

**Lifestyles, social milieus and voting behaviour  
in Germany**

A comparative analysis of the developments in eastern and western Germany

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Vorgelegt von  
Ingvill Constanze Mochmann

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**To my parents  
who taught me to fight  
for what I believe in**



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## **PREFACE**

I have been interested in the concepts of the social milieu and lifestyle since I came to Bonn in 1992 in order to collect material for my graduate thesis. Even then I was told that this was no subject of discussion as the lifestyle concept was too ambiguous to contribute to the social sciences, especially in the field of electoral research. Furthermore, no analysis of the social milieus seemed necessary because research had proven that their impact on the German population's voting behaviour had decreased.

Nevertheless, for several reasons, I was too fascinated to just drop the topic. Firstly, when I looked at the concepts in 1992, I already considered the definitions as rather indistinct; not much effort was put into explaining how the concepts differ from and resemble each other. I figured that if this was worked out in more detail, the concepts would perhaps prove to be more fruitful than generally assumed. Such a detailed examination of concepts may seem rather unnecessary, but the more I studied the concepts the more I realised how closely the concepts relate to the societal changes that took place during the last centuries. Thus, the concepts and their application to social research reflect to a certain extent the development of the German state and its party system, the cleavages, social conflicts, social milieus, lifestyles, socio-economic and socio-cultural transformations over the past two centuries. The second reason for getting involved in this topic was with the aim to understand how historical developments influenced Germany and made it the way we know it today. Obviously, only major developments which are of particular interest for my research question can be presented in this thesis. Finally, the analysis of social milieus and lifestyle groups in Germany is still flourishing, ignoring critical voices, and this convinced me that some of my ideas and thoughts developed over the past few years, as well as the empirical results of my analyses, may contribute to the ongoing dispute.

When I was first confronted with the concepts of the lifestyle and the social milieu in electoral research, they were completely new to me. However, I soon realised that a huge number of publications and analyses existed in this field, but all, except a few, were written in German. Since I have found this topic very interesting, I thought that other, non-German speaking social scientists, might find it interesting, too. Thus, although my native language is Norwegian, I have decided to write my thesis in English in order to open the

topic to a broader scientific community. Of course, many nuances of the German language are difficult to translate, but I hope the main contents are clearly presented and pleasant to read. Quotations are kept in the original language, but in most cases I have added an English translation that gives the essence of the original quotation.

## 1. INTRODUCTION

On December 2, 1990 the first general election of reunified Germany took place. Both national and international election researchers followed the outcome with great interest. For the first time in European history a people who shared the same historical roots and political developments, but who were then in the course of history separated into two completely different political regimes for over forty years, were reunited and were to decide on the composition of a shared parliament. How would the people of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) vote in this first free election since the state elections in 1946? Would they take up where they left off in 1946 or had identification with the parties been completely disrupted during the decades of dictatorship? Or would the eastern Germans take over the party system that had developed in West Germany during the past few decades? These and many other questions were of interest for the researchers, as theories generally used in explaining voting behaviour could hardly be applied in this extraordinary situation. Whereas, for example, in the old *Länder*<sup>1</sup> the impact of the Catholic and workers' milieus, established during the German Empire and Weimar Republic, still influenced voting behaviour even in 1990, this was not the case in the new *Länder*<sup>2</sup>. This was confirmed by the election outcome: the Christian Democratic Party (CDU) won the election, also receiving the highest support in the former GDR, even though the Social Democratic Party (SPD) had been expected to have a strong structural basis of support given the large working class and the insignificant number of Catholics in the new *Länder*.

In the meantime, research has shown that the first general election of reunified Germany took place under very special circumstances. The voters' evaluation of the candidates and parties' trustworthiness and capabilities, especially regarding the reunification of East and West Germany and the economic future of reunified Germany, was important to the outcome (cf. Forschungsgruppe Wahlen 1990; Kaltefleiter 1991). The coalition parties in West Germany

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<sup>1</sup> This expression is being used when referring to the states (*Länder*) of the Federal Republic of Germany before unification including Schleswig-Holstein, Lower Saxony, Nordrhein-Westphalia, Palatinate, Hesse, Bavaria, Saarland, Bremen, Baden-Württemberg, Hamburg and West-Berlin.

<sup>2</sup> This expression is being used when referring to the states (*Länder*) of the former GDR including Mecklenburg-West Pomerania, Brandenburg, Saxony-Anhalt, Saxony, Thuringia and East-Berlin.

since 1983, the CDU/CSU<sup>3</sup> and the liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP), received the highest scores in these categories and won the election (cf. Kaltefleiter 1991). Thus, this election was more or less based on issue voting with party identification and social structural characteristics playing no or only a minor role, in particular in the former GDR (cf. Roth 1990:371).

Also developments since the first general election prove that this election was an exception and should not be used to generally predict future voting patterns of both the eastern and the western German electorate. The 1994 and 1998 general elections have, for example, shown that the Bündnis 90/die Grünen<sup>4</sup> and the successor of the GDR Communist party, the German Socialist Unity Party (SED), the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), have not disappeared from the political landscape. On the contrary, their political power has increased and since the 1998 general election the Bündnis 90/die Grünen is even - for the first time in their history - in power, forming a coalition with the SPD. The PDS managed the 5% election threshold and has its own faction in parliament.

Does this development indicate the rise of new social milieus in the electorate of reunified Germany in which the Bündnis 90/die Grünen, for example, represent the “environmental milieu“ and the PDS a “regional milieu“?

In this thesis, I will analyse existing, traditional milieus and try to identify rising new social milieus in reunified Germany. The following questions will form the centre of analysis:

- do the traditional social milieus which were established in the German Empire and Weimar Republic still exist in the old and new *Länder*?
- have any new social milieus arisen in the old and new *Länder*?

And finally, based on the answers found to the above questions

- can social milieus contribute to understand voting behaviour in Germany?

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<sup>3</sup> The CSU is only present in Bavaria, where it stands at elections instead of the CDU and the parties cooperate at the national level.

<sup>4</sup> The Greens were established in 1980 as a federation of regional formations formerly constituting the Other Political Union, the Greens (cf. Caramani 2000:398). Since 1993 the Greens form a party together with Bündnis'90 which was established in East Germany in 1990 from a number of formations (cf. Caramani 2000:396).

### 1.1 Background of the research question: The rise and fall of social milieus

In 1933 Germany was marked by a scattered party system and a break up of the close relationship between social milieus and parties established at the time of the German Empire and the Weimar Republic. According to Lepsius (1993:11ff., first published 1966), the four milieus which until then had been decisive for the development of the German party system, were the Catholic, the Conservative-Protestants, the Protestant-bourgeois and the Socialist workers and manual workers. The social milieus were established due to the existence of social conflicts and were represented by their respective political elite. All milieus were sharply separated from each other by moral barriers. Lepsius defines milieus as

"...Bezeichnungen für soziale Einheiten, die durch Koinzidenz mehrerer Strukturdimensionen wie Religion, regionale Tradition, wirtschaftliche Lage, kulturelle Orientierung, schichtspezifische Zusammensetzung der intermediären Gruppen, gebildet werden. Das Milieu ist ein sozio-kulturelles Gebilde, das durch eine spezifische Zuordnung solcher Dimensionen auf einen bestimmten Bevölkerungsteil bestimmt wird" (Lepsius 1993:38).<sup>5</sup>

Lepsius uses the stability of the close relationship between the social milieus and the parties to explain the instability of the German democratic system. The parties were the political representatives of these highly complex social milieus and their political activity was caught in the interest of the milieus (Lepsius 1993:37). In the German Empire the segregation of political blocs led to a lack of democratisation. This resulted in the splitting of the electorate and political elite holding uncompromising positions. In the Weimar Republic these milieus lost their unifying force and could no longer absorb voters who were not tied to a milieu or who had detached from their milieu (cf. Best 1989:8). This orientation vacuum provided a chance for the National Socialists (NSDAP) to gain votes.

After the Second World War and the division of Germany, two milieus were still dominant in West Germany, the Catholic and the workers' milieu. They were based on the religious cleavage which had changed from being one between Catholics and Protestants to one between religious and secular citizens and the cleavage between employers and workers (cf. a.o. Linz 1967; Pappi 1976; Pappi/Terwey 1982; Kühnel/Terwey 1990; von Alemann 1992).

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<sup>5</sup> English translation: „... characteristics of social units which are established through the coincidence of several structural dimensions such as religion, regional tradition, economic position, cultural orientation, the class composition of the intermediate groups. A milieu is a socio-cultural object which is defined by the specific arrangement of these dimensions on a certain part of the population”.

Both milieus had maintained their party ties - the Catholics to the CDU/CSU<sup>6</sup> and the workers to the SPD. In both milieus clear party loyalties existed and voting behaviour could be predicted based on religious belief and trade union membership.

## 1.2 The process of individualisation and the pluralisation of lifestyles

In the following decades, West Germany was marked by severe socio-economic transformations which enabled the individual to loosen the ties with the primary social environment and thus leave his milieu. Increasingly, the individual could freely choose his actions and way of life which again, according to many social scientists, led to a process of individualisation<sup>7</sup> (Beck 1986). Individualisation can be defined as „the process by which an individual acquires his or her unique characteristics which distinguish him or her from other persons“ (Koschnick 1992:496). These characteristics are therefore no longer solely „inherited“ from the social environment the individual was brought up in. Individualisation thus implies that the individuals of a modern society can belong to a growing number of different, sometimes contradictory and also changing, groups. Consequently, the impact each of these groups has on the behaviour of the individual decreases (Schnell/Kohler 1995:635).

In the case of voting behaviour a decrease in the impact of traditional milieus was stated. The milieus had shrunk due to social transformations<sup>8</sup> and no longer sufficiently explain the different attitudes and actions of a more complex West German electorate. In any case, new approaches which could explain individual and group behaviour beyond class and strata were increasingly demanded.

The lifestyle concept has been quite dominant in West Germany since the 1980s; it emphasises the individuals' *distinctive, but recognisable way of living*. Several analyses were

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<sup>6</sup> The CDU/CSU was newly founded after the war, resuming the traditions of the purely Catholic party, the Centre Party (Zentrum) and the Bavarian People's Party (BVP). Furthermore, it offered an attractive new platform for conservative Christian middle-class voters in the Protestant regions of West Germany (Pappi 1992:179).

<sup>7</sup> Whether an individualisation process has actually taken place is not the focus of this work. Nevertheless, it must be emphasised that the scientific community has different opinions on this matter. Problems in empirically testing the individualisation thesis arise in the definition and operationalisation of the concept as well as the availability of variables over time which are needed in a longitudinal analysis. For further discussions on this topic in Germany see, among others, Schnell/Kohler 1995; Müller 1997, Jagodzinski/Quandt 1997; Beck/Sopp 1997 and Friedrichs 1998.

<sup>8</sup> A summary of the most important social transformations in West Germany and the GDR will be given in Chapter 4.

made in order to categorise different lifestyle groups with the purpose of finding specific group preferences in, for example, the field of consumption, leisure, life quality and voting behaviours (cf. Becker/Nowak 1982; SPD 1984; Gluchowski 1987; Lüdtke 1989; Schulze 1992a; Giegler 1994; SPD 1984; Spellerberg 1996; Otte 1997; Oedegaard 2000). Whereas the traditional social structural approach only considers objective, often economic factors, the lifestyle concept also includes common behaviour and values of major groups in a society (cf. Spellerberg 1997:25). The lifestyle concept may thus be understood as a modern concept of social structure in which the expressed lifestyle is related to the economic capital and social asset of an individual, thus reflecting the social fragmentation of today's population better. Lifestyle analyses, for example, show that the social structural cleavages between religious and non-religious people and between workers and employers are reflected in the analysis of lifestyle groups (cf. SPD 1984; Gluchowski 1987, 1989, 1991). The lifestyle analyses also indicate other latent cleavages, for example, advancing conflicts between rich and poor people, between old and young people, between representatives of modern versus representatives of traditional values and between eastern and western Germans (cf. Gluchowski 1987, 1989, 1991; Becker/Becker/Ruhland 1992; Vester 1993, 1995; Oedegaard 1994, 2000; Spellerberg 1996).


The most important difference between West Germany and the GDR was the strong state control in the latter. The emergence of lifestyles in the west was a result of increased individual freedom, whereas social developments in the east were controlled by the state. Both Germanys had the same historical roots, but the traditional milieus that continued in the west after the Second World War, abruptly ended in the GDR. Although a worker-based milieu continued, its primary aim was to legitimise the SED-regime, and thus cannot be compared to the west. The meaning of life was to be found in Marxism and Socialism. Religion was thus opposed by the state and religious life only existed to a limited extent. However, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the reunification clearly showed that the East German population's views had changed over the decades too. The support for the official state ideology had continuously declined, especially amongst the younger population who asked for more individual freedom, although they could not freely express themselves. It was, among other things, the regime's disregard of the people's desire for change that finally led to its collapse (Glaebner 1991:25). Since the reunification, the eastern German population has also been categorised into lifestyles (cf. Becker/Becker/Ruhland 1992; Vester 1992; Vester/von Oertzen/Geiling/Hermann/Müller;

Ueltzhöfer/Flaig 1993; Vester/Hoffmann/ Zierke; 1995; Spellerberg 1996, 1997) and can be compared with the western German population in order to investigate how the population in two states has differently or similarly developed over the past 40 years.

### 1.3 Research question and framework of analysis

In today's research, the concept of the social milieu and the lifestyle concept are often treated as equal and used interchangeably (cf. Gluchowski 1989; Koch/Kurz/Mahr-Georg/Wasmer 1999). Analyses include an extensive number of variables and by using, for example, cluster analysis individuals are grouped by means of statistical procedure. The milieus or lifestyle groups are then defined, based on the homogeneity of various individual characteristics.

Social milieus defined on such a basis have quite different implications for individual behaviour if they are compared with Lepsius' usage of the social milieu as presented in Chapter 1.1; a statistically identified milieu may *assume* joint action between its members, but it cannot *prove* it. I will go into further details regarding these concepts, its similarities and differences, in Chapter 2 of this thesis. Nevertheless, for the formulation of the research question, I already need to emphasise the basic differences between the concepts of the milieu and the lifestyle at this point. As can be seen from Figure 1.1, the traditional social milieus of Lepsius are used as the starting point (1). In these traditional milieus the lifestyle of the members within each milieu was more or less identical. They participated in the same activities, dressed more or less the same way, spoke the same dialect, shared the same interests, values etc. The milieu was also closely connected to a region and a high level of interaction between the members of a milieu took place. There was a close relationship between the social milieus, (local) organisations and specific political parties, representing the interest of "their milieu" too.

**Figure 1.1 The transition of social milieus**

Especially in the post World War II decades extensive social transformations took place in both Germanys, even though these were stronger in the west than in the east; economic growth, expansion of education, technological developments etc. facilitated – at least in the west - geographical and social mobility (2). More or less simultaneously a value change started to take place, shifting the individual aims in life. Consequently, the society became more differentiated; the so-called individualisation process took place (3). This process resulted in the decrease of the large milieus with rather homogenous lifestyles, organisational memberships and party preferences among its members (4) and the rise of several new, more differentiated lifestyles which were not related to either specific organisations or political parties (5). The assumption is that some of these lifestyle groups may indicate the rise of what may be considered new social milieus (6).

**The general research question of this thesis thus is:**

**Do social milieus still exist in reunified Germany and if so, do the old and new *Länder* differ with respect to the existence of social milieus?**

As the social developments in the east and west since World War II have been of different natures the following assumptions will be made:

**In the old *Länder* the traditional milieus still exist, i.e. the religious and the workers' milieu, and there will also be signs of new milieus with features typical for a modernised society, for example, post-materialist features.**

**In the new *Länder* the traditional social milieus will no longer exist in the population, social milieus which are typical for an advanced industrialised society will not exist either, but milieus will exist covering specific eastern German features.**

The research question thus covers two components, a geographical and a time aspect. It deals with both the differences between the old and new *Länder* and the socio-economic changes that took place, particularly since the Second World War. The social changes are considered the reason for changing social milieus. Due to the lack of suitable data, the empirical analysis itself will be based on only one point in time, the 1998 German General Social Survey (ALLBUS). Nevertheless, other data, results and information – going as far back as to the German Empire and Weimar Republic - will be presented throughout the work to emphasise the proposed arguments.

Chapter 2 introduces the theoretical framework. The definition of the most frequently used concepts and theories in the sociological approach of voting behaviour will be discussed. It will focus on the social milieu and two concepts closely related to it; the cleavage and the lifestyle concept. Furthermore, two theories of value change will be discussed, as these seem to be essential for understanding the driving forces behind the changing milieus and thus changing voting patterns. In the following chapter the establishment of the most dominant cleavages and social milieus in the German Empire and Weimar Republic will be presented as well as their changes after the Second World War (Chapter 3). An outline of the most important differences in the social transformations in the old and new *Länder* until the reunification follows in Chapter 4. It gives some background information on how different or similar the two Germanys developed during the past few decades. This is - of course - important for understanding similarities and differences in the existing and developing social milieus and voting behaviour in the two states. Chapter 5 includes a presentation of social milieus or lifestyle groups in other empirical studies. With regard to the western German

population studies exist which relate lifestyle groups to party preference. Such studies are not available regarding the eastern German population. Nevertheless, the results allow some hypothetical reasoning, i.e. lifestyle groups showing certain party preferences.

Before presenting the results of the empirical analysis in Chapter 7, the hypotheses will be elaborated in Chapter 6 and an introduction of the data and variables as well as the strategy of data analysis will be given. Finally, in Chapter 7 social milieus will be analysed. Different analyses will be carried out for the eastern and western population due to their different political and historical developments from the end of the Second World War until the reunification. The analyses are based on the 1998 ALLBUS survey because this survey includes a special module of lifestyle questions. This study also has an extensive list of both past and present memberships in organisations of the respondent as well as information concerning voting behaviour. This information is fundamental for the analysis because it offers a connection between individuals sharing a similar lifestyle and a (possible) social milieu. In conclusion, a summary and discussion will follow (Chapter 8).



## 2. SOCIAL STRUCTURE, VALUE CHANGE AND VOTING BEHAVIOUR

Three different approaches are traditionally used in explaining voting behaviour. These are the sociological approach usually called the *social structural approach* with the Columbia-school and the circle of Paul F. Lazarsfeld and the cleavage theory of Lipset and Rokkan as the most prominent representatives, the *social-psychological approach* which is often referred to as the Michigan-school and finally the *theory of the rational voter* with Anthony Downs as the founding father (cf. Dalton/Wattenberg 1993; Roth 1998:23ff.). These approaches are often used complimentary in the study of voting behaviour, even though researchers tend to prefer one rather than the other in the conception of their research framework.

In particular, the social structural approach seems to be no longer interesting to electoral researchers. The social and economic processes which have taken place in western democracies during the past few decades have reduced the impact of the traditional social structural characteristics as, for example, occupation and denomination. Simultaneously, no new social structural characteristics with equal significance to explaining voting behaviour have emerged, even though new characteristics have been searched for like, for example, gender, private versus public employment and education (cf. a.o. Ola Listhaug 1989; Dalton/Wattenberg 1993; Hayes 1997; Falter/Gehring 1998).

Nevertheless, in combination with other characteristics such as value positions, social and political attitudes and behaviour, social structural characteristics may still contribute to explaining different voting patterns of social groups in the modern society. In this chapter, I will present in further detail the social structural approach and develop a theoretical framework in which it can (still) be useful to electoral research. The three concepts which were already introduced in Chapter 1, the cleavage, the milieu and the lifestyle concepts, will be in the centre of this presentation. The cleavage concept is probably the most known concept and was used by Lipset/Rokkan (1967) and Rokkan (1970) in order to explain the development of the European party system until the 1960s. The concept of the social moral milieu does not have the same international significance in election research as the cleavage concept. However, it has been used and still is used to explain the development of and changes

in the German party system (cf. Lepsius 1993; Pappi 1976; Best 1989; Schmitt 1989,1997; Zelle 1994).

The lifestyle concept is not a typical election research concept and has only been used to explain voting behaviour to a limited extent (cf. SPD 1984; Gluchowski 1987,1989,1991; Vester 1993; Otte 1997; Oedegaard 1994, 2000). However, as will also be analysed in this thesis, it might prove quite helpful in explaining voting behaviour in modernised societies featured by social fragmentation.

As I pointed out in Chapter 1, these concepts differ quite significantly but are to - some extent - also related. By showing their most important differences and similarities, I will work out this relationship. Furthermore, this chapter presents two theories of value change, Inglehart's theory of post-materialism and value change in the light of the secularisation process. It is often assumed that the stated decrease in impact of the traditional cleavages, the declining of social milieus, the process of individualisation and the pluralisation of lifestyles were - if not triggered - at least reinforced by value changes in the society. Finally, the use of the milieu concept and its application in this work together with the lifestyle and cleavage concept will be discussed.

## **2.1 Theories of social structure and voting behaviour**

### **2.1.1 Political cleavages and social milieus**

The social structural approach is often divided into the micro and macro level. The micro level approach is represented by the Colombia-school; its theory is based on the „social circles“ first mentioned by Georg Simmel (cf. Roth 1998:23). Applied to voting behaviour the theory implies that the voter lives in a certain context where the social circles of the voter are defined by economic status, religion, place of residence, occupation, age etc. These social circles influence the voter's decisions. Every social circle has its own norms and sticking to this norm is awarded with integration. Thus, the social structure is the individual's attachment to his social environment which again influences the individual's political attitudes. The different social influences are assumed to be either compatible and therefore reinforcing political attitudes, cumulatively or contradictory, thereby developing cross-pressure situations (cf. Lazarsfeld/Berelson/Gaudet1968:58; Tingsten 1963:230).

The macro sociological approach from Lipset/Rokkan (1967; Rokkan 1970) is based on the assumption that fundamental social conflicts exist within society which cause tensions. The individuals involved in these conflicts form groups with the purpose of promoting common interests. On the national level the interest groups search for partners, i.e. parties, trade unions and other organisations in order to influence the political decision-making processes. Consequently, members of certain social groups will vote for the party representing their interests. (cf. Pappi 1976; Dalton/Wattenberg 1993; Roth 1998). In their well-known study, *Party Systems and Voter Alignments*, Lipset/Rokkan (1967) explain the development of party systems in Western Europe according to different constellations of social conflicts, the so called cleavages existing in the societies:

"Conflicts and controversies can arise out of a great variety of relationships in the social structure, but only a few of these tend to polarize the politics of any given system. There is a *hierarchy of cleavage bases* in each system and these orders of political primacy not only vary among polities, but also tend to undergo changes over time" (Lipset/Rokkan 1967:6)

Although Lipset and Rokkan do not give a definition of a *cleavage*, three criteria are in general considered essential (Aardal 1997:215): 1. The contradictions usually have a socio-economic basis or a connection to identifiable social groups. There are, however, examples of cleavages which do not have such an embedment. 2) The contradictions must have been exposed to a process of ideological consciousness, that is voters who are influenced must realise that there exists a collective interest community and 3) the cleavage does not get institutionalised before parties, trade unions or other organisations are established. Concerning the question which cleavages are to be identified and how many, Rae and Taylor argue that:

"Cleavages are the criteria which divide the members of a community or sub community into groups and the relevant cleavages are those which divide members into groups with important political differences at specific times and places" (Rae/Taylor 1970:1).

