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Predictors and Consequences of Faking in Personnel Selection:

A Dual-Process Perspective

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'Thank you for flying with us, you can leave the plane now.'

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General Introduction:
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Peacocks are harmless birds able to flutter more than to fly long distances. Yet, when trying to impress a potential mate or to ward off a potential predator, peacocks turn into a magnificent sight, showing a wheel approximately three meters in diameter (and thus larger than any of their predators) and staring back at you with hundreds of eyes. Above that, peacocks are also skilled liars, issuing their characteristic mating hoot more often than they actually mate, just to appear more sexually active and attractive than they truly are—and the hens believe it (Dakin & Montgomerie, 2014).

Self-presentation, an umbrella term for behaviors aiming to create a favorable impression on others (Marcus, 2009), used by animals and humans alike, can, as illustrated in the above example, be quite adaptive in order to obtain specific goals (Smith, 2004). In the working life, self-presentation is of great interest in the literature on personnel selection because applicants often rely on it to increase their chances of getting hired (e.g., Levashina & Campion, 2007). Yet, applicants' self-presentation might either be honest or deceptive. Applicants might present themselves using *honest impression management* (IM), which includes behaviors that aim to influence the way a person is perceived by others (Bolino, Kacmar, Turnley, & Gilstrap, 2008), yet without being deceptive and possibly even without being overly intentional (Peeters & Lievens, 2006). In contrast, applicants might use *faking*, which describes all intentional and deceptive attempts to misrepresent one's skills, abilities, and other favorable characteristics in order to make a good impression (Levashina & Campion, 2006). Originally introduced to questionnaire and interview literature, in this dissertation, I argue and show that faking is also relevant in behavior-based selection exercises (e.g., role-plays and group discussions) and might thus either be shown verbally or behaviorally. Although applicants use both forms of self-presentation (i.e., honest and deceptive) frequently

in personnel selection (Bourdage, Roulin, & Tarraf, 2018), this dissertation will mainly focus on faking and address honest IM only in Chapter 3.

Faking has been described as situation-specific (Levashina & Campion, 2006) and might therefore change depending on the job applicants are aiming for (Roulin & Bourdage, 2017). For this reason, it has to be differentiated from *socially desirable responding* (SDR) "the tendency to give answers that make the respondent look good" (Paulhus, 1991, p. 17). In contrast to faking, SDR is described as a stable trait that remains consistent across different situations. Levashina and Campion (2006, p. 301) illustrate the difference between faking and SDR as follows: During selection, an applicant is asked "can you see someone suffer?". Applicants scoring high on SDR aiming to look good might say 'no' because it is the ethically most appropriate answer to this question. However, for the job as a nurse for example the answer 'yes' would be much more appropriate and might be given by applicants who fake.

So far, most faking research has addressed applicants' faking in no- (e.g., personality inventories, integrity tests; Birkeland, Manson, Kisamore, Brannick, & Smith, 2006) or low-fidelity selection exercises (e.g., interview; Levashina & Campion, 2007), both of which ask applicants to provide answers to a given item or question orally or in writing. In contrast, high-fidelity exercises aim to recreate job-related tasks or situations and require applicants to show actual behavior in a dynamically ongoing social interaction (e.g., role-plays, group discussions; Lievens & DeSoete, 2012). Knowledge about faking in such exercises is, however, still scarce. Accordingly, existing faking models aiming to predict the occurrence of faking have exclusively been developed and tested based on questionnaires and interviews—leaving it open whether the results are generalizable to high-fidelity exercises, too. Based on that, the first objective of this dissertation is to test how much faking occurs in selection exercises varying in fidelity (low- vs. high-fidelity) and identify potential predictors of faking in those exercises.

Furthermore, research has not only focused on predicting faking during personnel selection, but has also studied whether faking influences applicants' performance evaluations (e.g., Roulin, Bangerter, & Levashina, 2015). While studies on faking in questionnaires consistently showed that applicants can easily fake such measures and by doing so they can increase their chances of success in the selection process (e.g., Rosse, Stecher, Miller, & Levin, 1998). Yet, the results for selection exercises that involve any kind of social interaction (i.e., interactive selection exercises) are (a) limited to interview studies only and (b) quite inconsistent. In particular, for the link between faking and applicants' performance, some studies found a positive effect of faking on interview performance (e.g., Buehl, Melchers, Macan, & Kühnel, 2019; Levashina & Campion, 2007; Roulin et al., 2015), others found none (Allen, Facteau, & Facteau, 2004; Bourdage et al., 2018; Roulin, Bangerter, & Levashina, 2014) or even a negative effect of faking on performance evaluations (Swider, Barrick, Harris, & Stoverink, 2011). It thus seems that the relationship between faking and performance evaluations in interactive selection exercises is not as straightforward as it is in questionnaires.

Also, existing research has primarily focused on whether faking influences performance evaluations, while the process underlying this effect is still unknown. It therefore remains open as to *how* faking influences applicants' performance evaluations. For this reason, adopting a process-perspective has not only been requested by some scholars (Levashina, Hartwell, Morgeson, & Campion, 2014), but it might also be pivotal in unraveling the process underlying the effects of faking. Hence, the second objective of this dissertation is to test a process-oriented faking model aiming to explain how faking influences performance evaluations in interactive selection exercises.

As aforementioned, applicants' self-presentation is not limited to faking, rather, applicants also use honest IM during personnel selection (Kristof-Brown, Barrick, & Franke, 2002). Although both tactics are frequently used during personnel selection, the existing

research has (a) not sufficiently differentiated honest IM from faking (Klehe, Kleinmann, Nieß, & Grazi, 2014; Levashina et al., 2014), or (b) only studied honest IM and faking separately (Kristof-Brown et al., 2002), or (c) only focused on one specific selection exercise (Tsai, Chen, & Chiu, 2005). For this reason, it remains unclear whether and how honest IM and faking relate to the same antecedents and outcomes in the personnel selection context. Based on that, the third objective of this dissertation was to identify differential predictors and consequences of faking and honest IM.

The Present Dissertation

This dissertation presents six studies in three empirical chapters that focus on predictors and consequences of faking in interactive selection procedures varying in their fidelity (low- vs. high-fidelity exercises). In the following, I will briefly outline each of the three chapters.

Chapter 1: Using the Theory of Planned Behavior to Predict Faking in Selection Exercises Varying in Fidelity

Much research on faking has revolved around questionnaires and interviews. Despite notions that applicants' motivation to fake should be equally high for different selection tools (Lievens & DeSoete, 2012) and theoretical considerations that faking happens across different selection methods (e.g., Salgado, 2016), so far there is no empirical evidence on faking in high-fidelity exercises. Therefore, the study presented in Chapter 1 expanded research on faking to high-fidelity exercises and asked whether the antecedences found to predict faking in questionnaires and job interviews can also be translated to high-fidelity exercises.

A theoretical framework that has been used to predict and explain faking during selection (e.g., McFarland & Ryan, 2006; Mueller-Hanson, Heggestad, & Thornton, 2006) is the theory of planned behavior (TPB; Ajzen, 1991; 2012). The TPB claims that human action is guided by a person's (a) attitude toward a certain behavior, (b) beliefs about the normative expectations of important others, and (c) the perceived behavioral control (PBC) about the

behavior (Ajzen, 2012). These three forces lead people to form intentions which in turn determine whether a person shows a specific behavior or refrains from it. Empirically, the TPB has proven to be a valuable framework to predict behavioral intentions as well as actual behavior (Armitage & Connor, 2001). Also, with special regard to deception, Beck and Ajzen (1991) demonstrated that the TPB predicts college students' intentions to cheat on a test, to shoplift and to lie, as well as their actual behavior regarding these issues. Studies on faking used the TPB to successfully predict intentions to fake and actual faking in personality inventories (McFarland & Ryan, 2006) and intentions to fake in job interviews (Lester, Anglim, & Fullarton, 2015).

For this reason, I tested whether the TPB would be able to predict behavioral intentions as well as self-reported faking in high-fidelity exercises, too. I expected that the specificities of high-fidelity exercises (i.e., based on behavior, interactive nature, depending on reactions of others, hardly predictable progress) thwart intentions to fake in some instances while offering unexpected opportunities in others, which should weaken the link between applicants' pre-exercise intentions to fake and their self-reported faking during the exercise itself.

Chapter 2: Does Faking Help or Hurt? A Two-Process Perspective on the Effects of Applicants' Faking on Performance Evaluations in Interactive Selection Exercises

Based on the above finding that faking does also happen in high-fidelity exercises, the four studies presented in Chapter 2 addressed how faking influences performance evaluations in high- versus low-fidelity exercises. I proposed a dual-process model, which builds on identity theory (Burke, 1991) and the stereotype-content model (e.g., Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2008) and takes into consideration that faking in interactive selection procedures might have positive as well as negative consequences on performance evaluations.

Most literature suggests that faking during personnel selection increases applicants' performance evaluations (e.g., Griffith, Chmielowski, & Yoshita, 2007). After all, that is why

people do it in the first place: to present themselves as more suitable than they actually are (Levashina & Campion, 2006). However, mixed results from interview studies call this expectation into question or at least the generalizability of this expectation to other selection procedures than questionnaires (e.g., Bourdage et al., 2018).

For this reason, the model proposed the effect of faking on performance evaluations to be twofold: (a) an external positive effect of faking on performance evaluations mediated via observers' impression of the applicant, as expected from the stereotype content model (Cuddy et al., 2008) and (b) an internal negative effect of faking on performance evaluations mediated via inauthenticity and distress, as predicted from identity theory (Burke, 1991).

The primary goal of applicants engaging in faking is to make a more positive impression on observers than they otherwise would, for instance, by representing a particularly high level of competence and/or likeability. Indeed, faking has been shown to have a particular positive effect on performance when observers formed a positive impression of the applicant (Roulin et al., 2014; Swider et al., 2011). It thus seems feasible to assume that observers' impressions of applicants contribute to a positive effect of faking on performance.

In contrast, a negative effect of faking might be conveyed via affective reactions to the use of faking. Burke (1991) proposed an identity-related control system, which entails a constant comparison between the self-concept and the behavior shown. Identity incongruent behavior (i.e., faking) then would disrupt the normal identity process and cause negative psychological consequences (i.e., inauthenticity and distress), which may eventually lower applicants' performance (Grandey, 2003; Mann, 1999).

Taken together, I expected the effects of faking to rely on two indirect processes: an external and an internal process. I suggested that these indirect effects might be able to explain how faking influences performance evaluations differently in selection exercises varying in fidelity (e.g., low- vs. high-fidelity), as the strength of both the external (i.e., positive effect) and the internal (i.e., negative effect) process may differ between these

exercises. Specifically, I expected the internal path to be stronger in high-fidelity exercises, thus counteracting any benefits that faking may otherwise have on performance evaluations and therefore making it more costly in high- compared to low-fidelity exercises.

Study 3: 'To show, or not to show … one's true self' – Self-Verification and Inauthenticity as Predictors and Consequences of Honest and Deceptive Impression Management

The study presented in Chapter 3 built on the previous findings and served to compare predictors and consequences of faking and honest IM. More specifically, I examined self-verification as a potential predictor of faking and honest IM and inauthenticity, distress, and performance (internal process from Chapter 2) as consequences. By integrating self-verification theory (Swann, 1983, 2012) and identity theory (Burke, 1991), this study did not only expand the conceptual model from Study 2, it also aimed to clarify in further depth whether and how faking and honest IM differently relate to predictor and outcome variables.

Existing research has shown that individuals high on self-verification striving tend to seek self-verifying feedback and thus want to be seen by others as they see themselves (e.g., Swann, Bosson, & Pelham, 2002). Using this idea, I argued that applicants high on self-verification striving might use less faking and more honest IM during selection procedures. Furthermore, I argued that, in accordance with identity theory, faking is self-concept discrepant behavior which should increase applicants' felt inauthenticity, while honest IM is in line with the self-concept and thus decreases applicants' felt inauthenticity.

Moreover, the study investigated the influence of faking and honest IM on applicants' performance evaluations. In line with existing research (e.g., McFarland, Ryan, & Kriska, 2003), I argued that honest IM positively influences applicants' performance evaluations. In contrast, based on the model from Study 2, for faking, I proposed no direct but a negative indirect effect on performance evaluations mediated via inauthenticity and distress.

Contribution

In sum, the proposed research makes four prime contributions. First, the studies presented offer a new perspective on faking, that is, I review faking from an applicant's perspective and test a model that does not solely focus on the direct relationship between faking and performance, but rather includes applicants' potential affective reactions to faking and their consequences on performance evaluations. This approach does not only seem valuable because it enhances existing faking models (Levashina & Campion, 2006; Roulin, Krings, & Binggeli, 2016), but I might also be able to explain the inconsistent findings surrounding the effect of faking on performance evaluations.

Second, I use and integrate different theoretical frameworks (i.e., TPB, identity theory, self-verification theory) in order to explain the occurrence and consequences of applicants' self-presentation in further depth. Most of the existing faking models focused on explaining applicants' ability, motivation, and opportunity to fake (e.g., Roulin et al., 2016). Far less is known, though, about the process underlying faking. Therefore, the present research aims to study the effects of faking from a process-perspective clarifying the link between faking and performance evaluations. Such process-perspective may greatly advance faking research as it (a) might challenge existing assumptions (e.g., faking fosters applicants' performance evaluations) and (b) helps to gain a deeper understanding of which constructs are involved in the faking process. The proposed model thus takes into account that the effects of faking in actual selection setting might be multi-layered and more complex than studied with existing models. Furthermore, my results might also advance the used theoretical frameworks themselves (i.e., TPB, identity theory, self-verification theory), as I (a) used them in the selection context and thus showed that these models might be able to explain phenomena across different contexts and (b) showed how these models might conceptually relate to each other.

Third, the present studies follow the call to extend research on faking in questionnaire measures to other commonly used selection procedures by focusing on faking in interactive and most prominently in high-fidelity exercises. By doing so, the validity of existing faking models can be tested in high-fidelity exercises and potential adaptions can be made to these models in order to account for (a) the fact that faking does not only occur in low-fidelity exercises and (b) the fact that faking might relate differently to outcome variables based on the specific exercise type. Additionally, my studies identify and compare the impact of different predictors and potential consequences of faking in these exercises.

Fourth, from a practical standpoint, this research does away with the common assumption and fear of practitioners that applicants may gain an advantage in the selection process through faking. Rather, the existing studies show that faking can even backfire, especially in high-fidelity exercises. For this reason, trying to increase applicants' honesty during selection might not only help applicants themselves to feel and perform better during selection, it might also contribute to making good selection decision.

Taken together, this dissertation (a) proposes a dual-process model of faking in interactive selection procedures, that incorporates external as well as internal effects faking might have on performance evaluations, (b) extends the scope of faking research to high-fidelity exercises, and (c) might help clarifying some of the conflicting findings from existing faking research.

Chapter 1

Using the Theory of Planned Behavior to Predict Faking

in Selection Exercises Varying in Fidelity

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Abstract

Faking has been a concern in selection research for many years. Many studies have examined faking in questionnaires while far less is known about faking in selection exercises with higher fidelity. This study applies the theory of planned behavior (TPB, Ajzen, 1991) to low- (interviews) and high-fidelity (role-play, group discussion) exercises, testing whether the TPB predicts reported faking behavior. Data from a mock selection procedure suggests that applicants do report to fake in low- and high-fidelity exercises. Additionally, the TPB showed good predictive validity for faking in a low-fidelity exercise, yet not for faking in high-fidelity exercises.

Using the Theory of Planned Behavior to Predict Faking in Selection Exercises Varying in Fidelity

Applicants in personnel selection strive to get hired and often seek to increase their chances by using influence tactics. One extreme influence tactic is *faking*, including all deceptive attempts to intentionally distort one's behavior in order to receive a better evaluation (Levashina & Campion, 2007). As faking can influence selection outcomes (e.g., Griffith, Chmielowski, & Yoshita, 2007), it is a controversial topic. Yet, faking has primarily been studied in *no-* (e.g., personality inventories; Alliger & Dwight, 2000) and *low-fidelity selection exercises* (e.g., interviews; Levashina & Campion, 2007), both of which ask applicants to provide answers to a given item or question orally or in writing. *High-fidelity* exercises, on the other hand, evaluate applicants on their actual behavior in response to simulated job situations (Lievens & DeSoete, 2012). Such exercises are particularly popular in the context of assessment centers (e.g., Eurich, Krause, Cigularov, & Thornton, 2009). Yet, knowledge about faking in high-fidelity exercises and thus assessment centers is still scarce.

Existing faking models often build on the theory of planned behavior (TPB; e.g., McFarland & Ryan, 2006; Mueller-Hanson, Heggestad, & Thornton, 2006). As these models have mostly been developed and tested in personality inventories, it remains unclear how well the TPB holds for predicting faking in exercises with higher fidelity. Generalizability of findings is far from certain, given that low- and high fidelity exercises differ in their core characteristics (cf., Lievens & DeSoete, 2012). The current study thus uses the TPB to predict applicants' pre-exercise intention to fake and their subsequent self-reported faking in low- (interviews) versus high-fidelity (role-play, group discussion) exercises. Accordingly, we aim to broaden theoretical knowledge about faking in low- and high-fidelity exercises and contribute to the literature by clarifying in how far existing faking models are also applicable to other selection methods.

Faking in Personnel Selection

Faking, or "deceptive *impression management* (IM)", is characterized by its intentional and misleading nature. It thus deviates from honest IM. Levashina and Campion (2007) identified four faking dimensions: *slight* and *extensive image creation* (i.e., faking to make the impression of a suitable applicant), *image protection* (i.e., faking to protect the image of a suitable applicant), and *deceptive ingratiation* (i.e., faking to make the assessor like oneself). Many studies have shown that self-report (e.g., biodata-, personality) questionnaires are susceptible to faking (e.g., Alligier & Dwight, 2000; Griffith et al., 2007). Similarly, Levashina and Campion (2007) found that over 90% of undergraduates faked during their last job interview.

In contrast, studies on influence tactics in high-fidelity exercises have primarily focused on applicants' honest IM (e.g., Klehe, Kleinmann, Nieß, & Grazi, 2014; McFarland, Yun, Harold, Viera, & Moore, 2005), rather than on faking. The likely reason for this lack of research is the belief that high-fidelity exercises are much harder, if not impossible, to fake because they require applicants to show actual behavior. It has been argued that while applicants' motivation to fake should be unaffectedly high in different selection procedures, high-fidelity exercises leave applicants with fewer resources to fake due to the high cognitive demands spent on the exercise itself (e.g., McFarland, Ryan, & Kriska, 2003). The assumed consequence is that faking in high-fidelity exercises might be a non-issue and has therefore been neglected in research until now.

However, there are also reasons to believe that faking may indeed occur also in high-fidelity exercises. Stretching the truth seems to be part of daily life as people lie about twice a day (DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer, & Epstein, 1996). They tend to do so even more when aiming to appear especially likeable or competent (Feldman, Forrest, & Happ, 2002; Weiss & Feldman, 2006). DePaulo (1992) reported that people are able to fake emotions, attitudes, and also personality traits, implying that faking might be deeply ingrained in

humans and even serves an adaptive purpose. Therefore, we propose that intentional faking might also be possible in high-fidelity exercise:

Hypothesis 1: Applicants report faking in both low- and high-fidelity exercises.

Since faking is an intentional behavior, existing models have relied on the TPB to predict faking (McFarland & Ryan, 2006; Mueller-Hanson et al., 2006). The TPB claims that intentional human behavior is guided by a person's (a) attitude towards, (b) beliefs about the normative expectations of important others (i.e. subjective norm), and (c) perceived behavioral control (PBC) to show a certain behavior (Ajzen, 1991). Each of these three forces fosters people's intention, which in turn determines whether a person shows a specific behavior or refrains from it. Applied to faking, this means that the more people feel that faking is ok, think that also important others will consider it as being ok, and the more they believe that they will be able to fake successfully, the more likely they will form the intention to fake, which in turn should predict faking itself.

McFarland and Ryan (2006) found the TPB to predict students' intention to fake and actual faking when asked to respond to a personality inventory as if they were applying for a job. Similarly, Lester, Anglim, and Fullarton (2015) showed that the TPB could predict the intention to fake in interviews. We propose that the TPB will be able to predict the intention to fake high-fidelity exercises, too:

Hypothesis 2: Attitude, subjective norm and perceived behavioral control predict applicants' intention to fake in both (a) low- and (b) high-fidelity exercises.

The next step of the model, however, the prediction of actual faking behavior from faking intention, has been tested for neither interviews nor high-fidelity exercises so far. Yet, generalizability from personality inventories (which usually require no more than a checkmark in order to fake) to interactive selection tasks such as interviews and even more so high-fidelity exercises is far from given. Still, in line with the theory of planned behavior, we propose:

Hypothesis 3: Applicants' intention to fake predicts reported faking in (a) low- and (b) high-fidelity exercises.

The proposed study model can be taken from Figure 1.1.

Method

Setting and Procedure

Data stemmed from half-day application-training procedures for prospective university graduates. This setting, realistic to applicants and valuable as a research set-up (e.g., Klehe et al., 2014), allowed us to collect sensitive data on self-reported faking as participants did not fear to deteriorate their chances of getting hired when answering a faking questionnaire. Participants underwent three evaluated exercises: one low- (structured interview) and two high-fidelity exercises (role-play and group discussion).

To ensure participants' motivation, they submitted a résumé and cover letter, and completed an online questionnaire in advance. The questionnaire included the TPB items alongside items on demographics, personality, and experiences with selection procedures.

During the procedure, participants dressed and were treated like applying for a real job. In each exercise, two trained observers scored participants' performance on the dimensions cooperation, planning, and leadership on a scale from 1 (*poor performance*) to 5 (*outstanding performance*). Ratings were averaged across the three exercises to determine the best performing participant in each procedure, who was awarded a cash prize of 50€. At the end of the procedure, each participant received an individual feedback.

Participants

Participants (N = 86; 18 male) were studying business (37), social- (16), nutritional- (13), natural sciences (10) and other (10) subjects. Most participants were currently studying in a master's program (64) and were employed full-time (12), part-time (14), spare-time (29) or were doing a full-time internship (5).

Measures

TPB. We adapted Beck and Ajzen's (1991) scales to the selection context measuring applicants' attitude (5 items) and subjective norm towards faking (3 items), as well as their perceived behavioral control (PBC; 4 items) and intention to fake (3 items), an approach similarly used by McFarland and Ryan (2006). Answers on a 5-point scale were coded such that higher scores represent a positive stance towards faking. Applicants were given a short explanation of what faking is (i.e., "Faking means intentional cheating, deceiving or pretending") and then asked to respond separately for low- (interviews) and high-fidelity exercises (role-plays, group discussions). Scales were administered online, two weeks prior to the actual procedure.

Faking. Directly after each exercise, applicants reported their slight (4 items) and extensive image creation (5 items), deceptive ingratiation (4 items), and image protection (4 items) during the exercise on a shortened version of Levashina and Campion's (2007) faking scale (cf., Roulin, Bangerter, & Levashina, 2014) on a 5-point Likert scale.

Results

Descriptives, intercorrelations and internal consistencies are depicted in Table 1.1.

Hypothesis Testing

H1. Over half of participants reported at least some faking in both low- and high-fidelity exercises (Table 1.2). We used the low-fidelity exercise as comparison standard, because faking in interviews is beyond question at this stage. Scores for slight and extensive image creation, deceptive ingratiation, and average faking were in the same range or even higher in high-fidelity exercises than in the low-fidelity exercise. Reported image protection was marginally lower in high-fidelity exercises. The results indicate that applicants report faking in both low and high-fidelity exercises, supporting H1.

H2/H3. Path analysis was used to test H2 and H3 with two models: one for the low-fidelity exercise and one for high-fidelity exercises. Table 1.3 shows that attitude and PBC

were significantly related to intention to fake in both (a) low- and (b) high-fidelity exercises while subjective norm was not, partially supporting H2a and H2b. For H3, correlation coefficients showed significant relationships between intention to fake and different faking dimensions for the low-fidelity exercise, yet not for high-fidelity exercises (Table 1.1). In line, the model fit was good for low-fidelity exercises with CFI = .96 to .98 and SRMR = .05, including significant indirect effects for attitude and PBC on reported faking via applicants' intention to fake, confirming H3a. However, for high-fidelity exercises, in line with the non-significant correlations, the model fit was insufficient resulting in a lack of support for H3b.

