is composed of sentences 28 to 38. In the sample text, the climate issue was discussed in the context of the UNFCCC climate negotiations. Therefore, the justice issue was again placed in the *international domain* (Gardiner 2011).

Since Xie Zhenhua plays an important role in China's climate negotiations, the present analysis will first include some background information on this social actor. At the time, he served not only as the deputy director of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) but also as the head of the Chinese delegation to the Copenhagen Summit. For many years, the NDRC was responsible for climate policy until this authority was transferred to the Ministry of Ecology and Environment (MEE) in 2018 as part of a broader restructuring of government ministries. In the profile "*Xie Zhenhua: China's Top Climate Negotiator Steps Down*" by Li Jing (2019), Xie is described as a determined negotiator who staunchly defended China's right to development. Todd Stern, the U.S. special climate envoy, told China Dialogue that Xie had a deep understanding of the issues and was fiercely protective of China's interests. At the same time, Xie was pragmatic and a skilled listener. Li noted that these qualities helped him earn the trust of his counterparts from other major developing countries, allowing him to mediate effectively during critical phases of negotiations. While Xie advocated for China's "right to emit," this did not mean he denied the reality of climate change or underestimated its impact on humanity. On the contrary, Li described Xie as "a climate believer." In fact, under Xie's leadership, China's stance on climate issues gradually evolved from defending its "right to emit" to embracing low-carbon development as a national strategy. As a high-ranking

official, Xie played a key role in shaping the elite discourse on climate change in China. From Xie's background information, we see another side of this elitist discourse of climate change: (1) it is not monolithic as assumed. There are different voices within the elite discourse; (2) the discourse undergoes *changes*. These two characters will be discussed in a later chapter of the dissertation.

Although this sample text came from *People's Daily*, it was a report by Jiang Guocheng, a journalist for *Xinhua News Agency*. It is interesting to observe that in the text, the nouns "experts and scholars" were often attached to the possessive determiner "our." Pronouns are used to refer to possession and "belonging." It is unknown whether the experts and academia spoke for the Chinese government or the Chinese people or only represented themselves as independent researchers. Since the voices of experts and academia were not directly quoted in the interview, it is hard to reach a conclusion about their political positions. By being labeled "us," the experts and academia are represented by *Xinhua* and passively become a part of *Xinhua's* identity, namely the biggest state-owned news agency. Theoretically, all people in China are part of "us." However, *Xinhua* does not represent the average people. Only the voices of elites (Beck 2010) are represented by the media institution that fundamentally influences the discourse on climate issues.

As Parks and Roberts (2010: 148) argued, "we live in a morally ambiguous world where social understandings of fairness are 'configurational,' depending on countries' position in the global hierarchy of economic and political structure." That is to say, the identity of a country in the world system influences its understanding of justice.

In the first part of the news report, which deals with China's contribution to the summit, China is clearly *identified* as one of the BASIC countries: Brazil, South Africa, India, and China. These four countries are recognized as the most prospective developing countries. This section focused on how China played a leading role in the negotiation. China initiated and led China the BASIC alliance, which united to fight against the developed negotiating bloc. The alliance worked to define a common position on emission reductions and financial aid. The group also discussed the possibility of providing financial and technical aid to the poorer nations of the G77. Shortly before the Copenhagen Summit, the BASIC countries gathered in Beijing in November 2009 and agreed to act jointly. China was *self-positioned* as a *big developing country* to play a leading role in the developing camp.

However, in the second part of the sample text, which is focused on the unsatisfying negotiation progress at the summit, I observed that China's identity as a big developing country was no longer clearly presented. On the contrary, Xie put China in the developing camp and stressed the right to development for developing countries (expressed in sentence 21). It seemed that China was downgraded from a big developing power to a normally developing country. That is to say, "developing" in the identity "big developing country" was highlighted. As Harris, Chow, and

Karlsson (2013: 298) pointed out, “identifying itself as a developing country, China has repeatedly argued that the responsibility for climate change should reside with the developed world and that China must not be asked to take on mandatory emissions reduction targets, certainly not before developed states act on their obligations.” In the last three sentences of the second part of the news report, and in the third section, China was again defined as a big developing country responsible for both Chinese people and all human beings. Depending on the context, either the aspect of “big” or “developing” in the identity of a “big developing country” was highlighted. In general, the media tend to describe China as a developing country when binding obligations and the right to development are concerned and as a big power when contributions to the climate fight at the global level are concerned.

With regard to the understanding of climate justice, Xie expressed China’s position clearly in the following sentences:

[21]He said that developed countries “ignore the developing countries’ right to development and demand high emission reduction requirements from major developing countries, which is unfair and unreasonable.”

This approach to climate justice considers climate justice to be concerned with the global South’s and semi-periphery’s “right to industrialize” or *right to development* in a carbon-constrained world. This approach is also adopted by the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, as discussed in the theory chapter. It is widely agreed that developing countries have the “development imperative” (Giddens 2009). For a long time, China has insisted on its sovereign right to economic and social development. Nationalists even see any attempt that may prevent China from further development as a conspiracy. As mentioned previously in the present chapter, scholars agree that China’s principled stance makes sense from most perspectives of climate justice, given the poverty that still prevails in many parts of the country (Harris et al. 2013: 299).

Besides the insistence on the right to development, China also takes a hard line on some distributive principles of climate change justice. *Distributive justice* is the most discussed aspect of climate justice in academia. Xie’s interview also refers to this issue, as shown in the following sentence. Here, the two first principles of distributive justice stressed: the *historical responsibility principle* and the *per capita principle*.

[19]“Developed countries have ... leading to an increase in the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. They should assume their historical responsibilities and be the first to quantify emissions reductions substantially. [20] But the reality is that ... greenhouse gas emissions are still increasing, and the per capita emissions are still high. The proposed emission reduction target by

2020 is also quite far away from ... the expectations of the international community."

Some scholars have defended broad "historical accountability," according to which nations have obligations proportional to their historical emissions of greenhouse gases (Shue 1993; Neumayer 2000). The central argument of a historical responsibility approach is that there are specific states that have brought us to our current, climate change dilemma; those parties should now bear the primary responsibility for the results of their actions and should pay the costs incurred by these past transgressions (Neumayer 2000; Dryzek et al. 2011). The idea is the PPP, which ties responsibility for addressing the issue to those who have produced the problem (and who can afford to right the wrong). Ultimately, this approach is a way to operationalize the "common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capacities" agreed to by the UNFCCC in 1992. Therefore, many developing countries support the historical responsibility principle. In the interview, Xie mentioned that Chinese academia had studied the per capita distributive principle, which had been the Chinese government's basic position on climate negotiation. As President Hu Jintao once said, "China's per capita emission is relatively low and is even lower if calculated in accumulative terms. A significant share of China's total emissions falls in the category of subsistence emissions necessary to meet people's basic needs" (China Climate Change Info-Net 2008). In academia, the "*sustainable per capita*" approach (Athanasίου and Baer 2002, Singer 2002, Jamieson 2006) and the "*subsistence per capita*" approach (Shue 1993; Baer et al. 2008) are differentiated. Regardless of which approach is used, the per capita principle generally holds that every human on Earth has equal rights to the global atmosphere, and therefore, allocations of how much one can pollute should be done on a per capita basis. Per capita proposals place rich nations at a sharp disadvantage since most have already far exceeded the stabilization target. Poor nations, by comparison, stand to gain considerably from a per capita allocation of carbon entitlements because their existing levels of income and industrialization place them well below the one metric ton threshold. Therefore, India, China, and the Group of 77 advocated for this simple and egalitarian principle.

Although distributive justice is often discussed and represented in media reports, we should also consider "*procedural fairness* of climate policy" and "participation of parties in the development of climate policy" (Philander 2012: 288). For some scholars, paying attention to procedural justice is not only necessary but also very important because the distributive dimension of justice alone is not sufficient to address climate justice and argue for a broader perspective of climate justice that should include the dimension of representation (Kortetmäki 2016: 322-323). Procedural justice is concerned with the issue of representation and participation. It

refers to the adoption of fair procedures and an inclusive framework in the process of reaching decision-making in international negotiations between nation-states.

The *procedural justice* was highlighted in the sample text. According to Xie's description, China participated in the negotiation very actively from various angles. For example, the BASIC countries drafted a text that was adopted by the African group and also drawn upon by UNFCCC working groups. Xie said, "the text drafted by BASIC countries has played an important role for developing countries to take the initiative, guide the negotiation process, and contribute to the outcome of the conference." Xie also mentioned that the Chinese delegation met with ministers and delegation representatives of different countries and officials of international organizations and NGOs and communicated with island and least-developed countries. In addition, the Chinese delegation, for the first time, established the "China News and Exchange Center" to communicate China's climate policy and positions to the world. China had participated in the negotiating process in different ways. Xie used many adjectives and adverbs to describe China's participation, such as "actively," "constructive," "tenacious," "welcome," "initiatively," "intensively," and "proactively." He expressed his satisfaction with the delegation's effort and its outcome. As Xie told *Xinhua News Agency*, "The Chinese delegation took an active and constructive attitude to fully and deeply participate in the negotiation of all negotiation topics and made important contributions to the eventual achievement of the meeting." Unlike some international organizations, such as the IMF and the World Bank, dominated by the main developed countries, China seems to be better represented in the UNFCCC mechanism due to its significance in the battle against climate change. As mentioned above, China led the BASIC initiative to strengthen the power of big developing countries in climate negotiations within the UN framework. The BASIC also united the G77 negotiating bloc to fight the developed bloc. According to Bond and Chatterton, this approach to climate justice emphasizes a political and diplomatic struggle between global Northern and Southern states within the UNFCCC process (Bond 2012: 196-7 and Chatterton 2013: 607). Therefore, China's active participation can be interpreted both as a fair inclusion of China into the UNFCCC mechanism and as struggling for *more power over the discourse of climate change* within that mechanism.

Last, we look at this sample text's *intertextuality*. According to Fairclough's three-dimensional model for CDA (1992), it is important to analyze intertextuality. Individual texts always relate to past and present texts. Intertextuality focuses on how people draw upon other texts and text types that are socially and culturally available to them in producing and interpreting a text.

A pronounced characteristic of the intertextuality of this sample text is that the content of this news report was completely drawn from a report by the *Xinhua News Agency*. It is not unusual for newspapers in China to adopt text directly from *Xinhua*, since it has the widest and best reporting networks within China and abroad. For

example, the protagonist of this sample text is Xie Zhenhua, one of the highest officials to take charge of climate policy in China. They both belong to influential media institutions in China, dominating climate change discourse in the country. In the third part of the sample text, Xie defined the Copenhagen Summit as a successful climate negotiation. But the public discourse in the West seemed to be different. In fact, the world had very high expectations of the summit. Therefore, it was regarded as a failure mainly because the Copenhagen Accord was not politically binding. One of the widespread criticisms was from an article in the *Guardian* newspaper⁶⁵ on 20 December 2009, titled “China tried to hijack Copenhagen climate deal” by Ed Miliband, the UK climate secretary at the time. He accused China, Sudan, Bolivia, and other left-wing Latin American countries of trying to hijack the Copenhagen Summit and “hold the world to ransom” to prevent a deal from being reached. Miliband also criticized the UN mechanism and said there must be “major reform” of UNFCCC and how negotiations are conducted. He was reportedly outraged that a few countries had been allowed to nearly block a deal. *Xinhua*’s interview with Xie Zhenhua took place several days after the publication of Miliband’s article in the *Guardian*. The aim of the interview was to argue for the success of the Copenhagen Summit and China’s contribution, which can be interpreted as responding to Miliband’s criticisms. As Beck argued (2010), climate change is staged by the media and the media becomes a *battlefield* of discourses of climate change. By drawing upon the *Guardian* article, *Xinhua* tried to fight back.

It is interesting to find in the analysis of *intertextuality* that Miliband’s main criticism was how some developing countries led by China took advantage of the negotiation procedure to destroy the meeting. As we analyzed in the previous paragraphs, China was, on the contrary, quite satisfied with its participation in the UN negotiation procedure by leading the BASIC initiative and uniting other developing countries. Judging whether the Copenhagen Summit was a successful meeting is difficult and not the task of this project to do so. But we can say that in comparison to the IMF and the World Bank developing countries can be more easily and better included in the UN negotiation procedure, and the UN becomes a *battlefield* for procedural justice between the developing and developed countries.

Before ending the analysis of this sample text, I will briefly review samples 4.2.1.1-4, 4.2.1.1-5, and 4.2.1.1-6 together. The following table lists the main titles of three texts.

Table 15: Main Titles of Three Sample Texts

Text 4.2.1.1-4	<i>The key to negotiation success is that developed countries take the historical responsibility</i>
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⁶⁵John Vidal, ‘Ed Miliband: China tried to hijack Copenhagen climate deal,’ *The Guardian*, December 2009 <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2009/dec/20/ed-miliband-china-copenhagen-summit> (accessed 17 November 2024)

Text 4.2.1.1-5	<i>Officials of developing countries and international organizations applauded China's commitment and claims of dealing with climate change</i>
Text 4.2.1.1-6	<i>China has made important contributions to the achievements of the Copenhagen Conference The attempts of developed countries to evade their obligations have led to little progress in the negotiation of many key issues Copenhagen Summit achieved two important results</i>

The three news reports were published during, at the end, and after the summit, respectively. Following this timeline, the success of the climate conference was first framed as dependent on developed countries while the summit was still going on. When the conference was coming to an end, voices from outside China were drawn upon to applaud China's commitment and accomplishments. Directly after the summit, the world started to criticize the outcome. However, the newspaper highlighted China's contributions and did not criticize the outcome of the negotiations. The titles of three samples are put together to show the *People's Daily's* framing tactics. It framed the developed countries' commitment as the prerequisite for the success of the negotiation on the one hand and highlighted China's contribution on the other. In doing so, the readers have a sense of who should be held responsible for the failure of the summit if it is regarded as a failure. This framing tactic prevents China from the attribution of responsibility and leaves an impression that any unsatisfying outcome of the climate negotiations has little to do with China, even though China might also have played games at the summit, just like the countries it criticized.

Text 4.2.1.1-7

Climate justice: the keyword of diplomacy 2010.

The issue of climate change has become an important consideration in international relations today and has penetrated all aspects of international relations.

Wu Qimin, Wei Dongze, Jiao Xiang. 2010-01-07. 023 International (ST7/PD10)

This is one of the two sample texts whose headlines contain "climate justice." The analysis of this sample text is more detailed than the others. The news report was published on 7 January 2010, in the aftermath of the Copenhagen Summit. Although it was located on page 23 under the "international" heading instead of the first three pages of the newspaper where the top news was published, the authors of this article are very noteworthy. First, in (at least Chinese) media institutions editors are superior to journalists. The fact that this article was written by three editors rather than journalists for *People's Daily* reflects that it is a report of higher importance than normal international news. Second, three academic experts based at national

institutions were listed as co-authors. The article was based on interviews with these three experts: Pan Jiahua, Lü Xuedu, and Xu Huaqing.

Since media framing is, first of all, influenced by journalists, the analysis will start with background information on the authors. Based on public information,⁶⁶ the editor, Wu Qimin, graduated from the Beijing No. 55 High School and the Capital University of Economics and Business. Both are top educational institutions. She joined the International Department of *People's Daily* in 1991 and started reporting on foreign affairs. She has reported on nearly 1,000 events in more than 40 countries and regions visited by Chinese presidents and premiers of the State Council. She served as editor-in-chief of International Weekly of *People's Daily*. She published a book in 2013 titled "Special Reports on High-Level Diplomacy." However, the title in Chinese is different. It can be translated as "Big Country's Diplomacy on Site: News Reports Collection on Central Foreign Affairs by Wu Qimin of People's Daily" (Wu 2013). The book's preface says that the high-level reports of *People's Daily* are the official history of Chinese diplomacy and the authoritative document. Like Wu, the other editor Jiao Xiang also holds an important position at *People's Daily*. He graduated from the School of Arabic Studies at Beijing Foreign Studies University (BFSU), which was affiliated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs until the 1980s and whose alumni are well-known in Chinese diplomacy circles. Jiao is the associate editor of the West Asia and Africa Office in the International Department of *People's Daily*. Moreover, he is the only *People's Daily* journalist to have reported from Egypt, Libya, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan while stationed there between 2011 and 2014. Some of his in-depth reports were adopted by foreign affairs officials and commented on by the leaders of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. His excellent performance has earned him a lot of honors⁶⁷, including the Outstanding Communist Party Member, Best International News Journalist, and recipient of the May Fourth Medal, which is the top honor for young Chinese journalists. The last editor, Wei Dongze, was a *People's Daily* journalist stationed in the African Bureau. From their education and career experience, it can be concluded that Wu and Jiao are journalists with excellent educational backgrounds who are very close to high-level policymakers. The text generally reflects an *elite discourse* of climate justice. The heading of this article explicitly implied that climate justice is regarded as a theme of diplomacy and thus placed in the *international domain*. It is noteworthy that the editors realized that climate change was co-related to many other factors, including political, diplomatic, economic, and geopolitical issues. Climate change was no longer regarded as a simple scientific issue. It became a *meta-discourse*. However, the editors narrowed climate change down as a diplomatic issue, confining it to the

⁶⁶<http://world.people.com.cn/GB/8212/80865/index.html> (accessed 11 July 2020)

⁶⁷ Jiao Xiang background information (accessed 17 November 2024)

http://www.xinhuanet.com/zgjx/zthjzjhgs/gr_jx.htm

<http://dangjian.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0630/c117092-28513239.html> (accessed 12 July 2020)

international domain. Furthermore, no expert pointed out that climate change was also very relevant to domestic issues, such as social inequality in the context of climate change. This fact shows that the public understanding of climate change in China around 2010 was still at an early stage, *falling behind* the developed countries.

The article consists of four parts. Each part has a subtopic, led by the editors's questions and followed by the answers of three experts. The four subtopics are heating up and "publicity stunts," disagreement and trade, fairness and "MRV," and emission reduction and hegemony. Since the text is relatively long, each part was first analyzed separately, followed by a brief analysis of the overlapping content of all the parts.

In the first part, the editors mentioned that in the past 20 years, the issue of climate change has continued to heat up, attracting widespread attention from the international community and gradually becoming one of the central issues of bilateral and multilateral diplomatic occasions. Three experts were invited to respond. All of them admitted that the Copenhagen Summit was an important event in international diplomacy. Pan Jiahua used the *metaphor* "climate storms rolled in Copenhagen" to describe the summit's importance and complexity. Xu said the Copenhagen Summit was unprecedented in scale and attracted global attention. As shown in Chapter 3, the methodological chapter, the number of journalistic reports on climate change increased to 343 in 2006 from 6 in 2000 and considerably up to 1525 in 2007. In 2008, the number rose steadily to 1628 and then dramatically up to 4632 in 2009, when the Copenhagen Summit was held. This summit was, to some extent, a *turning point* when it comes to media communication on climate change in China. However, expert Pan warned that if developed countries, especially "some of them," didn't fulfill their commitments, all diplomatic activities left an impression of "publicity stunts." Pan didn't explicitly point out who "some of them" were. According to Fairclough, if the agent is not explicitly indicated, its responsibility is decreased. However, it is a bit different in Chinese language usage. In Chinese, "some of them" is a *euphemistic usage* to blame a person or other agents in certain contexts. To be specific, in the context of climate change, it is well-known that the U.S. and some of its close allies, such as Australia, in the developed world, not only ignored their climate commitments but even set a bad example by withdrawing from the Kyoto Protocol. By applying this euphemistic expression, the responsibility of the U.S. was not minimized. On the contrary, the U.S. was regarded as a default agent holding responsibility.

The second part of the article discusses mechanisms, new concepts, new rules for climate cooperation, and the difficulties of international cooperation. In terms of mechanisms, expert Lü said, "at present, there are two main types of international cooperation mechanisms for addressing climate change: one is the traditional bilateral cooperation mechanism, the other is through the United Nations-led climate change negotiations and consultation channels" (sentence 44), and he claimed that

both mechanisms should serve the negotiation process within the framework of UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol instead of replacing them. His opinion focused on the UNFCCC mechanism and *excluded* the possibility of bilateral cooperation. This is in line with the Chinese government's official diplomatic position. As discussed above, China has insisted that the UNFCCC mechanism deal with climate change. It is worth pointing out that these two mechanisms were also mentioned by the editors in the first part of the article. Expert Xu responded that further negotiations need to be pushed forward by proper bilateral and multilateral diplomacy. Xu stressed the role of the *bilateral mechanism*, which has not appeared often in the official climate change discourse. From the two experts' responses about the cooperation mechanisms, we see the *discrepancies* in their opinions, although both of them were important people in the decision-making.

In fact, during the Obama presidency, the U.S. preferred to engage with China through a bilateral mechanism as opposed to the UNFCCC mechanism. For example, the renowned think tank, the Brookings Institution published a report on the prospectives and policy suggestions of the Sino-US cooperation in energy and environment at the beginning of Obama's first administration. The same year, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton gave a speech at the Asia Foundation, a nonprofit international development organization, on Sino-US cooperation in energy, environment, and climate change. The first session of the US-China strategic forum on clean energy cooperation took place in China on 22 October 2009. From 15 to 18 November that year, Obama visited China, and climate cooperation was one of the important issues on the agenda. If China and the U.S. could put these measures into practice, both of them would make contribution to combating climate change.

In terms of new concepts and new rules of international climate cooperation, the phrase "funds and technology" appeared in this part of the article very frequently. In the experts' opinions, financial and technological support was not only "the key to establishing a new multilateral cooperation mechanism" (sentence 23 by Xu) but also a *compensation* for the climate debt of developed countries (sentence 35 by Pan). Although developed countries did not want to offer funds or technology support, it seemed to be acceptable that developing countries exchange their emission quota with developed countries for funding and technology so that the former could go onto a low-carbon path (sentence 35 by Pan). From a perspective of *international political economy*, it is not difficult to understand this framing. The emerging countries have pumped a huge amount of carbon into the air, and their contribution to emissions will increase if their economies maintain the high speed of development. However, the so-called miracle of economic growth is based on low-added value industries. In an *unequal global market*, they do not have the right to or have little influence on pricing. Once they adopt binding targets of emission reductions, the cost of products will increase, rendering the price of products less competitive in the global market. It is not impossible for developing countries to take stronger action if the North offers a

better bid for technology transfer and economic support (Paterson 1996: 75). In other words, they hope to get energy technology at lower costs in exchange for its national market. As Pan pointed out, exchanging emission quotas for funding and technology aims to transform the economy into a low-carbon development. The first China National Climate Change Program (2007: 5) shows that optimizing energy mix by developing *low-carbon and renewable energy* has been part of China's efforts and achievements in mitigating climate change. Therefore, the "funds and technology" are important to understanding China's belief in climate justice.

The *carbon trading* was another new concept mentioned in the second part of the sample text. This idea is in the spirit of the late Harvard liberal philosopher John Rawls, who advocated for climate justice---the "right to pollute" and then let under-polluters sell their surplus rights via some form of carbon trading (Bond 2012; Chatterton et al. 2013). Unlike many small and island countries, China welcomes this *market-based approach* to addressing climate change. The most important mechanism of carbon trading is the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). CDM is intended to assist developed countries in achieving compliance with their obligations under the Kyoto Protocol. In return, developing countries get environmentally friendly technologies and financial support for their sustainable development. Out of concern that developing countries may not have enough space for emissions reductions in the future, China *was very doubtful* of this mechanism at first. However, China became an active player in the cooperation. Scholars have estimated that the value of the CDM market would be between \$457 million and \$4.5 billion in 2010 under various trading scenarios, and China would capture 60% of the CDM market (Zhang 2003: 73). In this sample text, expert Lü even praised the CDM as "creative thinking" (sentence 43). This *change* indicated that China's political standing on climate change could be adjusted.

As has been the case in some of the other sample texts, this article framed climate change as a *development* issue. Pan said that tackling climate change is "after all, a development issue," and global cooperative actions should promote all countries, especially developing countries, economic development rather than impede it. It should be noted that that Pan both asserted the *right to development* for the developing countries and supported this right for the developed counterparts. A similar framing exists in China's National Climate Change Program 2007. The first national policy on climate change held that climate change "is an issue involving both environment and development, but it is ultimately an issue of development." Focusing on the right to development for developing countries reflects an approach to climate justice also advocated by the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs.

The third part of the sample text is concerned with *fairness vs efficiency* and *multilateral mechanism vs sovereignty*. The analysis started with the latter. The

mitigation-related MRV was highlighted by the interviewees.⁶⁸ Both Lü and Xu opposed the idea of applying MRV to developing countries' voluntary mitigation actions. The term MRV first appeared in the context of climate change mitigation policy as part of the Bali Action Plan (2007), which called for "measurable, reportable, and verifiable nationally appropriate mitigation commitments or actions." A common criticism is that a common understanding of its definition, objective, and content is missing.⁶⁹ With the climate change negotiation going on, academic interest in MRV increased. Singh summarized that MRV includes "Measure or monitor (M) data and information on emissions, mitigation actions, and support; Report (R) by compiling this information in inventories and other standardized formats to make it accessible to a range of users and facilitate public disclosure of information; and Verify (V) by periodically subjecting the reported information to some form of review or analysis or independent assessment to establish completeness and reliability" (Singh et al. 2016: 3). According to Pang (2014), MRV should be applied in three areas: (1) MRV of GHG emissions that refers to estimation, reporting, and verifying of emissions over a defined period of time at national, regional, and sectoral levels; (2) MRV of nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs) that involves assessing the reduction of GHG emissions, and sustainable development (non-GHG) effects of policies, projects, and actions as well as monitoring their implementation progress. It also involves assessing progress toward mitigation goals. (3) MRV of support, which means monitoring financial flows, technical knowledge, capacity building, and evaluating the results and impact of support. Out of the three kinds of MRV, the interviewed experts strongly opposed the second type of MRV mitigation actions.

[49]It is obviously a stupid idea to force the implementation of the "MRV" on such actions (refers to NAMAs) taken by developing countries...[50] Of course, for actions taken by developing countries with the support of funding, technology transfer, and capacity building, the "MRV" should be implemented to ensure that these actions effectively use the support provided and correspondingly generate positive effects of climate protection. (by Lü)

[69]...only the mitigation actions by developing countries that are supported by the "measurable, reportable and verifiable" funding and technology transfer from developed countries should accept the so-called MRV ... It should not be applied to voluntary NAMAs that are not supported by funding and technical transfer. (by Xu)

⁶⁸ Discussion of adaptation-related monitoring and evaluation is outside the scope of this dissertation.

⁶⁹Information on MRV

<https://carbon-turkey.org/en/what-is-mrv>

<https://www.oecd.org/environment/measurementreportingandverificationofghgmitigation.htm> (accessed 17 November 2024)

Lü not only opposed the MRV of NAMAs but also criticized it as “silly,” “stupid,” and “ridiculous” to impose binding targets on NAMAs of developing countries. In fact, as we have seen, there is a principled resistance to legally binding national emissions targets in China’s climate change diplomacy. As previously mentioned, the arguments reflect two justice principles: the *historical responsibility* principle and the *ability to pay* principle. Another important reason for China’s refusal to accept binding GHG limits is tied to China’s modern history, which is a profound *driving force* for its climate diplomacy. As Harris and co-authors (2013: 302) have pointed out, “few countries are as preoccupied with issues of *national sovereignty* as is China. For historical reasons, not least occupation by Western powers and Japan, China is extraordinarily sensitive to even suggestions of outside meddling in its internal affairs.” The 2009 Copenhagen Summit was a typical example of this position. “Chinese officials refused all efforts by diplomats to persuade them to agree to the outside monitoring of their voluntary pledges to restrain China’s GHG emissions” (Harris et al. 2013: 302).

Generally speaking, China’s official refusal against the MRV mechanism is understandable, especially when considering its national history between 1840, the start of the First Opium War, and 1949, when the People’s Republic of China was founded. During that time, China was a semi-colony. It was nominally ruled first by the Qing Dynasty and later by the Republic of China, but it lost its control of customs, economy, ports, and so on, through unequal agreements and treaties with Western powers. In the post-war international political economy characterized by *unequal power relations*, the (major) developing countries worry that imposing obligations upon them is a conspiracy to curb their economic growth. Therefore, they strongly *resist* any binding obligations. It has to be pointed out that the Chinese government accepts the MRV mechanism for mitigation actions supported by external funding and technical transfer, although it refuses external monitoring of its national voluntary targets.

In terms of *fairness vs efficiency*, the developed block suggested that it would be both unfair and unrealistic to expect them to make sharp and immediate reductions in their carbon emissions because reducing the same amount of emissions costs them much more than it costs developing countries. Here is the paradox of equity and efficiency: developed countries prioritize efficiency and believe it is unfair for them to reduce emissions. Pan refuted this idea by stressing the importance of prioritizing *equity* in international cooperation. The table illustrates the data he listed in the interview.

Table 16: Carbon Emission Related Data in the U.S. and Developing Countries

	The U.S.	Average Developing Country Level
CO2 emission per capita (T)	20	2

Cost of emission reduction per ton (\$)	100	20
Average annual Income (\$)	40,000	4,000
Cost of emission reduction in relation to annual income (\$)	1/400	1/200

In the table, we see that the cost of emission reduction per ton for the U.S. is \$100, five times the level for an average developing country. That means that it is more efficient for developing countries to cut emissions. However, when the average annual income is considered, the cost of emission reduction in relation to the annual income of the U.S. is half of the average developing country's level. That is to say, the actual cost of reducing emissions in the U.S. is lower than that of developing countries. Therefore, the claim of developed countries is not justified.

It is remarkable that Pan compared the U.S. to the average developing country. If the U.S. should be compared, it should be to one nation and not a collective of nations. Furthermore, Pan said that the cost of emission reduction per ton is "assumed to be" \$100 for the U.S. and \$20 for the developing countries. Since no sources were given for the statistics, the usage of "assumed to be" weakens the accuracy and credibility of them and makes the case less convincing. As analyzed above, in the *antagonism* between the U.S. and China, China's *identity* is often hidden behind the collective categorization of "developing countries." It misleads readers into equalizing China with all developing countries or thinking that China is the representative of developing countries. I checked statistics of CO2 emissions of several developed and developing countries for comparison (stand 2008-2009).

Table 17: CO2 emissions (metric tons per capita) 2009

Developing Nation		Developed Nation		Collective Blocs	
China	6.0	US	17.2	World	4.7
India	1.4	Germany	8.8	East Asia and Pacific (excluding high income)	4.7
Brazil	1.9	France	5.4	North America	17.0
Indonesia	1.9	Japan	8.4	Euro area	7.3
South Africa	10	Australia	18.2	OECD members	9.9
Malaysia	7.2	UK	7.6	High income	11.2
Philippines	0.8	Qatar	41.8	Upper middle income	5.5
Ethiopia	0.1	Luxembourg	20.9	Lower middle income	1.3
Mexico	4.2	Sweden	4.6	Heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC)	0.2
Russia	11.0	Norway	11.5	Least developed	0.3

				countries: UN classification	
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Source: The World Bank⁷⁰

The table 17 shows that China's CO2 emissions in 2009 were 6.0 tons, and in the U.S., 17.2 tons. The 17.2 tons value was close to Pan's estimated 20 tons for the U.S. Pan's estimated value for the developing countries was 2 tons, which was close to Brazil's 1.9, Indonesia's 1.9, and the lower-middle-income nation bloc 1.3. According to World Bank statistics, China is categorized into the upper-middle income bloc. Its CO2 emissions per capita were 5.5 tons in 2009, a little lower than that of China's. The world average CO2 emission per capita was 4.7 tons, which China surpassed. In the same bloc of upper-middle-income countries, Russia and South Africa had values of up to 11 and 10 tons, even higher than Japan's 8.4 tons, Germany's 8.8 tons, and Sweden's 4.6 tons. To be accurate, China's value (6.0) was closer to that of upper-middle-income countries (5.5), slightly higher than the world average (4.7), and much higher than that of lower-middle-income countries (1.3). This indicates that China's CO2 emission per capita was not as low as often perceived and could not be representative of developing countries as a whole. Comparing the high CO2 emissions value of the U.S. with the much lower value of lower-middle countries, Pan's argument for developing countries' right to emit seems more justifiable and just. Putting China into the category of developing countries means defending China's right to emit. When compared with the U.S., China is indeed justified in developing its economy and improving the social welfare of its citizens. However, the question is: should China compare itself with the U.S. in terms of carbon emissions? Is the U.S. path the right one to follow?

The last part of the text focuses on the development of international climate cooperation in China. The editors mentioned that the international climate cooperation has been influenced by political, diplomatic, and economic factors. They asked the experts when this issue started to be viewed from the perspective of international relations. As discussed in the previous chapter, climate change has already gone beyond a scientific discourse and became a *meta-discourse* involving many aspects of human life. The fact that the editors saw climate change merely as a diplomatic issue reflects a *limitation of the media's understanding* of this issue in China. However, two of the three experts were aware of the complexity of climate change. They pointed out that "the establishment and implementation of an international climate cooperation system goes far beyond the scope of climate change scientific issues, and includes more non-climate subjective factors, such as national interests, international image, cultural factors, and other strategic

⁷⁰https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.ATM.CO2E.PC?end=2009&most_recent_year_desc=true&start=2008 (accessed 16 July 2020)

considerations” (sentence 90 by Xu), and “climate change negotiations involved almost all important factors: economics, diplomacy, politics, trade, technology, finance, and even indigenous peoples, women's unions” (sentence 84 by Lü). Lü further said that new studies on climate change have emerged in different academic disciplines. Whereas Lü and Xu referred to the complexity and interdisciplinarity of climate issues, scholar Pan saw climate negotiations primarily from the perspective of “interest conflicts among nations” (sentence 75). Lü and Pan are high-level officials who are highly likely to view climate change from the perspective of interest conflicts among nations rather than Pan, a researcher at a renowned national research institute, who is expected to be aware of its complexity and interdisciplinarity. This seems a little odd. It may imply that Chinese academics needed to do more work in order to catch up with the up-to-date research on climate change.

Expert Xu mentioned the “*international image*” that influenced international climate cooperation. It is indeed an important driving force of China’s foreign policy. Scholars concluded that “enhancing China’s international image and elevating its international stature are important goals of Chinese foreign policy” (Zhang 2003: 78). In foreign affairs, China views itself as a major world power and wants to be seen as a responsible and constructive member of the world community (Hao 1992: 32-33; Perlack et al. 1993: 86; Johnston 1998: 559-566; Oksenberg and Economy 1999: 21-22). Compared with most countries, China is particularly sensitive to external criticisms of its policy and behavior in international regimes and will go out of its way to avoid diplomatic isolation and international censure (Zhang 2003: 78).

In the last part of the analysis, a new *framing of “hegemony”* is observed. Xu criticized that “there are still very few developed countries that cannot face up to their historical responsibilities in the current process of the international community’s cooperation in addressing climate change and set various conditions and obstacles in providing financial support and technology transfer to developing countries.” He further commented in sentence 92 that “there are still very few developed countries that *separate* historical and realistic responsibilities to look at the future emission responsibilities of large developing countries, *ignore* the gap in per capita emissions and compare the total national emissions one-sidedly, *ignore* the need of developing countries to develop their economies, eliminate poverty, and adapt to climate change, and *force* developing countries to reduce emissions prematurely and radically, thus *use* international climate cooperation as a strategic means to curb the rise of developing countries. All of this is hegemonic thinking and power logic of international climate cooperation.” Xu used “very few developed countries” as a euphemism twice in his criticism. As analyzed above, they are referred to as the U.S. and its alliance. In sentence 92, Xu used five parallel sentences in the attributive clause of “very few developed countries.” These five parallel sentences are led by

verbs of strong and negative emotions, which highlight the criticism against the *hegemony* in international climate cooperation.

Xu's framing of hegemony was actually very representative among Chinese high-level officials, and this narrative was representative of Chinese media around 2009. According to Li Jing's interview with Xie Zhenhua,⁷¹ the old narrative that dominated Chinese media around 2009 was that climate change was a *conspiracy* by developed countries to curb *China's rise*. Apprehension over interference by other countries with China's internal affairs is deeply rooted in the Chinese foreign policy community due to its *semi-colony history* (Harris 2003; Kobayashi 2003; Zhang 2003). It has been a national discourse why China became weak since the late Qing Dynasty, then was defeated in the Opium War, losing its historical glory, and how it could (peacefully) rise and become prosperous and strong again. The discourse is especially reflected in Xi Jinping's thoughts on "China's Dream" and "China's Great National Renaissance" (Central Committee Research Office for Literature 2013). It is, therefore, not difficult to understand why climate change was considered a conspiracy by developed countries to slow down or even stop China's development. The *conspiracy narrative* underwent a change, however. The interview said that during Xie's tenure (2006-2015) China's stance on climate change shifted increasingly from a defense of its "right to emit" to a promotion of low-carbon development as a national strategy, and thus, the old narrative was gradually replaced by a call for an "energy revolution."

After the four parts of the article have been analyzed separately, the analysis will focus on the *actors* represented in the article. The following *actors* of climate justice were represented in the article: "developed countries" (17 times), "very few developed countries" (3 times), "developing countries" (38 times), "major developing countries" (2 times), "the U.S." (3 times), "international community" (7 times), "international organizations" (1 time), "indigenous people" (1 time), and "women's associations" (1 time). It is interesting that China was not designated in the text. It was hidden in the *categorization* of developing countries or major developing countries. China's *identity as a major developing nation* was played down.

From the represented actors, two kinds of *antagonism* were observed. One is between developed and developing countries. The other is antagonism between the few developed countries and big developing countries. Although the antagonism between the U.S. and China is not specified, it is obvious that the U.S. and China are the "very few developed countries" and "major developing countries," respectively. To some extent, the antagonism between developed and developing worlds is

⁷¹https://www.chinadialogue.org.cn/article/show/single/ch/11717-Xie-Zhenhua-China-s-top-climate-negotiator-steps-down?utm_source=chinadialogue+newsletter+%E2%80%93+bilingual&utm_campaign=c8b24767eb-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2019_05_23_03_COPY_02&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_5db8c84b96-c8b24767eb-46475205&mc_cid=c8b24767eb&mc_eid=e062347445 (accessed 15 July 2020)

framed as antagonism between the U.S. and China. Historically, China was not powerful and was seen as a developing country. However, in recent years, China has emerged as a big power in global affairs, especially after the global economic crisis in 2007-2008. China was thrust into the spotlight at the Copenhagen Summit, which serves as the backdrop for this sample text. It marked the first time China attracted such intense attention at an international conference and the first time it was so closely tied to the U.S. in global climate discussions. The two countries have never been so similar or comparable in GDP and carbon emissions. During the climate change negotiations in 2009, a discourse of G2 in terms of climate change was strongly implied (Cheng, 2014). Since the amount of carbon emissions is regarded as a measurement of a country's obligation to climate change and the scale of the economy as a country's capacity to deal with climate change, China and the U.S. were seen as the decisive leaders in dealing with climate change from the perspective of the third party.

When a country accepts the binding obligations, it reflects its willingness to act first, taking the *leadership* in combating climate change globally. Pan works at CASS, one of the most important think tanks to the Chinese central government. Xu works in the National Development and Reform Commission, which is in charge of climate policy and whose leader also serves as the head of the Chinese delegation to the Copenhagen Summit. Their discourses and framing of leadership in climate diplomacy are very representative:

[19] This is particularly important for certain developed countries. Only when these countries make substantial emission reduction commitments and actions can the international community see the hope of further progress. [26] Developed countries facing up to their historical responsibility is the prerequisite for the international community to work together to tackle climate change. (Xu)
[82] Third, climate cooperation requires developed countries to take the lead. (Pan)

In the climate diplomacy China has repeatedly argued that the responsibility for climate change should reside with the developed world and China must not be asked to take mandatory targets before developed states act on their obligations (Harris et al. 2013: 298). Unfortunately, the US hasn't made a good example yet in any way.