Thus, the politically relevant cleavages may change over time and the question is how to possibly identify those cleavages which are politically significant at different times.

Several redefinitions of the cleavage concept have been made in West German scientific literature as, for example, the one by Pappi (1983:185) who defines cleavages as follows

“(...) generell können soziale Konflikt- und Spannungslinien als dauerhafte Konfliktpotentiale bestimmt werden, die in sozialstrukturellen Gruppierungen einer Gesellschaft verankert sind und wegen ihrer Politisierung bei Wahlen und Abstimmungen ihren Ausdruck finden.“<sup>9</sup>

Pappi (1992:190) sees a social cleavage as a lasting coalition between a population group and a political party. Since a population group is not a political actor, the interests of the group are represented by an organisation whose leaders form a coalition with a political party. He defines two such coalitions for the West German party system: the coalition of the Catholic Church with the CDU/CSU and the trade unions with the SPD.

In addition to cleavages which have their basis in the social structure, the argument is that *ideological cleavages* have become more important in recent decades (Aardal 1994:228ff.). According to Aardal, Valen introduced the concept in 1981 to distinguish between cleavages which originate from socio-economic structures and cleavages which to a lesser extent can be traced back to such structures. Valen defines ideological cleavages as “contradictions which exist in the consciousness of individuals and which can be identified on the basis of their opinion and evaluation of certain issues” (cf. Aardal 1994:229).

I would say that the question of whether Norway should join the EU or not is an example of such a cleavage which is neither established on a socio-economic basis or has a connection to just one social group. The alliance of the no-side consists both of farmers, business men, academics and people living in the periphery as well as in northern Norway. In the 1993 parliamentary election the agrarian-protectionist anti-EU Centre Party (Senterpartiet) received 16.7% of the votes and became the third strongest party in parliament (cf. Aardal 1999:12). The election was considered to be an indicator for the EU referendum in November 1994. At the referendum 47.8% voted for EU-membership and 52.2% against. In the meantime the support of the Centre party has dropped significantly, as the EU-issue has withdrawn into a state of latency. However, it might rise again as it did in the early 1990s after about 20 years of latency after the first EU-referendum in 1972 (cf. Aardal 1994:237).

Aardal emphasises that it is necessary to distinguish between short-term issues and more permanent ideological contradictions which may be considered as cleavages, though.

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<sup>9</sup> English translation: „(...) in general social conflicts and tensions may be considered lasting conflict potentials which are fixed in the social structural groupings of a society and which are expressed at elections due to their politicisation.“

Empirically such dimensions have been analysed on the basis of issues by means of, for example, factor analysis. However, Aardal suggests calling these attitudinal dimensions rather than cleavages to emphasise that it is not yet clear whether these dimensions actually represent independent cleavages (Aardal 1994:230). As it is the aim of this thesis to analyse whether new cleavages exist or may develop which are of a different kind than the traditional ones usually applied in analyses of cleavages in the German society, the empirical analysis in Chapter 7 includes issues which are assumed to measure such *ideological cleavages*. I would like to emphasise already at this point, though, that although I will refer to these issues as cleavages, only future analyses including more relevant variables for the measurement of attitudinal dimensions are needed in order to test empirically to which extent these ideological cleavages may actually be considered cleavages or whether they are short-term issues.

According to Hradil (Hradil 1992a:21) Hippolyte Tain is generally considered the original founder of the milieu concept in the social sciences. He emphasised the contextual fusion of numerous heterogeneous objective and subjective components in the environment which are considered causal for the everyday pattern of living. Emile Durkheim put the milieu concept in a theoretical framework by separating the *outer* social environment or society from the *inner* social milieu which is the immediate community surrounding the individual (cf. Hradil 1992a:21ff).

In political science Rainer M. Lepsius' theory of the social moral milieu is most important in contributing to the understanding of the development of the German party system in the time of the German Empire and the Weimar Republic. The political milieus were formed as a result of the influence of several factors such as religion, regional traditions, cultural orientation, class/strata etc. The sub-cultural infrastructure was important for the political social milieus. Institutions like parties, trade unions and church associations had a unifying function. The milieu concept is quite closely related to the cleavage concept as it also focuses on the interests of specific social groups and their alliances with political parties representing their respective interests. However, Lepsius' social moral milieus are to a larger extent connected to local or regional traditions than the cleavage concept (Lepsius 1993; cf. Pappi 1976:617). This implies that the norms of the milieus are basically established through direct social interaction whereas the similar political attitudes of the cleavage groups come into existence by pure

identification with political aims and norms. In the case of the social milieus the regional party traditions are also important to the voting pattern of the electorate and Lepsius shows how differently similar socially structured regions developed in the years towards the end of the Weimar Republic (Lepsius 1993)<sup>10</sup>.

Even though Lepsius' applied the concept of the social moral milieu in order to describe the problems of the development of the German party system and the lack of democratisation in the Weimar Republic, the concept is also used today and helps to explain long lasting group attachments and party identification as well as the decline in this area. However, when applying concepts under different conditions than they were initially intended for, changes in definition will necessarily occur although the main implications remain. I will return to the milieu concept and the way it will be applied in this thesis later in this chapter.

Lepsius' theory of the social moral milieu has been particularly criticised in one aspect. The definition of social milieus as a synthesis of several dimensions of social structure conceals the fact that in complex societies individuals usually belong to several intermediate groups. These have different and sometimes contradictory expectations of their members (Best 1989:12). If it is anticipated that the configuration of group memberships and their different strengths and effects of loyalty produce a connection between social structure and politics, it is thus necessary to study the importance of the role of elites in the perception of cleavages and the formation of milieus.

This development takes place through the process of communalisation (*Vergemeinschaftung*) and aggregation (*Vergesellschaftung*) (Weber 1976, first published 1922). Weber's terminology is reminiscent of the differentiation made by Tönnies in his pioneering work *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft* (1971, first published 1887). Tönnies uses the concepts to explain social transformations that took place in the history of western societies from the early Middle Ages to his lifetime. The communities (*Gemeinschaften*) were characterised by a close relationship between individuals. The individualisation process dissolved these ties and in the society (*Gesellschaft*) human behaviour was marked by the individual's free choice of means to reach the desired goal. This again resulted in the formation of new unities through groups and organisations, replacing the old ties of the primary social environment. These

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<sup>10</sup> Further details on the development of cleavages and social milieus in the German Empire and Weimar Republic will be given in Chapter 3.

developments must be seen in a dynamic relationship to one another, with the Community defined as a precondition for shaping the Society.


According to Best, the relationship between cleavages and milieus can be studied in five phases and is based on Weber's differentiation between communalisation and aggregation. In the first phase, differences between social categories exist, but they have not (yet) developed into political communities or manifest conflicts, i.e. the cleavages are latent. Subjective solidarity in the sense of communalisation is felt without leading to a collision of interests - communalisation is a result of emotional or traditional attachments of the participants (Best 1989:14ff.).

The second phase is one of definition. Differences are perceived either as advantage or disadvantage. This starts the process of a development to a rationally motivated union of interests in the sense of aggregation. The aggregation of social relationships is the result of reconciliation and balancing of interests which are motivated either by rational value-judgements or expediency. This implies that the subjective meaning of a social relationship may change from being one based on solidarity into one based on conflict. In this phase a relationship between latent interest groups and the elite divisions is drawing to an end.

An extensive structure of unions and associations with special political affiliations arises in the third phase, i.e. the cleavages become manifest. If they fully developed, they form social moral milieus. In the end of their development these political communities reach their highest point of capacity and readiness for conflict. The fragmentation of the elite reflects the segmentation of the population. The elite is more interested in maintaining its autonomy in the milieus than integrating into the all-society (*Gesamtgesellschaft*). This situation leads to the fourth phase which has two possible outcomes. One outcome is based on conflict: the milieus are either concentrated in territorial strongholds or organised at the trans-regional level. The other possible outcome is a peaceful settlement of interests within the concordant solution of the proportional democracy.

The last and fifth phase starts with the break-up of subcultures; a process of de-segmentation of the cleavages begins. The cleavages can have an underlying effect on political behaviour even if the differences that had caused them, vanished. The cleavages which have been eliminated from a present conflict situation, can also proceed to a state of latency. An adequate

example is the revival of the religious cleavage in Germany in the 19th century after almost 200 years of latency. Figure 2.1 shows the five phases described above.

**Figure 2.1 The dynamics between cleavages, social milieus and elites**

### 2.1.2 Lifestyle as a modern concept of social structure

With the complete success of the industrialised society, milieus and cleavages retreated into the background and the occupational status moved to the foreground. Based on the idea that *das Sein das Bewußtsein bestimmt* the analysis of social structure was strongly influenced by the anticipation that objective factors like age, sex, income, profession and education also determined the mind and actions of the individual (Hradil 1992a:9). Although voting behaviour was still explained by church attendance and membership in trade unions, the noticeable reduction of these groups together with the growth of a new middle class, led to an increased focus on the individual's placement in the class/strata hierarchy.

In the late 1960s the impression grew that the objective features alone were insufficient in order to explain individual behaviour and attitudes. Changes in the society like expansion of education, mobility, urbanisation, increase in resources, decrease in working hours and thereby increased leisure time, welfare services etc., had resulted in a process of individualisation, pluralisation in the ways of living and changes in value orientations (Beck 1986). Increasingly, the lifestyle concept was used in the study of the social structure.

The emergence of the lifestyle concept can be traced back to the beginning of the 20th century. Like the micro-level approach of the social structure used by Lazarsfeld et.al. (cf. Chapter 2.1.1 ) it is also based on Georg Simmel's theories (1968). Simmel argued that modern society increasingly confronts the individual with different social groups; the individual is part of the environment he grows up in and later part of his own family, as well as part of other social groups encountered through occupation or memberships in different organisations etc. The individual can, by acquiring certain qualities, turn to a more distant group which has characteristics that are different from the primary social group the individual belongs to. This results in an individualisation process and the development of lifestyles which are not forced out of external living conditions and original group attachments. In *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (1989, first published 1904-05), Weber, for example, emphasises the impact of social value orientations on the lifestyles of religious groups.

It was the marketing field in the USA in the 1960s which first reintroduced the lifestyle concept. It realised that objective features were no longer sufficient to distinguish between consumer groups. Danielsen (1991:853) sees this growing interest for lifestyle studies as a

sign of a new paradigm for sociological analysis of modern societies that reflects current trends in marketing and the turbulent life of complex societies generally.

The importance of class/strata has, however, not vanished with the increasing focus on lifestyles. On the contrary, lifestyles are used to explain how differences between classes continue and how these differences develop. Already in the 1930s Geiger (1967:5) observed specific mentalities in the different social classes stating

"(...) daß ein Bevölkerungsteil von bestimmter ökonomisch-sozialer Lage typisches Rekrutierungsfeld einer Schicht von bestimmter Mentalität ist." <sup>11</sup>

According to Bourdieu (1982) three important resources are unequally distributed in the population: the economic, the cultural and the social capital (i.e. social relations). The different distribution of these capitals decides which class the members of society belong to. By growing up in different living conditions certain class-specific forms of *Habitus* emerge which influence the thoughts, perceptions and values of the individual resulting in different patterns of everyday life and different ways of action thus resulting in class-specific lifestyles.

Since the 1980s the lifestyle concept experienced a renaissance in West Germany, too. The first study was conducted by Sinus (Becker/Nowak 1982). By using cluster-analysis consumer groups were categorised based on factors that influenced the individual's everyday life: work, family, leisure, plans for the future, dreams and concerns, subjective variables that again explain attitudes, values and actions.

The growing tendency of volatility in the electorate and the rise of post-materialistic value orientations resulted in an increased popularity of lifestyle studies also in political science. The first categorisation of the West German voters was carried out by Sinus (SPD 1984) on behalf of the SPD with the aim to track down new potential voters for the party. A study followed by Gluchowski (1987), who focused on the change of the traditional support base for the CDU/CSU. He categorised the electorate into political generations and divided them into traditional and modern lifestyles. According to Gluchowski there are many different definitions of lifestyles. He thus proposes that

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<sup>11</sup> English translation: "(...) that a part of the population with a specific economic-social position is a typical field of recruitment for a specific class mentality.

"...als kleinster gemeinsamer Nenner aller Lebensstil Definitionen der verschiedenen Forschungsrichtungen kann gelten, daß der Lebensstil als eine typische unverwechselbare Struktur von im Alltagsleben sichtbaren Verhaltensweisen bei Individuen oder Gruppen von Individuen angesehen wird" (Gluchowski 1991:212).<sup>12</sup>


The list of definitions is endless; basically they all express the same expectations: lifestyles are to be understood as manifest, not imposed patterns of behaviour which are characterised by a high degree of self-reflection and expressive symbolism (Hradil 1992a:29). Furthermore, all lifestyle definitions generally assume that social participants in general orientate socially by their lifestyles and at the same time dissociate themselves through their lifestyle from other participants and groups (cf. Otte 1997:304; Hölscher 1998:16).<sup>13</sup>

The lifestyle concept tries to include all factors which might influence the individual's thoughts and actions. These factors form part of two opposing points (Müller 1992): The materialistic point which determines the basis for individual action. Objective social structural features such as social background, profession, income and fortune, age, sex and nationality are located here. Opposite the ideal point is located which determines the situation of individual action. Here the impact of the social environment on individual action can be found. Social environment influencing individual behaviour are according to Müller, for example, social background and family and socialisation through school, work and other group attachments etc. In Figure 2.2, I have tried to summarise Müller's arguments graphically. As shown in Figure 2.2 the materialistic and ideal points may be understood as the foundation for the expressed lifestyle. Values are positioned in the middle of the diagram because they are a product of both the materialistic and the ideal point.

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<sup>12</sup> English translation: „(...) the lowest common denominator of all lifestyle definitions in the different research areas may be that a lifestyle is seen as a typical, unmistakable structure of visible attitudes by individuals or groups of individuals in everyday life.“

<sup>13</sup> Several books have been published which discuss the application of the lifestyle approach in the social sciences, for example, Berger/Hradil 1990; Hradil (ed.) 1992a and Schwenk (ed.) 1996. See also the summary of lifestyle surveys presented in Chapter 5.1.

**Figure 2.2 The formation of the individual lifestyle**

### 2.1.3 Social milieus and lifestyles in the former GDR

Since the reunification the study of social milieus and lifestyles has received growing attention in the new *Länder*. This is probably due to the limited possibilities during the SED regime to conduct research regarding changes in mentality and the social structure of the eastern German population during the time of the SED regime. With the fall of the Berlin Wall the research into different and similar developments in the eastern and western population was made possible, using theories and methods employed in the West during the last decades.

The main questions in the first years after the reunification were the following: where those social milieus and lifestyles that existed in the former GDR before the reunification similar to those which had been found in West Germany (Ritschel 1992:293)? And what would happen to the milieus and lifestyles in the new *Länder* after the reunification? In this respect Vester (1992:347) argued that the milieus or lifestyles which might develop in the eastern German population would depend on how the members of every social group managed to handle the rapid changes that took place in the eastern German social structure.

Two aspects need special consideration when the concepts of the milieu and the lifestyle are applied to the former GDR. The first focuses on the difference in the modernisation processes of West and East Germany. It was in the field of values and norms, thinking and actions of the individual that the social structure in the West changed. Hradil (1992b:13) argues that at the time of the reunification, West Germany had left the stage of the typical industrial society and had reached a new level of modernisation, one of a developed industrial society. However, modernisation did not just occur in a positive sense through, for example, state benefits and a general increase in the standard of living. A *subjectivisation* took place based on the failures of modernisation. The everyday functionalism of the individual in society caused so many negative aspects that neither state nor market; only individual control could remove them.

In contrast, the former GDR focused on an *objective* modernisation where individual possibilities, means and ends were objectively measured. This kind of modernisation aimed at an extensive functionality, expediency and protection against failure. This policy damaged the economy, the environment and creativity to the same extent. In the worst case this meant that lifestyles did not develop in the GDR. The social movements of the younger generation, those born after the formation of the GDR, can, however, be traced back to the mid-1980s. They basically reflected a growing criticism of the system. Young people realised the inconsistency of the official ideology in the GDR and their real experiences in everyday life (Gensicke 1992,1993).

The second aspect emphasises the difficulty in judging the long-term significance of lifestyles in the eastern German population. Even now, a decade after the reunification, extreme changes occur in the lives of individuals. Many feel insecure about the future and have partly lost control over their situation. Thus, analyses of the eastern Germans' changing behaviour need to be treated carefully because noticeable attitudes and mentalities, including the ability to handle a crisis, might only be temporary (cf. Schweigel/Segert/Zierke 1992:61). With the reunification the three sources which are according to Bourdieu necessary to keep the social status were devaluated in the new *Länder* (Vester 1995:9); the economic capital was devaluated through de-industrialisation, the educational capital through downgrading and the social capital through political and social patronisation.

Increasingly, the eastern Germans focus on their own regional and social group values; they combine structures and experiences from both the old and new society. Due to the historical

preconditions, however, most of the eastern Germans will not be able to catch up with the modernisation of the western Germans; the coincidence of the economic boom, more chances and social integration does not exist anymore. On the contrary, especially the eastern German workers' milieu is confronted with a declining industry and agriculture, thus losing its social structural basis (Vester 1995:10ff.). Thus, even now a decade after the reunification, analyses of lifestyles in the new *Länder* should take into consideration the still ongoing changes in the eastern German population when trying to predict future behaviour. A summary of some lifestyle studies conducted in the eastern and western German population will be presented in Chapter 5.

## 2.2 Theories of value change

The change in values is often considered a consequence of the modernisation process<sup>14</sup> that took place in western industrialised democracies over the past few decades. This modernisation process changed the preconditions of the materialistic and ideal points presented in Figure 2.2 in Chapter 2.1.2, thus influencing the development of and change in values, lifestyles and social milieus (cf. also Figure 1.1, Chapter 1.3).

Before presenting two theories that seem significant for explaining value change in Western Germany over the past few decades, it should be emphasised that the debate on values and value change is characterised by different and even sometimes contradictory arguments. It is, for example, questioned how values and value change are to be defined and measured and what the consequences of these processes are, both at the individual and at the societal level (cf. a.o. Inglehart 1977, 1989, 1997; Klages 1984,1992; Meulemann 1992,1996; Bürklin/Klein 1998; Hammes 1996). Nevertheless, it is important for the further discussion in this work that research results have proven that value orientations may be considered a universal key in understanding social attitudes and behavioural dispositions (Klages 1992:9). Thus, it might be assumed that changes in values may also change social attitudes and behavioural dispositions on the individual level which then might have significant impact on the collective level.

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<sup>14</sup> A detailed presentation and discussion of social transformations in both eastern and western Germany will be given in Chapter 4.

The two theories which shall be presented in further detail in the following sections are value changes in the light of Inglehart's theory of post-materialism and Maslow's motivation theory and an approach which relates changing value orientations with the secularisation process in post-war West Germany. Although both theories have their origin in western democracies of the post World War II era, research indicates that the preconditions for value change were also fulfilled in the former GDR, although not with the same strength and not in all fields (Gensicke 1992; Klages/Gensicke 1993).

### **2.2.1 Maslow's motivation theory and Inglehart's theory of post-materialism**

Maslow's (1954) motivation theory emphasises the fact that value changes take place when certain needs have been satisfied. The needs are placed on different levels in a value hierarchy. When basic needs, i.e. need of survival, are fulfilled the individual will move onto the next level. Other values like security and stability will then become important. On the third level, when the needs on the second level are fully satisfied, the individual will strive for acknowledgement, status, independence and freedom, respect etc. In the end, the highest level expressed by self-realization, is reached.

Inglehart (1977) used this theory in order to explain changing political values. The value orientations can be classified into two big groups: the materialist, seeking materialistic supply and security and the post-materialist characterised by the struggle for self-realization. The transition of the groups is based on the thesis of shortage and socialisation. Materialistic needs will lose their priority among individuals whose needs have already been satisfied. Those who have not yet reached the level of materialistic satisfaction will give top priority to it.

In advanced industrial societies, the material needs of the population are basically satisfied and they therefore, receive less attention compared to the new, post-materialistic values. The older generation often experienced economic difficulties or insecurity during their formative years and will thus give a relatively high priority to materialistic and military security. Post-war generations were brought up during a period of unprecedented affluence, economic well-being and personal security and turn their attention to post-materialistic goals (Dalton/Flanagan/Beck 1984:20). Issues of post-materialism are, for example, environmental interest, peace and solidarity with the Third World. Inglehart assumes that the following

generation will keep the same list of priorities. This generation thesis thus anticipates that throughout the years post-materialists will dominate the society.

Both theories have frequently been criticized. Firstly, an individual can have needs of different levels simultaneously, for example, an individual may want higher materialistic satisfaction and security as well as respect and self-realization (Bürklin/Klein 1998:142). Secondly, value orientations shift during the different phases of life. This phenomenon is also known as life cycle thesis and is empirically proven. The number of post-materialists does therefore not increase as Inglehart assumes; on the contrary, it remains rather constant (cf. Bürklin 1988:108; Klages 1992:21). The proportion of mixed value types, i.e. West Germans having a preference for both materialist and post-materialist values, seems to have increased during the past 25 years from 42% in 1970 to 55% in 1994 (Bürklin/Klein 1998:151). More aspects of the above theories have been criticized, particularly regarding the validity and reliability of the measurement instrument of post-materialism (for details on this debate see a.o. Klages 1992; Bürklin/Klein 1998:148ff.).

Although as shown above, several aspects of Inglehart's and Maslow's theories can be questioned, I will also assume that a link between the satisfaction of materialistic needs and value orientations exists. It helps to explain plausibly differences in value orientations between the two Germanys. The eastern Germans, in all probability, have not yet reached a level of materialistic satisfaction. Thus, it can contribute to understand the existence of different lifestyle groups and social milieus in the old and new *Länder*. It should be emphasised, though, that the first level of Maslow's theory is based on a minimum level of existence which is not characteristic for the situation in either Germany.

The concepts of materialism and post-materialism expressing value changes are often used interchangeably with value changes as a movement away from the values of duty and acceptance, towards an increased impact on self-realization and self-development (Klages 1984). Klages distinguishes between four value types: the conventionalists, characterised by a traditional values system (acceptance and security), the realists, who cherish both traditional values as well as values emphasising self-realization and engagement, the resigned, who deny values altogether and finally the idealists, who are characterised by self-realization and engagement. In summary, Klages' conventionalist may be compared to Inglehart's materialists and the idealists to the post-materialists (cf. Schorpp 1989:23f.; Hammes 2002:53). According

to Klages, however, value change is no linear development, for example towards post-materialism. Klages argues that value change is influenced by different forces and tendencies in society and depending on the circumstances will take place in phases or be of a cyclic or waveformed character. With time he expects a synthesis of values in which an integration of materialist and post-materialist values takes place (Klages 1988). Such a development towards and increase of mixed values types was confirmed in a survey he conducted in 1987/88. As can be seen from Figure 4.4 in Chapter 4.3.1 an increase in mixed value types in the western German population from approximately the mid 1980s can be confirmed on the basis of the Eurobarometer surveys as well.