Discussion

This study addressed whether faking occurs in exercises varying in fidelity (low vs. high) and whether the TPB can predict faking in those exercises. Results confirmed that applicants do report faking in low and high-fidelity exercises and that intention to fake can be predicted using the TPB components attitude and PBC in both kinds of exercises. However, a link to self-reported faking behavior only emerged in low-fidelity exercises, suggesting that the TPB is applicable to interviews, but does not directly translate to high-fidelity exercises. This is possibly due to the more dynamic nature of high-fidelity exercises, in which additional challenges and unpredictabilities emerge from the opponent's behavior. As such, these exercises call for a greater flexibility, offering unexpected possibilities to fake in some instances but prevent faking in others, thereby diminishing the predictive power of applicants' intention to fake. In high-fidelity exercises, faking seems thus less predictable than in low-fidelity exercises.

In general, the results imply that the TPB might be a valuable framework to predict and explain faking in exercises in which applicants can plan their behavior in advance (i.e. questionnaires, interview). Yet, for exercises that require instant reactions to unforeseen challenges, the theory might be less applicable. This also offers more insight into faking behavior in general. Whereas it seems that faking intentions in interviews can be put into

practice, faking in high-fidelity exercises is much more dependent on whether the exercise offers the possibility to engage in the intended faking behavior.

A first potential limitation of this study is the simulated selection setting challenging the generalizability of our results. Nevertheless, this setting is well validated (e.g., Klehe et al., 2014) and allowed us to collect sensitive data that might not be directly measurable in field research. With regard to previous studies, which also used a simulated selection setting (e.g., Niessen, Meijer, & Tendeiro, 2017) and applicants' reactions during our procedure, we do not believe this to compromise our results. Second, we translated Levashina and Campion's (2007) faking items to the high-fidelity context without undertaking further measures to ensure that this scale covers all aspects that faking may entail in high-fidelity exercises. At the same time, the largely comparable internal consistencies, intercorrelations, and means, irrespective of whether they addressed faking in low- or high-fidelity exercises, speak against this concern. Third, most of our participants did not have experiences with high-fidelity exercises, thus it could be possible that they were not able to accurately judge their intention to fake prior to having undergone such exercise. This could have eventually lead to the non-significant link between intention to fake and reported faking behavior in high-fidelity exercises. Yet, a post-hoc comparison between participants with and without prior selection experience revealed that correlations between intention to fake and reported faking were smaller, yet not significantly different, for applicants with experience in respective selection procedures than for novice applicants. Therefore, we deem the differences found between exercises not to be a matter of applicants' experiences but rather of the exercises themselves.

Further research should work on extending theoretical and applied knowledge about faking in different exercises and contexts. This study showed that there might be a need to adjust existing faking models to fit different selection contexts. Also, research might work on translating the ample amount of knowledge on faking in questionnaires to exercises with

higher fidelity. This study is also of practical relevance as it challenges the common opinion that high-fidelity exercises are not susceptible to faking. While faking appeared to be less plannable in high-fidelity exercises, it still occurred. Research as well as practice might thus investigate the effectiveness of measures known to reduce faking in questionnaire measures (e.g., claims that it might be observed and punished, highlighting adverse effects of faking) in high-fidelity selection contexts.

Appendix Chapter 1



Figure 1.1 Proposed study model.

Table 1.1

Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations for Study Variables

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	*M*	*SD*
1	Attitude	(.82/.91)	.48**	.58**	.76**	.01	.06	.02	.25*	.11	.11	−.05	2.40	0.99
2	Subjective Norm	.44**	(.70/.66)	.40**	.49**	−.24	−.21*	−.23*	.03	−.22*	.17	−.03	3.22	1.00
3	PBC	.50**	.27*	(.78/.68)	.67**	.12	.13	−.10	.13	.07	.35**	−.09	2.94	0.85
4	Intention to fake	.68**	.43**	.61**	(.72/.81)	.09	.09	.06	.17	.13	.30**	−.08	2.73	1.08
5	Sl. Image Creation	.43**	.20	.34**	.41**	(.72/.73)	.80**	.34**	.51**	.82**	.15	−.19	1.58	0.62
6	Ext. Image Creation	.42**	.26	.32**	.37**	.71**	(.77/.78)	.32**	.51**	.81**	.16	−.24*	1.57	0.59
7	Deceptive Ingratiation	.24*	.02	−.01	.20	.41**	.37**	(.79/.71)	.29**	.70**	.00	−.12	2.61	0.89
8	Image Protection	.33**	.09	.21*	.25*	.20	.31**	.60**	(.71/.85)	.74**	.22*	−.11	1.56	0.71
9	Faking Average	.44**	.13	.24*	.38**	.68**	.71**	.86**	.76**	–	.16	−.19	1.83	0.54
10	Gender[a]	.16	.20	.38**	.26*	.33**	.23*	−.01	.12	.09	–	.04	1.21	0.41
11	Age	−.25*	−.06	−.21	−.26*	−.28	−.32**	−.24*	−.09	−.29**	.04	–	25.73	2.91
	M	2.14	2.84	2.76	2.72	1.53	1.44	2.26	1.72	1.74	1.21	25.73		
	SD	0.79	1.04	0.94	0.38	0.57	0.55	0.94	0.82	0.55	0.41	0.91		

Note. $N = 86$, low-fidelity exercise below the diagonal, high-fidelity exercises above the diagonal. Internal consistencies in diagonal, first number for low-fidelity exercise, second number for high-fidelity exercises. Faking average = mean from different faking dimensions.

[a] Dichotomous variable: female = 1, male = 2.

*$p < .05$ **$p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 1.2

Faking Scores and Comparison of Faking Scores from Low- to High-Fidelity Exercises

	Low-fidelity			High-fidelity						
Faking dimension	%	*M*	*SD*	%	*M*	*SD*	*t*(85)	*p*	95% CI	*d*
Slight image creation	53.49	1.53	0.57	48.84	1.58	0.62	−0.56	.57	[−.18, .09]	.05
Extensive image creation	34.88	1.44	0.55	44.18	1.57	0.59	−2.12	.03	[−.26, −.02]	.24
deceptive ingratiation	75.58	2.26	0.94	90.69	2.61	0.89	−3.23	<.01	[−.57, −.13]	.38
Image protection	48.84	1.72	0.82	40.70	1.56	0.71	1.97	.07	[−.00, 33]	.20
Average faking	53.20	1.74	0.55	56.10	1.83	0.54	−1.70	.09	[−.20, .02]	.17

Note. $N = 86$, dependent samples *t*-test, percentages represent base rates of faking on the different faking dimensions. Participants were counted as 'faker' if their score was higher than 1.50 on a specific faking dimension. 95% CI for mean difference. The value −.00 in the CI of image protection represents a value of −.003 and was shortened as we report only two decimals in all tables.

Table 1.3

Fit Indices, Weights, and Indirect Effect Sizes for Path Models

Outcome variable	Fit							Weights				Indirect effect		
	χ^2	*p*	χ^2/df	CFI	TLI	RMSEA	SRMR		γ	β	*p*	SES	95 % CI	*p*
								Low-fidelity						
Slight image creation	5.25	.16	1.75	.98	.94	.09	.05	Attitude	.44		<.01	.18	[.04, .39]	.01
								Subjective norm	.14		.08	.06	[-.02, .15]	.16
								PBC	.34		<.01	.14	[.05, .26]	.01
								Intention		.41	<.01			
Extensive image creation	7.25	.06	2.42	.97	.89	.13	.05	Attitude	.44		<.01	.16	[.05, .33]	.02
								Subjective norm	.14		.08	.05	[-.03, .14]	.17
								PBC	.34		<.01	.13	[.05, .25]	.02
								Intention		.37	<.01			
Deceptive ingratiation	6.13	.11	2.04	.97	.91	.11	.05	Attitude	.44		<.01	.09	[-.01, .27]	.08
								Subjective norm	.14		.08	.03	[-.01, .09]	.20
								PBC	.34		<.01	.07	[-.01, .14]	.08
								Intention		.20	.06			
Image protection	5.30	.15	1.77	.98	.93	.10	.05	Attitude	.44		<.01	.11	[.01, .26]	.04
								Subjective norm	.14		.08	.04	[-.01, .09]	.07
								PBC	.34		<.01	.09	[.01, .17]	.04
								Intention		.25	.02			

(continued)

Table 1.3 (continued)

Fit Indices, Weights, and Indirect Effect Sizes for Path Models

	χ^2	*p*	χ^2/df	CFI	TLI	RMSEA	SRMR		γ	β	*p*	SES	95 % CI	*p*
								High-fidelity						
Slight image creation	10.88	.01	3.63	.95	.83	.18	.08	Attitude	.52		<.01	.05	[-.10, .20]	.49
								Subjective norm	.12		.11	.01	[-.03, .06]	.60
								PBC	.32		<.01	.03	[-.05, .13]	.49
								Intention		.09	.40			
Extensive image creation	9.56	.02	3.12	.96	.86	.16	.07	Attitude	.52		<.01	.05	[-.08, .18]	.51
								Subjective norm	.12		.11	.01	[-.02, .06]	.62
								PBC	.32		<.01	.03	[-.04, .13]	.51
								Intention		.09	.39			
Deceptive ingratiation	10.58	.01	3.53	.95	.84	.17	.08	Attitude	.52		<.01	.03	[-.10, .15]	.62
								Subjective norm	.12		.11	.01	[-.03, .05]	.73
								PBC	.32		<.01	.02	[-.06, .12]	.62
								Intention		.06	.59			
Image protection	4.07	.25	1.36	.99	.98	.07	.03	Attitude	.52		<.01	.09	[-.04, .23]	.12
								Subjective norm	.12		.11	.02	[-.02, .07]	.29
								PBC	.32		<.01	.05	[-.02, .16]	.12
								Intention		.17	.11			

Note. *N* = 86, SES = Standardized indirect effect.

Chapter 2

Does Faking Help or Hurt? A Dual-Process Perspective on the Effects of Applicants' Faking on Performance Evaluations in Interactive Selection Procedures

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Abstract

Faking has been suggested to increase applicants' performance in personnel selection, thus improving their chances to get hired. Yet, recent studies on faking in job interviews found mixed results as to whether faking indeed increases applicants' performance and therefore challenges this suggestion. To investigate whether faking really helps applicants or even hurts them, this research proposes a dual-process model of faking, which clarifies the processes underlying the effect of faking on performance in interactive selection exercises (low- and high-fidelity). Using notions from identity theory (Burke, 1991) and the stereotype content model (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, Xu, 2008), we propose the effect of faking to rely on two simultaneous processes: An external process mediated via observer impressions leading to an indirect positive effect of faking on performance evaluations and an internal process mediated via applicants' affective reactions (felt inauthenticity and distress) leading to an indirect negative effect of faking on performance. We tested the model across four studies (overall $N = 624$), three in a mock and one in an actual selection setting. While we found no support for an indirect positive effect of faking on applicants' performance, results suggest that faking triggers negative affective reactions in applicants, which, especially in high-fidelity exercises, can decrease performance evaluations. Overall, it seems that faking might help in low-fidelity exercises, but hurts in high-fidelity exercises.

Does Faking Help or Hurt? A Dual-Process Perspective on the Effects of Applicants' Faking on Performance Evaluations in Interactive Selection Procedures

"*The sense of strategic manipulator also requires (…) that one willingly though shamefully forsakes the path of authenticity*."

–Kenneth J. Gergen, The saturated self: Dilemmas of identity in contemporary life, 1991

What Gergen (1991) implies here is that manipulation comes with a price, the price of not being able to feel like one's true self (Kernis & Goldman, 2006). Yet, manipulation is not uncommon. Especially when people aim for a specific goal, they might be tempted to do so (Feldman, Forrest, & Happ, 2002). Personnel selection is one of such situations, in which applicants strive to be hired and thus frequently use *faking*, the intentional attempt to deceptively misrepresent own skills, abilities, and other desirable characteristics in order to make a favorable impression (Levashina & Campion, 2006). Studies suggest that applicants' faking is prevalent in different selection procedures, such as non-cognitive questionnaire measures (e.g., McFarland & Ryan, 2000), job interviews (e.g., Levashina & Campion, 2007), and assessment centers (Duerr & Klehe, 2018).

Faking is relevant not only because it happens, but also because it might attenuate the quality of the selection process. In particular, faking might change applicants' performance scores as well as their rank ordering, possibly giving fakers an advantage over honest applicants (e.g., Stewart, Darnold, Zimmerman, Parks, & Dustin, 2010). It might impact the criterion-related validity of selection procedures (e.g., Buehl, Melchers, Macan, & Kühnel, 2019; Marcus, 2006), and it might even be detrimental to the workplace as fakers, once hired, supposedly perform poorly and exhibit more counterproductive work behavior (Donovan, Dwight, & Schneider, 2014; Peterson, Griffith, Isaacson, O'Connell, & Mangos, 2011).

So far, most faking research focuses on faking in questionnaires and concludes that applicants can easily inflate their scores and thus increase their chances of success in the

selection process (McFarland & Ryan, 2000; Mueller-Hanson, Heggestad, & Thronton, 2006; Snell, Sydell, & Lueke, 1999). Yet, faking questionnaire items is easy—it requires applicants to tick one box (e.g., "5 = *fully agree*") instead of another (e.g., "3 = *neither agree nor disagree*"). In comparison, faking in job interviews requires applicants to exaggerate or lie during an ongoing social interaction, and faking in high-fidelity exercises, which rely on actual behavior (e.g., role-plays or group discussions), even requires applicants to distort their behavior.

Accordingly, results on the relationship between faking and applicants' performance in interactive selection procedures are far less conclusive than results on faking in questionnaire measures: Some studies find a positive effect (Levashina & Campion, 2007), some find no effect (Roulin, Bangerter, & Levashina, 2014) and others even a negative effect of faking on applicants' performance evaluations (Swider, Barrick, Harris, & Stoverink, 2011). It is thus questionable whether research on faking in questionnaires generalizes to selection procedures that involve a constant social interaction (i.e., interviews, role-plays, group discussions).

Furthermore, although existing faking models greatly helped understanding who is most likely to fake (i.e., applicant characteristics) and which situational characteristics influence faking (i.e., selection exercises; Levashina & Campion, 2006; McFarland & Ryan, 2006; Roulin, Krings, & Binggeli, 2016), no research, as far as we know, has addressed *how* faking influences applicants' performance evaluations in interactive selection exercises. For this reason, some scholars requested adopting a process perspective in order to unravel the process underlying faking (Levashina, Hartwell, Morgeson, & Campion, 2014).

Consequently, we aim to test a model that tries to unravel the processes through which faking influences applicants' performance evaluations in interactive selection procedures, acknowledging that faking might not only have the intended positive, but also negative consequences for applicants. The model proposes two simultaneous processes to link faking

with performance evaluations: an internal and an external process. The internal process builds on Burke's *identity theory* (1991), which suggests that actions contrary to the own self-concept (i.e., faking) disrupt the identity process and thus lead to negative psychological consequences. The resulting feelings of inauthenticity and distress might in turn impair applicants' performance. The external process builds on the *stereotype content model* (SCM) which proposes competence and warmth as fundamental dimensions of social perception (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2008; Fiske et al., 2002). We assume that applicants' faking will target and influence observers' impression of applicants' competence and warmth which in turn should improve performance evaluations. Moreover, the internal and the external process might be linked through applicants felt inauthenticity also influencing observers' impressions of applicants. We assume these processes to run simultaneously, mitigating a potential direct effect of faking on performance evaluations.

Taken together, this research makes four prime contributions to the related literatures. First, the model reviews faking from a process perspective and thus not only follows scholars' request for process-oriented faking research (Levashina, Hartwell, Morgeson, & Campion, 2014), but might also be able to explain some of the inconsistent results from existing studies (Buehl et al., 2019 vs. Bourdage, Roulin, & Tarraf, 2018). By incorporating different theoretical frameworks (identity theory, SCM), the model provides a more in-depth approach to study the faking—performance link. Moreover, we expand the current scope of faking research to high-fidelity exercises because recent research has shown that applicants fake in such exercises as well (Duerr & Klehe, 2018). The proposed model might therefore not only advance existing faking models and thus contribute to a better understanding of the faking process in different selection procedures, but it might also be valuable in order to judge whether practitioners indeed need to worry about applicants faking.

Second, our proposed model addresses faking from a new and innovative perspective. Rather than focusing only on the direct effect of faking on performance evaluations, we

propose explanatory mechanisms that account for potential positive as well as negative effects of faking. The model incorporates both observer impressions, primarily targeted by applicants' faking tactics, and applicants' own affective reactions to their faking. Through putting applicants themselves in the center of attention, this perspective might help to explore individual as well as organizational consequences of faking. Additionally, we consider a potential impact of applicants' affective state and observer impressions, which might contribute to the literature on observers (in)-ability to detect faking (e.g., Roulin, Bangerter, & Levashina, 2015).

Third, our approach might advance identity theory (Burke, 1991) as well as the SCM (e.g., Cuddy et al. 2008), as they are integrated and applied to a new context. Burke's identity theory (1991) argues that self-concept incongruent behavior leads to a disruption of the identity process and thus causes negative psychological consequences. Our research might add to this theory by showing that this disruption is not solely an inner phenomenon but might also show to others (observer impression) and can have negative behavioral consequences (decrease performance) as well. Research on interactive service work proposed a similar mechanism for emotional labor, yet, most of this research studied the detrimental effects of felt inauthenticity in the long run (Grandey, 2003). Our research might add to that by showing that felt inauthenticity might also hurt short-term.

Fourth, up to now, it is still unclear whether and how faking influences the performance of applicants in interactive selection procedures. The proposed model therefore aims to clarify the mixed findings. However, irrespective of whether faking influences applicants' performance positively or negatively, it still represents a sort of measurement error, which compromises the initial goal of personnel selection to accurately judge an applicant's suitability for a given job (e.g., Roulin & Powell, 2018). Our results might therefore (a) clarify how big of a problem faking really is in different selection exercises and (b) be used to create measures to encourage applicants to present themselves honestly.

Theoretical Background

Faking in Personnel Selection

Faking, the intentional and deceptive misrepresentation of own attributes in order to make a favorable impression, is common in all kinds of selection procedures (e.g., Levashina & Campion, 2006; McFarland & Ryan, 2000). Levashina and Campion (2007) identified four different faking tactics that applicants use: Self-directed faking tactics include slight and extensive image creation (i.e., faking in order to create a positive image) as well as image protection (i.e., faking to protect the positive image). Other-directed tactics include ingratiation (i.e., faking in order to appear likeable). Since we focus on faking in low- and high-fidelity exercises, applicants can convey faking either verbally (i.e., by telling how one wants to be perceived; Levashina & Campion, 2007) or behaviorally (i.e., by acting how one wants to be perceived; Duerr & Klehe, 2018).

Faking and Related Constructs

Whereas we focus on faking to make a positive impression (i.e., 'faking-good'), faking can also be used to make a negative impression (i.e., 'faking-bad'), when applicants try to avoid being selected, for instance, for military service or to remain unemployed. Still, since most applicants strive to get hired, this article focuses only on 'faking-good'.

Faking needs to be further distinguished from *impression management* (IM) and *socially desirable responding* (SDR). IM encompasses all "conscious or unconscious attempts to influence images during interaction" (Levashina & Campion, 2006, p. 301). IM can either be honest or deceptive. While honest IM is not necessarily intentional and is non-deceptive (Peeters & Lievens, 2006), deceptive IM is semantically comparable to faking (Roulin et al., 2015).

SDR is "the tendency to give answers that make the respondent look good" (Paulhus, 1991, p. 17). Despite faking and SDR being related, SDR is described as a stable trait, while faking is situation-specific and may vary depending on the targeted job (cf., Roulin &

Bourdage, 2017). To illustrate the difference between faking and SDR, Levashina and Campion (2006, p. 301) describe a selection situation in which the applicant is asked "can you see someone suffer?". Applicants scoring high on SDR might say 'no' because it is the ethically most appropriate answer to this question. However, for the job as a nurse, the answer 'yes' would be more appropriate and might be given by applicants who fake.

Another difference between these constructs is the approach to measure them. SDR is usually assessed with specific scales that only show small to moderate correlations with faking measures (Levashina & Campion, 2007). IM has been measured either by using questionnaires that ask applicants to report their IM behavior right after the selection situation (e.g., Levashina & Campion, 2007) or retrospectively after a longer period of time (König, Hafsteinsson, Jansen, & Stadelmann, 2011). Other studies have used interviewer ratings of IM (e.g. Roulin et al., 2014) or used video recordings to code IM externally (e.g. Ellis, West, Ryan, & DeShon, 2002; Klehe, Kleinmann, Nieß, & Grazi, 2014). While all these measures have their advantages and downsides, it is pivotal to note that during interactive selection procedures (e.g., interview, role-play), faking might not be distinguishable from other forms of applicant behavior for the external observer (Roulin et al., 2015). Therefore, faking is best measured via self-reports.

Faking and Performance Outcomes

Faking has often been addressed in non-cognitive questionnaire measures (i.e., personality, integrity, biodata; Morgeson et al., 2007; Viswesvaran & Ones, 1999). This research clearly shows that questionnaires are susceptible to faking (e.g., Alliger & Dwight, 2000) and that applicants can fake to inflate their evaluations (e.g., Griffith, Chmielowski, & Yoshita, 2007; McFarland & Ryan, 2000).

Yet, for interactive selection procedures, existing evidence is less conclusive: (a) only few studies explored the link between faking and applicants' performance evaluations during interactive selection procedures, (b) the results of these studies are so far limited to job

interviews, and are (c) more heterogeneous than the common consensus might suggest. More specifically, the existing studies on the effect of faking on interview performance found partly positive effects (e.g., Buehl & Melchers, 2017, Study 2; Buehl et al., 2019; Levashina & Campion, 2007; Roulin et al., 2015), partly no significant effects (e.g., Allen, Facteau, & Facteau, 2004; Buehl & Melchers, 2017, Study 1; Bourdage et al., 2018; Roulin et al., 2014; Roulin & Powell, 2018; Bourdage et al., 2018; Schneider, Powell, & Roulin, 2015), and sometimes even a negative effect (Swider et al., 2011). Moreover, some multi-study papers using the same set-up for their studies found positive effects of faking in one study but no effect in another (e.g., Roulin et al., 2015, Study 3-5), suggesting that the inconclusive findings are not due to treatment effects. Hence, it remains unclear why and how these mixed results occur and whether faking helps or hurts applicants in interviews specifically or in interactive selection procedures in general.

Existing faking models give little answer to this riddle, as they mainly focus on antecedents of faking, such as who can fake (ability to fake), who will fake (motivation to fake), which circumstances foster faking (characteristics of the selection process) or a combination of these (Ellingson & McFarland, 2011; Goffin & Boyd, 2009; Levashina & Campion, 2006; Marcus, 2009; McFarland & Ryan, 2006; Mueller-Hanson et al., 2006; Roulin et al., 2016; Snell et al., 1999).

The present research proposes a dual-process model to shed light on the underlying process of *how* faking affects applicants' performance evaluations in interactive selection procedures. Using ideas from identity theory (Burke, 1991) and the SCM (Fiske et al., 2002), the model includes an internal path conveyed through applicants themselves and an external path conveyed through the observers (Figure 2.1). We will first outline the internal path, suggesting that faking can entail negative psychological consequences that may impair performance evaluations. After that, we will outline the external path, focusing on the mediating role of positive observer impressions in the link between faking and performance.

A Dual-Process Model of Faking

The internal path. A persons' identity comprises of traits, characteristics, roles, social groups, values, and shapes how people see themselves (Oyserman, Elmore, & Smith, 2012). Expanding on theories of dissonance (e.g., Festinger, 1957), Burke (1991) describes an identity process that entails four components: (a) the own identity (i.e., how we think we are), (b) a situational input (i.e., the situation we are currently in), (c) a comparison between the own identity and the situational requirements and (d) a behavioral output resulting from the comparison between the own self-concept and the situational requirements. When situational requirements tempt people to show behavior not in line with their own self-concept, Burke argues, the identity process gets disrupted and negative psychological consequences arise. More specifically, when the comparison process has identified an incongruence between the persons' self-concept and a specific behavior, the feeling of inauthenticity may arise, which is the feeling of not being able to express one's true self (Sloan, 2007). Inauthenticity is a negative emotional state and thus triggers the experience of distress. Taken together, the model suggests that identity incongruent behavior leads to negative psychological consequences.