The last point of the analysis of this sample text is the idea of climate *cosmopolitanism* and *intergenerational climate justice*, both of which I did not pay enough attention to in the previous sample texts. Pan proposed that "both developed and developing countries need to sacrifice certain current interests to safeguard the common interests of mankind in the future" (sentence 81). He drew this conclusion based on his belief that climate catastrophe will affect both developed and developing countries. Beck argued that climate change also releases a

“cosmopolitan imperative” because the powerful in the world cannot escape from the threats of climate change if the risk becomes greater and greater, although climate change does intensify the existing inequalities between the privileged and non-privileged on a global scale (Beck 2010: 258). Unlike the message in official statements, Pan explicitly pointed out that developing countries also need to sacrifice certain current interests. This discourse is more cooperative than the official antagonism between developing and developed countries. In terms of intergenerational justice, Pan mentioned the possible impact of climate change on the future generation, but did not discuss further how to address the current climate issue for the sake of human offspring.

Text 4.2.1.1-8

Guardian Wrote: The Failure of the Copenhagen Conference Should Be Blamed on Denmark, Not China.

Xinhua News Agency London. 2010-01-02. 003 Top News (ST8/PD11)

This article was published in the top right corner of page 3, “Top News,” in the aftermath of the Copenhagen Summit. Since the issue of climate justice was discussed in the framework of international climate negotiation, this article confined climate justice to the *international domain*. The articles in this location of *People’s Daily* are usually opinion pieces. Therefore, it was an *opinion-based journalistic* piece about the climate negotiations in Denmark. From the title, it is easy to conclude that this is a *framing of blaming* the failure of the Copenhagen Summit. The conference was widely expected to produce a legally binding agreement. However, it left the world an impressions that country blocs were playing deadlock. The result, the “Copenhagen Accord”, was not legally enforceable. The huge gap between the expectations and the final result triggered the pointing of fingers and the blaming game.

In responding to this significant media event, different social actors compete to have their voices heard. Because of the media’s presumed influence, it is “a site on which various social groups, institutions, and ideologies struggle over the definition and construction of social reality” (Gurevitch and Levy 1985: 19). In other words, the media is “an *arena of competition* between actors who claim to say what is and what should be” (Mormont and Dasnoy 1995: 61). In a *Guardian* article published on 20 December 2009, UK Climate Change Secretary Ed Miliband accused China of “hijacking” the conference. He accused China, Sudan, Bolivia, and other left-wing Latin American countries of trying to hijack the summit and “hold the world to ransom” to prevent a deal from being reached.⁷² Miliband’s article provoked an international media storm. This position was backed by Mark Lynas who accused China of

⁷²John Vidal, ‘Ed Miliband: China tried to hijack Copenhagen climate deal,’ *The Guardian*, December 2009 <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2009/dec/20/ed-miliband-china-copenhagen-summit> (accessed 17 November 2009)

wrecking the Copenhagen deal also in a Guardian article⁷³ on 22 December 2009. Maybe out of journalistic professionalism, the *Guardian* published a counter-response. It was titled “Blame Denmark, not China, for Copenhagen failure” and was published by Martin Khor on 28 December 2009.

The present sample text reported by *Xinhua News Agency* in London and *People’s Daily* once again adopted *Xinhua’s* report. It has to be pointed out that no Chinese media, including *Xinhua News Agency*, was as resourceful as international media, such as the *New York Times* and the *Guardian*. It is not rare for Chinese media to translate reports of their international peers and publish them in Chinese. The international media landscape has an *asymmetrical* flow.

The sample text is almost a Chinese-translated summary of Martin Khor’s article in The *Guardian*. Only a few paragraphs were deleted. Therefore, the sample text primarily reflected Khor’s opinions. Martin Khor is a journalist, activist, and economist. According to public records, he served on the Board of the South Centre (1996-2002) and as its Executive Director (2009-2018).⁷⁴ Khor was formerly a member of the UN Committee on Development Policy, the UN Secretary General’s Task Force on Environment and Development, and the Vice Chair of the Expert Group on the Right to Development of the UN Human Rights Commission.⁷⁵ In a tribute to Khor, he was described as “a prominent thinker and one of Malaysia’s famous sons whose expertise was often sought by governments and organizations.”⁷⁶ Akyüz and Kozul-Wright (2020) wrote that Khor was “a staunch multilateralist but not an advocate of globalization.” He knew that developing countries could not have fair deals with developed countries in the international economic system. Khor also believed that multilateral rules and practices were unbalanced and designed to subject developing countries to the discipline of unfettered international markets. Thus, his efforts focused on reshaping multilateral rules and practices to bring about systemic changes in the service of development.

Knowing Khor’s political positions it is easy to understand why he criticized Denmark for hijacking the conference. Denmark selected a small group of developed countries and convened a meeting of 26 leaders in the last two days of the conference in an attempt to override the negotiations among 193 countries throughout the two weeks. From Khor’s perspective, the UN climate convention did not mandate the “exclusive meeting.” The result of this meeting, the “Danish text,” he wrote, “would violate the *multilateral* treaty-based process.” As an advocate of

⁷³Mark Lynas, ‘How do I know China wrecked the Copenhagen deal? I was in the room,’ The Guardian, December 2009 <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2009/dec/22/copenhagen-climate-change-mark-lynas> (accessed 17 November 2024)

⁷⁴Tribute to Martin Khor, The South Centre <https://www.southcentre.int/tribute-to-martin-khor/> (accessed 17 November 2020)

⁷⁵More tributes to Martin Khor <https://www.nst.com.my/news/nation/2020/04/580237/condolences-pour-late-martin-khor> (accessed 17 November 2020)

⁷⁶<https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2020/04/02/tok-mat-pays-tribute-to-civil-society-advocate-martin-khor> (accessed 17 November 2024)

multilateralism, Khor fought for a *fair and just* climate change negotiation process under the UN mechanism for developing countries. The *procedural justice* of climate change refers to the adoption of fair procedures and inclusive framework in the decision-making process in international negotiations between nation-states. There are three principles of procedural justice (Grasso 2011: 366). The first one, recognition, is the foundation of procedural justice. The second principle, participation, encompasses the involvement, the right to information and to be heard in policy making, and the right to a general view of the enforcement of laws. The final principle concerns the distribution of power, which should ensure that every negotiation party has the knowledge and skills necessary to take an active part in planning, decision-making, and governance. The exclusive meeting criticized by Khor mainly violated the second principle of procedural justice. Although the exclusive meeting was, to some extent, also “multilateral,” 26 countries participated, but they were exclusively developed countries. Within the UNFCCC mechanism, all countries, especially the developing countries, can best participate in the procedure and best protect their interests. In the *unequal international political and economic system*, the UN mechanism seems to be the best framework for developing countries to fight for their rights to development.

In addition to concerns about procedural justice, Khor also pointed out that “the Copenhagen Accord's lack of ambition is largely due to its failure to include any medium-term emission reduction commitments by developed countries” (sentence 16). Besides, “there is no credible plan for developed countries to provide developing countries with the funds and technology to help them achieve low-emission development” (sentence 22). These criticisms refer to *corrective justice* that emphasizes that some actors may owe restitution because of their roles in past failures.

Although the sample text is almost a Chinese translation of the original article, there are places where the *intertextuality* and its implications can be explored.

Table 18: Comparisons Between the Original Article and the Xinhua Report

Original in English	Xinhua report in Chinese
The unwise attempt by the Danish presidency to impose a non-legitimate <u>meeting</u> to override the legitimate multilateral process was <u>the reason why</u> Copenhagen will be considered a disaster.	[15] The article pointed out that the attempt by the Danish presidency to impose a non-legitimate <u>outcome</u> to override the legitimate multilateral process was “ <u>the root cause</u> why Copenhagen will be considered a disaster.”

Khor stressed the fact that the meeting convened by Denmark was not legitimate. That is to say, the focus was the meeting itself. However, the *Xinhua*

report focused on the outcome, namely the “Danish text.” In the translated report *Xinhua*, the correspondent used quotation marks to highlight the last sentence, enhancing the blame on Denmark. In addition, the correspondent replaced “the reason” with “the root cause.” This also strengthened the degree of *blame*.

It is worth pointing out that the *Xinhua* report used “Guardian wrote” in the title. In fact, the *Guardian* published Ed Miliband’s article that blamed China for hijacking the conference. And it was this article that triggered the battle of finger-pointing in international media. Although each newspaper has its own political alignment, it is also a basic principle that at least the quality newspapers try to represent different opinions on the same issue. To be accurate, the article that was written by Martin Khor does not necessarily represent *the Guardian’s* opinion. That is to say, although Khor supported China, it does not mean that the *Guardian* did. We cannot find out why Khor’s authorship was replaced by *the Guardian’s* in the title of the *Xinhua* report. What is certain is that the *Guardian* is a worldwide renowned media outlet. Replacing the authorship of an individual with that of a renowned newspaper could make the statement or opinion more powerful and influential. Therefore, it could make the voice of supporting China much stronger.

Another interesting instance of *intertextuality* is that the last sentence of the original text was omitted in the *Xinhua* report. The sentence is:

The bottom-up democratic process is slower but also steadier, compared to the top-down attempt to impose a solution by a few powers that will always lack legitimacy in decision-making and success or sustainability in implementation.

According to the context of the original text, the *bottom-up democratic process* refers to the UNFCCC process. The *top-down* attempt is Denmark’s failed meeting of a small group of developed countries. In fact, China has always supported the UNFCCC mechanism. It is strange that *Xinhua’s* correspondent did not include this sentence in the news report. It is hard to know whether it was deliberately omitted. A possible explanation could be offered from the perspective of language usage of “bottom-up” and “top-down” in China. In China’s political and social context, the phrase “top-down” is often linguistically related to the authority of the (central) government, whereas “bottom-up” is linguistically used to recall social movement, highlighting the power of the bottom. In the original text, the “bottom-up” process was described by Khor as “slower but also steadier,” and the “top-down” attempt was described as “lack(ing) legitimacy.” Considering that climate change policy is carried out in a *top-down manner* in China, describing top-down as lacking legitimacy and advocating a bottom-up solution may reduce the authority of top-down policies, thus being judged by *Xinhua* as not conforming to the government’s guidelines of addressing climate change.

Text 4.2.1.1-9

*China's Policies and Actions for Addressing Climate Change 2011 released
Compulsive Objectives Manifest China's Determination.*

Yang Ou. 2011-11-23. 002 Top News (ST9/PD14)

This article was published five days before the opening of the UN Climate Change Conference in Durban in November 2011. This report covered the press conference to announce the release of the white paper "China's Policies and Actions for Addressing Climate Change 2011" on page 2, "Top News." The full content of the white paper was published on page 15 and 16. Xie Zhenhua, the Deputy Director of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), hosted the press conference.

The white paper concerns China's determination to promote low-carbon development and active response to climate change. The sample text contains 15 full sentences. "Five-Year Plans of China" appears 7 times, including "12th Five-Year Plan" 5 times, and "11th Five-Year Plan" and "10th Five-Year Plan" once each. The title refers to China's policies and actions against climate change. However, Xie said at the press conference that it was believed that China would be able to complete the targets of energy saving, emission reductions, and control of GHG emissions outlined in the "12th Five-Year Plan." Xie correlated the binding targets of emission reductions with the Five-Year Plans several times at the press conference. It seemed that the white paper "China's Policies and Actions for Addressing Climate Change 2011" was designed to ensure the fulfillment of the "12th Five-Year Plan." As discussed in the theoretical chapter, one of the driving forces of China's climate policy and diplomacy is its *national economic interests*. Despite China's active participation in international climate governance, some scholars believe that it does so only out of its "no regrets" policy (Hatch 2003; Zhang 2003; Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2015). A "no regrets" policy means China takes action, regardless of whether the threat of climate change is real...Some even conclude that China's achievements in curbing the growth of GHG emissions have been realized through "no regrets" strategies (Zhang 2003: 72). The National Development and Reform Commission is crucial in making Five-Year Plans. Xie's double duties as the NDRC's Deputy Director and the Head of the Chinese Delegation to Copenhagen also implied that China's climate diplomacy serves the needs of its national economic and social development. The Five-Year Plans are a series of economic and social development initiatives issued for five years under the leadership of the Communist Party of China.

The Outline of the 12th Five-Year Plan (2011-2015) was adopted in March 2011 by the National People's Congress. It stated the following compulsive objectives to address climate change during the 12th Five-Year Plan period:

(1) By 2015, carbon dioxide emissions per unit of GDP will be reduced by 17 percent, and energy consumption per unit of GDP will be reduced by 16 percent compared to 2010.

(2) The proportion of non-fossil energy consumption to primary energy consumption would be increased to 11.4 percent.

(3) The acreage of new forests would increase by 12.5 million ha, the forest coverage rate would rise to 21.66 percent, and the forest growing stock would increase by 600 million cu m.

The white paper “China's Policies and Actions for Addressing Climate Change 2011” adopted all these compulsive objectives. Something very *different* regarding climate change policy in the 12th Five-Year Plan and this white paper is that the objectives are *compulsive*, as the author of this report emphasized in the title. The previous analysis of sample texts about the Copenhagen Summit showed that the Chinese government refused any binding and compulsive targets. Two years after the summit, a *change in the discourse* in media reports was observed, although these compulsive objectives are still confined within China and will not be subject to the MRV mechanism. The motivation and consideration behind this change is explained by what is in the white paper. Influenced by President Hu Jintao's theories of “scientific development,” the government decided to “foster the concept of green and low-carbon development and take addressing climate change as an important strategy for its economic and social development as well as an important opportunity for economic restructuring and the transformation of its economic development pattern” (White Paper 2011).

The objectives of the 12th Five-Year Plan reflect several different principles of *distributive justice* of climate justice. For example, stressing the emission per-unit GDP as well as energy consumption per-unit GDP refers to the *carbon intensity* principle approach. It forces countries to find solutions that allow further growth while minimizing the impact on the climate. Since hard caps are regarded as limitations on development, and the carbon intensity approach does not impose a “hard cap” on total emissions, it creates greater opportunities for developing countries to buy-in (Roberts and Parks 2007: 140-151). Increasing the forest coverage is concerned with forest carbon sink. A *carbon sink* is a reservoir that absorbs more carbon than it releases and thereby reduces the concentration of CO₂ in the air. Forests and oceans are the most important carbon sinks. Since carbon emissions can be traded, raising forest coverage actually increase the volume and capacity of the forest to absorb carbon, thus increasing the space to emit GHG emissions. In the spirit of the late liberal philosopher John Rawls, this object implies the approach of “*right to pollute*” to climate justice (Bond 2012: 196-7; Chatterton 2013: 607).

An *alternative* discourse on carbon emission was found in this sample text. At the press conference Xie said:

[9]... China's current greenhouse gas emissions are indeed very large, and the increase rate is also very fast; this is a fact. [10] China is taking active measures to slow down the growth rate of greenhouse gases and strive to achieve the peak of CO₂ emissions as soon as possible....[12] As a developing country, China must effectively control the growth rate of emissions while developing, and it will achieve the peak before the per capita GDP reaches 40,000 US dollars.

One of the official *framings* observed in the previous sample texts is that China is a developing country, and it has the right to development. Therefore, demanding China to reduce emissions prevents China from developing and rising. In this framing, China's identity as a developing is highlighted. However, China is also a big developing country, so its future emissions are expected to be very large if it continues on the same development path. Since the government has tried to talk about the peak date of carbon emissions, it is unknown whether it will take action to tackle the fast increase in future emissions. This is *ignored* in the media's framing. Unlike previous media reports, this report covered the government's positive attitude toward the *peaking*. Xie mentioned \$40,000. This is the value of per capita GDP when most developed countries achieved the peak of emissions. Sentence 12 implies that China will *not follow the path* of developed countries.

With regard to the peaking of emissions, it is necessary to come back to the Copenhagen Summit while conducting an analysis of *intertextuality*. Setting a peak date for developing countries whose emissions are expected to rise rapidly was a key issue for negotiations in Copenhagen. Although think tanks and research groups estimated that the emissions peak could occur between 2020 and 2050 in China, the Chinese government had not officially discussed the peak date before. In fact, China was not interested in this issue since the peaking of emissions is concerned with a hard cap on emissions, in other words, limitation on development, which was by no means in China's interest. However, what is interesting is that Wan Gang, the former Minister of Science and Technology, spoke exclusively to the *Guardian*. He told the newspaper that the peak would definitely come between 2030 and 2040.⁷⁷ According to Yang Ailun, the Head of Climate and Energy of Greenpeace China, it was the first time an official at ministerial level confirmed the peak range. Although a ministerial-level official mentioned the peak date, Wan's comment was not official policy, as it was stressed in the interview. There is no clear indication of the origin of the Chinese report about the Wan interview.

Since it was the first time a Chinese high-level official talked about peak dates publicly, it is worth investigating if the mainstream media in China covered the news. I entered the keywords "Minister Wan Gang," "Peak," and "Copenhagen" in Chinese into the Google search engine. Since the issue of peak dates is so important and

⁷⁷ <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2009/dec/06/china-carbon-emissions-copenhagen-climate> (accessed 24 August 2020)

Wan is a ministerial-level official, a report on his interview with international media would be expected to draw attention from authoritative and mainstream media institutions, such as *Xinhua News Agency*, *People's Daily*, or the like. However, it seems not to be the case. Some decent online news platforms carried the news about Wan's interview with the *Guardian*, and the original sources were *Wuhan Evening Post* and *Shanghai Evening Post* or even unknown sources (see Appendix, Wan's interview part I). These two sources are tabloid newspapers and not as influential as broadsheets. Another two online news platforms also published about the interview. One was the People's Daily online, and the other was QQ News (see Appendix, Wan's interview part II). Both are quality sources and very influential online news providers in China. However, the links cannot be opened, and I was forwarded to the main pages of both platforms. In other words, the reports on Wan's interview were *deleted* or *hidden* on both platforms. This is very surprising. The fact is that regional newspapers like *Wuhan Evening Post* and *Shanghai Evening Post* were not capable of getting first-hand information about Wan's interview. In addition, this interview took place in Copenhagen, which makes it impossible for both newspapers to be the original sources of such an interview. They simply do not have the capacity or the network. Given that the content of the coverage of Wan's interviews in both newspapers is very similar, it is assumed that they might have drawn upon a general wire copy by a news agency like Xinhua. Of course we cannot prove this, but it can be concluded that the government regarded Wan's interview and his opinion on peak date as *inappropriate* or even *sensitive*. That's why we cannot find relevant reports from the most influential media channels, considering that information spreads unbelievably fast on the internet, it is not easy to delete all digital traces of the report online. Last but not least, supporting evidence proves that Wan's interview was considered sensitive. A researcher, He Jijiang, once publicly discussed his postdoctoral research experience with He Jiankun, Director and Professor of the Institute of Low Carbon Economy at Tsinghua University. He Jiankun was also the vice president of Tsinghua University at that time, one of the top two universities in China. He was Deputy Director of the National Expert Committee of Climate Change. He also led a joint research program between Tsinghua and MIT on the possibility of reaching the peak by 2030. He Jiankun belongs to a group of policymakers on the issue of peak dates. Since He Jijiang worked in this group, he is also an insider regarding relevant policy about peak date. He Jijiang mentioned that Minister Wan Gang was requested not to publicly express his opinion on peak dates after returning from the UN climate summit⁷⁸. The research group published its research results about peak dates in 2013. In the sample text, Xie Zhenhua, one of the policy makers of climate change in China, mentioned only

⁷⁸ Information about the peak date 'He Jiankun: China's carbon emissions will peak around 2025, and the share of non-fossil energy will reach 50% by 2050': <http://www.tanjiayoi.com/article-21037-1.html> (accessed 17 November 2024)

that China will try to reach the peak as soon as possible. In other words, Minister Wan leaked the peak date to the media too early, and because it was foreign media it was hidden.

It is widely agreed that the Chinese government officially announced the peak date in 2014 when U.S. President Obama visited China under Xi Jinping's presidency. The "U.S.-China Joint Announcement on Climate Change" on 12 November 2014 said that "China intends to achieve the peaking of CO₂ emissions around 2030 and to make best efforts to peak early and intends to increase the share of non-fossil fuels in primary energy consumption to around 20% by 2030."⁷⁹

After the central government made the peak date public, some high-level research projects (Jiang et al. 2016; Zhou et al. 2017) were conducted to argue for different scenarios of the peak date and the government's goal for climate mitigation. Zhou Dadi, the former Director of the Institute of Energy Research of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), led a "research group on China's implementation of achieving the peak date of carbon emissions as soon as possible." The research report shows an entirely *different discourse* on climate change. As the previous analysis shows, the Chinese government had insisted that climate change was fundamentally an issue of development. That means climate change policy should serve the prime goal of economic and social development. However, in the research report, it is argued that "the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese government attach great importance to climate change issues and see climate change not only as a global environmental and ecological major issue but also a significant question of which development path China will follow" (Zhou et al. 2017: 4). In this narrative, climate change is no longer inferior to development. Instead, it equates to development. Positively combating climate change means proper and sustainable development and vice versa. Furthermore, the report says that whether China can properly deal with climate change depends on whether the New Five Development Concepts⁸⁰ by the Communist Party of China can be realized (Zhou et al. 2017: 4). Previous analysis shows that requests from other countries for China to address climate change were perceived by the Chinese government as a *conspiracy* to prevent China from rising. This *framing was changed* in 2017. The report from Zhou's research group explicitly states that "China is moving towards the center of international political and economic activities, and it is bound to *take greater international responsibilities*" (Zhou et al. 2017: 11).

For China, the *CBDR principle* is the fairest and most just way to deal with climate change. Based on this principle, developing nations can take voluntary

⁷⁹U.S.-China Joint Announcement on Climate Change, from the White House press office, December 2014

<https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/11/us-china-joint-announcement-climate-change> (accessed 17 November 2024)

⁸⁰ At the Fifth Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in October 2015, the Party called for "development that is innovative, coordinated, green, open, and inclusive."

actions instead of making binding commitments. This principle has long been a guideline for the Chinese government in addressing climate change. The research group led by Zhou and co-authors (2017: 7) called this position mitigation actions “with no regrets” or “without shame.” Feeling regretless implies that China thinks it is right to do so. However, the basic principle seemed to have changed in 2017. The research report says that with the development of China’s economy and the increase in carbon emissions, it rapidly becomes urgent to reach the peak globally, and “it is now an urgent moment that China must take intensified actions to limit emissions” (Zhou et al. 2017: 7). The modal verb “must,” together with the two adjectives “intensified” and “urgent,” signify a change in the mitigation actions towards binding obligations, which the Chinese government refused 8 years ago. This change demonstrates that the Chinese government also *adjusts* its positions on climate politics, although it has insisted on some principles.

This longer analysis of *intertextuality* demonstrates the broader social and political background of how the ruling party and government make and communicate climate policy in China. The analysis reveals that the central government and CPC took *different positions* toward the expected peaking date in 2009 when the peak date was one of the central issues at the Copenhagen Summit. Despite the discrepancy in accurate peak date within the government, there is consistency in climate policy. Party leaders and government officials have been taking climate change seriously. Although Minister Wan Gang, a non-communist party member, revealed the confidential information of the peak date too early and was asked not to talk about it publicly again, seemingly his political career was not impacted. On 30 November 2015, he attended the “Mission Innovation: Accelerating the Clean Energy Revolution,” which was attended by government heads of other countries on behalf of President Xi Jinping.⁸¹

It took China five years from the Copenhagen Summit to make its commitment publicly and binding, mainly because it was not sure about its future development conditions. The uncertainties lie in four aspects: speed of economic development and industrial structures, demographical development and rate of urbanization, technological innovation, and energy structures, as stated by Xu Huaqing, an expert in the Chinese delegation to Durban in 2011.⁸² For China, it is not a question of whether it takes action to mitigate climate change. It is a question of when and how.

Text 4.2.1.1-10

*The first round of climate change negotiations this year ended without results
Developed Nations Are Not Willing to Be Responsible for Global Warming.
Huang Fahong, Zheng Hong. 2013-05-06. 022 International (ST10/PD16)*

⁸¹ http://www.most.gov.cn/kjbgz/201512/t20151210_122822.htm (accessed 08 September 2020)

⁸² <http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20130521/022915527141.shtml> (accessed 08 September 2020)

This report consists of two parts. The news report is followed by a comment by Chen Ying, a researcher and the Deputy Director of Sustainable Development at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). Looking closer at the sample text, the first part is more or less *opinion-based*. The first line of the headline in bold is descriptive, saying the climate negotiation failed. It is then followed by the second line, written in bigger font, which is the main headline. The main title alone could be both factual and opinion. Since it followed the fact that the negotiation was a failure, based on the *coherence* of the sentence, the main title is easily interpreted as an ascription to the failure of the negotiation in this context. Two sentences in the headline display a *blaming frame*.

A rough statistic of the representation of social actors in the report was collected. The table below shows that a wide range of actors were represented. This sample text mentioned the least developed and island countries for the first time. However, developing and developed countries were represented 13 and 14 times, respectively. Considering the intensity of the representation of different actors, the *antagonism* between the two blocs is apparent. UNFCCC, as a collective international actor, includes different mechanisms within its framework, such as the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, the Doha Climate Change Conference, the Kyoto Protocol, and the Bali Roadmap. The statistics indicate that climate issue was talked about in the *international domain* with a focus on climate diplomacy. And again, the report was published in the context of UN climate negotiations. Climate negotiation has become a *discursive battlefield* in which different actors fight to be represented in the media.

Table 19: Representation of Social Actors in ST10

Developed countries	Developing countries	Least developed countries and island countries	Identified experts	Unidentified experts
14	13	1	1	2
International Politicians	National Politicians	UNFCCC	China	USA
2	2	13	2	1
News institutions	International organizations	Representatives of international organizations	National research institutions	International research institutions
1	2	2	1	1

The previous sample texts normally appeared shortly before or when the UN climate change conferences, usually in November or December. Unlike those sample texts, this report was published in May 2013 on page 22 instead of on one of the first three pages, implying that it is not as important as the other reports in this

analysis. It is necessary to look at the *wider social practice* in which the communicative event took place (Fairclough 2003). The report covered the second session of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP), which took place between 29 April and 3 May 2013 in Bonn, Germany. It drew attention from the media because it focused on the Durban Platform agreed in 2011. The conference held in Durban agreed to start negotiations on a legally binding deal comprising all countries, to be adopted in 2015. This meant that the ADP included developing countries, such as China and India, and the U.S. for the first time in the UNFCCC process. The Doha Climate Conference in 2012 ended with an agreement to reify the Durban Platform, meaning that a successor to the Kyoto Protocol was set to be developed by 2015 and implemented by 2020. The Kyoto Protocol was the only binding agreement in the world. However, China, along with other big developing countries, is not subject to binding emissions reductions under the Protocol. The U.S. never ratified the Protocol. Therefore, it was almost impossible to make fundamental reductions within the framework of this mechanism. The Durban Platform was seen as a prospective replacement for the Kyoto Protocol, which would be a *big change* in the UNFCCC process.

The Kyoto Protocol differentiated between developing and developed countries in terms of emission targets. As a developing country, China was long “protected” by the Kyoto Protocol, meaning it had no binding reduction obligations. Since the Durban Platform included China and it was unclear how it would work, nations tried to fight for their own interests within the new mechanism.

[12] China’s chief negotiator for climate change, Su Wei, said that these propositions from developed countries reflected their unwillingness to continue the principles of the Convention and their consistent position of trying to evade historical responsibilities. “Developing countries will never accept it.” ... [14] Developed countries must reduce emissions substantially while developing countries should reduce emissions as much as possible in the process of sustainable development. [15] These statements embody the principles of “fairness” and “common but differentiated responsibilities.”

It is clear that China worried that the CBDR principle would be abandoned. Su Wei used the modal verb “must” to describe developed countries’ reduction obligations. In terms of developing countries’ contribution, Su used the modal verb “should,” which means the contribution is not necessarily an obligation or binding. Although the Durban Platform included China, the country still tried to avoid making a binding commitment. As the previous analysis shows, it was not until 2014 that China officially announced its willingness to accept binding reduction targets. The UN climate conference was still a *battlefield* of media discourses and climate

diplomacy. Substantial actions to deal with climate change were not communicated at the conference.

Applying Fairclough's three-dimensional CDA model, I look at the discursive practice. To be specific, I explore how the text is produced, distributed, and consumed. Besides the quotations from China's delegation head, Su Wei, and UNFCCC's Executive Secretary, Christiana Figueres, the two journalists also drew upon statements of NGO representative Sven Harmeling, team leader of international climate policy of Germanwatch. Germanwatch is a non-profit NGO committed to sustainable global development, which means socially equitable, ecologically sound, and economically stable.⁸³ Su and Figueres were quoted once and Harmeling twice.

[31][...]Sven Harmeling said: "The negotiations in Bonn showed that almost no country thought that the world's climate protection goals should be substantially increased. [32] In the past few years, many climate protection laws have been passed in the world, especially in developing countries. The core question now is how these measures can be widely used."

[35]"The core issues include higher climate protection targets in developed countries by 2020, more climate protection commitments from developing countries, [...]"

In sentence 31, Harmeling mildly criticized that climate protection goals of almost all countries were not enough. China was, of course, one of them. The first part of sentence 32 was an acknowledgement of developing countries' climate protection. However, the second half of that sentence implicitly implied that those laws and measures had not been well executed. In the last sentence of the main body of this report, the journalists again drew upon Harmeling regarding future obligations of all countries to combat climate change (sentence 35). Harmeling once again stressed that developing countries should make stronger commitments, which implied that the current commitments of developing countries, including China, were not enough. In all these three sentences, the journalists from *People's Daily* quoted criticisms made by an international NGO, though these criticisms were not directly aimed at China. It is *unusual* to observe this kind of discursive practice in the *People's Daily* newspaper, namely expressing *alternative* or even *different voices*. However, these criticisms are very mild and only indirectly referred to China; they cannot change the basic tune of this report, which, in general, sets up a *blaming frame*.

In the second part of this report, Chen Ying from CASS commented on the understanding of fairness. He stressed "common but differentiated responsibilities,"

⁸³ GermanWatch mission statement
<https://germanwatch.org/en/mission-statement> (accessed 17 November 2024)

which “suggests something like an *ability-to-pay* conception of responsibility for mitigation and the financing of adaptation to climate change” (Moellendorf, 2012: 136). In addition, Chen emphasized that “how to protect the rights of developing countries to ‘equitable access to sustainable development’ would be an inevitable focus issue in future negotiations.” This is a claim for the “*right to development*” principle. Meanwhile, Chen underlined that developed countries should not escape their *historical responsibilities*. As a researcher affiliated with CASS, Chen’s opinions are in line with China’s official positions on climate politics.

Text 4.2.1.1-11

Combating Climate Change, More Obligations from Developed Countries.
Specially appointed correspondent Wang Hailin, Hou Lulu.
2014-12-09. 003 Top News (ST11/PD18)

This report was published during the UN climate conference in Lima in 2014. Like with previous sample texts, the media paid more attention to the climate issue when UN climate summits took place. Again, it implies that these summits play an important role in climate communication in China. This news report was on page 3, “Top news,” revealing its importance. A possible reason could be that the Lima Climate Conference mainly discussed the central issues towards reaching an agreement in Paris the following year. Since the background of this sample text is a UN climate conference once again, climate justice is then discussed in the *international domain*, specifically, international climate diplomacy.

Journalists Wang and Hou were specially appointed to cover this conference by *People’s Daily*. According to publicly available information,⁸⁴ Wang and Hou were *People’s Daily* journalists in Brazil. They were sent to Peru to cover the Lima conference. The strong network and ability to allocate are advantages of state-owned media.

The headline of this report indicates that it is an opinion-based journalistic piece concerned with the core issue of climate justice, namely the distribution of responsibility. The article consists of four parts in a certain sequence. The first part is a summary of the report. The second sentence of the first part of the report states that there were “continuous differences between developing and developed countries,” which highlighted the *antagonism* between the related stakeholders of climate issue.

The other three parts of the report were led by bold headings that indicated the central theme of each part. The headlines of the second, third, and fourth part are: Green Climate Fund still has a large deficit; Western countries haven’t done enough;

⁸⁴ News site with information about the two journalists
<http://world.people.com.cn/n/2014/0829/c1002-25569192.html> (accessed 17 November 2024)

Developed countries should make greater commitments. The second part pointed out a problem in the climate negotiations, followed by the third part, which ascribed the reason for the problem to the insufficient actions of western countries. The last part suggested what the developed countries should do to fix the problem. Framing is the “process of culling a few elements of perceived reality and assembling a narrative that highlights connections among them to promote a particular interpretation” (Entman 2007: 164). Organizing the content in this sequence presents a *blaming frame* to the audience.

The voices that are represented matter. The following table shows how frequently different social actors were represented.

Table 20: Representation of Social Actors in ST11

Developed countries	Developing countries	Least developed countries and island countries	Identified experts	Unidentified experts
17	19	1	1	1
International Politicians	National Politicians	International mechanisms and arrangements	International organizations and its representative	
4	2	17	2	
EU	Australia	Germany	USA	China
3	1	1	5	2

Developed and developing countries were most frequently represented in the text. They were followed by international mechanisms, including the Green Climate Fund, which was represented 9 times. It can be observed that there is great antagonism between the two nation blocs regarding the Green Climate Fund. International politicians were more frequently represented and drawn upon in this sample text than national politicians. Four international politicians with a brief that focused on the environment mentioned were from Indonesia, Brazil, Sudan, and Germany. All of them were drawn upon either to criticize developed countries that had not done enough or to require them to make significant commitments. The politician from Germany was Romeo Bertolini, a climate policy adviser at the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development. Interestingly, he was drawn upon to criticize developed countries’ inaction regarding the Green Climate Fund. Bertolini pointed out that “main industrialized countries should take effective measures in terms of mitigation and low carbon development.” Since Bertolini was, to some extent, representative of the developed world, the *People’s Daily* made its criticism of developed countries more convincing by drawing upon Bertolini’s voice rather than just the voices of representatives from developing countries. In sentence

31, a professor from Norway was quoted to criticize the U.S. and some European countries that did not fulfill their commitments. Again, quoting a professor from Western academia better supports *People's Daily's* criticism of the West than quoting a professor from China or other developing countries.

Although the report discussed the responsibilities of the developed world, its focus was *on financial and technological support* rather than mitigation, which is the focus in many sample texts:

[7] In an interview with our reporter, Asep Sukiharda,⁸⁵ the head of the Environmental Services and Resources Protection Agency of the Ministry of Environment and Forestry of Indonesia, pointed out that Indonesia and other developing countries have abundant resources that many developed countries develop and make use of. However, developed countries cannot just exploit resources without making corresponding returns and compensations to these developing countries. Developed countries have the responsibility to provide financial and technical support for developing countries to deal with climate change.

This Indonesian official framed a causal relationship between developing countries' use of natural resources and the developed countries' obligation and responsibility to grant compensation. It reflects a perspective of *ecological debt* towards climate justice. In late November 2001, a group of scholars and activists from the global South met in the African nation of Benin to articulate a position on the so-called ecological debt, similar to the ecologically unequal exchange idea. Spanish economist Joan Martinez-Alier and the Ecuadorean environmental group Accion Ecologica developed the argument. They believe that wealthy nations have accrued enormous debt over centuries by exploiting poor nations' raw materials and ecosystems. The debt encompasses both the historical and modern exploitation of non-Western natural resources and the excessive use of "environmental space" for dumping waste. Based on this idea, it is justified for developing countries to request financial compensation from developed countries.

In this sample text, the justice principle of *historical responsibility* is also stressed. An interviewee from Sudan said, "[...] developed countries have historical responsibility, and developing countries are victims" (sentence 24). A similar wording is found in the interview with Su Wei, Deputy Head of the Chinese Delegation. Su said developed countries were "the biggest beneficiaries and parties of historical responsibilities" (sentence 30). Defining developing and developed countries as "victims" and "beneficiaries," respectively, highlighted the *antagonism* between these two blocs.

Some other sample texts from *People's Daily* quoted international politicians without identifying whether the quotation is from a first-hand or second-hand source.

⁸⁵ Since the original name is not given in the report, the translated name in the analysis may not be the right name of that person.

It is noteworthy in this sample text that it drew upon a variety of first-hand sources by stressing “xxx (name of interviewee) told our newspaper that [...]” The interviewees’ *identities* are wide-ranging. There are governmental representatives from Indonesia, Brazil, China, Sudan, and Germany, non-governmental representatives from Ethiopia, and experts from Norway. Several original interviews make the report look more professional. However, the report is embedded with a blaming frame, as previous analysis shows. The interviews and quotations from interviewees were appropriated to serve the purpose of making this frame. At the time, the Chinese government had already revealed its ambition to combat climate change, such as announcing a peak date just before the conference in Lima. Therefore, it is surprising that journalists of *People’s Daily* were still stuck on *finger-pointing* rather than problem-solving.

The theoretical discussion shows that one of China’s long-standing positions is its insistence on developing countries’ leadership in combating climate change. In this report, it is found that two journalists drew upon representatives from the International Fund for Agricultural Development to praise *China’s leadership* in developing sustainable energy. The previous chapter discussed how the dual governmental structure makes implementing climate policies in China difficult. However, the central and local government seem to have reached an agreement to develop *sustainable energy*. That is to say, although China is not willing to play the leading role in international climate politics in general, it does not refuse to manifest its effort and ambition in developing sustainable energy.

Text 4.2.1.1-12

Intended Nationally Determined Contributions Manifest China’s Courage to Take on Responsibilities.

Zhong Sheng. 2015-07-02. 021 International (ST12/PD21)

This report is in the top right corner of the international news page, usually reserved for comment on significant international issues. The author is “Zhong Sheng.” It is actually one of the pseudonyms of the column “international comment” in the *People’s Daily* newspaper. “Zhong Sheng” literally means “the voice of bell.” Since the pinyin “Zhong” is a *phonetic pun* that also means “China,” and “Sheng” means “sound, voice.” Therefore, “Zhong Sheng” can be understood as “the voice of China,” indicating that the report represents China’s opinion. The reasons for using this pseudonym were explained by Wu Changsheng and Wang Tian, the former Director and a journalist of the Desk of International Comment at *People’s Daily*, respectively. Wang said in an interview with *People’s Daily* Online in 2009 that with the continuous rise of China’s international status more international affairs involve China. Therefore, the international community expects more from China. Wang pointed out that *People’s Daily*, as China’s authoritative media, must express its

views on important international issues and refute false accusations made by the international community.⁸⁶ The reasons for using pseudonyms for comments are assumed to be (1) the comment is usually the work of the whole editorial desk; (2) the comment is usually very critical and contentious, and no one wants to take the risk of carrying all the responsibilities alone, considering that *People's Daily* is one of the most influential newspapers in China. The use of pseudonyms in the comment is an interesting *journalistic practice*. On the one hand, in order to respond to the rise of China's status, the state-owned media actively makes comments on and expresses its attitudes toward international issues. On the other hand, the editorial board does not want to conduct it more transparently. Instead, the comment was made in the name of a seeming individual rather than a collective identity. However, it could avoid leaving an image of being the mouthpiece of the Party by doing so. Although this report concerned the intended national determined contributions, it was published on the "international" news page. This implied that climate change was regarded as an international rather than a national issue.

The *direct context* of this comment was that on 30 June 2015, China announced "Enhanced actions and measures on climate change—China's Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC)," which was submitted to the Secretariat of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. The broader *social and political setting* was the UN climate conference in Paris later that year. There were a lot of expectations surrounding this conference because it could mark a decisive stage in negotiations towards 2020 and beyond. As Dröge wrote, the Paris Agreement 2015 is the "turning point for the international climate regime" (Dröge 2016). The French government sought to reach a binding agreement with all nations, including the U.S. and China, by the end of the meeting. China was the biggest emitter then and was expected to commit more to the summit. China's rise in status and the growing expectations reflects the *change* in international political economy. As discussed in the theoretical chapter, emerging countries have gained more *power* of discourse due to their increasing importance in the global capitalist system. In some areas, such as climate change, emerging powers have achieved a "veto-player" status (Hurrell and Sengupta 2012: 481). Some even concluded that as the EU is increasingly sidelined, leadership in climate governance "now needs to come from the G2, the US first and China second" (Cléménçon 2010: xxix).