From now the concepts materialism/post-materialism and duty and acceptance/self-realization and self-development will be used interchangeably.

### **2.2.2 Value change in the light of the secularisation process**

According to Meulemann, sociology has developed an own perspective on values. Since values determine the actions of individuals, they function as a mechanism for social integration in the society and are thus important to the holding together of society (1996:49). Meulemann (1985,1992,1996) distinguishes between four values he considers important to social integration<sup>15</sup>; equality, achievement, co-determination and acceptance.

Equality presents fairness and equal treatment or equal chances. Equality as a value is irrefutable, but so is its level of realization. If everybody approves of a certain value, each individual can still differently perceive its level of realization.

Achievement the second value is what can be considered as the result of one's own efforts. Achievement is a medium for self-realization. In a society with a highly developed division of work, specialised functions have to be fulfilled. Individuals, however, will only carry out specialised tasks if they are considered as personal achievements. Thus, society has to make achievements possible in order to tie the individuals to them.

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<sup>15</sup> Meulemann understands social integration as the holding together of the society which is not based on force, but on consensus of the members of the society (1996:48).

Co-determination is a value in all fields where power is being fought for. This is, in particular in the political field, but also in economy and upbringing and education. In modern societies individuals' opportunities are - to a large extent - determined by social institutions which the individual can neither overlook nor influence. Co-determination helps to soften the feeling of alienation which is unavoidable in industrialised and bureaucratic societies.

Finally, traditional values can justify an individual's destiny that cannot be explained in any other way. These traditions are based on the confidence and the beliefs of the individuals. This implies that if a tradition is no longer followed, it cannot be restored or imposed through coercion or persuasion. Meulemann characterises the existence of such values as acceptance. Acceptance itself is, however, not a value; it reflects a certain attitude to institutions and the norms and values they embody (Meulemann 1996:73). In every society inequalities and misfortunes occur which cannot be explained by the failure or fault of the individual or of society. These realities are easier to accept if explained by destiny – acceptance can thus facilitate social integration where the other values fail (cf. Meulemann 1996:74).

In this sense the continuation of traditional values differ very much from that of the social moral milieu because the acceptance of traditional values is not solely based on the transfer from the immediate social environment; rather it has been individually chosen as valuable. In traditional as well as modern society, religion plays an important role. Therefore, the degree of acceptance can indirectly be estimated by the significance of religion. Meulemann anticipates that the traditional values in the population have decreased parallel to a decline in church attendance. With the decrease of religion as a value the individual has to find the meaning of life by himself. Some people seek it in their professional life, but work is also decreasingly considered an end in itself and thus insufficient in fulfilling the wish for a meaningful life. The individual can do his duties, but does not necessarily consider it as a meaning of life. It can seek the meaning of life in two remaining areas: identification with family and participation in politics, i.e. the meaning of life can be found in both the private and the public sphere.

Empirical results on the development from materialism to post-materialism as well as in the four fields of social integration will be presented in further detail in Chapter 4.

### 2.3 The differentiation between lifestyle groups and social milieus – the impact of organisational membership

One of the problems in evaluating the contribution of milieus and lifestyles to the understanding of voting behaviour is the interchangeable use of the concepts in modern sociology (Otte 1997:306; Hartmann 1999:71; Oedegaard 1994, 2000; Zerger 2000:79). On the one hand, Schulze (1992b) talks about the transformations of milieus which today are characterised by individuals who choose their social circles independently and selectively. The social milieus are large groups of people with similar characteristics and intensified internal communication. On the other hand, Gluchowski (1989) sees the development as a change from traditional milieus to modern lifestyles. Others again define a milieu as a lifestyle group which is (statistically) as homogeneous as possible (Blasius 1994:237).

This mixture of definitions and ways of perceiving milieus and lifestyles may not be significant for distinguishing between consumer groups or explaining inequality among social groups. However, when used in election research, milieus and lifestyles have different meanings regarding the tenacity of party preferences. Social milieus should be considered in the light of Lepsius' definition. The social milieus express the presence of a long-lasting adherence to traditions, values and party affiliations which are not easily influenced by changes in society (cf. also Hörning/Michailow 1990:504). Their intermediate level of associations like trade unions, church organisations, environmental organisations etc strengthens these milieus. In the old *Länder*, milieus that can be traced back to the German Empire and the Weimar Republic still exist and political parties are still supported by their traditional milieus. Although these milieus have decreased in size over the last few decades, traditional milieus still exist. Bürklin (1988:79) states

" (...) daß die gruppenbezogenen Bestimmungsgründe des Wahlverhaltens in ihren Grundstrukturen gegenüber sozialem Wandel relativ hartnäckig sind."<sup>16</sup>

In order to be able to distinguish clearly between these concepts, lifestyles should be regarded as phenomena which long lasting impact still have to be proven (Diewald 1990:22). Firstly, lifestyles are easier exposed to social developments and value changes which can cause the rise and fall of lifestyle groups. Secondly, some groups are based on features that

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<sup>16</sup> English translation: „(...) that group related voting decisions are in their basic structure relatively resistant to social change.“

characterise an individual in a certain life situation. In the long run, these lifestyle groups will probably continue, but are not necessarily made up of the same individuals. Is it likely, for instance, that the young, unmarried, post-materialistic university student, who votes for the Greens, will do this for the rest of his life? He will, most certainly not, be in the same life situation all his life. However, as emphasised in Chapter 1.3 and showed in Figure 1.1 some of these lifestyle groups might also be developing social milieus.

As discussed above the lifestyle concept in election research is often criticised (cf. Müller-Rommel/Poguntke; Roth 1998:32) because it is difficult to clarify how the empirically established homogenous lifestyle groups can contribute to explaining voting behaviour as can be done with the social milieus. Lifestyle groups are based on certain homogenous factors of their members. But these factors do not necessarily have the same meaning or importance for each individual member. For example, we do not know whether a lifestyle group dominated by singles indicates the individual's preference for this way of living or whether they simply cannot find a partner. In addition, we cannot distinguish between those in the group being single for the first or the second reason because this is usually not asked.

Furthermore, social milieus are often defined as (very) homogenous lifestyle groups. Due to similar values and economic and social positions, a higher level of communication between individuals of a specific social milieu is expected. These social milieus are often criticised by electoral researchers because they lack the unifying function which was so significant to the establishment of traditional milieus and their impact on voting behaviour. Thereby, an important link between such milieus and a certain party preference is missing. In particular, since it is not always obvious whether an item has the same meaning for the individuals sharing a lifestyle or not, it cannot be assumed that a higher level of communication exists only due to a similarity of characteristics. Recalling that in the traditional milieus of Lepsius such unifying functions were fulfilled by, for example, trade unions or church associations, I would argue that there must be a link between a lifestyle group and organisational membership<sup>17</sup> in order to define a social milieu.

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<sup>17</sup> In this work organisations also include associations, clubs, societies, charities etc. For a detailed discussion on the different organisational types see Sahner 1993:23ff.

In this way we can at least assume that the interests of the individuals in a lifestyle group is going in the same direction (cf. Weßels 2000:131). As emphasised by Immerfall (1997:141ff.) voluntary organisations facilitate the development of the citizen's consciousness, self-organisation and solidarity. Furthermore, voluntary organisations provide 'free spaces' for the development of civil skills and more assertive group identities (cf. van Deth 1998:135).

According to von Alemann (1996) it might be correct that a process of individualisation as also stated by many sociologists took place, but this has not resulted in the disappearance of the organised society. On the contrary, the impact of the third sector has increased - sports organisations grow, trade unions still exist and the traditional welfare organisations have not failed in competing with the growing number of commercial nursing services. Epple (1995:40), too, argues that present analyses on decision-making processes reflect the indisputable tendency towards individualisation and anonymisation. However, these analyses ignore the existence of traditional relationships or the impact of new social relationships like informal connections at work and in leisure. Thus, not only the impact of organisations which traditionally have an impact on individual voting behaviour should be analysed. Other organisations which do, at first glance, not seem to be of particular importance to the political decision making process, should also be included in the analysis. In „Voting“ (1954) Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee, for example, analysed the impact of organisations on the voting decision of the citizens in Elimra, New York, with regard to the 1948 presidential election. They found out that

„(...) organizations as such do little in the way of potential political activity, yet membership does have an effect simply by bringing together people of like social position and interests“ (1954:53).

Thus, they argued, “organisational membership brings out latent political predispositions“ (Berelson/Lazarsfeld/McPhee 1954:53).

When stating the decline of the impact of old group memberships on voting behaviour it must be considered that new relationships between organisations and voting behaviour might have arisen. These new relationships might not have the lifelong impact old group memberships have and they will probably also not include such large homogenous groups as trade unions and church associations. But they may still be significant for the voting decision of the individual. Even Max Weber stated that choral societies in Germany have a considerable

effect in at first glance unlikely areas, for example, in political ones (cf. Sahner 1993:47; see also Otte 1998:187 and van Deth 2001:214).

Furthermore, in contrast to Lepsius', I assume that social milieus today do not have to be regionally restricted (cf. Chapter 2.1.1). As pointed out by Böltken (1992:169), there is a general tendency towards trans-local orientations and group specific lifestyles; groups are no longer regionally fixed in advance. In today's society most regional organisations are also part of national and partly also transnational organisations. And even if organisations only exist at the national level the development of modern technology facilitates, for example, with the help of the Internet, the establishment of specific group interests and group awareness between the individuals even though no direct personal interaction might take place in everyday life (cf. Beck 1997, Oedegaard 1994 and 2000). Several German parties have, for example, established virtual organisations in the Internet which they want to have the same legal status as a *Landesverband* (party organisation at the *Länder* level). These virtual party organisations offer chat-rooms and email exchanges between party members who due to job mobility both within Germany and abroad or only limited leisure time cannot engage in traditional party organisations. The SPD established such a virtual party organisation already in 1995 (SPD:2002), the FDP founded one in June 2002 (FDP:2002) and the PDS followed with the establishment of a 17. *Landesverband* end August 2001 (Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus:2001). As party memberships decrease the parties hope that in particular new and young members may be addressed through an Internet based party membership. To which extent this kind of organisational membership will actually become a significant alternative to traditional organisations remains to be seen. In particular this will depend on the future legal status these on-line organisations will have.

The above presented arguments can be summarised in the following way:

**I assume that both old and new social milieus exist in the German population. The old milieus are featured by traditional lifestyles and are still formed on the basis of social structural cleavages, like class, religion and region. To a certain extent, these cleavages are still reflected by organisations that are closely linked with specific political parties. In order to detect potential new milieus, new lifestyles also have to be considered. These lifestyles incorporate different aspects of the individual's way of living and its values. They might indicate the existence of other cleavages than the ones expressed by**

**traditional lifestyles and milieus. The membership structure of lifestyle groups and their connection to specific political parties is important for the establishment of new social milieus.**

As emphasised by Kriesi (1998:181)

“The decline of traditional cleavages does not necessarily signify the end of structuration of politics by social divisions. The crux is to identify theoretically and empirically the relevant social divisions in a world in flux and to study their political formation.”

In the empirical analysis in Chapter 7 lifestyle groups will therefore be used to describe statistically more or less homogeneous groups defined by important life areas, leisure activities and aesthetic preferences.

Thus, a lifestyle group will be defined as a

**group of people expressing similar values, leisure activities and aesthetic preferences in everyday life.**

By applying the lifestyle approach the assumption is that not only traditional cleavages become visible, but also – as pointed out by Kriesi – theoretically and empirically relevant social division and to study their political formation. A cleavage is in this thesis thus understood as a

**characteristic or issue which is represented by one particular lifestyle group which is also connected to organisational membership and organisational interest representation.**

These cleavages may be either latent or manifest (cf. Figure 2.3). Whereas latent cleavages may be understood as social divisions – either on the basis of social structure or issue position - which may have the “quality” and importance of becoming real societal cleavages, but have not yet reached the surface, manifest cleavage implies that a particular social division already exists and has been institutionalised by organisations and parties.

And finally,

**a social milieu will be defined if an association exists between a lifestyle group, cleavage(s), organisational membership, organisational interest representation and party preference.**

An discussion of the distinction and relationship between the concepts will take place in the following chapter.

#### **2.4 A theoretical framework for analysing cleavages, lifestyles and social milieus in modern electoral research**

Figure 2.3 (based on Figures 2.1 and 2.2) will be used to clarify the distinction between a lifestyle group and a social milieu as defined above. Figure 2.3 may be interpreted as follows: the individual lifestyle is a product of personal and socio-economic features, the experiences which have had an impact on the individual's values and socialisation process. In everyday life, the individuals choose to socialise with people with whom they basically share similar characteristics<sup>18</sup>, a process of communalisation takes place. Different groups exist side by side and no major conflict of interests arises. These groups can also be found on a trans-regional level where members of a group, through *Wahlverwandtschaft* (affinity), can equally identify with, for example, a political candidate or a party presented in the media. A process of virtual communalisation triggered by the media might take place.<sup>19</sup>

As shown on the right side of Figure 2.3, it might be assumed that people sharing similar lifestyles establish social groups. The reason may be non-political and be based on the preference for the same leisure activities like playing golf or going to the theatre. A process of communalisation may thus take place based on solidarity and sympathy. Although latent cleavages may already exist, this phase is characterised by group solidarity between the members sharing a similar lifestyle. There is no conflict with other social groups with different lifestyles. Nevertheless, the situation may turn into one of conflict. A group, comparing itself with other groups, may feel discriminated or see its values and interests undermined; at this time the social group will form itself, establish an own

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<sup>18</sup> Recall the argument from Lazarsfeld et.al presented in Chapter 2.1.1


<sup>19</sup> Such a process of virtual communalisation might also take place through other modern technologies like for example the Internet.

organisation or join an existing one - the cleavages may become manifest and a process of aggregation takes place (recall Figure 2.1). Such a development may be seen in the new social movements in the area of ecology, environmental protection, women's groups and citizen's initiatives in West Germany and their attachment to *die Grünen* (cf. von Alemann 1992:101; Weßels 1997:213f.). A cleavage that becomes manifest through the establishment of an interest organisation is required for the establishment of a milieu with a long-lasting loyalty to a certain party. Whether this is a party established by the interest organisation itself - the British Labour Party, for example, was initiated by trade unions - or whether the interest organisation finds an already existing party willing to represent their interest is of no importance for the impact of the milieu on voting behaviour.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> However, this is significant to the development of the party system since the establishment of a new party would change the number of parties competing for votes.

**Figure 2.3 The dynamics between cleavages, lifestyles, organisations and political elites in the establishment of social milieus**



In this context it may be interesting to note that Weber also argued that a process of aggregation could take place before a process of communalisation takes place. An example he uses is a school class which in the beginning is established on a functional basis; the pupils do not know each other. However, these pupils will gradually develop a feeling of solidarity; according to Weber a process of communalisation will take place. Thus, it is irrelevant which process comes first. This might be important in order to understand that individuals who - for different reasons - have joined an organisation might be more likely to develop similar attitudes than individuals who are not members of the same organisation.

In consequence, lifestyles may be considered as rationally motivated individual preferences facilitated by the individualisation process. Nevertheless, as argued in this section, lifestyle groups can also be developing social milieus where a process of communalisation takes place between individuals sharing similar social characteristics, cleavage perceptions, lifestyles and organisational membership structures. A reason why the lifestyle approach may seem so insignificant to electoral research may be that the lifestyle groups are simply not (yet) politicised or electoral researchers have not yet found those cleavages which uncover social conflicts between modern lifestyle groups.

In the next chapter the cleavages and social milieus established at the time of the German Empire and the Weimar Republic will be presented. It will also be explained how they developed in East and West Germany after the Second World War.


### 3. TRADITIONAL CLEAVAGES AND SOCIAL MILIEUS

#### 3.1 Cleavages and social milieus in the German Empire and the Weimar Republic

In their classic book *Party Systems and Voter Alignments* Lipset and Rokkan (1967) demonstrate how the political alliances were formed that led to the development of stable systems of political organisation in western countries (cf. Lipset/Rokkan 1967:35). They argue that the distinction between western party systems clearly reflect the differences of the national histories of conflict and compromise across different cleavage lines. Lipset and Rokkan (1967:47, Rokkan 1970:101ff.) define four decisive dimensions of cleavage in Western polities in relation to certain historical epochs: the conflict between centre and periphery to the Reformation and Counter-Reformation in the 16<sup>th</sup>-17<sup>th</sup> centuries. Issues dominating in this epoch were national versus supranational religion and national language versus Latin. The conflict between State and Church is arranged to the national revolution; the phase in which the nation states were formed and consolidated from 1789 and after. In this epoch the conflict of secular versus religious control of mass education dominated. The third cleavage, the one between land and industry corresponds with the Industrial Revolution in the 19<sup>th</sup> century and was characterised by the issues concerning tariff levels for agricultural products and control versus freedom for industrial enterprise. Finally, Lipset and Rokkan add a fourth dimension of cleavage, the one between capital and worker, corresponding to the Russian Revolution of 1917. The integration into national polity versus commitment to an international revolutionary movement was the dominating issue in this epoch.<sup>21</sup> Thus, in the 1920's a freezing of the major party alternatives had taken place in the wake of the extension of the suffrage and the mobilisation of major sections of the new potential supporters and led Lipset and Rokkan (1967:50) to the argument that, with a few significant exceptions, the party systems of the 1960s reflect the cleavage structure of the 1920s.

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<sup>21</sup> However, the Russian Revolution did not produce new cleavages but simply accentuated long-established lines of division within the working-class elite (Lipset/Rokkan 1967:48).

**Figure 3.1 The cleavage model of Lipset and Rokkan**

(Source: Roth 1998:27, English translation)

Regarding Germany, Lepsius argues that the crisis from 1929 till 1933 led to the violent break up of a party system which had been rather stable for sixty years (Lepsius 1993:36). According to Lepsius there is a significant continuation of the party system developed in the German Empire, even throughout World War I and into the Weimar Republic. The stable party system is caused by the close relationship between parties and social moral milieus. As defined in Chapter 1.1, social moral milieus are established by the coincidence of structural dimensions such as religion, regional tradition, economic situation and class specific combination of the intermediate groups. In his study of the party system in the German Empire and the Weimar Republic Lepsius (1993) defines four social milieus: 1) the Conservative milieu close to the Conservatives, 2) the Catholic, represented by the Centre Party (Zentrum), 3) the Protestant-Bourgeois which during the time of the Empire was more and more reduced to a middle class with petty bourgeois features, represented by the Liberals and 4) the socialist workers and manual workers who in the German Empire were closely associated with the

Socialists and who in the Weimar Republic were represented by the Communists (see also Sperber 1997:3).

All four political social milieus were sharply separated from each other by moral barriers. Until the end of the Weimar Republic the German party system was characterised by a close relationship between the political parties and their respective social milieus. The main characteristics of the social milieus and their development up to the end of the Weimar Republic will be given in the following section (cf. Lepsius 1993: 32ff.). As emphasised in Figure 2.1, there is a close relationship between cleavages, social milieus and parties and these will be presented in further details in the Chapters 3.1.2 to 3.1.4.

### **3.1.1 Social moral milieus and the development of the party system**

The Conservative milieu: the Conservative milieu developed due to the conflict between the feudal ruling strata whose members had the status of civil servant at the time of absolutism and the rising bourgeoisie. Furthermore, this conflict was complicated by the personal union between public servants and lords (of manors). With the Prussian agricultural constitution this conflict experienced a specific regionalisation and economisation in the East. Thus, the Conservative milieu had two variants, the feudal-agrarian one and the governmental-bourgeois one. Protestantism united them. The barrier of common moral concepts and religious prejudices protected this subculture against the Protestant petty bourgeois milieu and the Catholic milieu.

In the German Empire the Conservative Party had a solid, regionally concentrated support basis. From 1871 to 1887 the party increased in proportion to growing number of voters. It increased, however, in its traditional basis and not through votes of other electoral groups. The Conservatives managed to keep their electorate, but their growth stagnated. They remained the representatives of a Protestant, agrarian, regionally closed social milieu with traditional paternalistic ideals (Lepsius 1993:32ff.). With the beginning of the Weimar Republic, the Conservatives, now calling themselves the German National People's Party (DNVP), still depended on their 1912 pre-war milieus. In addition, the party significantly gained in the critical election of 1924 protest voters of the urban population which previously voted for the Liberals. However, in the 1928 election the Conservatives' election result dropped to the same level they had before World War I.

The Protestant-bourgeois milieu: in the course of time the socio-economic homogeneity which existed when the milieu was established, decreased and existential fear arose with growing industrialisation. Due to assimilation processes with both the Conservative and the Socialist milieu the bourgeois social milieu narrowed to a middle class with a specific petty-bourgeois social moral; the original democratic aims of the milieu were again and again ritualised and dogmatised in new intellectual versions. The self-confidence of this milieu was founded on a moral-cultural distance to the labour movement and the conviction to be conducive to the state's benefit (Lepsius 1993:48).

Although German liberalism is featured by changing party formations, a line may be found throughout the time period from the German Empire to the Weimar Republic. In 1871 the Liberals had 1.5 million voters and the peak was reached in 1897 with 2.7 million voters.<sup>22</sup> However, since then the Liberals failed to win new parts of the population over. They focused on the social groups they had roused before the establishment of the Empire. German liberalism managed the transition from the Empire to the Weimar Republic, but since 1924 rapidly declined because it lost its political, integrating power. It could not integrate the German bourgeoisie into the industrial society. Major parts of the liberal party converted into either protest parties like the Reform Party, the Antisemites and the National Socialists or parties representing the interests of specific professional groups (Lepsius 1993:34).

The Catholic milieu: this milieu was established on the conflict between church and state and its main aim was maintain inner autonomy. This led to isolation and to dogmatisation of an internal moral which social moral concepts came from a time, where no external threats gave reason for a religious conclusion. The inner heterogeneity of strata specific interest prevented the articulation of these social conflicts between the strata. Finally a denominational moral barrier against Protestants and dissidents surrounded the whole and the social milieu fought for an autonomous monopoly on the socialisation processes (cf. Lepsius 1993:47).

Zentrum entered the German Empire both well organised and with a high turnout in the Catholic areas. Furthermore, the strength of the Zentrum grew rapidly with the pressure of the struggle between the Church and the State (Kulturkampf) and reached its full strength in 1874 with 1,4 million votes which it also kept with the growing recruitment till 1887. Thereafter,

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<sup>22</sup> As in the case of the Conservative, also this due to the increasing proportion of voters since 1871.

the Zentrum continued to gain absolute votes, but the number lagged behind the actual population development. Till the end of the German Empire the Zentrum thus lost recruiting power. With the transition into the Weimar Republic, Zentrum gained votes again, in particular due to the introduction of female suffrage. Nevertheless, already from 1920 this development slowly reversed. The social and political order of the Zentrum voters was based on denomination, pre-political and pre-industrial value orientations which were indifferent to social and political events. This also facilitated the strong resistance of this milieu against the national socialists (Lepsius 1993:34ff.).

The Socialist milieu: Finally the fourth large social milieu integrated those parts of the population which dropped out of the other social milieus with the process of industrialisation. The Socialist milieu was rather homogenous and became the strongest fighter for political equality. However, restricted to specific class interests, the social democrats involved in several fights about political and social equality where no complete agreement could be reached on the priority of neither the one nor the other (Lepsius 1993:48 ff.).