Empirical support for this process comes from the literature on interactive service work. Interactive service work often requires workers to show positive emotions, such as joy or politeness, which might, however, not necessarily reflect their true feelings (i.e., surface acting; Grandey, 2003). In other words, the requirements of the situation ask employees to fake their emotions. Supporting Burke's (1991) presumptions, studies on surface acting convincingly show that faking emotions compromises one's sense of authenticity and thus leads to the feeling of inauthenticity (e.g., Erickson & Ritter, 2001; Erickson & Wharton, 1997). Furthermore, inauthenticity is a strong predictor of psychological distress (Boyraz, Waits, & Felix, 2014) and is related to an array of other negative psychological consequences, such as decreased well-being (Holman, Martinez-Inigo, & Totterdell, 2008) and work-related

maladjustment (e.g., Wharton, 1999). In line with this, Moore, Lee, Kim, and Cable (2017) suggest that this mechanism could also work in other contexts. The authors found that individuals who presented themselves honestly during job search were more successful on the job market than those who presented themselves insincerely. Although they did not ask participants themselves on their felt inauthenticity, they showed that honest applicants were rated as less inauthentic by recruiters and were more likely to be recommended for a job.

Applying these notions to personnel selection, we argue that faking during selection represents identity incongruent behavior that should lead to similar negative consequences as does surface acting (i.e., faking emotions). While surface acting aims to create emotional expressions that disguise one's actual emotions, faking in selection aims to exaggerate or invent skills, abilities or other characteristics desired by the organization. As both kinds of faking should lead to a dissonance between the self-concept and the behavior shown, we expect faking to cause the feeling of inauthenticity, which in turn leads to the experience of distress.

Research on surface acting further indicates that distress arising from feeling inauthentic might lower individual's performance (Grandey, 2003). Fakers arguably experience higher cognitive load than non-fakers (McFarland, Ryan, & Kriska, 2003): they not only have to deal with the given task, they also have to manage how they are perceived and additionally have to deal with the negative psychological consequences in the wake of faking. This should in turn leave them with fewer resources to spare for the task itself. Additionally, results from the deception literature attest that fakers intentionally control their movements, gestures, and facial expressions in order to suppress any signs of distress (e.g., Sporer & Schwandt, 2007). Yet, this should impose additional strain on them and deplete their resources even more. It thus seems plausible to assume that in personnel selection, the distress resulting from feeling inauthentic will reduce applicants' ability to fully master the task itself. We therefore propose:

Hypothesis 1: The effect of faking on performance evaluations is mediated by applicants' felt inauthenticity and distress, such that (a) faking is positively linked to felt inauthenticity, (b) felt inauthenticity is positively linked to distress, and (c) distress is negatively linked to performance evaluations.

Yet, the effect of distress on performance might depend on the selection exercise an applicant faces—and we expect the effect to be more pronounced in high- compared to low-fidelity exercises. Interactive selection procedures differ in how closely they mirror the respective job in terms of stimulus (i.e., is the task relevant for the job) and response fidelity (i.e., is the answer format relevant for the job; Lievens & DeSoete, 2012). For instance, job interviews are low in fidelity as the applicant is described a situation from past or future work settings (stimulus fidelity) and is then required to say how he/she did or would behave (response fidelity), usually without their responses eliciting further reactions or probing by interviewers (Latham, Saari, Purseel, & Campion, 1980). In contrast, high-fidelity exercises, such as role-plays or group discussions, replicate job-related situations and require applicants to actually react to tasks under socially dynamic conditions, for instance the changing reactions of a role-play partner. This makes high-fidelity exercises far more complex in terms of behavioral requirements, cognitive load (McFarland et al., 2003), and situational dynamics. Thus, a distraction from the task caused by additional distress should be more detrimental in high-fidelity exercises than in low-fidelity exercises. Hence, we propose:

Hypothesis 2: The negative link between distress and applicants' performance is moderated by exercise type such that the link is stronger in high-fidelity exercises than in low-fidelity exercises.

The external path. Applicants' faking tactics in interactive selection procedures usually target the observers on whose favor applicants depend. For this reason, the external path of the model takes into consideration how observers perceive applicants, a necessary but as of now understudied path in faking research (e.g., Roulin et al., 2014; Tyler, Feldman, &

Reichert, 2006). From a theoretical standpoint, interpersonal perceptions can be described with the SCM (e.g., Cuddy et al., 2008), which argues that individuals form automatic and relatively general impressions about others, especially when first meeting them (Cuddy, Glick, & Beninger, 2011). These impressions often rely on two fundamental dimensions: *competence* and *warmth*. Originally developed to explain the occurrence of stereotypes, these two dimensions emerged as underlying interpersonal perceptions in general. For instance, Wojciszke, Bazinska, and Jaworski (1998) found that 82% of the variance in the global impression of a well-known person was linked to competence and warmth. Similarly, Wojciszke, Abele, and Baryla (2009) showed that employees asked to describe their supervisors mainly used traits that were related to competence, warmth or both. Individuals perceived as competent are described as capable, skillful, intelligent, and confident. Individuals perceived as warm are described as good-natured, trustworthy, tolerant, friendly, and sincere. The model further posits that perceiving a person as competent and/or warm goes along with specific patterns of cognitive, emotional, and behavioral reactions.

In the selection context, interpersonal perception might be crucial for two reasons. First, in a high-stakes selection setting, when first meeting an applicant, observers will likely form impressions of applicants' competence and likeability (i.e., conceptually similar to warmth and more suitable for the selection context; Lemmink & Mattsson, 1998). These impressions should in turn influence how observers evaluate applicants' performance. Second, applicants might aim to alter these impressions by using specific faking tactics, which make them appear as more competent (i.e., image creation) or likeable (i.e., ingratiation; Bangerter, Roulin, & König, 2012). The use of faking tactics should thus not necessarily have a direct impact on performance evaluations themselves, but rather should be mediated through positive observer impressions (Kristof-Brown, Barrick, & Franke, 2002).

Empirical support for this assumption comes from studies on honest IM. Regarding competence, Howard and Ferris (1996) manipulated applicants' use of self-promotion, a self-

directed IM tactic, and showed that interviewee self-promotion was positively linked to observer ratings of applicants' competence. Similarly, results from mock and field interview settings demonstrate that applicants' use of self-promotion was positively related to observers' impression of person-job fit, which can be seen as a proxy for the impression of competence (Kristof-Brown et al., 2002; Chen & Lin, 2014). Regarding ingratiation and observers' impression of warmth (likeability), Kacmar and Carlson (1999) varied the extent of honest IM in different situations experimentally (selection, training, appraisal) and found a positive link between ingratiation and observers' impression of likeability. In line, a field study of Chen and Lin (2014) demonstrated that applicants' use of ingratiation during a job interview was linked to higher observer ratings of person-recruiter-fit, a proxy for applicant-recruiter similarity which is positively linked to interpersonal liking (e.g., Byrne, 1997). Taken together, these results suggest that the use of honest IM tactics can influence observers' impressions of competence and warmth (likeability). It thus seems plausible to suspect that the use of faking tactics should lead to comparable results. Finally, research from both simulated (Howard & Ferris, 1996; Schneider et al., 2015) and field settings (Chen & Lin, 2014) suggests that observer impressions of competence and likeability in turn relate to positive performance evaluations. We thus propose:

> *Hypothesis 3:* The effect of faking on performance evaluations is mediated by observers' impressions of applicants' competence and warmth, such that faking is positively linked to observers' impressions and these are in turn positively linked to performance evaluations.

Yet, most aforementioned evidence was on honest IM. In contrast to honest IM, faking should arguably make applicants feel more inauthentic (Sloan, 2007). This feeling should not only influence applicants themselves, but might also be noticeable to others and thus impact observers' impression of applicants. In fact, applicants who were perceived as dishonest were also evaluated as more inauthentic (Moore et al., 2017) and less likeable (Tyler et al., 2006).

We thus propose:

Hypothesis 4: Applicants' felt inauthenticity is negatively linked to observers' impressions of competence and warmth.

Overview of Studies

We conducted four complementary studies to test our hypotheses. Studies 1 to 3 relied on a well-validated mock selection procedure paradigm (cf., Ingold, Kleinmann, König, & Melchers, 2014; Klehe, Kleinmann, Nieß, & Grazi, 2014), while Study 4 examined the model in an actual selection setting. Study 1 investigated the internal process of our model with soon-to-be-graduates (Hypotheses 1-3). In Study 2, we experimentally manipulated applicants' faking in order to rule out alternative explanations for applicants' felt inauthenticity. Study 3 included the external path, thus testing the complete model with a bigger sample (Hypotheses 1-5). Finally, Study 4 aimed to replicate the model in an actual selection setting.

As Studies 1 to 3 relied on a similar mock selection procedure, we will outline the general procedure in more detail for Study 1 and only refer to adaptions of this paradigm in the method sections of the further studies.

Study 1

Setting and Design

Data were collected in the context of application training programs miming assessment centers for university students and graduates who were currently applying for jobs or would soon do so. This procedure has already proven realistic and valuable as a research-set up in earlier studies (e.g., Kleinmann, 1993; Klehe, König, Richter, Kleinmann, & Melchers, 2008; König, Melchers, Kleinmann, Richter, & Klehe, 2007) and was run in cooperation with the university's *Career Centre*. The procedure was designed as an assessment center for a fictional company selecting applicants for a trainee position open to

students from various academic backgrounds. To ensure participant motivation, participants were required to send in their résumé and fill in a 45-minute online questionnaire including demographic and personality items prior to the procedure. Only participants who had done so were invited to the procedure. Additionally, participants were asked to dress professionally and were treated like formal job applicants throughout the procedure.

During each assessment center, 6 to 12 participants underwent one low-fidelity exercise, a structured interview, and two high-fidelity exercises, a role-play and a group discussion. These exercises were chosen as they are among the most frequently used selection exercises (e.g., Thornton & Krause, 2009). Two comparable exercises were used for each exercises type that were similar in format and desired participant behavior, but differed in content. In order to rule out effects of specific exercises, these comparable exercises were rotated across procedures. The interview was either a behavior description (Motowidlo et al., 1992) or a situational interview (Latham et al., 1980). The role-play between two participants was either a negotiation between two team leaders about a shared subordinate or a negotiation of two managers about a potential change in supply policies. The group discussion, designed for three to four participants each, either asked participants to decide on the country in which to build a new plant or to decide whom among ten candidates to select for a fictional management position. In both instances, participants were given different roles accompanied with different objectives for the upcoming discussion.

After each exercise, participants filled in research-related questionnaires. At the end of the procedure, participants received an individualized feedback on their performance and were able to address any open questions.

Observers

Observers were graduate psychology students specialized in work and organizational psychology. As part of a two-term class in personnel selection, they learned about the theoretical background of personnel selection in one term and were employed as observers in

the second term. Prior to the selection procedure, observers underwent a two-day frame-of-reference training (Lievens, 2001; Roch, Woehr, Mishra, & Kieszczynska, 2012). During this training, observers updated their knowledge on frequent observer errors, grew familiar with the exercises and rating scales, and trained the process of observation until they arrived at a common understanding of the observed performance dimensions and rating scales.

During the actual procedures, observers worked in varying teams of two. They took extensive notes during the exercises in order to ensure appraisal quality and were instructed to restrain their communication with participants and among themselves to a minimum in order to avoid confounding effects. Both parties (participants and observers) were blind to the study's objectives. In Study 1, 23 (14 female) observers took part in the mock selection procedures with an average age of 26.78 (SD = 5.45) years.

Target Dimensions and Scoring

Following the feeling-thinking-power taxonomy (Kolk, Born, & van der Flier, 2004), We focused on the performance dimensions cooperation, planning, and leadership. These dimensions reflect three of the five most frequently assessed dimensions in personnel selection (Huffcutt, Conway, Roth, & Stone, 2001) and resemble three of Arthur, Day, McNelly, and Edens' (2003) criterion valid performance dimensions. For our purposes, cooperation included efficiently working with others, fostering a positive working atmosphere, appreciating and referring to the opinion of others, and putting oneself in somebody else's shoes. Planning included setting overall and interim goals, creating and using realistic schedules, and collecting and integrating information correctly. Finally, leadership included influencing and motivating others, delegating tasks, and taking responsibility.

Participants were evaluated on these dimensions during all exercises according to behavioral anchors on a scale from 1 (*poor performance*) to 5 (*outstanding performance*). Observers rated participant's performance individually and discussed results during their

observer conference after all exercises had been finished. Only in cases of a deviation of more than 1.5 points did observers consider changing their scores after intensive discussion with one another. As scores showed good interrater agreement (ICC (2,1) = .86 to .87), scores from the two observers were averaged. We then aggregated performance scores across the three performance dimensions (α = .78 to .89; cf. Moore et al., 2017).

Participants

The target group were, soon-to-be university graduates from a German university who were looking for a job or would soon do so. Participants were recruited through university mail, advertisements on the university's *Career Centre* homepage, notices on campus, and postings in social networks. In Study 1, 88 participants took part in the procedure. We excluded two participants from data analysis based on their response of 'strongly disagree' to the post-procedure question 'I perceived the assessment center to be realistic and behaved as in an actual selection setting' (cf., Schneider et al., 2015). Of the remaining 86 participants (46 women), 25.60% were completing their undergraduate studies, 65.10% held a university degree (bachelor's or master's) and 9.30% held a doctoral degree. On average, participants were 27.36 years old (*SD* = 5.46; range 18 – 48) and had studied for 7.76 semesters (*SD* = 3.87) in natural sciences (51.16%), business (30.23%), social sciences (13.95%) and law (3.49%). One participant did not indicate a study program.

Measures

All measures were assessed after each exercise.

Faking. Faking was assessed using the subscale 'Inventing' of Levashina and Campion's (2007) Interview Faking Behavior Scale. The subscale consisted of eight items, which ask participants to what extent they had exaggerated or made up things during the selection exercises. We adapted the wording of the items from 'interview' to 'exercise' to match the high-fidelity exercises, too. An example item is, "During that exercise, I claimed that I have skills that I do not have." (cf., Levashina & Campion, 2007, p. 1654). Answers

were given on a 5-point Likert scale from 1 (*to no extent*) to 5 (*to a very great extent*). Higher scores reflected a greater amount of faking. Alpha reliabilities ranged from α = .88 to .92.

Inauthenticity. Since there is currently no existing validated questionnaire on the feeling of inauthenticity that fits well to the context of personnel selection, we adapted items from two scales on inauthenticity during interactive service work. Participants should indicate on a 5-point Likert scale from 1 (*strongly disagree)* to 5 (*strongly agree*) to what extent they agreed to the following statements: "I felt I could not be myself during that exercise" (Erickson & Ritter, 2001), "I basically had to become a different person during that exercise", "I felt I could not express my true self during that exercise", "I felt most like myself during that exercise" (reversed coded), and "The way I acted during that exercise was very different from the way I usually act" (all others cf. Sloan, 2007, p. 309). High scores reflected a greater feeling of inauthenticity. The alpha reliabilities (α = .73 to .81) were similar to original scales (Erickson & Ritter, 2001; Sloan, 2007).

Distress. We assessed participant's distress with 20 items from the perceived stress questionnaire (Levenstein et al., 1993). An example item is „You felt tense during that exercise". Participants answered on a 5-point Likert scale from 1 (*never) to* 5 (*always*). Higher scores reflected a greater level of distress (α = .91 to .92).

Based on recommendations by Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, and Podsakoff (2003), the questionnaires were used in the reversed order as indicated in our model to reduce common-method bias. That is, we first assessed participants' distress, then their felt inauthenticity, and finally their reported faking.

Results

Preliminary analyses. Descriptives, internal consistencies, and correlations between study variables are shown in Table 2.1. Participants perceived the procedure to be realistic and behaved like in a real selection situation (scale from 1 = *do not agree* to 6 = *fully agree*; mean rating = 4.64, *SD* = 1.21). We tested whether each comparable two exercises resulted in

similar mean performance scores. We found no differences expect for the interview (Table 2.2) and thus additionally checked whether these significant mean differences had any effects on the strength of the relationships between study variables. As no such differences were found, we deem no further correction for the different exercises to be necessary (Table 2.3). Since comparisons of correlations between the two different high-fidelity exercises (role-play vs. group discussion) were all in the same direction and only significantly different for the faking—inauthenticity relationship (Table 2.4), we choose to aggregate the scores from the role-play and the group discussion to one overall high-fidelity score.

The total effect from faking on performance evaluations was neither significant for the interview (r = .004, p = .98) nor for high-fidelity exercises (r = −.04, p = .72), indicating that faking had no overall effect on performance.

We tested our hypotheses using path modeling. We choose to rely on manifest variables because of the small sample size. We tested our hypotheses using 'lavaan' for RStudio (Rosseel, 2012). Furthermore, we used bootstrapping (10,000 draws) to account for deviations from normality to test the indirect effects (Preacher & Hayes, 2008).

Hypotheses testing. The model fit very well with the data for the low- and high-fidelity exercises (Table 2.5). For details on path coefficients see Figure 2.2.

Hypothesis 1a proposed that applicants' reported faking is positively linked to their felt inauthenticity. In support of H1a, faking was positively linked to inauthenticity in both the low- (β = .41, p < .01) and high-fidelity exercises (β = .48, p < .01).

Hypothesis 1b proposed that inauthenticity mediates the relationship between faking and distress. In support of H1b, we found significant indirect effects for both the low- (b = .22, 95% CI [0.09; 0.37]) and high-fidelity exercises (b = .18, 95% CI [0.09; 0.29]).

Hypothesis 1c proposed that distress mediates the relationship between inauthenticity and performance, such that inauthenticity is positively linked to distress and distress is negatively linked to performance evaluations. In support of H1c, inauthenticity was positively

related to distress for both the low- (β = .61, $p < .01$) and high-fidelity exercises (β = .50, $p < .01$). Distress was in turn negatively related to performance evaluations for the low- (β = −.27, p =.01) and high-fidelity exercises (β = −.38, $p < .01$). Also, the indirect effects were significant for both exercise types (low: b = −.11, 95% CI [−0.20; −0.02]; high: b = −.16, 95% CI [−0.27; −0.07]). Additionally, the indirect effect for the double mediation from faking via inauthenticity and distress was significant for the low- (b = −.05; 95% CI [−0.13; −0.01]) and the high-fidelity exercises (b = −.09; 95% CI [−0.14; −0.04]). The direct effects from faking to performance evaluations were non-significant for both the low- (β = .06, p = .57) and high-fidelity exercises (β = .07, p = .51).

Hypothesis 2 proposed that the link between distress and performance evaluations is moderated by exercise type such that the link is more negative in high-fidelity exercises. We fitted a model including distress and performance evaluations from both exercise types in it (Figure 2.3). A model with free estimation of the path coefficients for the distress—performance link fit the data very well (Table 2.6). When we fixed the path coefficient for the relationship between distress and performance evaluations to be equal for low- and high-fidelity exercises, the resulting model showed a slight decrease in model fit (Table 2.6) as indicated by a marginally significant Chi-Square difference test ($\Delta\chi^2$= 2.97, p = .09) and a difference in the CFI of both models bigger than 0.01, which suggests a significant difference in model fit (Cheung & Rensvold, 2002). With regard to the size of the path coefficients (low: β = −.27; high: β = −.38) it seems that the effect of distress on performance evaluations in high-fidelity exercises is slightly stronger than the effect in the low-fidelity exercise. Overall, our results support H2.

Discussion

The goal of Study 1 was to test the assumption that faking might entail negative psychological consequences which might negatively influence applicants' performance evaluations (internal process). In line with our expectations, we found no direct positive

effects of faking, however strong negative indirect effects were transmitted via inauthenticity and distress. While significant in both exercise types, the negative effect of distress on performance appeared somewhat stronger in high-fidelity exercises. While these results are promising, we need further proof that (a) inauthenticity indeed arises from faking, rather than a feeling of inauthenticity possibly causing applicants to show or report more faking behavior, (b) results are truly caused by faking in general or just the specific subscale, inventing, that we had used in Study 1, and (c) the negative indirect effect on performance is indeed stronger for high-fidelity exercises. Accordingly, Study 2 aims to address these questions.

Study 2

The main aim of Study 2, run a year after Study 1, was to demonstrate that faking indeed induces the feeling of inauthenticity and thus to rule out reverse causation as an alternative possible explanation for the above results. We expected that inducing faking should lead to (a) higher reported scores on faking and (b) higher scores on inauthenticity. Further, Study 2 served to test whether results from Study 1 also held in selection settings that disclose the performance criteria to applicants (i.e., transparency), in line with recommendations to increase procedural fairness (Gilliland, 1993).

Setting and Design

We used a within-subject design including two conditions: In the morning (applicant condition), participants were informed about the performance dimensions without any further instructions, thus presenting a transparent selection procedure. In the afternoon (faking condition), we additionally induced faking by asking participants “try to appear as favorable as possible even though you may have to distort the truth to do so”. In order to enhance the testing atmosphere and to prevent contrast- or carry-over effects in observers across conditions, we changed the order of the exercises and rotated observers across participants between conditions. We used the same exercises as done in Study 1. After their individualized

feedback, participants were debriefed at the end of the procedure.

Participants

One hundred and eight participants took part in the procedure. We excluded two participants for the same reason described in Study 1. Of the remaining 106 participants (83 female), 38.68% were completing their undergraduate studies while 61.32% held a university degree (bachelor's or master's). On average, participants were 25.28 years old (*SD* = 3.47; range 18 – 36) and had studied for 5.34 semesters (*SD* = 3.40) in business (41.51%), natural sciences (30.19%), social sciences (24.53%), and law (3.78%).

Observers

Twenty-three (20 female; mean age = 25.30 years, *SD* = 2.07) graduate psychology students served as observers in this study, having undergone a comparable two-term training as observers in Study 1. Observers were blind to the experimental manipulation of the study.

Measures

All measures were assessed after each exercise.

Faking. Faking was assessed using a 17-items version of the Interview Faking Behavior Scale by Levashina and Campion (2007) as used in related studies (e.g., Ingold et al., 2014; Roulin et al., 2014) with similar adaptions to the items' wording as in Study 1. The measure included four subscales: Slight image creation (4 items); extensive image creation (5 items); deceptive ingratiation (4 items), and image protection (4 items). Participants answered on a 5-point Likert scale from 1 (*to no extent*) to 5 (*to a very great extent*). Higher scores reflected more faking. Since intercorrelations between different faking tactics were substantial (*r* = .24 to .80) and we could not consistently replicate the four-factor structure proposed by Levashina and Campion (2007), we choose to rely on an average faking score (α = .85 to .94).

Inauthenticity. We used the same measure as in Study 1 (α = .71 to .85).

Distress. We used the same measure as in Study 1 (α = .86 to .95).

Results

Preliminary analyses. Descriptives, internal consistencies, and correlations between study variables can be taken from Tables 2.7 and 2.8. Descriptives indicate that participants perceived the applicant condition to be realistic and behaved like in a real selection situation (scale from 1 = *do not agree* to 6 = *fully agree*; mean rating = 4.39, *SD* = 0.67). Expectedly, scores were lower for the faking condition (mean rating = 3.90, *SD* = 1.54).

As a manipulation check, we tested whether the faking manipulation indeed resulted in higher reported faking scores. The results of within-samples *t*-tests showed a significant increase of faking scores in the faking condition for the low- (*d* = 0.98) and high-fidelity exercises (*d* = 0.83; Table 2.9), we thus deem the manipulation to be successful.

Correlations showed that the total effect from faking on performance evaluations was neither significant for the low- ($r = -.07$, $p = .47$) nor for high-fidelity exercises ($r = -.14$, $p = .15$) in the applicant condition as well as for both exercises in the faking condition (low: $r = .15$, $p = .12$; high: $r = .03$, $p = .80$), indicating that faking had no overall effect on performance.

