

## The Economic Reconstruction of West Germany in the Context of International Relations 1945–1949\*

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Since the end of the 19th century economic problems have become more and more important for both international relations and domestic stability or instability. This is obviously the case for 20th century Germany and the Federal Republic in particular. As West German historian Werner Abelshauser wrote recently: “The history of the Federal Republic of Germany is – above all – its economic history.”<sup>1</sup> Until a few years ago both the so-called economic miracle (*Wirtschaftswunder*) and the belief in unlimited economic growth were important in shaping the self-image of the Germans,<sup>2</sup> something that muted nationalism and any strong initiatives to overcome the division of Germany.

One of the central questions in evaluating the West German reconstruction process is the extent to which either domestic or external factors were decisive in bringing about specific developments in the economic field. With the opening of American, British, and German archives and improved access to French source materials it has become possible to interpret West German recovery in the context of international relations and to evaluate the motives of decision-makers in the countries mentioned.<sup>3</sup> To demonstrate the importance of international de-

\* At the Augsburg Symposium the following papers discussed problems of West German economic developments: Werner Abelshauser, ‘Westdeutschlands Durchbruch zur wirtschaftlichen Rekonstruktion 1947/48’; Manfred Knapp, ‘Deutschlands Wiedereingliederung in die Weltwirtschaft. Außenwirtschaftspolitische Vorentscheidungen in der Gründungsphase der Bundesrepublik 1948/49’; Hans-Jürgen Schröder, ‘Die Rekonstruktion der westdeutschen Wirtschaft im Kontext der internationalen Beziehungen’. The contributions by Abelshauser and Knapp are published in full length in Josef Becker/Franz Knipping (eds.), *Im Schatten der Ohnmacht. Machtbewußtsein im Nachkriegsdeutschland 1945–1949*, Paderborn, Schöningh, 1986.

<sup>1</sup> Werner Abelhauser, *Wirtschaftsgeschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (1945–1980)*, Frankfurt/Main 1983, p. 8.

<sup>2</sup> See Harald Mey, ‘Marktwirtschaft und Demokratie. Betrachtungen zur Grundlegung der Bundesrepublik’, in: *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, 19, 1971, pp. 160–186.

<sup>3</sup> A number of essay collections investigate the formative years of the Federal Republic, e.g. *Westdeutschlands Weg zur Bundesrepublik 1945–1949*, Beiträge von Mitarbeitern des Instituts für

velopments for the West German reconstruction process the following problems will be discussed: the growing importance of Germany in U.S. European policy and the beginning of West German economic revival, the Anglo-American disputes over the economic order within West Germany, West German reaction to the devaluation of the British pound in 1949, and the economic elements in West German diplomacy as well as problems of continuity in German foreign policy after two world wars.

Long before the end of hostilities in Europe the American Government had planned extensively for Germany's role in the post-war world. Most of the studies came to the conclusion that a reconstruction of world trade would in the long run not be possible without the ultimate re-integration of the German economy into the world economy. Although the Morgenthau Plan which called for a de-industrialization of Germany provoked extensive debates it never had any chance to be applied seriously.<sup>4</sup>

Long-range economic planning was soon to be complemented by immediate economic and political necessities. Despite the restrictive directive JCS 1067, General Clay, the Deputy Military Governor, became an ardent advocate of rapid economic stabilization of West Germany to make it less dependent on external support. A few weeks before the German capitulation, Clay, in a letter to Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, explained his position as follows: "Conditions are getting progressively worse and large sections of all important cities have been obliterated. Of course, we have a long-range problem in preventing the restoration of Germany's war potential. However, this is not the short-range problem as several years will be required to develop even a sustaining economy to provide a bare minimum standard of living."<sup>5</sup> Long before the directive 1067 was officially revised in July 1947 the American Military Government under the

guidance of Clay had started to pursue a pragmatic stabilization policy. And Clay urged officials in Washington actively to support his policy of "Priming the German Economy,"<sup>6</sup> using the Communist danger as a key argument: "It is our belief that the Russian Zone is feeding approximately 1500 calories and will continue to do so until the next harvest season. We have insisted on democratic process in the U.S. zone and have maintained a strict neutrality between political parties. As a result the Communist Party has made little inroad. However, there is no choice between becoming a communist on 1500 calories and a believer in democracy on 1000 calories. It is my sincere belief that our proposed ration allowance in Germany will not only defeat our objectives in middle Europe but will pave the way to a Communist Europe."<sup>7</sup>

Due to growing East-West tensions and the emergence of the Cold War this view was largely shared by Washington. And the American Government supported General Clay's pragmatic stabilization policy in West Germany.<sup>8</sup> Referring to this development Werner Abelshauser<sup>9</sup> has repeatedly argued that the significance of both the currency reform of June 1948 and the Marshall Plan for West German reconstruction have been exaggerated by both politicians and historians. And he presents statistical evidence for his view "that the deadlock in German industry was broken" and a "substantial" progress in reconstruction were made "before the currency reform of June 1948" and "that foreign aid did not prove to be the crucial factor in priming the German economy." Abelshauser argues that "American contributions to German economic reorganisation, e.g. the currency reform and the Marshall Plan seem to have been less crucial for the breakthrough. On the other hand the US Military government was more successful in priming the German economy with German means and resources at a very early stage of postwar development." Marshall Plan deliveries had come "too late" to initiate an economic upswing which had already been inaugurated

Zeitgeschichte, München 1976; Claus Scharf/Hans-Jürgen Schröder (eds.), *Politische und ökonomische Stabilisierung Westdeutschlands 1945-1949, Fünf Beiträge zur Deutschlandpolitik der westlichen Alliierten*, Wiesbaden 1977; Heinrich August Winkler (ed.), *Politische Weichenstellungen im Nachkriegsdeutschland, 1945-1953*, Göttingen 1979; Josef Becker et al. (eds.), *Vorgeschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Zwischen Kapitulation und Grundgesetz*, München 1979; Claus Scharf/Hans-Jürgen Schröder (eds.), *Die Deutschlandpolitik Großbritanniens und die Britische Zone 1945-1949*, Wiesbaden 1979; Rudolf Richter/Wolfgang F. Stolper (eds.), *Economic Reconstruction in Europe: The Reintegration of Western Germany. A Symposium (= Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft 137/3, 1981)*; Claus Scharf/Hans-Jürgen Schröder, *Die Deutschlandpolitik Frankreichs und die Französische Zone 1945-1949*, Wiesbaden 1983; Josef Foschepoth/Rolf Steininger (eds.), *Die britische Deutschland- und Besatzungspolitik 1945-1949*, Paderborn 1985.

<sup>4</sup> On the Morgenthau Plan in the context of international relations see Warren F. Kimball, *Swords or Ploughshares? The Morgenthau Plan for Defeated Nazi Germany, 1943-1946*, Philadelphia 1976.