The Socialist party was hardly organised at the beginning of the German Empire. In 1875 the social liberal and radical democratic sects united and formed the Social Democratic party<sup>23</sup>. Under the pressure of the socialist law (Sozialistengesetzes)<sup>24</sup> a broad network of pre-party organisations were developed and up till 1890 the party gained a fifth of the votes (1.4 million). This increase continued until 1912 and the party mobilised workers, certain parts of the agricultural workers and decayed craftsman and integrated these groups into a specific sub-culture. With the transition to the Weimar Republic the party grew significantly, however, already in 1920 the Socialist (including the Communist) only had their relative share of 1912. According to Lepsius the development of Socialism in Germany got stuck to the organised social milieu developed at the turn of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. The population part mobilised until then was a reliable base of recruitment, but no expansions were successful except for in the

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<sup>23</sup> In 1875 the General German Workers' Association (Allgemeiner Deutscher Arbeiterverein – ADAV) which was founded in 1863 by Ferdinand v. Lasalle and the Social Democratic Workers Party (Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei – SDAP) founded in 1869 by Karl Liebknecht and August Bebel merged and became the German Socialist Workers' Party (Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei Deutschlands). In 1890 the party name was changed to the German Social Democratic Party (SPD). In 1917 the Independent Social Democratic Party (USPD) and the *Spartakusbund* split from the SPD. The USPD joined the SPD again in 1922 whereas the *Spartakusbund* constituted the German Communist Party (KPD) in 1919 (Iral 1997:1 in the section on SPD).

<sup>24</sup> Otto von Bismarck tried to win the workers and thereby abolish the workers' party by introducing extensive social insurances during the 1880s (cf. Görtemaker 1994:293ff.)

extraordinary situation in 1919. Socialism was the only new community with a political–social ethos in the era of the Empire and it was in direct confrontation with industrialisation. Nevertheless, the recruitment was finished within the time of the Empire (Lepsius 1993:35).

The share of votes for the parties in the German Empire and the Weimar Republic are shown in Table 3.1.

**Table 3.1 The development of the German party system 1871-1928**

Year	Turn-Out In %	Conservatives		Liberals		Centre		Socialists		Other	
		%	abs.	%	Abs	%	abs.	%	abs.	%	abs.
1871	51	23	9	40	15	19	7	3	1	15	6
1874	60	14	7	39	20	28	14	7	4	12	6
1877	60	18	10	38	20	25	13	9	5	10	5
1878	63	27	15	33	19	23	13	8	4	9	5
1881	56	24	12	37	19	23	12	6	3	9	5
1884	60	22	12	37	21	23	13	10	5	8	5
1887	77	25	19	36	27	20	15	10	8	9	6
1890	71	19	13	34	25	19	13	20	14	8	6
1893	72	19	15	27	20	19	15	23	18	12	9
1898	68	16	12	24	18	19	15	27	21	14	12
1903	76	14	13	23	22	20	19	32	30	12	11
1907	84	14	15	25	28	19	22	29	33	13	14
1912	85	12	15	26	31	16	20	35	43	11	13

		DNVP		DVP and DDP		Centre and BVP		SPD and KPD		Other incl. NSDAP	
1919	83	10	31	23	70	20	60	45	139	2	5
1920	79	15	42	22	62	18	51	42	117	3	9
1924	77	20	57	15	43	17	49	33	97	14	42
1924	79	21	62	16	40	17	53	35	106	11	33
1928	76	14	44	14	42	15	47	40	124	17	51

\*The numbers refer to the share of votes in percentages at the elections as well as the absolute number of votes in 100 000. (Source: Lepsius 1993:33, English translation)

As can be seen from Table 3.1 the party system in the Weimar Republic was increasingly fragmented. According to Jeffery (1999:98 ff.)

“(..) the tendency to party political sectionalization evident in the extreme form at the bourgeois centre but also in the manual worker and Catholic population, had serious implications for party interaction, coalition formation and governmental stability throughout the Weimar years. It indicated a narrowness

of perspectives which led parties to be unwilling to subordinate sectional interests or to compromise sectionally based ideologies in pursuit of any wider, shared conception of national interests.“

In particular in the bourgeois centre the splinter parties represented a “sectionalization gone mad” (Jeffery 1999:98). Parties sought to represent small social groups like the Saxon Farmers’ Party and the League of Farmers and Vineyard Owners in the German South-West. Thus, the Weimar years lacked the clearly identifiable cleavage structures on which the Lipset-Rokkan thesis of long-term continuities in the social foundations of party politics is based. Jeffery (1999:98) argues

“There was no one middle class as such in the Weimar years, but rather a series of different middle classes which lacked any sense of collective identity and interest (beyond, at best, a shared anti-Leftism).”

The summary of the different social milieus and the development of the party system in the German Empire and the Weimar Republic clearly show how different the social milieus were with respect to stability. As emphasised in Falter and Bömermann’s study (1989) of the rise of the National-Socialist German Workers’ Party (NSDAP), before 1933 the party strongholds of the Zentrum and the Bavarian People’s Party (BVP)<sup>25</sup> most strongly resisted the extreme right wing nationalists. The Catholic strongholds had a below-average support for the NSDAP and until July 1932 the number of votes for the Zentrum even increased. Schmitt concludes these results to confirm

“(…) welche stabilisierende Wirkung ein durch Amtskirche, Partei und Verbände integrierendes konfessionelles Milieu selbst unter extremen Bedingungen noch entfalten konnte” (Schmitt 1989:165).<sup>26</sup>

The extreme left wing strongholds could be distinguished from the other parties, as well, due to their stability and even growth in support for the Communist Party (KPD). However, at the same time their support of the NSDAP highly increased. This phenomenon is traced back to the different powers of the milieus. The Zentrum and the BVP were 2 1/2 times stronger in their strongholds than the KPD was in his (Falter/Bömermann 1989:110). The party stronghold exchange between the DNVP and the NSDAP was the clearest sign of a change of political representation within a milieu. A similar exchange between the Liberals and the NSDAP was only partly confirmed.

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<sup>25</sup> The BVP, was a Catholic Party, too, which split off the Zentrum in 1925 and which represented the Catholics in the state of Bavaria.

<sup>26</sup> English translation: “(…) which stabilising effect a confessional milieu integrated through Church, party and organisations could unfold even under extreme conditions” (Schmitt 1989:165).

The social milieus were all closely connected with regional loyalties and sometimes also had their own regional party representation. The impact of the regional cleavage on the party system in the German Empire and the Weimar Republic is presented in further detail in the following chapter.

### **3.1.2 The centre-periphery cleavage and the development of regional milieus**

According to Urwin<sup>27</sup> (1982:165) there has always been a disjunction between ‘political’ Germany and the territory occupied by German speaking-peoples. A German state did not exist until 1870 although German societies have been on the European map for centuries. Due to the changing political boundaries of German territory, German politics showed marked regional differences and not even the establishment of a single German state in 1870 could deny the existence of important regional differences that had grown over centuries: An east-west gradient reflected economic differences in terms of urbanisation, agricultural settlement and industrialisation and was crossed by the religious north-south axis (Urwin 1982:181).

These regional loyalties which had developed over centuries manifested themselves not only in a cleavage between Prussia and the remaining Germany, Prussia itself was a collection of disparate territorial units with different histories, identities and behavioural patterns. This regional particularism which existed before Germany was unified in 1870 still existed in the twentieth century. Regional loyalty remained high and Berlin never obtained the dominating central power some other west European capitals developed (Urwin 1982:181).

In the German Empire the SPD was mainly a party of the industrial and urban areas. It was not able to establish itself in areas dominated by Catholics who, except in ethnic regions like West Prussia, Posen and Alsace-Lorraine, voted for the Zentrum. Given the regional distribution of Catholics the electoral base of support for the party could thus be found in the western Rhineland, the south (especially Bavaria) and Upper Silesia (Urwin 1982:189). The Conservatives had their base of support in the Prussian aristocracy in the eastern provinces. The National Liberals were essentially Protestant and had first gathered force in

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<sup>27</sup> Only the most significant developments of the centre-periphery cleavage and regional developments in Germany will be stated. For a more extensive presentation see Urwin 1982:165-249.

the borders of Germany, like Baden and Schleswig-Holstein. The liberals were stronger in western Germany; in the northwest their support was based in urban areas and in the south in rural and agricultural areas. However, the progressive element of liberalism was Prussian and the many mergers and splinters reflected regional as well as programmatic differences. An example is the South German People's Party in Württemberg which kept its independence till 1910 (Urwin 1982:190ff).

The most noticeable regionalist parties were those of the ethnic minorities like the Polish population in the eastern provinces and the population of Alsace and Lorraine. Urwin considers the Guelph (in German *die Welfen*) movement of Hanover as a regionalist party. The Guelph movement denied Hanover's annexation by Prussia which the deposed monarch had accepted in 1866 (Urwin 1982:191).

In the Weimar Republic a particular variant of proportional representation was introduced which encouraged parties to contest in every electoral district. Thus, electoral results of this period offer a better opportunity to study the parties' regional support (Urwin 1982:192). The newly founded liberal parties, German Democratic Party (DDP) and German People's Party (DVP) had no major political power in the Weimar Republic, only in Baden and Württemberg the DDP had significant, regional support. The DVP inherited some of the National Liberal strongholds in north-western Germany and in urban areas. The votes for the Zentrum and the BVP highly correlated with the distribution of Catholics.<sup>28</sup> Only in some of the industrialised areas of the Rhineland the Zentrum party had problems being supported by Catholic voters and in Bavaria the BVP did not obtain all Catholic votes due to competing regional and rural groups like the Bavarian Peasants' league which was strongly supported in Lower and Upper Bavaria. The successor of the Conservative Party, the DNVP, was mainly supported east of the river Elbe. Apart from strongholds in Hessen and support in the Protestant Middle Franconia, the DNVP had no regional base of support west of the Elbe.

Politically significant parties survived in Hanover (*die Welfen*) and Bavaria (Bavarian Peasants' league) which were both founded in the times of the German Empire. In Württemberg the already mentioned (Protestant) Württemberg Farmers' and Winegrowers'

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<sup>28</sup> The Zentrum and the BVP did not compete for Catholic votes except in the Palatinate (Urwin 1982:193).

became a strong regional force (cf. Urwin 1982:193). Together with other rural parties which were also survivors of the old *Bund der Landwirte* and the DNVP these parties represented a more or less permanent agrarian disaffection with the regime. The permanent agrarian crisis during the 1920s and the fact that no agrarian party existed helped the NSDAP to gain support. Urwin emphasised (1982:196):

“The NSDAP was the first national party able to exploit the anti-urban, anti-capitalist sentiments of the German countryside: the 1930 breakthrough came primarily in western Protestant areas of peasant smallholdings.”

The SPD and the KPD – the latter had split off the SPD - were the dominant parties in Berlin. Both parties highly correlated with industrialisation and therefore competed for support of the same social base. Whereas the SPD was a party that was evenly supported nationwide, the KPD’s heartland was the industrialised regions of the Rhineland and the Saxonies. Except for the KPD support in the Rhineland neither the SPD nor the KPD received noteworthy support in the Catholic regions (cf. Urwin 1982:196).

### **3.1.3 The religious cleavage and the Catholic milieu**

Two events were of special importance for the revival of the religious cleavage in Germany in the 19th century. Firstly, this was the territorial resettlement of the Great Secularisation and the Wiener Congress - the religious homogeneity that had existed until 1814 was no longer given. Large, closed, Catholic areas were connected with Protestant-dominated German states that were in a majority, especially in Prussia. Secondly, due to the establishment of the German Empire which excluded Austria, this process was intensified. In most regions, except in Bavaria and Saxony, the German Catholics lived under the rule of Protestant dynasties. In addition to being a minority of one third, they also felt like second-class citizens (Schmitt 1989:158).

The fact that all conflicts could be connected with the religious cleavage was essential for the Catholic milieu in Germany. There were several decisive factors for the Catholic population: the opposition between the Catholic hierarchy and the State, between the Catholic minority and Protestant majority, between cultural periphery and the central state, between the bourgeois society and the State as well as the social contrast between the ordinary people (Catholics) on the one hand and the state class and employers (Protestants) on the other hand.

The abolition of the *Kulturkampfgesetzgebung* made it possible to integrate the Catholics into the nation state in the decades before the 20th century. However, the religious conflict still maintained its impact on Catholics as a Catholic social milieu with a strong political representation by the Zentrum party had been established in the meantime.

On the local level the formation of associations and the local presence of the church integrated Catholic milieus across all strata. The universal character of the church and the national constitution of the associations provided, at the same time, a counterbalance to this parochialism and made the integration of milieus from different social structures feasible. Thereby not only the existing base of support was secured. The Catholic milieu was also established in the rising industrial societies:

"Es erlaubte einerseits die Aufrechterhaltung hergebrachter Bindungen, traditionaler Weltbilder und unstädtischer Lebensweisen. Es bot äußere Ordnung und innere Sinnggebung von einer außerhalb der Arbeitsphäre liegenden Lebenswelt her, und damit auch Schutz gegen die atomisierenden Folgen industrieller Arbeitsprozesse. Andererseits offerierte auch das katholische Milieu Instrumente, die es den Betroffenen erlaubte, die aus der Arbeitswelt resultierenden Problemlagen, innerhalb des katholischen Bevölkerungselements zu bewältigen (Arbeitervereine, christliche Gewerkschaften usw.)" (Schmitt 1989:161).

This explains the immense immunity of the Catholic milieu to the only milieu which was established after the foundation of the Empire, the Social Democratic milieu.

In contrast, the Protestant milieu was characterised by the absence of the unifying function of the church. The church as an institution could not integrate opposing social groups on the local and the national level. None of the three Protestant milieus, the Conservative, Liberal and Social Democratic one, could base its mobilization on religious solidarity or the institutional support of the church. Every milieu had to build up its own specific integration mechanisms. Only the Social Democratic milieu managed to consolidate its organisational infrastructure to an extent comparable to that of the Catholic milieu. The religious milieu, therefore, had an advantage. It had already mobilised its members when the industrial revolution and the class conflict related to it began.

### **3.1.4 The cleavage between workers and employers and the worker's milieu**

In the 19<sup>th</sup> century Germany was characterised by a significant increase in payroll workers. In particular agricultural workers and small peasants had moved to the cities hoping for better living conditions (Winkler 1995:401, cf. Görtemaker 1994:175-206).

Simultaneously, an increasing number of workers were employed due to technical changes and a division of labour in expanding companies. The workers in the cities developed a different tradition than the workers in the countryside and in the small cities. In the latter areas the workers were still attached to the middle class through background, family, marriage, profession and membership in organisations and associations that included all strata. Thereby social contradictions were less obvious than in the cities. This even resulted in a certain distance to the Socialist movement established in the cities (cf. Winkler 1995:402). In the big cities, modern industrial iron and metal companies including a large number of qualified workers were founded. Due to the working conditions in these companies these workers were most strongly exposed to the industrial socialisation and the tensions between employers and workers.

According to Lepsius (1993:45) the central social event in the 1860s and 1870s was the establishment of a social cultural workers' milieu. Due to the far-reaching social change a sub-culture including both agricultural and manual attitudes was developed; this sub-culture simultaneously had to address the underprivileged situation of its members and demand political-cultural emancipation. This pre-socialist sub-culture was the basis of the political workers' movement which integrated about 50% of the workers (Lepsius 1993:45). Although the number of members and voters dramatically increased during the Empire, the sub-cultural orientation of the workers' movement did not shake the party system. The socialist milieu of workers and manual workers was embedded in the already politically organised social-cultural milieu. Since the milieu was represented by the SPD, the party system was hardly influenced by the impact of industrialisation. It led to a "negative integration" of the working class as Roth puts it (cf. Lepsius 1993:46f.). The working force was structured within itself and not integrated in the society as a whole – party, trade unions, education-, welfare-, sports- and social associations integrated the proletariat in a political sub-culture which facilitated the definition of a common situation.

This coalition between the workers and the socialist parties which had developed during the time of the Empire was also maintained during the Weimar Republic by actualising political issues relevant for the working class. Winkler (1995:404) emphasised:

“Die zum großen Teil durch die Position der Eltern vorbestimmte soziale Lage der Arbeiter, die Prozesse der primären politischen Sozialisation, die wahrgenommenen überlieferten Erfahrungen der relevanten Bezugsgruppen in der Gesellschaft sowie die eigenen stratifikationsbedingten Erfahrungen

banden einen beträchtlichen Teil der Arbeiterschaft an diejenige politische Elite, die sich der Interessen insbesondere der gewerblichen Arbeiterschaft angenommen hatte.”

As discussed in Chapter 3.1.2 the regional differences of socialist support varied significantly and the support highly correlated with the number of workers in a region. The manual workers thus formed, at least in urban, industrial centres, an identifiable and distinguishable social milieu in the Weimar years and they formed the social basis of a stable, left wing vote (Jeffery 1999:105).

According to Urwin (1982:205ff.) the party systems and the institutional structures of both the Empire and the Weimar times were supported by keeping alive cultural and economic differences and their regional basis. The system of the Empire ignored all problems whereas the Weimar Republic's system permitted everybody to name them.

Urwin offers a summary of the salient conflict dimensions of both in the Empire and in the Weimar Republic. Furthermore he places the parties according to a more 'centrist' or more 'regional' position. The summaries are presented in Tables 3.2 and 3.3 and also clearly demonstrate how varying party alliances became possible.

**Table 3.2 Conflict dimensions and parties in the German Empire**

Cleavage	SPD	Zentrum	Minorities	Agrarian Parties	Regional Parties	Progress Party	National Liberals	German Reich Party	Conservatives
<b>Culture</b>									
Ethnic-Linguistic		(R)	R			(C)	C	C	C
Religion		R	R		(R)	(C)	C	C	(R)
<b>Economic</b>									
Rural-urban	(C)			R	(R)	C	C	C	R
Rural class		(R)		R	(R)				C
Urban class	R					(R)	C	C	C
Social welfare	C	C				C	R	R	R
<b>Political/Territorial</b>									
East vs. west		R		(R)	R	C	C	C	C
Prussia vs. rest	(R)	R	R	R	R	R	C	C	C
Traditional values	R	(C)	R	R	R	R	R	R	C
Centralisation	(C)	R	R		R	C	C	C	(R)

(Source: Urwin 1982:206)

**Table 3.3 Conflict dimensions and political parties in the Weimar Republic**

Cleavage	KPD	SPD	Zentrum	BVP	Agrarian/Regional Parties	DDP	DVP	DNVP
<b>Culture</b>								
Religion		C	R	R		C	C	C
<b>Economic</b>								
Rural-urban	C	C		(R)	R	C	C	R
Rural class		(R)		(R)	R			C
Urban class	R	R				(R)	R	R
Social welfare	C	C	C			C	R	R
<b>Political/territorial</b>								
East vs. West			R	R	R			C
Centralisation	(C)	C	R	R	R	C	C	(R)
Regime support	R	C	C	(R)		C	RC	R

(Source: Urwin 1982:207, C = centralist; R = regionalist. Brackets indicate a subsidiary and more dubious ranking).

### 3.2 Changes in the traditional Cleavages and social Milieus after 1945

After 1945 three events took place which changed the situation compared to that in the German Empire and the Weimar Republic. Firstly, the Catholics lost their minority position due to the division of Germany. Secondly, the traditional anti-central and anti-Prussian tendencies vanished with its dissolution. Thirdly, a religious mix of the population took place due to evacuations, mobility of refugees etc.

### 3.2.1 Developments in West Germany: Continuity and discontinuity

The parties represented in the first election in 1949 were a mixture of old and new ones. The SPD continued in the tradition of the Weimar Republic by representing the manual working class. The KPD continued to represent the far left and the German Rights Party (DRP) the far right whereas the bourgeois centre was still as disintegrated as during the Weimar times. However, in addition to the continuities of the party system of the Weimar Republic, the CDU/CSU and the FDP emerged as new, nationwide parties at the 1949 election

“The foundation of the FDP was an attempt to bring together different strands of the hitherto divided German liberal tradition, while the CDU/CSU represented an altogether new type of party. Although descended closely from the inter-war Centre Party (and Bavarian BVP), the CDU/CSU styled itself as a democratic *Volkspartei*, a catch-all ‘party of the whole people’”(Jeffery 1999:102).

This prevented a re-establishment of Christian trade unions and its own religious party. Instead of forming a purely Catholic party, a union party was established which also included Protestant factions. At the same time the Catholic network lost its functions as these were taken over by the *Länder* or municipalities. However, a relatively closed Catholic milieu existed in the 1950s. The Social Democrats and the Liberals had also maintained their traditions of 1933, strongly focusing on their respective milieus.

The transformations which began in West Germany in the 1950s and which continue until today can be seen as a process during which the parties became independent and loosened their ties to their respective milieus. The foundation of the old party system was shattered with the CDU/CSU as a political party that represented more than one milieu. The religious cleavage still existed but only between religious and secular movements and not - as in former times - as a cleavage between Catholics and Protestants. In addition, the CDU/CSU committed itself to the West German ‘social market economy’ and a western orientated foreign policy. The party thus managed to integrate broad sections of the non-left electorate into the party. It was able to build up a widespread support basis (cf. Jeffery 1999:102).

This development made it impossible for the SPD not to react to the political changes. It had to leave its traditional milieu as well if it wanted to get more than a 30% basic rate of support. In its *Godesberger Programm* of 1959 the SPD defined itself as a left-of-centre people’s party. The party gave up its Marxist base and increasingly accepted the principle of a socially responsible market economy as opposed to their previous adherence to socialist interventionism and large-scale nationalisation (cf. Jeffery 1999:103).

These transformations of the parties' led to important changes on the part of the milieus. Both were reciprocally reinforcing processes - the erosion of milieus and the transformation of parties which had detached themselves from their original milieus by becoming people's parties. This implies that parties can allow social transformations to take place or that they can adjust to social changes. It is a process of interaction and has an important impact on the stability of the social milieus. The individual may leave his traditional milieu more easily, without having to expect punishments from his social environment; the parties' loosening of ties actually more or less asks for an active individual political orientation and identification which is not just based on tradition.

The dual role of the Union parties as a party of the Catholic milieu on the one hand and as a representative of movements on the right side of the SPD on the other hand, guaranteed the loyalty of Catholics who remained in their milieu. At the same time a great number of Catholics were given the opportunity to loosen or give up their connection with the church without having to give up their original party political orientation. According to Mair (1993) it is thus necessary to consider the movements within the traditional parties when proclaiming that an electoral change has taken place in the advanced industrialised society. As can be seen from Table 3.4 the CDU/CSU and the SPD are still the major parties in Germany although the party system has become more fragmentary with the Greens taking office in the *Bundestag* in 1983 and the PDS at the general election in 1990 after the reunification with the former GDR.