Hypotheses Testing. The primary goal of this study was to show that inauthenticity is caused by faking. Thus, we first tested whether the faking condition led to higher scores on inauthenticity. In line with expectations, results of a within-samples *t*-test showed a significant increase in inauthenticity scores in the faking condition (*d* = .69/.74; see Table 2.9).

For testing Hypothesis 1, we relied on the same approach as done for Study 1. In the applicant condition, the model fit the data very well for the low- and acceptably for high-fidelity exercises (Table 2.5). In the faking condition, both models fit the data very well (Table 2.5). For details on path coefficients see Figures 2.4 and 2.5.

Hypothesis 1a proposed that applicants' reported faking is positively linked to their felt inauthenticity. In support of H1a, faking was positively linked to inauthenticity in both the

low- (β = .21, *p* =.03) and high-fidelity exercises (β = .49, *p* < .01) in both the applicant and the faking condition (interview: β = .66, *p* < .01; high-fidelity: β = .50, *p* < .01).

Hypothesis 1b proposed that inauthenticity mediates the relationship between faking and distress. In support of H1b, we found significant indirect effects for both the low-, *b* = .18, 95% CI [0.02; 0.34], and high-fidelity exercises, *b* = .26, 95% CI [0.14; 0.39] in both the applicant and the faking condition (low: *b* = .30, 95% CI [0.19; 0.42]; high: *b* = .21, 95% CI [0.12; 0.32]).

Hypothesis 1c proposed that distress mediates the relationship between inauthenticity and performance, such that inauthenticity is positively linked to distress and distress is negatively linked to performance evaluations. In the applicant condition, inauthenticity was indeed positively linked to distress for both the low- (β = .66, *p* <.01) and high-fidelity exercises (β = .52, *p* <.01). Distress was in turn negatively linked to performance evaluations in high-fidelity exercises (β = −.26, *p* = .03), yet not for the low-fidelity exercise (β = −.01, *p* =.91). Accordingly, the indirect effect was significant for high-fidelity exercise (*b* = −.10, 95% CI [−0.20; −0.01]) and non-significant for the low-fidelity exercise (*b* = −.01, 95% CI [−0.10; 0.09]).

The faking condition yielded similar results: inauthenticity was positively linked to distress in the low- (β = .54, *p* <.01) and high-fidelity exercises (β = .53, *p* <.01). Distress was in turn negatively linked to and performance evaluations in high-fidelity exercises (β = −.26, *p* = .03), yet not in the low-fidelity exercise (β = −.04, *p* = .67). Accordingly, the indirect effect was significant for high-fidelity exercises (*b* = −.11, 95% CI [−0.21; −0.02]) and non-significant for the low-fidelity exercise (*b* = −.02, 95% CI [−0.09; 0.05]). Additionally, the indirect effect for the double mediation from faking via inauthenticity and distress on performance evaluations was significant for high-fidelity exercises in both the applicant (*b* = −.06, 95% CI [−0.14; −0.01]) and the faking condition (*b* = −.05, 95% CI [−0.11; −0.01]). Overall, results support H1c for high-fidelity exercises and not for

the low-fidelity exercise.

Hypothesis 2 proposed that the exercise type moderates the relationship between distress and performance evaluations, such that there is a stronger negative relationship in high-fidelity exercises. We used the same approach as outlined in Study 1. In the applicant condition, a model with free parameter estimation fit excellently to the data (Table 2.6). When we fixed the path coefficient between distress and performance to be equal, model fit decreased (Table 2.6). Accordingly, the model comparison showed a significant difference between both models, $\Delta\chi^2 = 4.50$, $p = .03$, and ΔCFI was bigger than 0.01 (Cheung & Rensvold, 2002).

The faking-condition yielded similar results. The model with freely estimated coefficients fit the data well. When we fixed path coefficients for the distress—performance link model fit significantly decreased (Table 2.6), which led to a marginally significant difference in the overall model fit, $\Delta\chi^2 = 3.26$, $p = .07$ and ΔCFI bigger than 0.01 (Cheung & Rensvold, 2002). Overall, these results support H2.

Discussion

The goal of Study 2 was to replicate and to extend findings from Study 1 to a broader range of faking behaviors and to ascertain that findings regarding participants' feelings of inauthenticity and impaired performance were indeed due to participants' faking, rather than the other way around. Results supported the notion that faking, here manipulated experimentally, caused a significant increase in applicants' feelings of inauthenticity. Study 2 replicated results regarding the relationship between inauthenticity, distress and performance evaluations and supported a negative indirect effect of faking on performance evaluations, especially in high-fidelity exercises. A handicap of both studies, however, particularly regarding the proposed moderation effect, is the studies' relatively small sample size and thus low statistical power. Furthermore, Study 1 and 2 both focused on the internal path only (Figure 2.1), whereas the external path still needs empirical examination.

Study 3

Setting and Design

The aim of Study 3 was to test the full model with a bigger sample. Since we found no systematic effect of the comparable exercises in the previous studies, we used only one version of the high-fidelity exercises for this Study. Interviews were still rotated. To be logistically able to increase the sample size, we ran two procedures per day—one in the morning and one in the afternoon.

Participants

In order to recruit a larger sample, we combined our regular recruitment efforts (see Study 1) with offering course credits to business students attending a specific lecture. A total of 295 participants took part in the procedures, five of whom were excluded from data analysis for the reason described in Study 1. Of the remaining 290 participants (184 female), 78.97% were completing their undergraduate studies, 18.30% held a university degree (bachelor's or master's), and one participant held a doctoral degree. Five participants did not indicate their educational status. On average, participants were 22.88 years old (*SD* = 2.71; range 18 – 35) and had studied for 4.99 semesters (*SD* = 1.95) in business (68.28%), social sciences (16.55%), natural sciences (14.83%), and law (0.34%). Two participants were no students and two others did not indicate their field of study.

Observers

Observers were 21 (16 female; mean age = 25.00 years, *SD* = 2.92) graduate psychology students, who had been trained the same way as in Studies 1 and 2.

Measures

In this study we reduced the number of items of the faking and the distress scale for two reasons. First, we needed shorter scales for testing more participants. Second, and more importantly, we tested shorter scales because we were given constraints regarding the number of items for the field study (Study 4). The following scales were assessed after each exercise.

Faking. Faking was assessed using the six items with the highest factor loadings, based on Studies 1 and 2, from the subscales slight image creation, extensive image creation, and ingratiation (2 items each). We excluded the subscale image protection because responses from Studies 1 and 2 showed that our exercises did not put participants in a defensive position—they rarely used this tactic. Answers had to be given on a 5-point Likert scale from 1 (*to no extent*) to 5 (*to a very great extent*). Higher scores represented more faking (α = .76 to .78).

Inauthenticity. We used the same measure as in Study 1 (α = .65 to .78).

Distress. Distress was assessed using the 15 items with the highest factor loadings from previous studies. Participants answered on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = *never*; 5 = *always*). Higher score indicated a greater level of distress (α = .87 to .93).

Competence. Following Cable and DeRue (2002), observers rated participants' competence on a 5-point Likert scale from 1 (*not at all)* to 5 (*completely)* on two items: "During this exercise, the applicant appeared competent to me" and "During this exercise the applicant impressed me with his/her competence.". Higher scores represented a stronger impression of participants' competence (α = .91 to .92).

Warmth (Likeability). We choose to assess observers' impression of applicants' likeability instead of warmth for two reasons. First, warmth and likeability are conceptually very similar (*r* = .61–74; Lemmink & Mattsson, 1998). Second, in the personnel selection context, likeability will arguably be more relevant than warmth because observers also judge how good an applicant might fit in a specific organization or team (Kristof-Brown et al., 2002). Thus, observers rated participants' likeability on two items adapted from the interpersonal liking scale (Nicholson, Compeau, & Sethi, 2001). On a 5-point Likert scale from 1 (*not at all*) to 5 (*completely*), observers answered to the items: "During this exercise the applicant appeared likeable to me." and "During this exercise I liked the applicant as much as other people I know.". Higher scores represented a stronger impression of

participants' likeability (α for all exercises = .94).

Results

Preliminary analyses. Descriptives, internal consistencies, and correlations between study variables are shown in Table 2.10. Descriptives indicate that participants perceived the procedure to be realistic and behaved like in a real selection situation (scale from 1 = *do not agree* to 6 = *fully agree*; mean rating = 4.76, *SD* = 1.21). As descriptives showed a significant effect of daytime on study variables, we included daytime as a control variable into further analyses.

Observers' impression of applicants' competence and likeability correlated highly with one another in both low- and high-fidelity exercises (r = .61/.88; p <. 01). Moreover, exploratory factor analyses revealed that items from both scales loaded on one common factor explaining 76.73% of the variance for the low-fidelity and 82.79% of the variance for high-fidelity exercises with factor loadings from .81 to .90 (see Table 2.11). For this reason, we combined scores for competence and likeability to an aggregated observer impression score.

The total effect from faking on performance evaluations was neither significant for the low- (r = .07, p = .22) nor for high-fidelity exercises (r = .02, p = .68), indicating that faking had no overall effect on performance.

Since we were primarily interested in the relationships between constructs and not between items, we used item-to-construct balance parceling (Little, Cunningham, Shahar, & Widaman, 2002). The small amount of randomly missing data ($\chi^2(31) = 26.15$, p = .71; Little, 1988) was modeled using the full information maximum likelihood method (Enders & Bandalos, 2001). Moreover, we used bootstrapping (10,000 draws) in order to account for deviations from normality when estimating the indirect effects (Preacher & Hayes, 2008).

Results of a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) supported the hypothesized five-factor model over a four-factor model with inauthenticity and distress loading on the same factor

(Table 2.10). Thus, we deem the construct validity of the current measures to be supported.

Hypothesis testing. Both structural models for low and high-fidelity exercises fit the data well (Table 2.12) and did not significantly deviate from the measurement models (low: $\Delta\chi^2 = 1.97$, $p = .58$; high: $\Delta\chi^2 = 5.77$, $p = .12$). For details on path coefficients see Figure 2.6. [1]

Hypothesis 1a proposed that applicants' reported faking is positively linked to their felt inauthenticity. In support of H1a, the model coefficients for the low- ($\beta = .44$, $p < .01$) and high-fidelity ($\beta = .36$, $p < .01$) exercises were significantly positive.

Hypothesis 1b proposed that inauthenticity mediates the relationship between faking and distress. In support of H1b, the indirect effects were significant for both the low- ($b = .40$, 95% CI [0.28;0.54]) and high-fidelity ($b = .21$, 95% CI [0.12;0.30]) exercises.

Hypothesis 1c proposed that distress mediates the relationship between inauthenticity and performance evaluations, such that inauthenticity is positively linked to distress and distress is negatively linked to performance evaluations. Indeed, inauthenticity was positively linked to distress for both the low- ($\beta = .70$, $p < .01$) and high-fidelity ($\beta = .64$, $p < .01$) exercises. However, the relationship between distress and performance evaluation was only significant for high-fidelity exercises ($\beta = -.15$, $p < .01$) but not for the low-fidelity exercise ($\beta = -.04$, $p = .51$). Accordingly, the indirect effect was only significant for high-fidelity exercises ($b = -.08$, 95% CI [−0.14; −0.03]) not for the low-fidelity exercise ($b = -.02$, 95% CI [−0.09; 0.04]). H1c was thus partially supported. Additionally, the double mediation from faking to performance evaluations via felt inauthenticity and distress was significant for high-fidelity exercises ($b = -.03$, 95% CI [−0.06; −0.01]).

Hypothesis 2 proposed that exercise type moderates the relationship between distress and performance evaluations, with a stronger negative relationship in high-fidelity exercises.

[1] To test whether the estimated relationships are robust, we estimated the final model with and without the control variable daytime. The inclusion of this control variable did not result in a significant change of model coefficients. We thus report model coefficients without control variables (cf., Spector & Brannick, 2011).

Using the same approach as for Studies 1 and 2, the model with free estimation of path coefficients fit the data acceptably (Table 2.6). When we fixed the path coefficients between distress and performance evaluations to be equal for high- and low-fidelity exercises, model fit significant decreased ($\Delta\chi^2 = 11.63$, $p < .01$), indicating a significant difference in the distress—performance relationship between low- and high-fidelity exercises. As path coefficients from our structural models indicate this relationship to be stronger for high-fidelity exercises ($\beta = -.15$, $p < .01$) than for low-fidelity exercises ($\beta = -.04$, $p = .51$), we deem H2 as supported.

Hypothesis 3 proposed that observers' impressions (competence and likeability) mediate the relationship between faking and performance evaluations. Results showed that observers' impressions were positively linked to performance evaluations for both the low- ($\beta = .48$, $p < .01$) and high-fidelity ($\beta = .60$, $p < .01$) exercises. Yet, faking was not significantly linked to observers' impressions. Accordingly, the indirect effects were non-significant for the low- ($b = .02$, 95% CI [−0.05; 0.09]) and high-fidelity ($b = .05$, 95% CI [−0.02; 0.12]) exercises. Thus, H3 was not supported.

Hypothesis 4 proposed that applicants' felt inauthenticity is negatively linked to observers' impressions of applicants' competence and likeability. The respective link was negative but non-significant for the low-fidelity exercise ($\beta = -.07$, $p = .41$), yet significant for high-fidelity exercises ($\beta = -.23$, $p < .01$; see Figure 2.6). Thus, H4 was partially supported.

Finally, the direct effect from faking to performance was positive for the low- ($\beta = .17$, $p < .01$) and non-significant for the high-fidelity exercises ($\beta = .05$, $p = .27$).

Discussion

The goal of Study 3 was to test the full model including the internal and the external path. Results for the internal path were mostly in line with our hypotheses, showing that faking can indeed have a negative effect on performance evaluations mediated through inauthenticity and distress. This effect was stronger for high-fidelity than for low-fidelity

exercises, supporting our notion that faking should be more detrimental in exercises that rely on actual behavior.

The results for the external path were not that straightforward, however. As applicants primarily fake to make a good impression (Levashina & Campion, 2006), we assumed that this should show in a positive link between faking and positive observer impressions (Chen & Lin, 2014). Yet, the results did not support this notion. Rather, observers' impressions were negatively influenced by applicants' felt inauthenticity, thus reinforcing the negative effect of faking in general. One potential explanation could be that while observers are usually unable to detect applicants' faking per se (Roulin et al., 2015), they may be impressible by applicants' affective state (Schneider et al., 2015), such as applicants' felt inauthenticity. Additionally, observers were extensively trained to accurately judge applicants' performance. We did, however, not train them to judge competence or likeability. Also, observers had only little time to make their judgements. Their impressions could thus be influenced by their focus on applicants' performance. Yet, the same should also be the case in actual practice. We further found a direct positive effect of faking on performance evaluations in the low-fidelity exercise. In conjunction with the results from the internal path that showed no significant effect of distress on performance evaluations for the low-fidelity exercise, it thus seems that faking might help in low- (e.g., interviews) but hurts in high-fidelity exercises (e.g., role-plays, group discussions).

Study 4

The objectives of Study 4 were to ensure the external validity of our results, to further clarify the effect of faking on observer impressions, and to ensure that the effects were not solely due to specific high-fidelity exercises (we used role-plays and group discussions in Studies 1 to 3). Thus, Study 4 tested the model in an actual selection setting.

Setting and Design

Data were collected with a Swiss outplacement firm using assessment centers to select applicants for further outplacement counselling. Up to 16 applicants took part in each assessment center, including among other tests and questionnaires a presentation exercise and a group discussion. The presentation exercise asked applicants to present themselves and to describe a situation in which they had encountered a conflict in the workplace and how they had dealt with this conflict. Applicants presented themselves in front of observers and a maximum of seven of their fellow applicants. For the group discussion, a maximum of eight applicants discussed a fictional company's marketing strategy of a product. They were given material in advance to prepare for the discussion.

Participants filled in our questionnaires online after each exercise. In order to reduce participant worries, all applicants received an email prior to the actual assessment center in which we explained that we are scientifically studying the effects of applicant behavior on affective reactions during personnel selection. Right before the actual assessment center, applicants were again explained that the questionnaires were research-related only and would not be considered for their personal evaluation. Participation was voluntarily, yet the response rate was very high (> 90%). Data were collected pseudonymously and submitted to us in such form that tracing back specific applicants was not possible. We were able to collect data from observers at the end of the assessment center. Thus, we used their impressions for both the presentation and the group discussion.

Participants

Applicants were 141 (28 female) recent lay-off victims from technical and managerial positions. Applicants were between 27 and 63 years old (M = 46.80, SD = 8.21).

Observers

Ten (8 female; mean age = 51.44 years, SD = 8.60) self-employed individuals served as observers for the assessment centers. The majority of them (7) had an educational

background in psychology while the others came from a law or management background. All had profound experience in personnel selection and received an in-depth frame-of-reference training for this specific procedure.

Target Dimensions and Scoring

Based on Arthur et al.'s (2003) criterion-valid assessment center dimensions, applicants were evaluated on three performance dimensions: interpersonal skills, initiative, and self-marketing. Interpersonal skills included showing interest in others, expressing own opinions and appreciating the opinions of others, an appreciative communication style, and active listening. Initiative included participating actively, showing presence in body language and communication style as well as being open to questions and answering them comprehensively. Self-marketing included building eye contact with interaction partners, a clear communication style, the ability to differentiate between own strengths and weaknesses, and a confident appearance. All dimensions were evaluated according to behavioral anchors on a scale from 1 (*poor performance*) to 4 (*outstanding performance*). The presentation assessed social skills and self-marketing and the group discussion assessed social skills and initiative. Performance dimensions were aggregated to one overall score for each exercise (α = .58 for the presentation and α =.81 for the group discussion).

Measures

Faking. Faking was assessed using the same six items as done in Study 3. Internal consistencies were α = .61 for the presentation and α = .63 for the group discussion.

Inauthenticity. We used the same measure as in Studies 1 to 3 (α = .72 for the presentation and α =.82 for the group discussion).

Distress. Distress was assessed using the six items with the highest factor loadings from the previous studies. Participants answered on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = *never*; 5 = *always*). Higher scores indicated a higher level of distress (presentation: α = .85; group discussion: α = .80)

Observer impression. Observers rated a general impression of applicants' competence and likeability at the end of the procedure. Observers rated the same items used for Study 3 (competence: $\alpha = .86$; likeability: $\alpha = .94$).

Results

Preliminary analyses. Descriptives, internal consistencies, and correlations of study variables are shown in Table 2.13. Descriptives indicated that the actual job applicants reported less faking, inauthenticity, and distress than participants in the mock settings. Still, there was enough variance to run data analysis.

The total effect from faking on performance evaluations was neither significant for the presentation ($r = .02$, $p = .85$) nor for the group discussion ($r = -.12$, $p = .15$), indicating that faking had no overall effect on performance in either exercise.

The small proportion of missing data were missing completely at random ($\chi^2(33) = 44.14$, $p = .09$; Little, 1988). Thus, we used the same analytical strategy as outlined in Study 3. CFA showed that the hypothesized five-factor model (i.e., faking, inauthenticity, distress, observer impression, and performance evaluation) fit the data good for the presentation and excellently for the group discussion and was superior over a four-factor model with inauthenticity and distress loading on the same factor (Table 2.11). Thus, we deem the construct validity of our measures to be supported.

Hypothesis testing. Both structural models for the presentation and the group discussion showed good fit with the data (Table 2.12) and did not significantly deviate from the measurement models (presentation: $\Delta\chi^2 = 6.17$, $p = .10$; group discussion: $\Delta\chi^2 = 4.24$, $p = .24$). For details on path coefficients see Figure 2.7.

Hypothesis 1a proposed that applicants' faking is positively linked to their felt inauthenticity. In support of H1a, the respective model coefficients were positive for both the presentation ($\beta = .38$, $p = .06$) and the group discussion ($\beta = .62$, $p < .01$).

Hypothesis 1b proposed that inauthenticity mediates the relationship between faking

and distress. In support of H1b, the indirect effects were significant for the presentation (b = .72, 95% CI [0.00; 1.32]) and the group discussion (b = .77, 95% CI [0.43; 1.38]).

Hypothesis 1c proposed that distress mediates the relationship between felt inauthenticity and performance evaluations. The negative link between distress and performance evaluations was non-significant for both the presentation (β = −.16, p = .11) and the group discussion (β = −.02, p =.88), also rendering the indirect effects non-significant (presentation: b = −.12, 95% CI [−0.30; 0.03]; group discussion: b = −.02, 95% CI [−0.24; 0.23]). Thus, results do thus not lend convincing support to H1c.

Hypothesis 2 proposed the effect of distress on performance evaluation to be stronger in high- compared to low-fidelity exercises. Since both exercises, presentation and group discussion, are high-fidelity exercises, we did not calculate this hypothesis for Study 4.

Hypothesis 3 proposed that observers' impression of applicants' competence and likeability mediates the relationship between faking and performance evaluations. Results showed that observers' impressions were positively linked to performance evaluations for the presentation (β = .35, p <.01) and the group discussion (β = .32, p <.01). Yet, faking was not significantly linked to observers' impressions. Accordingly, the indirect effects were non-significant for the presentation (b = −.04, 95% CI [−0.53; 0.10]) and the group discussion (b = −.15, 95% CI [−0.49; 0.08]). Results thus lend no support to H3.

Hypothesis 4 proposed a negative effect of applicants' felt inauthenticity on observers' impression of applicants' competence and likeability. Although the link was negative for both exercises, it was only marginally significant for the presentation (β = −.31, p =.06) and not significant for the group discussion (β = −.07, p =.64). Thus, H4 was partially supported.

General Discussion

This research developed and tested a dual-process model, which, based on notions from identity theory (Burke, 1991) and the SCM (Fiske, et al., 2002), aimed to explore the

effect of faking on performance evaluations in interactive selection procedures. We expected the effect of faking on performance evaluations to rely on two simultaneous processes: an internal process, proposing a negative influence on performance evaluations mediated by applicants' affective reactions, as suggested by identity theory (Burke, 1991) and an external process, proposing a positive influence on performance evaluations mediated by observer impressions, as suggested by the SCM (Fiske et al., 2002). Tables 2.14 summarizes our findings.

Results regarding the external path, which portrays the common assumption that faking increases applicants' performance evaluations (e.g., Levashina & Campion, 2007), were not as straightforward as expected. Although we found observers' impressions of competence and likeability to be positively related to performance evaluations (Chen & Lin, 2014; Kristof-Brown et al., 2002), faking had in turn no significant effect on observers' impressions. One explanation for this results is that we used highly structured selection procedures in all of our studies, which might generally limit applicants' opportunity to influence observers' impressions through faking (Levashina et al., 2014). As mentioned before, observers were only trained to accurately judge applicants' performance, not however, to judge their competence or likeability. Also, observers had only limited time to make their judgements. Their impressions could thus have been influenced by their focus on applicants' performance.

Results regarding the internal process across all four studies consistently showed that faking fosters applicants' feeling of inauthenticity. Not only does this result confirm notions from identity theory (Burke, 1991), it also extends findings from interactive service work (e.g., Grandey, 2003; Sloan, 2007) to the domain of personnel selection in showing that behavior that is incongruent to the self-concept can impair psychological wellbeing. The link between self-concept incongruent behavior and negative psychological consequences thus appears to be a general phenomenon that is not limited to faking emotions but also occurs

when faking job-related credentials during personnel selection.

We also found strong support for our assumption that feeling inauthentic increases applicants' distress, again extending findings from interactive service work (Boyraz et al., 2014) to the selection context. These findings offer a new perspective on applicant behavior, as they suggest that not only characteristics of the selection procedure can put a strain on applicants, but that applicants might experience negative affective consequences when faking.