This sample text has seven paragraphs. Except for the first and the last paragraphs, the paragraphs begin with "China," which makes a *parallelism* of paragraphs. The fourth, fifth, and sixth paragraph even begin with "China's 'contribution.'" In the table we see that each sentence that led with "China's 'contribution'" consists of two parallel clauses. The structure of these three leading sentences is identical. Looking at the structure more closely, in the first sentences of

⁸⁶ <http://sh.people.com.cn/n/2012/1115/c346507-17724674.html> (accessed 07 October 2020)

paragraphs 4 and 5, the first clause led with the link verb “be” and the second clause by notional verbs.

Table 21: Parallelism in ST12

Paragraph	Subject	Predicate 1	Predicate 2
P4	China’s “contribution”	is full of details;	and focuses on execution.
	中国“贡献”	内容充实，	重在落实。
P5	China’s “contribution”	is serious and reasonable;	and manifests a sense of responsibility.
	中国“贡献”	严肃合理，	彰显责任。
P6	China’s “contribution”	keeps the overall situation in mind;	and have a long-term view.
	中国“贡献”	胸怀全局，	着眼长远。

Parallelism is the use of components in a sentence that are grammatically the same or similar in their construction, sound, or meaning. From a linguistic perspective, the use of parallel structures in speech or writing allows speakers and writers to enhance clarity, emphasize key points, and contribute to the *persuasive* power of language (Fahnestock 2011). The function of persuasion is obvious in the text. The editorial team tried to argue that China’s contribution to addressing climate change was big enough and described China as a responsible international player.

It is noteworthy in this sample text that many *adjectives* were employed. In linguistics, an adjective is used to modify and provide more detail about a noun or noun phrase. Besides the adjectives used in the table above, the editorial team also wrote that China’s INDC was “realistic, down-to-earth and comprehensive,” and that China’s action was an “excellent” response to the global climate fight (sentence 6). The goals submitted to the UN were “strict,” “tenable,” and “mentionable” (sentence 9). China’s proposed carbon emission intensity and peak date in the INDC were based on “rigorous” research and were the goals of “greatest effort” (sentence 13). All these adjectives were used to argue that China had done a lot to combat climate change.

As the previous analyses show, many sample texts contain a *blaming* frame. To be specific, climate change is highlighted as a global problem, and developed countries are ascribed as the ones who worsen the problem. Therefore, the developed countries should take the lead in problem-solving. However, in this sample text, we see a focus on how China has contributed to the *problem-solving* and how it will do more to tackle this global problem. Criticisms against developed countries can also be found in this sample text. Nevertheless, they were narrated as suggestions rather than simple criticisms. For example, the editorial team wrote that:

[21] Tackling global climate change requires all members of the international community to do their best and work hand in hand. In particular, developed countries should less muddle with their duties, and more show the willingness and sincerity; less play zero-sum games, and more concentrate on pragmatic cooperation.

In comparison to the attribution of climate problems, suggestions are more oriented toward problem-solving. “Hand in hand” implies that China is willing to solve the problem with others, including developed countries. *Cooperation* rather than finger-pointing is stressed here.

In terms of China’s identity, the editorial team explicitly wrote that “China is the biggest developing country and a big emitter of greenhouse gases at the same time” (sentence 5). As the previous analysis shows, *People’s Daily* tends to hide China behind the concept of “developing countries” when it is involved in the distribution of obligations, whereas it stresses China as the leading nation in the developing bloc. It is noteworthy that the editorial team used “a big emitter” although China had been the biggest emitter since 2006/2007. By using the indefinite article “a” instead of the definite article “the,” the sample text played down China’s share of the current carbon emissions. Actually, in all sample texts of *People’s Daily*, no wording identifies China as the biggest emitter of greenhouse gases. I checked all sample texts and found the wording in only two texts from other newspapers. One is “Control the greenhouse effect: developed countries must take more responsibility,” published on 29 September 2008 in the *21st Century Business Herald*; the other is “The government should be responsible for the long-term interests of the people---an Exclusive interview with the Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations Achim Steiner” on 19 November 2009 in *Southern Weekly*. Both newspapers are market-based media institutions.

As far as fairness was concerned, China still insisted on the *CBDR principle*. At the same time, the editorial team wrote in sentence 18 that China stressed a balance of all aspects of combating climate change: mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology, capacity building, transparency, etc. It is noticeable that transparency was mentioned. Transparency is related to the MRV (measurable, reportable, and verifiable) mechanism. Previous analysis shows that China was very sensitive to MRV. It did not accept any monitoring of its effort to deal with climate change and even saw this mechanism as interfering in its internal affairs. Although the sample text did not explicitly explain what transparency meant, the passing mention of this word may be a sign of China’s willingness to contribute more, as it was claimed, to the global effort to deal with climate change.

This editorial team has a unique *linguistic* character. Specifically, it drew upon a lot of expressions and proverbs from Chinese traditional philosophy. These rhetorical expressions were quite often quoted and used by President Xi Jinping under this

presidency. For example, Yán bì xìn, xíng bì guǒ is one of them. It comes from the Analects of Confucius (13.20) and means “Keeping to one’s words and following through in one’s actions.” It is an answer by Confucius to the question of how a person must be in order to deserve to be called a gentleman. The Central Literature Research Office of the Chinese Communist Party published a book in 2013 called “Xi Jinping’s Selected Addresses on China Dream to Realize China’s Great National Renaissance” (Central Committee Research Office for Literature 2013). According to the book, Xi first quoted this expression at the Central Economic Work Conference in December 2012, shortly after becoming the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. The following table shows examples of Xi’s use of this expression on different occasions.

Table 22: Xi Jinping’s Use of Chinese Traditional Philosophy on Different Occasions

Time	Title of the report	Background of the report	Source
2014-07-15	Xi Jinping meets with Russian President Putin: we will keep our words and follow through in actions in Sino-Russian cooperation	6th BRICS summit	China News Service, Xinhua News Agency
2014-08-26	True, Real, Close, Sincere	Xi Jinping held talks with President Mugabe of Zimbabwe in Harare.	People’s Daily
2015-09-28	Bring more confidence and hope to the world (voice of peace)	Xi Jinping attended Leaders’ Summit on Peacekeeping	People’s Daily
2017-01-24	Xi Jinping revealed the details of the conversation with Bach: China will keep its words and follow through its actions in the Winter Olympics	Xi Jinping talked with the International Olympic Committee President Bach in Lausanne, Switzerland and later visited the contest area in Zhangjiakou.	Xinhua News Agency

The sample analyzed was published in July 2015. Before and after this date, Xi Jinping had quoted the Confucian’s words many times. It is noticeable in the table that Xi quoted that expression very often on *diplomatic* occasions.

In the sample text, there is another quotation: Jiǔ céng zhī tái, qǐ yú lèi tǔ, which means that a nine-storied tower rises from a heap of earth. It originated from the Tao Te Ching (chapter 64). According to the preface of “Xi Jinping’s Citations of Classics” (Editorial of People’s Daily and Yang, 2015), Xi has developed his own habit of language use—Xi’s Style—in his speeches by intensively citing from the classics. The above-mentioned quotation was first cited in his speech at the National Conference on Propaganda and Ideological Work in August 2013. The American Sinologist Sam Crane pointed out that Xi Jinping most often cites classical Chinese philosophy to bolster his image as a man of learning and virtue (Crane 2017, 2018). He quite often quotes from Confucianism and Taoism.

China has always been criticized for not making a binding commitment to mitigation goals, which hardly earns the trust of the international community. However, Chinese leaders and officials tend to draw on the ancient wise men and their philosophies to make their claims more credible.

Besides the quotations from Chinese classical philosophy, the sample text also drew upon typical expressions that are widely used in documents of the Communist Party and conferences of party building. Sentence 9 said that China’s climate mitigation goals are “tenable” and “praisable.” The two adjectives are often used together.

Research shows that Xi Jinping likes citing Chinese traditional classics more than his two predecessors. The propaganda department of the Chinese Communist Party also actively matches up Xi’s citations (Kang 2020). From the analysis of *intertextuality*, it is observed that this sample text from *People’s Daily*, mouthpiece of the Party, not only maintained the political positions consistent with the Party, but intentionally imitated the *linguistic style* of the Party’s leader, President Xi.

Looking at the broader *social and political discourse*, the fact that the media drew intensively upon Xi’s speech could be explained as a prelude to the increasingly centralized power of the Communist Party under Xi Jinping since 2012. Although this sample text was published in 2015 and Xi officially proposed that “The Party leads everything” in 2016, research showed that building an all-encompassing Party leadership had been underway since 2012, when Xi was selected as the President of the Party (Xue 2018; Qiushi⁸⁷ Editorial 2020). At the 19th Party Congress in 2017, Xi said that “the Party leads everything,” including the Party, government, army, people and scholars. In fact, this all-encompassing Party leadership was first proposed by Chairman Mao Zedong in 1973. After the Cultural Revolution, Deng Xiaoping proposed separating the Party from the government and society. Scholars point out that the separation does not mean the Party completely gives up its leadership. In principle, the Party leads the whole country. However, the

⁸⁷ Qiushi, literally meaning “seeking truth,” is a political theory journal published by the Central Party School and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. It is the mouthpiece of the Party and is described as the theory journal of the Party.

Party should not take the place of the concrete functions of the government and society (Xu 2013). To put it simply, in Deng's era, the Party had a looser leadership, which was more or less continued by his successors, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. The Party's leadership has been strengthened under Xi Jinping. At the the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) meeting on 7 January 2016, Xi proposed making "The Party leads everything" a political principle again. This principle was then written into the Party Constitution at the 19th Party Congress on 24 October 2017. Later, on 11 March 2018, at the first session of the 13th National People's Congress (NPC), China's national legislature adopted a constitutional amendment, writing "The leadership of the Communist Party of China is the most essential attribute of socialism of Chinese characteristics" into the Constitution.

In the sample text, a typical expression of the language used by the Communist Party of China appears. It is called "balancing domestic development and opening to the outside world," which is part of the six balances in the theory "Scientific Outlook on Development," one of the guiding socioeconomic principles of the CPC. This theory is credited to the former Chinese President Hu Jintao. Hu was in power from 2002 to 2012, and this theory was ratified into the Party Constitution at the 17th Party Congress in 2007. Hu's outlook on scientific development was also added to the amended Constitution at the 13th National People's Congress (NPC) on 11 March 2018. This sample text was published in 2015 during Xi's governance. The fact that the thoughts of Hu were used in this report authored by an editorial team and published during the presidency of Xi indicates that the CPC's policy has a certain *consistency* and *continuity* with regard to both domestic and foreign affairs, no matter who is in power. This is very different from the U.S., where the policy is strongly dependent on which party is in power. This is especially true regarding country's climate policy because the two parties' basic positions towards climate change differ strongly. When the Republicans govern, the climate issue would probably not be prioritized and perhaps even excluded from the political agenda. Even when the Democratic-led government plans to take actions against climate change, its efforts could be stalled by the legislature. For example, the Kyoto Protocol has never been ratified in the U.S. The American political system makes it hard for the nation to engage in global climate cooperation consistently.

The last linguistic characteristic of this sample text is its use of words and phrases that reflect a *global*, *cooperative*, and *cosmopolitan* perspective on addressing climate change. These words and phrases include global climate change, all members of the international community, international cooperation, the international community, global cooperation, global governance of climate change, "Warm and Cold, We Share Together" (Meaning: The whole world is in this together), win-win, global village, common pursuit, all human beings, common cause and combat climate change globally. The expression "Warm and Cold, We Share Together" is the title of China's climate documentary, first presented to the world at

the UN climate conference in Doha in 2012. The documentary calls on mankind to take responsibility for dealing with the consequences of environmental degradation and adopting a path of sustainable development. In comparison with the previous sample texts, this one lacks an antagonistic to the language. Instead of amplifying the different climate positions of developing and developed countries and provoking conflicts between them, this sample text focuses on global climate *interconnectedness* or *cosmopolitan public* (Beck 2010; Chouliaraki 2008; Carvalho 2007a), *solidarity*, and *cooperation*.

This sample text often emphasizes that China will deal with climate change in a Confucian way, namely “keeping to one’s words and following through in one’s actions.” The intertextual analysis reveals a strengthened leadership of the Communist Party of China in Xi era and a continuity in climate policy in China regardless of who is in governance. The editorial team appropriates several linguistic tools to highlight China’s climate goals and its contribution to global climate governance. Putting all these together the editorial seems to channel the information that China, under the leadership of the CPC, is determined to pursue a path of sustainable development and is already prepared to do more under Xi’s governance.

4.2.1.2 Short Summary of the Analysis of People’s Daily

Since almost half of the sample texts I analyzed here are from *People’s Daily*, it is necessary to present a short summary of the analysis of these texts before proceeding with the analysis of sample texts from other newspapers.

Most of the samples were published as “Top News,” either as important news or in commentaries or editorials. This indicates that *People’s Daily* attaches great importance to climate change and climate justice.

In general, discourses on climate change and climate justice are elite discourses (ST2, ST6, ST7). Either the journalists are quite well educated, or the social actors represented are high-level officials, scientists at elite universities and research institutes, or established international NGO representatives from both China and abroad.

People’s Daily mainly framed climate justice as being concerned with developing countries’ *right to industrialize* or to develop (ST3, ST5, ST6, ST8). It is believed to be just that developing countries have the right to complete their industrialization. Industrialization is understood as the best, even the only, way to eliminate poverty and improve people’s quality of life in developing countries.

In the media framing of *People’s Daily* *distributive justice* is highlighted (ST2, ST3, ST4, ST5, ST6). Developed countries are framed as significantly responsible for climate change due to their *historical responsibilities* (ST1, ST2, ST3, ST4, ST6, ST11) for the accumulated GHG emissions. *Compensatory justice* is sometimes mentioned but not often related to China. China requires no compensation from the developed countries. Regarding the African countries that are more vulnerable to the

impact of climate change, compensatory justice is highlighted (ST3). It is interesting to note that *procedural injustice* is mentioned only in ST6. Although procedural (in)justice is one of most important elements of climate justice and is demanded by many developing countries, *People's Daily* seems not to be interested in addressing procedural justice. It has to do with China's role in the international climate negotiations. China is one of the most important global players in international climate politics and more than capable of participating in international climate negotiations.

The distributive justice, compensatory justice, and procedural justice are all represented in *international domain*, especially in climate diplomacy (ST1, ST2, ST3, ST4, ST6, ST7, ST8, ST10). However, the issues of justice, equality, and fairness of climate change in China are not mentioned. Climate justice seems to be *excluded* from the national political agenda.

A *collective* approach is applied in the media framing. That is to say, the discussions of these varieties of climate justice focus on if, which, and how a country or nation-state should be responsible for the carbon emissions caused by human and economic activities to which country or nation-state, and how this issue should be addressed in the current international political and economic system. Individual responsibility is not mentioned in the sample texts.

An *antagonism or a blaming* frame (ST1, ST8, ST10, ST11, ST12) is very popular in the sample texts. *People's Daily* depicts developed countries as irresponsible, on the one hand, and China as a very responsible big country that contributes to a just global climate deal on the other.

The newspaper represents China as an actor with a strong determination to reduce emissions. However, it is considered as injustice if the effort is scrutinized by measurable, reportable, and verifiable (MRV) mechanism (ST5, ST7, ST9). During the presidency of Hu Jintao, the MRV mechanism was even seen as a *conspiracy* used by developed countries to prevent China's rise. China seems less reluctant to talk about climate mitigation transparency and the MRV mechanism under Xi Jinping's governance. The broader social and political background of this change is China's continuous fast development and a huge increase in carbon emissions, as well as the increasing pressure from the outside. The change is also related to China's attempt to build a positive image and seek leadership in international affairs and global climate governance.

4.2.2 Analysis of Science and Technology Daily (STD)

4.2.2.1 Analysis of Samples

Text 4.2.2.1-1

Climate Change and Justice Issue.

Chen Ying, Pan Jiahua. 2008-04-23. 003 Roundup (ST13/STD2)

The text is one of the three sample texts whose titles contain “justice.” The immediate context of this sample text is that the Forum on Climate Change and Science and Technology Innovation was held on 24-25 April 2008 in Beijing. According to the information on the official website of the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST), the ministry was the leading organizer of this forum.⁸⁸ Therefore, it is understandable that *Science and Technology Daily*, the affiliated official newspaper of the MOST, published articles on climate change around the date of the event. Based on information on the MOST’s website, this forum was China’s biggest climate change forum ever hosted. Many other high-level organizations were involved: the Foreign Ministry, the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Environmental Protection, the China Meteorological Administration, CAS, UNDP, UNEP, the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP), World Meteorological Organization (WMO), the China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development, the Danish Government, the China National Petroleum Corporation, the China National Offshore Oil Corporation, the Energy Foundation, and the Chinese Society for Sustainable Development and Administrative Center for China’s Agenda 21 (affiliated with MOST). The forum was generously supported by the Secretariat of UNFCCC. The theme of the event was how to deal with climate change through science and technology. The co-organizers ranged from political to academic, economic, social, and scientific bodies, both national and international organizations. However, grassroots organizations were not included. The discourse on climate change is exclusively an *elite discourse*.

In fact, there are many relevant governmental bodies in China that could have had this large-scale conference on climate change, but MOST was designated to take the lead. These facts reflect a *technological orientation* in climate discourses of the Chinese government. In Chapter 2, the theoretical chapter, it was pointed out that climate change is, first of all, a scientific issue. Climate change policy initially belonged to science and technology governmental departments, such as MOST, the State Environmental Protection Administration⁸⁹ (SEPA), the China Meteorological Administration (CMA), and CAS. MOST was a crucial ministry in climate governance and established a research program on climate change in the 1990s. Its officials have traditionally been sympathetic to environmental concerns (Heggelund 2007: 173).

Compared with the official tech discourse of climate change, the two authors of this sample text introduced a *broader* spectrum of understanding climate change. Chen and Pan state that climate justice can be understood from two angles:

⁸⁸Forum on Climate Change and Science & Technology Innovation COMMUNIQUE https://en.most.gov.cn/pressroom/200804/t20080430_61057.htm (accessed 17 November 2024)

⁸⁹ Since 2008, Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP).

mitigation and adaptation. Regarding the justice issue of climate mitigation, they understood it as “equitable distribution of rights to emission among countries based on each country’s situation” (sentence 4). They mentioned that the “grandfathering principle” has been dominant in the distribution of emission rights since the 1990s, although there are many other alternatives. The discussion in the theoretical chapter pointed out that under this principle, nations should reduce their emissions incrementally from a baseline year. For example, the Kyoto Protocol was based on the “grandfathering principle.” Chen and Pan stated that this principle aligns with the interests of developed countries that have completed industrialization by using the global greenhouse gas emission capacity and will pursue a low-carbon economy. However, it constraints the future emission space of countries still in the industrialization process. Therefore, they criticized the “grandfathering principle” as unjust to developing countries.

The two authors also mentioned that it is meaningful and fair to take *historical responsibility* into consideration when distributing the obligations of emission reduction. However, they believed the “historical responsibility principle” emphasizes “polluters pay” and does not consider the actual needs of countries’ future development at different stages of development. Moreover, a *future-oriented* perspective of climate justice was also observed in the text.

[15] The allocation of emission rights is a development goal formulated to influence the future development model. While historical and practical responsibilities are important, historical emissions have already occurred and cannot be changed. [16] The future development path, however, can be guided by policy measures [...] [19] The pursuit of fairness should focus more on the future [...]

Unlike some sample texts from *People’s Daily* that haggle over historical responsibility and use it as a tool to blame developed countries, these two scholars played down the importance of historical responsibility and focused on the future development of each country. They argue that many people in developing countries still have basic needs that still need to be met. Instead of *finger-pointing*, these two authors paid more attention to *problem-solving* and the rights of average people to development in developing countries.

It has to be pointed out that Chen and Pan expressed a very different understanding of climate ethics. They believed that “the original intention of ethical fairness is not to protect ‘international fairness’ between countries, but to protect everyone’s basic needs as the primary goal, and to promote ‘*interpersonal fairness*’ between people” (sentence 12). As pointed out in the theoretical chapter, climate justice is mostly discussed and represented in the international domain and focused on the justice between countries. It is a “statist posture on climate change” (Harris et

al. 2013: 301-302). For the first time, I observed a perspective on climate justice that is based on *individual human beings* instead of collective identity, namely nation-states. This perspective helps *break the deadlock* on climate change between nation-states and *challenges* the Chinese government's statist posture on climate change. To some extent, it reflects a certain *cosmopolitanism* on climate justice.

Chen and Pan wrote that it is fair that everyone's basic needs should be met. Energy has to be consumed to meet those needs. If the current energy system based on fossil fuels cannot be changed entirely, the emission of greenhouse gases is inevitable. In academia, the greenhouse gas emissions from that energy consumption are called "*survival emissions*" (Shue 1993). Since many developing countries still struggle with poverty alleviation, it is no problem to say that these countries and their people have the development imperative (Giddens 2009), in other words, the right to emission. The UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs leadership considers climate justice to be concerned with the global South's and semi-periphery's "right to industrialize" or "right to development" in a carbon-constrained world. Thus, the right to development is entangled and often equated with the right to emissions. Meeting basic needs is considered a part of human rights. Therefore, the right to development can be justified as a certain kind of manifestation of human rights.

While developed countries focus on the distribution of reduction obligations, developing countries are more concerned with the impact of climate change, namely the justice in *climate adaptation*. Scholars believe that "the most serious unfairness of climate change is that developing countries will inevitably bear social and economic burdens that are not commensurate with their own responsibilities for the adverse effects of climate change" (sentence 21). Not only is the international climate politics 'stuck' on the mitigation justice, but academia also neglects research on justice issues in climate adaptation. It is good that two scholars in this sample text touched on the justice issue of climate adaptation, although they did not extend the discussion on it.

The two scholars also mentioned that climate justice has profound and plentiful ethical connotations. It is involved with the relationship between human beings and nature and that among generations. Their thoughts actually reflect environmental and ecological justice as well as *intergenerational justice*. As discussed in the theoretical chapter, climate justice is relevant in many domains of human life, such as international, domestic, intergenerational, environmental, and ecological (Gardiner 2011). We saw that many of the previous sample texts were confined within the international domain regarding climate justice. Although the two authors did not explain in detail about environmental, ecological, and intergenerational justice, this sample text provided an *alternative* perspective to understand the justice issue of climate change.

It has to be pointed out that Chen Ying and Pan Jiahua are both affiliated with CASS, the highest research institute of social sciences and one of the most important think tanks in China. Chen is a researcher in sustainable development and the Deputy Director at CASS, while Pan is a research fellow of the Institute of Urban Development and Environment at CASS.

In the text EO1/ST22 on 11 June 2007, Pan Jiahua was interviewed by journalist Zhang of the *Economic Observer*. He mentioned that it took Western countries 100 years to complete industrialization. China was expected to be a moderately developed country by 2030. Pan believed that only then would China be able to undertake the required quantitative emissions reduction, which implies that it is not fair to ask China to reduce emissions before it can further develop without constraints. Both scholars see climate change as a *development issue*. Climate justice is equated with a fair opportunity for sustainable development. Their positions are, per se, in line with that of governments. In addition, they were also convinced that developed countries should take the lead and act first based on the argument that developed countries have a historical debt to developing countries. Chen wrote in his article for *People's Daily* (PD5 2009-07-23, sentence 6) that it is unfair that developed countries are unwilling to take the lead in reducing greenhouse gas emissions and have repeatedly emphasized that emerging economies need to reduce emissions significantly. Pan expressed very directly in his suggestions to combat climate change that "in climate cooperation, developed countries should take the lead" (PD10/ST7, 2010-01-07, sentence 82).

The two authors discussed climate justice from a *broader range of perspectives* in this sample text, compared with journalists and editors of the state-owned *People's Daily*. For example, they paid attention to the development rights of average people in developing countries and looked at justice from an individual rather than a collective perspective. Also, as mentioned above, they also noticed *environmental and ecological justice* and *intergenerational justice*, which was rare in other sample texts. However, the brief diachronic analysis of their statements in the sample texts shows that their essential positions do not deviate from the government's.

Text 4.2.2.1-2

Africa: Looking Forward to Fair and Effective Agreements.

Li Xuehua. 2009-12-08. 002 International News (ST14 / STD5)

Li Xuehua, the correspondent of *Science and Technology Daily* based in South Africa, wrote this sample. In addition to 31 stations across China, STD has reporter stations in the UN, the U.S., the UK, France, Germany, Russia, Canada, Japan,

Korea, South Africa, Israel, Brazil, and other technologically developed countries⁹⁰. As the affiliated newspaper of the Ministry of Science and Technology, STD is financially able to establish a reporting network worldwide.

The instant context of this report was again the Copenhagen Summit, which took place one day before the report was published. As mentioned in previous chapters, the Copenhagen Summit was a turning point for media reports on climate change in China. Climate change and climate justice are again reported, represented, and discussed in the *international domain*, namely as an international issue.

This text has three parts. The first part describes the severe impact of climate change on Africa. It points out that African countries have difficulty dealing with it due to poverty, unsound markets, underdeveloped infrastructure and technology, and frequent regional conflicts. It also referred to the issue of *climate vulnerability* and *adaptation*. While climate change is mainly a mitigation problem for many countries, for African countries, climate adaptation is a priority. Compared with other text samples, this sample spent more time discussing the adaptation aspect of climate change. The second part stated that Africa should unite and fight climate change with one voice in international negotiations. The third part was titled “Asking for Fair Agreements.” Part 2 and 3 are closely related, which the following analysis on climate justice will focus on.

It was stressed that “dealing with climate change must be consistent with the priority goals of developing countries to eliminate poverty, ensure food security and sustainable development” (sentence 21). This is actually a claim for the *right to development*. In the following sentence, it is written that Africa has a very low share of carbon emissions but has been greatly suffering from the impact of climate change. Therefore, Africa is eligible to obtain compensation from developed countries for environmental, social, and economic losses caused by climate change . It is an example of *compensatory justice* of climate justice. Compensatory justice means compensation for past harm. It emphasizes the obligation of those who had high levels of carbon emissions in the past to those who were impacted by the emissions (Okereke 2010).

The report states that African countries insist on the CBDR principle in international climate negotiations. They believe that developed countries must fulfill the obligations stipulated in the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. Speaking of climate negotiations, the journalist drew upon Meles Zenawi, the Coordinator of the Committee of African Heads of State and Government on Climate Change (CAHOSCC), saying that African countries will, for the first time in history, form a unified delegation to ensure that Africa speaks with one voice in global climate change negotiations. As discussed in the theoretical chapter, a country’s overall economic and political power impacts its ability to attend international conferences

⁹⁰ <https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/ceuk/chn/sybd/zyym/t775058.htm> (accessed 21 December 2020)

and *participate* in international organizations (Roberts and Parks 2007: 14). As Eckersley observed, vulnerable and less powerful states often have fewer delegates and less technical resources and are excluded from many crucial backroom meetings Eckersley 2012: 34–35). The problem here is not entirely distributional: the obstacles to equal participation are not only economic but also *power-related* and are built in the hierarchies of state relations (Kortetmäki 2016: 324). That is to say, the unequal participation is rooted in the *unequal world system*. All this makes it hard for African countries to be heard or treated equally in international climate negotiations. The unprecedented effort of African countries to unite reflects their desire to fight the unfair procedures and framework and try to be more powerful and *more included* in the process of decision making in international negotiations.

What is striking in this sample text is its *intertextuality* with another sample text from *People’s Daily* by Zhan Shiming. The headlines of the two texts resemble each other: “Africa: Looking forward to fair and effective agreements” vs. “Africa asks to deal with climate change fairly.”. Both headlines have the same subject, “Africa,” and a similar object, namely climate deal. The aim of Africa’s request or wish is either a fair climate agreement or a fair manner in which climate change is addressed. Not only are the headlines of the two text samples similar to each other, but many expressions in both texts are almost the same (see table 23).

Table 23: Comparisons of Excerpts from Two Sample Texts

ST14 by Li Xuehua on 2009-12-8	ST3 by Zhan Shiming on 2009-08-27
1. Climate change is both an environmental issue and a development issue, especially for African countries.	14. Climate change is both an environmental issue and a development issue, especially for African countries.
2. African countries ... are full of expectations for a fair and proper solution to climate change issues.	15. African countries are full of expectations for a fair and proper solution to climate change issues, [...]
4.The African continent only emits 3.8% of the world’s greenhouse gases, but it bears the brunt of the harsh effects of climate change.	1.[...] The African continent emits about 4% of the world’s greenhouse gases, but it bears the brunt of the harsh effects of climate change.
7. In the next few decades, the average temperature increase on the African continent will be about 1.5 times the global average,[...]	2. It is estimated that in the next few decades, the average temperature increase on the African continent will be about 1.5 times the global average,[...]

<p>12. At present, most African countries have signed the "United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change" and the "Kyoto Protocol".</p> <p>13. African countries have truly felt the harm caused by climate change and realized that in order to safeguard Africa's vital interests, they must unite, actively participate in climate change negotiations and the process of formulating international climate systems and speak in a stronger voice.</p>	<p>5. At present, most African countries have signed the "United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change" and the "Kyoto Protocol", and they are also actively seeking consensus to speak in a stronger voice in international climate change negotiations.</p> <p>4. African countries have truly felt the harm caused by climate change and actively participate in climate change negotiations and the process of formulating international climate systems.</p>
<p>21. African countries believe that [...]</p> <p>22. [...] Africa should get compensation for environmental, social, and economic losses caused by climate change from developed countries.</p> <p>23. International climate negotiations must adhere to the established principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities", [...] At the same time, developed countries must give priority to Africa's needs for sustainable development, poverty reduction, and the achievement of the Millenium Development Goals, and provide predictable and verifiable financial, technical, and capacity-building support for African countries to adapt to the impact of climate change and take mitigation actions.</p>	<p>8.1 African countries believe that, [...] Africa should get compensation for environmental, social, and economic losses caused by climate change from developed countries;</p> <p>8.2 The new international climate negotiations must adhere to the established principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities" and give priority to Africa's needs for sustainable development, poverty reduction, and the achievement of the Millenium Development Goals;</p> <p>8.3 At the same time, developed countries should earnestly fulfill their emission reduction obligations and provide Africa with financial, technological, and capacity-building support in an operable and verifiable manner.</p>

Because the sample text ST3/PD6 by Zhan was published on 27 August 2009, and the ST14/STD5 by Li Xuehua was published on 8 December 2009, it is assumed that journalist Li drew upon scholar Zhan's article. As mentioned previously in this

analysis, Zhan is an expert on African issues. Li was a correspondent based in South Africa. It is understandable that Li quoted Zhan.

ST14 has 26 full sentences, and ST3 has 15. As the table shows, 9 full sentences of ST14 resembled 7 full sentences of ST3. The full sentence 8 in ST3 has three parallel clauses. However, all three parallel clauses were quoted and transformed into three single full sentences, 21, 22, and 23 of ST14, with only infinitesimal differences in expression. In the sampling I counted the full sentence with parallel clauses as one full sentence. If counting the cited parallel clause as a single sentence, then more than half of the content of ST3 was drawn upon by ST14, which is a large amount of quotation. The original sentences of ST3 were quoted with almost no changes in content. They were merely applied and rearranged in a different order in ST14. In addition to the resemblance of many sentences, the main ideas of both texts were also very similar: (1) Africa has been suffering from the impact of climate change; (2) Africa tries to unite and play a more important role in international climate negotiation; (3) Africa asks for a fair climate deal.

From the title to the main ideas and even the expression of many sentences, there was quite a lot of similarity and sameness in ST14 and ST3. To some extent, ST14 is like a copy of ST3 with only some extensions, interpretations, and reorganization of sentences. It is strange that journalist Li quoted Zhan without giving the sources. It appears unprofessional. However, it may indicate that Chinese journalists' understanding of certain issues strongly relies on scholars.

Text 4.2.2.1-3

Chinese entrepreneur said in Copenhagen

Dealing With Climate Change is Business Opportunity More Than Only Responsibility.

Li He. 2009-12-17. 003 Roundup (ST15/STD6)

This sample text is relatively short, with only seven full sentences. It describes a telephone interview between STD and Huang Ming, a renowned solar energy entrepreneur and researcher in China, during the Copenhagen Summit, again indicating the importance of the COP15 meeting in climate change communication in China.

Huang created the Himin Solar Energy Group, which is the leading company in the renewable energy industry in China. Due to the great success in the industry sector, Huang was invited as a special guest to the 14th UN Forum on developments for sustainable energy to introduce the model of Chinese solar energy to the world. Huang was also elected in September 2008 as Vice President for Industry of the International Solar Energy Society (ISES), making him the first entrepreneur to hold a leading position in the internationally renowned solar organization. It was in his capacity as the Vice President for Industry of ISES and as the business

representative of China that Huang was invited to attend the Copenhagen Summit. Huang is not only a business pioneer but also plays important role in politics. He was elected as a national representative to the National People's Congress, the only NPC representative from China's renewable energy industry. He proposed and promoted the draft of the Renewable Energy Law. The Renewable Energy Law of the People's Republic of China was passed in 2005 and enacted in 2006. Huang represents not only the business world but also the policymakers.

The interviewer was Li He, a Beijing journalist specializing in the environment and renewable energy.⁹¹ In the interview, I observed that Huang had a supportive attitude towards the government. At the very beginning of the interview, he criticized that many companies stood by and had not done enough to address climate change. He said, "It is not that the government's efforts are weak, but the enterprises and industries" (sentence 3). Before the Copenhagen Summit, the Chinese government announced the target: a 40%-45% reduction of carbon dioxide emissions per unit of GDP by 2020 compared to 2005. This target put a lot of pressure on local governments. In the interview, Huang expressed how enterprises can "help" local governments complete the task. While enterprises in many liberal economies maintain a certain distance from the government, finding a *symbiosis* between enterprises and governments in China is not unusual, especially in the case of the development of renewable energy. As discussed, China has a *dual governmental structure* that complicates the implementation of climate policies. It seems easier for both the central and the local governments to reach an agreement with enterprises to develop renewable energy.

Looking back at the brief history of Himin Solar Energy Group, we can see how the local government and the company "helped" each other. In 1982, Huang Ming graduated from the Mechanical Design Department at the China University of Petroleum and worked at the Petroleum Drilling Research Institute in the former Ministry of Geology and Mineral Resources⁹² based in Dezhou that same year. He used his spare time to teach himself solar energy out of strong concerns about oil shortages and concern for his daughter's generation. In 1995, Huang gave up his stable job and started his own business. Public information shows that Huang Ming established his company with a debt of nearly one million Yuan. However, the company developed extremely fast. By 2002, Himin Solar Energy Group was awarded the only "China Famous Brand" award given to a company in the solar energy industry. In 2005, Himin's company won the "Chinese Top Brands" crown, thus becoming the only business in the solar industry with double crowns. Huang Sheng, the highest-level local governor in Dezhou, Shangdong Province, strongly supported Himin's explosive development between 1995 and 2007 (Zhao 2018). In

⁹¹ http://css.stdaily.com/kjrb/content/2009-05/27/content_59863.htm (accessed 06 January 2021)

⁹² It was replaced by the Ministry of Land and Resources in 1998 and then again replaced by the Ministry of Natural Resources in 2018 <http://www.mnr.gov.cn/> (accessed 8 January 2021)

1995, it was impossible for an average institute employee to establish a company on a debt of nearly one million Yuan from the bank if the local government did not strongly support the business idea.

Huang is called the Godfather of solar energy in China. The first and primary product of his company was solar water heaters. At a time when China was still a technology follower of advanced Western countries, China had been a leader in solar water heaters not only in production but also in research and innovation. To some extent, the fact that Huang rose so rapidly in social status reflects the policy *preference* of the Chinese government to develop renewable energy. As pointed out in the theoretical chapter, energy is a common denominator in the climate change discussion for China, and in a certain sense, China's *energy policy* is the country's climate policy (Heggelund 2007: 158-161). Correspondently, developing *renewable energy* has been regarded as a very efficient way to deal with climate change.

Huang was without doubt a very pioneering, ambitious, and visionary entrepreneur. However, the symbiosis or *power relation* between his enterprise and the local government is not *balanced*. As a private enterprise, Himin Group has to take greater business risk compared to the state-owned companies, no matter how much support it has from the government. Dezhou is not a well-known or economically developed city, even in China. But it was chosen over the renowned British university town Oxford and Australia's Adelaide to host the 4th International Solar Cities Congress 2010. Huang was a lobbyist for Dezhou. As Yogi Goswami, president of the International Solar Energy Society, said, "Huang put Dezhou on the map."⁹³ This congress was organized by the Dezhou municipal government and sponsored by Himin Solar Energy Group. After the congress, Dezhou became known as the Solar City all over the world (Zhao 2018). The local government enjoyed the reputation. However, the financial burden landed on Himin Group. Huang Ming once revealed in his blog⁹⁴ that Himin's capital chain was almost broken after sponsoring the congress, and it was a miracle that Himin financially survived.

The symbiosis is not only unbalanced but also *unstable*. When Huang Ming was strongly supported by the local governor Huang Sheng, his business had a golden time in terms of development. After Huang Sheng left Dezhou, Himin was not very lucky. The group underwent difficulties, especially after sponsoring the congress. It tried three times to go public, but the IPO failed every time. Huang Ming himself was rumored to be involved in the corruption case of Huang Sheng, who was investigated in 2012 by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection of the Chinese Communist Party. Huang Sheng was later dismissed from public office and expelled from the Party for multiple offenses, including corruption and moral degeneration (Qu

⁹³ 'Himin sees more shine in Dezhou's Solar Valley,' China Daily, 2009 http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2009-02/09/content_7456117.htm (accessed 17 November 2024)

⁹⁴ This article is somehow defined as sensitive and cannot be found anymore.

2012; Yu and Meng 2012). It is not my task to explore the inside story of Huang Ming and Huang Sheng. What is obvious, however, is that private enterprises in China is strongly influenced by the local government, and their symbiosis is *not healthy or balanced*. The story shows how dominant government was in the economic and technological development of businesses. Dealing with climate change and promoting sustainable development in China has followed a *top-down* approach.

Let us come back to the interview with Huang at the Copenhagen Summit. He mentioned that technology and products need to be prepared so that the mitigation goals can be achieved. In terms of technology and products, he referred to renewable energy technology and products. That is to say, his solution to climate change is *technology and business-based*. As mentioned in sample text 13, MOST was the leading organizer of the Forum on Climate Change and Science and Technology Innovation, which reflects a *technology-oriented discourse* on climate change by the Chinese government. Thus, Huang's solution to climate change is in line with the government's guiding principles for combating climate change.

4.2.2.2 Summary of the Analysis

Since climate change is a scientific issue, it is a relevant topic for the *Science and Technology Daily*, a newspaper affiliated with MOST. A *technology-oriented discourse* of climate change was manifested in the sample texts (ST13, ST15) of this newspaper. Climate change was seen as an issue of development (ST13, ST14), especially for the developing world. To ensure justice for developing countries, it was *framed to ensure their opportunities for development*, especially sustainable or *low-carbon development*. There were examples of *procedural justice*, though not very many. Unlike most of the sample texts from *People's Daily*, the sample texts from STD also discussed climate justice in the *national, intergenerational, and ecological domains* (ST13) instead of only the international domain. It is a pity that experts only mentioned the *national, intergenerational, and ecological domains* in passing.

It is worth remembering that Chen and Pan (ST13) believed that "the original intention of ethical fairness is not to protect 'international fairness' between countries, but to protect everyone's basic needs as the primary goal, and to promote 'interpersonal fairness' between people."