**Table 3.4** *Bundestag* election results 1949-1998

Party	1949	1953	1957	1961	1965	1969	1972	1976	1980	1983	1987	1990	1994	1998
CDU/ CSU	31.0	45.2	50.2	45.4	47.6	46.1	44.9	48.6	44.5	48.8	44.3	43.8	41.5	35.1
SPD	29.2	28.8	31.8	36.2	39.3	42.7	45.8	42.6	42.9	38.2	37.0	33.5	36.4	40.9
FDP	11.9	9.5	7.7	12.8	9.5	5.8	8.4	7.9	10.6	7.0	9.1	11.0	6.9	6.2
Die Grünen	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.5	5.6	8.3	3.8	7.3	6.7
PDS	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.4	4.4	5.1
Others	27.8	16.5	10.3	5.7	3.6	5.5	0.9	0.9	0.5	0.5	1.4	4.2	3.5	5.9


(Source: Statistisches Bundesamt 1999 and 2000)

Since the national cleavage (centre versus periphery) which had been decisive in the Weimar Republic as well as the agricultural-industrial cleavage (urban versus rural) had lost its importance<sup>29</sup>, the West German party system was dominated by the two cleavages work versus capital and religious versus secularism in the 1950s and 1960s. These were crosscutting

<sup>29</sup> Among other things, this was due to post-war mobility and the development of the welfare state.

and formed a party system with three dominant parties, the CDU/CSU, the SPD and the FDP. In addition, the Zentrum which still existed in the beginning of the 1950s represented the Catholic employees (Alemann 1992: 95).

**Figure 3.1 Cleavages in the West German party system in the 1950s and 1960s**



(Source: Alemann 1992:95, English translation)

With regard to the relationship between religion and voting behaviour, some comments are necessary. Firstly, it is the general assumption that voting behaviour and the decreased impact on religion and church attendance in society is directly proportional to one another. However, Schmitt (1989:171) states that religion is the main influencing factor for voting behaviour:

"(...) die Konfession hat im Laufe der Geschichte der Bundesrepublik ihre Bedeutung für das Wahlverhalten nicht nur nicht verloren, sondern ist - angesichts der rückläufigen Einflusses anderer

Merkmale wie etwa Schichtzugehörigkeit - zur wichtigsten sozialstrukturellen Einflußgröße des Wahlverhaltens geworden."<sup>30</sup>

Secondly, the contrast between the drastic changes of the milieu and the parties and a persistent voting behaviour can be explained by the long-term transformation process: the secularisation effect on voting behaviour will, if actually taking place, first become apparent in the next generation's voting behaviour (cf. also Pappi 1992:204).

The changing impact of the class cleavage and the religious cleavage on voting behaviour since World War II is shown in Table 3.5.

**Table 3.5 The socio-economic and religious cleavage in West Germany between 1949 and 1994**

	1949	1953	1961	1965	1969	1972	1976	1980	1983	1987	1990	1994
CDU/CSU voters among.... (in % of the average share of votes in the population)												
All respondents	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Workers	80	66	78	73	68	68	87	87	88	84	85	89
Employees/ Civil servants	102	120	107	100	98	103	98	100	106	105	98	100
Self-employed	105	102	109	135	140	142	137	144	131	140	141	141
Farmers	159	144	115	160	194	213	191	200	175	174	166	197
Protestants	80	78	72	75	66	74	78	74	81	81	85	92
Catholics	134	127	131	131	138	134	133	136	129	128	124	124
SPD voters among.... (in % of the average share of votes in the population)												
All respondents	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Workers	146	165	141	145	133	130	123	120	127	136	129	128
Employees/ Civil servants	80	84	76	88	100	94	95	96	93	93	102	105
Self-employed	54	52	46	31	50	67	51	59	59	52	50	54
Farmers	17	16	62	33	10	20	19	31	32	31	31	31
Protestants	111	123	132	126	129	117	121	116	124	117	114	118
Catholics	94	74	76	67	69	80	74	78	71	83	83	87

(Source: Bürklin/Klein 1998:81, English translation)

To facilitate the analysis of party identification of the different social groups over time the share of votes have been compared to the electoral results in the population (Bürklin/Klein 1998:79f.). Although no dramatic changes in the party affiliation of the social groups can be found there is a light tendency towards convergence in voting behaviour of the social groups over time. In 1949, for example, the share of Catholics voting for the CDU/CSU – was compared with the population – 134%. In 1994 this number was still significantly high, but had dropped to 124%. Simultaneously, the share of Protestants voting for the CDU/CSU increased from 80% to 92% in the same time period. As is shown in Table 3.5.

<sup>30</sup> English translation: "(...) denomination has not only not lost its significance on voting behaviour throughout the history of the Federal Republic, but has become the most important social structural influential factor on voting behaviour in view of the decreasing impact of other characteristics like strata."

as well the share of workers voting for the SPD dropped from 146% in 1949 to 128% in 1994. Parallel hereto the share of workers voting for the CDU/CSU increased from 80% to 89%. With regard to the voting behaviour of employees and civil servants – the so-called “new middle class” – no particular party affiliation to either people’s party is evident since the late 1960s. Thus, although the traditional cleavages obviously still have an impact on voting in the 1990s, the people’s parties are increasingly concentrating on the social group of employees and civil servants without strong party affiliations. With the growing impact of the service sector (cf. Chapter 4.1.3) and growing size of this group they become increasingly important for the people’s parties to win the election.

As presented in this chapter the German party system shows significant differences between the Weimar and Bonner party system. Germany thus belongs to the few exceptions of the Lipset and Rokkan model. Nevertheless, the cleavage theory still contributes to understand the establishment of and changes in the German party system.

### **3.2.2 Developments in the GDR: 40 years of dictatorship**

The GDR was, on the other hand, run by a dictatorship for over 40 years. Other parties existed but they were under the power of the SED and in the end it really did not matter whom the citizens voted for. Social transformations were controlled, for example, the full development of the service sector was renounced to maintain the size of the working class (cf. Chapter 4.1.3). A secularisation process took place in the GDR, although to a much larger extent than in West Germany. The number of Protestants in the population decreased from 80.4% in 1950 to about 30% in 1989. In the 1950s the number of Catholics was 11%, in 1989 it had declined to 6.1% (Statistisches Bundesamt 1992:193). In the GDR religion was influenced by governmental policies, too, but in contrast to West Germany a strict separation between Church and State existed. In the 1950s, for example, the right to teach religion at school was withdrawn from the Church. Nevertheless, the Church kept involved in cultural and social matters. Since the mid 1980s opposing individuals, criticising the Communist regime, gathered in the Protestant church. As pointed out in Chapter 1, religion itself, though, as a measure of the existence of traditional values and changing value orientation can hardly be used with regard to the GDR.

In the GDR's first free election for over 40 years, the *Volkskammerwahl* in March 1990, the SPD was expected to win significantly. It was assumed that the electoral patterns of pre World War II would revive (Schmitt 1997:425). In the Weimar Republic the geographical territory of the GDR mainly maintained Socialist and Communist voters. In the 1928 elections to the *Reichstag*, the SPD obtained 36% of the votes compared to 27% in the region which later became the Federal Republic of Germany (cf. Schmitt 1994:186). Together with the KPD the left-wing parties even received 49% of the votes compared to 35% in the Federal Republic. Even at the election in 1933 SPD and KPD maintained this stronghold in the east and received 38,1% of the votes compared to 25,8% in the territory of the later Federal Republic. Furthermore, in the elections in the Soviet zone in 1946 the voting pattern of pre war times continued, too. Nevertheless, this continuation finished in the following 40 years of dictatorship. At the *Volkskammer* election in 1990 the SPD and PDS were only weakly represented in the traditional industrial areas of the workers' movement (Schmitt 1997:426f.) whereas the Conservative block *Allianz für Deutschland* (CDU, DSU and *Demokratischer Aufbruch*) received their highest support in these areas. Only two minor lines of continuation can be found between the 1990 and the 1946 election. The Liberals were supported above average in parts of their former strongholds and the CDU received a significantly high support in the only closed Catholic area in the former GDR which was Eichsfeld in Thuringia.

Based on analyses of the social structure and voting behaviour at the 1990 *Volkskammer* election, Schmitt (1997:433) argues that the traditional social structural cleavages still existed. However, the decades of dictatorship had also changed the relationship between social structure and party system. With respect to religion he found a close relationship between both Catholic and Protestant religious voters and the CDU. Thus, the religious cleavage in the east is to a larger extent one between the religious and the secular population than in the west. In the west still significantly more Catholics than Protestants vote for the Union parties. At the 1998 election, for example, the voting behaviour of Catholics in the east and the west hardly differed (Forschungsgruppe Wahlen 1998:26f.). In the west 47% of the Catholics voted for the Union parties and in the east 46%. Among the Protestants, however, a different voting behaviour existed. In the west the SPD received 48% of the Protestant votes, the CDU obtained only 32%. However, in the east the CDU received 37% of the votes among Protestants compared 35% for the SPD.

According to Schmitt there thus exists a religious social moral milieu in the sense of Lepsius in the east (Schmitt 1997:430).

With regard to the class cleavage Schmitt sees a disruption after 1990 both with 1) the historical patterns of the territory of the GDR and with 2) to the development in West Germany. The majority of workers in the GDR voted for the CDU in 1990. Both the SPD and PDS which traditionally represent the workers lacked a basis in their electorate. Furthermore, Schmitt argues that the class cleavage in the GDR was not as much embedded into milieus as in the west due to the fact that the workers in the GDR did not clearly dissociate themselves from other working people. Decades of repression and a lacking articulation of interests prevented the development of large social groups sharing a feeling of togetherness. The only group in the social hierarchy which according to Schmitt may be defined as a milieu is the leading strata in the SED and other leaders who received their positions due to their political career within the SED (cf. Schmitt 1997:430). The main outcome of the 1990 election was also confirmed at the 1994 general election, although the CDU lost some votes among workers in the east and won a few among the self-employed. In addition, the SPD increased their support in the new middle strata of employees and civil servants. The support among workers and self-employed stagnated which according to Schmitt (1997:440) indicates a development into an employees' party. The outcome of the 1998 general election seems to confirm this trend towards a convergence of voting patterns in the east and west. 39% of the workers in the east voted for the SPD at the 1998 election whereas the CDU only received 27% of the votes in this group (cf. Forschungsgruppe Wahlen 1998:22ff). Arzheimer/Falter (1998:43) argue, however, that this convergence in voting pattern among East German workers at the 1998 election was a result of increased readiness to change party support rather than an increasing similarity to West German voting patterns and that this may change again at the next election.

I have now presented the two dominant cleavages in Germany, work versus capital and religion versus secularism. They both managed to develop into stable milieus and to keep stable during World War II. As emphasised in this chapter the changes in milieus after World War II are closely linked to the social transformations that have taken place over the past decades. As argued by Pappi (1992:182) there is a change in election return at the

aggregate level when the social composition of the electorate changes. Thus, it is important to know the main trends of demographic, economic and social change. Before discussing the rise of new cleavages and possible new social milieus on the basis of lifestyle studies in Chapter 5, I will therefore present some of the most important social transformations of the post war Germanys which are assumed to have contributed to the weakening of the traditional cleavages and social milieus and facilitated the rise of new ones.

#### 4. SOCIAL TRANSFORMATIONS IN WEST GERMANY AND THE GDR

The development which has led to the transformation of milieus in West Germany – that of decreasing the traditional milieus in the past decades - can be seen as a change in the relationship between subject and situation (cf. Schulze 1992b). The situation affects the individual by limits, suggestion and release whereas the subject determines the individual's actions via influence, symbolization and choice.

Limits: Everyone acts in a room of restricted possibilities, given limits of money, mobility, communication, social networks, supply of consumer goods, chances to reach certain positions in the job market etc. Suggestion: The exposure to a situation has an impact on the individual who thereby obtains additional knowledge. New situations are overcome with the help of the cognitive knowledge of past situations. Release: The (new) situation is manifested. Only a part of the objective reality reaches the subject where the important thing is how the reality is perceived by the individual and what he/she does with it.

In contrast to the above three modes of situation, are the following three modes of action: Influence: An action that changes the situation like environmental influence, the construction of objects, the influence of other individuals etc. Symbolization: Signs to express attachment to, for example, a social group by special clothes, way of talking etc. Choice: Refers to which alternative an individual chooses in a given situation, for example, when choosing among consumer goods, planning a vacation or deciding whether to study or not.

According to Schulze the social transformations which have taken place in the post war decades have shifted the impact of the modes described above. Whereas individuals' actions were previously determined by limits, influence and extraneous symbolic they are today determined by self-determined symbolization, suggestion, release and choice. This also implies that social circles are today selectively chosen by the individuals and not imposed by, for example, the family.

The relationship between subject and situation has in particular been marked by the decrease in situational limits over the past decades which again has resulted in an increased impact of

"suggestion" and "release". Examples of declines in situational limits are: increased supply of consumer goods, more income and leisure time, technological improvements in the home, increased mobility, less control from neighbours, relatives and religious associations, extended communication through the telephone and increase in information.

These transformations of society imply that the cognitive orientation of the individuals helps to establish different social milieus and not just the translation from the primary environment. Important factors for an individual's choice of social relations can be personal style, educational level, age etc.

Nevertheless, with regard to the increased individual freedom two important aspects need to be considered. Firstly, limits may vanish at a national level but can still exist among individuals. The chance to get a higher education when living in a small community is, for instance, based on an individual's willingness to leave its familiar surroundings. Besides, the importance of education can have a different status in different social groups. The chance to increase one's income depends on the economic structure in the region as well as on the individual's education. Thus, it is important to consider that individuals use opportunities differently and that different regions offer different opportunities (cf. Bertram 1992,1993; Schweigel 1993).

Secondly, even if a decrease in situational limits at the individual level takes place this may not necessarily lead to milieu transformations. I will try to clarify this argument by using a simple example: an individual leaves his rural Catholic community in order to study in a university town. He decreases the situational limits by moving, acquiring a higher level of education and leaving his social network. He is then confronted with other values and social groups and can more freely choose his actions. He may still maintain the values of his social milieu; he does not stop being a Catholic or being anti-abortion and regards marriage as the correct way of living. Furthermore, the loss of the social milieu from his hometown may be substituted by joining a milieu representing the same values in the new town.

Nevertheless, there is no doubt that important social transformations have taken place in the past few decades and that these have caused erosions in the traditional social milieus. The major socio-economic changes, changes in the social structure and value changes in the two Germanys will be presented in the following sections.

## 4.1 Socio-Economic Changes

Since 1945 the two German states have been marked by very different socio-economic developments. In this chapter, I will summarise the most important changes and differences in the fields of economy, education and production.


### 4.1.1 Economic growth

In West Germany income and fortune per capita increased five times between 1950 and 1980. Based on the prices of 1983, the income per capita exploded from 4000 DM in 1950 to about 21.000 DM in 1983 (Geißler 1992a:38). All working groups benefited from this increase. However, due to the deceleration in wage levels at the beginning of the 1980s, the income of all groups increased only to a limited extent. Only the self-employed, except farmers, could considerably increase their income. The expansion of the welfare state also increased the standard of living of the economically weak strata (Geißler 1992a: 40).

In the GDR an economic growth also took place, but not to the same extent as in West Germany. In the 1960s and 1970s the differences in income between the two German states considerably increased. In the 1960s the real average income in the GDR was 30% below the West German one, in the 1970s 40% and in the beginning of the 1980s it increased to 55 %. In the following years the gap decreased as a result of the weak increase in West Germany and a relative improvement of the purchasing power of the *Ost-mark* (Geißler 1992a:42)

In 1988 the disposable income of all private households in the GDR was 53% lower than in West Germany. The income of the working class was 43% lower than in West Germany. It should be considered, however, that there was a higher number of double income households in East Germany and that the gap in individual incomes was therefore even larger (Geißler 1992a:42). Figure 4.1 shows the different developments in net average income in West Germany and the GDR.

**Figure 4.1 Net average income of employed households 1960-1982: Difference between West Germany and the GDR**



(Source: DIW 1985:280 in Geißler 1996:48, English translation)

Since 1990 this difference between the two Germanys has declined. Wages in the former GDR have been partly adjusted to the West German level. In particular, pensioners, officials and employees in the service sector have benefited from the reunification (Geißler 1992b:25).<sup>31</sup> In 1996 wages in the new *Länder* varied - depending on which branch - between 68% and 90% and more of the level in the old *Länder*. The gap in household income declined, too. Whereas in 1991 the eastern Germans had only 45% of the West German household income, it increased to 74% in 1994 (Geißler 1996:54).

<sup>31</sup> This does not necessarily imply a growth in purchasing power since all prices were adjusted to the West German level at the same time.

The acquisition of material goods increased in both Germanys over the decades as shown in Table 4.1. This can be seen as a result of a growth in purchasing power and of technological developments. In West Germany the supply of consumer goods continuously increased and often led to lower prices. However, in the GDR most luxury consumer goods were basically non-available for the common East German citizen. This explains the gap between the possession of material consumer goods in East German and West German households at the time of the reunification. I will not discuss this in further detail, but would like to emphasise that according to Inglehart East Germans were likely to have a backlog of demand for materialist satisfaction at the time of the reunification. However, as can be taken from Table 4.1 too, the differences have shrunk since 1990. This is probably a result of the East Germans access to the western German supply market and the expansion in the supply of goods in the former GDR.<sup>32</sup>

**Table 4.1 Consumer goods in East and West German households 1962-1993 (in %)**

	West					East				
	1962	1973	1983	1988	1993	1960	1970	1983	1988	1993
Car	27	55	65	68	74	3	16	42	52	66
Washing-machine <sup>1</sup>	34	75	83	86	88	6	54 <sup>1</sup>	87 <sup>1</sup>	66	91
Freezer	3	28	65	70	80	0	91	29 <sup>3</sup>	43	73
Dish washer	0	7	24	29	38					3
Telephone <sup>2</sup>	14	51	88	93	97		6	12	16	49
Television	37	89	94	95	95	1	70	91	96	96
Colour television	0	15	73	87	95	0	0	38 <sup>3</sup>	52	92
Stereo	0	0	38	42	75					62

(Source: Different sources cf. Geißler 1996:51, English translation)

<sup>1</sup> West – Automatic washing-machine. East 1970 and 1983 other washing-machines, too.

<sup>2</sup> DDR - Number of main extensions in apartments pro 100 household.

<sup>3</sup> 1985

#### 4.1.2 Spread of education

Since the education debate in West Germany in the 1960s, the number of pupils and students seeking higher education has significantly increased. The continuous growth of the industrial and the service sector in the 1950s and 1960s caused an increased demand for people with higher educational qualifications. General admission to higher education was considered fundamental for the continuation of economic growth. In the 1970s and 1980s this

<sup>32</sup> In the immediate period after the fall of *the Wall*, the trade and merchandise branch experienced a boom, which fell dramatically after a few years. This was a result of both the satisfaction of backlog demand and of the recession causing increased unemployment and an inflation rate of about 4% (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, October 21st 1993:17).

development continued although the economic sector warned of a surplus of qualified people. However, the spread of education had developed its own dynamic force, independent of direct political and economic impulses (Geißler 1992a:215).

The *Hauptschule* (extended elementary school), in the 1950s called the *Volksschule* (elementary school) was attended by 79% of the total number of pupils in 1952 whereas in 1993 the number had dropped to less than 1/3 (cf. Geißler 1996:253). During the same time, the number of high school pupils increased from 6% in 1960 to 26% in 1993. The growing number of university students was almost equally strong – more than every third student per age group started a university (24%) or polytechnic university (14%) career.

The results of increased equal opportunities for education in all strata can be summarised as follows: the formation of secondary schools (*Realschule* and *Gymnasium*) and other ways to matriculate as well as the opening of the universities, increased the chances of education for all children in all strata. However, a reduction in the differences between the strata could only be noticed at the medium level of education, whereas the differences at the high school and university level have become even larger. Whereas it is correct that nowadays more workers' children attend high schools and universities compared with two decades earlier, their number is still relatively low when compared to the number of children from the upper strata (cf. Geißler 1996:260ff).

Equal opportunities in education were a principle goal in the GDR. In particular children with a working class background were encouraged to break the bourgeois monopoly of education. For this reason, *die Einheitsschule* (*comprehensive school*) was established, the education of teachers from the lower strata began and the family's influence regarding the children's socialisation was limited in favour of the state's influence (Geißler 1992a:227).

Since 1958 equal opportunities in education have been retracted. Between 1960 and 1989 the number of children from the intelligence strata increased from 19% to 78%. Children from other strata were forced out of the universities (cf. Geißler 1996:264f.).

In the course of the reunification state control of the admission to the final year at high school and university was abolished in the new *Länder*. According to Geißler (1996:271ff.) the educational spread that was blocked in the GDR for two decades disappeared and developments in the east and west became more similar. In 1993 32% of the pupils in the

seventh grade – both in East and West Germany - attended high school which seems to confirm that the old and new *Länder* have become more alike. At university level the number of first year students grew continuously from 14% in 1989 to 24% in 1994, although the number was still lower than in the west where it was 29.4% in 1994. The newly established universities for applied science became highly popular in the new *Länder*. In 1994 42% of first year students chose this option compared to 35% in the old *Länder*.

Apart from differences in the political and educational system, the following characteristics were evident in both societies: the resistance of the upper strata to the children's social decline was stronger than the striving of the lower strata for social advancement (cf. Geißler 1996:269).

#### **4.1.3 The shift from the primary sector to the service sector**

The long-term changes in economy and society can be explained by the shifts within the three economic sectors: the primary sector of production (e.g. agriculture, fishing and forestry); the secondary sector of manufacturing (e.g. industry, trade, mining and building); and the tertiary sector of service (e.g. commerce, transport, administration, education and research). Over the last century the West German society changed from an agrarian society into an industrial and finally into a service society.

Until into the 1970s West Germany was still an industrial society (cf. Table 4.2). Most of the workforce was employed in the production of goods (48%). The strength of the secondary sector increased at the expense of the primary sector which fell from 25% in the 1950s to 13% in the 1960s. However, the growth rate of the tertiary sector was even stronger and between 1950 and 1989 the West German service sector increased from 33% to 55% (Geißler 1992a:118) and to 58% in 1993 (Geißler 1996:137).

In the 1950s and 1960s typical features of the industrial society developed in both German states. The secondary and tertiary sector expanded at the expense of the primary one, in West Germany this development was more pronounced than in the GDR. Thereafter, both societies developed differently. West Germany was characterised by an increased shift towards the tertiary sector and a decline of the other two. In 1993 the West German primary sector was

only 3.3% and the secondary sector 39% whereas the service sector had increased, as already mentioned above, to 58% (cf. Geißler 1996:137).

**Table 4.2 Development of the production sectors from 1950-1993 (in %)**

Production Sectors	West						East					
	1950	1960	1970	1980	1989	1993	1950	1960	1970	1980	1989	1993
Primary	25	13	9	5	3.7	3.3	31	17	13	11	11	4.2
Secondary	43	48	48	45	41	39	42	49	51	52	50	38
Service	33	39	43	49	55	58	27	34	36	38	40	58

(Source: based on Geißler 1996:137)

In the GDR, on the other hand, all three sectors stagnated. Its socio-economic structure in the 1990s was almost similar to the one of West Germany in 1965. The tertiary sector did not develop continuously. Obvious deficits existed in the credit and insurance sector, in the legal system and in the consumer service as well as in the field of juridical and economic counselling. Another characteristic of the service sector – in those areas where it did exist – was the personnel surplus in areas such as public administration and universities (Geißler1992a:117). In 1989 the secondary sector was still dominant in East Germany (50%) whereas the primary sector was 11% and still quite large when compared to West Germany (3.7%) although the primary sector had decreased significantly in East Germany since the 1950s (31%), too. The service sector in East Germany had only grown from 36% to 40% from the 1970s to 1989 compared to 12% in West Germany within the same time (from 43% to 55%). Since the reunification the production sector of the new *Länder* has significantly changes and is now more or less similar to the one of the old *Länder*. The service sector increased from 40% in 1989 to 58% in 1993, the secondary sector decreased from 50% to 38% and the primary sector decreased from 11% to 4.2% in the same period of time.