<sup>5</sup> Clay to Byrnes, 20 April 1945, in: Jean Edward Smith, *The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay (Clay Papers)*, Bloomington (Indiana) 1974, p. 6.

<sup>6</sup> John M. Backer, *Priming the German Economy. American Occupational Policies, 1945-1948*, Durham (N.C.) 1971.

<sup>7</sup> Clay to Echols and Peterson, 27 March 1946, in: *Clay Papers*, p. 184.

<sup>8</sup> On Clay see now John H. Backer, *Winds of History, The German Years of Lucius DuBignon Clay*, New York 1983; on American occupation policy John Gimbel, *The American Occupation of Germany. Politics and the Military, 1945-1949*, Stanford (Calif.) 1968.

<sup>9</sup> See the following publications by Werner Abelshauser: *Wirtschaft in Westdeutschland 1945-1948. Rekonstruktion und Wachstumsbedingungen in der amerikanischen Zone*, Stuttgart 1975; 'Die Rekonstruktion der westdeutschen Wirtschaft und die Rolle der Besatzungspolitik', in: Scharf/Schröder, *Politische und ökonomische Stabilisierung*, pp. 1-17; 'Probleme des Wiederaufbaus der westdeutschen Wirtschaft 1945-1953', in: Winkler, op. cit., pp. 208-253; 'Wiederaufbau vor dem Marshall-Plan. Westeuropas Wachstumschancen und die Wirtschaftsordnungspolitik in der zweiten Hälfte der vierziger Jahre', in: *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, 29, 1981, pp. 545-578; 'Westdeutschlands Durchbruch zur wirtschaftlichen Rekonstruktion', loc. cit.; unless otherwise stated the following quotations are from Abelshauser's unpublished paper 'The Role of the U.S. in West German Economic Recovery: A Reappraisal'.

without foreign aid.<sup>10</sup> Although Abelschauser minimizes the impact of currency reform<sup>11</sup> and the Marshall Plan he also leaves no doubt that an early economic breakthrough could not have taken place against the wishes of American policy-makers.

The State Department's preparations for Marshall's Harvard University speech of June 1947 leave no doubt that West Germany by then had become the cornerstone of Washington's policy of containment by economic means. As George F. Kennan summed up in a Policy Planning Staff paper: "The importance of Germany to general European recovery is well-known and requires no statistical illustration. No impartial student of Europe's pre-war economy can fail to appreciate the vital significance which German productivity and German markets have had [...] There can be no avoiding the fact that some further restoration of German production is essential to European recovery."<sup>12</sup> In August 1947 Secretary of Commerce Harriman summed up his impressions of a visit to Germany in a memorandum for President Truman: "We cannot revive a self-supporting Western European economy without a healthy Germany playing its part as a producing and consuming unit."<sup>13</sup> This would also be in the interest of those Western allies who asked for reparations from deliveries of dismantled German factories: "The best reparations our Western Allies can obtain is prompt recovery of Germany."<sup>14</sup>

In August 1948 an important State Department Policy Statement on Germany emphasized at great length the close interdependence between European recovery and German economic reconstruction: "Our interest in Germany's relation to ERP arises from the importance of Germany's economic position in Europe. Germany is potentially one of the most important European suppliers of such acutely needed commodities as coal, mining machinery, and industrial equipment. At the same time she is potentially an important market for Eu-

ropean goods. German economic recovery is therefore vital to general European economic recovery. On the other hand, German economic recovery is largely dependent on the economic recovery of other European countries since they are the chief markets for her goods. It is US policy that the fullest possible recognition be given this interdependence in order to achieve the greatest over-all benefits for the European Recovery Program.[...] The US is now completely committed to a far-reaching programme of political and economic reconstruction for Western Germany."<sup>15</sup> A few months later George F. Kennan reaffirmed Germany's vital position for the success of the European Recovery programme. He pointed out that when negotiating with the Soviets "we would [...] accept no arrangements which would inhibit the Germans from participating in ERP. To do so would place Germany economically at the mercy of Russia and would defeat the purposes of this programme."<sup>16</sup>

Although Marshall Plan aid was not the first step in America's reconstruction policy in West Germany, its implications for West Germany both in the economic and political sphere were – as Manfred Knapp<sup>17</sup> and Werner Link<sup>18</sup> have shown – of major importance. This may be summed up as follows: It was, for example, a source of immediate supply of foreign exchange for the importation of key products and for long-range investment programs as well as an instrument to speed up West German reintegration into the world economy. It had major psychological importance for decision-making. It was, in addition, a first step toward the founding of the Federal Republic, a precondition for West

<sup>10</sup> Abelschauser, 'Westdeutschlands Durchbruch zur wirtschaftlichen Rekonstruktion', loc. cit.

<sup>11</sup> A differing view is now presented by Albrecht Ritschl, 'Die Währungsreform von 1948 und der Wiederaufstieg der westdeutschen Industrie. Zu den Thesen von Mathias Manz und Werner Abelschauser über die Produktionswirkungen der Währungsreform', in: *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, 33, 1985, pp. 136–165.

<sup>12</sup> 'Certain Aspects of the European Recovery Problem from the United States Standpoint', National Archives (NA), Record Group (RG) 23 July 1947, 59, Records of Charles E. Bohlen, Box 6.

<sup>13</sup> Harriman to Truman, 12 Aug. 1947, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence (Missouri), President's Secretary's File (PSF), Germany.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., on the reparation problem see esp. Bruce Kuklick, *American Policy and the Division of Germany: The Clash with Russia over Reparations*, Ithaca (N. Y.) 1972; John H. Backer, *The Decision to Divide Germany. American Foreign Policy in Transition*, Durham (N. C.) 1978; Otto Nübel, *Die amerikanische Reparationspolitik gegenüber Deutschland 1941–1945*, Frankfurt/Main 1980; and John Gimbel, 'The American Reparation Stop in Germany. An Essay on the Political Uses of History', in: *Historian*, 37, 1975, pp. 276–296.

<sup>15</sup> Department of State Policy Statement, Germany, 16 Aug. 1948, II, p. 1319.

<sup>16</sup> Policy Planning Staff Paper, 12 Nov. 1948; in: *FRUS*, 1948, II, p. 1330.