In the previous analysis of *People's Daily* text samples, climate justice was mostly confined to the justice between countries. It is a "*statist posture* on climate change" (Harris et al. 2013: 301-302). A perspective on climate justice based on *individual* human beings instead of a *collective identity*, namely nation-states, was observed for the first time. This perspective helps break the deadlock on climate change between nation-states and challenges the Chinese government's *statist posture* on climate change. To some extent, it reflects a certain *cosmopolitanism* on climate justice. However, neither scholar has gone further on this topic. They did not see that the real divide is not so much between developed and developing states as

it is between affluent and poor people, if we open up the traditionally closed box of “the state” (Harris et al. 2013: 301). Considering Chen and Pan’s article was published in 2008 when the division between the rich and the poor in China and the world was not as striking as it was in 2013, when Harris and his colleagues’ article was published, it is still plausible that Chen and Pan tried to see climate justice beyond the statist angle.

4.2.3 Analysis of China Environment News (CEN)

4.2.3.1 Analysis of Samples

Text 4.2.3.1-1

Swedish Minister for Environment Andreas Carlgren expressed in interview Dealing With Climate Change is the Common Responsibility of the Whole World. Fang Fang, Zhang Shengxi. 2008-04-18. 005 Global (ST16/CEN1)

The direct context of this text was the official visit of Swedish Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt to China. This was the first personal visit of a Swedish Prime Minister with a delegation since 1996. It lasted 5 days, making it an important visit. The Minister for Environment Andreas Carlgren was “on top of the list” among the delegation members. The journalists from *China Environment News*, affiliated with the Ministry of Environmental Protection, had planned an exclusive interview with him. However, due to Carlgren’s tight schedule, the exclusive meeting was rescheduled to a joint interview with some other media. The journalists wrote that Carlgren was the second busiest person during that visit. Reinfeldt’s visit and Carlgren’s importance in the delegation all reflected that the climate issue was a very important topic of this diplomatic visit. In addition, the text mentioned that Sweden would assume the EU’s six-month rotating presidency for the second half of 2009 when the Copenhagen Summit would take place. Though Reinfeldt’s visit was more than one and a half years ahead of the Copenhagen Summit, the Summit was a significant background to this visit. Climate change is again confined to the *international domain*, focusing on *climate diplomacy*.

In the joint interview, Carlgren first said that developed countries would and should take the lead in climate cooperation (sentences 10-11). It is *rare* to observe that a representative from a developed country admits the leading role of developed countries in dealing with climate change. In the previous sample texts analyzed, developed countries were described as irresponsible.

Carlgren then switched the main subject of conversation to developing countries and stressed that mitigation could not succeed if a big developing country like China did not join in (sentence 12-13). In this context, Carlgren concluded that “dealing with climate change is the common responsibility of the whole world” and “we cannot escape because we are in the same boat” (sentence 14). From sentence 10 to 14,

there was a turning point in sentence 12. Five sentences were placed in a way that switched the focus on sentences 12 and 13, meaning they focused on China's contribution. Carlgren identified China as a *big developing country* and tried to argue that China should commit for the sake of world interconnectedness, represented by the *metaphor* of "one boat." In fact, the *discourse of "big developing country"* was officially refused by China. Surprisingly, journalists Fang and Zhang did not write against this discourse and even directly cited Carlgren making "dealing with climate change is the common responsibility of the whole world" as the main headline. This journalistic practice indicated that they were not against Carlgren's opinion. In other words, they did not oppose the idea that China should take more responsibility as a big developing country, which was *not consistent with* the government's official position, making it an *alternative* climate change discourse.

The main topic of this visit was *bilateral technology cooperation* between China and Sweden, which is stated at the beginning of the text (sentence 3) . Sentences 15 to 41 focused on this topic, and the 27 sentences were well structured. In sentences 15 and 16, Carlgren expressed Sweden's intention to work with China on reducing greenhouse gases, which was "of interest of to both countries." He then introduced in sentences 17-24 Swedish's experience of ensuring economic development and, at the same time, reducing carbon emissions. Sweden had proved that "economic development and a significant reduction in emissions were not in conflict." Carlgren advocated a way of reducing carbon emissions, not by limiting economic developing. Instead, experience from Sweden shows that emission reduction is possible while ensuring economic growth.

In fact, this *discourse aims to decouple economic development from carbon emissions*, which is attractive to the Chinese government. China had been doubtful about the developed countries' intention of including China in dealing with climate change. If dealing with the climate problem does not impede China's development imperative, China will be more cooperative and willing to make more effort. Decoupling economic development from carbon emissions would be an *alternative discourse* to dissolve the *dilemma of international cooperation* between developed and developing countries. The decoupling discourse was realized by framing climate change as a technological issue. Carlgren listed several successful technology-based policies: reducing dependence on oil, improving energy efficiency, developing renewable energy, and promoting a central heating system. A technocratic *frame of climate change* was highlighted. All these policies are applicable in China and in line with the Chinese government's guidelines for addressing climate change. However, renewable energy has a relatively higher technological threshold and needs intensive investment and consistent policy support. Improving *energy efficiency* is much less expensive and takes effect in a much shorter time than promoting renewable energy development. In its first National Climate Change Program in 2007,

China stated that improving energy efficiency and conservation were fundamental to its mitigation ambitions (Wei 2007).

In sentences 25-32, Carlgren gave the journalists details of some environmental technologies and enterprises. In the last 9 sentences, Carlgren talked about the cooperation between Sweden and China, with a focus on wind energy. He pointed out that Sweden had “great advantages in environmental technology” and China had “grand plans in the process of urbanization.” Carlgren hoped for a “partnership” with China and “cooperation in all aspects.” Looking closely, the philosophy behind this cooperation is a cooperation mechanism based on *market and technology transfer*. Research has suggested that at the time, China was still catching up technologically and not yet an innovator (Altenburg et al. 2008). In the past, *technology transfer* from the *global North* to China has played a major role in renewable energy development in China, particularly for wind energy, partly also for solar (Urban et al. 2015; Urban 2018; Watson et al. 2014).⁹⁵

In climate change cooperation, technologically advanced countries work with China quite often in the form of the clean development mechanism (CDM), which was stressed in Carlgren’s interview. The CDM is one of the Flexible Mechanisms defined under the Kyoto Protocol. It provides for emissions reduction projects that generate Certified Emission Reduction units (CERs), which can be traded in emissions trading schemes. The purposes of CDM are to help non-Annex I countries, as labeled in the Kyoto Protocol, to achieve sustainable development on the one hand. On the other hand, it aims to assist Annex I countries to fulfill their reduction commitments. In this mechanism, developed countries, Annex I countries, can meet part of their emission reduction commitments by buying CERs from CDM emission reduction projects in developing countries where the CDM projects can be carried out most efficiently and cheapest (Carbon Trust 2009). This reflects Rawls’ “*right to pollute*” approach to climate justice. The under-polluters sell their surplus rights via some form of carbon trading scheme to those with tight emission caps. The CDM was introduced into the Kyoto Protocol by the U.S. government in the face of considerable skepticism and strong opposition from many developing countries. However, it has proved a remarkable political success in the decade since (Carbon Trust 2009: 6). Interestingly, China has been actively participating in the CDM, although many other developing countries opposed the mechanism.

Although the market-based solution to climate change and the *technocratic frame of climate change* have been criticized for not considering social aspects of the climate issue, they seem to be better frames compared with the *antagonism frame* of developed vs. developing countries. Framing climate issues as technical

⁹⁵ The sample text was published in 2008. As China further develops, the empirical evidence shows that for low-carbon innovation, the concept that China lacks innovation capabilities is partly outdated. Instead, there is an increase in indigenous innovation capabilities, resulting in South-South technology transfer and cooperation as well as elements of ‘reverse’ South-North technology cooperation. (Urban 2018)

problems can make China, the biggest developing country, more engaged in combating climate change.

Text 4.2.3.1-2

Can “New Concepts” Really Clarify Responsibility?

Zhai Yong. 2009-10-22. 007 Global (ST17/CEN4)

The publication date of this sample text was 22 October 2009, only a few weeks before the Copenhagen Summit. The UN climate change summit in Denmark triggered a surge of media report on climate change in China. It again indicated the importance of the COP15. The text was published on the “Global” page. It showed that climate change was treated as an international rather than an issue of national relevance. Climate change was again discussed in the *international domain*.

The author of this text is Zhai Yong, who is the Deputy Director of the Law Office of the Environmental Protection and Resources Conservation Committee of the National People’s Congress. This is a high-level political position with a research function.

This opinion-based text consisted of more than 100 full sentences, making it the longest of all sample texts. The first 4 sentences are a brief abstract of the long text. It demonstrated that this article was published to argue that some new ideas, such as “big power responsibility,” “climate responsibility of emerging economies,” and “25 major emitters,” are misleading.

The text had a strong linguistic characteristic that we first focused on when we discussed the textual level of Fairclough’s three-level model for CDA. The following tables show how Zhai used nouns, verbs, adjectives, and adverbs to argue the new concepts emerging in the international community around 2009 were “misleading” and even “plotted by politicians with malicious purposes.”

Table 24: Usage of Nouns

Sentence	Usage
20	(to make an)illusion (to the international community)
30	(Stern Review is a) misguide
44	(suffer from) political attack
63.3	Suppression (of developing countries)
104	Fallacy (of the new concepts)

These words made it clear that Zhai did not believe in the new concepts and even saw the climate negotiations as a *battle between developing and developed countries* with the latter dominating the former. This was again an *antagonism discourse* of climate change.

Table 25: Usage of Adjectives

Sentence	Adjectives and modified nouns
2	Misleading (facts)
6	Non objective and non comprehensive (recognition)
10	so-called (“new ideas”)
14	Misleading (facts and conclusions)
16, 17, 20	False (facts)
30	Untenable (scenarios)
49	Exaggerating (danger and emergency of climate change)
63.1	So-called (responsibility of “big developing country” or “developing big country”)
64.4	Illusory (subject)
83	(“big power responsibility”... is) invented/fictitious
86	Invented/fictitious (“big power responsibility”)
98	Invented/fictitious (concepts)
102	(“big power responsibility” is) invented/fictitious
103	So-called (“big power responsibility”)
109	mercenary

The wording “so-called” is usually used to show that you do not think the word or phrase used to describe somebody or something is appropriate (Oxford Dictionary 2004). It implies a negative meaning of the subject it modifies. Together with words like “misleading,” “illusory,” and “invented,” it is clear that the author completely denied the validity of the new concept of “big power responsibility” regarding climate change.

Table 26: Usage of Adverbs

Sentence	Adverbs and the modified verbs
14	One-sidely (quote scientific conclusions)
22,38	One-sidely (communicate scientific conclusions)
45	One-sidely (focus on scientific conclusions)
28	elaborately (plot)

In four sentences, “one/sidely” was used to criticize that international politicians for mainly focusing on the 90% confidence that scientists have regarding the correlations between the observed increase in global average temperatures and the observed increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas concentrations in the IPCC reports. Zhai thought it was one-sidely that the remaining 10% of uncertainty was not talked about. This argument was not justifiable. As is known, scientific conclusions

can hardly be 100% certain. It is not about how high the probability is. Instead, it is about whether the scientific arguments are strong enough to receive a general agreement on the subject studied. It seemed that the 90% confidence was not convincing enough to persuade Zhai to believe in the causal relation between human activities and climate change.⁹⁶ On the contrary, Zhai believed that the danger of climate change was exaggerated. This is actually a *skeptical discourse of climate change*, to which I will return in the following analysis. It is rare to observe that the IPCC conclusions are questioned and even criticized.

Table 27: Usage of Verbs

Sentence	Verbs and their objects
2, 14	deceive (the public)
2, 14	induce (the international community)
2, 14	make an issue of
9, 103	violate (the stipulations of the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol)
14	avoid (the complete scientific conclusions)
14	avoid and even deny (the basic principles of international laws)
17	deceive (the heavens/Emperor to cross the sea)
20, 64.4	replace the beams with rotten timbers
20	deceive (the international community)
20	force (governments of other countries)
22, 23	mislead (scientific conclusions)
30	mislead (peoples)
46	exaggerate (the danger of climate change)
50	compel (each country)
54	peddle (the expensive “emission reduction technologies”)
55	obscure (the subjects of responsibility of international laws); obscure (the responsibilities of international laws)
57	obscure (the responsibilities of international laws by obscuring the subjects of responsibilities)
58	(how could it be) obscured?
60	control (China’s economic development)
62	ignore (the fact of historical emissions)
64.3	suppress (the economic development of China and co.)
64.4	are restricted and even prevented (from development)

⁹⁶ The IPCC assessment report in 2013 stated with unprecedented confidence - at least 95% certainty - that humans have been the dominant cause of the observed warming since the mid-20th century (IPCC 2013).

It has to be pointed out that all subjects of these actions in the text were international politicians and developed countries. The common point of these verbs was that all of them had a negative implication. Verbs like “deceive,” “induce,” “violate,” “avoid,” “deny,” “mislead,” “exaggerate,” “peddle,” “obscure,” and “ignore” were used to draw a very negative picture of international politicians and developed countries as irresponsible and playing tricks. Verbs such as “force,” “compel,” “control,” “suppress,” and “restrict” were used to refer to *unequal power relations* between developed countries and their counterparts, namely the developing bloc, and the *hegemony* of developed countries in the international system. Using these verbs represented an *antagonism frame* of developed and developing countries.

The phrase in sentence 17, “deceive the heavens to cross the sea” was a *metaphor*. It is the first stratagem of the Thirty-Six Stratagems in the Chinese classic “The Art of War” by Sun Tzu. It means masking your real goals by using the ruse of a fake goal until the real goal is achieved. Tactically, this is known as an ‘open feint’: in front of everyone, you point west when your goal is actually in the east. Another idiom, “replace the beams with rotten timbers,” was found in both sentences 20 and 64.4. It means disrupting the enemy's formations, interfering with their methods of operations, and changing the rules they are used to following. In this way, the supporting pillar, the common link that makes a group of men an effective fighting force, is removed. Coincidentally, it is also a stratagem of the Thirty-Six Stratagems. From Zhai’s perspective, the climate change negotiation appears to be a *war full of tricks and plots*. It reflects a discourse of *conflict* rather than cooperation.

After looking at the words, I observed a recurrence of the structure of the *sentence*. In seven sentences (2, 17, 20, 52, 57, 62, 84), the author employed sentences like “attempt to do sth,” “attempt to do something with the aim of,” or “attempt to do something in order to.” Sentences of this kind contain a connotation that the agents of the actions have a pre-designed plan and carry out it intentionally. It leaves the reader with the impression that what the agents have done looks like a trap, indicating a *discourse of climate conspiracy*.

Above, I discussed Zhai’s doubt and skepticism of climate change from his usage of language. This is also reflected by Zhai’s *intertextual* quotation from the following sources: Abdalla Salem El-Badri, the OPEC Secretary General, and the Lavoisier Group. They were drawn upon to criticize the Stern Review. The report concluded that the benefits of strong and early actions on climate change far outweighed the costs of not acting (Stern 2007) and received a broadly positive response from those who believe in the mainstream scientific conclusions on climate change and support active measures to deal with it. It is obvious that the OPEC cannot support anti-global warming measures. The Australian Lavoisier Group rejects the scientific conclusions that climate change is primarily caused by human activities and downplays the risk of the effects of climate change. Zhai showed his skepticism by drawing upon statements from William Nordhaus, Professor of

Economics and Forestry and Environmental Studies at Yale University. A Nobel Prize Laureate, Nordhaus is known for his research in the economics of climate change. Nordhaus criticized that “the Review’s radical revision of the economics of climate change depends on the assumption of a near-zero time discount rate combined with a specific utility function” and “the need for extreme immediate action will not survive the substitution of assumptions that are consistent with today’s marketplace real interest rates and savings rates” (Nordhaus 2007: 686). In short, Nordhaus is against the advocacy of strong, immediate actions to climate change, even though he does not deny the fact of climate change.

In fact, it is unusual to observe the discourse of climate change skepticism in the sample texts or in the public discussions in China. Compared with the U.S. and Europe, climate change is well-accepted as a real phenomenon in China. For example, the theoretical chapter discussed Chinese scholars’ research in media communication of climate change. Almost none of them denied the fact of climate change. The most representative climate skeptic in China is Ding Zhongli. He is an academic at the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) specializing in Geology and Paleoclimatology and functions as CAS’s Deputy President. Moreover, Ding is one of the 14 National People’s Congress Standing Committee vice presidents. An *intertextuality* analysis showed that Ding’s *discourse of skepticism* was given a voice in Zhai’s article.

In the sample text, Zhai questioned the conclusions of the IPCC reports on the causal relationship between human activities and climate change (sentences 38 to 42). Zhai also drew upon unidentified scientists, writing that from a geological point of view, the earth had not undergone major changes, and many of the negative effects mentioned were *exaggerated* by some politicians (sentences 46, 47). At the end of the long article, Zhai thus called for a return to a *rational* understanding of climate change. This reflected the opinions of Ding Zhongli. He has held the opinion that climate change is a fluctuating process from long-term perspective and that coping with or studying it requires a return to *rationality*. Although he does not deny the causal relationship between human activities and global warming, he insists the impact of human activities on global warming has been *exaggerated* (Ding 2009; Jia and Zheng 2010; Ding 2015; Zhang and He 2018).

The *discourse of climate change skepticism and the discourse of climate conspiracy* are two sides of the same coin. According to Li Jing’s interview with Xie Zhenhua,⁹⁷ the narrative dominating Chinese media around 2009 was that climate change was a conspiracy by developed countries to curb China’s rise. Zhai used

⁹⁷Xie Zhenhua and his legacy of climate diplomacy,’ Dialogue Earth, 2022
https://www.chinadialogue.org.cn/article/show/single/ch/11717-Xie-Zhenhua-China-s-top-climate-negotiator-steps-down?utm_source=chinadialogue+newsletter+%E2%80%93+bilingual&utm_campaign=c8b24767eb-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2019_05_23_03_03_COPY_02&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_5db8c84b96-c8b24767eb-46475205&mc_cid=c8b24767eb&mc_eid=e062347445 (accessed 17 November 2024)

more than half of the text to reveal how the conspiracy had been realized by the international politicians. He criticized the Stern Report fiercely. Zhai believed that the report served the purpose of the UK and EU to promote post-Kyoto climate negotiations. In his view, the UK used this report to play a leading role in both the EU and the world on climate issues (sentences 26, 27). Zhai quoted Partha Dasgupta, a Professor of Economics at the University of Cambridge, saying, “this is a political rather than an academic report” (sentence 31). Zhai commented that the solution prescribed in the Stern Report suggested a path for the world economic that “disadvantages developing and non-European countries, including China” (sentence 36).

This criticism mirrored Ding’s opinions. Ding once pointed out that the emission plans proposed by the IPCC, the G8, and OCED plotted a “*huge trap*” (Ding 2009). The discourse of conspiracy was represented at a diplomatic event in an interesting way. On 7 December 2020, Trump put Ding on a sanction list over the Hong Kong issue. All 14 Chinese officials on the list were top legislature and vice chairs of the 13th National People’s Congress Standing Committee. The state-owned *Global Times* once raised a question on the Zhihu, the most used Chinese question-and-answer social media website: “How to view the U.S. sanctions on 14 Chinese officials, including Ding Zhongli?”⁹⁸ The officials were sanctioned for undermining Hong Kong’s autonomy. However, it is interesting to find out that most of the answers and the most popular answers did not relate Ding’s sanction to the Hong Kong issue. Instead, the netizens ascribed Ding’s sanction to his position against climate change. They believed climate change is a conspiracy by the developed countries led by the U.S. They saw Ding as a “national hero” because he insisted that the impact of climate change has been exaggerated. Since Ding asserted the Chinese people’s right to development, he was regarded by the netizens as “the backbone of China.” This Q&A was even reported by the *Deutsche Welle* as news.⁹⁹

The discourse of U.S. sanctions against Chinese officials is somehow *transformed* into the discourse of climate change conspiracy. How can the transformation be interpreted? First, it implies that Ding is well known among netizens in China for his skeptical opinions on climate change. The fact that the *Global Times* exclusively mentioned Ding’s name in the question can be understood as the media using Ding’s popularity to attract the attention of the netizens. Second, if the U.S.’s sanctions on Chinese officials over the Hong Kong issue were perceived as an overt intervention in China’s national affairs, the sanction on Ding Zhongli is understood by many netizens as a hidden climate change conspiracy to prevent China from economic and social development. The *discursive transformation* also

⁹⁸ <https://www.zhihu.com/question/433863754/answer/1622581973> (accessed 03 March 2021)

⁹⁹ <https://www.dw.com/zh/%E7%BE%8E%E5%88%B6%E8%A3%81%E4%B8%AD%E5%9B%BD%E9%AB%98%E5%AE%98%E6%88%90%E7%83%AD%E8%AE%AE%E8%AF%9D%E9%A2%98/a-55882641> (accessed 03 March 2021)

indicates how widely the discourse of development regarding climate change is accepted in China.

The last discourse is about *hegemony*. Let us look at the following sentences first:

[20] Politicians ..., *force* governments of other countries to agree that the international community makes new rules of dealing with climate change.

[50] Politicians ..., *compel* each country to join in controlling the greenhouse gas emissions without considering the facts of historical responsibility and high per capita emissions.

[60] Some politicians ..., with the purpose of making China shoulder more reduction obligations and thus *controlling* China's economic development.

[64.3] In this way, the politicians successfully achieved the ultimate goal of *suppressing* the economic development of China and other countries.

[64.4] ...responsibilities are transferred to the victims of the responsibility of the subject of international legal responsibility, namely to those developing countries that are justifiable on development that are *restricted* and even prevented from development.

In the excerpts, words like "force," "compel," "control," "suppress," and "be restricted" were used, implying that stronger countries can force weaker countries in the international system to do what the former want to do. Although developing countries have sovereignty, they do not seem powerful enough to make the rules or even take control of their destinies. In the world system, developed nations are centered, and developing nations are on the periphery. Poor peripheral nations export their natural resources, and some supply cheap labor directly to manufacturers. Semi peripheral middle-income nations lie somewhere in the middle, with some industry, higher-value services, and a partially diversified export structure. In the view of world systems theorists, then, a few nations move up, but the relations of extraction, production, and consumption between core and (semi-)peripheral nations have changed but not reversed since colonial times (Roberts and Parks 2007: 165-6). The unequal relationship is strengthened by appropriating different mechanisms such as WTO, WB, IMF, and so on.

Besides the discourse of hegemony, an *anti-hegemony discourse* emerged in the sample text. Zhai criticized that some people in China echoed the voices of international politicians who believe that China is a "responsible big power" and should bear the corresponding responsibilities (sentence 70). He further criticized that the so-called "big power responsibility" discourse was also "catered" by some people within China (sentence 84). Lastly, he claimed that his criticism was "pointing to a rational way of looking at climate change" (sentence 110). That is to say, catering to the discourse of "big power responsibility" is not rational. Ding reiterated

that China should be rational and should not echo the views of others (Ding, 2009, 2015; Jia and Zheng, 2010).¹⁰⁰ As pointed out above, Zhai and Ding appealed to Chinese scholars to understand climate science in a rational way instead of easily accepting the conclusions of the international scientific community, which is dominated by Western academia. Here, the *discourse of anti-hegemony* is connected with the *discourse of climate skepticism*.

Regarding Zhai's ideas on climate justice, he divided the responsibilities into two kinds: moral and obligatory. He argues that based on the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, China has no obligation to reduce GHG emissions, although every country has the moral responsibility to combat climate change. Zhai believed that China only has moral responsibility, namely "common" responsibility, and is not subject to obligatory or "differentiated" responsibility (sentence 79). It is obvious that Zhai saw the *UNFCCC principle* as the highest principle of fairness. Since the UNFCCC's equity principle favors developing countries, China has consistently emphasized the importance of the CBDR principle. China frequently references to the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol and calls upon developed countries to adhere to established principles (Zhang 2003: 81).

Zhai further claimed that the "big power responsibility" was illusory. He argued that China could be counted as a *big power* if it was defined on population and territory. However, if it was defined by comprehensive qualitative standards such as politics, economy, national defense, social management, living standards, infrastructure, and urbanization, then China was not a *big power*. Zhai drew upon the IPCC, UNFCCC, and Kyoto Protocol to argue that developed countries with resources to deal with climate change are big countries. He equated the *big power* to a developed and strong nation. That is to say, countries with large population and territories alone cannot be called big powers. Therefore, Zhai argued that China was not a *big power* and did not have to take responsibility. Zhai's argument can be said to be right. However, he ignores the dynamic and diachronic dimension of this concept. When UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol were negotiated and signed in the 1990s, China was indeed only a big country in the sense of population and territory. The country was not a strong power. That is why it was exempted from the obligatory reduction when the UNFCCC was established. However, China experienced rapid development from the 1990s to 2009 when the sample text was written. Up to that time, China was not only a big country in terms of its size, but also a big power considering its overall emissions volume and economic achievement. Of course, it was still less strong than the First World, especially when the per capita standard is applied to the comparison. Zhai criticized that some international politicians intended to say China should take on climate responsibility by creating the "big power" concept. One tactic was to stress current and future emissions and ignore the fact

¹⁰⁰ Also see Ding's interviews with *Xinhua News Agency* on 30 January 2010 and an exclusive interview with Chai Jing of CCTV on 21 March 2010.

that historical emissions were primarily made by developed countries and the high per capita emissions in those countries. Thus, it is based on the *historical responsibility principle* and *per capita principle* that Zhai believed that China is not a *big power*. In general, Zhai insisted that the identification of climate responsibility and the responsible subjects should strictly abide by the regulations of UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol.

4.2.3.2 Short Summary of the Analysis

The detailed qualitative analysis of two samples from *China Environmental News* showed that climate change in general and climate justice, in particular, were again talked about in the *international* rather than *national* domain with a focus on *climate diplomacy*. The UNFCCC climate negotiations were always the impulse of media reports on climate issues. However, the climate negotiations were often depicted as a *battle* full of *tricks* and *plots* between developing and developed countries, which reflected a discourse of *antagonism* rather than cooperation. Scholars used linguistic tools to reveal that the *hegemony* of developed countries over developing ones exists.

In China, the CDM was preferred as a solution to climate change. This mechanism essentially reflected the “*right to pollute*” approach to climate justice.

Chinese scholars strictly followed the fairness principles of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, namely the “*common but differentiated responsibilities*.” This principle was interpreted by scholars as developing countries having only *moral* responsibilities and developed having *binding* obligations. They also argued against the framing of China as a big developing country and denied that China has obligations as a *big power*. The analysis showed that the arguments neglected the diachronic dimension of China’s development from the 1990s to 2009. Although China was not a big power from a per capita perspective, it had achieved a lot in terms of economic and social development, and its international status had been raised. Even though China itself did not want to take more responsibility in combating climate change, the international community had higher expectations of it.

In rare instances, I found a *discourse of climate change skepticism* in the sample texts. The skepticism of climate change science was entangled with a *discourse of climate conspiracy*. Some high-level officials and scholars believed climate change is a conspiracy between developed countries led by the U.S. to prevent China from further development. Even a seemingly irrelevant US sanction against Chinese officials is somehow transformed into the discourse of climate change conspiracy. The *discursive transformation* also indicates how deeply the discourse of development is embedded in the media coverage of climate change and climate justice in China.

4.2.4 Analysis of 21st Century Business Herald (CBH)

4.2.4.1 Analysis of Samples

Text 4.2.4.1-1

A Just Perspective of China's Global Responsibility for Environmental Protection.
Tang Xuepeng. 2007-06-08. 003 Comment (ST18/CBH1)

This sample text is a commentary by Tang Xuepeng published in the 21st Century Business Herald on 8 June 2007. In a commentary, the opinions are generally expressed at the very beginning of the text. However, instead of directly showing his views on climate justice, Tang drew upon Ma Kai, the Director of NDRC, writing:

[2] Director of NDRC Ma Kai said China attaches great importance to global warming and environmental protection. However, it is not objective and fair to require developing countries prematurely, radically, and excessively to undertake the same quantifiable emission reduction obligations as developed countries. The developing countries are thus restricted from further development and realization of industrialization and modernization. [3] Ma Kai believed that although China did not undertake quantifiable GHG reduction targets, it would still take on its due international obligations and responsibilities.

In the first lines, quoting Ma's opinions about climate justice, the commentator Tang functioned as a mediator in channeling the official position of climate justice in the newspaper. Through the quotations, the official discourse of climate justice was thus *transferred* to the media discourse on climate justice. The quotations reflected two standards for judging whether the international climate governance is fair from China's perspective. The first standard is whether China should undertake quantifiable reduction obligations and whether these obligations should take place as soon, radically, and excessively as possible. The second standard is whether the reduction measures restrict China from realizing its industrialization and modernization or, in other words, further development. The first standard involved how to understand and define China's *identity*, because the UNFCCC stipulates that only the Annex I countries should set binding reduction targets. The commentator believed China belongs to Annex II countries and should not take binding responsibility. Looking at the text's *linguistic coherence*, the Kyoto Protocol stipulates that developed nations have binding reduction goals, whereas developing nations, including China, do not have these obligations. Since the Kyoto Protocol's just principle is based on the *historical emissions and respective capabilities*, it is widely accepted by developing nations as the fairest solution to climate change. . Like with

many other texts in the analysis, Tang holds the same opinion. The second standard referred to understanding *justice as a right to development*.

Next, the analysis focuses on the third dimension of Fairclough's model for CDA --- *social practice*. The "social practice" level of the model attends to issues such as the institutional and organizational circumstances of the discursive event and how that shapes the nature of the discursive practice and the constitutive/constructive effects of discourse referred to above. (Fairclough 1992: 4).

The *direct* social background of this news is the publication of "China's National Climate Change Program," issued on 4 June 2007 by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). It was the country's first global warming policy initiative. The government swiftly adopted measures ranging from laws, economy, administration, and technology, which aimed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and imbue the country with a flexible approach to climate change. It has to be pointed out that shortly before the publication of the national climate change program, the State Council also published another policy document---Notice of Comprehensive Work Plan for Energy Conservation and Emission Reduction, which for the first time clarified that the state would use fiscal, taxation, price, and financial levers to promote the realization of energy conservation goals and reduction of emissions. These initiatives indicate whether and how the media report climate change strongly depends on government policy. In other words, the media discourse on climate change was strongly influenced by the *government's agenda* on climate change. This also indicated that 2007 was a very important point in the course of climate policy and the public discussion on this issue in China.

However, the broader social background of this text was the post-Kyoto Protocol negotiations on GHG emissions. These negotiations dealt with the period after the first "commitment period" of the Kyoto Protocol, which expired at the end of 2012. Besides the talks within the UNFCCC, negotiations were also conducted within external processes, including the G8 process. It seemed that the U.S. wanted to take the lead in the negotiations. On 16 February 2007, the Group of Eight + Five (G8+5) had a Climate Change Dialogue in Washington, D.C. The G8+5 consists of the G8 nations (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the UK, and the U.S.) plus the five leading emerging economies (Brazil, China, India, Mexico, and South Africa). After this meeting, the 33rd G8 Summit took place from 6-8 June 2007, in Germany. Although the traditional focus of the G8 is economic issues and trade, this summit put climate change on the agenda.

A brief *intertextual and linguistic* analysis of the post-Kyoto Protocol negotiations reveals the media discourses of climate change. In a non-binding agreement at the G8+5 summit on 16 February 2007, the leaders agreed that a global system of emission caps and carbon emissions trading should apply to both industrialized and developing nations. The talks did not represent official government policy.

Nevertheless, the Western mainstream media¹⁰¹ reported the meeting as if the agreement was official and agreed upon by all parties. For example, the BBC used the headline “Politicians sign new climate pact” and wrote that the “non-binding declaration was seen as vital in influencing a replacement for the Kyoto Protocol.” However, it was not appropriate to use the word “sign” because the agreement was neither official nor new to be signed. The *Guardian* had the headline “Global leaders reach climate change agreement” as if all the leaders attending that meeting, including the Chinese, leader agreed on the climate deal. However, no evidence showed that the Chinese government ever agreed to abandon the Kyoto Protocol. I conducted a very brief search of the media coverage of the Washington Summit. It was hard to find media reports covering the meeting from the Chinese mainstream media. A possible reason for this was that Chinese leaders did not officially agree to include developing nations in the global system of emission caps and carbon emissions trading. Actually, Chinese leaders would definitely not do it. In comparison with the indifference of Chinese media, the British media were enthusiastic about the outcome of the meeting. The *Guardian* even wrote that the announcement “will be seen as a coup for the British government.” It is not difficult to understand the enthusiasm of British media when we look at the background of the G8+5 Climate Change Dialogue. The meeting was organized by the Global Legislators Organization for a Balanced Environment (GLOBE). It is part of GLOBE International, which was founded by “cross-party legislators from the U.S. Congress, the European Parliament, the Japanese Diet, and the Russian State Duma in early 1992 to enable parliamentarians to have a voice at the landmark UN Earth Summit in Brazil in June 1992.”¹⁰² In 2005, when Tony Blair was premier, GLOBE was invited as the only non-governmental body to participate in the G8 Dialogue on Climate Change hosted by the UK. Since then, the UK has promoted climate dialogue through this mechanism.

The discourse of a “new agreement which would include developing countries” was only popularly accepted in the Western mainstream media. It was another picture in China. A similar phenomenon was observed in the *intertextual analysis* of the G8. At the same G8 summit in Germany, there were different discourses. The following table shows how different official texts narrated the outcomes of and the positions on climate change. The first text is the Chair’s Summary of the G8 meeting. The second is the Joint Statement by the German G8 Presidency and the Heads of State and Governments of Brazil, China, India, Mexico, and South Africa (short for

¹⁰¹Politicians sign new climate pact, BBC News, 2007
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/6364663.stm> and

Global leaders reach climate change agreement, The Guardian, 2007
<https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2007/feb/16/usnews.greenpolitics> (both accessed 17 November 2024)

¹⁰² <https://globelegislators.org/about-globe/history> (accessed 17 November 2024)

Joint Statement of G8+5). The third is the speech of Hu Jintao¹⁰³, President of China. All three announcements were made on 8 June 8 2007.

Table 28: Comparison of Key Content from Three Documents on the G8+5 Summit

Texts	Main content regarding climate change
G8 Chair's Summary (extract)	<p>[...]In setting a global goal for emissions reductions in the process we have agreed in Heiligendamm involving all major emitters, [...]</p> <p>[...]We are committed to moving forward in that forum and call on all parties to actively and constructively participate in the UN Climate Change Conference in Indonesia in December 2007 with a view to achieving a comprehensive post 2012-agreement (post Kyoto-agreement) that should include all major emitters. To address the urgent challenge of climate change, it is vital that the major emitting countries agree on a detailed contribution for a new global framework by the end of 2008 which would contribute to a global agreement under the UNFCCC by 2009. We reiterate the need to engage major emitting economies on how best to address the challenge of climate change. We stress that further action should be based on the UNFCCC principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and capabilities.</p>
Joint Statement of G8+5 (extract)	<p>[...]We reaffirm our commitment to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and to its objective through both mitigation and adaptation in accordance with our common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. [...] We call on all parties to actively and constructively participate in the negotiations on a comprehensive agreement at the UNFCCC Conference in Indonesia in December 2007.</p>
Hu Jintao's talk at G8 (extract)	<p>Climate change is an environmental issue, but in the final analysis it is a development issue.</p> <p>We must adhere to the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities established by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. This principle not only reflects the differences in the level of economic development, historical responsibilities, and current per capita emission levels of different countries, but also the basis for maintaining future international cooperation.</p>

¹⁰³ <https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/123/wjdt/zyjh/t328680.htm> (accessed 12 April 2021)

	<p>According to this principle, developed countries should complete the emission reduction targets set by the Kyoto Protocol, provide assistance to developing countries, and continue to take the lead in assuming emission reduction obligations after 2012. ...</p> <p>[...] Therefore, it is not appropriate to impose mandatory emission reduction requirements on developing countries at this stage. At the same time, developing countries should also take measures according to their own conditions within their capabilities and make positive contributions to the promotion of sustainable global development.</p>
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The most striking difference between the three texts was the length of the content concerning climate change. In Hu’s speech, 12 out of the total 19 paragraphs tackled climate change and sustainable development. The number of Joint Statements was 1 in 7, and in the Chair’s Summary, 3 in 38. China and the five developing countries attached great importance to the climate issue.

The only common discourse of three texts (in green) was that the common but differentiated responsibilities and capabilities (CBDR) principle was once again stressed by the G8 as well as five major economies, including China. However, when looking closer at the *linguistical usage* and *textual structure*, there are many subtle differences. In the G8 Chair’s Summary, the CBDR is a principle that “should be based on.” The main use of the modal verb “should” is to “tell somebody what they ought to do, to give advice or to add emphasis” (Oxford English-Chinese Dictionary, 2004: 1614). It is about what the right thing to do is. The Joint Statement of G8+5 text used “commitment” to the CBDR. The word means “a promise to do sth” or “a thing that you have promised or agreed to do” ((Oxford English-Chinese Dictionary, 2004: 328). In Hu’s speech, the CBDR is a principle that “must” be firmly stuck to. The modal verb “must” was used to point out the “necessity and obligation” to do something (Oxford English-Chinese Dictionary, 2004: 1141). The noun “commitment” and the modal verb “must” imply a much stronger and more unavoidable obligation than that of “should.” It seems that the G8 Chair’s Summary highlighted the importance of the CBDR principle less than the joint statement of G8+5 and Hu’s speech did.

Another difference is that in the joint statement of G8+5 and Hu’s speech, the agent of following the CBDR principle is apparent, namely “we,” the addressers and addressees present at the G8 Summit. In contrast, in the G8 Chair’s Summary, it is only stated that “further action” must be taken without pointing out who the agents are. According to Fairclough’s CDA, by *omitting the agent* of action, the responsibility of the agent is weakened, ignored, or hidden. Since it was the Chair’s Summary, it represented the opinions and positions of the eight leading countries. Therefore, the agent of “further action” is also supposed to be them. Nevertheless, the last

sentence concerning the CBDR did not explicitly state the agent. The responsibility of G8 as an agent was then weakened. Although the G8 Chair's Summary unilaterally announced that all major emitters were involved in setting a global goal for emissions reductions, there is no sign in the Joint Statement of G8+5 or in Hu's speech that the big developing economies are were to be involved in the new process. On the contrary, Hu explicitly pointed out what the developed and developing countries should do respectively—the former should take the lead in reducing emissions and the latter take voluntary actions, as stipulated in the Kyoto Protocol.

The linguistic analysis of three texts showed that by using different modal verbs, verbs, nouns, and choosing to highlight or hide agents of action, different interest groups hide their real attitudes to and positions on the CBDR principle in seemingly similar discourses. While the leading G8 countries announced that all big emitters would be involved in the new process, the big emitters from the developing camp saw the announcement as a *discourse of hegemony* that tried to change the basic principle of the Kyoto Protocol. The discourse of hegemony was manifested by linguistic characteristics in the sample text. The text consists of 7 paragraphs, of which 4 deal with U.S. *intervention* in climate negotiation. The commentator Tang wrote that the second Bush government did not want to join the Kyoto Protocol and tried to “get rid of” the responsibility and “transfer” it to other countries such as China or India. The U.S. aims to “alter” the Kyoto Protocol and “change” the rules of the game. Tang defined all these actions as the U.S.'s attempt to “oppress” a country with a high economic growth rate and a sharp increase in emissions, such as China. From China's perspective, any attempt to skirt the Kyoto Protocol was regarded as a hegemony imposed on developing countries.