However, the number of working women was 82% in the GDR. This corresponds to the picture of advanced industrialised societies such as Sweden and the USA. It is a result of governmental efforts since the 1970s to compensate the loss in working power (Hradil 1992b:9).

## 4.2 Changes in the social structure

The aforementioned socio-economic developments changed the West German social structure which in the 1960s was dominated by a large working class (45%) and a small middle class

(20%) as shown in Figure 4.2. Increased chances of social advancement and the changes in the production sector caused fundamental shifts in the West German social structure between the 1960s and 1980s. The old middle class dropped to 7% and the working class was reduced to 33% (18% skilled workers and 15% unskilled and trained workers). The social structure in the 1980s was clearly influenced by the continuous growth in the service sector and 28% of the West German population belonged to the new middle class (Figure 4.3).

**Figure 4.2 Social strata in the West German population in the 1960s**




(Source: Dahrendorf 1965 in Geißler1992a:5, English translation)

Social mobility to the upper strata can be seen from two perspectives. With the transformation to a service society and increase in professions with demands for higher qualifications, the lower strata of manual workers reduced and the middle and upper strata in the tertiary sector grew at the same time. The decreasing strata were mainly farmers and unskilled workers. Since the 1970s skilled workers and parts of the non-managerial service sector have belonged to the decreasing strata as well. In addition, the admission of immigrant workers in the 1960s and 1970s, taking over the rather unpopular jobs of the lower strata, facilitated the West Germans' further chances for upward mobility.

Seen from another point of view, the change in strata was made easier by the increased dominance of the "relatively open, educated strata" over "the relatively closed strata of proprietors". The old middle class of farmers and other self-employed who possessed capital, property etc. was rather difficult to join from the outside. With regard to the educational strata the new middle class was easier to join by obtaining higher degrees and these were easier to obtain than capital and property. Due to the expansion of the middle strata into the service sector, the social structure opened at the expense of the old middle class.

**Figure 4.3 Social strata in the West German population in the 1980s**



(Source: Geißler 1992a:76, English translation)

Although it is difficult to say anything about social mobility in the GDR during the past few decades because of the lack of data, some tendencies may be found. The increase of general education was similar to the one in West Germany. It can be interpreted as an upward movement and has resulted in social advancement for a large number of the population. As

mentioned before, the service sector developed far less quickly than the one of West Germany. Nevertheless, the structural changes forced large parts of the population to leave the declining agrarian sector and move to industrial positions. However, the stagnating development of the tertiary sector prevented a structural-based transition into the tertiary sector. Furthermore, the strong decrease of "the relatively closed property strata" of independent farmers, manual workers and merchants, removed mobility barriers.

This high vertical mobility in the revolutionary phase of transformation was marked by a decline in social mobility in the following decades. In the 1980s a phase of solidification was reached and children from the lower strata were denied access to higher education more often than in West Germany (Geißler 1992a: 211).

As shown in Chapter 4.1.3 the production sector significantly changed in the former GDR after the reunification. With the growth of the service sector and the crises in – among others - industry and agriculture – changes in the economic and professional structure took place. Mobility was further increased because people who had important positions in the old GDR system were replaced (Geißler 1996:245ff.). According to Geißler these changes led to different possibilities for social mobility: 50-60% of the former leading strata lost their positions which facilitated social advancement for qualified people from the upper middle strata although they competed with West Germans. Graduates from universities of applied sciences who are employed in the service sector will probably maintain their status; workers and employees in industry and agriculture are, on the other hand, exposed to social decline. In particular the semi-skilled and unskilled are affected by the labour market's crisis and will hardly be able to socially advance.

The social changes also had an impact on the individual's way of living and plans for the future. Since the 1960s the number of marriages in West Germany decreased. In addition the average age of people marrying has risen. The divorce rate increased to 30% and other ways of living became increasingly popular at the expense of the traditional normal nuclear family, which was characteristic of the industrial society. At the end of the 1980s 16% of the population lived in single-person households, 4% as co-inhabitants and about 5% in single-parent families. The number of children born outside marriage increased from 5.5% in the 1970s to 10.2% in 1989. To put this matter in a nutshell: this is called the pluralisation of ways of living (Hradil 1992b:6).

In addition, the life cycles of individuals have changed. The standardised continuation from childhood, youth, adolescence and old age, has changed. Life phases like post-adolescence, i.e. the time between youth and adulthood, have been extended due to among others longer education.

Some peculiarities were evident in East Germany at the time of the reunification. More people married and married younger. As a result children were also born earlier and the birth rate was higher than in West Germany (1.67 per woman compared to 1.42 in West Germany). At the same time the divorce rate was higher compared to the West (45%). The number of children born outside marriage was 35% and the percentage of single-parent families was 17%. It is necessary to emphasise that the social network in the GDR had encouraged procreation since the 1970s because of the decrease in population, which had resulted in a large number of old people and the necessity for increased reproduction. During its existence the GDR was a country of emigration which was only reduced by closing the borders. The percentage of foreigners was minimal compared to West Germany (1.2% versus 8.2%) and the GDR was thus marked by a rather homogenous population (Hradil 1992b:6).

Since the reunification changes in the social structure have taken place and still do. Also in the former GDR the marrying age as well as the age of first-child mothers increases. At the same time, the birth rate has dramatically fallen. This can be explained by the adjustment of the social welfare network in the new *Länder* to the one in the old *Länder*. East German mothers were guaranteed jobs, apartments and places in kindergartens and day-care nurseries for their children. Whether these arrangements were just another way for the Communist regime to control the socialisation process of the children will not be discussed since their existence is the only relevant point here. In the last few years, in particular women in the new *Länder* have lost their jobs or see them threatened. The growing insecurity regarding the economic situation and the labour market makes it difficult for individuals to plan a family and the future.

This presentation shows that not only decreases in situational limits can take place as Schulze argues and as stated at the beginning of this chapter. The rise of new and the revival of old limits such as cuts in the financial support of students or cuts in state-supported kindergartens can take place. In this respect the political elites can control social transformations and influence changes in the social structure. An increase in situational limits may also take place due to economic developments. Increased unemployment, also among academics indicates

that, for example, education may no longer be considered as a secure ticket for upward-mobility (cf. Chapter 4.3.2.1).

Beck's (1986:205) thesis, pointing out that the decline of control by the primary social environment has been substituted by the control from public institutions, thus seems confirmed. Increasingly, the individual's freedom to choose and to plan his life is influenced by the bureaucracy, which influences the access to education, job markets etc. Therefore the individual needs to plan his action, which again results in a process of individualisation. Everything from passing an exam to leading a successful marriage and having a family are perceived as personal success or failure. The individual has been freed from traditional social control and is now a part of the "risk society", where different patterns of individual action to master a situation and reach certain goals are seen in the rise of (new) lifestyles.

In the course of the reunification the East Germans were exposed to this western *subjective modernisation* (cf. Chapter 2.1.3). They probably experience the changes more strongly since they do not result of a long transformation process as was the case in the West. This makes the contrast to the former "secure", government-controlled society even more evident. The ability of the East Germans to integrate into the western "risk society" will be important for Germany's future. How individuals or groups perceive their new situational limits will also be of special importance for the establishment of new and old lifestyle groups and social milieus in the former GDR. In all probability not everyone will perceive the fall of Communism and the introduction of the social market economy as positive.

### **4.3 Changes in value orientations**

In Chapter 2.2 I presented two theories of value change: Inglehart's theory of post-materialism and changes in different values important to social integration. In this chapter, I will present empirical results of value change based on these theories.

Although it is difficult to make any comparison with the former GDR, empirical results regarding value change will be presented if available. Besides the lack of data in the former GDR value change developed differently due to the existing social order. For example, already since the 1950s the GDR regime opposed religion. Measuring the decline in the traditional value of acceptance due to the decrease in the importance of religion – as is done for West

Germany - makes no sense. However, a GDR-specific decline in the value of acceptance nevertheless exists and will be presented in Chapter 4.3.2.5.

#### **4.3.1 Is there a change from materialist to post-materialist value orientation?**

Inglehart (1977:27ff.) applied a four item values index to measure changes in value orientations in six European countries in the early 1970s (cf. Chapter 2.2.1 for details on Inglehart's theory). The question asked was (Inglehart 1977:28):


“If you had to choose among the following things, which are the *two* that seem most desirable to you?”

- Maintaining order in the nation.
- Giving the people more to say in important political decisions.
- Fighting rising prices.
- Protecting freedom of speech.

The respondent was asked to name first priority and the second priority value. Based on the answer pattern, individuals were classified as materialists, post-materialists or mixed types. Materialists considered the first and third value as important, the post-materialist chose the second and fourth values, whereas the mixed value types chose, as indicated by the name, both materialist and post-materialist values.

This question has been repeated in most Eurobarometer surveys since the 1970s and thus facilitates a comparison of the development from materialism to post-materialism in West Germany from 1970 until 1999. The results are presented in Figure 4.4.

**Figure 4.4 The development of materialists, post-materialists and mixed types in West Germany 1970-1999**



(Source: The numbers are based on the Eurobarometer surveys from the European Commission. The numbers from 1970-1997 are taken from Klein/Pötschke 2000:214 who took the numbers from 1970 until 1993 from Abramson/Inglehart 1995:12f. Klein/Pötschke calculated the numbers for 1994 and 1997 according to the standard weight variable "Weight Result From Target" also used by Abramson/Inglehart. Only respondents who had ranked both first and second priority were included in the analysis. The 1999 numbers were kindly provided by Dr. Markus Klein).

As can be seen from Figure 4.4 a value change from materialism to post-materialism as predicted by Inglehart has not taken place in the West German society during the past decades. Although until the end 1980s, the number of materialists fell and number of post-materialists steadily grew a shift took place at the time of reunification. Since then the number of materialists compared to the post-materialists have continued to grow. The number of mixed types value orientations is at the highest during the whole time period analysed. It has even, more or less, continuously increased since the 1970s.<sup>33</sup>

Although Inglehart's theory is not really applicable to analyse value change in the former GDR, the development of materialism and post-materialism from the time of reunification


<sup>33</sup> By using a non-linear autoregression model assuming an inflation rate of zero percent, Klein/Pötschke (2000:212f.) predict the number of materialists, post-materialists and mixed types in the West German population 1970-97. Whereas they find a decrease in the number of materialists and an increase in the number of mixed types, they find no increase or decrease in the number of post-materialists.

until 1999 will be shown in Figure 4.5. During the whole time period analysed, the number of mixed types is the highest as is also the case in the west. Whereas the materialists and post-materialists nearly equalled in 1990 - the number of materialists is slightly higher than the number of post-materialists - this gap has significantly increased since 1991.

Looking at the four questions used in the Inglehart-Index, this result is not surprising. The questions used to measure post-materialist value orientations, “giving the people more to say in important political decision” and “protecting freedom of speech” were more important to the eastern German population immediately after the end of more than forty years of dictatorship than during the following years. Thus, it could even have expected that post-materialistic values would rank much higher in 1990 than they actually did. However, a backlog of demand in materialistic satisfaction could have been expected, too and an increase in materialistic values with growing economic problems like rising unemployment and the cut back of eastern German industry. Nevertheless, the meaning of the questions used to measure post-materialists values obviously have, or at least had, a different meaning in the former GDR immediately after reunification than what it according to Inglehart’s theory is supposed to measure.

I summarised some criticism of Inglehart’s theory in Chapter 2.2.1 and therefore need not to repeat them. However, at least for Germany there is no clear indication that a value change towards pure post-materialistic values is taking place.

**Figure 4.5 The development of materialists, post-materialists and mixed types in eastern Germany 1990-1999**



(Source: The numbers are based on the Eurobarometer surveys from the European Commission 1990-1999 (Eurobarometer number 34.0, 35.0, 36, 37.0, 38.0, 39.0, 40, 42, 47.1 and 52.1) and were kindly provided by Dr. Meinhard Moschner. The numbers have been weighted according to the standard weight variable "Weight Result From Target". Only respondents who had ranked both first and second priority were included in the analysis. For some years, surveys including the index were carried out both in the spring and autumn. This has been indicated by year and 1 for spring (i.e. 1991-1) and year and 2 for autumn (i.e. 1991-2)).

### 4.3.2 Changes in values of social integration

Meulemann analyses value change in the West German society during the past decades based on four values important to social integration in society: equality, achievement, co-determination and acceptance (cf. Chapter 2.2.2). Based on different sets of variables, Meulemann measures the development of these four values. The results are summarised in the following sections.

#### 4.3.2.1 Equality: Stable valuation of equality in the west, no research in the east

Although the analysis of equality is based on different variables and different time series, Meulemann argues that the results show that the value of equality remained constant in West Germany over the past decades (cf. Meulemann 1996:87). For example, asking whether an individual believes that the chances and possibilities to achieve something are fairly or

unfairly distributed in West Germany, 49% thought that the chances were equal in 1967, 53% in 1976 and 50% in 1977 (Meulemann 1996:79).

With respect to the evaluation of equality in the fields of economy, administration and education, the evaluation of equality in the first two remained stable during the past two decades: In 1964 42% of the population thought that the economic conditions in West Germany with respect to what people own and earn were fair, in 1969 this number was 47%, in 1970 46%, in 1973 44%, in 1975 43% and in 1979 50% (cf. Meulemann 1996:81f.). Concerning equality in the field of administration, for example, if confronted with the police due to a minor violation, 72% of the respondents thought they would be treated fairly in 1959, in both 1977 and 1980 the percentage was 69%.

However, the assessment of realization of educational opportunity has decreased over the past decades. In 1958 and 1963 70% thought that everyone has the possibility to get educated according to his/her talents and abilities. In 1979, 1984 and 1986 only 50% thought so. Meulemann explains this development with the simultaneous increase in number of people taking education that increased competition and reduced opportunities within the educational system (cf. Chapter 4.1.2). While assessment of actual equality within the given social order was maintained, assessment of equality in the education system got worse due to simultaneous expansion of the system (Meulemann 1992:533).

In the GDR equality was a basic value of the social order that was - or was at least expected to be - fulfilled with the establishment of a socialist state, although it is widely known that significant inequalities existed in the former GDR. However, since the socialist state was assumed to offer equal opportunities, the question of equality and its assessment within the population was not questioned; neither by the state nor by social research which lacks of empirical data altogether (cf. Meulemann 1996:188-190).

#### **4.3.2.2 Achievement: Decreased importance in the west, but not in the east**

Achievement is the result of an individual's own effort and thus a tool for self-realization. According to Meulemann one's whole life can be considered an achievement, but in particular professional work is regarded as such. Between 1956 and 1968 the percentage of people considering life a duty was 60%, between 1972 and in 1980 this number was 50% and between 1982 and 1990 the number had decreased slightly to 44% (cf. Meulemann 1996:88f.).

As life can be perceived as easy or difficult work, too, can be seen as an end in itself or a tool for *joie de vivre*. In the course of time, work has lost its value in favour of leisure time. Between 1952 and 1963 between 11% and 14% of the population agreed that life would be more enjoyable without work. Between 1972 and 1990 this number rose to 20%.

In addition, in West Germany the motives to work changed over the decades. This can be measured with two sets of variables regarding motives to work: “job satisfaction” and “accomplishment of a task” versus “necessary evil” and “chance to earn money”. The first sets of motives increased to 60% in 1962; thereafter it decreased continuously to 39% in 1987 and increased again to 48% in 1990. Thus, the evaluation of achievement changed in West Germany; the value of work depreciated in favour of leisure time. In 1982, 67% agreed to the statement: "You do not live to work, you work in order to live" (Noelle-Neumann 1990:310).<sup>34</sup>

According to Meulemann, this does not imply that individuals no longer fulfil their duty, but that what they do is decreasingly perceived as such. Instead of considering work a duty, work is increasingly characterised by responsibility and participation. The ways of perceiving work might have changed over the decades as Meulemann states, but the presentation of different lifestyle groups presented in Chapter 5 will show that distinct attitudes towards work can still be found. Some people consider work a duty or a way to earn money and thereby increase their standard of living whereas in other groups work in itself is still a value.

In March 1990 similar questions were asked in the former GDR (cf. Noelle-Neumann 1990). 67% of the respondents regarded life as a duty, whereas only 17% wanted to enjoy their life. When asked which hours were generally considered the best, "the hours working or the hours not working", 69% answered that they liked both equally. An additional 10% preferred the working hours. This means that - in total - 79% of the eastern Germans had a positive attitude towards working.

These differences in the evaluation of achievement at the time of reunification can be explained by the fact that in the former GDR work was far more important to social integration than in the west. As Meulemann puts it ‘the GDR was a working society’; it had a high employment rate for both men and women, independent of family status; social policies

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<sup>34</sup> Research conducted by the *Allensbacher Institut für Demoskopie* with comments by Noelle-Neumann in *Forbes*.

were institutionalised at the working place; the allocation of company apartments took place as well as the organisation of holidays. Thus, work was the core of *Vergesellschaftung* in the GDR (cf. Meulemann 1996:191). This idealization of work and low wages and salaries were closely connected; the less individual achievement was rewarded by increased payment the more achievement had to be encouraged by moral appeals (Meulemann 1998:124f.). Company surveys show that throughout the decades from 1967 until 1990 employees in the GDR complained about lacking rewards for personal achievement (Meulemann 1996:194).

In all the four areas Meulemann (1996:190-210) uses in order to measure the development of achievement from 1967 until 1990 - work achievement, motivation for working, the importance of work and work as an aim in life, no value change took place in the GDR. As pointed out above this differs from the development in the west during the same time period. Whereas the west changed from a 'working society' to 'an achievement and leisure society' during the past decades, where self-realization is also practised in other areas than work, the east remained a working society (Meulemann 1996:211).

#### **4.3.2.3 Co-determination: Increased evaluation in the west, diversity in the east**

Meulemann analyses changes in co-determination in the political area and in the area of upbringing in family and school. I will first present some results regarding changes in political participation. In 1952 27% of the population claimed to have an interest in politics. Between 1960 and 1969 this number increased to 41% and fluctuated between 40% and 50% until 1989 (Meulemann 1996:95ff.). In 1990 political interest even rose to 55%, but fell below 50% again in 1992. This indicates that the increase was probably a short-term mobilization due to the reunification. Political discussions with friends, neighbours and relatives increased from an average of 1.17 in 1953 to 2.24 in 1990 (cf. Meulemann 1996:77). In the field of political efficacy changes took place during the past decades, too. In 1959, for example, only 25% disagreed with the statement: "People like me do not have an influence on what the government does." In 1968 the number of people who disagreed with this statement had risen to 35% and remained stable at approximately 40% until 1991 (Meulemann 1996:103).

The move to egalitarianism in society is measured by questions regarding the upbringing of children: obedience and meekness, orderliness and diligence, or self-reliance and free will. In 1951 25% and 41% of the population approved of the first two sets of variables, whereas

independence and free will were approved by 28% (EMNID nr. 3/4 1992:103). A continuous decrease in the appreciation of obedience and meekness has taken place during the past few decades and in 1991 only 9% agreed with these values. At the same time the approval of self-reliance and free will increased to 63% whereas orderliness and diligence were considered valuable qualities by 36% of the respondents.

In the former GDR the same questions were answered similarly in 1991. 61% agreed to the variables of free will and self-reliance. Obedience and meekness received only the approval of 5% altogether 4% lower than in West Germany. This is not surprising regarding the fact that the population in the new *Länder* had been living according to these principles for over 40 years. The largest differences between the two German states could be found in the valuation of orderliness and diligence, where the number of approval was 10% higher among the eastern Germans (EMNID nr. 3/4 1992:103).

In other areas of egalitarianism as well as in the area of political participation data is too scanty to be meaningful with regard to the development in the GDR. According to Meulemann, however, there is a slight decrease - or at best a constant development - in political participation in the GDR from the late 1960s until the late 1980s (cf. Meulemann 1996:221) and an increase in egalitarianism between generations and genders (cf. Meulemann 1996:227).

#### **4.3.2.4 Acceptance: Devaluation in the west, forced secularisation in the east**

With the increased evaluation of co-determination, Meulemann expects a decrease in the value of acceptance that he measures by religiousness and morality (cf. Meulemann 1996:125ff.). The number of people who do not attend church increased significantly during the past decades. Between 1953 and 1963 the number was rather constant between 13% and 19%, but increased to 40% between 1963 and 1976 (Meulemann 1996: 77 and 126). In 1982 the percentage of people never attending church was 50% and remains at this level until the end 1980s. Even among Catholics the regular church attendance decreased from 60% in 1953 to 36% in 1979.

A more direct decrease of the value acceptance becomes obvious in the field of morality, for example, with the question whether divorces should be made as easy as possible, as difficult as possible or if they should be indissoluble. In 1953 13% wanted divorces to be as easy as

possible, in 1976 this had increased to 31% (Meulemann 1985:406). In 1980 the number had decreased to 26%, but is not directly comparable to the other percentages since infidelity instead of guilt was introduced as grounds for divorce in 1977 (Meulemann 1992:535).

Meulemann gives the following reason for the decrease of acceptance as a value in West Germany over the last decades; the meaning of life can no longer be found in traditions – which is the same as religion - but has to be made in everyday life (Meulemann 1996:133). As professional achievement has lost its position as being meaningful, people search for the meaning in life in co-determination - either in family or political life. The identification with one's family implies living and working for the children. Meulemann argues that the growing impact of an independent upbringing of one's children refers to an increased importance of family as a source of meaning of life.<sup>35</sup> With regard to politics as a source of meaning of life, Meulemann emphasises that this not necessarily imply a real increase in political influence. It is rather a new way of viewing politics where political interest and involvement today is regarded as a chance for personal self-realization.

This value change can be understood as a second kind of secularisation which followed the secularisation of the 19th century and which is characterised by an enlargement of its social base. Whereas the first secularisation transferred the religious motives to working life, the second secularisation has been marked by the simultaneous depreciation of religious and professional motives in West Germany. Meulemann concludes is that what religion has ceased to offer is not being sought after in professional life but in leisure time, where leisure time includes both political involvement and devotion towards children (Meulemann 1985:403). Meulemann points out that many of the value changes had already started to take place in society when the student protest movements reached their peak in 1968. The movements can thus be seen as a release of value changes since a large part of the population might have agreed with them.

As emphasised in Chapter 3.2.2, the GDR government already opposed religion from the early 1950s and different policies were carried out in order to alienate the population from the Church. As the following numbers show, the government was quite successful; the territorial

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<sup>35</sup> I would like to point out that this growing devotion towards children does not necessarily mean an increased evaluation of the child itself, but might just as well be a result of the parents need for self-realization that can be fulfilled by successfully bringing up a child.

area of the former GDR was mainly Protestant and in 1946 81.6% of the GDR population were Protestants, in 1964 this number was 59.4%, in 1984 30.0% and 1989 the number had sunk below 30 %. Simultaneously, the number of people without religious affiliation increased from 5.9% in 1946 to 69.3% in 1990 (Meulemann 1996:230). Religious practices like weddings, christenings and confirmations decreased dramatically after the SED offensive in the mid-1950s. In particular, confirmation lost in competition with the *Jugendweihe*<sup>36</sup> which was introduced by the SED in 1954, promising the youth educational and professional advantages.