<sup>17</sup> On Germany and the Marshall Plan see the following contributions by Manfred Knapp: 'Deutschland und der Marshallplan: Zum Verhältnis zwischen politischer und ökonomischer Stabilisierung in der amerikanischen Deutschlandpolitik nach 1945', in: Scharf/Schröder, *Politische und ökonomische Stabilisierung*, pp. 19–43; 'Das Deutschlandproblem und die Ursprünge des europäischen Wiederaufbauprogramms. Eine Auseinandersetzung mit John Gimbel's Untersuchung 'The Origins of the Marshall Plan'', in: *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, 19, 1978, pp. 48–65; 'U. S. Economic Aid and the Reconstruction of West Germany: Political and Economic Implications of the European Recovery Program', in: Ekkehart Krippendorff (ed.), *The Role of the United States in the Reconstruction of Italy and West Germany, 1943–1949. Papers presented at a German-American Colloquium held at John F. Kennedy-Institut für Nordamerikastudien, Berlin, June 1980*, Berlin 1981, pp. 40–55; 'Reconstruction and West-Integration: The Impact of the Marshall Plan on Germany', in: *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft*, 137, 1981, pp. 415–433; 'Wiederaufbau und West-Integration: Die Auswirkungen des Marshall-Plans auf Deutschland', in: Willi Paul Adams/Knud Krakau (eds.), *Deutschland und Amerika. Perzeption und historische Realität*, Berlin 1985, pp. 111–133; 'Deutschlands Wiedereingliederung in die Weltwirtschaft. Außenwirtschaftspolitische Vorentscheidungen in der Gründungsphase der Bundesrepublik 1948/49', loc. cit.

<sup>18</sup> Werner Link, 'Der Marshall-Plan und Deutschland', in: *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, Beilage zur Wochenzeitung Das Parlament*, 50, 1980, pp. 3–18; see also Erich Ott, 'Die Bedeutung des Marshall-Plans für Nachkriegsentwicklung in Westdeutschland' *ibid.*, 4, 1980, pp. 19–37.

Germany's fast integration into the West, a lever for an active West German foreign policy, and an instrument to influence the socio-economic order in West Germany. The extent to which American policy shaped the reestablishment of a private capitalist system in West Germany and the formulation of the *Soziale Marktwirtschaft*<sup>19</sup> is still controversial. In the following the problem will be discussed in the context of Anglo-American relations.

When discussing the U.S. policy of reconstruction in West Germany revisionist historians haven't taken for granted that a major aim of the Truman Administration was not only to reintegrate Western Germany into the Western political and economic system but also to revamp the German economy according to the American model of free enterprise. Lloyd Gardner, for example, described policy towards Germany as being reactionary: "What actually took place in Western Germany [...] was an American counter-revolution – against the policy of [...] German Social Democrats, and, finally, European radicalism."<sup>20</sup>

In challenging this revisionist interpretation, Dörte Winkler, in an article published in 1979, even went so far as to speak of "The American Policy of Socialization in Germany,"<sup>21</sup> with the U.S. cast in the unaccustomed role of a spearhead of socialism in Germany. By stressing the different approaches of OMGUS and War Department on one hand and the State Department on the other the author concludes that the United States Government in general was surprisingly open-minded and flexible in its approach towards both German Social Democracy and German trade unions. She also suggests that both German politicians and trade union leaders actually had more freedom to launch their respective programs of socialization and co-determination than they realized at the time.

More recently, Werner Link, in his article on the Marshall Plan and Germany has supported Dörte Winkler's approach. Link, whose research is based on a broader archival basis, is convinced that "the American Government

would not have rejected a (German) democratic decision to socialize basic industries."<sup>22</sup> The same attitude, he concludes, could have been expected by the American business community.<sup>23</sup> "Whatever the *indirect* effect of the Marshall Plan in blocking socialization in the Ruhr might have been [...] in the U.S. Zone (Hesse) socialization of basic industries did actually take place despite the introduction of the Marshall Plan." Link adds "that by Military Law No. 75 the American Government was binding itself both to allow and to accept a free and democratic decision of the German people."<sup>24</sup> To support his thesis Link points out that the United States finally accepted the British Labour Party's socialization policies that were put into effect in Britain. But was the United States' acceptance of socialization in Britain representative of its position towards continental Western Europe, including Western Germany?

While many members of the Truman Administration were critical of Britain's domestic policies, most State Department officials thought it would be unwise to intervene in its internal affairs. When Bernard Baruch urged Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Clayton to do something to stop socialization, the latter objected on the ground that "I don't know of anything we could do or should do to prevent England and other countries from socializing certain of their industries if that is the policy they wish to follow. The attempt to force such countries to adopt policies with respect to their domestic economies contrary to their wishes would, in my opinion, be an unwarranted interference in their domestic affairs."<sup>25</sup> In private conversations with their British counterparts members of the Truman Administration often didn't hesitate to express their critical views on various aspects of British domestic policies, socialization in particular. But, as the Norwegian historian Geir Lundestad has written, "more important [...] than such more or less private views would be the extent to which Washington more directly tried to influence the domestic policies of other countries."<sup>26</sup> Washington's avoidance of such direct pressure on the British Government on the issue of socialization should be viewed against the larger context of American global aims and especially the Truman Administration's strategies to counteract communist influence in Western Europe.

In September 1946, R. G. Hooker, Executive Assistant to Assistant Secretary of State Berle, drew attention to the phrase coined by Charles E. Bohlen

<sup>19</sup> On the idea of the social market economy see esp. Gerold Ambrosius, *Die Durchsetzung der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft in Westdeutschland 1945–1949*, Stuttgart 1977, and Georg Müller, *Die Grundlegung der westdeutschen Wirtschaftsordnung im Frankfurter Wirtschaftsrat 1947–1949*, Frankfurt/Main 1982, with further references; see also the recent contributions by Anthony Nicholls, 'The Other Germany – The 'Neo-Liberals'', in: R. J. Bullen et al. (ed.), *Ideas into Politics. Aspects of European History 1880–1950*, London 1984, pp. 164–177, and Volker Berghahn, 'Ideas into Politics: The Case of Ludwig Erhard', *ibid.*, pp. 178–192.

<sup>20</sup> Lloyd C. Gardner, 'America and the German 'Problem'', 1945–1949', in: Barton J. Bernstein (ed.), *Politics and Policies of the Truman Administration*, Chicago 1972, pp. 113–148.

<sup>21</sup> Dörte Winkler, 'Die amerikanische Sozialisierungspolitik in Deutschland 1945–1948', in: Winkler, *op. cit.*, pp. 88–110.

<sup>22</sup> Werner Link, 'Der Marshall-Plan und Deutschland', *loc. cit.*, p. 14.

<sup>23</sup> See Werner Link, *Deutsche und amerikanische Gewerkschaften und Geschäftsleute 1945–1975. Eine Studie über transnationale Beziehungen*, Düsseldorf 1978; see also Link's article 'Die Mitwirkung amerikanischer Gewerkschafter und Geschäftsleute an der Stabilisierungspolitik in Westdeutschland 1945–1949', in: Scharf/Schröder, *Politische und ökonomische Stabilisierung*, pp. 45–60.

<sup>24</sup> Link, 'Der Marshall-Plan und Deutschland', *loc. cit.*, p. 14.

<sup>25</sup> Clayton to Baruch, 6 Dec. 1946, NA, RG 59, 841. 5034/11–2346.

<sup>26</sup> Geir Lundestad, *America, Scandinavia, and the Cold War, 1945–1949*, New York 1980, p. 114.