Some other discourses were represented in the sample text. Tang commented that oppression by the U.S. is unjustified. He had two arguments: (1) Although the growth of China's greenhouse gases is fast, the per capita growth is very small; (2) China is the world's factory and uses a lot of energy consumption to produce export products (exported to developed countries) and thus creates emissions, which means China helps developed countries reduce their emissions by exporting commodities. The *discourse of per capita emission* was embedded in the first argument. This is very common for developing countries, especially those with huge populations, to justify their right to emissions. The second argument reflected a *discourse of trade globalization* entangled with the *discourse of environmental/ecological debt*. As discussed in the theoretical chapter, a group of scholars (Martinez-Alier 2002; Muradian and Martinez-Alier 2001a, 2001b) and activist groups argued that wealthy nations have built up a massive debt over centuries by exploiting the raw materials and ecosystems of poor nations. The debt encompasses both the historical and modern exploitation of non-Western natural resources, as well as the excessive use of “environmental space” for dumping waste.

This idea attracted the support of the Chinese government and the G-77 at the 2000 South Summit in Havana, Cuba.

In this sample text, we found a *new discourse prioritizing water pollution and emissions of other air pollutants over carbon emissions* around 2007. Tang wrote in the commentary that the increase in GHG in China started to slow down dramatically, but the sulfur emissions were worse than carbon emissions and that the water pollution in China was “hardly” mitigated. Thus, he proposed that “the Chinese government should make the reduction of ‘water pollution’ a priority indicator, and ‘pollutant discharges’ should be more important than ‘emissions’” (sentence 27). Although climate change is an environmental problem, the following brief *textual analysis* of Chinese government policy documents showed that the GHG emissions were not considered pollution initially. Instead, climate change resulting from GHGs was categorized into the domains of economic and social development.

As mentioned above, on 3 June 2007, the State Council announced the “Notice on a Comprehensive Work Plan for Energy Conservation and Emission Reduction.” In this document, the word “emission reduction” appears 103 times. But what are the emissions pointed to in the document? There are different expressions: pollutants emissions (5 times), main pollutants emissions (4 times), sulfur dioxide emissions (2 times), motor vehicle pollutants emissions (1 time), ship pollutants emissions (1 time), and GHG emissions (1 time). The main GHGs are water vapor, carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, ozone, chlorofluorocarbons, and Hydrofluorocarbons. However, according to the Ambient Air Quality Standards by China’s Ministry of Environmental Protection 2012,¹⁰⁴ the air pollutants include: sulfur dioxide, total suspended particulate matter (TSP), particulate matter PM10, fine particulate matter PM2.5, nitrogen oxides, carbon monoxide, ozone, lead (Pb), benzo[a] pyrene, fluoride, cyanide, etc. It is obvious that in this policy document, pollutants and GHGs are two kinds of emissions, and the government’s primary goal is to reduce pollutants rather than carbon emissions. Since pollutants and GHGs are categorized into environmental protection and climate change domains, respectively, this policy was implemented to deal with environmental pollution rather than climate change. The brief text analysis of the policy document showed that by 2007, climate change had yet to be a priority on the government’s agenda.

Nevertheless, 2007 was still a turning point in climate change policy in China. On 4 June 2007, only one day after the announcement of the above-mentioned “Notice on a Comprehensive Work Plan for Energy Conservation and Emission Reduction,” the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) released China's National Climate Change Program. The NDRC is a macroeconomic management agency under the State Council and has significant influence on the

¹⁰⁴ Ambient air quality standards from the Ministry website https://www.mee.gov.cn/ywgz/fgbz/bz/bzwb/dqhjbh/dqhjlz/201203/t20120302_224165.shtml (accessed 17 November 2024)

national economy development. The fact that the first national program was designed and released by the NDRC instead of the environmental agency implies that the government defines climate change more as an *economic and development issue* than an environmental problem. Therefore, it is clear why many previous sample texts represent *climate change as a discourse of development and see climate justice as the right to development*.

Text 4.2.4.1-2

Control the Greenhouse Effect: Developed Countries Must Take More Responsibility.

Lin Boqiang. 2008-09-29. 036 Xin Bai Jia. (ST19/CBH3)

The author, Lin Boqiang, is the Professor and Director of the China Center for Energy Economics Research (CCEER) at Xiamen University. Lin was the honored “Changjiang Scholar” in 2007, which is the highest academic award issued to an individual in higher education by the Ministry of Education of China. As a scholar, Lin is very active in national policymaking bodies. He is a member of the National Energy Consultation Committee, National Energy Commission, National Energy Price Consultation Committee, and the National Development and Reform Commission. In addition, Lin got his PhD degree in Economics from the University of California, Santa Barbara. He is also a member of the World Economic Forum’s Global Agenda Council on Energy Security. With his national and overseas educational and working experience, Lin belongs to the elite group in China that influences the policymaking on energy and climate change. This again demonstrates that climate change is an *elite discourse* in China.

Lin discussed the climate justice issue in the main body of the sample text. The discussion focused on the distributive justice principle. He presented three arguments:

(1) global warming is caused by the accumulated historical emissions of GHGs by developed countries. Lin listed two sets of data: from 1950 to 2000, when some developing countries began to industrialize, the emissions of developed countries accounted for 77% of the total emissions. It has been estimated that from 1950 to 2002, China’s CO₂ emissions accounted for only 9.3% of the world’s cumulative emissions.

(2) per capita emissions of developing countries are far lower than that of developed countries. Lin used the statistics of 2006 when China’s per capita emissions were 4.74 T. In contrast, the values of the U.S. and Japan were 19.37 T and 9.78 T, respectively. He also applied research results from the institute CCEER, where he worked, to argue that the U.S. can reduce emissions by 20% in 2020 compared to 2005. The U.S.’s per capita emissions are still as high as 15.7 tons, and

even in the case of high economic growth, China's per capita emissions will only be 8.8 tons by then.

(3) There are "emission transfers" in the emissions in developing countries. As the global manufacturing center, China produces most of the energy-intensive products needed by other countries, especially developed countries.

The first two arguments reflected two principles of *distributive justice*. The first is the *historical responsibility principle*, the reasoning behind which is that carbon dioxide stays in the atmosphere for a long time, and, therefore, it is important to account for all of the damage done from emissions of earlier years. The 'polluter pays' argument is that high-emitting nations, even if they did not know the danger of their behavior, still benefited from it and should be held responsible for its impacts. The second principle of distributive justice is the *per capita* principle. This principle argues that every human on Earth has equal rights to the global atmosphere, and, therefore, allocations of how much each nation can pollute should be done on a per capita basis.

The third argument referred to "*emission transfers*." The net emission transfers represent the CO₂ emissions in each country to produce exported goods and services minus the emissions in other countries to produce imported goods and services. They are sometimes called the "balance of embodied emissions in trade" (Muradian et al. 2002: 51). Statistics show that global emissions have grown by 39% from 1990 to 2008 during which both global trade and global emissions increased significantly. While emissions in the developed countries have largely stabilized, emissions in developing countries have doubled. A general trend is that emissions have increased most in rapidly emerging economies (Le Quéré et al. 2009). The data indicates that developing countries have the largest share of emissions and are allocated most of the emissions growth. However, some scholars have argued that the divergent emission trends between developed and developing countries were partially the result of a transfer of emissions between countries facilitated via rapidly growing international trade flows (Peters et al. 2009). Peters and co-authors (2011: 8903) conducted comprehensive research on the growth in emission transfers via international trade from 1990 to 2008. They found that the emissions from the production of traded goods and services had increased from 4.3 Gt CO₂ in 1990 (20% of global emissions) to 7.8 Gt CO₂ in 2008 (26%) and that the net emission transfers via international trade from developing to developed countries increased from 0.4 Gt CO₂ in 1990 to 1.6 Gt CO₂ in 2008, which exceeds the Kyoto Protocol emission reductions (Peters et al. 2011: 8903). According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) accounting rules, mitigation only applies to greenhouse gas emissions and removals taking place within national territory and offshore areas over which the country has jurisdiction (IPCC 2006). Peters and co-authors concluded that many developed countries have reported stabilized emissions under the IPCC accounting rule of only reporting territorial emissions.

However, their results showed that the global emissions associated with consumption in many developed countries had increased with a large share of the emissions originating in developing countries (Peters et al. 2011: 8907).

Now, we turn to the *dimensions of linguistic and textural analysis* of this text. It was published on the “xin bai jia” page, which literally means different voices from experts. Therefore, the articles published on this page are opinion pieces in which the author’s opinions are usually clearly argued and presented. Nevertheless, the analysis of its *language use* and *text coherence* showed that the author could have expressed his opinions more clearly, especially regarding his position on whether and how China should deal with climate change.

The first paragraph of the text is an extract that consists of two sentences from the middle of the original text by Lin Boqiang. So, the second paragraph (sentences 3 to 5) of this sample text was actually the first paragraph of Lin’s original text. Lin first listed data stating that the global warming effect was becoming increasingly serious and the task of reducing emissions was huge. Then he pointed out in the second paragraph (sentences 6-9) that “China is currently the country with the largest carbon dioxide emissions and increase” and thus “has been criticized by some Western countries.” The first paragraph discussed the problem of and solution to global warming. It was followed by the second paragraph, which focused on China’s emissions. Regarding text coherence, a link between China’s responsibility and the climate problem was implicitly established.

The author wanted to argue that China should participate in combating climate change. However, he did not express his opinions openly. Instead, he drew upon Jeffrey Sachs, the Professor and Director of the Center for Sustainable Development at the Earth Institute at Columbia University, who said that the global warming problem cannot be solved without China’s participation. Lin then agreed with Sachs’ opinions, but in a *euphemistic* way by using the phrase “to some extent, Jeffrey Sachs is right” (sentence 10). After that, he listed some statistics (sentences 11-13) from CCEER at Xiamen University to support Sachs’ opinions. The statistics showed that the goal of a 20% reduction in global carbon dioxide emissions by 2020 will not only be unattainable but may increase emissions by 2.4 billion tons because the emissions from India and China will dramatically increase. In fact, as the director of the CCEER, Lin was fully justified in reaching the same clear conclusion as Sachs based on his research outcomes and statistics, which he used to support Sachs’ opinions. However, Lin would rather hide his personal opinions behind others’ voices.

The *euphemistic and vague language* was again used at the end of the text. Lin drew upon the affirmation of an official of the International Energy Agency (IEA), who said that an additional investment of US\$45 trillion may be needed to reduce carbon dioxide emissions by 50% by 2050. Lin commented that the affirmation may seem alarmist and exaggerated, but \$45 trillion may be worthwhile to save the planet we depend on for survival. Again, he used the modal verb “may” and the adverb

“maybe,” which weakened the clarity and certainty of his opinions. Although Lin thought it was necessary for all countries, including China, to do more, he seemed to have tried not to openly request China to take more responsibility.

Instead of further discussing China’s future responsibility, Lin swiftly focused on historical responsibility, namely, who caused the problem? The turn of meaning was realized by using the conjunction “but” in sentence 14. Sentences 14 -43 discuss historical responsibility, making it the main body of the text. As mentioned above, Lin argued climate justice for developing countries from three perspectives. Based on the *principle of historical responsibility and per capita emission rights*, Lin believed that it was fair to “request developed countries to take more energy and environment responsibilities, either through trade or assistance” (sentence 33). This opinion was also extracted by the newspaper editorial as the title of the journalistic article. In sentence 43 Lin concluded that “it is unreasonable to evaluate the emission reduction of developing countries only in terms of total emissions.” The main body of this sample text clearly channeled the opinion that China should not be restricted by total emission reduction goals.

What was confusing was that Lin used the adverb “however” in sentence 44 to shift to seemingly opposite opinions. He wrote “however, it is not to say that developing countries do not need to face the carbon emission problem correctly.” His argued that the environmental capacity was limited and that there was a threshold value beyond which “very little emission may cause tragic consequences” (sentence 46). This argument implied that there was an emission cap, and it was necessary to restrict the global total emissions. In this case, it made sense that developing countries, including China, should set up total emission goals, which was contrary to Lin’s argument in the main body of the text.

The last confusing point was observed in sentences 39 and 48. Lin wrote in sentence 48 that “mandatory emission restrictions will inevitably come at the expense of economic growth, and governments of all countries will face severe policy choices. All countries, of course, include China.” However, in sentence 39, Lin wrote that “if emissions restrictions are imposed before 2020, it will inevitably be at the expense of economic growth and the process of urbanization. For China, this is neither feasible nor possible.” On the one hand, Lin believed all countries have to choose between obligatory emission reductions and economic growth as soon as possible. On the other hand, he thought the obligatory emission reductions would not happen in China before 2020. From the logic and coherence of the text, it can be assumed that Lin’s position was that China should choose its reduction goals after 2020. Again, Lin did not state this opinion explicitly.

As an article published on the opinion page of “xin bai jia,” Lin’s opinions regarding the responsibility of Western countries can be regarded as clear enough. However, his positions and opinions on China’s future responsibilities were expressed in a very euphemistic and vague way by appropriating modal verbs,

adverbs, and phrases that reduce the clarity and certainty of his opinions. The possible explanation for this language use was that around 2009, there was a *climate conspiracy* among high-level government officials, and the government was reluctant to commit to binding climate goals, although China announced the first national climate program in 2007. This sample text was published in 2008. Lin's background shows that he is not only a scholar but also has an influence on policy making. From the analysis, we saw that Lin implied that China, under national and international pressure, should take responsibility for reducing its emissions and make a commitment for the period after 2020. These opinions did not fit in the atmosphere of climate conspiracy when the article was published. Therefore, Lin may not have wanted to express his non-mainstream opinions very clearly and personally. By drawing upon others' opinions and appropriating some linguistic tools, Lin expressed his opinions about China's positions less explicitly and less personally, which may make his opinion piece less noticeable and *less challenging* against the official discourse of climate policy.

Text 4.2.4.1-3

Ambassador Yu Qingtai, Special Representative for Climate Change Negotiations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said:

"The responsibility for the stagnation of climate negotiation cannot be credited to the market."

*Wang Haiping. 2010-07-20. 024 Carbon*Pioneer (ST20)*

The sample text is an interview with Yu Qingtai, a professional ambassador and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Special Representative for Climate Change Negotiations. The text consists of two parts. The first part (sentences 1 to 12) is Yu's general introduction, and the second (sentences 13 to 70) is the main body of the interview.

Previous analysis showed that the *social practice* of many sample texts was related to the announcement of important climate policy. Another impact factor of media attention on climate issues is impending climate change conferences. In terms of this news report, it does not seem to be connected to announcement of climate policy. This report was published in July 2010. Considering the UNFCCC climate change conference would take place by the end of November, the relevance of this report to the climate conference was also weak. Then I checked news reports about Yu and climate change around July 2010 and found out that Yu resigned from his post as the Special Representative for Climate Change Negotiations three days before the publication of this report. I then assumed that Yu's resignation was the *direct social practice* of the text. Normally, the resignation of an official of his stature is announced on the website of the National People's Congress of China and will not

be very interesting to the media, especially the media that focuses on the economy like the newspaper in which the sample text was published. However, it seemed different in Yu's case. Not only did the *21st Century Business Herald* write this article, but the *China Business News* also published an article about Yu's post as the Special Representative from 2007 to 2010¹⁰⁵ shortly after his resignation on the page for "important news." This case revealed that a social actor who played an important role in national climate policy and climate diplomacy can be an impulse for a media report on climate issues.

The sample text began with a high compliment for Yu Qingtai, writing that "a Chinese official changed the perception of senior foreign media professionals about China's participation in international negotiations." It is interesting and meaningful to explore why Yu was sought after by the media because it can reveal the considerations of the Chinese government behind the choice.

Regarding the *broader social practice*, Yu took up his post in 2007 when China announced its first national program on climate change. The announcement of this program demonstrated a change in climate change policy in China, which drew the media's attention. As the first person holding the post, Yu naturally became the focus of the media coverage. Another reason he was sought after by the media was due to the tasks involved with post. Yu once said in an interview with *The Bund*¹⁰⁶ that besides attending the international negotiations and conferences, he spent most of his time communicating with foreign scholars, institutions, and NGOs to let them learn about China's contribution to combating climate change (Zhou 2009). Apparently, public relations and communication were major duties of this post. No matter who takes the post, the role was designed to channel information to the international stakeholders of climate change. For this purpose, China needs a person with very good communication skills and international working experience.

Besides the broader social and political background, Yu could offer what the post required. The first 12 sentences of the sample text were written to praise his competencies and accomplishments. One of his most distinguished characteristics was that he had very good communication skills. Chinese negotiation officials were normally regarded as too discreet and not good at dealing with Western media. The reasons for that were "being worried of speaking wrongly on the one hand and lacking linguistic abilities on the other" (sentence 2). However, Yu was an official who "speaks English as well as Chinese" (sentence 3). "Ambassador Yu's excellent English is of great help and significance to the entire negotiation," Lü Xuedu, a climate change negotiator and the Deputy Director of the National Climate Center, told the reporter, "his language talent has made China's voices louder and stronger"

¹⁰⁵ 'Three years of Yu Qingtai's career as China's first "climate ambassador,' *China Business News*, 2010 <https://www.yicai.com/news/390561.html> (accessed 17 November 2024)

¹⁰⁶ *The Bund* (waitan huabao) is a lifestyle magazine that caters to an upscale, sophisticated audience. It is renowned for its artistic photography, stylish layouts, and insightful articles.

(sentence 8). According to public information, before Yu was designated as the Special Representative for Climate Change Negotiations, he had worked in the Department of Asian and North African Affairs, the Department of International Organizations and Conferences, and the Department of African Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Correspondingly, he had been a diplomat in Jordan, Egypt, the UN, and Tanzania. His broad and varied diplomatic experience enabled him to deal with vital stakeholders in climate change negotiations: the developing countries in Africa and West Asia, the members of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC), and the multilateral international organizations. To some extent, the fundamental interests of developing countries in Africa and West Asia conflict with those of OAPEC in the climate change negotiations. However, Yu had rich diplomatic experience of dealing with both sides. Yu's experience and background in diplomacy reflected that the climate issue was categorized as a diplomatic issue in the *international domain* rather than an issue of only national relevance.

The analysis of Yu's background was not irrelevant. On the contrary, as Yu said in the interview, "delegation members were carefully selected" (sentence 70). Yu's designation reflected some strategic considerations of the Chinese government on climate change politics. First, China had positioned itself as a developing country at least before 2010, when the article was published. China needed to unify as many developing countries as possible in the negotiations. The most important strategy China used was the liaison of G77+China. This negotiation bloc advocated the *right to development* and fairer participation in international trade. Second, in the course of climate change negotiations, China had stuck to the UN mechanism and insisted on the UNFCCC framework as well as the principles of the Kyoto Protocol. Yu's knowledge of various developing countries and the UN mechanism enabled him to fulfill his tasks. The last strategic consideration was to enhance China's voices in global climate politics. The media acts as a field of a *power struggle* in the social construction of climate politics, and media is the *battlefield of different discourses* fighting to define the meaning of climate politics (Beck 2010: 260). China was increasingly aware of the importance of the power struggle of discourses through the media. For this purpose, China needed a person with very good communication skills. Appointing Yu as the special representative helped China channel the information to the world, enhancing China's voice in the *battle of discourses* over climate change negotiations.

Regarding China's voice, the author of the sample text Wang Haiping mentioned that a Chinese official in the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) was going to retire, which was believed to affect China's ability to be heard in the future. The official the article referred to was Professor Yan Hong, the former Deputy Director of the China Meteorological Administration (CMA) and Deputy Secretary-General of WMO. He was the first Chinese to have a higher post in the WMO. Yu did not answer the question directly. He pointed out that if China wants to play a more

important role in global issues in the future more Chinese need to take leading posts in international organizations. This statement pointed to *procedural justice*, which refers to adopting fair procedures and an inclusive framework in the decision-making process in international negotiations between nation-states. In the unequal international system, developing countries are afraid of being excluded from decision making due to their lack of participation in international organizations and institutions. The journalist's raising of this issue in the interview reflected that China had been aware of using the multilateral international organizations to influence the policymaking on global issues.

The text focused on the climate change negotiations and one of the delegation members. The discussion of climate justice was confined to the *international domain* with a focus on international *climate diplomacy*. The main focus of the discussion on climate justice was the significant difference in national emission levels and negotiations of how to distribute the emission rights, namely the *distributive justice*. Following the detailed introduction of the interviewee comes the main body of the interview, consisting of three parts titled: (1) "Correctly distinguish the problem makers and victims of climate change" (sentences 14 to 24); (2) "Cancun negotiation: re-establish the mutual trust?" (sentences 25 to 51) (3) "Climate negotiations are government actions" (sentences 52 to 70).

In part 1, Yu expressed his opinions on climate justice:

[18] ... Developed countries have over-occupied the emission space in the long-term development, which has caused the problem of climate change today....[20] Therefore, for developed countries, emissions must be reduced and excess emissions must be freed up. This is a very reasonable requirement. [21] Therefore, developed countries should compensate victims and provide developing countries with technology and funds to promote better energy conservation and emission reduction.

He argued that climate change was caused by the massive GHG emissions produced by developed countries. This judgement was based on the *historical responsibility principle of distributive justice*. In order to deal with climate change, Yu proposed that developed countries should offer technology and funds to developing countries. This is a *compensatory justice*. In the third part of the interview, Yu even said, "one important reason for the unsuccessful climate negotiations and international cooperation is that developed countries haven't fulfilled their promises on funds and technology" (sentence 54). As Paterson pointed out, both developing and developed countries realize the necessity of combating climate change, but they cannot agree on financial resources and technology transfer, which are the issues over which most of the conflicts occur. He said it is not impossible for them to take

stronger actions if the North offers a better bid for technology transfer and economic support (Paterson 1996: 75). Research on media reports of climate change in China found that the Chinese government is very concerned with the development of green technology (Cheng 2014). It can claim not to ask for financial aid from the climate fund, but it never loses its position on technology transfer.

The second part of the interview referred to the mutual trust between developing and developed countries. Some scholars have argued that an enduring deficit in North-South trust, together with incongruent worldviews, causal beliefs, and persistent global inequality, are the fundamental reasons for differences in principled understandings of what is fair for different countries (Roberts and Parks 2007). However, without a basic common understanding of fairness the global cooperation on climate change is hardly possible. Yu believed that the Copenhagen Summit not only did not achieve an agreement but also broke the mutual trust in international cooperation (sentence 33). His arguments were that the developed countries had not taken actions according to the CBDR principles nor done much to reduce emissions and provide technology transfer as it was stipulated in the Kyoto Protocol. On the contrary, they tried to “transfer” (sentence 32) their responsibilities to the developing countries and put unreasonable demands on them. All participants had high expectations for the Copenhagen Summit. Developing and developed countries tried to put aside their mistrust and think of a solution that both sides could accept. Nevertheless, the failure in Copenhagen made the existing *North-South mistrust* even deeper.

In the third part of the sample text, Yu stated that it is the responsibility of governments to address climate change; it cannot be shifted to the market. Relatedly, Giddens (2009) once argued that the resolution of climate change depends, to some extent, on top-down political action. Giddens proposed a comprehensive approach to tackling climate change, known as the “politics of climate change.” This approach aims to address climate change while ensuring healthy economic development from a political perspective. The vision is ideal, but reality is much harsher. Chris Shaw described a “governance trap” where governments direct responsibility for action on carbon emissions to individuals and businesses, while people and organizations expect the political leadership to set the rules for action. The result is an unwillingness to take radical or long-term action (Dobson 2014 : 4).

4.2.4.2 Short Summary of the Analysis

The detailed analysis of all three sample texts showed that (1) the media report on climate issues was strongly influenced by the climate change policy, especially the National Climate Change Program from 2007. However, ST20 showed that VIPs in climate politics could also attract media attention to climate issues (2) climate change and climate justice were almost exclusively confined to the *international*

domain with a focus on international climate diplomacy (3) the focus on climate justice was *distributive justice*, which highlighted the *historical responsibility principle* and the *per capita principle*.

The *discourses of environmental/ecological debt* were found in ST18 and ST19. They reflected the unequal power relations in the international trade system. *Procedural justice* and *compensatory justice* are discussed in ST20. In ST18, there was a *new discourse of prioritizing the water pollution and emissions of other air pollutants over carbon emissions*.

The role of language and media as means of communication was highlighted in all three sample texts. In ST18, the linguistical analysis showed that by using different modal verbs, verbs, and nouns and choosing to highlight or hide agents of action as well as organizing the sentences in a certain sequence, different interest groups hid their real attitudes to and positions on the CBDR principle in seemingly similar discourses. While the leading G8 countries announced that all the big emitters would be involved in the new negotiation process, the big emitters from the developing countries saw the announcement as a *discourse of hegemony*. In this sense the media landscape is a *battlefield of different discourses* fighting to define the meaning of climate politics (Beck 2010: 260). For this reason, China took action to improve its ability to communicate its principles and priorities to the world, as discussed in ST20. In ST19, we saw that a scholar appropriated some linguistic tools to express his opinions on China's positions less explicitly and personally, which may make his opinion less noticeable and less challenging against the official government discourses on climate change.

4.2.5 Analysis of Economic Observer (EO)

Text EO

The Truth of China's Responsibility of Emission Reduction.
Zhang Chen. 2007-06-11. 007 Economy (ST21)

This article was written by *Economic Observer's* own journalist Zhang Chen. Several time dates in the text should be noticed. The text mentioned that on 4 June 2007, China's National Climate Change Program (2007) was released. The author interviewed an expert on 7 June and also referred to the 33rd G8 summit from 6-8 June that year. The news report was published on 11 June, several days after the events mentioned above. It could be assumed that this report was a response to these events, however. This assumption could be proved by exploring the *intertextuality* of the text.

[1] Even though rich countries cause global warming global, the international press criticizes China for not shouldering the responsibility of greenhouse gas “emission cut.”

[4] The main obstacle of the quarrel is the US’s attitude, but the international press says, “no emission cut by China, no action by the U.S.” (zhongguo bujianpai, meiguo buxingdong).

The author mentioned “the international press” twice at the beginning of the text. It set up a target that was argued against later. It implied that the international press was wrong, and he would reveal the “truth” as written in the title. The framing “no emission cut by China, no action by the U.S.” can be linguistically interpreted in two ways: 1. If China does not cut emissions, the U.S. won’t act. 2. Because China did not cut emissions, the U.S. did not act. In this context, the author interpreted the framing in the second scenario. I checked which international press said so. By entering the original Chinese words, I found that the *Financial Times* published an article¹⁰⁷ with the exact same expression on its Chinese website on 4 June 2007. The article in Chinese was, in fact, a translated version of an original English text titled “HEATED DISCUSSIONS.” The original expression of this FT article was, “the U.S. won't jump unless China curbs its emissions.”¹⁰⁸ This is a relatively neutral expression of the US’s position, as interpreted in the first scenario. The FT wrote further, “China, with some justification, points out that it is still industrializing. While China will soon overtake the U.S. in terms of aggregate CO2 output, it rightly points out that per capita emissions are much lower.” In these sentences, we did not see FT criticizing China for not undertaking the responsibility. However, the framing represented in the title of the translated Chinese version of the original FT article in English was confusing. From the perspective of the media, a brief title with a *protagonist* and an *antagonist fighting* is eye-catching. Although the original FT text also highlighted two opposite actors, the Chinese adaptation amplified the tone of *antagonism* by employing a linguistic tool: parallel sentences---“no emissions” vs. “no actions,” “China” vs. “the U.S.” Although this media practice is understandable, it may also result in misunderstanding in the communication flows.

In challenging the Financial Times’ (FT) framing of climate change solutions discussed at the G8 summit, the author drew on the perspectives of several prominent individual social actors. Li Gao, an associate research fellow at the Office of Global Environmental Affairs under the Chinese Ministry of Science and Technology and co-author of China’s National Climate Change Programme (CNCCP), provides academic insights into China’s domestic climate policy framework. Pan Jiahua, a research fellow at the Institute of Urban Development and

¹⁰⁷<https://www.ftchinese.com/story/001011797?ccode=LanguageSwitch&archive> (accessed 16 December 2019)

¹⁰⁸<https://www.ftchinese.com/story/001011797/en?archive> (accessed 16 December 2019)

Environment at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) and co-author of the 2007 IPCC report, contributes scientific expertise on global climate challenges. Ma Kai, the director of the National Development and Reform Commission, offers a policymaker's perspective on China's climate strategy. Lü Xuedu, deputy director-general of the Office of Global Environmental Affairs under the Chinese Ministry of Science and Technology and a member of the UNFCCC Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) executive board, represents China's role in international climate negotiations. Additionally, Martin Hiller, the communication manager for the global climate change program at WWF International, expresses opinions from perspective of NGO. The first four are researchers and officials at high-level institutes or government departments in China. They belong to the *elite group*. Hiller is a representative of worldwide renowned NGO. In addition, the author drew upon the Kyoto Protocol and the IPCC report. Both are authoritative documents within the UN framework.

The analysis first focuses on what and how the NGOs and UN documents were used in the text. One of the quoted NGOs was the WWF. Its communications manager, Martin Hiller, told *Xinhua News Agency* that the U.S. had not fundamentally changed its position on climate change at the G8 summit. I entered the keywords Martin Hiller, WWF, Xinhua, the U.S. and G8 into Google. The search results showed that the quotation came from a wire copy of the *Xinhua News* and the wire copy was reprinted by several mainstream media outlets¹⁰⁹ in China, such as *China Central Television (CCTV)* and *China Internet Information Center*. The former is the predominant state-run public television broadcaster. In addition to its public functions such as news communication, social education, culture, and entertainment information services, it is also responsible to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council (Zhu 2010). The latter is a state-run web portal led by the State Council Information Office and the China International Publishing Group. It is obvious that *Xinhua* has a very powerful influence on the reporting of international affairs in China. The author of this text drew upon Oxfam's report saying that rich nations should pay the bill for climate change. The author, Zhang, used the IPCC report to prove that developed countries cause climate change:

[9] IPCC report concludes that the likelihood that global warming in the past half century has been created by human activities, especially the burning of fossil fuels, is greater than 90%. [10] In this process, developed countries burned huge amounts of fossil fuels in their industrialization.

¹⁰⁹<http://news.cctv.com/world/20070608/100070.shtml>
http://lianghui.china.com.cn/tech/txt/2007-06/08/content_8360050.htm (accessed 18 December 2019)

Zhang further quoted the Kyoto Protocol to underline his understanding of what is fair:

[23] The document stipulates that the Parties to the convention should, on the basis of equity, take differentiated responsibility in accordance with their capabilities. Therefore, it only stipulates the quantifiable reduction goals of greenhouse emissions for developed nations.

The author mainly drew upon the discourses of climate responsibility and climate justice from international NGOs and UN bodies as well as their official documents. In doing so, he argued against China being responsible for climate change. To his mind, fairness meant that developed countries take the lead on climate change.

Li Gao told the newspaper that the world was focusing on the vast amount of emissions from China in the past two years without looking for the historical reason for climate change, which was biased. As we have seen previously, this is an approach of *historical responsibility to climate justice*. As mentioned, he is also a co-author of China's National Climate Change Program. At the end of the main body of this sample text, there was an extract from the program, serving as an extension of the main text.

The extract exclusively deals with China's efforts and achievements in mitigation climate change, including the following four aspects: (1) Restructuring the economy, promoting technology advancement, and improving energy efficiency; (2) Optimizing energy mix by developing low-carbon and renewable energy; (3) Launching a nationwide tree-planting and afforestation campaign and enhancing ecology restoration and protection; and (4) Effectively controlling the growth rate of the population through family planning. The first two aspects focus on technological advancement, energy efficiency improvement, and renewable energy development, reflecting China's long-standing climate policies and priorities.

It is interesting to analyze the last two aspects. In fact, afforestation and forestry development became a strategic national task after the founding of the People's Republic of China, and it became a legal obligation for citizens at the beginning of the reform and opening-up period. On 23 February 1979, at the sixth meeting of the Standing Committee of the Fifth National People's Congress, a proposal from the State Council was adopted, designating 12 March each year as National Tree Planting Day. During Tree Planting Day in 1982, Deng Xiaoping personally set an example by planting the first tree of the voluntary tree-planting campaign on Yuquan Mountain in Beijing. Since then, voluntary tree planting has been implemented as a legal obligation for citizens.¹¹⁰ Although there are some problems, the national and

¹¹⁰https://www.gov.cn/node_13949/content_803945.htm#:~:text=%EF%BC%91%EF%BC%99%EF%BC%95%EF%BC%96%E5%B9%B4%EF%BC%8C%E6%88%91%E5%9B%BD%E5%BC%80%E5%A7%

international media¹¹¹ cannot deny that China has made great achievements in afforestation. A report from the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO 2024: 6) said that China led the world with the maximum forest area gain of 1,937,000 hectares during 2010 and 2020. This brief introduction to the tree-planting and afforestation campaign in China points out that afforestation was *initially not a measure to address climate change* but was considered an effective measure of environmental protection. It was only after climate change entered the political agenda that people recognized that afforestation could increase carbon sinks, reduce the greenhouse effect, and mitigate climate change. Since then, the issue of afforestation has *transformed* from an environmental protection discourse to a climate change discourse.

This transformation also applies to the fourth aspect regarding family planning. In the early 1970s, mainland China began to implement family planning policies. By the end of 1982, at the Fifth Session of the Fifth National People's Congress, family planning was established as a fundamental national policy. From 26-28 October 2015, at the Fifth Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, an accelerated implementation of a comprehensive two-child policy was announced during the Xi Jinping administration. This marked the official end of the one-child policy that had been in effect in mainland China for over 30 years. Although the family planning policy successfully helped China control its population and even received recognition from the UN Population Fund (Huang 2001), it was often criticized by Western media for violating human rights. Since climate change has entered the political agenda in China, family planning is often framed as an effective measure to reduce the total emissions.

4.2.6 Analysis of China Business News (CBN)

Text CBN1

What is the “Common But Differentiated Responsibilities”?

Chen Xiaochen. 2010-08-30. A07 Column(ST22)

This article was published on the commentaries page. The author Chen is an employed journalist with this newspaper and specializes in reporting on climate change since 2009.¹¹² The headline of this article was a Wh-question. According to the Cambridge Dictionary definition, Wh-questions are used to ask for information. Her article aimed to inform the audience of the first international legal instrument to address climate change and the international attempt to address the impact of

8B%E4%BA%86.%E4%B8%BA%E5%85%A8%E5%9B%BD%E7%9A%84%E6%A4%8D%E6%A0%91%E8%8A%82%E3%80%82 (accessed 6 November 2024)

¹¹¹ <https://news.sciencenet.cn/sbhtmlnews/20078220322750187506.html> (accessed 6 November 2024)
<https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/chinese-news-53523742> (accessed 6 November 2024)

¹¹² The researcher got to know this journalist personally and her professional background during the Copenhagen Summit 2009 in Denmark.

climate change. The fact that the newspaper published this article indicates that the CBDR principle was not quite known by the readers, and it was necessary to explain it. This assumption can be proved by the statistics of media reports on climate change. I searched media articles again under the thematic term “climate change” in the “China Core Newspapers Full-text Database” from 2000 to 2009. The data showed that journalistic reports increased to 343 in 2006 from 6 in 2000 to 1525 in 2007. In 2008, the number rose steadily to 1628 and then dramatically to 4632 in 2009, when the Copenhagen Summit was held. This again implies the importance of that summit in communicating climate change in China. Although the CBDR principle was formulated at the UNFCCC of Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, it is quite possible that neither the average Chinese readers nor the journalists had enough knowledge of this principle. 2007 was a turning point of communicating climate change. As Cottle (Cottle 2009) argues, the release in early 2007 of the latest International Panel on Climate Change report proved to be a transforming moment in the news career of climate change.

Who and whose voices are represented in media text matters. Only one person was clearly represented in the text: Prime Minister Wen Jiabao. Another person was represented but not explicitly in an expression of “the Foreign Minister of a certain country.” The rest of the subjects were represented in a more collective and non-personal manner, such as “China,” “the U.S.,” “India,” “developing countries,” “developed countries,” “a certain developed country,” “a part of developed country Parties,” “all the countries in the world,” and “Chinese and foreign media.” An obvious categorization of developing and developed countries as the actors of climate negotiation was observed. In the meantime, they were depicted as *hostile* parties towards each other. At the beginning of the article, the author wrote that Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao declared that all countries should adhere to the CBDR principle at the Copenhagen Summit. Then, she added that China and most conference participants also acknowledged this principle. A sentence beginning with ‘But’ led us to the focus of the article: “The CBDR has been constantly challenged.” The author took the Copenhagen Summit as an example of the *fight* between two blocs by using the *rhetorical device* parallelism to enumerate the actions of how developed countries try to abandon the CBDR principle (sentence 7). The actions included the secretly agreed to but leaked “Danish Text.” As I previously mentioned, this was an attempt to abandon the Kyoto Protocol, exerting pressure on the Chinese and Indian delegations as well as blaming China for having hijacked the Copenhagen Summit. The function of parallelism here is to emphasize the attempt to break the CBDR principle by developed countries. In doing so, an *antagonism* between developing and developed countries is framed in the report.

It is interesting to notice that the author did not explicitly point out which country it was. There are two possibilities. The author did not point out the *identity* of the country because she assumed that readers already knew. The word “a certain

(developed) country” triggers cognition (van Dijk 2008) that is widely known by the readers. “A certain country” is, in some sense, not a country that seems unknown; instead, it is a country that is actually known by default. Not revealing the identity of the country was, in this context, not a euphemism. On the contrary, it echoed the cognitive frame that the readers and writers shared. As discussed in Chapter 2, China and the U.S. were narrated together in international governance of climate change. It is because, on the one hand, they are the biggest carbon emitters in the world. On the other hand, the U.S. had been insisting that it is unfair not to include big developing countries, such as China and India, in the Kyoto Protocol. The U.S. does not want to be constrained by the agreement. Therefore, when a developed country blames a big developing country, the journalists and readers take for granted that the developed country is the U.S. It is not uncommon in Chinese media reports to criticize the U.S. by not pointing out its identity. In another clause, Chen again mentioned that “the Foreign Minister of a certain country publicly blamed China for “hijacking” the Copenhagen Summit.” The usage of “certain country” was situated in this specific context. As I mentioned above, in the *Guardian* on 29 December 2009, British Climate Secretary, Ed Miliband, accused China, Sudan, Bolivia, and other leftwing Latin American countries of trying to hijack the UN climate summit and “hold the world to ransom” to prevent a deal being reached.¹¹³ On the contrary, Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao told *Xinhua News Agency* the following day that China “has played an important and constructive role in pushing the Copenhagen climate talks to earn the current results and has demonstrated its utmost sincerity and made its best effort.”¹¹⁴ The Chinese government was angered by Miliband’s charge. A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman, Jiang Yu, refuted Miliband’s remarks against China. She said the remarks contained “obvious political attempts,” as they were made to escape obligations and foment discord among developing countries.¹¹⁵ Since the Chinese government directly responded to the “hijack” discourse, we can say that Miliband’s accusation caused diplomatic friction between China and the UK. The Chinese journalists who covered the news about the climate negotiations were supposed to be familiar with this issue. It has to be pointed out that the author made a mistake with Miliband’s title. However, what she means with “a certain country” definitely refers to the UK in that clause. From a linguistic perspective, using “certain” to refer to a person or a country in Chinese language has a derogatory tone. Emotionally, it implies that it is disdainful to point out who it is clearly.

The analysis of *intertextuality* focused on both direct and indirect quotations. 8 indirect quotations and 3 direct quotations were found. 9 of these 11 quotations were

¹¹³<https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2009/dec/20/ed-miliband-china-copenhagen-summit> (accessed 17 November 2024)

¹¹⁴<https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cedk/eng/zd/gx/t647125.htm> (accessed 03 December 2019)

¹¹⁵<http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/qhbh/t647255.htm>

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-12/22/content_9210146.htm (accessed 17 November 2024)

from the UN Conference on the Human Environment 1972, UNFCCC 1992, Kyoto Protocol 1997, Dehli Declaration 2002, Bali Road Map 2007, and Copenhagen Accord 2009. The shared feature of the quoted sources was that they were all UN conferences on climate change. One quotation came from international mainstream scientific research, and the other one from Prime Minister Wen Jiabao. The character of the quotation reflected the journalist's high dependence on the *United Nations' discourses* on climate change and climate justice, which showed the importance of the UN framework for China's dealing with climate change. It also reflected that the UN climate conferences are the impulse for media reports on climate issues. According to the statistics from CNKI, Chinese newspapers reported climate change more intensively when the UN conference on climate change took place. This is true not only for Chinese journalistic practice but also for the media practice of other countries.