According to Meulemann two secularisation processes took place in the former GDR. The first one was the most significant and was initiated by the SED from the 1950s until the 1960s. The second one took place between 1965 and 1975 and can be understood as a consequence of modernisation, like the secularisation process in the West. Nevertheless, as the most important secularisation process in the GDR was the first one that was initiated by the state, the secularisation processes in the two Germanys cannot be compared. Thus, the secularisation process in the GDR cannot be seen in the light of value change. If judging the decrease of the value acceptance in the GDR another indicator seems more suitable the “solidarity with the GDR” and changing attitudes with regard to this indicator over the past decades. Before presenting this in further detail in the following Chapter 4.3.2.5, I will give a short summary of the development of the four values in the East and West after the reunification.

As emphasised at the beginning of this chapter, only some of Meulemann’s time series have been presented here in order to give an idea of what kind of indicators he uses to analyse value change in the West German society. Analyses based on data after 1990 indicate that these developments continued in the west with a few exceptions even after the reunification (Meulemann 1996:396ff.). With respect to developments in the former GDR, the figures after reunification are rather contradictive: On the one hand the secularisation process continues, on the other hand other measurements in the area of - among others - political interest, confidence in democracy and support of socialism fluctuate significantly since the reunification. Although this might be a consequence of methodological problems, Meulemann argues that the much higher fluctuation in the east might indicate a discontinuity of values in the east (cf. Meulemann 1996:410-413).

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<sup>36</sup> This was a ceremony in which 14-year-olds were given adult social status.

The four values of social integration that Meulemann uses in order to analyse value change in reunified Germany originated in West Germany and were transferred to the former GDR with the reunification. Thus, it must be taken into consideration that neither the values nor the indicators used to measure these values might be valid for the new *Länder*. Nevertheless, for the growing close of the two Germanys the differences and similarities of values and value change presented are of course still highly relevant.

#### 4.3.2.5 The devaluation of acceptance in the GDR

According to Gensicke (1993), "solidarity with the GDR" might be used as a measure of the changes of the value acceptance in the GDR. Gensicke argues that the mentality of the younger East German generation was so much westernised during the 1980s that it could hardly be distinguished from the West German youth.<sup>37</sup> The largest difference was found in the fact that they lived under conditions which made self-development in the ideal and material sense impossible.

In the three groups, students, apprentices and young workers, GDR solidarity was almost equally evaluated in the 1970s, but they developed differently in the 1980s.<sup>38</sup> At the beginning of the 1970s the percentage that felt unreserved solidarity towards the GDR was about 40% in all groups. The acceptance decreased in all groups but the most and the earliest among young workers and apprentices. The young worker's solidarity fell rapidly and was only approx. 5% in the late 1980s. The solidarity of the apprentices fell, too, however not as dramatically, to 20% in the late 1980s. Gensicke traces this back to the fact that these groups were to a larger extent confronted with the economic reality of East German policies. In comparison the students were raised according to the ideology and the discipline of the system. Besides, they mostly came from the intelligentsia and were to be the future elite. In the mid 1980s the solidarity with the GDR was - with 70% - at its highest among students. The support had fallen to about 35% in 1989, but the students were still the group with the highest level of solidarity with the GDR (Gensicke 1993:174). Another difference was the impact of the

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<sup>37</sup> The changes in the variable "GDR solidarity" are only presented for the younger generations as similar time series studies on the mentalities within the East German population were not possible under the SED-regime (cf. Gensicke 1993:172).

<sup>38</sup> The acceptance of "solidarity with the GDR" does not necessarily mean identification with Marxism (cf. Gensicke 1993:173). It can be founded on the social success, like the equality between men and women.

western media. The consumption was much higher among the working population. They were thus more strongly influenced and confronted by western values.

In the GDR value orientations were only of a positive nature if they were connected to social aims; family, love, work, sport or meeting friends had no individual value in itself. Individual values were seldom mentioned and if, only negative values like egotism, heartlessness, ruthlessness etc. Between 1979 and 1989 the claim for individual values increased. The acceptance of duty decreased from 4.13 to 4.09, self-criticism rose from 4.1 to 4.19, socialism fell from 3.59 to 3.25, achievement decreased from 3.62 to 3.14 and joie de vivre grew from 3.57 to 3.66 (Gensicke 1993:176).<sup>39</sup>

Value changes in the GDR are also related to age like in the West and values of self-development decrease with increased age. In all of the following areas, self-development, living standard, joie de vivre and individualism, the younger generations have higher scores than the older ones. Similarly the values of duty and acceptance increase with age. Discipline, for example, received the value 4.3 in the age group 18-25 whereas the age group 56-65 valued it with 4.8. The same result occurred when asked about achievement. Regarding the variable that measures the importance of the value of "contribution to society", the score is 3.6 in the younger generation and 4.4 in the older ones.<sup>40</sup>

Finally, I would like to comment on similarities and differences between the younger eastern and western Germans after the reunification. In both Germanys, family, friends and professional success have priority. Equally important are independence, self-realization and joie de vivre. However, some differences exist. In the new *Länder*, family, work, income and fashion are more important.<sup>41</sup> In addition, the eastern youth is less biased against pressure to do well than the western youth. In the old *Länder*, friends and leisure time are more highly valued. Since the reunification, the value of work has considerably increased in the former GDR. This can be understood in connection with the labour market's development. Additionally, the wish 'to make it' grew strongly. Job security and higher income are more highly valued in the new *Länder*; responsibility, appreciation, acknowledgement and usefulness are also extremely important.

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<sup>39</sup> Average value measured on a scale with maximum value 5.

<sup>40</sup> Average value measured on a scale with maximum value 5.

<sup>41</sup> The stronger valuation of the last two could be another sign of backlog demand (cf. Chapter 4.1.1).

Regarding interest in politics the eastern German youth has stabilized on the same level as the western youth. Until the *Volkskammer* election the interest in politics was the highest (79%). This dropped continuously to 27% in 1991. With the election in March 1990, the political decision had been made and political questions became less important than economic issues.<sup>42</sup> One development among all generations in the former GDR, which is not surprising regarding their high expectations of the reunification, is the decrease in satisfaction since 1990 (Gensicke 1993:189). Especially among young people dissatisfaction with political developments grew; firstly, it was basically the middle age group that benefited immediately from reunification, in particular, well-educated, skilled workers and employees with professional experience. Members of the younger age group could hardly get professional training and were also the first to be made redundant or put on part-time work. They also had little or no income at their disposal. Secondly, as Gensicke argues, the development of decreased political orientation, political division and radicalisation in the new *Länder* must be understood in the light of "stolen perspectives for a better future". The frustration is understandable, especially in those regions where economic improvement is not in sight.

These data prove that a process of individualisation and value change took place in the GDR, too (cf. also Gensicke 1992:679, Klages/Gensicke 1993:56-59). However, the political regime stopped the development towards a *subjective modernisation* (cf. Chapter 2.1.3). Ironically, it was at the same time, as shown above, this group of young people, who although not causing *die Wende*<sup>43</sup>, at least in the end, contributed to the fall of the ruling system. This they did through their enormous increase in complaints about the absence of promised improvements in living standards, freedoms and democracy (Ritschel 1992:300).

Recalling Meulemann's argument (Chapter 4.3.2.3), that the students protest movements were a release of value changes approved by broad parts of the West German population, a parallel might be drawn to the fall of the GDR regime. The developments that led to the final collapse of the Communist regime were not just a result of political opposition although with the changing Soviet policy since the mid-1980s a strong opposition towards the GDR system was facilitated. However, as shown above, changes in attitudes and value orientations of large parts of the East German population had especially taken place in the last decade. In this way, the

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<sup>42</sup> Please remember that these numbers mainly refer to results among young people age 18-24.

<sup>43</sup> This expression is used in Germany when referring to the peaceful revolution in the GDR.

opposition movement in the GDR might be seen as release of desired social changes. They could count on the population's support although their primary goals for wanting social and governmental change might have been of a different nature (e.g. democracy, human rights versus higher standard of living and travel permit).

#### **4.3.2.6 The decreased acceptance of "voting as a value"**

A final indicator for the decrease in the value of duty and acceptance that is important for understanding changes in election behaviour, is the decline in the number of individuals who consider "voting to be a duty of the citizen". An analysis of Falter/Schumann (1993:44), proved that among those citizens who agreed to the above statement, the percentage of non-voters was under 10% whereas among those who did not agree, the number was about 50%.<sup>44</sup> Usually protest and non-voting is measured according to disaffection with politics, parties and the system (*Politik-, Parteien- und System- Verdrossenheit*), lack of political interest and absence of party affiliation. These results show, however, that although no time series data on the development of "the norm of voting" exist, it seems plausible that a decrease in the acceptance of this value has contributed to the growth in non-voters.<sup>45</sup> When compared with Meulemann's data on the growth in political interest and participation, "voting as a duty" might also have been replaced by an active political orientation expressed by the increased evaluation of co-determination (see Chapter 4.3.2.3). Thus, if anticipating that a decrease in the number of people considering "voting as a duty" has taken place, this not necessarily relates to a decrease in political interest or an increase in the number of non-voters.

#### **4.3.2.7 Organisational membership and social integration**

Finally, voluntary organisations are important to social integration; they serve as a link between state and society (Immerfall 1997:141). Whereas values are important to the cohesion of society because lasting social relationships need a minimum of shared values, memberships in voluntary organisations offer citizens to establish and to practise

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<sup>44</sup> This analysis includes both the new and the old *Länder*. In the former GDR voting was compulsory. Its abolition might explain the drastic decrease in vote turnout between the *Volkskammerwahl* in March 1990 and *Bundestagswahl* in December 1990. The number of non-voters increased from 9.2% to 24.5% between these two elections. Another explanation is the fact that free elections were nothing new anymore, as four elections had taken place in ten months.

<sup>45</sup> 10 or 20 years earlier citizens who were not interested in politics or were dissatisfied would still vote because they would regard it as their duty. Today, this group is to a larger extent inclined not to vote.

consciousness, self-organisation and solidarity. An extensive network of organisations is thus important to a liberal democracy (Immerfall 1997:142; Sahner 1993:98). Table 4.3 summarises the development of organisational membership in the west from 1984 until 1998 and in the east from 1993 until 1998.

**Table 4.3 Membership in organisations 1984-1998**

	West Germany				East Germany	
	1984	1988	1993	1998	1993	1998
Membership (%) in:						
Trade union	16	16	17	12	25	13
Political party	5	5	5	4	3	3
Citizen's initiative	2	2	2	1	0	1
Church association	7	10	7	9	5	3
Musical-/choral society	7	8	6	7	1	2
Sports club	28	29	28	28	10	12
Other organisations	19	24	19	22	14	14
No membership	44	42	44	42	53	62

(Source: Wohlfahrtssurvey 1984, 1988, 1993, 1998 in Statistisches Bundesamt (ed.) 2000:535, English translation)

As can be seen the pattern of organisational membership remained – in most areas – the same in the west over the past 15 years. Only membership in trade union decreased significantly from 16% in 1984 to 12% in 1998. This development is closely related to the changes in the labour market presented in Chapter 4.1.3 and 4.2. Trade union membership decreased in the east, too, from 25% in 1993 to 13% in 1998. This development is similar to the one that took place in the west, although the reasons for this development are probably more diverse than in the west (Statistisches Bundesamt 2000:535).

The development indicates an increasing similarity in the pattern of organisational membership in the east and the west with respect to memberships in trade union, parties and citizen's initiatives. However, there are still significant differences with respect to the other organisations. In particular, the number of memberships in the east is considerably lower than in the west. Furthermore, the number of people without membership is 20% higher in the east than in the west (42% in the West versus 62% in the East in 1998). Memberships in voluntary organisations are often considered a social capital, important to democracy and democratic stability (cf. Putnam 1995). This low level of memberships in the former GDR with even an increase in the number of non-members over the past years should thus be closely observed (cf. Schöb 1999:8ff.).

The purpose of this extensive presentation of the social transformations was to clearly show how – changes in social structure and values - have influenced the cleavage structure of the

German electorate and thus also the voting potential of the West German people's parties, the CDU/CSU and the SPD during recent decades. Furthermore, the aim was to emphasise how differently and to some extent how similarly, the two Germanys have developed during forty years of division. This is important to bear in mind and decisive for understanding the existence of lifestyle groups in the new and old *Länder* that will be presented in the following chapter.



## **5. LIFESTYLE GROUPS IN GERMANY**

In this chapter results from German lifestyle studies in the field of sociology and political science will be presented and discussed. Firstly, an overview of some of the studies will be given. Secondly, two lifestyle analyses – one conducted in the west and one conducted in the east – will be presented in further detail and discussed with regard to cleavages and voting behaviour. As already several times emphasised in this thesis, the terms lifestyle groups and social milieus are often used interchangeably. In the surveys presented regarding the milieu concept, I have marked the term, i.e. “milieu”, in order to indicate that it is of a different nature than a social milieu as applied in this thesis.

### **5.1 An overview of different lifestyle surveys in Germany**

Since the 1980s several lifestyle analyses have been conducted in West Germany (cf. Chapter 2.1.2). The aims of the analyses are of a different character and so are their methodological approaches and sampling procedures. Lüdtké (1989), for example, analysed lifestyle groups based on 98 respondents. The majority of the sample lived in middle and upper Hesse and some came from other cities in West Germany. Lüdtké was the first German author who tried to put empirical lifestyle research on a theoretical basis (Hartmann 1999:108). According to Lüdtké, lifestyles are established when participants form their life consciously. This happens in interaction with the environment surrounding the individual. Furthermore, Lüdtké distinguishes clearly between attitudes, preferences and values (mentality), actions and behaviour (performance) and social structural characteristics (structural context). He emphasises, however, that these three areas dynamically interact. In his survey Lüdtké used six fields of performance. Firstly, factor analysis was used for data reduction; thereafter he used the factor values in order to obtain 12 lifestyle groups by means of cluster analysis. Discriminant analysis was then used to analyse the social characteristics of the lifestyle groups.

Schulze's analysis (1992a) is based on a random sample of 1014 respondents in the city of Nuremberg in 1985. On the basis of items like activities, cultural preferences and habits he used factor analysis to construct three patterns of aesthetic preferences in everyday life which have developed in West Germany in the post World War II era; the trivial scheme, the

excitement scheme and the highly civilized scheme. Finally, Schulze arranged age and education with these patterns of aesthetic preferences in everyday life in order to construct five “social milieus”; the entertainment “milieu”, the self-realization “milieu”, the harmony “milieu”, the integration “milieu” and the high-class “milieu”.

Giegler’s (1994) survey is based on a geographically limited sample, too, analysing lifestyle groups in the city of Hamburg in 1990. The sample was rather small, including only 168 respondents who were questioned about leisure activities, nutrition, personal hygiene, the consumption of beverages, use of media and aims in life. On the basis of these items seven lifestyle groups were established by means of cluster analysis.

Since 1979 the Sinus-Institute in Heidelberg has carried out a so-called *Lebenswelt-Forschung*. It aimed to find large groups in the German society that possess similar attitudes to life and ways of living in order to facilitate the finding of market segments more precisely than this could be done with socio-demographic characteristics (cf. Georg 1998:108). Until 1981 the “milieus” were defined using a qualitative method and from then on statistical methods were applied as well. On the basis of qualitative material 112 items were developed which were considered characteristic for defining an individual’s affiliation to a “milieu”. Thereafter 250 individuals whose “milieu” affiliation was already identified answered to these items in a standardized survey. By means of factor analysis the structure of the items was found and by applying discriminant analysis a satisfactory solution of the group affiliations on the basis of 68 items could be found. After testing these 68 items on a representative sample of 1000 respondents, the number of items could be reduced to 40. Since an individual’s affiliation to a “milieu” could be estimated on the basis of these items, they were called “milieu indicators”. In a final step the indicator was again tested on the basis of 5000 respondents (cf. Hartmann 1999:73). Originally, eight “milieus” were defined by Sinus in 1992 and from 1991 a ninth “milieu” - “the milieu of the new employee” – was included. Furthermore, in 1996 three of the “milieus” were exchanged (cf. Hartmann 1999:78).

In 1984 Sinus carried out an analysis for the SPD in order to find the party’s basis of support using the “milieu indicator”. The sample of this survey included 5000 respondents. It was quite large and included both social structural characteristics like occupation, gender and age as well as attitudes and interests. The conclusion was that the “advancement orientated milieu” and “technocratic-liberal milieu” would play a key role in receiving the majority of votes at

the 1987 election (SPD 1984:5). On the basis of a survey conducted in 1991 a continuity of the relationship between “milieus” and parties was confirmed (cf. Flaig/Meyer/Ueltzhöffer 1994:143).

In 1990 the Sinus-Institute started to cooperate with the eastern German Concrete-Institute located in the eastern part of Berlin (cf. Ueltzhöffer/Flaig 1993:69) in order to analyse lifestyle groups in the former GDR and to compare similarities and differences between the east and the west. In 1991 a survey was carried out on behalf of the *Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung*. The sample included 1979 respondents in the new *Länder* and 2027 respondents in the old *Länder* (cf. Becker/Becker/Ruhland 1992:7). The result of the survey carried out in the east will be presented in further detail in Chapter 5.2.2.

Following the analysis on behalf of the SPD, Gluchowski at the CDU-orientated *Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung* carried out a survey in 1986. Nine lifestyle groups were defined using factor and cluster analysis on a basis of items like aims in life, value orientations, attitudes towards different areas such as work, family and leisure as well as religiosity and political attitudes. The survey was based on a representative sample of 3000, carried out in the autumn of 1986 (cf. Gluchowski 1987:20f.) A detailed presentation of the lifestyle groups will be presented in Chapter 5.2.1.

Spellerberg (1996, 1997) relates life satisfaction, aims in life and lifestyle in her survey. She considers the lifestyle concept as useful in defining large social groups which are not only based on economic factors but also on similar behaviour and attitudes. According to Spellerberg, lifestyle is a symbolic visible way of expressing social position, social experiences and individual orientations. She thus analyses lifestyles from the social structural perspective (cf. Spellerberg 1997:25). Her survey was carried out in conjunction with the 1993 *Wohlfahrtssurvey*. Only respondents between the age of 18 and 61 answered the additional lifestyle questionnaire. The survey was based on a representative sample and included 1564 respondents in the west and 776 in the east. 119 variables in the areas leisure activity, media use, television preferences, musical taste, reading habits, style of fashion and furnishing as well as aims in life were reduced to 35 dimensions by means of factor analysis. Thereafter, a cluster analysis was carried out and nine lifestyle groups were found in the east and west respectively (Spellerberg 1997:26). Finally, she analysed the relationship between the lifestyle groups and job position and education as well as quality of life.

Otte (1997) conducted a secondary analysis of Spellerberg's data in order to analyse to which extent lifestyle groups can predict voting behaviour. By means of factor analysis Otte reduced the variables to 25 factors and by applying cluster analysis he found 6 lifestyle groups in West Germany which to a significant extent match with the findings of Schulze. With respect to voting behaviour, Otte discovered that the traditional social structural variables class and religion were more important in explaining the preference for the CDU/CSU versus SPD than the lifestyle approach. However, the lifestyle approach was more powerful in explaining a preference for the Greens or non-voting (Otte 1997:339). A similar analysis was carried out by Zerger (2000) using the Sinus milieu concept to analyse the impact of milieus on voting behaviour at the 1990 federal election. His conclusion is that a relationship between milieu and voting behaviour is difficult to prove and that the few significant results are hard to interpret (Zerger 2001:225). However, in this context it should be kept in mind that the 1990 election was the first one in reunified Germany and thus took place under special circumstances (cf. page 1).

Vester et.al (1993, 1997, 2001) carried out an extensive research project analysing the social structural change of "social milieus" and the rise of "new social milieus" in West Germany 1988-1992. The analysis was based on representative samples, expert interviews, narrative interviews, content analysis and the in depth analysis of the rise of "new social milieus" in three West German regions. The research design is complex and so is the interpretation of the results. However, I will try to summarize some of the main steps and findings. In the representative survey - carried out in 1991 - questions about gender equality, social equality, multiculturalism, readiness to become politically involved and political dissatisfaction were asked (cf. Vester 1997:113). The analysis included 44 statements and by means of cluster and factor analysis Vester et. al. found seven political styles which could easily be distinguished. Thereafter, they analysed the relationship between social position and political-ideological *Lager* (political camp), "milieus" and social cohesion. The analysis of "milieus" was based on the 1991 Sinus indicators - the "milieus" are thus the same as those used by Sinus. Four *Lagers* each comprising about 25% of the population were found. These were: the *Lagers* of individualisation, of modernisation, of a conservative order and the declassed *Lager*. Although neither the political ideological *Lagers* nor the political party *Lagers* corresponded with the nine "social milieus", Vester argued that both still concentrate on very specific milieu zones (Vester 1997:115). Furthermore, Vester et.al. discussed the existence of cleavages in the West

Germany society in four areas; social structure, mentalities, unequal social positions and political and ideological cleavages (Vester et.al. 1993:36-50). In conclusion Vester argued that the political immobility in 1997 was not the consequence of depoliticised and egocentric mentalities in the population; the societal changes that have taken place due to individualisation have not yet been translated to the political agenda which was still blocking the development and perspectives and the change to the younger generations (Vester 1997:121). With the 1998 parliamentary election this situation changed. The new Chancellor Gerhard Schröder obviously had received the message – using Tony Blair and “new Labour” as a model - that the voting potential was located in “the new middle”. However, as emphasized by Vester the “new middle” Chancellor Schröder is addressing consists of only 5% of the population and has hardly nothing in common with the sociologically defined “new middle” that comprises more than 25% of the population (cf. Die Zeit Nr. 49 1999:7).

A comparison of some of the different lifestyle groups and “social milieus” found in the surveys presented above is given in Appendix 1. As can be seen, there are some similarities in the number and labelling of lifestyle groups and “social milieus” found by different researchers. In order to give the reader indications which kind of variables might hide behind the sometimes quite “adventurous” labels used in the presentation of lifestyle groups, two lifestyle analyses – one conducted in the east and one conducted in the west - will be presented in detail in the next chapter. Although some expressions used in the labels are rather difficult to translate into English, I have done so. The original German labels can be taken from the overview in Appendix 1.

## **5.2 Lifestyle groups, cleavages and party preference**

As presented above only a few lifestyle surveys in the west have been carried out in the field of election research. In the east, no surveys on voting behaviour exist yet. Nevertheless, two surveys will be presented in further detail in this chapter; they were selected on the basis of the following criteria: 1) For the west one of the surveys including election behaviour should be used; one of the most well-known German lifestyle analyses in election research conducted by Peter Gluchowski in 1987, was chosen and 2) The lifestyle analysis presented for the eastern German population should be as close in time to Gluchowski’s survey as possible. One of the first extensive lifestyle analyses of the eastern

German population was carried out by Becker, Becker and Ruhland in 1991<sup>46</sup> and will thus be presented in further detail. Although this survey does not include voting behaviour, a classification of possible political preferences will be given (cf. Oedegaard 1994).