The internal path of our model further proposed that faking might have a negative indirect effect on applicants' performance evaluations mediated through inauthenticity and distress. Across all four studies, we found some support for this proposition, such that distress was negatively related to applicants' performance evaluations. In the field study, however, results were not as strong as for the other studies. There are two potential reasons that might explain these different results. First, the exercises used in the field setting included more applicants than the exercises in the mock selection setting. In the mock selection setting, up to four applicants participated in one exercise (group discussion), whereas the field setting used exercises with up to eight applicants in it. In exercises with many applicants in it, the individual contribution of each applicant might arguably decrease and the chance to 'fly under the radar' might increase. In this case, a high distress level might not be that challenging compared to exercises in which constant participation is necessary, thus decreasing the negative effect of distress on performance evaluations. Second, the samples were considerably different. In our mock selection studies, we recruited younger participants close to the end of their studies, most of whom had little work experience beside the occasional student job. In contrast, the field study sample consisted of older and more experienced applicants, all of whom formerly held technical and managerial positions. For this reason, applicants in the field study might be more accustomed to functioning under distress and thus be less affected by it than less experienced applicants. In line with this assumption, personality psychology shows that emotional stability grows with age, as does resistance to stress (McCrae et al.,

1999). It might thus well be that our proposed negative indirect effect is stronger for younger applicants than for older applicants.

Moreover, results also imply that faking is more detrimental to applicants' performance evaluations in high-fidelity exercises (i.e., role-play, group discussion) than in low-fidelity exercises. This finding complements existing research with results from high-fidelity exercises and implies that faking might not uniformly lead to the same outcomes for different selection exercises. It rather seems that the higher the fidelity of selection procedures, the less beneficial faking might be. While results from faking in questionnaires attest consistent positive effects of faking (Griffith et al., 2007), results on the effects of faking in interviews are mixed (Levashina & Campion, 2007; Swider et al., 2011). Our results on faking in high-fidelity exercises suggest that rather than having a direct effect, here faking might have a twofold indirect negative effect on performance evaluations.

On the one hand, we found a negative indirect effect mediated via inauthenticity and distress on performance in high-fidelity exercises. On the other hand, we found that observers' impressions were negatively influenced by applicants' felt inauthenticity. It thus seems that the affective state applicants are in during the procedure shines through and makes an impression on observers (Schneider et al., 2015). As people are generally more reactive to negative stimuli (Rozin & Royzman, 2001; Skowronski & Carlston, 1989), observers could thus be stronger influenced by negative signals from applicants (i.e., applicants that appear to be not themselves) than by applicants' efforts to make a favorable impression (i.e., faking).

Overall, it seems that while positive effects of faking have often been assumed (Buehl & Melchers, 2017; Levashina & Campion, 2006), negative consequences of faking might actually override, particularly in high-fidelity exercises. Across four studies, we only found one significant positive effect of faking in low-fidelity exercises. All other direct effects were non-significant. In contrast, the indirect effects of faking were twofold negative. First, faking fostered negative affective reactions in applicants, which in turn decreased their

performance evaluations. Second, these negative affective reactions also lowered observers' impressions of applicants' competence and likeability, and thus indirectly impaired performance ratings as well.

Taken together, the results of our studies suggest that indeed two processes underlie the effect of faking on performance evaluations in interactive selection exercises. The two processes are, however, slightly different than expected. On the one hand, faking might directly positively influence performance evaluations rather than to be mediated by observer impressions. On the other hand, however, faking increases applicants felt inauthenticity, which both causes applicants' distress and impacts observers' impressions of applicants' competence and likeability, both of which influence performance evaluations. Based on these results, it thus seems that faking might rather hurt applicants than to help them.

Strengths and Limitations

In order to gather sensitive applicant data (faking, affective reactions) and to manipulate applicant behavior in a way that it would not be possible in an actual selection setting (i.e., faking manipulation), the first three studies relied on a mock selection paradigm that is well validated in personnel selection research (Klehe et al., 2014; Kleinmann, 1993). Yet, though we took several measures to ensure the realism of our setting and to motivate participants, it still was simulated. For this reason, it might be possible that participants were not as motivated or did behave differently than they would have done in an actual selection setting.

In order to increase the generalizability of our results, Study 4, is to our knowledge, the first of its kind to present field data on faking in high-fidelity exercises. By doing so, we aimed to validate the results from the mock selection studies and strengthen the overall informative value of our results. Yet, while advancing faking research overall, this study, too, comes with some limitations. For logistic reasons, we could only use very short scales, which might not have captured the constructs in their entirety. Additionally, observers filled in the

impression questionnaire only once, capturing a general impression of applicants' competence and likeability. Hence, their impressions might be stronger influenced by the last exercises that they saw the applicants in. However, in order to reduce this potential bias, we explicitly instructed observers to think of their general impression of the applicant. Moreover, we assessed observers' impression separately for low- and high-fidelity exercises in Study 3 with similar results.

Theoretical Implications

Our results also contribute to identity theory (Burke, 1991) and the SCM (e.g., Fiske et al., 2002). Identity theory proposes a mechanism that explains how self-concept incongruent behavior (e.g., faking) might lead to adverse psychological consequences, such as the feeling of inauthenticity or distress. Our results confirmed these notions, and above that, suggest that these adverse consequences are not only internally but might (a) be visible from the outside and (b) even impact behavioral outcomes (e.g., performance). Our findings show that people who feel inauthentic are evaluated as less competent and likeable from others. That is, the feeling of inauthenticity might shine through and thus have a negative impact on others. The feeling of inauthenticity might also trigger distress and thus compromise behavioral outcomes, such as performance. Taken together, our findings extend identity theory in that they show that self-concept incongruent behavior triggers adverse affective consequences, which are, however, no solely internal phenomena, but might influence others as well as behavioral outcomes.

In line with notions from the SCM (e.g., Fiske et al., 2002), we assumed that faking would influence observers impressions' of applicants' competence and likeability. Yet, contrary to our expectations, we did not find an effect of applicants faking, but rather a negative effect of applicants' felt inauthenticity, on observer impressions. It thus seems that the impression of a persons' competence and likeability is not only based on whether this person is indeed highly competent or likeable, but also by whether a person is perceived as

(in-)authentic (Moore et al., 2017). This expands the SCM by showing that internal processes of the opponent might also influence the impressions of others.

As both, notions from identity theory (Burke, 1991) and the SCM (e.g., Fiske et al., 2002), rely on basic mechanisms of human functioning and interaction (e.g., identity, interpersonal perception), our results might be translatable to other contexts, too. For instance, the underlying mechanisms and effects of phenomena, such as gender-nonconforming role-behavior (Brescoll, 2016) or the imposter syndrome (Sherman, 2013), which might also entail the feeling of inauthenticity, could potentially be studied using our proposed model.

Directions for Research and Practice

This study might give impulses for future research not only in the area of personnel selection, but also to other behaviors that are incongruent to the self-concept.

First, the current study looked at negative consequences of faking independent of individual characteristics. Yet, the relationship between faking and negative affective consequences might be moderated such that the effects are stronger for some people than for others. In particular, people scoring high on honesty-humility (Ashton & Lee, 2009) or self-verification striving (Swann, 1983), who naturally are less prone to insincere behavior, might be more strongly affected by the feeling of inauthenticity when faking. This phenomenon might not only allude to the personnel selection context, but might also appear in other contexts in which honest or self-verifying individuals show behavior that does not match their self-concept. For example, leadership might sometimes require individuals to show behavior that is incongruent to their self-concept in order to be efficient. Arguably, in this case we would expect a similar effect than for faking in the personnel selection context.

In the same vein, it would also make sense to study not only faking but also honest IM in order to further clarify whether the assumptions from Burke's identity model hold for both honest IM and faking. In particular, one would expect that faking (i.e., self-concept incongruence) increases applicants' feeling of inauthenticity whereas honest IM (i.e., self-

concept congruence) should not affect or even decrease applicants' feeling of inauthenticity.

Second, such feeling of inauthenticity might not only indirectly influence performance outcomes, but might also affect other outcomes, such as organizational attraction, acceptance of the procedure or willingness to accept a job offer. Since organizations usually strive to maximize applicants' acceptance of the procedure (Gilliland, 1993), it might be interesting to study whether applicant behavior itself can impair applicant reactions. So far, the focus of the justice and acceptance literature was to investigate how selection procedures should be designed in order to maximize applicants' acceptance or how personality traits might explain why some people react more (un-)favorably to some procedures than others (Schinkel, van Dierendonck, & Anderson, 2004). Our results, however, indicate that it might be useful to also acknowledge applicant behavior in order to ameliorate acceptance models and recommendations for practitioners. Additionally, results could also be translated to the work context. In this regard, it would be interesting to study whether applicants, who faked in order to get the job, also fake more when on the job and whether such faking does also increase inauthenticity and distress, thus potentially leading to negative consequences, such as lower performance or less job satisfaction in all day work.

Third, future research should shed more light on observers' impressions of applicants. In our studies, we looked at the two fundamental dimensions of social perception—competence and likeability (Cuddy et al., 2008), without truly finding a difference between these two. However, social perception might indeed be more complex and include other impressions, too (Schneider et al., 2015). For this reason, future research might include further impressions of applicants in order to disentangle the interplay between applicants faking and observers' impression of applicants. Additionally, it would also be reasonable to look at the relationships between specific faking tactics and respective observer impressions (e.g., ingratiation and likeability, etc.).

From a practical standpoint the implications are twofold. First, many practitioners fear

that applicants who fake might gain an unfair advantage over honest applicants (Griffith et al., 2007). Our results show that faking itself has for the most part no direct effect on applicants' performance evaluations. More so, faking entails also negative consequences which might negatively influence how applicants feel and perform. Second, the results could be used to make applicants aware that faking will not give them an advantage. Research showed that warnings against faking are somewhat effective in deterring applicants' from faking (Dwight & Donovan, 2003; McFarland, 2003). However, giving applicants a reason for *why* to refrain from faking might give such warnings more credibility and thus strengthen their effects.

Conclusion

This study asked whether faking helps or hurts applicants in interactive selection exercises. In order to answer this question, we tested a dual-process model to clarify *how* faking influences applicants' performance evaluations. The results from four comprehensive studies suggest that in low-fidelity exercises, faking might help applicants. However, in high-fidelity exercises, faking had a twofold negative effect on their performance. First, faking increased applicants' feeling of inauthenticity, which in turn triggered distress, which eventually lowered performance evaluations. Second, applicants' felt inauthenticity negatively influenced observers' impressions, thus lowering their performance, too. Taken together, we thus conclude that faking might help applicants in low-fidelity exercises, but hurts them in high-fidelity exercises.

Appendix Chapter 2



Figure 2.1 Proposed dual-process model of faking in interactive selection procedures.

Table 2.1

Study 1 Descriptives, Internal Consistencies, and Correlations for Study Variables

		1	2	3	4	5	6	*M*	*SD*
1.	Faking	(.92/.88)	.51**	.20	−.04	.01	−.09	1.78	0.71
2.	Inauthenticity	.41**	(.81/.75)	.48**	−.03	−.23*	−.12	2.42	0.74
3.	Distress	.28**	.59**	(.91/.92)	−.35**	−.09	−.12	2.31	0.53
4.	Performance evaluation	.00	−.05	−.29**	(.78/.86)	.03	.04	3.46	0.65
5.	Age	.11	.05	−.10	.13	–	.14	27.36	5.46
6.	Gender[a]	.19	−.11	−.27*	.01	.14	–	1.47	0.50
	M	1.59	2.19	2.69	3.21	27.36	1.47		
	SD	0.77	0.88	0.65	0.59	5.46	0.50		

Note. $N = 86$. Correlations below the diagonal for low-fidelity exercise, correlations above the diagonal for high-fidelity exercises. Means and standard deviations for low-fidelity exercise are presented in the vertical columns, and means and standard deviations for high-fidelity exercises are presented in the horizontal rows. First value in parenthesis for low-fidelity exercise, second value for high-fidelity exercises.

[a] Dichotomous variable: female = 1, male = 2.

*$p < .05$ **$p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 2.2

Comparison of Performance Scores Between Comparable Exercises (Study 1)

	Exercise 1		Exercise 2				95% CI		
Variable	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*t*(86)	*p*	*LL*	*UL*	*d*
Interview perf	3.04	0.63	3.37	0.50	−2.754[a]	.007	−0.583	−0.094	.59
Role-play perf	3.64	0.62	3.43	0.73	1.471	.145	−0.075	0.501	.32
Discussion perf	3.32	0.85	3.43	0.73	−0.659	.512	−0.451	0.227	.14

Note. n = 43 for both exercises; perf = performance *CI* = confidence interval, *LL* = lower limit, *UL* = upper limit.

[a] corrected df = 80.429 because of inhomogeneous variances.

Table 2.3

Comparison of Correlation Coefficients for Comparable Exercises (Study 1)

	Interview				Role Play				Group Discussion			
	1	2	*z*	*p*	1	2	*z*	*p*	1	2	*z*	*p*
Faking—inauthenticity	.456	.454	0.011	.496	.249	.413	−0.827	.204	.441	.595	−0.953	.170
Inauthenticity—distress	.613	.573	0.276	.391	.463	.427	0.201	.420	.501	.483	0.100	.460
Distress—performance	−.381	−.131	−1.205	.114	−.285	−.399	0.578	.281	−.290	−.231	−0.283	.389

Note. $N = 86$ for each exercise. 1 = first version of the respective exercise; 2 = second version of the respective exercise.

Table 2.4

Comparison of Relationship Strength Between High-Fidelity Exercises: Role-Play and Group Discussion (Study 1)

	Role-Play	Group Discussion	*z*	*p*
Faking—inauthenticity	.368	.526	−1.716	.043
Inauthenticity—distress	.410	.510	−1.094	.137
Distress—performance	−.318	−.249	−0.694	.244

Note. $N = 86$ for each exercise.

Table 2.5

Study 1 and Study 2 Fit Statistics

Model	χ^2	*df*	*p*	CFI	SRMR	RMSEA
Study 1						
Interview	2.62	2	.270	.990	.033	.059
High-fidelity	2.18	2	.337	.997	.031	.032
Study 2 (Applicant condition)						
Interview	2.31	2	.315	.995	.029	.038
High-fidelity	7.03	2	.030	.930	.052	.154
Study 2 (Faking condition)						
Interview	4.47	2	.107	.975	.035	.108
High-fidelity	1.98	2	.371	1.00	.028	.000

Note. $N_{\text{Study 1}} = 86$; $N_{\text{Study 2}} = 106$.

Table 2.6

Fit Statistics for Hypothesis 2 Across Studies 1 to 3

Model	χ^2	*df*	*p*	CFI	SRMR	RMSEA
Study 1						
Free parameters[a]	0.74	2	.690	1.00	.027	.000
Fixed parameters[b]	3.72	3	.294	.982	.055	.052
Study 2 (Applicant condition)						
Free parameters[a]	1.62	2	.445	1.00	.034	.000
Fixed parameters[b]	6.12	3	.106	.922	.062	.099
Study 2 (Faking condition)						
Free parameters[a]	2.25	2	.325	.997	.032	.034
Fixed parameters[b]	5.51	3	.138	.974	.049	.089
Study 3						
Free parameters[a]	107.19	18	< .01	.950	.038	.131
Fixed parameters[b]	118.81	19	< .01	.944	.060	.135

[a] = Model with free estimation of path coefficients for the distress—performance link; [b] = Model with path coefficients fixed to equal for the distress—performance link.



Figure 2.2 Study 1 path coefficients. First number for low-fidelity exercise, second number for high-fidelity exercises. Dashed line shows a path that has not been hypothesized but is especially informative.
*$p < .05$ **$p < .01$ (two-tailed).



Figure 2.3 Structural equation model to test Hypothesis 2. Link between distress and performance evaluations for low- and high-fidelity exercises was first estimated with free parameter estimation, then path coefficients were fixed to equal.

Table 2.7

Study 2 (Applicant Condition) Descriptives, Internal Consistencies, and Correlations for Study Variables

		1	2	3	4	5	6	*M*	*SD*
1.	Faking	(.89/.86)	.49**	.34**	−.14	−.15	.04	1.83	0.56
2.	Inauthenticity	.21*	(.75/.75)	.52**	−.33**	−.22*	.02	2.34	0.71
3.	Distress	.05	.66**	(.92/.90)	−.28**	−.19	−.17	2.18	0.58
4.	Performance evaluation	−.07	−.08	−.01	(.82/.85)	.03	.13	3.70	0.52
5.	Age	−.19	−.12	−.14	−.04	–	.11	25.28	3.47
6.	Gender[a]	.08	−.02	−.11	−.18	.11	–	1.22	0.41
	M	1.76	2.22	2.65	3.25	25.28	1.22		
	SD	0.55	0.78	0.73	0.61	3.47	0.41		

Note. $N = 106$, Correlations below the diagonal for low-fidelity exercise; Correlations above the diagonal for high-fidelity exercises. Means and standard deviations for low-fidelity exercise are presented in the vertical columns; means and standard deviations for high-fidelity exercises are presented in the horizontal rows. First value in parenthesis for low-fidelity exercise, second value for high-fidelity exercises.

[a] Dichotomous variable: female = 1, male = 2.

*$p < .05$ **$p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 2.8

Study 2 (Faking Condition) Descriptives, Internal Consistencies, and Correlations for Study Variables

		1	2	3	4	5	6	*M*	*SD*
1.	Faking	(.93/.94)	.50**	.36**	.03	−.11	−.02	2.42	0.80
2.	Inauthenticity	.66**	(.85/.79)	.53**	−.10	−.18	−.04	2.85	0.79
3.	Distress	.23*	.54**	(.95/.94)	−.22*	.01	−.11	2.30	0.65
4.	Performance evaluation	.15	.06	−.00	(.84/.88)	.13	.01	3.55	0.62
5.	Age	−.04	−.03	−.04	−.08	–	.11	25.28	3.47
6.	Gender[a]	−.09	−.06	−.13	−.13	.11	–	1.22	0.41
	M	2.53	2.86	2.55	3.19	25.28	1.22		
	SD	0.93	0.95	0.80	0.62	3.47	0.41		

Note. $N = 106$. Correlations below the diagonal for low-fidelity exercise, Correlations above the diagonal for high-fidelity exercises. Means and standard deviations for low-fidelity exercise are presented in the vertical columns; means and standard deviations for high-fidelity exercises are presented in the horizontal rows. First value in parenthesis for low-fidelity exercise, second value for high-fidelity exercises.

[a] Dichotomous variable: female = 1, male = 2.

*$p < .05$ **$p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 2.9

Comparison of Inauthenticity Scores from Applicant and Faking Condition (Study 2)

	Applicant		Faking				95% CI		
Faking	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*t*(105)	*p*	*LL*	*UL*	*d*
Interview	1.76	0.55	2.53	0.93	−8.43	< .01	−0.950	−0.588	0.98
High-Fidelity	1.83	0.56	2.42	0.80	−8.56	< .01	−0.729	−0.455	0.83
Inauthenticity									
Interview	2.22	0.78	2.86	0.95	−5.77	< .01	−0.865	−0.422	0.74
High-Fidelity	2.34	0.71	2.85	0.79	−5.84	< .01	−0.689	−0.340	0.69

Note. *N* = 106. *CI* = confidence interval, *LL* = lower limit, *UL* = upper limit.



Figure 2.4 Study 2 path coefficients for applicant condition. First number for low-fidelity exercise, second number for high-fidelity exercises. Dashed line shows a path that has not been hypothesized but is especially informative.
*$p < .05$ **$p < .01$ (two-tailed).



Figure 2.5 Study 2 path coefficients for faking condition. First number for low-fidelity exercise, second number for high-fidelity exercises. Dashed line shows a path that has not been hypothesized but is especially informative.
*$p < .05$ **$p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 2.10

Study 3 Descriptives, Internal Consistencies, and Correlations for Study Variables

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	*M*	*SD*
1.	Faking	(.76/.77)	.32**	.28**	.01	.02	.04	−.03	−.13*	2.09	0.66
2.	Inauthenticity	.25**	(.78/.71)	.53**	−.14*	−.14*	−.10	−.13*	−.15*	2.54	0.74
3.	Distress	.25**	.61**	(.91/.93)	−.21*	−.26**	.00	−.13*	−.02	2.05	0.60
4.	Observer impression	.06	−.05	−.06	(.90/.93)	.65**	−.03	.03	−.04	2.70	0.66
5.	Performance	.07	−.03	−.00	.46**	(.81/.85)	.01	.12*	−.07	3.57	0.56
6.	Age	.03	−.10	−.13*	−.06	−.02	–	−.03	.10	22.88	2.71
7.	Gender[a]	−.02	.01	−.10	−.03	.02	−.03	–	.00	1.37	0.48
8.	Daytime	−.14*	−.17**	−.23**	−.17**	−.24**	.10	.00	–	1.47	0.50
	M	2.03	2.22	2.40	2.59	2.99	22.88	1.37			
	SD	0.68	0.86	0.75	0.77	0.60	2.71	0.48			

Note. $N = 290$. Correlations below the diagonal for low-fidelity exercise; correlations above the diagonal for high-fidelity exercises. Means and standard deviations for the low-fidelity exercise are presented in the vertical columns, means and standard deviations for high-fidelity exercises are presented in the horizontal rows. First value in parenthesis for low-fidelity exercise, second value for high-fidelity exercises.

[a] Dichotomous variable: female = 1, male = 2.

*$p < .05$ **$p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 2.11

Factor Loadings of Competence and Likeability Items (Study 3)

Factor loading	Interview	High-fidelity
Competence Item 1	.842	.868
Competence Item 2	.814	.879
Likeability Item 1	.859	.900
Likeability Item 2	.807	.864

Table 2.12

Fit Statistics for Measurement and Structural Models Study 3 and 4

Model	χ^2	*df*	*p*	CFI	SRMR	RMSEA
Study 3 Low-Fidelity Exercise						
Measurement model	39.53	26	.043	.993	.024	.042
Four-Factor Model[a]	144.77	30	<.01	.942	.056	.115
Structural Model[b]	41.50	29	.062	.994	.026	.039
Study 3 High-Fidelity Exercises						
Measurement model	44.26	26	.014	.992	.025	.049
Four-Factor Model[a]	164.80	30	<.01	.944	.064	.124
Structural Model[b]	50.02	29	<.01	.991	.039	.050
Study 4 Presentation						
Measurement model	24.71	18	.133	.988	.035	.051
Four-Factor Model[a]	40.29	22	.010	.966	.048	.077
Structural Model[b]	30.88	21	.076	.982	.048	.058
Study 4 Group Discussion						
Measurement model	15.93	18	.597	1.00	.031	.000
Four-Factor Model[a]	62.15	22	<.01	.927	.050	.114
Structural Model[b]	20.17	21	.511	1.00	.036	.000

[a] = Model with inauthenticity and distress loading on the same factor; [b] = proposed five-factor model (Figure 1).



Figure 2.6 Study 3 standardized model coefficients. First number for low-, second number for high-fidelity exercises.
*$p < .05$ **$p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 2.13

Study 4 Descriptives, Internal Consistencies, and Correlations for Study Variables

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	*M*	*SD*
1. Faking	(.63/.61)	.27**	.17*	−.25**	.02	−.12	−.01	1.22	0.34
2. Inauthenticity	.45**	(.82/.72)	.64**	−.22**	−.19*	−.23**	−.31**	1.66	0.72
3. Distress	.31**	.61**	(.80/.85)	−.35**	−.22**	−.12	−.19*	2.04	0.70
4. Observer impression	−.30**	−.26**	−.25**	(.89)	.35**	−.02	−.08	3.52	0.82
5. Performance	−.12	−.22**	−.10	.31**	(.81/.58)	−.07	−.11	2.55	0.45
6. Age	−.16	−.15	−.14	−.02	−.06	−	.09	46.80	8.21
7. Gender[a]	.03	−.04	−.07	−.08	−.08	.09	−	1.80	0.40
M	1.40	1.55	1.90	3.52	2.73	46.80	1.80		
SD	0.46	0.66	0.63	0.82	0.65	8.21	0.40		

Note. $N = 141$. Correlations above the diagonal for presentation; correlations below the diagonal for group discussion. Means and standard deviations for presentation are presented in the vertical columns; means and standard deviations for the group discussion are presented in the horizontal rows. First value in parenthesis for group discussion, second value for presentation.

[a] Dichotomous variable: female = 1, male = 2.

*$p < .05$ **$p < .01$ (two-tailed).



Figure 2.7 Study 4 standardized model coefficients. First number for presentation second number for group discussion.
†$p < .10$ *$p < .05$ **$p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 2.14

Overview on Confirmation of Hypotheses for Low-and High-Fidelity Exercises

	Hypotheses											
	1a		1b		1c		2		3		4	
Study	low	high	low	high	low	high	low	high	low	high	low	high
1	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x				
2	x	x	x	x	o	x	x	x				
3	x	x	x	x	o	x	x	x	o	o	o	x
4		x		x		-				o		-

Note. Dark grey = hypothesis not tested in this study; x = supported, o = not supported, - = partially supported.