During a media event, different media institutions have different capacities and resources to cover the event. Take the above-mentioned Miliband's hijack discourse as an example; almost all the Chinese authoritative media outlets and many official institutions drew upon the same report of Jiang Yu refuting against Miliband by the *Xinhua News Agency*. This discursive practice reflected *Xinhua's* important role in communicating information and constructing discourse on climate change. *Xinhua News Agency*, as it claims on the website, has more than 180 foreign bureaus worldwide,¹¹⁶ making it the largest news agency in the world in terms of attached reporters. *Xinhua* is state-run and the most influential media institution in China. It is a ministry-level institution subordinate to the Chinese central government and the main channel for the distribution of important news related to the Communist Party. For instance, Prime Minister Wen claimed China's role in the Copenhagen climate negotiations solely through *Xinhua*.

There are many approaches to understanding and addressing climate justice. In this text, I observed a *development discourse of* climate justice. Chen first asked a question: "Well, what is the Common but Differentiated Responsibility principle then?" Directly after this question, she described a comic that was spread widely during the Kyoto Conference in 1997. In the comic, there is a very emaciated man clothed in rags (a metaphor for developing countries) picking up firewood to cook. At that time, a fat and bulky guy (*metaphor* for developed countries) comes and blames him, saying: "carbon emission causes global warming." It is easy to get the information embedded in the comic. *Blaming* a country that is still striving for basic human needs is not fair or just. It is even worse when the country is blamed by another country where its people live an affluent life. The author mentioned the UN Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm in 1972. She believed the CBDR principle started to emerge from then on. She drew upon the declaration's content, which

¹¹⁶ <http://203.192.6.89/xhs/xhsjj.htm> (accessed 03 December 2019)

stated that environmental problems in developing countries “are to a large extent caused by under-development” (sentence 17). The author further expressed her belief in *development justice* by drawing upon the Delhi Ministerial Declaration on Climate Change and Sustainable Development, which was made in 2002.

[42] The basic point of the declaration is to acknowledge the importance of addressing climate change in the context of sustainable development.

[43] The Delhi Declaration reaffirms that economic development and poverty eradication are the first and overriding priorities of the developing country parties.

Besides the development discourse of climate justice there is also a discourse of *historical responsibility*. Chen drew from the “current scientific academia,” saying that climate change is caused by human activities, especially the activities of industrialization of developed countries. It is a widely acknowledged conclusion through IPCC reports by the scientists except those that are climate change skeptics. The author then listed several statistics to support her argument: developed countries accounted for 95% of CO₂ emissions from the Industrial Revolution in the 18th century to 1950, and during the 50 years from 1950 to 2000, emissions by developed countries still took up 77% of the world total. The source of the statistics was not identified. As far as I can research, the statistics did not appear in the IPCC reports (1992, 2007). However, I found that the exact same data and discourse appeared in Chinese media coverage and a scientific report written solely by Chinese researchers (Li et al. 2014: 18). The earliest media coverage that contained the statistics came from a *Xinhua* report titled “Dealing with Climate Change: Developed Countries Shoulder Bigger Responsibilities and Obligations” on 6 June 2007. The journalists Sun Xia and Wang Libin drew the statistics from Xu Ying, then the deputy director of the National Climate Center of China Meteorological Administration. However, Xu did not disclose where the statistics came from. It seemed that Xu’s discourse, represented by the *Xinhua Agency*, had been so well spread that it is accepted as common sense. Even the above-mentioned scientific report by Li and co-authors from 2014 drew on the data without giving the source. From my point of view, not identifying the source of statistics may decrease the reliability and trustworthiness of the argument, either by the media or the scholar.

Let us come back to the historical discourse of climate justice. Chen argued that the U.S.’s cumulative emission was 29% of the total amount, whereas China took up 8%. Moreover, greenhouse gases stay in the air for hundreds of years. This argument does not deny that developing countries should also take active measures to tackle the problem. The difference is that developed countries have a legal obligation to reduce emissions, while mitigation action of developing countries “including China” is voluntary. What she indicated was that China contributed very

little to the historical cumulative emissions, which justifies the non-binding mitigation obligations of developing countries, including China.

Text CBN2

How to Share the Responsibility? Developing Countries seek "Climate Justice."

Miao Qi. 2015-12-01. A04 International (ST23/CBN3)

This article is worthy of close examination because it explicitly addresses the issue of climate justice. It was published on the international page on 1 December 2015 during the UN Climate Change Conference in Paris. At that time, China was under Xi Jinping's administration. Furthermore, China's economic and political environment changed between 2007 and 2015.

The main actors represented in the article included politicians, such as the President of China Xi Jinping, the Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi, the Minister of Environment, Forest and Climate Change of India Prakash Javadekar, and businessmen, such as the CEO and chairman of CHINT Group co. Ltd. Nan Cunhui, and two collective actors: World Resources Institute (WRI) and Goldman Sachs. Since the title of the article is about developing countries' struggle for climate justice during the climate conference in Paris, it is normal to represent the high-level politicians from the two biggest developing countries. CHINT Group is a world smart energy solution provider located in China. Goldman Sachs is an American multinational investment bank and financial services company. WRI is a global research nonprofit environmental organization that spans over 50 countries. It works on six urgent challenges: water, food, forests, energy, cities, and climate. The China office, its first international office, was opened in Beijing in 2008. Other represented actors included China, India, the U.S., the EU, developing countries, developed countries, (several/rich) developed countries, poor countries, countries in the primary stage of development, leaders of each country, people, 300.000 Indian people, the international community, Chinese companies and enterprises, and emerging economics. They all are collective identities.

The represented actors were highlighted mainly through quotations. Xi was quoted twice, Modi 2 times, and Javadekar 2 times. A report by Goldman Sachs was quoted once. It is interesting to observe that the newspaper more often represented the voices of India than those of China. In doing so, India was "*foregrounded*" and China "*backgrounded*" (Fairclough 1995: 104). This media practice seemed confusing. We will come back to this issue in the following analysis. For now, we turn to the concept of "emerging economy" in the sample text.

The author wrote that several developed countries insisted that there wouldn't be an effective agreement unless the emerging economies shared more responsibilities to tackle the climate challenge (sentence 15). The emerging economy can also be equated to an emerging country, emerging market, or newly

industrialized country (NIC). These concepts do have differences but are often used interchangeably. They primarily refer to the countries whose economies have not yet reached developed country status but have outpaced other developing counterparts and play a more important role in world economics and society. Such countries are still considered developing nations,¹¹⁷ but these countries' growth rate is much higher than other developing nations. However, this new narrative of identity places these countries in a dilemma. On the one hand, the big developing countries, such as China and India, are still confronted with the eradication of poverty and improvement of living standards; on the other hand, those countries are growing and will grow at a relatively fast rate. This will result in tremendous greenhouse emissions over the following decades, meaning that they will be expected to take more responsibility. While these countries' economic power is growing, their influence within international organizations and institutions has not increased accordingly, which makes them reluctant to take more binding responsibilities. Because developing countries do not have binding obligations of emission reduction, these countries prefer to position themselves as developing nations rather than emerging countries. In the text, we see that the leaders of China and India identified their countries as developing countries that prioritize the right to development:

[3] ... the Chinese President Xi Jinping put forward in their speech that addressing climate change should not deny the legitimate needs of developing countries to reduce poverty and improve their people's living standards; he also emphasized that the "common but differentiated responsibility" principle should be adhered to.

[13] In Modi's words, when considering fairness, developing countries should be allowed to continue with the development path.

Due to the large population, high speed of development, and rapidly increasing emissions, both China and India are under greater pressure and criticism from other countries, especially developed countries. However, there are differences between China and India. India had a larger poverty rate, and the overall social and economic development was not as high as China's. In terms of total carbon emissions, India placed fourth after China, the U.S., and the EU, as the author writes. Thus, it received less criticism from other countries than China. It seemed more justified for India to claim the right to development than China. As mentioned above, India is foregrounded whereas China is backgrounded. In Chinese culture, there is a proverb:

¹¹⁷ For example, the UN report "World Economic Situation and Prospects 2014" still categorizes China and India into the "Developing Economies" (page 146) https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/wesp/wesp_current/2014wesp_country_classification.pdf (accessed 17 November 2024)

not to stick your neck out. The media discursively let India stand out, and speaking for developing countries can prevent China from harsh criticisms.

The analysis focused on *intertextuality*. Miao also stressed that insisting on CBDR was the prerequisite for developing countries' willingness to cooperate. It is interesting to find that Miao almost completely drew upon Chen Xiaochen's (ST22) narratives on CBDR in four sentences ([8], [9], [10], [11]). Chen belongs to those journalists who started to report on climate change relatively early in China. As a journalist employed at the same newspaper, Miao must know that her colleague, Chen, specializes in this topic. What is striking is that Miao quoted Chen's discussions on the CBDR with only very minor differences in wording. Noting an almost six-years gap between the two articles, Miao seemed to fully accept Chen's understanding of the CBDR as a normative and standard interpretation. This intertextuality reflected that the media strongly adheres to the *CBDR* as the explanatory climate justice framework. The main points of their understanding of climate justice focused on: 1. developed countries have binding obligations to reduce emissions, whereas developing countries do not 2. developing countries should focus on *economic development* and poverty eradication rather than emission reduction. By the way, Miao quoted her colleague Chen's interpretation of climate justice without mentioning the source. This shortcoming in journalistic practice again decreased the reliability of the report.

Although both China and India see the right to development as the primary principle of fairness and believe that it is just, they are willing to participate in global cooperation regarding climate change. Miao wrote that China had agreed to provide the poor countries with \$2 billion and pledged to peak CO₂ emissions by around 2030¹¹⁸ ([20]). India pledged to increase the nonfossil fuel by up to 40% by 2030, thus increasing renewable energy capacity of 1.75 gigawatts (GW) by 2022. The country also promised to reduce the carbon intensity of GDP by 33-35% on the basis of 2005 numbers ([25], [26]). What they did not want to accept was the binding obligations. In the text, we found a *discourse of non-binding intended nationally determined contributions* (INDC). The discourse of non-binding contribution is intertwined with two other discourses in the text. The first one is *the discourse of South-South cooperation*. The author wrote:

[21] Xi Jinping stressed in his speech in Paris that China will keep its promise to South-South cooperation. This year, China announced the establishment of an RMB 20 billion South-South Cooperation Fund. China will set up 10

¹¹⁸ According to a recent study CO₂ emissions in China may peak up to a decade earlier than the nation has pledged under the Paris Agreement.
<https://www.carbonbrief.org/chinas-emissions-could-peak-10-years-earlier-than-paris-climate-pledge>
<https://www.nature.com/articles/s41893-019-0339-6>
<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-carbon/china-co2-emissions-to-peak-in-2022-ahead-of-schedule-government-researcher-idUSKCN1VQ1K0>
(accessed 17 November 2024)

pilot low-carbon industrial parks, start 1000¹¹⁹ mitigation and adaptation programs, continue to promote international cooperation in clean energy, disaster prevention and mitigation, ecological protection, and climate-smart agriculture, and help other developing countries to increase their financing capacity.

There is a frustrating North-South deadlock in the climate negotiations. Although cooperation between developed and developing countries did not progress much, China's engagement enhanced South-South collaboration. According to UNDP's information, this UN organization and the Chinese government signed a new agreement on strengthening South-South cooperation between the two sides in 2010. In 2012, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) announced that funding would be doubled for climate change aid to about \$72 million a year. Subsequently, a project to donate materials to help countries respond to climate change was initiated. It was headed by the NDRC's Department of Climate Change and funded by the Ministry of Finance. In September 2015, before the Paris climate conference, China stepped up its commitment when Xi Jinping announced a 20 billion yuan (\$3.1 billion) South-South Climate Cooperation Fund. Two months later, in Paris, the government clarified its scope: from 2016, China would fund 10 low-carbon demonstration projects, 100 climate change adaptation and mitigation projects, and 1,000 training places in developing nations (it became known as the "10-100-1000" plan). The joint implementation of multiple innovative UNDP-China projects promotes South-South cooperation between China and other developing countries and improves China's participation in international affairs.¹²⁰ In the past, it was those developed countries that were able to offer development aid. As China's economy grows fast, it has more financial resources. Therefore, the framework of the UNDP enables China to establish aid programs and participate in international affairs. The discourse of South-South cooperation is an *alternative discourse of the North-South impasse*. As discussed in the theoretical chapter, China values the relationship with southern countries and has always tried to take the leading role in South-South cooperation. China does it tactically because it enhances China's discursive power in international affairs.

The second related discourse was *clean technology and renewable energy*. China not only provides less developed countries with aid, but it also cooperates with India, another big developing country from the Global South, especially in renewable energy. The core issue of climate change is the carbon emission that is a byproduct of conventional fossil fuels. By applying renewable energy or so-called clean energy technology carbon emission can be reduced or even eliminated. However, clean

¹¹⁹ It should be 100 mitigation and adaptation programs in the original speech of Xi Jinping.

¹²⁰ <https://www.cn.undp.org/content/china/en/home/sustainable-development.html> (accessed 14 December 2019)

energy technology is expensive, high-tech, with high threshold, demanding a lot of money. It is not difficult to imagine that developed countries or profit-oriented companies in those countries are not willing to transfer the high-tech in renewable energy at low cost to the developing ones because it requires substantial early-stage investment in both capital and technology. Most developing countries cannot afford it. However, China is an exceptional example among developing countries. Since its Reform and Opening-up policy, “science and technology is the primary productive force” has been the guiding rule of economic policies. Confronted with huge economic and ecological stress, the Chinese government has invested tremendously in renewable energy for the last two decades. Compared with India, China goes far beyond in research and development as well as the application of renewable energy. The author Miao concluded that Chinese companies had “a huge business chance” in renewable energy by drawing on the following data:

[27] According to the analysis by the World Resources Institute, India needs to reach at least 200 GW of renewable energy capacity by 2030 in order to meet the goal of increasing the percentage of nonfossil fuel with up to 40% before 2030.

[30] A report by Goldman Sachs says that foreign investment in renewable energy can reach up to \$300 billion in the coming ten years.

In fact, Chinese businesses have started investing in India. Nan Cunhui, CEO of CHINT Group, personally handed over the investment letter of intent to Modi on 15 October 2015. CHINT plans to invest \$1.6 billion in the Indian energy sector in five years. Since *China Business News*'s reporting focus is business and finance, it is easy to understand that Miao drew upon Goldman Sachs' report on investment in renewable energy. The journalist combined the discourse of investment in clean technology and renewable energy with that of South-South cooperation as an alternative solution to the climate (justice) deadlock. This showed that the discourse of climate change and climate justice of CBN is both *technology---* and *market-based*.

4.2.7 Analysis of Southern Weekly (SW)

4.2.7.1 Analysis of Samples

Text 4.2.7.1-1

China's Role.

Zou Ji. 2007-06-14. C23 Specials (ST24/SW1)

This sample text focuses on China's role and position in combating climate change. It was published as a comment or opinion on the “Specials” page. The newspaper did not explicitly claim that Zou's position only represents his own

opinions. Therefore, we can assume that Zou's opinions were accepted by the newspaper.

The author of this article is a researcher who is active both in academia and politics. According to information from different sources¹²¹ about Zou Ji, we can roughly categorize his titles and positions into four dimensions: (1) Zou is a renowned Chinese scholar with very rich international experience and a network as a professor of Environmental Economics Studies at Renmin University of China, director of the Chinese Ecological Economics Society (CEES), researcher (1995-1996) of the London School of Economics and Political Science, visiting scholar (2007) of the Harvard Kennedy School as well as editorial board member of the British journal "Climate Policy" (2) Zou was not only a key member of the Chinese climate negotiation team that traveled to UNFCCC conferences but also a Chinese representative to the UN Intergovernmental Committee of Experts on Sustainable Development Financing. He previously served as a deputy director general of the National Center for Climate Change Strategy and International Cooperation (NCSC), subordinated to the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) under the Chinese State Council (3) In addition to his role in the Chinese government, Zou held positions in international non-governmental organizations. He acted as the first China Country Director of the World Resources Institute, a global research think tank. Since 2017, he has been president of the Energy Foundation in China. (4) Zou was also often interviewed by both national and international media, such as *Reuters* and *Southern Weekly*. That is to say, he had a good media network. The brief background information about Zou Ji as a social actor revealed that Zou is part of the elite group in Chinese society; his influence extends from academia to politics and media and outside China.

The text was written by Zou himself and consists of two parts. The main body of the text is the article written by Zou. The editor placed an extract of the article before the main body, and the analysis focused on it. When doing *text analysis* of journalistic articles, it makes sense to start from the first paragraph, which normally introduces the main topic or main opinions about an issue.

In the first sentence of Zou's article, he used a *metaphor* "game" to describe the global effort of combating climate change. He pointed out that China had been participating in this international game since the very beginning of making rules and had played a very important role in the UNFCCC. In the following paragraphs, Zou focused on discussing China's role in the international climate change negotiations since the 1990s. As Fairclough (2003) argues, textual analysis must consider not only what is present in a text but also what is absent. The international climate

¹²¹ Public information about Zou Ji
<http://www.efchina.org/About-Us-en/Staff-en/JiZou-en>,
<https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E9%82%B9%E9%AA%A5> (accessed 17 November 2024)

change negotiations are part of a global effort to combat climate change, but not all of it. Besides the multilateral climate change negotiations there was also bilateral cooperation either in politics or economics as well as more *bottom-up grassroots movements* in which China also played an important role. His article does not address *alternative aspects of climate change*. The issue of climate change in general, and climate justice in particular, was mainly addressed in the *international domain* as an *top-down elite discourse*.

In media text analysis, it matters which actors or participants are represented and which are omitted, as well as in which way the present actors are represented. It is also meaningful to analyze the actors' identities and relationships among them (Fairclough 1995). Since the author used the "game" metaphor, there were game players. It is not difficult to figure out that the players were the parties of the UNFCCC, namely the states or governments. Some actors were explicitly represented, such as "China" and "negotiators," in sentences 7 and 15. Some actors were represented in the form of personal pronouns, which I divided into three types: "I," "we," and "you." "I" appeared 4 times, "we" 10 times, and "you" 2 times with "your" 1 time. The sentences where "I" was located were constructed in the form of "I think/believe/what I have said..." as a way to enhance his *authority as an expert and official*. The pronoun "we" is a very ambiguous word that can refer to different actors according to the context. It may refer to the climate change negotiators in sentences 18, 19, and 39. It could be the economic sectors in sentences 35, 36, 37 and 39. More often, "we" was used simply to represent China or the Chinese government. "You" (or "your") is used in singular, as opposite to "I" (or "my"). It seemed that the word "you" included any other social actors. However, when we read "you" in the sentences it appeared, we had a different understanding.

[15] The initiative of the negotiation does not come from the negotiation itself; the negotiators rely more on their national power; It is the national policy and strategy that your initiative comes from.

[33] When estimating a country's economic competitiveness and comprehensive competencies, it indicates that you do not have competitiveness....., if you have a polluted economy...

In sentence 15, "your" actually referred to the negotiators to whom the author himself belonged. The two "you" in sentence 33 referred to China as a whole. The analysis of the actors showed that the actors who were explicitly represented were mainly officials, experts, politicians, and China as a sovereign state. The actors that were implicitly represented were the game players, including other nation-states. In fact, the voices or *actors from the civil society were missing*. With regard to the relations between the actors, the authoritative actors try to include other actors by using "you" in the text. However, according to the critical analysis, other actors were

de facto *not included* in the “you.” Therefore, the authoritative actors were dominant in the relations, and thus, the elite discourse of climate change was dominant.

Using CDA, , we found a very interesting aspect of how the author’s identity and relation to other social actors changed in the social practice. According to a report¹²² on 1 December 2015, Zou said to the media that dealing with climate change could not rely only on one type of actor. It was not enough to depend solely on government or industry. He believed that global governance of climate change should include different stakeholders, the government should make policies to stimulate a transformation into a low-carbon economy, and industries and the public should be encouraged to change their behaviors. The background of his talk with the media was that on 30 November 2015, Chinese President Xi Jinping gave a speech at the opening ceremony of the 2015 UN Climate Change Conference in Paris. The speech was titled “Work Together to Build a Win-Win, Equitable and Balanced Governance Mechanism on Climate Change.” In Xi’s speech, he said that besides governments, it was necessary to mobilize businesses, non-governmental organizations, and all players in society to participate in international cooperation on climate change, thus raising public awareness of pooling resources on climate change. It is clear that Zou drew upon President Xi’s discourse in his interview with the media. However, Zou did not mention the role of different actors in the sample text, which was published in 2007, eight years earlier than his interview with the media. That is to say, Zou spoke in accordance with the discourse of the highest political actor.

Now we will turn to the analysis of the *discursive practice*. Zou discussed China’s role in international negotiations on climate change since the 1990s. At that time, China insisted that it should continue to focus on its development. That meant that China would continue to increase carbon emissions. Zou drew upon his own professional experience, revealing that China was at a time called “Mr. NO” among the climate negotiators. In his opinion, China should insist that its principles and position were not wrong from a historical perspective. It is obvious in the text that the *discourse of the right to development* was regarded as a just principle. This principle relates to the CBDR. The CBDR principle is the first international legal instrument to address climate justice. It was formulated in 1992 UNFCCC article 3 ‘Principles’ as follows:

The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof (UNFCCC 1992: 4).

¹²² Zou Ji: Dealing with climate change needs joint efforts, 2015
http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/2015-12/01/content_37207984.htm (accessed 17 November 2024)

The fact that the UNFCCC stipulated the leading role the developed countries should take also reflects the consideration that the developing countries have a “development imperative” (Giddens 2009; Beck 2010).

In the text, there was a *discourse of game* regarding climate change politics. “The international game of climate change” was foregrounded in the first sentence of the main body of the text. Since it is a game, there are winners and losers in the game. Zou wrote that the principles of common but differentiated responsibilities were accepted by all sides and became the guideline for dealing with international environmental issues. In his opinion, this was “a big victory” for developing countries. He also believed that developing countries could benefit from the “Kyoto Protocol”, which was a result of an “arduous *struggle*.” How long developing countries can take advantage of the Kyoto Protocol depends on “the second round of the game,” wrote Zou. He believed that climate change was mainly a political and diplomatic game. The goal was to win the game by improving China’s “core competitiveness and comprehensive competencies.”

If climate change is understood as a game in which the winner takes all, then there seems to be a contradictory discourse in Zou’s text, i.e., the *moral discourse of big country responsibility*. Zou described China in the text as a developing country whose opposite side was that of the developed countries. It is popular to categorize the countries in the world into developed, developing, and underdeveloped countries, especially by politicians and international organizations. However, in Zou’s text, I observed a *new identity*¹²³ given to China, i.e. a *big responsible country* or a *moral power* in the world. In the following sentences, he wrote:

[40] China has a higher strategic consideration when facing toward the world. [41] The direction of China’s development is to get along with the world more harmoniously and get integrated into the world system in which China plays the role as a responsible big country. [42] In fact, it has a deeper moral implication. If China is rich and strong in the future, it should be a power which is able to accumulate its merits and virtues and deliver favors to others. [43] It matters how China positions itself in the family of world nations.

In his opinion, even though China was not very rich and strong at the time of writing, the world was “terrified” by China due to its high-speed development during the past decades. No matter whether it is out of utilitarian considerations or a moral obligation to justice, China should address merits and values. He thinks that China’s rise depends on whether its values are attractive to the rest of the world. Expecting China to be a responsible country and moral model in the future, Zou indicated that China should contribute more to dealing with climate change.

¹²³ It has to be stressed that we call it a new identity in the context of 2007 when the article was published.

The analysis identified two different discourses in Zou's article. On the one hand, Zou firmly believed that climate policy should serve China's economic and social development and be in accord with China's national interests in climate politics. Holding this belief, Zou saw the *right to development as the highest principle of justice*. It reflected approaches to climate justice shared by the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) (Bond 2012). The UNDESA leadership considers climate justice to be concerned with the global South's and semi-periphery's "right to industrialize" in a carbon-constrained world. On the other hand, he also proposed that China should take more responsibilities in the future.

In order to understand the seemingly incompatible discourses, it is necessary to investigate how the author drew upon different discourses and interweaved them together to make his own arguments by looking at the *intertextuality* of the text. In sentences, 22, 23, 24, and 25, he mentioned China's sustainable development policy and environmental goals of the Five-Year Plans on National Economy and Social Development since the 1990s, especially the Scientific Outlook on Development (SOD) of the Communist Party of China and President Hu Jintao (2002-2012). The SOD aimed to create a socialist harmonious society by incorporating sustainable development, social welfare, scientific socialism, a humanistic society, and increased democracy. The sustainable development was already addressed in the 9th Five-Year Plan (1996-2000) and highlighted in the SOD. Zou pointed out that the reason for the government's emphasis on sustainable development was that China's economy was constrained by the high consumption of energy and resources. What Zou meant by constraints was that China's GDP was growing fast and, correspondently, so were its carbon emissions. According to data¹²⁴ from the World Bank, China's GDP was \$2.752 trillion in 2006 and \$3.552 trillion in 2007. It surpassed the UK's GDP in 2006 and then Germany's in 2007, making China the third largest economy after the U.S. and Japan. On the other hand, the World Bank data¹²⁵ also showed that in 2005 China's carbon emission reached 5,896,957.7 kt, surpassing the U.S. to become the largest emitter in the world. The development model based on high emissions needs to be changed. Therefore, Zou proposed that the change in the national economic and social development should be reflected in China's climate policy. Participating in the global fight for climate change is, in a certain sense, in accordance with China's economic and social transformation into a more sustainable model. Taking more responsibilities for climate change cooperation in the future creates a moral image, and stimulates the transformation. With its tremendous economic development in mind, it seems difficult for China not to take

¹²⁴The World Bank data
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?end=2017&locations=CN-US-DE-JP-GB&name_desc=false&start=1997 (accessed 28 October 2019)

¹²⁵The World Bank data
<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.ATM.CO2E.KT?end=2014&locations=CN-US-DE-JP-GB&start=1960&view=chart> (accessed 28 October 2019)

more (binding or voluntary) responsibilities. That can explain why the two different discourses are compatible in one text. While Zou called for setting up a moral model by supporting “international justice” ([32]), he still emphasized the integration of climate policy into national social and economic policies. His arguments indicated that China makes its climate change policy based on its national economic and social development strategies (Lewis 2007, 2009). China’s motivation for combating climate change comes mainly from its need to transform its economic development paradigm.

Although Zou wrote the article as a comment or an opinion to the newspaper, the editor placed a passage before the author’s article. It revealed what the editor thought was the article’s most important and relevant parts. The extract was:

[1] Today, we say we are in the early phase of development, which makes the heavy pollution and high emissions understandable and forgivable. [2] Can we still say that after 20 years? [3] China should take advantage of the international game of climate change to improve its core competitiveness and comprehensive competencies. [4] China’s wealth and power should be demonstrated by being able to do good deeds and favors for others, constantly and morally.

In the original text by Zou, the first and second sentences appeared later than the third sentence. The editor positioned them at the beginning of the extract and the sample text. The first sentence was a presupposition implying a belief in China that environmental and climate problems were inevitable in the early stage of development. There were two answers to the second question, either yes or no, theoretically. However, the first and second sentences were sequenced together with a turning, and the first presupposition was actually implicitly denied by applying the rhetorical question, which implied that China could not continue with the business as usual in the future. The editor highlighted two sentences perhaps to provoke readers to rethink the widely accepted belief. Zou stressed that China’s climate policy should be based on its national interests, but the extract, which consists of four sentences, focused more on China’s moral responsibilities. There was, therefore, a small *discrepancy* between the author’s opinions and the editor’s opinions. This newspaper is regarded as more liberal and critical than other newspapers. It concentrated more on the *alternative frame* rather than the normative one. The discursive practice by the editor of *Southern Weekly* was also different from that of other newspapers.

After conducting the text and discourse analysis, let us have a look at the broader *social and cultural practice* of the text. This article was published on 14 June 2007 as a special report on climate change. The social and political context is the announcement of China’s National Climate Change Program that month. This is the first policy paper in China that outlines the impacts that China faces from climate

change and sets out a strategy to address climate change and sustainable development. On that day the State Council Information Office held a press conference at which the director of the NDRC explained the climate change policy and answered questions from journalists. Regarding the same policy paper the State Council Information Office held another press conference on 14th of June 2007. This time it was the Minister of Technology Wan Gang who introduced the technological aspect of China's effort to deal with climate change. As mentioned in the chapter on data collection, there was a remarkable increase in media reports of climate change in China. The *national climate policy* had a great influence on media reports on climate issues.

In order to better understand why the author related climate change policy to China's rise, we need to focus on the social and political context of this discourse. China was a semi-colony from the Opium War up to the foundation of the People's Republic of China in 1949. There has been a national discourse about why China became weak since the late Qing Dynasty, then was defeated in the Opium War, lost its historical glory, and how it can (peacefully) rise and become prosperous and strong again. Even after its foundation, the People's Republic of China was relatively isolated from the world until the Opening of China started in 1978. Since then, China has developed so fast that its economy has been integrated into the global economic system, in which its role is becoming more and more important. Some remarkable events happened in China in the 2000s. On 13 July 2001, Beijing was declared the host city for the 2008 Summer Olympic Games. On 3 December 2002, the Bureau International des Expositions (BIE) announced Shanghai as the host city of World Expo 2010. The Summer Olympic Games and the World Expo were regarded as ideal opportunities to showcase a country's soft power.

Beijing and Shanghai are the biggest cities in China. Their success in the 2000s symbolized the rise of China's power on the international stage. In 2004, the most influential television, China Central Television (CCTV), started to produce a documentary series called "The Rise of the Great Powers." This series explored the rise of nine great powers in modern world history: Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, the UK, France, Germany, Japan, Russia (Soviet Union), and the U.S. It was first broadcast in November 2006. This 12-part series was seen as part of a new agenda by China's Communist Party, which "is encouraging people to discuss what it means to be a major world power and has largely stopped denying that China intends to become one soon"¹²⁶. Before the "*peaceful rise*" and "*peaceful development*" came onto the political agenda in China, the Chinese government had followed a dictum by Deng Xiaoping "tao guang yang hui," meaning to conceal one's fame and ability, namely keep a low profile. To be specific, it was understood that China should focus

¹²⁶*China, Shy Giant, Shows Signs of Shedding Its False Modesty, The New York Times, 2009*
<https://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/09/world/asia/09china.html?n=Top%2fReference%2fTimes%20Topic%2fPeople%2fK%2fKahn%2c%20Joseph&pagewanted=all> (17 November 2024)

on developing its economy and *not seek to play a leadership role* in international affairs.

Returning to the sample article, it was published in 2007 during Hu Jintao's presidency. On 15 September 2005, Hu gave a speech at the UN Summit titled "Build Towards a Harmonious World of Lasting Peace and Common Prosperity."¹²⁷ President Hu said that peace, cooperation, and development are the main themes of the times, and the trend toward a globalized economy is deepening. He called for upholding multilateralism to realize common security, upholding mutually beneficial cooperation to achieve common prosperity, and upholding the spirit of inclusiveness to build a harmonious world together. According to a Chinese scholar, Shi Yinhong, who is an expert and a professor in international relations, President Hu continued Deng Xiaoping's low-profile foreign policy.¹²⁸ Hu held a relatively conservative attitude towards China's global leadership; rather, he proposed a more *cooperative and harmonious relationship* between China and the rest of the world. The moral discourse of China's role presented by Zou in this text reflected President Hu's main ideas of China's position in a changing global system.

Text 4.2.7.1-2

*Minjian Should Also Take on Common But Differentiated Responsibilities
A New Round of Sino-American Cooperation on Energy and Environment
Qi Ye, 2009-11-19, Page 10 Environment (ST25/SW4)*

The author of this sample text is Qi Ye, a leading expert on China's environmental policy and professor of public policy and management at Tsinghua University¹²⁹. He also served as the Brookings-Tsinghua Center for Public Policy (BTC) director in Beijing. Before joining the BTC, he was the Climate Policy Institute director at Tsinghua University. After obtaining a master's degree in China, he received his doctorate in environmental science from the State University of New York and Syracuse University in 1994¹³⁰. Based on this, Qi belonged to the *elite* group in China.

This article is an opinion piece. Similarly to the previous article by Zou about China's role, there is also an extract by the editor before the author's article here. The article's headline is "Minjian Should Also Take on Common But Differentiated Responsibilities." The subheading is "A New Round of Sino-American Cooperation on Energy and Environment." In the headline, it is mentioned that the "Minjian" should play a role in combating climate change. "Minjian" could be translated as civil

¹²⁷ <https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/123/wjdt/zyjh/t212359.htm> (accessed 29 October 2019)

¹²⁸ Shi Yinhong: Xi Jinping's diplomatic grand strategy is gradually taking shape, New York Times Chinese website, 2015

<https://cn.nytimes.com/china/20150120/cc20shiyinhong/> (accessed 17 November 2024)

¹²⁹ <http://www.sppm.tsinghua.edu.cn/szdw/qzjs/26efe4891e2a9c84011e391ce0650023.html> (accessed 01 November 2019)

¹³⁰ <https://www.brookings.edu/experts/qi-ye/> (accessed 17 November 2024)

society, people-to-people, folk, local, nongovernmental organizations, etc. What was actually meant by the “Minjian”? Which social actors were included?

The author mentioned that more actors from “Minjian” were involved in Sino-American cooperation on energy and environment. Some cooperation was between enterprises and higher educational institutions. Besides, there was collaboration on low-carbon energy between Tsinghua University, the University of Cambridge, and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

At the end of his article, the author writes, “we expect that more Minjian groups, individual citizens, small and medium-sized enterprises can participate in the Sino-American cooperation on energy and environment. Likewise, we hope to see the influence of Minjian on protecting the climate. After all, the wisdom and power reside in the Minjian.” From Qi’s sentences his definition of Minjian did not only include grassroot alike individual citizens and civil groups, but also business and elite universities as well as thinktanks. Although his definition of Minjian overlaps that of civil society¹³¹It is more accurate to understand Qi’s Minjian as non-governmental organizations and institutions. The sample text provides evidence. Qi put Minjian and the government in the same sentence and discussed their respective roles in combating climate change.

[14] It is a governance innovation to combine the powers of government and Minjian.

[21] The wisdom of government lies in its ability to encourage, explore, and converge the wisdom from Minjian as well as to promote and strengthen the power of Minjian.

No matter what Minjian means exactly, it is certain that the author highlighted the role of non-governmental actors, especially the academic organizations and associations from both China and the US. It seemed that he felt that cooperation between Chinese and American academia on climate change was much easier than cooperation between governments.

He further criticized the climate negotiations that had been dominated by governments. The climate negotiations within the UNFCCC, which was dominated by governments, were “prolonged, not efficient and full of variables.” He said the climate issue was critical to the development of every country and the destiny of human beings, but it had become a risk of an “international political and economic *game*” that had become “bureaucratic and *elitist*.” Like Zou, the author of the previous sample text, Qi also used the metaphor “*game*” to describe the competition among countries in the international political and economic system. What is different is that Qi criticized the countries that were playing the game, while Zou seemed to

¹³¹ “civil society is society considered as a community of citizens linked by common interests and collective activity” https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/civil_society (accessed 06 May 2019)

see the game as an established reality. In Qi's opinion, more stakeholders should participate actively, equally, and efficiently in order to *break the deadlock* and *transform* the risky game into *cooperation*.

Betsill pointed out that the international climate change regime has mobilized actors beyond national governments, giving rise to a complex system of multilevel governance (Betsill et al. 2015). The trend toward multilevel governance challenges the centrality of the international regime in global climate governance and presents new opportunities for the development of effective responses. The opinion piece analyzed here was written in 2009. At that time, Qi was already criticizing the disfunction of government-led climate negotiations and calling for the comprehensive participation of more and various actors other than nation-states. This perspective, which was relatively *new and alternative*, reflected a *bottom-up and cosmopolitanism perspective*.

However, he did not deny the role of government. On the contrary, he thought the government should always play a leading role. This conclusion was made by analyzing the grammatical constructions in the text (Fairclough 1995). Qi wrote: "The role of non-governmental organizations and institutions is highlighted at an unprecedented level." After this sentence, the author gave some examples of how the Chinese and American think tanks, foundations, and professional associations contributed to the governmental bilateral cooperation on energy and environment and how importance was attached to these non-governmental organizations and associations by both governments. In this passive sentence, the agent was not given. But based on the cohesion of the text, it was not difficult to figure out that the agents were the governments, the Chinese and the U.S. governments in this context. Although the non-governmental organizations and institutions were the subject of the sentence, their importance seemed to be only a complement to the government's leading role and was reduced by using passive sentences.

As mentioned above, in front of the main body text, there is an extract placed by the editor representing the positions of the newspaper. It said:

[1] The big issue critical to every country's development and human destiny has become a risk of an international political and economic game that has become bureaucratic and elitist. [2] In order to break the deadlock and transform the risky game into cooperation, we need more stakeholders to participate actively, equally, and efficiently.

While author Qi still believed in the *government's leading role*, the editor emphasized the *disfunction* of the current climate negotiations, which are dominated by nation-states, and appealed for the *participation of more diverse actors*. Again, there is a small *discrepancy* between the media discourse and the author's discourse on the government's role. Beck argued that the discourse on climate

politics so far is an expert and elitist discourse in which peoples, societies, citizens, workers, voters and their interests, views and voices are very much neglected. Without a majority of very different groups of people, climate politics is doomed. (Beck 2010: 254-5). From a critical point of view, Qi represented the expert and elitist discourse. The non-governmental organizations and institutions in his definition were all high-level thinktanks or academic institutions. That means he referred “Minjian” just to the non-governmental organizations and not necessarily the grassroots groups.

The CBDR is the officially acknowledged principle by which nation-states deal with climate change at the international level. The discourse of CBDR was often found in sample texts discussing how to distribute rights and obligations among nation-states, making it an official and *top-down* discourse. It is interesting to observe in the analyzed text that Qi *transformed* this CBDR principle into a more *unofficial and bottom-up discourse* of climate justice. He wrote:

[18] In fact, problems of energy, environment, and climate change are problems of the whole society and human beings. The solution to them lies in changing the way of production, the way of living and consuming. [19] The transforming process may be long and full of pains, but it also can be inspiring and full of chances. [20] To this transformation applies also the CBDR principle, namely: in combating energy, environment, and climate change, the governments, enterprises, and civil societies take on the common but differentiated responsibilities, to play common but differentiated roles and to share the common results of cooperation.

It is widely acknowledged that climate change impacts and even threatens human beings. However, more often than not, we see conflicts, quarrels, and seesaws rather than constructive discussions and suggestions regarding the solution. Qi proposed that all social actors, besides governments, should take responsibilities by changing their “business as usual” attitude. He encouraged everyone to make their contribution toward solving the climate change problem instead of focusing on the different interests of individuals, groups, or nations. This is a more *cosmopolitan* discourse focusing on individual responsibilities, which is an *alternative* to the normative discourse focusing on the responsibilities of nation-states. It contributes to facilitating a kind of *global interconnectedness* that motivates different social actors to unite in dealing with climate change.

What is also different in this text is a *cooperative rather than antagonistic discourse of Sino-U.S. relations*. Qi advocated that non-governmental and governmental bodies from both countries should work together. The U.S. and China have been the two biggest carbon emitters in the world since 2007. If these two countries are not willing to work cooperatively, it will be difficult for the rest of the

world to deal with climate change. Unfortunately, the two big players are often framed as opponents rather than partners. No one wants to be the first to take more responsibility. If we say this is a normative discursive practice, then it is a “*creative discursive practice*” (Fairclough 1992, 1995) that advocates cooperation by non-governmental organizations and institutions from two countries. As media texts are “sensitive barometers” (Fairclough 1995: 60) of cultural change, creative discursive practices become “both a sign of, and a driving force in, discursive and thereby socio-cultural change” (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002: 73).