“that the best way to serve U.S. interests in our relations with the USSR is to ‘support the NCL’ meaning the non-communist left.” Bohlen’s reasoning was as follows: The non-communist left (the Labour Party in Britain, Social Democrats on the Continent) had a program calculated to accomplish the social objectives which communists claimed as theirs. Only the NCL could oppose Soviet expansion without laying itself open to the charge of serving reactionary interests. And only the NCL could command the broad basis of popular support necessary to resist Soviet expansion.<sup>27</sup> This political philosophy doubtless had many adherents in the State Department. They feared that direct U.S. pressure to prevent socialization in Britain might well have weakened the United Kingdom as a bulwark against communist influence in Western Europe. In June 1948, a State Department policy statement on Britain even underlined certain advantages of the Labour Government’s policy: “on the ideological level, the election of a socialist-labor government in Britain has strengthened that country’s domestic position vis-à-vis Soviet propaganda. A government of this type is not so vulnerable with its own people as a conservative regime might be to charges of reactionary prejudice against the Soviets, and a socialist flavor to its policies is a good antidote to Communist appeal abroad. While the US would not adopt for her own certain of the internal economic and social legislation which the British have adopted, it is not our policy to interfere with or attempt to direct the domestic legislation or policies of the democratically-elected representatives of the British people.”<sup>28</sup> Similar considerations shaped Washington’s policy towards Scandinavia, as recent findings by Geir Lundestad suggest. It would be misleading, however, to extend these pragmatic and open-minded American reactions to socialization schemes in Scandinavia and especially in Britain to explain U.S. attitudes towards the problem of socialization in Western Germany.

Immediately after the war there was a strong anticapitalist movement in Germany, the business community having discredited itself through its close interrelationship with National Socialism. Following the end of hostilities there were few indeed who “would make a bet on the survival of the capitalist system” in Germany.<sup>29</sup> All major political forces were struggling to find concepts for a socio-economic system different from that of capitalism. Even Konrad Adenauer, soon to become one of the most outspoken opponents to any kind of socialism, called in a speech at the University of Cologne in 1946 for the “early

socialization of the coal mining industry.”<sup>30</sup> The Christian Democrats’ attitudes towards public ownership, as elaborated in the “Ahlenner Programm” of the CDU (February 1947) have often been referred to.<sup>31</sup> Statements by Karl Arnold, *Ministerpräsident* of North-Rhine-Westphalia, might also be cited. In a speech of June 17, 1947, he pleaded for a “re-vamping of our economy” adding that “the capitalist system has been brought to a deadlock as a result of its own inconsistencies.”<sup>32</sup>

The strongest opposition to any idea of restabilizing the capitalist system stemmed from the Social Democratic Party and especially from Kurt Schumacher. He particularly stressed the close interrelation of public ownership and democracy. In a political resolution the 1947 party conference at Nuremberg committed itself to the “propagandization of Socialism as the spearhead of democracy.”<sup>33</sup> It should also be mentioned in this context that Schumacher did not oppose the adoption of the Marshall Plan. To the contrary: he saw it as a chance for Europe to rebuild its economy and expressed his conviction that it was “not motivated by the wish to transplant a bit of America into Europe but to revive the European market.”<sup>34</sup> The Marshall Plan, in other words, was not regarded as being detrimental to the SPD socialization schemes. Another often cited example of the anticapitalist mood in postwar Germany is the work of the Hesse Constitutional Assembly in 1946.<sup>35</sup> The Social Democrat’s pleas for the adoption of public ownership schemes gained strong support when the British Government announced its socialization plans for the Ruhr in late 1946.<sup>36</sup> The British archives clearly reveal the high priority assigned socialization in the Ruhr by the Attlee Government. Both security considerations and social policy were

<sup>30</sup> Ernst Ulrich Huster/Gerhard Kraiker/Burkhard Scherer/Friedrich-Karl Schlotmann/Marianne Welteke, *Determinanten der westdeutschen Restauration 1945–1949*, 5th ed., Frankfurt/Main 1977, p. 404.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 424ff. On “Christlicher Sozialismus” see: Rudolf Uertz, *Christentum und Sozialismus in der frühen CDU. Grundlagen und Wirkungen der christlich-sozialen Ideen in der Union 1945–1949*, Stuttgart 1981, with further references.

<sup>32</sup> Cited by Kocka, ‘Restauration oder Neubeginn?’, loc. cit., p. 118.

<sup>33</sup> English translation from: Murphy to State Department, 4 Aug. 1947, NA, RG 59, 862.00/8–447.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>35</sup> On early Hesse constitutional development see the report by Ministerpräsident Geiler, 6 Jan. 1947, in: *Hessischer Landtag, Stenographische Berichte, Drucksachen-Abteilung III, I, Wahlperiode, 3. Sitzung*, pp. 12 ff.; and: *Die Auseinandersetzung um die Länderverfassungen in Hessen und Bayern 1946 – Dokumente*, Frankfurt/Main 1978. Text of the Hesse Constitution in: *Verfassungen deutscher Bundesländer mit Gesetzen über die Landesverfassungsgerichte*, München 1979, p. 167, English translation in: NA, RG 59, 862.011/4–2248.

<sup>36</sup> See for example the remarks by Robertson on 14 Aug. 1946, in: *Akten zur Vorgeschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1945–1949*, vol. I, München 1976, p. 675.

<sup>27</sup> Memorandum Hooker, 20 Sept. 1946, NA, RG 59, 711.61/9–2046. I want to thank John Lewis Gaddis who made this document available to me during my research in the National Archives.

<sup>28</sup> Cited by Lundestad, op. cit., p. 115.

<sup>29</sup> Jürgen Kocka, ‘Restauration oder Neubeginn? Deutschland 1945–1949’, in: *L 76. Demokratie und Sozialismus. Politische und literarische Beiträge*, 11, 1979, p. 118.

important in this respect. Recent publications by Horst Lademacher<sup>37</sup> and Rolf Steininger<sup>38</sup> leave no doubt about this.