Chapter 3

'To show, or not to show … one's true self' -

Self-Verification and Inauthenticity as Predictors and Consequences of

Honest and Deceptive Impression Management

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Abstract

Applicants frequently use honest as well as deceptive impression management (IM) in personnel selection procedures. Research is only starting to compare both forms of IM in terms of predictors and consequences and has so far yet to study their occurrence and effects in more than just low-fidelity exercises (i.e., interviews). This study examines whether applicants' self-verification striving differentially predicts honest and deceptive IM and how both relate to applicants' experience of inauthenticity, distress, and their performance evaluations in low- and high-fidelity exercises. During an evaluated mock selection setting, including an interview and a role-play, we assessed participants' use of honest and deceptive IM as well as their felt inauthenticity and distress. We found that self-verification striving was negatively linked to deceptive IM. Furthermore, while honest IM decreased participants' felt inauthenticity and directly as well as indirectly increased their performance evaluations, deceptive IM increased participants' felt inauthenticity and indirectly decreased their performance evaluations. Thus, it appears that honest IM might help applicants, whereas deceptive IM might backfire during personnel selection.

'To show, or not to show … one's true self' - Self-Verification and Inauthenticity as Predictors and Consequences of Honest and Deceptive Impression Management

"We are all just actors trying to control and manage our public image, we act based on how others might see us."

—Erving Goffman, The presentation of self in everyday life, 1959

With this quote, Goffmann (1959) illustrates that people often act in order to convey a specific image toward others—the core of all *impression management* (IM) theories (Bolino, Kacmar, Turnley, & Gilstrap, 2008). In personnel selection, applicants are not only willing (Levashina & Campion, 2006; McFarland, Ryan, & Kriska, 2002), but recruiters even expect applicants to show their best behavior (Jansen, König, Stadelmann, & Kleinmann, 2012). In order to do so, many applicants use IM (e.g., Roulin, Bangerter, & Levashina, 2015) and might, for example, highlight their job-related experiences and competences or act overly polite, but they might also exaggerate, invent or lie. In other words, IM can be either honest or deceptive. As many applicants report to have not only used honest but also deceptive IM during selection (Duerr & Klehe, 2018; Levashina & Campion, 2007; Roulin et al., 2015), IM is a highly debated topic in selection research.

However, *self-verification theory* proposes that people strive to be seen by others as they see themselves (Swann, 1983). That is, individuals usually behave in a way through which they are most likely to receive feedback from others that confirms their own self-concept. Self-verification striving is a trait-like construct and thus varies across individuals such that some people strive more for self-verification than others (Cable & Kay, 2012). Yet, what happens in a situation that creates a dilemma between striving to show who you really are and wanting to present yourself in the best light possible?

Different theoretical models and empirical studies have explored predictors of IM use, such as personality traits, abilities, and situational factors (Bozeman & Kacmar, 1997;

Levashina & Campion, 2006; Roulin & Bourdage, 2017), and have studied the influence of IM use on performance outcomes during selection procedures (Klehe, Kleinmann, Nieß, & Grazi, 2014; Roulin et al., 2015; van Iddekinge, McFarland, & Raymark, 2007). Yet, most past research on IM has either not differentiated between honest and deceptive IM (e.g., Levashina, Hartwell, Morgeson, & Campion, 2014), has looked at only one form of IM (Kristof-Brown, Barrick, & Franke, 2002), and/or has focused on only one selection exercise (Tsai, Chen, & Chiu, 2005). Few studies looked at honest and deceptive IM simultaneously—even though a simultaneous consideration is pivotal for the conceptual and empirical differentiation of the constructs (Roulin et al., 2015; Roulin & Bourdage, 2017). Although theoretical models both for honest and deceptive IM propose predictors and consequences of IM (Bozeman & Kacmar, 1997; Levashina & Campion, 2006), it is unclear whether and how honest and deceptive IM relate to the same antecedents and outcomes. To address these issues, in the current study, we integrate notions from self-verification (Swan, 1983; 2012) and identity theory (Burke, 1991) and apply them to the personnel selection context.

While generally striving for coherence and predictability, individuals usually act in line with their self-concept (cf., self-verification). However, they might act against it when the requirements of the situation ask them to. Personnel selection is a situation that might tempt or even require applicants to show behavior that does not match their self-concept in order to increase their chances of getting hired (Levashina & Campion, 2007). In this context, IM might connect self-verification theory and identity theory, which in turn might give more insights into who will use specific IM tactics and how these tactics feed back into how applicants feel and perform in the respective situation. Thus, we expect applicants high on self-verification striving, who want to be seen and hired for who they really are (Moore, Lee, Kim, & Cable, 2017), to be more likely to rely on honest and less likely to rely on deceptive IM. Furthermore, in line with identity theory (Burke, 1991), we expect that unlike honest IM, deceptive IM might foster negative psychological consequences and might thus attenuate

potential positive effects that deceptive IM might otherwise have on performance. By integrating both theories, we aim to (a) explain why some people present themselves deceptively and others do not during selection and (b) how different IM tactics influence applicants' performance evaluations and why.

Taken together, the present study makes four main contributions. First, the study integrates self-verification theory and identity theory. While both these theories pertain to people acting in accordance to their true self, they have so far only been studied separately. With this study, we aim to gain a deeper understanding on how both theories relate to each other and how their coinciding assumptions can be combined. By using their notions in an applied setting, we will not only be able to answer questions related to personnel selection but also contribute to the theoretical advancement of both theories. Since IM is not only limited to the selection context and can in general be seen as self-concept (in-)congruent behavior, results will likely generalize to other contexts as well.

Second, the study looks at honest and deceptive IM simultaneously and thus helps to conceptually distinguish both constructs and to support the integration of both streams of research. This might prove pivotal for further theoretical work on honest and deceptive IM, but could also show which applicants are more likely to use which form of IM. From a practical standpoint, this differentiation might also prove important because deceptive IM potentially undermines the validity of selection decisions (Stewart, Darnold, Zimmerman, Parks, & Dustin, 2010) and can result in negative consequences for the workplace later on (i.e., poor performance, counterproductive work behavior; Donovan, Dwight, & Schneider, 2014; Peterson, Griffith, Isaacson, O'Connell, & Mangos, 2011).

Third, the study systematically explores the different IM types in low- (i.e., interview, evaluations rely on what applicants say they would or did do) and high-fidelity exercises (i.e., role-play, evaluations rely on what applicants actually do). We hope to yield more insight into positive and negative consequences of different IM tactics in different exercises.

This might, on the one hand, put into perspective the common assumption that IM generally helps applicants in selection and, on the other hand, also give guidance to practitioners as to how vulnerable commonly used low- and high-fidelity exercises are to the influence of IM. In turn, this may help to clarify whether and when to worry about applicants' IM use or not.

Fourth, the study gives a new perspective on IM use during personnel selection by examining applicants' affective reactions to their own behavior. So far, research on applicants' affective reactions is rare (Schinkel, van Vianen, & van Dierendonck, 2013) and, to our knowledge, only one study has addressed applicants' affective reactions to their own behavior in personnel selection (Sieverding, 2009). We thus shed more light on this understudied topic and may use affective reactions to potentially explain why honest and deceptive IM do not equally relate to performance outcomes. This could serve as a more in-depth explanation of the mixed results of IM during selection, and enriches IM theories in general. Figure 3.1 gives an overview of the proposed relationships.

Theoretical Background

Self-Verification Theory and Identity Theory

Based on self-consistency frameworks (e.g., Lecky, 1945; Festinger, 1957), self-verification theory proposes that individuals strive to be seen by others as they see themselves, regardless of whether they have a positive or negative self-view (Swann, 2012). Self-verifying feedback from others strengthens the individual self-concept and thus makes individuals perceive the world as more coherent and predictable. This in turn reduces the strain of having to prove oneself in every new situation.

In line with the theory, Swann, Pelham, and Krull (1989) as well as Swann, Stein-Seroussi, and Giesler (1992) found that, individuals preferred to interact with others who saw them in a similar way as they perceived themselves (positive or negative). More specifically, individuals with positive self-views preferred to interact with others who also perceived them as positive while individuals with negative self-views chose to interact with others who

perceived or evaluated them negatively. Likewise, individuals preferred college roommates and romantic partners whose perception of them matched their self-view (Swann, Bosson, & Pelham, 2002; Swann, Pelham, & Chidester, 1988).

Yet, individuals also differ in the strength of their self-verification striving. Cable and Kay (2012) found variance across individuals' tendency to self-verify during organizational entry. A strong tendency to self-verify was linked to higher job satisfaction and organizational commitment. Moreover, Moore et al. (2017) found that during job search, individuals high on self-verification striving were more likely to be recommended for a job than those low on self-verification striving. All in all, these results indicate that self-verification striving seems to be a trait-like characteristic (Cable & Kay, 2012) that might influence applicant responses and their success during personnel selection.

Yet, not only self-verification theory proposes that individuals strive for coherence and predictability and thus act in accordance with their understanding of who they are. Likewise, Burke's (1991) identity model proposes that individuals usually act in accordance to their self-concept in order to avoid negative psychological consequences. In particular, the model proposes an internal process that constantly compares one's demonstrated behavior to one's inherent self-concept. Behavior that does not match the self-concept increases the feeling of inauthenticity (Sloan, 2007), that is, the feeling of not being true to oneself (Kernis & Goldman, 2006), and thus causes psychological strain.

Although both theories have similar underlying thoughts, they have only been studied separately so far. With regard to the personnel selection context, however, an integration of both theories might prove valuable in order to study predictors and consequences of honest and deceptive IM in further depth.

Honest and Deceptive Impression Management

Applicants often put a lot of effort into creating, maintaining or protecting the image they want to convey during selection procedures (Bolino et al., 2008). Such behavior is called

IM and is frequently used in low-fidelity (Levashina & Campion, 2007; McFarland et al., 2002; Roulin et al., 2015) and high-fidelity exercises (Duerr & Klehe, 2018; Klehe et al., 2014; Kleinmann & Klehe, 2010). IM tactics can either rely on the truth (i.e., honest IM) or be deceptive (i.e., deceptive IM).

Honest IM. Honest IM serves to create, maintain or protect a desired image without being deceptive (Levashina & Campion, 2007) and possibly even without being overly intentional (Peeters & Lievens, 2006). In this, honest IM can be assertive (i.e., create a desired image) or defensive (i.e., protect a desired image). Assertive honest IM tactics can be self-focused, aiming to create an image of competence or respect (Godfrey, Jones, & Lord, 1986), for instance by emphasizing personal strengths or highlighting past accomplishments (i.e., self-promotion). Assertive honest IM can also be other-focused, aiming to foster interpersonal liking, for instance by complementing or conforming to recruiters' opinions (i.e., ingratiation). Defensive honest IM tactics aim to reactively protect a desired image by means of apologies, excuses, and justification (Bolino et al., 2008).

Deceptive IM. In contrast, deceptive IM tactics, also called faking, are intentional and misleading (Levashina & Campion, 2007). They, too, can be classified into assertive versus defensive. Assertive deceptive IM tactics include slight image creation (i.e., to overdo the image of a good applicant), extensive image creation (i.e., to invent an image of a good applicant), and deceptive ingratiation (i.e., to appear a more likeable or same-minded applicant than one considers oneself to be). Defensive deceptive IM is labelled image protection and aims to defend an image of a good applicant by means of omission, dissociation, and disguise. These tactics vary in their extent of deceptiveness such that some tactics are less dishonest (e.g., slight image creation) than others (e.g., extensive image creation; Levashina & Campion, 2007).

Currently, two views exist on the link between honest and deceptive IM. On the one hand, they have been described on a continuum ranging from honest self-presentation tactics

to outright lies about job-related credentials (Buehl, Melchers, Macan, & Kühnel, 2019). On the other hand, they have been described as two separate constructs (Roulin & Bourdage, 2017) that may well come from different intentions (honest vs. deceptive presentation), but show in very similar behaviors that are difficult to distinguish from an outside perspective. Accordingly, Roulin et al. (2015) showed that when asked to tell when and whether applicants are using honest and/or deceptive IM, interviewers fail to detect and differentiate between applicants' honest and deceptive IM. Similarly, the relationship between self-reported IM and external ratings of this IM is usually rather small ($r < .34$; Roulin et al., 2015). Since both types of IM aim to increase applicants' chances of getting hired (Marcus, 2009) and thus show in a similar set of observable behaviors, we propose that:

Hypothesis 1: Honest and deceptive IM are positively related.

Self-Verification Striving as Antecedent of IM

Applicants' personal characteristics influence their choice of and intention behind IM. Roulin and Bourdage (2017) showed that honest and deceptive IM relate differently to dimensions on the HEXACO model and the dark triad: Whereas deceptive IM was negatively related to conscientiousness and Honesty-Humility and positively with psychopathy, Machiavellianism, and narcissism, none of these personality traits related to honest IM.

During personnel selection, applicants with a strong tendency to self-verify aim to be hired for who they really are (Moore et al., 2017) and thus should be more willing to create an image that reflects their true strengths and weaknesses (i.e., honest IM). Individuals with a low tendency to self-verify on the other hand, should be less interested in creating an accurate image of themselves, but rather strive to meet the requirements of the situation (i.e., to present themselves favorably), even if it comes at the cost of having to deceive. Thus, they should be more prone to use deceptive IM. We therefore propose:

Hypothesis 2a: Self-verification striving is positively related to honest IM.

Hypothesis 2b: Self-verification striving is negatively related to deceptive IM.

Identity Theory and Consequences of IM

Most studies on IM during personnel selection have addressed the relationship between IM and performance evaluations. Though the common assumption is that IM helps applicants during selection, empirical results are mixed (Buehl et al., 2019; Swider, Barrick, Harris, & Stoverink, 2011). In the light of identity theory, one aspect that has received little research attention but might be crucial, is applicants' affective reaction to IM use. Burke's (1991) identity theory gives some insights into how behavior that is (in-)congruent with a person's self-concept influences their affective state. These notions might be translatable to honest (self-concept congruent) and deceptive (self-concept incongruent) IM and suggest that both types of IM relate differently to affective and performance outcomes.

Affective reactions to IM. In costumer-related occupations, employees are often required to express specific emotions (e.g., politeness, costumer-orientation). In such instances, employees can either change their inner feelings in order to sincerely express the required emotion (i.e., deep acting) or they might disguise their true emotions by faking the required emotional display (i.e., surface acting; Grandey, 2003). These two strategies to express emotions can be perceived as self-concept congruent (deep acting) or as self-concept incongruent behavior (surface acting), and closely resemble honest and deceptive IM. If honest and deceptive IM, indeed, represent self-concept (in-)congruent behaviors, they should, according to identity theory, lead to different psychological consequences.

Several studies suggest that showing behavior incongruent to the own self-concept leads to negative psychological consequences, such as the feeling of inauthenticity (Erickson & Ritter, 2001), emotional exhaustion (Grandey, 2003) or decreased life-satisfaction (Boyraz, Waits, & Felix, 2014). In contrast, behavior that is congruent with the own self-concept might decrease one's sense of inauthenticity (Sloan, 2007). For this reason, we assume that the use of honest IM decreases applicants' felt inauthenticity whereas deceptive IM increases it. Taken together, we therefore propose:

Hypothesis 3a: Honest IM is negatively related to felt inauthenticity.

Hypothesis 3b: Deceptive IM is positively related to felt inauthenticity.

Performance evaluations. The influence of applicants' IM on performance outcomes has been studied extensively—with two major shortcomings. First, honest and deceptive IM are often not conclusively distinguished (Klehe et al., 2014). Second, existing studies mostly addressed IM in low-fidelity exercises (e.g., interviews) while much less is known about the relationship between IM and performance in high-fidelity exercises (e.g., role-plays) even though high-fidelity exercises are also commonly used for selection purposes (Eurich, Krause, Cigularov, & Thornton, 2009). For this reason, it is still unclear whether the relationship between honest and deceptive IM and performance holds across different selection exercises.

Honest IM. Various studies attest a positive link between honest IM and performance evaluations in interviews (e.g., Chen & Lin, 2014; Ellis, West, Ryan, & DeShon, 2002; Kacmar & Carlson, 1999; Kacmar, Delery, & Ferris, 1992; Kleinmann & Klehe, 2010; Kristof-Brown et al., 2002; McFarland, Ryan, & Kriska, 2003; Stevens & Kristof, 1995). Results for high-fidelity exercises point in the same direction, yet are not that consistent (Klehe et al., 2014; McFarland et al., 2003). The positive effect of honest IM on performance evaluations has conceptually been explained through positive observer impressions. While self-promotion should arguably help applicants to convincingly convey their qualities toward observers, other-focused honest IM tactics should increase the perceived similarity between applicants and observers and thus increase interpersonal liking. In fact, observers' impressions of applicants' fit and likeability mediated the relationship between honest IM and performance evaluations (Chen & Lin, 2014; Kristof-Brown et al., 2002). Hence, we propose:

Hypothesis 4: Honest IM is positively related to performance evaluations.

Deceptive IM. Empirical evidence for the link between deceptive IM and performance evaluations is still sparse: few studies examined this relationship, and these studies solely focused on interviews, overlooking high-fidelity exercises. Additionally, the existing studies

come to inconclusive findings as some studies found a positive link between deceptive IM and performance evaluations (e.g., Buehl et al., 2019; Levashina & Campion, 2007), while others found none (Buehl & Melchers, 2017, Study 1; Roulin, Bangerter, & Levashina, 2014; Roulin & Powell, 2018) or even a negative relationship (Swider et al., 2011). So far, it is thus not clear whether deceptive IM relates (positively vs. negatively) to performance.

Furthermore, existing studies have only addressed main effects of deceptive IM on performance. As the mixed results mentioned above attest, the processes connecting deceptive IM and performance may be too intricate to capture with such an overall approach. Instead of only focusing on the main effect of deceptive IM on performance, we suggest that at least parts of such a relationship may be due to an indirect effect mediated through applicants' affective reactions to deceptive IM use. Drawing on the aforementioned identity theory (Burke, 1991), inauthenticity, which might arise from using deceptive IM, strongly predicts various negative psychological consequences (e.g., Holman, Martinez-Inigo, & Totterdell, 2008; Wharton, 1999), most prominently psychological distress (Sloan, 2007). Distress in turn might lower individual's performance (Grandey, 2003). Indeed, coping with distress requires cognitive effort, thereby depleting cognitive resources to spare for the task itself and thus eventually deteriorating performance (DePaulo et al., 2003). Therefore, we propose:

> *Hypothesis 5:* Distress mediates the relationship between felt inauthenticity and performance evaluations such that inauthenticity is positively related to distress and distress is in turn negatively related to performance evaluations.

Method

Setting and Design

Data were collected in summer 2018 as part of mock *assessment centers* (ACs) for university students and graduates who were currently looking for a job—an established paradigm in personnel selection research (cf., Ingold, Kleinmann, König, & Melchers, 2016;

Klehe et al., 2014). The ACs were set up to select trainees from all kinds of academic backgrounds applying to a fictional organization. In order to participate in one of the 27 half-day ACs, participants signed up online and completed an online survey before the actual AC. Two ACs were run per day: one in the morning and one in the afternoon for six to twelve participants each.

During the procedure, participants completed two frequently used and well-established selection exercises: an interview[2] and a role-play (Spychalski, Quinones, Gaugler, & Pohley, 1997). Not only are these exercises commonly used in actual selection procedures, they are also representative for low (interview) and high-fidelity (role-play) exercises. In order to avoid effects of daytime, we rotated the different interview types from morning to afternoon across the different procedures. Role-plays were conducted between two participants.

In order to ensure participants' motivation, we only invited people that had filled in the online survey and handed in a résumé prior to the AC. Participants were asked to dress in business attire. To additionally motivate participants, we offered an individualized feedback at the end of the procedure and gave out a cash prize of €25 for the participant with the highest performance evaluation in each AC.

Procedure

The ACs were run on weekends at a German university. Both ACs followed the same schedule: After a short introduction on what to expect from the AC, participants underwent the interview and after that the role-play, each directly followed by short research-related questionnaires asking participants about their self-report on honest and deceptive IM, inauthenticity, and distress. We made sure to emphasize that the questionnaires were research-related only and independent of their performance evaluations in order to avoid participants'

[2] Approximately half of the participants underwent a structured interview consisting of 12 questions (6 behavior descriptive, 6 situational). The other half underwent a holistic interview based on life stories McAdams (2001) including 10 questions.

response distortion. Additionally, participants answered different selection-related questionnaires (e.g., personality) and completed a cognitive test in the course of the AC. In the end, all participants received feedback by one of the observers.

Observers

Twenty-seven (21 female, M_{age} = 24.61, *SD* = 2.50) master's level students specialized in work and organizational psychology served as observers for the ACs. After a thorough theoretical training on personnel selection, they received an in-depth two-day frame-of-reference observer training in which they grew familiar with the exercises, the scoring system, but also refreshed their knowledge about frequent observer errors and appropriate observer behavior (Lievens, 2001). Observers were blind to the purpose of this research.

Target Dimensions and Scoring

Based on the feeling-thinking-power taxonomy (Kolk, Born, & van der Flier, 2004), performance was evaluated on the dimensions cooperation, planning, and leadership. Cooperation was defined as the ability to efficiently work with others, to maintain a positive working atmosphere, to appreciate and refer to the opinion of others, and to put oneself into somebody else's shoes. Planning was defined as the ability to set goals and interim goals, to create and use realistic schedules, and to collect and integrate information well. Finally, leadership was defined as the ability to influence and motivate others, to delegate tasks, and to take responsibility. These dimensions were evaluated in both exercises on a scale from 1 (*poor performance*) to 5 (*outstanding performance*). For the structured interview, we used behavior anchored rating scales, that is, observers were given example answers that are worth a scoring of 1 (*poor answer*), 3 (*average answer*) or 5 (*outstanding answer*). For the holistic interview approach as well as for the role-play, evaluations were made on different behavioral anchors reflecting high versus low scores on the respective dimension. Observers were instructed to extensively take notes in order to ensure evaluation quality.

According to the four-eye principle, observers worked in changing teams of two to evaluate the same participants. After both exercises, observers compared their scores. Only in case of a deviation of more than 1.5 points did they discuss and potentially change scores. Given the satisfying interrater agreement (average r = .88 for the interview, average r = .85 for the role-play, Table 3.2), we aggregated scores across both observers. We further aggregated the performance dimension scores to one overall score per exercise (α = .76 to .88).

Participants

Participants were recruited through postings on campus, on the website of the university's *Career Centre,* in social media and through university mail. Business students were eligible to get course credits for their participation. Overall, 227 people participated in the ACs. One person did not finish the AC and was thus excluded from further analyses. The remaining 226 participants (147 female) were between 19 and 38 years old (M = 22.96, SD = 3.27) and had studied for an average of five semesters (SD = 3.07) mainly in business (79.65%) and natural sciences (13.00%). The majority of them (65.14%) worked besides their studies. 17.26% had already experiences with ACs.

Measures

All scales were translated into German from the original. In order to ensure the content of the items, we used the common translation-retranslation procedure (Brislin, 1970).

Self-verification striving. Participants indicated their level of self-verification striving on an 8-item scale from Cable and Kay (2012) asking participants for example "When looking for a job, I work hard to find a place where people will accept me for who I am". Answers had to be given on a 7-point Likert scale from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*). Higher scores represent a greater level of self-verification striving. In order to reduce potential demand effects, the scale was, among other questionnaires, conducted online several weeks before the actual AC (α = .77).

Honest IM. We used a 10-item scale adapted from Bourdage, Roulin, and Tarraf (2018) measuring self-promotion (4 items), honest ingratiation (3 items), and honest defensive IM (3 items). We replaced the word 'interviewer' by 'observer' in order to make the items fit also to the role-play. Participants had to answer on a 5-point Likert scale from 1 (*to no extent*) to 5 (*to a very great extent*) to items such as "I emphasized the values and goals I share with the organization." (honest ingratiation). Higher scores represent a greater amount of honest IM. The questionnaire was used after both exercises (α = .84/.88[3]).