The creative discursive practice is embedded in and influenced by social context. As the subheading of the text showed, the background of this opinion piece was Barack Obama’s first visit to China after first assuming office. It took place from 15-18 November 2009. It was reported¹³² that climate change and energy issues were parts of the most important topics of this visit. The Chinese government has been addressing environmental protection, sustainable development, and climate change since the ninth Five-Year Plan (1996-2000). Whether the U.S. government actively tackle climate issues depends heavily on the president in office. Obama’s government emphasized the importance of combating climate change both at the national and international levels. Before his visit to China, actions were taken from both sides. The renowned think tank, the Brookings Institution, published a report on the perspectives and policy suggestions related to Sino-U.S. cooperation in energy and environment. In the same year, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton gave a speech on the Sino-U.S. cooperation in energy, environment, and climate change at the Asia Foundation, a nonprofit international development organization. In China, the first session of the U.S.-China strategic forum on clean energy cooperation took place on 22 October 2009. It was greatly supported by both governments. Obama’s visit took place shortly before the Copenhagen Summit. At that time, the world expected the U.S. to take the lead in the coming climate change negotiations and make commitments. China, as the fast-developing country and largest carbon emitter, was also expected to take on more responsibilities. The high profile of bilateral climate change cooperation between the two largest carbon emitters created an optimistic anticipation ahead of the climate summit in Denmark.

4.2.7.2 Short Summary of the Analysis

Like Zou, Qi also used the metaphor “*game*” to describe the competition among countries in the international political and economic system. What is different is that Qi criticized the countries playing the game, while Zou seemed to see the game as an established reality. In Qi’s opinion, more stakeholders should participate actively,

¹³² <http://env.people.com.cn/GB/10380490.html>
https://www.china5e.com/html/old_special_html/special_151.html
<http://www.chinanews.com/hb/news/2009/11-19/1973085.shtml>
(all accessed 06 May 2019)

equally, and efficiently in order to break the deadlock and transform the risky game into cooperation.

4.2.8 Analysis of Southern Metropolis Daily (SMD)

4.2.8.1 Analysis of Samples

Text 4.2.8.1-1

China Should Make a Greater Contribution to Improving the Global Environment. 2007-06-05. A02 Editorial. Southern Metropolis Daily (ST26/SMD1)

This sample text is an editorial on the announcement of the first National Climate Change Program published on 4 June 2007.

According to Fairclough's CDA, choice matters. Media texts are not only mirrors of realities, they also constitute a version of reality "through choices which are made at various levels in the process of producing texts" and the analysis of representational processes in a text come down to "an account of what choices are made - what is *included* and what is *excluded*, what is made *explicit* or left *implicit*, what is *foregrounded* and what is *backgrounded*" (Fairclough 1995: 104). The most striking linguistic and textual characteristics of this sample text are its explicitness, assertiveness, and directness, while foregrounding China's global climate responsibility.

There are 32 complete sentences in the text. The actor "China" appeared 27 times in all these sentences, which is highly frequent and intense. Within Fairclough's analytical framework (1995), analyst has to investigate if the agent is deleted because it is unknown or already known but judged as irrelevant or if it is deleted to leave agency and responsibility vague. On the contrary, repeating the actor can highlight the actor's accountability. The recurrence of "China" left readers with the strong impression that China should do more to combat climate change.

The directness was also reflected by the use of words, including modal verbs and adverbs. In critical linguistics, the concept of "modality" is used in a very general way to cover features of texts that "express speakers' and writer' attitudes towards themselves, towards their interlocutors" (Fairclough 1995: 27). As a writer, the editor expressed his assertive attitude towards his interlocutor, namely the readers including the government. The editor wrote in the headline that China "should" contribute more to improving the global environment. The main use of the modal verb "should" is used to "tell somebody what they ought to do, to give advice or to add emphasis" (Oxford English-Chinese Dictionary 2004: 1614). Another usage of "should" is to express obligation. When China was under Hu Jintao's governance, the Chinese government still tried to keep a low profile in international affairs compared with Xi Jinping's regime. This editorial was published during Hu's regime. The editor wrote that China was the "focus country" of climate change and China had

“no playroom at all” on this highly complicated global issue. By using the adverbial expression “not at all,” he denied the possibility of China avoiding its global responsibility. This position *differed from the normative discourses of the Chinese government*.

Choice matters. The media can decide what to present and what not, as well as how to. Concerning China’s responsibility, it is a fact that China was the second-largest emitter in the world in 2007 and the largest since 2008. This fact was not explicitly mentioned or even mentioned in many sample texts. For example, in sample text 12, it was written that “China is the largest developing country and meanwhile has been a big emitter of GHG.” What is astonishing is that that particular sample text was published in 2015 when China had already been the biggest carbon emitter for years, which was *not explicitly* stated in text 12. In sample text 19, published in 2008, the author noted that China was the biggest emitter that year. However, this fact was *not foregrounded*. Instead of making a strong link between China’s emissions and its responsibility, the author expressed his opinions to China’s climate positions and responsibility less explicitly and less personally in a vague and euphemistic way by drawing upon others’s opinions and appropriating specific linguistic tools. Unlike other sample texts, the sample text analyzed here was published in 2007 and explicitly pointed out that China was already the second largest emitter. It even drew upon statistics predicting that China would become the largest carbon emitter in two or three years (sentence 11). By clearly stating China’s emission volume, the editor made a strong connection between China and its global responsibility.

Corresponding to the textual characteristics, the sample text contained very different and alternative discourses (Fairclough 1992) regarding China’s responsibility and climate justice. There are even discourses criticizing the *government’s inaction*.

The Chinese government has been insisting on two principles of fairness in climate negotiations, namely *emission per capita* and *accumulative historical emissions*. In academia, some scholars assume that justice requires people to attain a certain threshold standard of living. From this sufficientarian approach, they support a per capita distributive principle of greenhouse gas emissions (Shue 1993). Some scholars, such as Dale Jamieson (2005), have grounded their equal per capita view in a direct appeal to global egalitarian ideals. Regarding the second principle, Harris wrote that a fundamental concern for most developing countries, including China, has been the question of historical responsibility (Harris et al. 2013: 296). Based on these two principles, the usual framing is that China is entitled to further emissions in the longer term because of its historically low emissions per capita, although its total emission is the largest in the world. These framings are very common in many sample texts. However, although the editor did not deny these arguments, he stressed that these arguments “alone cannot help China establish a

responsible image in the globe” (sentence 15). He believed that China should find the connecting point between its own interests and universal values. This comment can be seen as a response to some scholars’ criticism of China’s role. There is a growing misfit between historical responsibility and current emissions in China, and the world cannot address climate change effectively without much more action from China (Harris et al. 2013: 303). Considering the editorial was published in 2007, the *discourses of criticism towards the government’s inaction* in this commentary piece were both *alternative* and very pioneering.

Another focal issue in climate negotiations is the quantifiable emissions reduction obligation. While the Chinese government has demonstrated a willingness to take action to reduce emissions, it has consistently opposed quantifiable obligations tied to the MRV (Measurement/Monitoring, Reporting, and Verification) mechanism. This stance has been a significant point of contention in international climate discussions, with critics arguing that China’s refusal to accept binding greenhouse gas (GHG) limits has contributed to the global impasse on climate action. For instance, the U.S. has cited China’s position as a reason to reject GHG cuts, and Canada used it as partial justification for withdrawing from the Kyoto Protocol.

To fully understand China’s insistence on rejecting the MRV mechanism, it is essential to consider its modern history and the narratives that have shaped its national identity. As previously mentioned, China’s experience during the 19th and early 20th centuries, particularly following the Opium War in 1840, left a profound impact on its collective memory. Since the Opium War in 1840, foreign imperialists invaded China in the 19th and the early 20th centuries. China was a semi-colony nation-state for almost a century before the People’s Republic of China was founded in 1949. Compared with the glorious Empire history, that period of modern history has been framed as the “*Century of Humiliation*,” and these national discourses have played an essential role in China’s identity, national security, and foreign policy (Callahan 2004; Kaufman 2011; Li 2014).

Against this backdrop, the MRV mechanism is often regarded as an intervention in China’s sovereignty. When analyzing China’s position on climate negotiations, some scholars accurately pointed out that “few countries are as preoccupied with issues of national sovereignty as is China” and for historical reasons, “not least occupation by Western powers and Japan, China is extraordinarily sensitive to even suggestions of outside meddling in its internal affairs” (Harris et al. 2013: 302).

Nevertheless, the editor of this sample text has a very different perspective regarding China’s binding commitments. His criticism is three-fold. According to him, there are three reasons for China’s rejection of quantifiable obligations: (1) Many energy industries and related industries in China are undergoing rapid development and make high profits from the unrestrained emissions policy; (2) The local governments and interest groups are involved and nested; (3) Climate policy is involved in the assessment standards for party and government cadres’ performance

at all levels. The editor argued that before that complicated relationship of interests could be straightened out, “not undertaking quantifiable emission reduction obligations” was just a firewall against excessive external pressure (sentence 23). Furthermore, he criticized that if the government sought to protect vested interests and did not take proactive action, China would face international pressure on environmental issues for a long time. Unlike other sample texts that discuss climate change and climate justice in the international domain, this sample text *internalizes* the justice issue into the *national domain* by ascribing the government’s inaction to the domestic problems of economic development and social governance.

The internalization of justice issues into national domain is very *unusual* and *unique* in all sample texts. The main framing observed in many other sample texts was that China has historically contributed little to climate change. Its current per capita emission is still low. These two justice principles were used in international climate negotiations to defend China’s right to continue with its development path, at least for a certain period of time. This sample text, however, *transformed* the discourse of international pressure into a *creative discourse* of the impetus of national reform and the transition to a new development path. As the editor wrote, starting from the common environmental crisis, turning “international pressure” into a driving force for further reforms should be the most important strategy (sentence 31). This was a new and *creative discursive practice* (Fairclough 1992, 1995) that organized discourses in a new and mixed way. As media texts are “sensitive barometers” of cultural change (Fairclough 1995: 60) creative discursive practices become “both a sign of, and a driving force in, discursive and thereby *socio-cultural change*” (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002: 73). If China could see climate change as a chance to change its development path, it would perhaps be more willing to participate in international climate cooperation and thus help break the deadlock of the status quo.

Intertextuality is an important tool for analyzing discursive practice. It focuses on how, in the production and interpretation of a text, people draw upon other texts and text types that are socially and culturally available to them. The editor drew upon a report from 28 December 2006 by *Xinhua* to point out that China’s domestic environmental problems were getting worse due to the lack of efficient measures. This *Xinhua* report quoted an environmental official who revealed that the environmental protection figures from local governments in 2006 were misrepresented and falsified, and the CO₂ emissions that year actually increased instead of being reduced. Normally, reporting on the dereliction of duty and corruption of government officials is highly sensitive. Both state-owned and commercialized media deal with reports of this kind very carefully. It is unknown why the *Xinhua* report revealed the uncomfortable truth. What is clear is that Xinhua Agency is one of the largest state-owned media institutions, and the fact that it published this negative news implies that this news should be acceptable in the

editorship framework. By drawing upon *Xinhua's* report, the editor of the *Southern Metropolitan* newspaper, a more commercialized and liberal media outlet, kept the *discourse of criticisms* against government officials on a safer spectrum.

As previous analysis has shown, in many text samples, climate change was framed as a development issue that usually *excludes the possibility of changing* the 'business as usual' situation. However, climate change is a complicated issue that can be viewed from various dimensions. Framing climate change as a development issue emphasizes the dimension of development. The development dimension is superior to the environmental dimension. An *intertextuality* analysis of this sample text showed that it represented a *different discourse* on climate change. The editor drew upon President Hu Jintao's speech at the G8 summit on 7 July 2005. He used indirect quotations:

[18] President Hu Jintao expressed China's views at the G8 summit the year before last: climate change is an environmental issue and also a development issue. [19] That is to say, China will adhere to the principle of balancing environment and development.

From a *linguistic* perspective, the indirect quotation consisted of two parallel clauses, and both clauses were equally important, as shown by using the conjunction "and." It is clear in this expression that the environmental and development dimensions of climate change are in a balanced and equal relation, without one being superior to the other, which is different from framing climate change as merely a development issue. The question is whether President Hu or the Chinese government really said so or if it was the editor's personal interpretation. The following table presents the official positions on several occasions:

Table 29: Official Stances on the Definition of Climate Change

Time	Occasion	Official Expression
2005.7.7	President Hu's speech at G8 summit in Scotland	Climate change is an environmental issue and also a development issue, but ultimately an issue of development. ¹³³
2007.6.4	China's National Climate Change Program	It is an issue involving both environment and development, but it is ultimately an issue of development.
2007.6.6-8	President Hu's speech at G8 summit in Germany	Climate change is an environmental issue, but it is, in essence, a development issue. ¹³⁴

¹³³ Text of Hu Jintao's G8 speech

http://www.gov.cn/lhdh/2005-08/27/content_26664.htm (accessed 17 November 2024)

¹³⁴ <http://de.china-embassy.org/det/zt/g8/t330273.htm> (accessed 07 July 2021)

As we can see, all three expressions used the conjunction “but.” According to the Cambridge Dictionary, the conjunction is used to link items that the same grammatical type. It is used to connect ideas that contrast.¹³⁵ That means the Chinese government eventually saw climate change as a development issue, although it also admitted it was an environmental problem. It is clear that the Chinese government has always insisted on framing climate change as a development issue.

Although President Hu explicitly expressed at the G8 summit in 2005 that climate change is ultimately an issue of development, the editor only *partly* drew upon Hu’s speech by using indirect quotations. Fairclough pointed out that in indirect media discourse, the quotation marks disappear, and the represented discourse takes the form of a clause grammatically subordinated to the reporting clause. He further argued that “the voices of reporter and reported are less clearly demarcated, and the words used to represent the latter’s discourse may be those of the reporter rather than those of the reported” (1992: 107). Therefore, it can be inferred that “China will adhere to the principle of balancing environment and development” is actually the editor’s opinion rather than China’s official position. It is unknown whether the editor drew upon the leader’s speech indirectly and incompletely intentionally or simply because of omission. Regardless of the subjective purpose, through the indirect quotations, the editor spoke his opinions in the leader’s name. In doing so, his arguments seemed more convincing and justified. To some extent, this is a *creative discursive practice* (Fairclough 1992, 1995).

Framing climate change, in essence, as a development issue denied the nature of climate change as an environmental issue. By equalizing the environmental dimension to the developmental dimension of climate change, the editor gave more importance to the former dimension. Instead of continuing with the business-as-usual development path, the editor proposed a climate solution that tries to balance development and the environment. In this sense, the *new creative discourse* can be seen as a rejection of the *normative discourse* and advocacy for a *discursive change* (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002).

The discourses of this sample text were so different from the other texts that we have to look at the broader social and political background. *Social practice* is the last level of Fairclough’s three-dimensional analytical model. CDA teaches that language is constitutive of social practices on the one hand and also constituted by broader social practices on the other. The analysis of social practices “may be at different levels of abstraction from the particular event: it may involve its more immediate situational context, the wider context of institutional practices the event is embedded within, or the yet wider frame of the society and the culture” (Fairclough 1995: 62).

¹³⁵ <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/grammar/british-grammar/but> (accessed 17 November 2024)

The more immediate situational context of this sample text is that in 2007, China experienced the most influential environmental event, as discussed in the chapter on methodology. The Xiamen PX protest has been referred to as "the milestone in public participation in China" (Huang and Yip 2012: 201-223). In response to this event, many media outlets gave much more attention to the environmental issue. Another immediate background of this sample text is, of course, the announcement of the National Climate Change Program 2007.

The fact that the sample text represented comments and even criticisms in an assertive, explicit, and direct way reflects the liberal political stance of this newspaper and its affiliated media institution. In addition to this editorial, the newspaper published many other editorials and opinion pieces and some of them were really radical. Some examples as follows:

Table 30: Editorials Reflecting Liberal Political Perspectives

Date	Titel and Core Opinions
2007-7-5	<p><i>Environmental Protection Must First Be a Government Storm</i></p> <p>*If you can't govern officials, you can't manage the water problem, and you can't deal with the pollution.</p>
2007-7-9	<p><i>The Essence of Environmental Protection Is a Political Issue</i></p> <p>*The prerequisite for solving the officials problem is to solve the problem of the system. The prerequisite for resolving institutional problems is to resolve the issue of the country's development concepts.</p>
2007-7-11	<p><i>Kneeling is the Most Real Dilemma for China's Environmental Protection</i></p> <p>*In order to cultivate and protect an innovative society, the government must transfer part of its power and let the society organize itself, and develop a new social order in a peaceful age.</p>
2007-7-24	<p><i>The Fate of "Green GDP" Is the Fate of Every Chinese</i></p> <p>*The development model of "pure GDP doctrine" is elitist in nature. . . . because the elitism essentially ignores the balance of society and the balance of environmental ecology.</p> <p>*The concept of "green GDP" represents the self-reflection of the so-called "modernization".</p>
2007-7-30	<p><i>China Needs "Environmental Democracy"</i></p> <p>*On environmental issues, the world will make greater demands on China.</p> <p>*I believe that the central government has a full understanding of the seriousness of this problem, and it has considerable determination. But [...]the central government alone cannot solve the problem. The real way out is environmental democracy, which gives the grassroots</p>

	society full power.
2008-1-9	<i>Only the Courage and Rationality of Citizens Can Save the Planet</i> *In China, environmental protection does not lack official policies and elite speeches. What is lacking is precisely the grassroots forces from the people.

In the texts listed above, there were reflections on and criticisms against *modernization, elitism, and authority*. Advocacy for green development, civil participation, and democracy is represented. These claims reflected a “*discourse of grassroots climate justice movements*” (Schlosberg and Collins 2014: 359), which was unique among all the sample texts.

As already discussed, the editor advocated that China should take more responsibility and obligation in global climate change cooperation. The previous analyses showed that the dominant Chinese media and government discourse around 2009 was that climate change was a conspiracy of developed countries to curb China’s development by imposing pressure increasing pressure on China (ST7, 12, 17, 19). The rejection of taking more global responsibility is also related to the foreign policy in Hu’s presidency (2002-2012), during which the Chinese government still followed a dictum by Deng Xiaoping, “*tao guang yang hui,*” even though China was already a big power during his presidency. The dictum literally means to conceal one’s fame and ability, namely, keeping a low profile. To be specific, it is understood that China should focus on developing its economy and not seek leadership in international affairs, no matter how much pressure the international community puts on China. The editor’s opinions did not represent the normative discourse of China’s position on climate change at that time. On the contrary, he saw the international pressure as a *chance for social change and national reform*, toward a more environmentally sustainable development path.

Text 4.2.8.1-2

Copenhagen Climate Change Conference: Developed Countries Should Take Greater Responsibility.

2009-12-07. A02 Editorial (ST27/SMD4)

The editorial, which is the last sample text in this analysis, is a joint call for action from global leaders on climate change before the Copenhagen Summit in 2009. . The joint call was initiated by the *Guardian* newspaper. The text was drafted by a team of journalists over more than a month of consultations with editors from more than 20 newspapers. On the opening day of the summit, 56 newspapers around the world published this editorial in 20 languages, including English, German, French, Chinese, Arabic, and Russian.

It is rare in the world media landscape that newspapers in different countries publish a joint editorial on an issue. However, the summit drew media attention worldwide, which is more evidence of the importance of this summit. It is also rare for Chinese newspapers to participate in such initiatives. Besides *the Southern Metropolitan Newspaper* (SMN), *the Economic Observer* is the other Chinese newspaper that worked with the *Guardian* on the joint editorial. Both are more market-oriented newspapers, although all newspapers in China undergo censorship to some extent. As discussed in the theoretical chapter, media reports are strongly influenced by national interests and tend to frame the news from national perspectives. When climate change, as one of the most significant global risks, is in the media, it has “an enlightening function” that helps to facilitate a certain degree of *interconnectedness*, which is crucial to global cooperation (Beck 2010). When the global public has awareness of interconnectedness, it becomes a “*cosmopolitan public*” (Chouliaraki 2008). As members of a cosmopolitan public, media audiences see themselves not only as a part of their own communities but also as a part of the world confronted with risks. The participation of two Chinese newspapers in the media initiative helped the public in China to get to know the issue and foster an interconnectedness with the rest of the world.

Not only did the joint editorial reflect a kind of cooperation among the world media that is normally influenced by national interests, but the content of this editorial called for global cooperation instead of focusing on conflicts and antagonism. This can be observed from the language used.

Table 31: Language Use in the Joint Editorial

Type of Word	Words and its Frequency
Noun	globe (3), planet (2), humans (5), everyone (2), the whole world (2), the Earth (1), untold millions of people (1), developed/rich/industrial countries (7), developing/poorer countries (3), the USA/Obama (4), China (1), species (1)
Pronoun	we (14)
Adjective	common (2)
Verb and verb phrase	unite (1), share (1), not get into disputes (1), not shirk each other (1)

In the discourse of antagonism, the world is divided into two camps, namely developed/rich and developing/poor countries. The conflict of interests and lack of willingness to cooperate are highlighted. Contrary to the discourse of antagonism, this joint editorial used different types of words trying to convey the message that we are *all* humans on Earth, facing the *common* problem that requires *all* of us to *unite* instead of disputing and shuffling. Although the division between developed and

developing countries also appeared in the editorial, they were not put in an antagonistic context. Instead, the prospect of *cooperation* between the two camps was stressed. For example, the editorial wrote, “the recent commitments to emissions targets by the world’s biggest polluters, the United States and China, were important steps in the right direction” (sentence 24). Reflecting the discourse of cooperation, the editorial foregrounded *actions and chances instead of stalemate and pessimism*. The editorial called for a “change of lifestyle.” It also advocated the “transformation of economic development and energy use” (sentences 31-33).

The analysis now focuses on the climate justice issue represented in the joint editorial. It was pointed out that a fair and effective agreement contained two key aspects: (1) “a settlement between the rich world and the developing world covering how the burden of fighting climate change will be divided” (2) “how we will share a newly precious resource: the trillion or so tons of carbon that we can emit.”

While the first aspect stressed the distribution of the burden, the second aspect focused on the distribution of emission rights. Both aspects are relevant to *distributive justice* that is concerned with the present and future responsibilities of in relation to reducing carbon emissions. In order to combat climate change, unconstrained carbon emissions must be stopped. This then raises questions about who should be allowed to emit both in the short and long run, to what extent, and with what justification (Gardiner 2011: 310). A fair solution proposed in the editorial was that developed countries “must now take the lead” and “commit to concrete and deep cuts” based on the acknowledgment that “the rich world is responsible for most of the accumulated carbon in the atmosphere.” This again reflected the climate justice principle of *historical responsibility*. The editorial stated that at the same time, developing countries “must pledge meaningful and quantifiable action” based on the argument that they will increasingly contribute to global warming. SMN supported the *quantifiable action* by developing countries appeal, which was not explicitly represented in the official discourse of climate change in China. In most sample texts, the framing is that China is a developing country and thus has the right to further development, avoiding facing the fact that China’s future emissions will be enormous.

Besides the discourse of distributive justice, the editorial explicitly expressed that “social justice demands” that industrialized world provide poorer countries with financial and technological support in order to help them adapt to climate change and grow economically. This reflected the *discourse of compensatory justice* that emphasizes the obligation of those who had a high level of carbon emissions in the past to those who were inflicted by the impact.

Although the text was drafted by mainstream media from the developed world, the editorial represented a commendable reflection on the “exported emissions.” It proposed that a credible assessment of “exported emissions” should be clarified in the architecture of a future treaty so that “the burden can eventually be more equitably shared between those who produce polluting products and those who

consume them.” Emissions exported from one country to another are called “*emission transfers*.” The net emission transfers represent the CO₂ emissions in each country to produce exported goods and services minus the emissions in other countries to produce imported goods and services. They are sometimes called the “balance of embodied emissions in trade” (Muradian et al. 2002: 52). Statistics show that global emissions have grown 39% from 1990 to 2008, at which time both global trade and global emissions increased significantly. While emissions in the group of developed countries have largely stabilized, emissions in developing countries have doubled. A general trend is that emissions have increased most in emerging economies (Le Quéré et al. 2009). The data indicates that developing countries have the largest share of emissions and are allocated most of the emissions growth. However, some scholars have argued that the divergent emission trends between developed and developing countries partially result from emissions transfer between countries facilitated via rapidly growing international trade flows (Peters et al. 2009). Since most polluting products are currently manufactured in the developing world, the editorial’s proposal speaks for the interests of the developing world. Addressing the issue of “emission transfers” actually paid attention to the *global inequality* in the international political economy.

As mentioned above, this was a joint editorial of 56 newspapers from 46 countries. It was supposed to be published in different local languages but keeping the content the same. However, the analysis revealed that the Chinese version was not merely a translation of the original English version. Although the majority of the content was the same, some discrepancies were found. A brief intertextual analysis of the joint editorial in both Chinese and English showed that the editors of SMN tried to convey their own positions that were slightly different from those of the joint editorial through *modifications, omissions, and additions*.

The first and biggest difference was found in the headlines. In the original version, the joint editorial was titled “Copenhagen climate change conference: ‘Fourteen days to seal history’s judgement on this generation,’” while in the Chinese version, it was titled “Copenhagen climate change conference: Developed countries should take greater responsibility.” The international version urged the current generation to take action, whereas the Chinese version still focuses on *blaming*. In the narrative of “history’s judgement on this generation,” the climate issue was tackled in the *intergenerational domain*. However, in the Chinese version, the climate issue was still confined to the *international domain*, focusing on finger-pointing among nation-states in international climate negotiations. If blaming developed countries for causing the climate issue is one side of the coin, the other side is excusing responsibility for developing countries, writing that they “are not responsible for the current crisis” (sentence 23). However, the original text did not say so. The *Guardian* wrote that developing countries “did not cause the bulk of the problem.” Obviously not causing the bulk of the problem is not the same as not causing the

problem at all. By deleting the phrase “the bulk of” the Chinese version of the joint editorial highlighted the climate justice principle of the *historical responsibility* of developed countries.

The second difference focused on the future responsibility of developed countries. For example, the original editorial said that the rich countries “must now take a lead, and every developed country must commit to deep cuts which will reduce their emissions within a decade to very substantially less than their 1990 level.” The Chinese version of the editorial called for “concrete and deep cuts” that will reduce emissions by 25% compared to the 1990 level. By adding the words “concrete” and the exact number “25%” to the text, the Chinese version made its demand on developed countries more explicit in the hope that they can give clearer and expectable reduction goals.

Although both versions of the joint editorial advocated that everyone on Earth should participate in dealing with climate change, the Chinese version changed the original opinions expressed in the joint editorial through the language used.

Table 32: Comparison of Excerpts from the Original Joint Editorial and Its Chinese Version

Original Joint Editorial in English	Joint Editorial in Chinese
<p>32. Many of us, particularly in the developed world, will have to change our lifestyles. 33. The era of flights that cost less than the taxi ride to the airport is drawing to a close.</p>	<p>29. The developed world needs to change lifestyles; the era of flights that cost less than the taxi ride to the airport should be over.</p>
<p>34. We will have to shop, eat and travel more intelligently. 35. We will have to pay more for our energy and use less of it.</p>	<p>30. We must shop, eat and travel more intelligently; We must pay more for energy and use less of it.</p>

In the original text, the actor of lifestyle changing was “many of us.” Since this was a joint editorial aimed at all audience in at least 45 countries, including developed and developing countries, the pronoun “us” referred to a wide range of citizens in those countries, including developing countries. However, the actor of lifestyle changing in the Chinese version was explicitly given, namely “the developed world.” In fact, there are increasingly many superrich people living a high-consumption lifestyle in developing countries. Likewise, there are extremely poor people in developed countries, and the gap between the rich and the poor is widening. It did not seem fair that the extremely rich in developing world continue with their lifestyles while restricting the poor in the developed world from consumption. Regarding the flights cost, the editorial in English used the present

continuous tense “is drawing,” which is used to talk about the present and future. It described an exist phenomenon. However, the Chinese version used the modal verb “should,” which is normally used to show what is right and appropriate, especially when criticizing somebody’s actions or giving or asking for advice. The sentence here implied, on the one hand, that the lifestyle in the Western world was not appropriate and, on the other hand, that it had to be ended. Compared to the present tense, using the modal verb conveyed the editor’s moral judgement regarding the issue and *criticism of the Western lifestyle*.

Referring to the possible changes in lifestyle, the two versions used different verbs, making their meanings different from each other. The original joint editorial used “will have to” 3 times, and the Chinese version used “need to” 1 time and “must” 2 times. “Have to” was used to show that a person is obliged to do something, usually by an outside force. The outside force can be a higher tax on energy that will force people to consume less energy or choose more environmentally friendly means of transportation. The modal verb “must” is also used to talk about obligation but for more personal opinions about what is necessary to do. The action does not necessarily depend on outside forces. For example, even though the tax on energy stays unchanged in the future, it is still necessary to consume less energy in order to reduce emissions. While the English text used “will have to” to describe the scenario of possible changes in lifestyle in the future, the Chinese text appropriated modal verbs to call for changes in lifestyle.

The last subtle difference between the two versions was *climate skepticism*. The original text had a long sentence mentioning the Climatic Research Unit email controversy (known as “Climategate”). It commented that the controversy “failed to dent the mass of evidence on which these predictions are based.” However, in the Chinese version, that sentence was deleted. According to CDA, choosing what to present or not matters. That the editor of SMN chose to ignore this issue reflected that it was not prioritized or thought to be relevant for the audiences in China. The overview of Chinese scholars’ research on climate change, as discussed in the theoretical chapter, shows that in the theoretical chapter the dominant discourse in China views climate change as a real, ongoing process primarily caused by human activities.

The joint editorial was published shortly before the opening of the Copenhagen Summit. It covered how to distribute the obligations and rights between countries. Thus, climate justice was discussed in the *international domain*. In some places, the justice issue was also mentioned in the *environmental and ecological domain* that refers to the relationship between humankind and nature, including animals.

The original editorial stated that inaction “would parch continents, turning farmland into desert. Half of all species could become extinct.”

As a Chinese newspaper, the fact that the SMN participated in the *Guardian* initiative and published the joint call demonstrated its openness and willingness to

represent *alternative* discourses. The analysis above showed that the joint editorial represented various discourses of climate justice, including ecological and environmental justice, intergenerational justice, and international justice. It emphasizes *interconnectedness* and has a more *individual* perspective of climate justice than a nation-states-based collective perspective. Meanwhile, some discrepancies were also observed in the Chinese version of the joint editorial. By making certain linguistic choices, the historical responsibilities of developed nations and their leadership were more highlighted in the Chinese version than in the original text.

Chapter 5: Summary and Comparisons of Analysis Results

This chapter summarized the quantitative and qualitative analysis findings with a focus on the latter. Comparisons were made during and after summarizing.

Many sample texts (ST) used for the qualitative analysis were published on the first three pages of the newspaper where top news was located (ST3, ST4, ST5, ST6, ST8, ST9, ST11, ST13, ST15), or on the pages where international news was covered (ST1, ST2, ST7, ST10, ST12, ST14, ST16, ST17, ST23). Several sample texts were published in the form of *opinion-based* editorials or comments (ST18, ST22, ST26, ST27) by editors or guest experts. Some sample texts (ST20, ST24) came from the pages that were especially dedicated to the report on climate change. This pattern was also observed in the quantitative analysis of all sample texts. It indicated that climate change in general and climate justice in specific were attached with a high degree of importance. No matter where the sample texts were published, the analysis showed that climate issues were mainly concerned with the *international domain*, with a focus on climate diplomacy in almost all samples. Only one sample text (ST26) addressed climate issues in the *national domain*. The editor of that text criticized the fact that if the government sought to protect vested interests and did not take proactive actions to deal with climate change, China would face international pressure on environmental issues for a long time. This sample *internalized* the justice issue into the national domain by ascribing the government's inaction on the domestic problems of economic development and social governance. The internalization of justice issues into the national domain was very *unusual* and *unique* in all sample texts.

While both quantitative and qualitative data showed that climate issue was framed in the international domain, some quantitative data presented that 72.4% of direct quotations and 57.3% of indirect quotations were from individual national politicians and scholars. A reasonable explanation for these seemingly conflict data would be that the climate issue was mainly understood as an international and diplomatic issue, but the national social actors determined the discourse of the climate issue. That is to say, the media framed the climate issue of international importance from a *statism national perspective*.

As discussed in Chapter 2, the theoretical chapter, climate justice can also be addressed in the intergenerational domain (ST7, ST13, ST27) and the environmental and ecological domain (ST13, ST27). However, it was only mentioned in those sample texts without being discussed in detail.

It was observed that quite a lot of texts were published when *UN climate change conferences*¹³⁶ (ST4, ST5, ST6, ST7, ST8, ST9, ST10, ST11, ST12, ST14, ST15, ST17, ST22, ST23, ST25, ST27) took place or when high-level diplomatic visits were made (ST2, ST3, ST16) or an important *national climate policy* was announced (ST18, ST21, ST24, ST26). Another impact factor of the media report was the role of VIP in climate politics (ST20). High-level officials such as Yu Qingtai and Xie Zhenhua drew a lot of media attention during the UN climate change conference. As far as the climate change conference was concerned, most sample texts were published during the Copenhagen Summit in 2009. It was regarded as the turning point in the media landscape of climate journalism in China. In addition, the release of the National Climate Change Program 2007 drew great media attention to the climate issue as well.

Regarding the *journalistic practice* of the newspapers, it is interesting to find that *Xinhua News Agency* played a very important role in communicating climate issues. The sample text ST4 was written by journalists from *People's Daily*. However, the text resembled that of *Xinhua*. Moreover, ST8 from *People's Daily* was simply a report by *Xinhua* correspondents in London. The sample texts did not only use reports by *Xinhua*, they did it also selectively according to their own needs. For example, *intertextuality* analysis of ST1 indicated that the sample text of *People's Daily* drew upon the text from *Xinhua*, but only partly. The former completely *excluded* the possibility of framing climate change as a security issue, a *new* and *alternative* discourse. Instead, the sample text from *People's Daily* only emphasized the *normative* discourse, namely, seeing climate change as a development issue. Since *People's Daily* is the largest and state-owned newspaper in China and regarded as the mouthpiece, of the Communist Party of China, it is easy to understand that it drew upon reports from *Xinhua*. However, the more market-based newspapers also drew upon *Xinhua's* reports. In ST22 many authoritative news institutions drew upon the same report by *Xinhua*. In ST26, the editor drew upon a report published on 28 December 2006 by *Xinhua* to criticize that China's domestic environmental problem was worsening due to the lack of efficient measures. By drawing upon *Xinhua's* report, the editor of *Southern Metropolitan Newspaper*, a more commercialized and liberal media, kept the *criticism against* the government officials on a safer spectrum.

Quantitative data showed that national politicians, international politicians, and national scholars were the most frequently represented concrete individual social actors. In the qualitative analysis, by exploring the journalists' background and analyzing the represented *social actors* in the media reports, it was easy to conclude that the media discourse on climate change in China was generally an *elite*

¹³⁶ Although some reports were not published exactly when the UN climate change conference took place, they appeared either shortly before or after that conference. In this case, the UN climate change conference was also seen as the background of those reports.

discourse. This was observed in all sample texts in the qualitative analysis. Journalists themselves were well-educated and full of professional experiences. Most represented social actors were high-level national and international officials, experts at renowned universities and institutions, representatives from world-class NGOs, and so on. Voices of the average people from *civil society* were *missing*. It seems ironic that *People's Daily* did not represent the voices of people. Social actors from the bottom were only mentioned in sample texts ST25 and ST26. The author, Qi Ye of ST25, criticized the dysfunction of government-led climate negotiations and called for the comprehensive participation of more and various actors other than nation-states. It reflected a *bottom-up* perspective. This opinion was relatively new and *alternative*. In ST26, the newspaper also made criticism against modernization, elitism, and authority and called for civil participation and democracy in environmental governance.

ST25 was extracted from the *Southern Weekly*, and ST26 from *Southern Metropolis Daily*. Coincidentally, both newspapers are regarded as *liberal and market-oriented* media institutions in the Chinese media landscape.

Most sample texts for qualitative analysis, especially those from the state-owned *People's Daily*, found a striking discourse of *antagonism/blaming* between developed/rich countries and developing/poor countries (ST1, ST7, ST8, ST10, ST11, ST17, ST21, ST22). The quantitative data also showed that the developing and developed worlds were represented 383 times and 366 times, respectively. They were almost equally represented. If media is the battlefield of discourse struggles, then the comments and editorials are the hottest spot of the battle. Since many sample texts were opinion-based journalistic pieces, it was not strange that the emotional antagonism was striking in the sample texts. *Cooperation* between the two blocs was relatively less addressed, except in ST12 (*People's Daily*), ST16 (*China Environmental News*), and ST25 (*Southern Weekly*). In Qi's opinion (ST25), more stakeholders should participate actively, equally, and efficiently in order to break the deadlock and *transform* the risky game into *cooperation*. It was interesting to find a *discourse on South-South cooperation* in ST23 (*China Business News*). The discourse of South-South cooperation is an *alternative discourse of the North-South impasse*. ST12 was the only sample among 12 *People's Daily* samples that highlighted climate change cooperation instead of blaming the developed countries. It has to be pointed out that ST12 was published in 2015, at a time when China positioned itself as a more cooperative actor in international climate governance ahead of the Paris Climate Conference. The discourse of *People's Daily* was highly consistent with government policy. In contrast, ST25 from *Southern Weekly* was published in 2009, during a time when the official climate change discourse was generally skeptical of China's responsibility.

Although there are three main varieties of climate justice, almost all sample texts highlighted *distributive justice*. *Compensatory justice* was sometimes mentioned

(ST1, ST27) but not often related to China. When it came to the African countries that are more vulnerable to the impact of climate change, *compensatory justice* was highlighted (ST3, ST14). It seemed that China did not necessarily require compensation from the developed countries and was willing to make the demand on behalf of African countries. *Corrective justice* was mentioned only occasionally (ST3, ST8), while *procedural justice* was highlighted in ST6 and ST20. China's active participation in the climate conference could be interpreted as a fair inclusion into the UNFCCC mechanism and as a struggle for *more power over the discourse of climate change* within that mechanism. It was interesting to notice that the Chinese media was not interested in addressing procedural justice, although the procedural (in)justice is one of most important elements of climate justice and is demanded by many developing countries. This has much to do with the China's role in the international climate negotiations. China is one of the most important global players in international climate politics and is more capable of participating in the climate negotiations than other developing countries.

In terms of the principles of climate justice, the *historical responsibility principle* was regarded as the most important distributive principle by most sample texts (ST1, ST2, ST3, ST4, ST6, ST7, ST10, ST11, ST18, ST20, ST21, ST22, ST26, ST27). To be specific, it was seen as fair only when those parties whose emissions caused climate change could well address their historical responsibilities. In ST13, a *future-oriented alternative* perspective of climate justice was observed. Unlike some samples that haggle over the historical responsibility and use it as blaming developed countries, a fair principle of climate mitigation from the two scholars of ST13 played down the importance of historical responsibility and focused on future development of each country. Instead of *finger-pointing*, two authors paid more attention to problem-solving and the rights of average people to development in developing countries.

In many sample texts (ST2, ST6, ST17, ST18, ST19, ST26), the *per capita principle* was stressed as the fairest principle to address China's carbon emission. It was argued that China still had enough quota to emit because its average emission is low. Another dominant discourse of climate justice was that China had a *right to development*. This climate justice principle was highlighted in ST4, ST5, ST6, ST10, ST14, ST18, and ST24.