The American reaction to this gives us a strong impression of conflicting Anglo-American interests in Germany: General Clay was alarmed about the British program calling "for a detailed regimentation of the German economy", which in his opinion "would prove to be completely unacceptable" to the American public. "Our own concept calls for the minimum control of selected scarce materials which would give private enterprise and initiative an opportunity to participate in rehabilitation." There could be no question, Clay added, "but that the long range issue involved in the entire matter is the establishment of State controls of economy, which will lead to a planned economy as advocated by socialists everywhere and with a substantial degree of State ownership." There would be little field in such an economy for private initiative and free enterprise. Clay asked for "assurance from our Government that its desire to make economic fusion work does not make it willing to accept a highly centralized economic control, which will be utilized in the hands of the SPD with the support of the British Military Government, to extend the socialist influence."<sup>39</sup>

The Political Adviser for Germany, Murphy, sent an urgent cable to Washington raising the question "whether we are [...] prepared to go along with the British in support of German Social Democrats' design for socialization of German enterprise which apparently has support of British Labor Party and Cabinet."<sup>40</sup> And Secretary of War Patterson in a letter to Marshall on June 13, 1947, raised two problems concerning the Army occupation in Germany which he thought were of the most urgent importance: "One has to do with preventing famine. The other has to do with the British program of socializing the coal mines in the Ruhr." Patterson asked for the guidance and assistance of the State Department "to avoid disaster." In referring to British plans for carrying out a socializing of the mines Patterson expressed his view "that the need for maximum production of coal at this critical time, is not for experiments in socialization." He was particularly concerned that "such experiments are certain to interfere with current production", and he added: "If my house is on fire, I do

<sup>37</sup> Horst Lademacher, 'Die britische Sozialisierungspolitik im Rhein-Ruhr-Raum 1945-1948', in: Scharf/Schröder, *Die Deutschlandpolitik Großbritanniens*, pp. 51-92.

<sup>38</sup> Rolf Steininger, 'Die Rhein-Ruhr-Frage im Kontext britischer Deutschlandpolitik', in: Winkler, op. cit., pp. 111-166; Rolf Steininger, 'Reform und Realität. Ruhrfrage und Sozialisierung in der anglo-amerikanischen Deutschlandpolitik 1947/48', in: *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, 27, 1979, pp. 167-240; see also Steininger's survey: 'Die britische Deutschlandpolitik in den Jahren 1945/46', in: *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte. Beilage zur Wochenzeitung Das Parlament*, 1-2, 1982, 9 Jan. 1982, pp. 28-47.

<sup>39</sup> Murphy to Matthews, 27 April 1947, in: *FRUS*, 1947, II, p. 910, and Clay to Noce, 29 April 1947, *ibid.*, p. 914.

<sup>40</sup> Murphy to Matthews, 27 April 1947, *ibid.*, p. 909.

everything I can to put the fire out, I do not engage in arguments on the state of the title to the house." Patterson urged the State Department that strong representation should be made to the British government, "to the effect that it must at least postpone its socialization program until the present emergency in production of coal has been overcome." Washington had every right, he argued, "to insist on this, since the load of carrying the two zones in Germany, particularly in the vital matter of food, is falling more and more on our shoulders."<sup>41</sup>

When the Secretaries of State, War and Navy discussed the problem of socialization of German coal mines they agreed "that strong representation should be made to the British Government to the effect that it must cease or defer any experiments in socialization of the German coal mines."<sup>42</sup> And Clayton was instructed by Marshall to make it "quite clear" to Bevin that he regarded the British management of the coal problem as "pathetic" and that the United States could not participate in "any big new commitments to help Europe get back on its feet unless we know that the problem of producing coal in the Ruhr will be licked and quickly." Marshall emphasized that the United States "could not sit by while the British tried out any ideas which they had of experimenting with socialization of coal mines; time does not permit for experimentation."<sup>43</sup> During the Anglo-American Talks on Ruhr Coal Production, held in Washington (August 12 - September 10, 1947), the American participants left no doubt about their position. The American records clearly reveal the U.S. delegation's enormous pressure on their British counterparts to abandon their plans to socialize the Ruhr mines.<sup>44</sup> Both sides used the argument of efficiency for their respective positions, but owing to their financial difficulties the British had to give in. As General Robertson put it: "He who pays the piper calls the tune."<sup>45</sup> In July 1947 the London Financial Times had already prophesied "that Uncle Sam will put his foot down and that the nationalizers will not be allowed to have their way."<sup>46</sup>

But the Americans "sweetened the pill": the British were not asked to abandon their plans in principle but merely to put them on ice. As summed up by a State Department official, the "conversations did not pretend to reach a decision on the issue of nationalization versus private ownership in the Ruhr mines." In supporting this statement, however, he referred to JCS 1779 of July 11, 1947,

<sup>41</sup> Patterson to Secretary of State, 13 June 1947, *ibid.*, pp. 1151 f.

<sup>42</sup> Minutes of Meeting of the Secretaries of State, War and Navy, 19 June 1947, extracts printed *ibid.*, p. 927.

<sup>43</sup> Memorandum Clayton, 20 June 1947, *ibid.*, p. 929.

<sup>44</sup> See especially NA, RG 59, 862.6362.

<sup>45</sup> Memorandum Robertson, 5 July 1947, Public Record Office (PRO), Foreign Office Papers, series 371, file 64514 (FO 371/64514); see also Steininger, 'Die britische Deutschlandpolitik'.

<sup>46</sup> *Financial Times*, 28 July 1947, cited in Clark to State Department, NA, RG 59, 862.6362/7-2847.

which instructed Clay "not to interfere with socialization if the Germans showed by democratic methods that they wanted it." This directive, of course, left him free "to preach the advantages of free enterprise", which he had been "instructed to do vigorously during the past few years."<sup>47</sup> To be sure, U.S. officials tried to avoid giving the impression that the results of the Washington Conference of August/September 1947 had fundamental significance. But postponement of socialization plans in fact meant a major defeat for such plans. American opposition also at least indirectly weakened the non-communist left in Western Germany. In October 1947, Schumacher himself complained during his visit to the United States that the US and UK Military Governments' failure "to effect socialization of the most important industries [...] hurt the prestige and influence of the Social Democratic Party as the most forceful proponent of the nationalization of industry." He added that "particularly great hopes were held out in the beginning that the British Government, not the British military authorities in Germany, would be able to effect socialization of industries within their area."<sup>48</sup> Despite American opposition, the SPD continued its drive to achieve some kind of socialization in the Ruhr. On August 6, 1948, the SPD draft law regarding socialization was adopted by the *Landtag* of North Rhine-Westphalia with a majority of 104 votes. The Free Democratic Party voted unanimously against the draft and most of the Christian Democrats abstained.<sup>49</sup> Taking account of the preceding Anglo-American talks about socialization one cannot be surprised that the law as passed by the *Landtag* was not authorized by the British.

During his visit to the United States Schumacher raised the question as to whether American opposition towards socialization was consistent with the ideal of self-determination.<sup>50</sup> The American Federation of Labor also stressed these inconsistencies. Mathew Woll, Chairman of the International Labor Relations Committee, welcomed General Clay's statement that the "Military Government will not interfere if the German trade unions [...] succeed in winning over a majority for their point of view." Woll nevertheless added, "we find [...] this statement [...] at variance with the Military Government policy and practice of vetoing legislation [which has been] duly and democratically adopted by decisive majorities of German *Laender* Parliaments – such as the Wuerttemberg-Baden and Hesse laws on co-determination." Woll also criticized the suspension by the British Military Government of the Law of Socialization of the Ruhr Industries which was adopted by the Parliament of Rhineland-Westphalia."<sup>51</sup>

<sup>47</sup> Memorandum Bolton, 22 Sept. 1947, in: *FRUS*, 1947, II, p. 966.