Deceptive IM. We used a shortened version of the Interview Faking Behavior Scale (Levashina & Campion, 2007), used similarly in earlier research (e.g., Ingold, Kleinmann, König, & Melchers, 2014; Roulin et al., 2015), measuring slight image creation (4 items, α = .74/.81), extensive image creation (5 items, α = .88/.89), deceptive ingratiation (3 items, α = .85/.82), and image protection (4 items, α = .86/.89). We replaced the word 'interview' by 'exercises' and 'answer' by 'behavior' in order to make the items fit also to the role-play. An example item is "During the last exercise, I distorted my behavior based on the comments or reactions of the observers." (slight image creation). Answers had to be given on a 5-point Likert scale from 1 (*to no extent*) to 5 (*to a very great extent*). Higher scores represent a greater amount of deceptive IM. The questionnaire was used after both exercises. Since intercorrelations between deceptive IM dimensions were high (*r* = .50 to .79) and we did not find a clear factor structure of the subdimensions, we aggregated them to an overall faking score (α = .92/.93).

Inauthenticity. Since the concept of inauthenticity is new to the selection context, there is currently no validated questionnaire on the feeling of inauthenticity that fits well to personnel selection. For this reason, we combined items from two scales on inauthenticity during interactive service work: we used the scale from Sloan (2007), adding one item from

[3] First number in parenthesis for internal consistency in the interview (low-fidelity), second number for internal consistency in the role-play (high-fidelity).

Erickson and Wharton (1997) to create a 5-item scale that matches the personnel selection context. An example item is "During that exercise I could not be myself". Answers had to be given on a 5-point Likert scale from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*). Higher scores represent a greater feeling of inauthenticity. The scale was assessed after both exercises (α = .75/.74).

Distress. We used a shortened version of the perceived stress questionnaire by Levenstein et al. (1993). The 15 items included statements such as "During the last exercise, I felt tense" and measured participants' stress perception on a scale from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*). Higher scores represent a greater feeling of distress during the last exercise. The scale was used after both exercises (α = .92 /.91).

Following recommendations of Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, and Podsakoff (2003) in order to reduce common method bias, the questionnaires were assessed in reversed order as indicated in our study model. That is, we first asked participants about their distress perception, then their experienced inauthenticity, and finally their IM.

Results

Preliminary Analyses/Analytical Strategy

Table 3.1 presents means, standard deviations, and correlations between study variables.

To test our hypotheses, we conducted structural equation modeling (SEM) with lavaan for RStudio (Rosseel, 2012). The very small proportion of non-systematically missing data ($\chi^2(78) = 77.67$, $p = .49$; Little, 1988) was modeled using full information maximum likelihood (Enders & Bandalos, 2001). Furthermore, we used bootstrapping (10,000 draws) to account for deviations from normality to test the indirect effects (Preacher & Hayes, 2008).

First, we conducted confirmatory factor analysis to evaluate the construct validity of our measures. Because we were interested in relationships between constructs, we used item-to-balance-parceling (Little, Cunningham, Shahar, & Widaman, 2002). Results are

summarized in Table 3.3 and show that the proposed six-factor measurement model (i.e., honest IM, deceptive IM, self-verification, inauthenticity, distress, and performance) showed good fit to the data for the low- and high-fidelity exercise. This model was superior to alternative models, such as a five-factor model with honest and deceptive IM loading on the same factor or a five-factor model with inauthenticity and distress loading on the same factor. Thus, the results support the construct validity of our measures.

Hypotheses Testing

The structural models for the low- and the high-fidelity exercise showed good fit with the data (Table 3.3) and did not significantly deviate from the measurement models (low: $\Delta\chi^2 = 9.55$, $p = .15$; high: $\Delta\chi^2 = 9.31$, $p = .16$). Model coefficients are shown in Figures 3.2 and 3.3.

Hypothesis 1 proposed that honest and deceptive IM are positively related. In line with H1, honest and deceptive IM were positively related in both the low- ($\beta = .41$, $p < .01$) and the high-fidelity exercise ($\beta = .60$, $p < .01$).

Hypothesis 2a proposed that self-verification striving is positively related to honest IM. Self-verification striving and honest IM showed a marginally significant positive link in the low-fidelity exercise ($\beta = .14$, $p = .09$) but were non-related in the high-fidelity exercise ($\beta = .05$, $p = .53$). Thus, support for H2a is rather weak.

Hypothesis 2b proposed that self-verification striving is negatively related to deceptive IM. In line with H2b, self-verification striving was negatively related to deceptive IM in the low- ($\beta = -.28$, $p < .01$) and high-fidelity exercise ($\beta = -.21$, $p < .01$).

Hypothesis 3a proposed that honest IM is negatively related to felt inauthenticity. In line with H3a, honest IM was negatively related to felt inauthenticity in both the low- ($\beta = -.32$, $p < .01$) and the high-fidelity exercise ($\beta = -.29$, $p < .01$).

Hypothesis 3b proposed that deceptive IM is positively related to felt inauthenticity. In line with H3b, deceptive IM was positively related to felt inauthenticity in both the low- (β = .59, $p < .01$) and the high-fidelity exercise (β = .64, $p < .01$).

Hypothesis 4 proposed that honest IM is positively linked to performance evaluations. In line with H4, honest IM was positively related to performance evaluations in the low- (β = .25, $p = < .01$) and the high-fidelity exercise (β = .28, $p < .01$).[4]

Hypothesis 5 proposed that distress mediates the relationship between felt inauthenticity and performance such that inauthenticity is positively related to distress and distress is negatively related to performance evaluations. In line with H5, inauthenticity was significantly related to distress in the low- (β = .74, $p < .01$) and the high-fidelity exercise (β = .52, $p < .01$). Yet, distress was not significantly related to performance evaluations in the low- (β = .08, $p = .28$), but in the high-fidelity exercise (β = −.22, $p < .01$). Accordingly, the indirect effect was not significant for the low- ($b = .06$, 95% CI [−0.04; 0.15]) and significant for the high-fidelity exercise ($b = −.10$, 95% CI [−0.19; −0.04]). Additionally, the double mediation from deceptive IM via felt inauthenticity and distress on performance evaluations was significant for the high-fidelity exercise, too ($b = −.08$, 95% CI [−0.14; −0.03]), indicating that the more participants engaged in deceptive IM, the more inauthenticity and thus distress they experienced, which in turn related to a lower performance evaluation by observers. The direct effect of deceptive IM on the performance evaluation was negative yet marginally significant for the low- (β = −.15, $p = .09$) and not significant for the high-fidelity exercise (β = −.14, $p = .17$). Overall, H5 was thus partially supported.

[4] Given earlier findings by McFarland, Yun, Harold, Viera, and Moore (2005) on possible differences in results depending on performance dimensions, we also tested the relationship for the non-aggregated performance dimensions. Results did not significantly differ for all three performance dimensions.

Additional Analyses

We additionally calculated the indirect effect from honest IM on performance evaluations mediated via inauthenticity and distress. The indirect effect was not significant for the low-fidelity exercise (b = −.02, 95% CI [−0.06; 0.02]), yet was significantly positive for the high-fidelity exercise (b = .03, 95% CI [0.01; 0.06]).

Moreover, in order to rule out common method bias to account for found relationships between both forms of IM, inauthenticity, and distress, we tested how much variance was shared between the self-report variables. In order to do so, we included an additional latent factor in our structural models and let all items parcels load on it. Results showed that 5.95% of the variance were shared between the self-report variables.

Discussion

This study integrated self-verification theory and identity theory to explore predictors and consequences of honest and deceptive IM. In particular, we proposed that individuals high on self-verification striving would use more honest and less deceptive IM. While honest IM should decrease applicants' felt inauthenticity and increase their performance evaluations, deceptive IM should increase applicants' felt inauthenticity and indirectly decrease their performance evaluations, mediated via inauthenticity and distress.

Indeed, self-verification striving was negatively related to deceptive IM, a finding complementary to existing research on individual antecedents of IM (Roulin & Bourdage, 2017). Yet, self-verification striving was not significantly related to honest IM. Although contrary to self-verification theory and our expectations, this finding resembles results from Roulin and Bourdage (2017), who also did not find any effects of related personality variables (e.g., Honesty-Humility) on honest IM. Our findings thus support their claim that honest IM might have a smaller dispositional basis than deceptive IM and thus might be stronger

influenced by situational factors, such as different question types or the behavior of the observers (Roulin & Bourdage, 2017).

Furthermore, these results support earlier research that honest and deceptive IM are separate constructs (Bourdage et al., 2018) that nonetheless are positively interrelated—possibly due to both forms of IM implying some rather similar behaviors (albeit with different intentions) and a common willingness to place oneself into the spotlight.

In line with this, honest and deceptive IM were differently linked to applicants' felt inauthenticity. More specifically, honest IM decreased applicants' felt inauthenticity while deceptive IM increased it. This supports notions from identity theory, such that honest IM can be seen as self-concept congruent whereas deceptive IM seems to be self-concept incongruent behavior, which thus disrupts the identity process and leads to negative psychological consequences (Burke, 1991). In sum, these findings imply that honest self-presentation might decrease negative affective reactions in applicants while deceptive self-presentation increases them.

Applicants who felt more inauthentic in turn reported higher levels of distress, irrespective of the exercise. Distress in turn was negatively related to performance evaluations in the high-fidelity, yet not in the low-fidelity exercise. The explanation for this might be the higher demands that high-fidelity exercises lay on applicants, compared to low-fidelity exercises. High-fidelity exercises require applicants not only to report a possible behavior, but to show it (Lievens & DeSoete, 2012). Further, they are both less familiar to most applicants than low-fidelity exercises and are also less predictable (McFarland et al., 2003): Rather than moving from one well-circumscribed scenario to the next as in most structured interviews, high-fidelity exercises present dynamic interactions that require applicants to react spontaneously to changing situations and demands arising from the interaction with their counterpart. Faced with these higher demands, applicants likely have fewer resources left to spare for coping with additional distress from feeling inauthentic in high-fidelity exercises.

In addition, honest IM was not only directly positively linked to performance evaluations in the low- and high-fidelity exercise, it also indirectly through lower inauthenticity and distress increased performance in the high-fidelity exercise. In other words, the positive effect of honest IM on performance evaluations was twofold: Not only did it pay off in terms of directly convincing observers of one's suitability, it also made participants feel more at ease, which in itself was rewarded by better evaluations.

With this, the indirect effects of honest and deceptive IM seem to rely on the same mechanism, though varying in direction. Both the direct and the indirect paths tested in this study may be useful in order to clarify why honest IM has consistently shown positive effects on performance evaluations (e.g., McFarland et al., 2003), while the results for deceptive IM are inconsistent (e.g., Roulin et al., 2015). In particular, our results suggest that not only IM behavior itself influences applicants' performance evaluations, but, affective reactions might contribute to a performance in- or decrement, too.

Taken together, our results therefore shed more light on (a) how self-verification influences applicants' choice of IM, (b) the consequences honest and deceptive IM entail, and (c) the process underlying the effects of honest and deceptive IM on performance evaluations.

Theoretical Implications

This study combined self-verification theory (Swann, 1983, 2012) and identity theory (Burke, 1991) to study predictors and consequences of honest and deceptive IM in low- and high-fidelity selection exercises. Our results might not only contribute to further understanding of applicant behavior, but might also advance the underlying theories themselves.

Results show that self-verification theory is not only useful for explaining phenomena in private (Swann et al., 1992; Swann et al., 2002) and organizational contexts (Cable & Kay, 2012), but is also applicable to the personnel selection context in order to help explain why

some applicants rely more on honest or deceptive IM than others. Thereby, our findings suggest that self-verification striving might influence peoples' behavior in different contexts.

Moreover, our results suggest that IM, especially deceptive IM, might link self-verification theory to identity theory. More specifically, IM might be the behavioral mechanism through which the tendency to self-verify is expressed. In other words, applicants' tendency to self-verify might lead them to refrain from using deceptive IM.

Different IM tactics in turn seem to trigger different affective reactions, such that honest IM, a self-concept congruent behavior, decreases applicants' felt inauthenticity, whereas deceptive IM, a self-concept incongruent behavior, increase it. These results support the notion from identity theory (Burke, 1991) that self-concept incongruent behavior (deceptive IM) may indeed disrupt the identity process and thus leads to negative psychological consequences.

Our results might, however, extend the theory in two ways. First, Burke's (1991) theory proposes an identity process, which explains negative affective consequences through self-concept incongruent behavior. That is, every time a person acts against his/her self-concept negative affective consequences may arise. The theory further assumes that people usually act in line with their self-concept (cf. self-verification theory) and therefore implies no specific effects of self-concept congruent behavior (honest IM) on the identity process. Expanding on this, our results show that in a situation that challenges whether to present oneself honestly (i.e., self-concept congruent behavior; honest IM) or ideally (i.e., self-concept incongruent behavior; deceptive IM), self-concept congruent behavior (honest IM) might indeed decrease negative affective reactions. This adds to identity theory in that it shows that not only self-concept incongruent behavior might have effects on peoples' affective state, but also self-concept congruent behavior can influence how people feel, especially in situations that tempt people to present themselves dishonestly.

Second, although identity theory acknowledges that negative psychological consequences may cause people to change their behavior in the long-run, it does not assume any short-term effects on performance outcomes. Thus, our results extend the theory, by showing that the disruption of the identity process entails not only internal consequences (affective reactions), but have also implications for peoples' short-term behavior (e.g., performance).

Furthermore, our results contribute to the literature on IM as they suggest that honest IM might not only have the often proposed direct positive effect on applicants' performance (e.g., McFarland et al., 2002), but reduces applicants' felt inauthenticity and distress. A reduced level of distress, in turn, not only feels better for applicants, but might also foster their performance evaluations. In other words, the process behind the effect of honest IM on performance evaluations might be twofold—a positive direct as well as indirect effect. Furthermore, results suggest that deceptive IM might not, as often proposed, positively influence applicants' performance evaluations, rather it might entail negative psychological consequences which might eventually attenuate performance evaluations. In other words, applicants, who use deceptive IM might feel bad with it and thus perform worse, especially in exercises that rely on actual behavior (high-fidelity exercises). Taken together, our results suggest that IM is indeed related to applicants' affective reactions which in turn might influence performance outcomes—a perspective that is new to IM research. Thus, further IM research might benefit from including affective reactions into their models, also because such constructs might enable a better understanding of the process underlying the effect of IM on performance evaluations.

Practical Implications

Our results also bear three practical implications. First, the results refute the common assumption and the related fear of practitioners that applicants who use deceptive IM in the selection process might gain an unfair advantage over others and are thus more likely to be

selected. Rather, our results show that deceptive IM might backfire, particularly in a high-fidelity simulation. In particular, we found that deceptive IM had no significant direct but a significant negative indirect effect on applicants' performance evaluations. However, irrespective of whether deceptive IM increases or decreases applicants' performance evaluation, it still compromises the initial goal of personnel selection to get an accurate account about applicants' qualifications (Roulin & Powell, 2018). For this reason, practitioners might want to ensure in the first place that applicants refrain from using deceptive IM. While research has already found some measures to potentially reduce applicants' dishonesty (e.g., warnings against faking; McFarland, 2003), it might also help to emphasize personnel selection as a mutual process during which disguising one's true self might have more negative than positive consequences.

Second, the results show that the positive effect of honest IM might be twofold. On the one hand, observers might reward applicants that honestly present their skills and abilities with higher performance evaluations. On the other hand, presenting own qualities honestly during the selection procedure might decrease applicants' felt inauthenticity and thus help them to cope with the tasks faced during the procedure, in turn further increasing their performance. For this reason, practitioners might want to consider using measures to stimulate applicants' honest self-presentation. One such measure can be taken from the notions of signaling theory, which proposes that building trust is pivotal for an honest selection process (Bangerter, Roulin, & König, 2012). In order to do so, organizations might want to give an honest account about strength and weaknesses that come with working in a specific job (i.e., realistic job preview; Phillips, 1998). Applicants might then reciprocate this trust by presenting themselves honestly.

Third, a recommendation often given to applicants before undergoing a selection procedure is to become aware of own skills, abilities, and other desirable characteristics. Our results might explain why this might indeed be a good advice to applicants. On the one hand,

applicants that are aware of their own credentials might be more able to honestly report about them/show them, which should be awarded with good performance evaluations. On the other hand, knowing about own strengths and honestly reporting about them/showing them might make applicants feel less stressed and thus be additionally beneficial for their performance evaluation.

Strengths and Limitations

Though we deem this study to be carefully designed and conducted, there are some limitations. Although a well-validated paradigm in IM research (e.g., Ingold et al., 2014; Klehe et al., 2014) that comes with several advantages such as access to sensitive applicant data and possibilities to control and manipulate several parameters, the mock selection setting has some downsides, too. The selection procedure was simulated and participants might thus not have been as motivated as for a real selection setting. Yet, we used several measures to ensure participants motivation: we targeted students and graduates intending to prepare for actual job applications and only invited participants who had filled in an online questionnaire and submitted their résumé in advance. Furthermore, we asked participants to dress in business attire and treated them like job applicants throughout the procedure. Also, we offered individualized performance feedback and a cash prize to further increase participants' motivation to do well in the procedure. Regarding the mock selection setting, we further want to mention that most of our participants were students, which might limit the generalizability of my results to well-educated applicants in the early stages of their careers. However, most participants were working besides their studies and thus not completely new to the personnel selection context. All in all, we thus deem our setting to not have compromised our results.

Additionally, we relied on self-report measures for most constructs. This might lead to a discussion about common method bias (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). However, given that honest and deceptive IM differ primarily in their intention, which, like feelings of inauthenticity and distress, are not reliably visible from the outside, these

constructs can only be accurately judged by applicants themselves. For this reason, we deem the self-report measures to be appropriate in our case (Conway & Lance, 2010). Additionally, just around 6% of the variance was shared between the self-report variables, and common method bias cannot explain the diverging results obtained for honest versus deceptive IM.

Directions for Future Research

This study offers various ideas for potential follow-up research projects. The present study has looked at self-verification as a predictor of and affective as well as performance outcomes of IM use. What has not been taken into consideration, however, is applicants' capacity to fake. As different studies come to mixed conclusions regarding the IM, especially the deceptive IM—performance link, scholars propose that applicants holding certain characteristics might use IM more successfully than others. For instance, IM may be especially successful if applicants possess sound social skills (Levashina & Campion, 2006), are able to accurately discern the relevant performance dimensions (Buehl et al., 2019), have no remorse telling lies (i.e., score high on psychopathy; Roulin, Krings, & Binggeli, 2016) or are particularly intelligent (Levashina, Morgeson, & Campion, 2009). Yet, what has not been studied in existing research is whether the use of specific IM tactics may interact with stable characteristics. For example, it might be interesting to study whether applicants with a strong tendency to self-verify are not only prone to use more honest IM, but are also more successful with it or whether applicants with a weak tendency to self-verify are more successful using deceptive IM—just because the chosen IM tactic matches their personality.

Most IM research has either focused on the prediction of IM with individual or situational variables (e.g., Bolino et al., 2008) or on whether IM relates to performance outcomes (Klehe et al., 2014). However, the process as to why these constructs are linked is for the most part unknown. For this reason, IM research might benefit from adopting a process-perspective in order to shed more light on the mediating mechanisms (Levashina et al., 2014). In our study, we included applicants' affective reactions (inauthenticity, distress) in

order to clarify how honest and deceptive IM differently relate to performance evaluations—a first step to unravel the process underlying the effect of IM on applicants' performance. As individuals often make judgements based on their (negative) feelings (Barsky & Kaplan, 2007), applicants' affective reactions could also be used in order to explain other phenomena, such as applicant reactions or applicants' inclination to accept or decline a job offer.

Conclusion

This study asked the question whether 'to show or not to show one's true self' during personnel selection. By integrating self-verification theory and identity theory, we found that applicants high on self-verification striving were less likely to use deceptive IM. Deceptive IM in turn increased applicants' felt inauthenticity while honest IM decreased it. Furthermore, deceptive IM was indirectly negatively linked to applicants' performance evaluations via inauthenticity and distress whereas honest IM was directly as well as indirectly positively linked to performance evaluations. Our findings suggest that applicants' affective reactions might be valuable in explaining how IM affects performance outcomes. In sum, it seems that showing one's true self might be beneficial for applicants in the selection process, while disguising one's true self might backfire.

Appendix Chapter 3

Table 3.1

Descriptives, Internal Consistencies and Correlations for Study Variables

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	*M*	*SD*
1	Self-verification	(.77)	.05	−.19**	−.10	−.14*	.08	.07	−.04	5.30	0.75
2	Honest IM	.14*	(.84/.88)	.53**	.04	.07	.17**	−.01	.16*	2.50	0.70
3	Deceptive IM	−.24**	.26**	(.92/.93)	.37**	.37**	−.04	−.02	.13	1.91	0.60
4	Inauthenticity	−.07	−.13	.45**	(.75/.74)	.43**	−.18**	.01	−.01	2.46	0.71
5	Distress	.01	−.09	.36**	.66**	(.92/.91)	−.24**	.10	−.11	2.25	0.65
6	Performance	.08	.21**	−.02	−.10	.01	−	.15*	.05	3.35	0.64
7	Age	.07	.09	−.01	03	.14*	.06	−	.11	22.96	3.27
8	Gender[a]	−.04	.11	.03	−.10	−.11	−.11	.11	−	1.35	0.48
	M	5.30	2.69	1.68	2.18	2.40	3.37	22.96	1.35		
	SD	0.75	0.70	0.50	0.75	0.69	0.64	3.27	0.48		

Note. $N = 226$. Values below the diagonal for interview, values above the diagonal for role-play. Numbers in parenthesis = internal consistency; first value for interview, second value for role-play.

[a] Dichotomous variable for gender: female = 1, male = 2.

*$p < .05$ **$p < .01$ (two-tailed).



Figure 3.1 Overview of proposed relationships.



Figure 3.2 Path coefficients for the low-fidelity exercise.



Figure 3.3 Path coefficients for the high-fidelity exercise.

Table 3.2

Interrater Reliability for Performance Evaluations in the Low- and High-fidelity Exercise

	Cooperation	Planning	Leadership	Average
Interview	.88	.91	.85	.88
Role-Play	.81	.86	.87	.85

Note. $N = 21$. Intraclass correlation (2,1).

Table 3.3

Fit Statistics for Measurement and Structural Models

Model	χ^2	*df*	*p*	CFI	SRMR	RMSEA
Interview						
Measurement model	174.49	90	<.01	.964	.052	.064
Five-Factor model[a]	569.19	95	<.01	.800	.125	.149
Five-Factor model[b]	270.33	95	<.01	.926	.065	.090
Structural model	184.04	96	<.01	.963	.061	.064
Role-Play						
Measurement model	163.43	90	<.01	.971	.038	.060
Five-Factor model[a]	583.10	95	<.01	.805	.098	.151
Five-Factor model[b]	252.17	95	<.01	.937	.062	.086
Structural model	172.74	96	<.01	.969	.053	.059

Note. $N = 226$. [a] = Model with honest and deceptive IM loading on the same factor; [b] = Model with inauthenticity and distress loading on the same factor.

General Discussion

Faking is a highly debated topic in personnel selection not only because applicants do it (e.g., Levashina & Campion, 2007), but also because existing research showed that faking might negatively influence selection quality (i.e., rank ordering of applicants, validity; Marcus, 2006; Stewart, Darnold, Zimmerman, Parks, & Dustin, 2010) and eventual work outcomes (e.g., Donovan, Dwight, & Schneider, 2014). While much research has been done on faking in questionnaires (e.g., McFarland & Ryan, 2000) and interviews (e.g., Roulin, Bangerter, & Levashina, 2014), far less is known about predictors and consequences of faking in high-fidelity exercises. Additionally, the process underlying the effects of faking on applicants' performance evaluations in interactive selection procedures (including low- and high-fidelity exercises) is so far unclear. For this reason, this dissertation focused on three main objectives: (1) test how much faking occurs in selection exercises varying in fidelity and identify potential predictors of faking in those exercises, (2) test a faking model aiming to explain the processes underlying the effect of faking on performance evaluations, and (3) identify differential predictors and consequences of faking and honest IM.