It was noteworthy that the climate justice principles contained in the Common but Differentiated Responsibility (CBDR) of the UNFCCC were widely accepted (ST2, ST3, ST9, ST12, ST13, ST23, ST24, ST25). One is the historical responsibility principle and the other is the *ability to pay principle*.

The carbon intensity principle was observed in several sample texts (ST4, ST5, ST9). According to this principle, no carbon emission cap/peaking date was set. Developing countries can then have more space for future emissions. China had been adamant about not discussing the exact date of emission *peaking*. Instead, it

insisted on the carbon intensity principle regarding climate mitigation. In ST9, there was an *alternative* discourse on carbon emission. It covered the government's positive attitude toward *peaking*. It was the first time that a Chinese official of a high level talked about the peak date in public.

Regarding the climate change justice issue, discourses of *ecological debt* (ST2, ST11, ST18) and *emission transfer* (ST19, ST27) were found in some samples. Both discourses were internally related and referred to the issue of *inequality in the international political economy*. In the context of global inequality, climate change was framed in some sample texts (ST7, ST17, ST18) as a *hegemonic* tool of restricting the development of developing countries. For example, in ST17, verbs such as "force," "compel," "control," "suppress," and "restrict" were used to refer to *unequal power relations* between developed countries and the developing bloc and the *hegemony* of developed countries over the developing ones in the international system. In ST18, while the leading G8 countries announced that all the big emitters would be involved in the new process, the big emitters from the developing camp saw the announcement as a *discourse of hegemony* that tried to change the basic justice principle of the Kyoto Protocol. The discourse of hegemony was often entangled with the *discourse of conspiracy*. As demonstrated in the analysis of ST7, the narrative that dominated Chinese media around 2009 was that climate change was a *conspiracy* by developed countries to curb *China's rise*. Sometimes, even the MRV (measurable, reportable, and verifiable) mechanism of climate mitigation was seen as *intervention in China's national politics* (ST5, ST7, ST9).

The qualitative analysis revealed a *collective* approach in the media discourses of climate change and its ethical issues. This finding can be well backed up by quantitative data. Table 8 showed that the collective social actors (CCSA and ACSA) made up 69.6% of the representation of all social actors. Among these collective social actors nation-states and blocs of nation-states were dominant. That is to say, the discussions of these varieties of climate justice focused on if, which, and how nation-state should be responsible for carbon emissions to which nation-state and how this issue should be addressed in the current international political and economic system. Only in ST13 and ST25 was a more *individual-based cosmopolitan* perspective observed. In ST25, the author, Qi Ye, tried to encourage everyone in the world to contribute to solving the climate change problem instead of focusing on the different interests of individuals, groups, or nations. This was a more *cosmopolitan* discourse focusing on individual responsibilities, *an alternative* to the normative discourse focusing on the responsibilities of nation-states.

8 newspapers provided 27 sample texts for detailed qualitative analysis. Although the newspapers took different political positions, the analysis identified many commonalities. Reporting climate change in all newspapers was affected by when UN climate change conferences took place and whether important national climate policy was made. The general framing of these sample texts is that climate

change was identified by these sample texts as a problem caused by developed countries due to their historical GHG emissions. Climate justice was primarily framed as distributive justice concerning the distribution of historical responsibilities and future emission rights based on the per capita principle. As a solution to this problem, it was framed that developed countries should take the lead. Besides, emphasis should be given to ensuring the right to the sustainable development of developing countries, for which financial support and technological transfer are necessary.

There were indeed some differences among sample texts from different newspapers. For example, the quantitative analysis observed that the state-owned *People's Daily* drew upon scholars from the more state-close academic institution, such as CASS. More market-based newspapers, such as *China Business Herald* and *Southern Weekly* preferred interviewing scholars from universities where the research atmosphere is relatively free. The reason for this difference could be that *People's Daily* is more resourceful in getting access to academic institutions with close ties to the state. For instance, in some sample texts of *People's Daily*, this newspaper interviewed experts and scholars from various national research institutions.

In the qualitative analysis, most sample texts represented the elite groups in China and their voices of climate change and climate justice. However, a discourse of *grassroots/anti-elitism* was found in ST26 from *Southern Metropolis Daily*. When climate justice was dominantly addressed in the international domain, it was again ST26 that *internalized* the justice issue into the national domain by ascribing the government's inaction to the domestic problems of economic development and social governance.

The perhaps most significant difference was China's position regarding its responsibility as a global player and its relationship with developed countries. Whereas the state-owned *People's Daily* believed that China should keep a low profile in global climate governance, one sample text (ST19) from *China Business Herald*, a business-oriented newspaper, only implied that China should take more responsibility in a *euphemistic* way. However, sample texts from the most liberal newspapers, *Southern Weekly* and *Southern Metropolis Daily*, explicitly advocated that China should make a more significant contribution. Regarding China's relation to the developed world, the state-owned media foregrounded the *antagonism* and *finger-pointing*, especially in samples from *People's Daily*. Instead, more market-based newspapers focused on the possibilities of *cooperation* in business, technology, and civil society.

In general, *alternative and creative discourses and discursive practice* were more frequently found in samples from market-based newspapers. As media texts are "sensitive barometers" (Fairclough 1995: 60) of cultural change, creative discursive practices become "both a sign of, and a driving force in, discursive and thereby socio-cultural change" (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002: 73).

Chapter 6: Conclusions, Reflections, and Discussions

This chapter concluded and reflected on analytical findings by referring to the theoretical framework. Then the strengths and weaknesses of this research were discussed. In the end, it provided some suggestions for future research as well as possible actions.

6.1 Conclusions and Reflections on Analytical Results

The detailed analysis of sample texts showed that almost all sample texts highlighted *distributive justice*, *compensatory justice* (Okereke 2010) / *corrective justice* (Gardiner 2011), and *restorative justice* (Sabbagh and Schmitt 2016) was sometimes mentioned but not often related to China. The Chinese media seemed uninterested in addressing *procedural justice*, although procedural (in)justice is one of most important elements of climate justice and is demanded by many developing countries.

That distributive justice was highlighted is determined by and also reflects China's realistic needs and its own economic and social conditions. The biggest issue for the Chinese government is how to develop the economy to satisfy the people's needs. Distributive justice concerns the past, present, and future responsibilities of carbon emission reduction. The past responsibility is relevant to China because it defines how much historical debt China should take--the less, the better. The present and future responsibilities are relevant because they determine how much space for development China has and will have. The reason why China did not stress compensation for climate impact is perhaps because its economic development has been fast and strong in the past three decades to finance itself for restoring the climate impact. The reason why procedural justice was not highlighted is probably that China has been participating well in the UN climate mechanism.

Regarding the first justice principle of distributive justice China has held, the analysis showed that *historical responsibility principles, including the polluter pays principle and grandfathering*, were regarded as among the most important distributive principles. Many sample texts stressed that China contributed historically less to climate change because it was far from industrialized before climate change was recognized as a problem. Because the atmosphere has a limit to absorb GHG emissions before a dangerous scenario takes place, it is an ethical concern how this absorptive capacity, in terms of emissions permits, should be divided between people. Since China is the most populous country (as of 2023), it is advantageous for China to insist on the *equal per capita emissions principle* so that the collective emissions permits are big enough for its current and future development. As far as development is concerned, "[T]here is a fairly broad consensus among both the philosophers who write about climate change and the majority of the climate-policy

community that efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions [...] should not harm the ability of poor countries to grow economically and to reduce as rapidly as possible the widespread poverty their citizens suffer” (Baer et al. 2010: 215). The *right to development* justice principle was also highlighted in most samples.

The reason why distributive justice was regarded as the most important variety of climate justice, and why the historical responsibility principle, equal per capita emissions principle, as well as the right to development principle, were held as the first principles of distributive justice can be explained by the central concepts: *development* and *legitimacy*. All these principles can ensure China’s further development and prosperity. In return, the political legitimacy of the CPC is based mainly on economic performance (Hatch 2003: 55). Lewis (2007: 155) argued that continued growth in the prosperity of the population is viewed as fundamental to *maintaining political stability*. Kopra (2019: 159) also asserted that China’s climate policy is primarily driven by the *Communist Party’s concerns with its legitimacy*.

Although China has firmly claimed its right to further emission permits and refused to accept an emission cap in the short future, it is *not completely uncooperative* regarding emission reductions. However, China has insisted on two strategies: the *carbon intensity principle* and *technology transfer of renewable energy*. These strategies are the result of the *special relationship* between energy issue and climate change in China. Energy efficiency can be improved either by reducing carbon intensity, namely the carbon emission per GDP unit, or by introducing advanced technology of renewable energy. In the end, the overall energy consumption can be reduced and thus *energy security* assured.

It has been agreed that the energy issue is at the core of China’s climate policy. Heggelund (2007: 158-161) wrote that energy is a common denominator in the climate change discussion for China, and in certain sense, China’s energy policy is the country’s climate policy. The national institutional establishment also reflects the *importance of energy issues*. For example, the National Energy Administration (NEA) has always been a critical player the climate change governance in China. Besides its central role in the planned economy and overall responsibility for economic development issues, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) is one of the most influential actors in domestic decision-making on energy and climate issues. The Energy Bureau in the NDRC has been responsible for China’s energy industry since 2003. Taking this in consideration, it is understandable why officials of NDRC were often mentioned many times in the sample texts. The deputy director of NDRC, Xie Zhenhua, was even China’s top climate negotiator for a long time. The Office of the National Energy Leading Group was established in 2005 at the ministerial level to underline the importance of energy issues (Heggelund 2007). With the establishment of these institutions, energy concerns have been elevated to the highest political level. In addition, both 11th and 12th FYPs highlighted the importance of energy efficiency, energy conservation, and renewable energy as well

as low-carbon technology. In its first national climate change program in 2007, China stated that improvements in energy efficiency and conservation were fundamental to its mitigation ambitions (Wei 2007). It is important to note that energy policies serve the same economic goals (Tsang and Kolk 2010: 180) as climate policies. As pointed out, China's climate change policy is based on its national economic and social development strategies (Lewis 2007, 2009). Therefore, China's motivation for combating climate change comes mainly from its *need to transform its economic development paradigm*. The ultimate aim of energy and climate policies is *national security*.

Speaking of national security, the Chinese government has been against quantifiable obligation subject to the *MRV mechanism*, although it has been willing to take action. This position is rooted in its culture and history. It is hard to understand why China persists on this issue without knowing the discourses of its modern history. Since the Opium War in 1840, foreign imperialists invaded China in the 19th century and the early 20th centuries. China then became a semi-colony nation-state for almost a century before the People's Republic of China was founded in 1949. Compared with the glorious Empire history, that period of modern history has been framed as the "*Century of Humiliation*." These national discourses have played an essential role in shaping China's identity, national security, and foreign policy (Callahan 2004; Kaufman 2011; Li 2014). For historical reasons, "few countries are as preoccupied with issues of national sovereignty as is China" and "not least occupation by Western powers and Japan, China is extraordinarily sensitive to even suggestions of outside meddling in its internal affairs" (Harris et al. 2013: 302). China's position on the MRV mechanism may be influenced by the *humiliation discourse* since China sees the mechanism as interfering with its sovereignty.

Because of *its semi-colonial modern history* and the humiliation it experienced, China has a deep *mistrust* in imperialist powers that happened to overlap with most Western developed countries. That explains why a striking discourse of *antagonism and blaming* between developed and developing countries was observed in the sample texts. In fact, colonialism has not influenced China but also many other countries all over the world. As discussed in the theoretical chapter, we live in a morally ambiguous world where social understandings of fairness are "configurational," depending on countries' position in the *global hierarchy of capitalist economy and political power* (Roberts and Parks 2007: 136-137; Christoff and Eckersley 2011: 443). What worsens global climate governance is *global inequality* and mistrust between the North and the South (Roberts and Parks 2007, 2010; Parks and Roberts 2010). While the developed countries hope the (large) developing countries take more mitigation responsibilities, the latter argue that the emissions resulted from the manufacture of global goods are partly *transferred emissions*, and what's worse is that the manufacture leaves *ecological debt* in the developing world.

These two discourses found in the analysis reflect the perceived inequality by the developing world in the global political economy.

In addition, the world system is not only unequal but also *dynamic* and *changing*, as is China's position within it. The Anglo-American and European global order was established in the nineteenth century, and around this order, "many conceptions and practices of power-political order, of the international legal system and of global economic governance have since been constructed" (Hurrell and Sengupta 2012: 463). However, power has been shifting in global politics since the 1990s, and emerging powers like the so-called BRIC countries are assuming a more prominent, active, and important role. This broader social context helps us interpret the analytical findings. In the sample texts, China positioned itself *sometimes as a developing country* and *sometimes labeled itself as a big, responsible country*. The first identity was discursively applied when discussing mitigation responsibilities, and the second was when expressing China's importance and engagement in international climate politics.

That China has identified itself in global climate politics in a rather ambiguous way can be explained from three angles: (1) *It is a fact*. On one hand, with China's rise in the global economy, its role in global climate politics has become increasingly important. As discussed in the theoretical chapter, there was a G2 discourse in the media representation of China's role in the Copenhagen Summit, comparing China to the U.S., a world superpower, in global climate politics (Cheng 2014). On the other hand, China's unprecedentedly fast development has also resulted in many social and environmental problems. In an average sense, its economic and social development has yet to reach the level of developed countries. (2) *It is a pretext*. China has been criticized for using climate justice by defining itself as a developing country as an excuse to avoid its responsibilities. Some have also criticized China for not taking binding responsibilities since it is a *big* developing country. (3) The analysis showed that it is both a fact and a pretext but *rather diplomatic tact*. Undoubtedly, China benefited from positioning itself as developing country. First, the Kyoto Protocol exempts developing countries from binding reduction obligations. Second, China can unify the developing world by identifying itself as developing country and thus playing a leading role in this group to gain an advantage in global climate politics with the developed world. Third, it helps China create a buffer time to further develop its economy and people's living standards without binding obligations. However, with China's economy growing faster and stronger and people's living standards improving, it becomes harder for China to identify itself as merely a developing country. China has confronted stronger and harsher international pressure with its rise on the global stage. That is the external reason why China started to claim more climate responsibility, especially in Xi Jinping's presidency. There are also internal motivations. During Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping's presidencies, the core concepts of guiding principles of social and economic development were

“Scientific Outlook on Development” and “Ecological Civilization.” Both stressed environmental issues and social inequality, including climate change and social justice. In order to realize these development goals, the Chinese government has become more willing to deal with climate change. Another internal motivation for China to be prepared to take more responsibility is to improve its *international image* by actively addressing climate change.

Regarding diplomatic tact, climate justice was mainly represented in the *international domain*, focusing on *climate diplomacy* in almost all sample texts. Moreover, the UN climate change conference is the climate diplomacy’s most important discursive arena. The analysis showed that China’s principled positions on climate justice overlap highly with the justice principles reflected in the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol, such as *the right to (sustainable) development principle* and *the ability to pay principle*. The concept of “broad justice” (Nussbaum 2007; Fraser 2008; Young 1990, 2000.) includes three dimensions: distribution, recognition, and representation. It is evident that China has only advantages by sticking to three UN mechanism: 1. As one of five permanent United Nations Security Council members, China enjoys high “*recognition*”. 2. Within the UNFCCC framework, China can *participate* in the whole negotiation process. 3. According to the Kyoto Protocol, China is an Annex II country, which means it does not have a binding obligation to reduce emissions.

Although the UN mechanism protects developing countries, especially the most underprivileged countries, from being totally marginalized in the climate change negotiations, the UN climate change conferences are not able to produce a satisfying outcome. Instead, they have become arenas for *game-playing* between nation-states. Scholars have questioned the fundamental element of the UN mechanism—nation-states. Cosmopolitan scholars interrogate the *statist approach* and ask, “Are states the relevant units of analysis in the study of climate justice?” (Parks and Roberts 2006: 347). They argue that “the notion of the nation-state contributing to, being vulnerable to, and responding to global climate change may obscure crucially important intra-country distinctions” (Parks and Roberts 2006: 347). As O’Brien and co-authors pointed out, in terms of climate justice, less attention is paid to equity issues within national boundaries or those that manifest at diverse scales and units of analysis. These analytical variables include race, gender, caste, ethnicity, and class. The inequities that are associated with climate change are closely linked to existing inequities, and they cannot be divorced from the very processes that create these in the first place (O’Brien et al. 2010: 8). If climate issues can be *discursively connected to the national economic and social concerns*, climate change in general and climate justice specifically could draw attention from more social actors and be related to their daily lives rather than being confined to a small elite group of people.

Instead of the nation-state, cosmopolitan thinkers view *individuals* as the starting point for moral consideration, as argued in the theoretical chapter of this dissertation. The cosmopolitan approach places rights and obligations at the individual level, discounting the importance of national boundaries. Sometimes, cosmopolitanism is criticized because of its idealism. It is often confronted with the doubt whether an individual emitter has an ethical responsibility to stop contributing to harm. The critics' main argument is that individual contribution is too small to influence global climate change, and personal ability is too weak to make any significant change (Cuomo 2011). However, the research in this dissertation aims to offer a *different perspective* on individuals' role in global climate governance.

The analysis showed that the media frames of climate change in general and climate justice in particular were *elite discourses*. Represented social actors were mostly high-level officials, scholars from renowned research institutions, representatives from business and elite NGOs, and so on. Even the journalists themselves were part of elite. The voices of *average people* from *civil society* were *missing*. Although the elite discourses of climate change and climate justice highlighted the elites and ignored the average person, it has a strong *character of individualism*, which is also one of the core elements of cosmopolitanism. Since cosmopolitanism is not only about the rights of people everywhere but also their duties, according to the *justice principle of ability to pay*, cosmopolitanism suggests that the world's capable and influential elites have an *obligation* to act against climate change. Cosmopolitan thinkers claimed that "those who are in a position to prevent or mitigate climate change are responsible for doing so regardless of their causal contributions" (Jamieson 1997: 117), and they "should seek to stabilize climate, and they should also do what they can to help those who are most vulnerable to the change that may already be occurring" (Jamieson 1997: 118). If elites in political, economic, social, and cultural power, even a small part of them, were willing to use their resources to make the global climate governance fairer, then the elitism could also contribute to the global course of dealing with climate change. Politicians of high levels can make a difference. For example, it cannot be denied that Germany's nuclear exit is a political legacy of its former Prime Minister Angela Merkel. The same applies to persons of worldwide influence, such as Elon Musk. Despite the many controversies surrounding him, it has to be said that his dedication to electric cars has changed the landscape of the automobile industry.

Of course, emphasizing the role of elites does not belittle the role of average individuals. The best scenario is that everyone does what they can. However, it is an ideal. No one can make excessive demands on average persons, especially those already in disadvantaged social situations, to deal with climate change more than they can. *Social inequality* among individuals should be taken into consideration. Imaging a nurse who has to move outside the city and live in the suburbs because of

low income, and she can only afford diesel. How can she be criticized for emitting too much CO₂ just because she has to drive the diesel to work every day?

It is indeed a problem that the elite discourse on climate change and climate justice ignores the voices of civil society. There is a Chinese proverb: whoever hung the bell on the tiger's neck must untie it. It means that whoever started the trouble should end it. If the media framing of climate change and climate justice is elitism, then it is the media itself that should solve this problem. Usually, the media tends to represent the elites' voices. However, the media also has the power to "select" (Entman 1993: 52) which elites are represented. Some in the elite class do not care about average people. However, some elites were average people and cared about the people from the base after moving up to the top. Suppose the voices of these elites can be channeled to as many people as possible through *media communication*. In that case, the media will definitely contribute to building a better public opinion about climate change and climate justice. The problem is that, as shown in the analysis, most Chinese newspapers mainly represented the *normative* discourses of officials and academic authorities. Only a few more liberal and market-based newspapers spoke for the average person and gave opportunities to scholars who could provide *alternative* discourses of climate change and climate justice.

The media has power. But sometimes, it cannot use this power well enough to deal with climate issues due to some of its internal traits. The media *prefers drama*. The analysis showed that sustainable and ecological development has been the guideline of the Chinese Communist Party, and Chinese scholars also advocated a peaceful and sustainable development path. However, the media tends to highlight conflict, antagonism, and game-playing. The media *likes clamour*. That is why media coverage of climate change always dramatically increased when UN climate change conferences took place. Media *chases trend*. The analysis showed that some UN climate change conferences were much more popular in the media, such as the Bali Conference 2007, the Copenhagen Summit 2009, and the Paris Conference 2015. In order to have better communication of climate issues, the media should constantly keep an eye on climate change instead of reducing it to a special report on UN climate conferences. The media should try to use its power to connect climate change and climate ethics to the daily concerns of average people instead of cheering for the game-playing of nation-states.

6.2 Discussions and Suggestions

This research project explored how the media framed climate justice in China from 2007 to 2015. It has many strengths and some weaknesses.

As argued in the literature review, there has not been similar research on this topic until now. This research can contribute to academic discussions on climate change in general and climate justice in China, the biggest carbon emitter. In

addition, the theoretical framework is unique and multidisciplinary. It consists of theories on media studies, linguistics, moral philosophy, international political economy, world system, and cosmopolitanism. In terms of methodology, this research applied critical discourse analysis focusing on qualitative linguistic analysis. This analytical tool helped to better understand the subtle and artful usage of the Chinese language. Another strength of this research is that the thorough analysis took the broader social and political context in China into consideration. China's social understanding and perception of justice and climate policy are strongly influenced by its remarkable history and culture, which has not been well addressed in other research so far. Last but not least, the personal experience and background of the researcher also influence the project. The diverse academic training has helped me form a unique understanding of the issue studied. Significantly, this research project is not funded by any third party, making it an independent intellectual endeavor. Lastly, I had a chance to work as freelance journalist for both nation-state news agency and market-based newspapers in China. All these experiences have contributed to the research.

Of course, this research project also has some things that could be improved. This research explored the media framing of climate justice in China. The period of sample texts is from 2007 to 2015, which is arguably not very current. However, research on this topic during that period was not available. Therefore, this dissertation can contribute to filling the gap in academic research. Another weakness is that the research analyzed reports by journalists of different newspapers or contributions by scholars. It would have been a good supplement to conduct interviews with at least some journalists and scholars and analyze the interview texts. Then more background information of the news reports and personal considerations of journalists could be dug out.

To conclude the dissertation, I would like to point out the possibilities for future research.

First, it would be interesting to explore the media frames of climate justice in China after 2015 and compare it to the present research to see if there are any chronological changes.

Second, researchers could shift focus from print to online (social) media and examine the similarities and differences in media frames of climate justice among different media types.

Third, as discussed in the theoretical chapter, journalists and "external sources of influence (e.g., political actors, authorities, interest groups, and other elites)" (Scheufel 1999: 115) are significant influencing factors on media framing. Those people have the *discursive power* when discussing climate change and climate ethics in China. Therefore, instead of analyzing the media texts, emphasis could be placed on analyzing concrete social actors and their roles in defining discourses of climate change and climate justice in China.

Fourth, the analysis showed that climate change and climate justice have been framed mainly as issues in the international domain. Quite often, the conflict and antagonism of different nation-states were highlighted, which leads to *impass* and *inaction*. For future research, exploring climate justice and media frames of climate justice in the *national domain* would be meaningful. Specifically, researchers can investigate if and how climate justice is intertwined with other social inequalities among classes, genders, and races within China. If climate justice could be connected to existing social concerns and daily life, people could more easily perceive the issue and take action.

The last possible research perspective could be to highlight the *corelations between intergenerational justice and sustainable development*. Rowlands (1997: 3) proposed that intergenerational aspects of climate change are closely related to sustainable development. Moellendorf (2015: 174) stated that mitigation is “importantly a matter of intergenerational morality or justice, perhaps not exclusively but mostly.” Unfortunately, these corelations have not been well discussed. If climate justice can be framed as an *intergenerational* issue, people would know that what they do now would profoundly impact their offspring and future generations.

These suggestions for potential academic research also provides insights to facilitate practical actions. For example, research based on the third suggestion would help identify which social actors in China possess the discursive power and willingness to address climate issues. For organizations and institutions working on climate change, targeting Chinese officials, scholars, and journalists with a more international perspective and experience may prove more effective in driving action. These individuals are generally more receptive to proactive approaches to tackling climate change. Organizing workshops for journalists to keep them informed about the latest discussion on climate change and climate justice, as well as workshops for scholars to help them disseminate their expertise to the public through media, would be highly beneficial. For business entities, projects and investments focused on renewable energy development are likely to appeal to both Chinese business partners and various levels of government. Additionally, it would be prudent for international policymakers to have some knowledge of China’s modern history to better understand its policies.


Appendix 1: Wan Gang's Interview in The Guardian

Part 1

Titel	Date	Online Link of the Report	Original Source
China's carbon emissions will peak 20 years from now. 中國碳排放 20 年後達頂峰	09.12. 2009	http://news.wenweipo.com/2009/12/09/IN0912090010.htm (accessed 24.08.2020)	Wuhan Evening Post 武汉晚报
China's greenhouse gas emissions are expected to peak between 2030 and 2040. 中国温室气体排放将在 2030-2040 年间达到顶峰	09.12. 2009	http://www.china.com.cn/news/txt/2009-12/09/content_19030951.htm (accessed 24.08.2020)	
Minister of Science and Technology, Wan Gang, has announced China's peak year for carbon emissions for the first time. 科技部部长万钢首次公布中国碳排放峰值年份	09.12. 2009	https://newenergy.in-en.com/html/newenergy-524764.shtml (accessed 24.08.2020)	
Minister of Science and Technology, Wan Gang, has announced China's peak year for carbon emissions for the first time. 科技部部长万钢首次公布中国碳排放峰值年份	09.12. 2009	https://www.china5e.com/news/news-61076-1.html (accessed 24.08.2020)	
China has, for the first time, disclosed the target year for reaching peak emissions. 中国首次公布谈判放峰值年份	09.12. 2009	http://news.sina.com.cn/o/2009-12-09/125416743934s.shtml (accessed 24.08.2020)	Shanghai Evening Post 新闻晚报
China's carbon emissions are projected to reach their peak between 2020 and 2040. 中国碳排放 2020-2040 年达峰值	09.12. 2009	http://www.cb.com.cn/jingjikuaijun/2009_1209/79546.html (accessed 24.08.2020)	unknown

Part II

Titel: China's Carbon Emissions Will Peak Between 2030 and 2040 accessed via People's Daily Online



Titel: Minister of Science and Technology Wan Gang announces the peak year of China's carbon emissions for the first time on QQ News



Appendix 2: Information of Sample Texts

Nr.	Newspaper; Date; Page	Title	Authorship
1	PD1/ST1; 2007-05-16; 007 International	气候变暖与富国责任 Global Warming and the Responsibility of Rich Nations.	赵金红 Zhao Jinhong
2	PD2/ST2; 2007-10-19; 010 International	美式哲学与减排义务 American Philosophy and Obligation of Carbon Emission Reduction.	马小宁 Ma Xiaoning
3	PD3; 2008-07-07; 003 International	负责任的合作伙伴 A Responsible Partner	沈骥如 Shen Jiru
4	PD4; 2008-07-11; 003 International	亚行官员说：发达国家须承担更大责任 Asian Development Bank Officials Said: Developed Countries Must Shoulder Greater Responsibility	刘华 Liu Hua
5	PD5; 2009-07-23; 014 Internatioanl Weekly	减排要明确义务分担 Emission Reductions Should Have Clearly Defined Obligations for Burden-sharing.	陈迎 Chen Ying
6	PD6/ST3; 2009-08-27; 003 Top News	非洲要求公平应对气候变化 Africa Asks to Deal With Climate Change Fairly.	詹世明 Zhan Shiming
7	PD7/ST4; 2009-12-13; 002 Top News	我代表在哥本哈根气候变化会议上指出： 发达国家履行历史责任是谈判成功的关键 中国不赞成有关哥本哈根会议将达成具有法律约束力的协议来取代《京都议定书》的观点 Our Representative Points Out at the Copenhagen Climate Change Summit The Key to Negotiation Success Is that Developed Countries Take the Historical Responsibility	本报记者， 新华社报道 Journalists of People's Daily and Report by Xinhua News Agency

		China does not agree with the view that the Copenhagen Conference will reach a legally binding agreement to replace the "Kyoto Protocol"	
8	PD8/ST5; 2009-12-19; 002 Top News	发展中国家官员和国际组织 赞赏中国应对气候变化承诺和主张 Officials of Developing Countries and International Organizations Applauded China's Commitment and Claims of Addressing Climate Change.	陈文仙 刘晓燕 Chen Wenxian, Liu Xiaoyan
9	PD9/ST6; 2009-12-27; 003 Top News	国家发改委副主任解振华接受媒体采访时指出— 中国为哥本哈根会议取得成果作出重要贡献 发达国家企图逃避义务导致许多关键问题谈判进展甚微; 哥本哈根会议取得两大重要成果 Deputy Director of the National Development and Reform Commission Xie Zhenhua Pointed Out in an Interview With the Media China Has Made Important Contributions to the Achievements of the Copenhagen Conference. The attempts of developed countries to evade their obligations have led to too little progress in the negotiation of many key issues; Copenhagen Summit achieved two important results.	江国成 Jiang Guocheng
10	PD10/ST7; 2010-01-07; 023 International	气候公正: 2010 年外交主题词 气候变化问题成为当今国际关系的一个重要考量因素,已经渗入国际关系的方方面面 Climate Justice: the Keyword of Diplomacy 2010. The issue of climate change has become an important consideration in international relations today and has penetrated all aspects of international relations.	吴绮敏, 韦冬泽, 焦翔 Wu Qimin, Wei Dongze, Jiao Xiang
11	PD11/ST8; 2010-01-02;	英国《卫报》称: 哥本哈根大会失败应归咎于丹麦而非中国	新华社伦敦 Xinhua

	003 Top News	Guardian Wrote: The Failure of the Copenhagen Conference Should Be Blamed on Denmark, Not China.	News Agency London
12	PD12; 2010-07-04; 002 Top News	世博“环境变化与城市责任”主题论坛举行 俞正声出席开幕式 Expo Forum on "Environmental Change and Urban Responsibility" Held; Yu Zhengsheng Attended the Opening Ceremony.	郝洪, 申琳 Hao Hong, Shen Lin
13	PD13; 2010-09-19; 001 Top News	习近平在参加全国科普日活动时强调 以高度负责态度应对全球气候变化 努力实现“十一五”节能减排目标 Xi Jinping Emphasized during National Science Popularization Day Activities: Address Global Climate Change with a Highly Responsible Attitude and Strive to Achieve the "11th Five-Year" Energy-saving and Emission Reduction Targets.	孙秀艳 Sun Xiuyan
14	PD14/ST9; 2011-11-23; 002 Top News	《中国应对气候变化的政策与行动(2011)》白皮书发布 约束性指标彰显中国决心 China's Policies and Actions for Addressing Climate Change 2011 Released; Compulsive Objectives Manifest China's Determination.	杨讴 Yang Ou
15	PD15; 2011-12-16; 003 Top News	发达国家不能逃避减排责任 Developed Countries Cannot Evade Their Emission Reduction Responsibilities.	齐晔 Qi Ye
16	PD16/ST10; 2013-05-06; 022 International	今年首轮气候变化谈判无果而终 发达国家不愿为全球变暖负责 The First Round of Climate Change Negotiations This Year Ended without Results. Developed Countries Are Unwilling to Take Responsibility for Global Warming.	黄发红, 郑红 Huang Fahong, Zheng Hong
17	PD17; 2014-12-05; 003 Top News	发展中国家与发达国家在应对气候变化问题上— 责任共同, 也要有别	侯露露, 王海林 Hou Lulu,

		When It Comes to Climate Change, Developing and Developed Countries Share Common Responsibilities, but They Must Also Be Differentiated.	Wang Hailin
18	PD18/ST11; 2014-12-09; 003 Top News	应对气候变化，发达国家应承担更多责任 Combating Climate Change, More Obligations from Developed Countries.	王海林, 侯露 Wang Hailin, Hou Lulu
19	PD19; 2014-12-12; 003 Top News	应对气候变化当各尽其责 Each Should Fulfill Their Responsibilities in Addressing Climate Change.	钟声 Zhong Sheng
20	PD20; 2015-07-01; 022 Roundup	强化应对气候变化行动——中国国家自主贡献 Strengthen Actions to Tackle Climate Change — <i>China's Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC)</i> .	新华社北京 Xinhua News Agency Beijing
21	PD21/ST12; 2015-07-02; 021 International	“国家自主贡献”彰显中国担当 Intended Nationally Determined Contributions Manifest China's Courage to Take on Responsibilities.	钟声 Zhong Sheng
22	STD1; 2008-04-21; 003 Roundup	气候变化的责任与中国的贡献 The Responsibility for Climate Change and China's Contributions.	徐华清 Xu Huaqing
23	STD2/ST13; 2008-04-23; 003 Roundup	气候变化与公平问题 Climate Change and Justice Issue.	陈迎, 潘家华 Chen Ying, Pan Jiahua
24	STD3; 2009-03-13; 002 International	应对气候变化人人有责 ——访 WWF 南非分会气候变化项目主任沃辛顿 Everyone Has a Responsibility in Addressing Climate Change — Interview with WWF South Africa Climate Change Program Director, Worthington.	李学华 Li Xuehua
25	STD4; 2009-10-09; 002 International	第三届欧盟—巴西峰会提出 每个国家均应明确减排责任 The 3rd EU-Brazil Summit Proposed: Every Country Should Clearly Define Its Emission Reduction Responsibilities.	张新生 Zhang Xinsheng

26	STD5/ST14; 2009-12-08; 002 International	非洲：期待公正有效的协议 Africa: Looking Forward to Fair and Effective Agreements.	李学华 Li Xuehua
27	STD6/ST15; 2009-12-17; 003 Roundup	中国企业家哥本哈根表示 应对气候变化是责任更是商机 Chinese Entrepreneur Said in Copenhagen Dealing With Climate Change Is Business Opportunity More Than Only Responsibility.	李禾 Li He
28	CEN1/ST16; 2008-04-18; 005 Global	瑞典环境大臣安德烈亚斯·卡尔格伦接受记者采访时表示 应对气候变化是全世界共同的责任 Swedish Minister for Environment Andreas Carlgren Expressed in Interview Dealing With Climate Change Is the Common Responsibility of the Whole World.	方芳, 张胜昔 Fang Fang, Zhang Shengxi
29	CEN2; 2009-06-23; 002 Opinion	减排须强化政府主导责任 Emission Reductions Require Strengthening Government-led Responsibilities.	韩孝成 Han Xiaocheng
30	CEN3; 2009-07-07; 004 Global	承担大国责任 应对气候变化 Shoulder the Responsibilities of a Major Power in Addressing Climate Change.	薛惠锋 Xue Huifeng
31	CEN4/ST17; 2009-10-22; 007 Global	“新理念”真的能辨明责任? Can “New Concepts” Really Clarify Responsibility?	翟勇 Zhai Yong
32	21 st CBH1/ST18; 2007-06-07; 04 Comment	公正地看待中国的全球环保义务 A Just Perspective of China's Global Responsibility for Environmental Protection.	唐学鹏 Tang Xuepeng
33	21 st CBH2; 2007-06-11; 008 Politics and Economy	G8 减排妥协 发达国家应担主要责任 G8 Emission Reduction Compromise: Developed Countries Should Bear Primary Responsibility.	李芑 Li Peng
34	21 st CBH3/ST19; 2008-09-29; 036 Xin Bai Jia	控制温室效应：发达国家必须承担更多的责任 Control the Greenhouse Effect: Developed Countries Must Take More Responsibility.	林伯强 Lin Boqiang
35	21 st CBH4; 2009-09-23;	“共同但有区别承担责任” ——联合国气象组织副秘书长颜宏谈中国减排	王海平 Wang

	008 Public Affairs	"Common but Differentiated Responsibilities" — WMO Deputy Secretary-General Yan Hong Discusses China's Emission Reductions.	Haiping
36	21 st CBH5/ST20; 2010-07-20; 024 Carbon° Pioneer	外交部气候变化谈判特别代表、大使于庆泰： “气候谈判缓慢不能把责任推给市场” Ambassador Yu Qingtai, Special Representative for Climate Change Negotiations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Said: “The Responsibility for the Stagnation of Climate Negotiation Cannot Be Credited to the Market.”	王海平 Wang Haiping
37	EO1/ST21; 2007-06-11; 007 Economy	中国减排责任真相 The Truth of China's Responsibility of Emission Reduction.	张沉 Zhang Chen
38	EO2; 2007-12-03; 004 News from Beijing	联合国报告称 温室气体减排富国未尽责 UN Report States: Wealthy Countries Have Failed in Their Greenhouse Gas Reduction Responsibilities.	张沉 Zhang Chen
39	CBN1; 2010-03-11; C04 AD	气候变化和城市的“低碳”责任 Climate Change and the "Low-Carbon" Responsibilities of Cities.	齐侯 Qi Hou
40	CBN2/ST22; 2010-08-30; A07 Column	什么是共同但有区别的责任”？ “What is the “Common But Differentiated Responsibilities”？	陈晓晨 Chen Xiaochen
41	CBN3/ST23; 2015-12-01; A04 International	如何担责？发展中国家寻求“气候公正” How to Share the Responsibility? Developing Countries Seek “Climate Justice.”	缪琦 Miao Qi
42	SW1/ST24; 2007-06-14; C23 Specials	中国的角色 China's Role	邹骥 Zou Ji
43	SW2; 2007-12-13; B11 Politics	“科学家已尽责,现在看政治家了” "Scientists Have Fulfilled Their Responsibilities; Now It's up to the Politicians."	潘基文 Pan Jiwen
44	SW3;	哥本哈根谈判前夜最权威的情势分析	胡贲

	2009-11-19; C10 Environment	“政府应该为国民的长远利益负责” ——独家专访联合国副秘书长阿希姆·施泰纳 The Most Authoritative Situation Analysis on the Even of the Copenhagen Negotiations. “Governments Should Be Responsible for the Long-Term Interests of Their Citizens.” — Exclusive Interview with UN Deputy Secretary-General Achim Steiner.	
45	SW4/ST25; 2009-11-19; C10 Environment	中美能源环境新一轮合作 民间亦应承担“共同但有区别的责任” A New Round of Sino-American Cooperation on Energy and Environment Minjian Should Also Take on Common But Differentiated Responsibilities	齐晔 Qi Ye
46	SW5; 2009-12-17; C14 Copenhagen	哥本哈根:名利与道义厮杀 “双轨合并”潜流暗涌 气候谈判举步维艰 Copenhagen: A Clash of Interests and Morality “Merging the Dual Tracks” Faces Underlying Turbulence; Climate Negotiations Struggle to Progress.	袁瑛 Yuan Ying
47	SW6; 2010-01-21; C09 Green	“有人正在逃避责任” ——联合国前副秘书长、联合国环境规划署 (UNEP)首任执行官莫里斯·斯特朗 “Some Are Evading Responsibility” — Maurice Strong, Former UN Under-Secretary-General and First Executive Director of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)	袁瑛, 冯洁 Yuan Ying, Feng Jie
48	SMD1/ST26; 2007-06-05; A02 Comment	中国应当对改善全球环境有较大贡献 China Should Make a Greater Contribution to Improving the Global Environment.	社论 Editorial
49	SMD2; 2007-12-15; A26 International	气候大会 7 大关键词 Seven Keywords of Climate Change Conference	新华社 张晓 军 高丽 Zhang Xiaojun and Gao Li from Xinhua News

			Agency
50	SMD3; 2008-01-02; A02 Comment	梁文道专栏：不负责任的第一强国 Liang Wendao's Column: The World's Leading Power Acting Irresponsibly.	梁文道 Liang Wendao
51	SMD4/ST27; 2009-12-07; A02 Comment	哥本哈根气候大会：发达国家应承担更大责任 Copenhagen Climate Change Conference: Developed Countries Should Take Greater Responsibility.	社论 Editorial

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