<sup>48</sup> Memorandum Kellermann, 31 Oct. 1947, NA, RG 59, 862.00/10-3147.

<sup>49</sup> *Landtag von Nordrhein-Westfalen, Stenographische Berichte*, 6 Aug. 1948, p. 987.

<sup>50</sup> Memorandum Kellermann, 31 Oct. 1947, NA, RG 59, 862.00/10-3147.

<sup>51</sup> Woll to Clay, 14 Feb. 1949, NA, RG 59, 862.5034/2-2349.

Most American officials, including Clay, were well aware of this inconsistency in American policy towards Western Germany. He commented on this problem in meeting with the U.S. Zonal Council of Trade Unions in early September 1947. Clay felt obliged to mention first "that I come from a country that believes in free enterprise.[...] We do believe that free enterprise has developed a high standard of living in America; however, we believe in democracy more than we do in free enterprise. We have no desire to impose any particular economic structure upon the German people." While stressing the overriding importance of democratic self-determination Clay nevertheless added certain qualifications to the application in practice on a *Länder* basis. "We are perfectly willing for the question to be resolved at State level for state utilities, city utilities and other enterprises which are clearly needed only for the particular state; however where the enterprise or industry is clearly an enterprise belonging to Germany as a whole, we feel that the final question as to how it is to be operated and managed must be determined by the German people when they can determine it as a whole, I want you to understand this position quite clearly because much has been said about the United States attempting to stop socialization in Germany when it is desired by the German people. That is not our position although we do hope that you will see some of the virtues that result from free enterprise before you make final decision."<sup>52</sup> Lorenz Hagen, President of the Bavarian Trade Union Federation, declared himself "pleased to hear from the General's statement that we, in Germany, are going to be given the freedom to establish our own economic policies on condition, of course, that the German people decide in democratic fashion about this question," Clay immediately interrupted, stipulating: "And as a whole, not by States."<sup>53</sup>

The insistence that the German people as a whole had to determine the question of socialization made it possible to champion the ideal of self-determination while blocking any significant legislation passed by the *Länder*, Hesse being an exception.<sup>54</sup> The State Department, in short, "waffled". As was admitted by one State Department official early in 1948: "On the issues of socialization, 'co-determination', participation in planning and administration, and denazification, we have in spite of our handsome statements of policy regarding German self-determination and initiative, in practice not arrived at any concrete action in these spheres [...]"<sup>55</sup>

This policy of postponement was effective in achieving the desired ends. It weakened the noncommunist left in Western Germany while favoring those

<sup>52</sup> Murphy to State Department, 16 Sept. 1947: NA, RG 59, 740.00119 Control (Germany) 19-1647.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>54</sup> Gerd Winter, 'Sozialisierung in Hessen 1946-1955', in: *Kritische Justiz*, 7, 1974, pp. 157-175; see also Wolf-Arno Kropat, *Hessen in der Stunde Null 1945/46*, Wiesbaden 1979, pp. 258 ff.

<sup>55</sup> Memorandum Stauffer, 30 April 1948, NA, RG 59, 862.5043/4-3048.

political forces that were opposed to any kind of public ownership. In fact, as already described by John Gimbel, Clay's strategy turned out to be successful: "Time is on our side," he had declared in October 1947. "If we can [...] defer the issue while free enterprise continues to operate and economic improvement results, it may never become an issue before the German people."<sup>56</sup> By postponing any large-scale socialization schemes – Hesse being of minor importance in this context – the U. S. Government thus effectively prevented the creation of a new economic order and decisively contributed to the restabilization of the capitalist system in Western Germany.

And the British plans which had called for the socialization for basic industries in Germany – as put forward by Bevin in his famous speech of October 1946 – were more or less a brief episode in British occupation policy in Germany. Although Bevin himself had informed the government in Washington that American opposition to British socialization schemes in Germany could damage the Labour Government's reputation, the Truman administration was not impressed. While Washington was prepared to tolerate nationalization in Britain, the Truman Administration clearly rejected the application of any large-scale socialization schemes in West Germany. The American position was determined by the fact that Washington regarded West Germany as a corner-stone of American reconstruction policy in Europe.

While there can be no doubt about Britain's growing dependence on the United States,<sup>57</sup> this does not imply that the Labour Government's decisions had become a *quantité négligeable* for Western Germany. The devaluation of the pound in late 1949 must be mentioned in this connection. When London announced the devaluation of sterling by 30% in September 1949 the Bonn Government found itself in a difficult position. Various cabinet meetings were devoted to the problem of a 'proper' realignment of the D-Mark.<sup>58</sup> The implications for both the domestic economy and West Germany's export position were discussed at great length. Chancellor Adenauer was particularly concerned that inflation resulting from a potential devaluation of the German mark might hurt the reputation of the new government in Germany.<sup>59</sup> He therefore wanted to avoid any

<sup>56</sup> John Gimbel, op. cit., p. 170.

<sup>57</sup> See for example Robert M. Harthaway, *Ambiguous Partnership. Britain and America, 1944–1947*, New York 1981, and D. Cameron Watt, *Succeeding John Bull. America in Britain's Place 1900–1975. A study of the Anglo-American relationship and world politics in the context of British and American foreign-policy-making in the twentieth century*, Cambridge 1984, pp. 90 ff.

<sup>58</sup> *Die Kabinettsprotokolle der Bundesregierung*, vol. I, 1949 (Kabinettsprotokolle), Boppard am Rhein 1982, pp. 74 ff, 285 ff.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 293.

rise in the cost of living for at least a few weeks and was even prepared to establish price controls. On the other hand, there seemed to be no alternative to devaluation in order to regain a competitive position for German exports since most countries outside the Sterling bloc had already followed the British example. Cabinet discussions on the extent to which the mark was to be devalued revealed clearly two basic assumptions that shaped the young republic's economic foreign policy. These were: 1) the top priority assigned to close cooperation with the United States; 2) the idea of using economic means to regain equality for Germany.

Therefore it is no surprise that a 30% devaluation was ruled out from the very beginning of the cabinet discussions. Minister of Economics Ludwig Erhard opposed a 30% devaluation on the ground that such a step might create the impression that Germany's decision was completely dictated by the British.<sup>60</sup> The President of the *Bank Deutscher Länder* put it more bluntly: "The greatest danger for Germany would be to become identified with the Sterling bloc." To join the British "*pari passu* and automatically" had to be avoided at all costs because West Germany would then cease to be what it had become during the years 1945–1949, namely, "the exponent of American policy." There would also be the danger of West Germany being transformed into a "puppet directed by London." And such a development would put an end to the "free market economy which is the basis of our high standard of living and of progress in general."<sup>61</sup>

The DM exchange rate was finally set at a 23.8 cents rate after tough bargaining with the High Commissioners.<sup>62</sup> This meant a return to the old mark-dollar relationship which had prevailed prior to the devaluation of the dollar in 1934. This exchange rate was regarded by some cabinet members as an opportunity to symbolize traditional close German-American relations.