I addressed these objectives in six studies independent studies. The study described in Chapter 1 used the theory of planned behavior (TPB) to predict faking in low- versus high-fidelity exercises (Objective 1). The four studies described in Chapter 2 extensively tested a faking model on the processes underlying the faking—performance relationship (Objective 2). Finally, the study described in Chapter 3 tested self-verification as a predictor and felt inauthenticity, distress, and performance evaluations as potential consequences of honest IM and faking (Objective 3).

All six studies consistently showed that in line with research on deception in daily life (DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer, & Epstein, 1996) and research on honest IM (Klehe, Kleinmann, Nieß, & Grazi, 2014; McFarland, Ryan, & Kriska, 2003), faking seems not to be limited to low-fidelity exercises, but applicants also report to fake in high-fidelity exercises

(e.g., role-play, group discussion). Furthermore, the study presented in Chapter 1 suggests that two of the components of the TPB (attitude and perceived behavioral control; PBC) predict applicants' intention to fake in both the low- and high-fidelity exercises. In other words, the way applicants think about faking (attitude) and whether they think they are able to fake successfully (PBC) shape whether applicants intend to fake during low- and high-fidelity exercises. Yet, applicants' intention to fake predicted self-reported faking only in the low-fidelity exercise (i.e., interview), not in high-fidelity exercises. Thus, faking appears to be as much of an issue in high-fidelity exercises (e.g., role-plays and group-discussions) as it is in low-fidelity exercises (e.g., interviews). The only difference that I found at this stage was that applicants' intention to fake predicts self-reported faking only in the low-fidelity exercise and not in high-fidelity exercises.

Consequently, it seems that while faking intentions can easily be put into practice in low-fidelity exercises, it is not that straightforward in high-fidelity exercises. A potential explanation is the set-up of low- and high-fidelity exercises: Low-fidelity exercises ask applicants to say how they did or would behave in a job-related situation (e.g., Latham, Saari, Purseel, & Campion, 1980; Motowidlo et al., 1992). High-fidelity exercises, however, require applicants to show actual behavior in reaction such situations (Lievens & DeSoete, 2012). As such, high-fidelity exercises are much more complex, interactive, and less predictable than low-fidelity exercises. Therefore, faking intentions might be easier put into practice in interviews because applicants (a) are more familiar with such situation (McFarland et al., 2003), (b) might be able to plan and prepare faking because they know what to expect from such situations, and (c) might have more resources to spare in order to think about how to present themselves in the most favorable way. In contrast, high-fidelity exercises might diminish applicants' possibilities to put intended faking into practice, while also offering unforeseen possibilities to fake due to the ongoing social interaction. Taken together, it appears that faking in low-fidelity exercises is largely a matter of applicants' pre-exercise

intentions to fake, while faking in high-fidelity exercises seems to happen more as a reaction to the requirements of the actual situation.

These results tie in with results from Chapter 2, which studied the underlying mechanism of the link between faking and performance evaluations based on notions from identity theory (Burke, 1991) and the stereotype content model (SCM; e.g., Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002). Indeed, the results indicate that not only faking itself (Chapter 1), but also the effects of faking on performance evaluations might be different in low- versus high-fidelity exercises. More specifically, across four studies, as well as the reported study in Chapter 3, I found that faking increases applicants' felt inauthenticity and distress. Distress in turn negatively influenced applicants' performance evaluations in high-fidelity exercises only, while performance evaluations in low-fidelity exercises were not significantly affected by applicants' distress.

With regard to the results of Chapter 1, it thus seems that interview faking, which applicants might have thought of or even planned before the actual procedure, might be less detrimental to applicants' performance evaluations than faking in high-fidelity exercises. The characteristics of low- and high-fidelity exercises might contribute to this effect. As aforementioned, scholars have argued that high-fidelity exercises are more demanding and use up more cognitive capacities than do low-fidelity exercises (McFarland et al., 2003). One could thus argue that applicants in high-fidelity exercises are left with fewer resources to spare for coping with additional distress arising from the feeling of inauthenticity than in low-fidelity exercises. Furthermore, using these fewer resources in order to handle additional distress may take away applicants' resources to spend on the task itself and thus contribute to the performance decrement through faking in high-fidelity exercises. Furthermore, one might argue that because interview faking is largely a matter of putting faking intentions into practice (Chapter 1), it might still increase inauthenticity and distress but this distress might be less detrimental because it is mainly about putting pre-planned behavior into practice. In

contrast, in high-fidelity exercises, applicants might fake even more due to situational requirements and, thus, might be less prepared for faking (which itself should be harder than putting faking intentions into practice) and also be more susceptible for feeling inauthentic and distressed, which therefore has a stronger negative effect in high-fidelity exercises.

In addition, the results presented in Chapter 2 showed that applicants' felt inauthenticity did not only influence their distress, but was in high-fidelity exercises also negatively related to observers' impression of applicants' competence and likeability. Thus, it seems that faking in high-fidelity exercises has a twofold negative effect, such that faking might (a) cause negative internal affective reactions (inauthenticity and distress), which negatively influence performance and (b) inauthenticity might also be recognizable to observers and thus further impair applicants' performance. These findings might complement research, which shows that observer positively evaluate applicants transparency (Roulin et al., 2014), by highlighting that observers might not only react to positive signs from applicants, but might above that also be sensitive to applicants' (in-)authenticity, which may eventually influence their evaluation (Moore, Lee, Kim, & Cable, 2017).

Overall, Chapter 2 highlights that faking might not only, as often proposed have a positive effect on applicants' performance evaluations (e.g., Levashina & Campion, 2007), but might rather even be detrimental. My findings show that considering applicants' affective reactions (inauthenticity and distress) to faking might help to understand the faking—performance relationship in further depth.

However, since faking is not the only influence tactic applicants use to present themselves favorably in personnel selection (Bourdage, Roulin, & Tarraf, 2018), Chapter 3 aimed to extend the model by adding honest IM. In particular, in Chapter 3, I combined notions from self-verification (Swann, 1983, 2012) and identity theory (Burke, 1991) to studied self-verification as a predictor and inauthenticity, distress, and performance evaluations as consequences of honest IM and faking.

The results from Chapter 3 showed that self-verification striving was negatively linked to faking and unrelated to honest IM, thereby supporting research, that implies a stronger dispositional basis for faking than for honest IM (Roulin & Bourdage, 2017). Also, I replicated results from Chapter 2 regarding the negative indirect effect of faking on performance evaluations in high-fidelity exercises. Moreover, honest IM did not only directly positively influence performance evaluations, but also decreased applicants' felt inauthenticity and distress, thus additionally increasing applicants' performance evaluations. In other words, while faking makes applicants' feel bad during the selection process impairing their performance, honest IM might lower applicants' negative feelings and thus, additionally to the direct effect on performance, foster performance indirectly, too. This links well to existing results as honest IM showed a positive effect on performance scores in most existing research (Higgins & Judge, 2004; Kristof-Brown, Barrick, & Franke, 2002; McFarland, Ryan, & Kriska, 2002), while the results for faking were inconsistent (Bourdage et al., 2018; Buehl & Melchers, 2017; Levashina & Campion, 2007).

In sum, the results across all three Chapters suggest that predictors and consequences of faking might differ in low-and high-fidelity exercises. As such, I found that faking in high-fidelity exercises might lower applicants' performance evaluations through affective reactions, while they had no effect on performance evaluations in low-fidelity exercises. In turn, these affective reactions might not only influence how applicants feel on the inside, but also influence how applicants are perceived by observers. Additionally, I could show that only faking has such negative effects on applicants' performance while honest IM might even increase applicants' performance. My results, therefore, clarify the process underlying the effects of faking by showing that applicants affective reactions and their relationship to observer impressions indirectly contribute to how faking influences performance evaluations. Overall, my results might thus not only help for a better understanding of faking in personnel

selection, but might also add to the theories themselves (identity theory, stereotype-content-model, self-verification theory) and be applicable to other contexts.

Strengths and Limitations

Although I consider the studies presented to be carefully designed and carried out, they are not without shortcomings. A traditional concern with simulated selection settings, as used in most of the studies in this dissertation, is that findings might not be comparable and might misrepresent the relationships in actual field settings (Dipboye & Flanagan, 1979). Nevertheless, using mock selection settings has proven to be a valuable research paradigm in the study of personnel selection (Buehl, Melchers, Macan, & Kühnel, 2019; Ingold, Kleinmann, König, & Melchers, 2014; Kleinmann & Klehe, 2010), not only because it allows for collecting sensitive applicant data (e.g., faking, inauthenticity, and distress), but also because it has yielded similar results as found in actual selection settings (Preckel & Schüpbach, 2005). Above that, it allowed me to experimentally manipulate applicant behavior (faking instruction, Chapter 2), which would not be possible in actual selection procedures. Across all of my studies, I took several measures to ensure the realism of my selection simulations: I only invited participants who had sent in a résumé prior to the actual procedure, participants and observers wore business attire, participants were treated like job applicants throughout the procedure, and participants received individualized feedback at the end of the procedure. All of these measures contributed to participants rating the realism of the mock selection procedures as high. Furthermore, Chapter 2 combined data from mock selection procedures with data from an actual selection setting. The results were largely comparable. Therefore, I deem the data collection in mock selection settings not to compromise my results, but rather it allowed me to investigate phenomena that would have been difficult to study in other research settings.

A second limitation to this collection of studies is that they relied on self-reports to assess most of the constructs, which, (a) raises questions about common-method variance and

(b) might compromise the generalizability of the results. However, as Conway and Lance (2010) note, the use of self-report measures needs to be weighed against the appropriateness of such measures. As honest and deceptive IM differ primarily in their intention, which, like feelings of inauthenticity and distress are not reliably visible from the outside, these constructs can only be accurately judged by applicants themselves. Another reason for me to use self-report measures was to assure the realism of the mock selection settings. Completing a short reflection questionnaire after each exercises might also be possible in actual selection settings and thus not take away from the realism of the situation compared to, for instance, having your blood pressure taken or being asked to give a saliva sample in order to measure distress. Moreover, I assessed self-report variables in reversed order as indicated in my study model (i.e., distress, inauthenticity, faking) in order to account for potential common-method effects (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, and Podsakoff, 2003). Additionally, in Chapter 3, I calculated the common method variance of self-report constructs. The shared variance between these constructs was approximately 6% and, thus, rather small. For this reason, I deem the use of self-report measures not to compromise the informative value of my results.

Apart from the mentioned limitations, the presented collection of studies does also have some strengths. As the existing research on faking has either focused on predicting faking (Levashina & Campion, 2006; McFarland & Ryan, 2006) or looked at the impact of faking on applicants' performance scores (Buehl et al., 2019; Roulin, Bangerter, & Levashina, 2015), scholars have called for more process-oriented faking research (Levashina, Hartwell, Morgeson, & Campion, 2014). Following this, I used different theoretical frameworks—TPB (Ajzen, 1991), identity theory (Burke, 1991), the SCM (Fiske et al., 2002), and self-verification theory (Swan, 1983, 2012)—in order to shed more light on faking in low- and high-fidelity exercises and the process underlying the effect of faking on performance evaluations. As all of the aforementioned theories focus on basic mechanisms of human functioning and interaction (identity, social perception), the proposed relationships from the

dual-process-model might not only hold for the selection context, but might be transferable to other contexts that involve self-concept incongruent behavior in any way. My findings do, however, not only contribute to applied research but might also add to the theories themselves (see discussion sections of individual Chapters for a detailed overview on theoretical implications).

Furthermore, my studies complement faking research by presenting a new perspective. I reviewed faking from a process perspective, putting applicants themselves in the center of attention. Thus, the results from five studies (Chapter 2 and 3) support that applicants' affective reactions to faking might be pivotal for understanding the effects of faking on performance evaluations more thoroughly. The proposed model not only expands existing faking research but might also inspire future research to include applicants' affective reactions in order to explain further phenomena during personnel selection.

Directions for Future Research

The studies presented offer a variety of possibilities for future research. First, as Chapters 2 and 3 have already shown, faking leads applicants to feel more inauthentic. Yet, what I have not considered so far is, whether this relationship might also depend on applicants' stable characteristics. In other words, based on their personality, some applicants might feel more inauthentic, when faking, than others. Specifically, personality traits that have been linked to frequent lying (i.e., psychopathy; Jonason, Slomski, & Partyka, 2012) or the acceptance of unethical behavior (i.e., moral disengagement; Detert, Treviño, & Sweitzer, 2008) might moderate this relationship. Thus, future research might want to consider including potential moderators in order to clarify whether personality might really influence the relationship between faking and inauthenticity.

Second, research on faking has primarily focused on the selection process itself. Only very few studies looked at potential implications of faking during the selection process for the actual workplace (Donovan et al., 2014; Peterson, Griffith, Isaacson, O'Connell, & Mangos,

2011). However, it might be valuable to review faking beyond the selection process. With regard to my model, research might want to consider assessing applicants' felt inauthenticity and distress levels once they are hired. It might be interesting to see whether applicants who used faking during the selection process, continue to fake on the job and thus experience more negative psychological consequences than non-fakers. This could, for instance, have implications for employees' commitment, job satisfaction or intentions to quit (Wharton, 1999). In this respect, future research could also test whether the use of specific IM strategies (honest vs. deceptive) relates to the use of influence strategies on the job (e.g., surface and deep acting). In particular, it might be possible that some individuals generally tend to use more deceptive influence strategies regardless of the context than others (cf., Roulin & Bourdage, 2017, faking has a stronger dispositional basis than honest IM). Hence, future research could try to integrate research on personnel selection with research on influence strategies at work to shed more light on potential spillover effects of influence strategies from selection to the actual workplace.

Third, the TPB proved to be a valuable framework not only to predict intentions to fake in low- and high-fidelity exercises, but also to predict reported faking in low-fidelity exercises. Nevertheless, research implies that applicants' faking evolves over time based on prior experiences (Roulin, Krings, & Binggeli, 2016). Yet, how faking changes and what contributes to this change is still unknown. Research could thus use the components of the TPB in order to explain how intentions to fake and actual faking change, based on prior experiences. Since not all applicants are able to increase their performance through faking (Roulin et al., 2014; Roulin & Powell, 2018) and faking might even lead to negative affective consequences for applicants (i.e., feeling inauthentic), faking experiences might have a direct connection to applicants' attitude, subjective norm, and PBC. These components may thus help for a better understanding of how faking experiences (successful faking vs. unsuccessful faking / negative feelings vs. no negative feelings) change applicants' faking.

Fourth, as aforementioned, not all applicants fake successfully. Rather, research has already acknowledged that some applicants are able to fake more successfully than others (e.g., Buehl & Melchers, 2017). Therefore, scholars proposed different constructs that may foster successful faking, such as, the ability to identify criteria (ATIC; Buehl et al., 2019), intelligence (Levashina, Morgeson, & Campion, 2009), or interpersonal skills (Roulin et al., 2016).Yet, what has not been studied is whether these constructs might interact with each or even with other variables (i.e., personality dimensions). For instance, high ATIC alone might not be enough to fake successfully in high-fidelity exercises. Instead, applicants might need to have high ATIC (recognize the relevant performance dimensions) and high interpersonal skills (show the relevant behavior convincingly) in order to fake successfully. Therefore, further research might also want to consider interactions between potential facilitating variables (three-way-interactions).

Additionally, future research might also want to consider how specific self-presentation tactics (honest vs. deceptive) interact with applicants' personality. Chapter 3 showed that applicants high on self-verification tend to use less faking. Similarly, Roulin and Bourdage (2017) showed that Honesty-Humility is negatively related to faking. However, this does not necessarily mean that all applicants high on these personality traits completely refrain from faking. Accordingly, if there is a mismatch between personality dimensions and self-presentation strategy, the negative consequences should be stronger than if there is none. For example, I would expect that applicants high on self-verification or Honesty-Humility, who fake during a selection procedure (i.e., mismatch) to have a bigger decrement from it than those low on self-verification or Honesty-Humility.

Finally, I propose an idea that acknowledges the ongoing trend of digitalization in personnel selection. In recent years more and more organizations have, for instance, started to rely on technology-mediated interviews (Blacksmith, Willford, & Behrend, 2016). Research on digital interviews is still emerging and the existing studies have primarily focused on

comparing applicants' scores to face-to-face interviews and applicant reactions (Langer, König, & Krause, 2017). Although the meta-analysis of Blacksmith et al. (2016) coincides with empirical evidence that applicants use less IM in digital selection procedures (Langer, König, & Hemsing, 2019), an exploratory mechanism for this is still missing. For this reason, further research could use the TPB components (attitude, subjective norm, and PBC) to clarify why applicants might use less influence strategies in digital selection procedures.

Implications for Practice

Applicants' faking is not only a highly debated topic amongst scholars, it is as equally, if not even more, relevant for practitioners, who, on a daily basis deal with (potentially dishonest) applicants. While, recruiters expect applicants to sell themselves during personnel selection procedures, they only rate honest self-presentation but not faking as an appropriate measure to do so (Jansen, König, Stadelmann, & Kleinmann, 2012). In contrast, several studies indicate that applicants admit to frequently using faking (Levashina & Campion, 2007; Roulin et al., 2014)—creating a dilemma.

Based on that, practitioners might fear that fakers gain an unfair advantage over honest applicants and thus are more likely to be hired than those who present themselves honestly. In fact, different studies substantiated this concern as they show that faking can cause a change in rank ordering of applicants (Rosse, Stecher, Miller, & Levin, 1998) or even change the selection decision (Griffith, Chmielowski, & Yoshita, 2007). However, most of these studies only looked at questionnaire measures (i.e., personality inventories, integrity tests, etc.), which are, however, much easier to fake as interactive selection procedures. In addition, most selection decisions are not solely made based on the results of certain questionnaires, but rather involve either a combination of different selection procedures or at least one face-to-face selection procedure (Eurich, Krause, Cigularov, & Thornton, 2009). For that reason, practitioners' concerns need to be put into perspective based on current selection practice.

With regard to interactive selection procedures, empirical evidence on the effect of faking on applicants' performance is quite inconsistent. While some studies find a positive effect on applicants' performance evaluations (Buehl et al., 2019; Levashina & Campion, 2007), others find no effect (Allen, Facteau, & Facteau, 2004; Bourdage et al., 2018) or even a negative effect (Swider, Barrick, Harris, & Stoverink, 2011) of faking on performance evaluations. Yet, all of these studies only looked at the direct effect of faking on performance evaluations. My results suggest, however, that the way applicants' feel while faking might undermine any positive effects faking might otherwise have on their performance evaluations, and even decrease their performance in high-fidelity exercises. In other words, my results suggest that faking might even hurt applicants' evaluations and makes it less likely for them to be selected. These findings, thus, further clarify the link between faking and applicants' performance evaluations and may diminish practitioners' concern about negative effects of applicants' faking on selection decisions.

Apart from whether faking has a positive or a negative effect on applicants' performance scores, it should be highlighted that faking may not only influence the selection decision, but more so the selection process in general. More specifically, applicants' perceived inauthenticity might not only increase applicants' level of distress, but might additionally have negative repercussions on applicant reactions. From a practical standpoint, it is pivotal to think about measures that encourage applicants to present themselves honestly. In the paragraphs that follow, I want to highlight three mechanisms that have been either already empirically tested or are derivable from existing theoretical frameworks in order to reduce faking or stimulate honest self-presentation.

First, a measure that stems from research on personality is telling applicants not to fake at the beginning of the procedure (i.e., warnings against faking). Warnings against faking have been shown to be effective in deterring applicants from faking on personality tests (Butcher, Morfitt, Rouse, & Holden, 1997; McFarland, 2003) and interviews (Law, Bourdage,

& O'Neill, 2016), especially, when they include the warning to be detected itself, and when they mention the potential consequences of being detected (Dwight & Donovan, 2003). For this reason, warning applicants at the beginning of the procedure that faking might be detected and sanctioned could potentially help to decrease faking.

Second, the careful design of a selection procedure itself may (a) help to reduce faking and (b) minimize the influence of applicants' self-presentation tactics on the selection decision. My research suggests that faking intentions are harder to put into practice when undergoing high-fidelity exercises (Chapter 1). Additionally, high-fidelity exercises could even be designed in a way to increase applicants' cognitive load so much (i.e., multi-tasks) that they have no spare capacities to fake anymore. Moreover, McFarland, Yun, Harold, Viera, and Moore (2005) suggested that faking might also depend on the assessed performance dimensions, such that interpersonal dimensions (e.g., cooperation, oral communication) should elicit more faking than technical dimensions (e.g., problem solving, technical skills/knowledge). Therefore, practitioners should carefully consider which performance dimensions to assess in what kind of exercises. In light of my aforementioned results, it might thus be useful to assess interpersonal skills in high-fidelity exercises and/or to, additionally, pair them with technical dimensions in order to increase the demands on applicants.

The careful design of a selection procedure should also, in this regard, make use of measures that minimize the influence of applicants' faking on the selection decision. The most prominent measure to decrease the influence of applicants' faking is to structure the selection procedure (Campion, Palmer, & Campion, 1997). Structure includes several components such as performance dimensions based on a job analysis, same procedure for all applicants, high-quality exercises, multiple observers, and extensive observer training, among others (Levashina et al., 2014). Yet, high-fidelity exercises are, by nature, less structured compared to structured interviews. One recommendation regarding high-fidelity exercises

might thus be to structure them as much as possible, for example, by using trained role-players, who follow a pre-determined script and do not deviate from it or by using high-fidelity exercises that include only one applicant at a time (e.g., case studies). Overall, the careful design of selection procedures might thus tremendously help to not only decrease applicants' faking but also to lower to influence of faking on the selection decision.

Third, signaling theory perceives personnel selection as an exchange of information between parties (i.e., applicants and organizations) with diverging goals. For this reason, both parties might act deceptively and only exchange accurate information if it is to their advantage (Bangerter, Roulin, & König, 2012). Yet, this might create an "ongoing spiral of mistrust in which each party tries to outdo the other" (Kirkwood & Ralston, 1999, p. 64). Bangerter et al. (2012), consequently, recommend trust as a mean in order to break this spiral. A practical application of this recommendation could be to perceive selection as a mutual process, in which not only applicants are asked to show their true self and provide information on strengths and weaknesses, but also the organization provides realistic information on advantages and downsides to working at this specific company or in a specific position. The realistic job preview (Phillips, 1998), which aims to honestly present how working in a specific job would be, could be extended to also include information on the organization in general and can be a means in order to signaling trust to applicants. One might therefore assume that signaling trust by honestly presenting advantages and downsides of working with an organization might lead to applicants reciprocating this trust by refraining from faking. In sum, it might be beneficial to organizations to signal trust to applicants by giving a realistic preview on working in an organization.

Conclusion

This dissertation presented six empirical studies, which relied on different theoretical frameworks (TPB, identity theory, stereotype content model, self-verification theory), to investigated predictors and consequences of faking in low- and high-fidelity exercises. My findings suggest that faking occurs in low- and high-fidelity exercises, and that faking might have differential predictors and consequences in both exercise types. While faking in low-fidelity exercises seems to be largely a matter of applicants pre-exercises intentions to fake, faking in high-fidelity exercises seems to happen more as a reaction to the specific requirements of the selection situation. As such, faking in low- and high-fidelity exercises also related differently to outcome variables: while faking increased applicants negative affective reactions (inauthenticity and distress) in both low- and high-fidelity exercises, it only led to a performance decrement in high-fidelity exercises. In particular, my results suggest that, against the common assumption that faking increases applicants' performance (e.g., Levashina & Campion, 2007), faking might have a twofold negative effect on applicants' performance in high-fidelity exercises. One the one hand, applicants' felt inauthenticity increased distress and distress in turn lowered applicants' performance. On the other hand, applicants' felt inauthenticity negatively influenced observers' impressions of applicants, thus additionally lowering their performance evaluations. In contrast to faking, honest IM seems to have a twofold positive effect on applicants' performance evaluations. On the one hand, honest IM was directly positively related to applicants' performance evaluations. On the other hand, I found a positive indirect effect on applicants' performance through decreased inauthenticity and distress. In sum, my dissertation suggest that while faking might backfire, especially in high-fidelity exercises, honesty might help applicants get the job.

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