In addition, the outcome of the pound crisis made it quite clear that Bonn wanted to continue its active export policy. A continued German export drive, Adenauer pointed out, would be vital for the new German state. In his first speech before the *Bundestag* Adenauer referred to the devaluation of the pound and expressed his conviction that without its share in world export markets Germany would be deprived of its economic, social and political foundations.<sup>63</sup>

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 285.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 296.

<sup>62</sup> See also Friedrich Jerchow, 'Der Außenkurs der Mark 1944–1949', in: *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, 30, 1982, pp. 286 ff.

<sup>63</sup> See *Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages, 1. Wahlperiode 1949, Stenographische Berichte*, vol. I, Bonn 1950, p. 24.

In the field of international affairs foreign trade was regarded as an important lever to reduce foreign controls in the German economy, to regain full sovereignty and equality for the Federal Republic. Decisions-makers in West Germany regarded economics as the only means to further their aims in the political field. In early 1949 a member of the Bavarian Government summed up this foreign policy strategy as follows: "Of course, one has to be aware of the fact that, due to what had happened, Germany could not regain equality of treatment in international affairs overnight. Nevertheless this task must be accomplished in the not too distant future. Germany's commercial policy is of vital political importance especially in the field of foreign affairs."<sup>64</sup> Germany had to use its ability to absorb foreign products as a political instrument, it was argued. The Chancellor himself repeatedly emphasized the political implications of commercial treaties to be negotiated, particularly with the United States, Great Britain and France. Due to these political implications intensive discussions in the cabinet would be of utmost importance, the Chancellor informed his cabinet members. To further underline the political significance of German trade policy the cabinet decided to establish an interdepartmental committee on commercial policy (*Handelspolitischer Ausschuss*),<sup>65</sup> an instrument that had been quite successful in coordinating political objectives and economic necessities during the interwar years. As Manfred Knapp has pointed out, West German politicians particularly stressed the necessity that their country become a proponent of a liberal trade policy.<sup>66</sup> This would be a means of attaining close relations with the United States Government which advocated a liberal world economy. A few weeks before the founding of the Federal Republic, Dr. Pünder, director of the bi-zonal Economics Administration, explained in a memorandum for Erhard:

"One watches in the ECA circles with particular interest the positions taken up by the individual European participants in regard to the question of the liberalization of trade. For this reason, the statement concerned with this question, which is to be punctually prepared by the Bizone before October 1, 1949, deserves special attention. I ask that this be taken into consideration during the elaborations on this position-paper. Apart from this purely tactical question, for the Bizone only the one position comes into consideration out of political de-

<sup>64</sup> Elmenau minute for Pünder, 31 Aug. 1949, in: *Akten zur Vorgeschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1945-1949*, vol. 5, München 1981, p. 836.

<sup>65</sup> Cabinet meeting of 6 Dec. 1949, *Kabinettsprotokolle*, p. 246.

<sup>66</sup> Manfred Knapp, 'Die Anfänge westdeutscher Außenwirtschafts- und Außenpolitik im bizonalen Vereinigten Wirtschaftsgebiet (1947-1949)', in: Manfred Knapp (ed.), *Von der Bizonenegründung zur ökonomisch-politischen Westintegration. Studien zum Verhältnis zwischen Außenpolitik und Außenwirtschaftsbeziehungen in der Entstehungsphase der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (1947-1952)*, Frankfurt/Main 1984, pp. 13-93; see also Knapp's introduction: 'Außenpolitik und Außenwirtschaftsbeziehungen in der Entstehungsphase des westdeutschen Nachkriegsstaates', *ibid.*, pp. 1-12.

liberations in general as well as sober economic ones, with which it makes itself the spearhead of the American view in terms of the abolishment of the inner-European trade barriers [...] The position of West Germany must give the new Federal Government a good start for foreign economic and foreign political tasks, and must assist in convincing the United States that cooperation with West Germany is worthwhile and that it can find an ideological ally in West Germany."<sup>67</sup>

The close interdependence of economics and diplomacy and particularly West Germany's use of trade policy as an instrument to regain equality in the international sphere after World War II necessarily raises the question of continuity and discontinuity in German foreign policy after the two world wars. Germany owed its re-emergence as a Great Power after World War I primarily to its economic ascendancy, especially from 1924 onwards. The strategy of recovering political ascendancy by economic means had already been envisaged by the German political and economic leadership in 1918/19: A stabilized German economy was to serve as the basis for revision of the Versailles Treaty.<sup>68</sup> This economic approach - which was regarded as the only alternative for a Germany handicapped by military defeat and control - had to take into account the interests of the United States which had emerged from World War I as the leading economic power. This development was clearly perceived by German decision-makers.<sup>69</sup> Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann, for example, explained in late 1925: "Economic power is the only lever available to us to shape our foreign policy."<sup>70</sup> The Foreign Ministry repeatedly stressed the policy potential of Germany's ability to absorb foreign products. The world economic crisis of 1920/21 already offered an opportunity to demonstrate the importance of the German market. Inflation in Germany had created export possibilities in the German market that were particularly important at a time when all other industrial countries were hit by a deep depression.<sup>71</sup> After the stabilization of the

<sup>67</sup> As quoted by Manfred Knapp in his unpublished paper 'The Marshall Plan and the development of the FRG's international orientation.' (Preliminary Outline), prepared for the first Conference on 'The Marshall Plan and Germany', held in Washington, D. C., 3-5 Oct. 1984.

<sup>68</sup> See esp. Peter Krüger, *Deutschland und die Reparationen 1918/19. Die Genesis des Reparationsproblems in Deutschland zwischen Waffenstillstand und Versailler Friedensschluß*, Stuttgart 1973.

<sup>69</sup> See the impressive book by Werner Link, *Die amerikanische Stabilisierungspolitik in Deutschland 1921-32*, Düsseldorf 1970.

<sup>70</sup> Henry Ashby Turner, 'Eine Rede Stresemanns über seine Locarnopolitik', in: *Vierteljahrshäfte für Zeitgeschichte*, 15, 1967, p. 434.

<sup>71</sup> See Carl-Ludwig Holtfrerich, 'Die konjunkturanregenden Wirkungen der deutschen Inflation auf die US-Wirtschaft in der Weltwirtschaftskrise 1920/21', in: Gerald D. Feldman et al. (eds.), *The German Inflation Reconsidered. A Preliminary Balance*, Berlin-New York 1982, pp. 207-234, and Hans-Jürgen Schröder, 'Zur politischen Bedeutung der deutschen Handelspolitik nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg', *ibid.*, pp. 235-251.

mark and the adoption of the Dawes Plan, the influx of foreign capital, especially American, substantially contributed to the re-establishment of Germany as the leading economic power on the Continent. During the Great Depression of the 1930s the Brüning Government used bilateral trade policy vis-à-vis Southeastern Europe to undermine the stability of the French security system. It was "the utilisation of economic forces to a definite political end," as a member of the British Foreign Office, Vansittart, put it in May 1931.<sup>72</sup> This economic lever was even more successfully applied by the Third Reich to achieve domination in Southeastern Europe. By 1936 this area had become Germany's Informal Empire.<sup>73</sup>

Due to this historical experience French diplomacy was particularly suspicious of any American move to speed up West German recovery. Secretary of State Marshall admitted that "growth of German economic power posed a problem to neighboring countries quite outside the matter of war potential." And he assured French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman "that the United States Government would not knowingly be involved in any procedure which would re-establish German power to a dangerous degree."<sup>74</sup> But despite such statements economic recovery of West Germany remained essential for U.S. reconstruction policy in Europe. And French security interests were played down by American diplomats as "intransigence" and "obstruction".

"We must be sure," Harriman wrote in a report for President Truman, "that the French do not obstruct reconstruction under the cloak of fear of military threat. The French are in fact suspicious of German recovery as a threat to their industry. [...] Since the French are not sharing the bill, they would like to see Germany kept down industrially."<sup>75</sup> And the Political Adviser for Germany, Murphy, complained in late 1948 that "progress has been impeded by French insistence on loading with the question of security every item, whether relating to the manufacture of aspirin or textiles, traffic on the Rhine, the Occupation Statute, western German government, or the Ruhr Control Authority." This French attitude, Murphy argued, was counterproductive to American stabilization policy in Germany.<sup>76</sup>

<sup>72</sup> Memorandum Vansittart, 13 May 1931, PRO, FO 371/15205.

<sup>73</sup> See Hans-Jürgen Schröder, 'Südosteuropa als 'Informal Empire' Deutschlands 1933-1939. Das Beispiel Jugoslawien', in: *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, 23, 1975, pp. 70-96, and Alfred Kube, 'Außenpolitik und 'Großraumwirtschaft'. Die deutsche Politik zur wirtschaftlichen Integration Südosteuropas 1933 bis 1939', in: Helmut Berding (ed.), *Wirtschaftliche und politische Integration in Europa im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, Göttingen 1984, pp. 185-211, with further references.

<sup>74</sup> Minutes of Meeting of Foreign Ministers, 19 Nov. 1948, in: *FRUS*, 1948, II, p. 520.

<sup>75</sup> Harriman to Truman, 12 Aug. 1947, Harry S. Truman Library, PSF, Germany.

<sup>76</sup> Murphy to State Department, 13 Dec. 1948, in: *FRUS*, 1948, II, pp. 1393 f.

The American Government was repeatedly confronted with the difficult task of reconciling its policy towards Germany with French demands for security. In marked contrast to its interwar policy towards Europe - when Washington had blocked any close economic cooperation between European states<sup>77</sup> - the U.S. Government now regarded economic integration as a possible bridge between the divergent interests of European states as well as between conflicting goals of U.S. diplomacy. Although at the end of the 1940's the Truman Administration had not yet developed a detailed conception of European integration, the Marshall Plan was an important element to achieve this goal.<sup>78</sup>

The idea of European integration corresponded exactly to Adenauer's strategy. Economic integration would give Germany the chance to reduce allied controls over the German economy. The reduction of controls would then put West Germany in the position to better use its economic power in the field of foreign affairs. Discussions on the Schuman Plan are an example of this strategy. European economic integration was not, however, seen as the ultimate goal of West German policy. Especially the exponents of a liberal Marshall Plan aid and West Germany's integration into the West European economies as a stepping stone to regain access to overseas markets and to permit West Germany's reintegration into the world economy.<sup>79</sup> These developments also were of far-reaching political significance, since economic integration into the West paved the way for West Germany's political alignment with the Western democracies.

<sup>77</sup> See Hans-Jürgen Schröder, 'Widerstände der USA gegen europäische Integrationsbestrebungen in der Weltwirtschaftskrise 1929-1939', in: Berding, op. cit., pp. 169-184.

<sup>78</sup> See for example Michael J. Hogan, "The Search for a 'Creative Peace': The United States, European Unity, and the Origins of the Marshall Plan", in: *Diplomatic History*, 6, 1982, pp. 267-285; extensive source material in: NA, RG 59, 840.50.

<sup>79</sup> See Knapp, 'Deutschlands Wiedereingliederung in die Weltwirtschaft', loc. cit.

## Zusammenfassung

Die ökonomische Rekonstruktion Westdeutschlands war nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg zunächst eine Funktion internationaler Entwicklungen und namentlich der Washingtoner Deutschlandpolitik. Diese wurde 1946/47 zunehmend von der Überzeugung der amerikanischen Führungseliten bestimmt, daß eine Rekonstruktion Westeuropas und der Weltwirtschaft ohne eine ökonomische und politische Stabilisierung Westdeutschlands nicht realisierbar war. Die Vorbereitungen des Marshall-Plans und die Zurückweisung französischer Sicherheitsbedenken machen dies deutlich. Der zentrale Stellenwert Deutschlands ergab sich für die Washingtoner Europapolitik u. a. auch aus der Überlegung, daß die Abhängigkeit Westdeutschlands vor allem von amerikanischen Wirtschaftshilfen einen wirksamen Hebel bot, die Gewährung dieser Unterstützung mit der Durchsetzung eigener Ordnungsvorstellungen im binnen- wie im außenwirtschaftlichen Bereich zu verknüpfen. Die Vereitelung britischer Sozialisierungspläne durch die USA und die Einbeziehung Westdeutschlands in eine liberale Außenwirtschaftspolitik machen dies deutlich.

Die Mehrheit der deutschen Führungseliten in Wirtschaft und Politik hat die dominierende Rolle der USA in Westdeutschland akzeptiert und zum Teil aktiv gefördert, wie die Diskussionen über die deutschen Reaktionen auf die britische Pfundabwertung vom Herbst 1949 zeigten. Die enge wirtschaftliche wie politische Anlehnung an die USA schien die besten Möglichkeiten zu bieten, den außenpolitischen Spielraum wieder zu erweitern. Vor allem eine aktive Außenwirtschaftspolitik, die sich in das amerikanische Konzept einer liberalen Weltwirtschaftsordnung einfügte, sollte als Instrument der Außenpolitik eingesetzt werden. Die Rekonstruktion der westdeutschen Wirtschaft erfüllte mithin nicht nur eine wichtige ökonomische Funktion, dem wirtschaftlichen Wiederaufbau kam darüberhinaus eine hervorragende außen- und (wie die spätere Entwicklung deutlich machte) auch machtpolitische Bedeutung zu. Hier manifestiert sich mithin eine verblüffende Parallele zur Zeit nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg und damit ein Element der Kontinuität deutscher Außenpolitik.