### **5.2.1 Lifestyle groups in the west – a presentation of Gluchowski's survey**

Gluchowski arranges the lifestyle groups in five different political generations. The first group consists of people who grew up during the time of National Socialism. The second consists of those who spent their youth during World War II and the first post-war era. The third group is the generation of the Adenauer era<sup>47</sup> and the fourth group presents the generation of students involved in the protest movements. The last group consists of those who grew up during the social and alternative movements that began in 1972. In the following the main characteristics of the different lifestyle groups have been summarised (for an extensive presentation see Gluchowski 1987:21-30)

In the older political generations, including the era Adenauer, four lifestyle groups exist that are marked by a preference for traditional values:

The upper conservative (11%): The average age of this lifestyle group is 52 years – although the level of people under age 45 is quite high, too - and is above-average represented by men. Special features of this group are a high level of education, a good professional standing and the highest average income of all groups. The largest part of the self-employed can be found in this group and it has an above-average proportion of executive employees. The value orientations of this group are traditional-conservative: professional success, a high standard of living and an intact family life with children are important. They are open-minded towards self-development although distant to gender equality. The members of this group have a strong personality, are used to responsibility and have basically reached their goals. Family is important and is characterised by a traditional division of work. Children are taught to respect the parents' authority. Leisure activities are limited due to lack of time. However, time is spent with the family or used for cultural activities and involvement in important societal interests. The members of this lifestyle group are against exaggerated consumption and fashion. It is

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<sup>46</sup> This survey includes an analysis of western German lifestyle groups as well as a comparison of the groups found in the east and west. However, since party choice is not included in the analysis of Becker/Becker/Ruhland, Gluchowski's study seems more useful to present the case of West Germany.

<sup>47</sup> Adenauer was leader of the CDU and the first Chancellor in West Germany after World War II.

important to be well dressed, but clothing should be unobtrusive. Technical development is considered important to maintain future prosperity. Church and religion are very important to the members of this group, too, and they take actively place in church life. Finally, this group is very interested in politics and are usually very well informed. On the left-right scale the members of this group have a position to the right of the middle. Law and order have to be respected, but it is also a duty of the citizens to get involved in politics beyond the act of voting. The party identification of this group is the CDU/CSU.

The duty-orientated employee (11%): Features of this lifestyle group are a relatively low level of education, a big share of workers and unskilled workers with strong ties to trade unions. The average age of the members of this group is 50 years and often the members are already pensioners. They often live in smaller communities. A harmonic family life is of importance and so is the acquisition of durable goods. Life goals are characterised by a conservative-petty bourgeois attitude with a strong orientation towards family life. Personal value orientations are dominated by traditional values of duty and acceptance as well as a high importance of social equality. Work is basically a means to earn money; regular working hours and a secure job are of major importance. Work is primarily considered a duty and does not have to be interesting or according to one's inclination. A traditional division of work dominates the household and family life is very important; leisure time is usually spent with the family. The members of this group don't put much emphasis on consumption and fashion. They want to be neatly dressed without showing up. Furthermore, this group is rather non-religious. Politics are only important when matters of the welfare state are discussed. In general, representatives of this group expect that the state comes up to their expectations. Law and order are obeyed. The only political activity of this group is regularly voting because they assumed to have no greater political influence. Members of this group tend to favour the SPD.

The integrated elderly person (11%): Older women and widows - average age 64 - dominate this category. They live in smaller communities and show a low level of education. Harmonic family life is important, as are thrift, love of one's native country and national consciousness. The members of this lifestyle group are conservative in every respect: household work is traditionally divided; more sense of duty is demanded of other people and developments towards the leisure society are seen as negative. A neat appearance is of big importance, however fashion is not favoured. Of all groups this has the strongest relationship with religion

and the church and members of this group often complain about the disappearance of religious values in today's society. Political interest is low, but they are very satisfied with the present political system. The confidence in the state is very high. As they think to have little political influence their political activity is limited to regular voting which they regard as a citizen's duty. The party identification of this group is the CDU/CSU.

The isolated elderly person (4%): This group has an average age of 68, is mostly female (73%) and half of the group are widows. Furthermore, they have a below-average level of education and the lowest income of all lifestyle groups. A number above average of this group's members come from the working class and live in very small communities. The group is characterised by loneliness and the aim in life is individual security and health. The group is conservative orientated and of all groups this one is the most distant towards self-development and hedonistic value orientations. Work has become irrelevant to the majority of this group, family has lost its meaning as well and leisure needs hardly exist. Consumption is reduced to what is daily needed and new clothes are rather unimportant. The members of this group have no relationship to modern technique but feel threatened by it. Furthermore, religion is very important to the members of this group. Faith provides comfort and the participation in church life is an occasion to have social contacts otherwise missing. The members of this group identify most strongly with the CDU, but this lifestyle group has the second highest number of members with no party identification, too. An inclination towards non-voting might thus exist since members of this lifestyle group are dissatisfied with the political system, have little confidence in the state and above 70% are not interested in politics.

Due to the social transformations in the post-war era, lifestyle groups with no definite or uniform party preferences came into existence. 38% of the population belongs to this group and can be separated into two major sub-groups:

The open-minded and adaptable normal citizen (25%): Men are above average represented in this lifestyle group. The average age is 50 years, but the group as such comprises the generation between 46 and 60 years whose children have already left the house. With respect to education, work and income this group is similar to the average population. Half of the members of this group have experienced social advancement when compared to their parents

and most of them live in smaller cities. Goals are social advancement, success in work, a high standard of living and a fulfilling family life as well as self-realization. The members of this group have traditional-conservative values like order, achievement, sense of duty and discipline. However, they also use this basis in order to develop values like personal freedom and self-development. A traditional division of work and up-bringing of children is this lifestyle group's standard. Leisure activities are widely spread and include family, practical work and craftsmanship as well as activities in organisations and clubs. Consumption and fashion is very important to the members of this group. They want to be well dressed and wear qualitative clothes that also serve as a status symbol. Technical development is considered very important for future prosperity. Furthermore, the members of this group are rather religious and participate in church life. Finally, politics is quite important to this group. They are very satisfied with the political system and have a big confidence in the state. However, they are only moderately interested in politics and are only conditionally willing to get involved in political participation. The members of this group have a stronger identification with the CDU than with the SPD. However, the largest number (38%) of this group has no party identification.

The inconspicuous, rather passive employee (13%): Younger people with an education below average in lower working positions – as their parents - with low income dominate this category. The majority of them live in big cities. Passivity results due to the fact that life goals can hardly be defined. A strong emphasis of leisure time is contrasted by the lack of orientation in other areas of life. Consumption and fashion dominate; the newest fashion is more important than the clothes' quality. Work is only a means to earn money and among the areas family, job and leisure time, the latter dominates. However, leisure activities are rather inconspicuous and leisure time is often spent watching television. Political interest is very low and the prevailing opinion is that the state basically acts correctly. Voting is irregular and respect for law and order is relatively low. This lifestyle group has an equal inclination towards the SPD and the CDU. However, 50% of the members of this group have no party identification.

The major difference between the last two groups is that “the open-minded, adaptable, normal citizen” has a higher social status and stronger ties to the church. Thus, this group has a

stronger inclination to the Union parties than the SPD whereas “the inconspicuous, rather passive employee” identifies himself equally strongly with both people's parties.

At the beginning of the 1970s three new lifestyle groups emerged in the younger generations. 25% of the western Germans fit into one of these lifestyle groups. All groups lack a long-term party affiliation. With an increased preference for the value of self-development, the distance to the traditional people's parties grows and the identification with the Greens increases.

The advancement-orientated younger person (10%): The average age of the members of this group is 33 years, the majority is married or has a partner and not seldom they have children, too. They work as employees in positions that require an average level of education. 1/5 is still studying. The main life goal is an organised meaningful life that allows enjoyment, too. Success in one's professional life, social respect and acquisition of property are prerequisites for reaching this goal. Value orientations consist of a mixture of duty and acceptance and self-development. Family life is characterised by equality; a lot of women work, household work and the upbringing of children are shared and children are brought up to be independent. A neat appearance is important and fashion is a status symbol. Technical developments are considered relatively important. Furthermore, this group is basically not religious, sees politics not essential, is satisfied with the political system and has confidence in the state. Political participation - beyond voting – is rather seldom. This group has the weakest party identification of all groups - 58% have no party identification at all - and there is a slightly stronger inclination towards the SPD than towards the CDU/CSU.


The post-materialistic, left-alternative younger person (5%): The majority of the members of this group live in larger cities and university towns. Most of them still study, either at school, in vocational training or at university. About one third works, mainly in the public sector where they achieve a relatively high income. Of all lifestyle groups this one has the highest level of education. The average age of the members of this group is 28 years. The value orientation of this group is dominated by values like self-development, equality and freedom of speech. They are distant to traditional-conservative values as well as values that are related to societal standing. The members of this group have a strong personality, they often try to convince other people of their opinion, they like to accept responsibility and can be very determined to reach their goal, in particular with regard to subjects or issues they consider important for society. One's profession is seen as a means for self-realization and self-

development and income is less important. Private relationships are based on partnership and equality. Leisure time is important and is often used for political activities or other societal involvement. The members of this group are hardly interested in consumption and fashion. They disapprove of technical developments as they consider them dangerous for mankind. Finally, the members of this group are almost anti-religious. Their aversion against the churches is big. However, politics is very important and political interest is high and is often expressed as criticism of the system. In comparison to the rest of the population, dissatisfaction with the political system and distrust in the state are very large. Ideologically members of this group lean towards the left. This group is reserved about the people's parties and strongly identifies with the Greens.

The left liberal integrated post-materialist (10%): This group differs from the preceding group because its members are older and have advanced positions in life cycles. Their education is finished and the level of education is high. They are married or live with a partner and have more often children than the members of the previous group. Many of them work in higher positions of the public sector. This group, too, is above average represented in large cities. Their value orientation is dominated by self-development and in particular values of social equality are important. Furthermore, the members of this group are characterised by a strong personality, they make their way in life, are highly convincing and like to assume responsibility. Self-development at work is considered important; contents of work should be interesting and according to one's qualification. The members of this group prefer to work independently. They are less interested in making a career, competition at work or be financially successful. Partnership and family life is based on equality and freedom. In their leisure time this group involves in intellectual, cultural and social activities. Among the fields family, work and leisure time, work is of special importance, in fact the separation between working hours and leisure time has vanished. Consumption and fashion are not important, except that clothing should be solid. In comparison with the younger post-materialist members of this group are not set against technical developments and they show no particular anti-religious attitude. The political interest of this group is high. They are satisfied with the political system and are marked by a left liberal, not a left-extreme position. They are critical of the state, but supportive. They believe that a further democratisation of society and politics is necessary and they are prepared to get personally involved in politics. Politically influenced

in the 1960s and 1970s, this group inclines more often to the SPD, but they can also identify themselves with the Greens.

**Figure 5.1 Lifestyle groups in the western German population in 1987**



(Source: Gluchowski 1991:235, English translation)

The above presentation of western German lifestyle groups shows that the traditional features of social structure still are important in distinguishing between the groups; differences in educational level, profession and income made a classification of lifestyle groups into strata possible and different value preferences were found by differentiating between political generations.

Figure 5.1 shows the different groups arranged on a vertical axis based on strata and a horizontal axis based on value preferences. The lifestyle groups that may present the continuation of the traditional milieus presented in Chapter 3 are "the upper conservative", "the duty-orientated employee", "the integrated elderly person" and "the isolated elderly

person". These groups are dominated by the desire for duty and acceptance (also characterised as materialistic) and hardly any differences in the intensity of the traditional value preferences are seen. The distinguishing characteristics between "the upper conservative" and the "duty-orientated employee" are basically expressed on the vertical strata dimension. This is also the case with the two other traditional lifestyle groups.

An opposite relationship exists in the three younger political generations. Differences in strata placement between the groups is of little importance to party preference, but the value orientations are of considerable impact. All three groups are in the upper part of the strata dimension and all are primarily orientated toward self-development. "The post-materialistic, left-alternative person" is the group with the strongest intensity toward self-development, which explains why its members incline towards the Greens, followed by "the left-liberal integrated post-materialist". "The ascension-orientated younger person" is the group with the least intensity.


"The open-minded and adaptable citizen" and "the rather passive employee" are the two lifestyle groups with the most non-uniform party preferences. The placement of the first group in the upper strata and at the same time its desire for traditional values might explain this group's inclination towards the Union parties. The second group's inclination towards both people's parties can be understood by seeing how the group crosses both the value and the strata dimensions. This presents the dilemma of the traditional people's parties quite clearly. Both the CDU/CSU and the SPD still recruit voters from the traditional milieus on the left side of the figure, but these include today only 37% of the electorate. Whereas the FDP does not have any clear voters potential in any of the lifestyle groups and is dependent on the political climate to recruit voters on the marginal areas of the SPD or CDU/CSU (cf. Gluchowski 1987:32).

### **5.2.2 Lifestyle groups in the east – a presentation of the findings by Becker, Becker and Ruhland**

In the eastern German population nine lifestyle groups were categorised, too. Although some have similar characteristics to those found in the old *Länder*, these lifestyle groups clearly reflect the special social and political conditions of the GDR and cannot be considered copies of those found in the west. The division of the population based on class/strata, i.e. lower,

middle and upper class, in the old *Länder* cannot be transferred to the former GDR. This especially applies for income and profession because the GDR policy was to level out income and basically ignore professional status. The lifestyle group of "the upper conservative" can therefore not be found in the former GDR. A development of such a lifestyle was not permitted under the Communist regime. "The bourgeois-humanistic" lifestyle which emerged in East Germany is only partly comparable with the western, conservative upper-class lifestyle.

The percentage of the distribution of the eastern German population is shown in Figure 5.2 and I will summarise the most important characteristics of every lifestyle group below (for an extensive presentation see BeckerBecker/Ruhland 1992:105-113).

**Figure 5.2 Lifestyle groups in the eastern German population 1991**

(Source: Ueltzhöffer/Flaig 1993:72, English translation)

The bourgeois-humanistic person (10%): The members of this lifestyle group have higher education and often a PhD. They work as qualified and executive employees, civil servants and self-employed in the field of administration, education and information. The income of this group's members is at a middle and higher level. One third is retired. Furthermore, the members of this group are characterised by Christian value orientations and protestant virtues like duty performance, discipline and social engagement. The preservation and the continuation of human traditions that includes respect of human dignity, tolerance and solidarity are important to this group. The members of this group have an esteem for arts and culture, too. Finally, they want to live a harmonic life with their family and social environment. They are distant towards materialistic goods that they consider substitutes for real values worth living for. With respect to consumption they prefer durable quality products.

The rationalist technocratic person (6%): The members of this group have an educational level which is above average and are qualified and executive employees, civil servants and self-employed. The income is at a middle and higher level. In the past, many representatives of this

group belonged to the privileged class, with access to consumer goods and services not available to the common East German citizens. This lifestyle group is marked by optimism about the future as well as trust in reason and scientific rationality. Their goal is an efficient life planning, therefore nothing is left to coincidence. Furthermore, the members of this group are characterised by elitism and they want materialistic and societal estimation which they consider well-deserved in relation to what they have achieved. Finally, these people are characterised by perfectionism, pragmatism and conformism. Success is considered to be a duty. The members of this group are thus willing to adjust, if necessary. They enjoy too busy themselves with technology at work and in their leisure time. With respect to consumption they are quality orientated and prefer an expensive style.

The petty bourgeois materialistic person (23%): This group consists of skilled workers and employees at the lower and middle level working in public administration, banks or in the area of education and health, possessing an income at the middle level. Their aim is to secure and improve living standards, have no material worries and be proud of what they have achieved in life. Family is important and they want to live a comfortable life without conflicts. The members of this group want to make the best out of things, they are optimistic and consider life satisfaction a main principle of life. Members of this group want order and do not allow themselves to stand out and thus adjust to the existing conventions. Status demonstration is important in order to express an attachment to the upper middle strata.

The traditional farmer and worker (27%): The largest of the eastern German lifestyle groups - the traditional farmer and worker - has no equivalent in the west. This means that more than 25% of the population in the new *Länder* lives under conditions which have not existed in the west since the first post-war years (Becker/Becker/Ruhland 1992:99). The members of this lifestyle group belong to the older generation, half of the members are unemployed, retired or are in early retirement. They possess a low educational level and those still working work as traditional manual workers, farmers or as employees at the lower and middle level. A secure job is considered the basis for maintaining both a satisfying standard of living and social security when retired as well as a basis for a life in organised communities with family, colleagues and the village community. Furthermore, the members of this group are characterised by austerity, simplicity and rationality. They have no exaggerated demands and do not live beyond their means. With respect to consumption the members of this group prefer

solid products and are attached to nature. In addition, they consider it a virtue to honestly say one's opinion and to behave naturally. Finally, life in the former GDR is often idealized, in particular, due to its simplicity, clarity and "social equality".

The worker without traditions (8%): This group is characterised by low education and its members are workers often employed in problematic industries like chemistry or in the service sector working for, in particular, the state run post- or train company. There is a high proportion of unemployed and short time workers in this group, thus income is low. The members of this group want to live an organised life without problems. They value materialistic security, to be able to afford more and to live a pleasant life. The members of this group mainly ignore the future – they wait for what comes. With respect to consumption many wishes remain unfulfilled due to a lack in finances. In order to cope with this they pretend not to need much.

The hedonistic worker (5%): The members of this group often have a middle level education. They are mainly skilled workers, but also low-level employees and civil servants are represented in this group. Income is at the lower and middle level; in particular the women in this group have a low income. The members of this group want to live a pleasant and comfortable life with a higher standard of living and to be able to afford all they want. All opportunities that may give them an advantage are used. They want to belong to the western world of consumption and leisure. The possession of materialistic goods is important to the members of this group and they focus on enjoying today's life and to follow the fashion trends. Finally, an exaggerated level of self-confidence may be found among the members of this group; according to the state ideology they were the "ruling class" and were thus supported by the state.

The status and career orientated person (9%): The members of this group have a high level of education. They are skilled workers, trade workers, qualified employees or self-employed. In the past they often belonged to the leadership in the SED and in administration – they had "good relations" and had access to privileges. The income is at the higher level. The life goal and the decisive value orientations of the members of this group are professional and social advancement. In the past, social status could be expressed through power and privileges and today the members of this group try to earn as much as possible to be able to show their status. Among the members of this group significant problems to adjust exist as well as a certain

insecurity as old values no longer exist. Western norms and standards of consumptions are used as orientation and the model example is the successful West German manager. Status symbols are important; members of this group cherish a fascination for high-tech and a belief in progress.

The sub-cultural youth (5%): The members of this lifestyle group are workers, temporary workers or performing employees. However, many are still in education or in vocational training, on short-term work etc. Income is low. They focus on withdrawing themselves from the conventional regulations, norms and constraints of society. They want to have fun and enjoyment in life as well as change and spontaneity. Communication is important and so is the social network of like-minded people. Furthermore, the members of this group want to distance themselves from the decent normal citizens. Finally, the members of this group are characterised by an aversion against planning the future as well as a disdain of materialistic goods. There is a generous handling of money among them and they put their own individual taste pointedly on show.

The left-intellectual alternative person (7%): The members of this group have a high level of education and often have a university degree or a degree in applied sciences. They work in the field of education, research, electronic data processing and arts. Their level of income is high. Self-realization and self-development is important to the members of this group. Furthermore, they want to be useful to society and they are characterised by an ecological way of thinking. With regard to consumption this group is simple, close to nature and they do not value materialistic needs. There is also a readiness – among the members of this group - to become politically, socially or artistically engaged – in order to realize own ideals.

### **5.2.3 The reflection of cleavages and party preference in eastern and western German lifestyle groups**

Summarising the discussion in the two previous chapters, four cleavages may be found in the West German lifestyle groups. These are the cleavage between religion and secularism, work and capital, left and right and materialism and post-materialism. The following lifestyle groups: "the upper conservative", "the integrated elderly person" and "the isolated elderly person" may be arranged according to the cleavages religion, capital, right and materialism. These lifestyle groups have a party preference for the CDU/CSU "The duty-orientated

employee" can be arranged according to the cleavages secularism, work, left and materialism and has a party preference for the SPD. The last lifestyle group that may clearly be arranged according to one or more of the above cleavages is "the post-materialistic, left-alternative, younger person". This lifestyle group is characterised by secularism, left and post-materialism and has an inclination towards the Greens.

Whether the value cleavage between the values duty/acceptance and self-development and/or materialistic and post-materialistic value orientations will actually remain depends on whether the generation thesis or the life-cycle thesis is confirmed (cf. Chapter 2.2.1). Looking at Figure 5.1 the first thesis would imply that the traditional values on the left side of the figure will disappear when individuals still representing these die and that the values and lifestyle groups on the right side of Figure 5.1 will take over completely.

The second thesis implies, that over the years, at least some individuals will move from the lifestyle groups presented on the right side of the figure to the left. This would imply that value changes can take place due to an individual's move from one life phase to another which means that the western German society does not necessarily move in the direction of post-materialism (cf. Chapter 4.3.1). On the contrary, values may show a retrograde movement towards traditional values. For instance, middle-aged people tend to give economic prosperity a higher priority than younger and older citizens. This can be explained by the fact that they are the age group dependent on a functioning and prosperous economy (cf. Dittrich 1991:176).

The presentation of eastern German lifestyle groups in Chapter 5.2.2 seems to reveal two (latent) cleavages, one between the deprived and the satisfied (i.e. between losers and winners of the reunification) and one between communism and opposition (i.e. between the supporters of the old SED regime and those opposing it). Both cleavages can be connected to the transformation process that has - and to some extent even ten years after the reunification still does take place. Furthermore, they reflect the chances of the different lifestyle groups to adjust to the new living conditions. "The traditional farmer and worker" and "the sub-cultural youth" may, for example, be assigned to the cleavages communism and deprived. The "bourgeois-humanistic" lifestyle group may, for example, be arranged according to the cleavages deprived and opposition, deprived and communism, but also to the cleavages satisfied and opposition, depending on how the group has coped with the transformation process. The "status and career orientated person" and "the rationalist-technocratic person" may be arranged on several

cleavages, as well. Here, too, the development is dependent on how the members of these lifestyle groups manage the integration process into the new society. On the one hand, those satisfied might take an oppositional image in order to increase opportunities in making a career. They have never really opposed communism, however. On the other hand, those not adjusting to the new political system might be assigned to the cleavages communism and deprived.

As pointed out in Chapter 5.2, the discussion of party preference of the lifestyle groups in the east has to take place at the purely hypothetical level as party preference is not included in the analysis presented by Becker, Becker and Ruhland. If meaningful suggestions of party preferences of East German lifestyle groups may be indicated, this is presented below (cf. Oedegaard 1994).

The "traditional farmer and worker" may have a preference for the PDS. As shown above, members of this group belong to the older generation and have lived in the communist system for a long time. This impact on individual mentalities should not be underestimated. In addition, they feel threatened by the new situation as their jobs are cut and abolished due to inefficiency and a decrease in subsidies. 27% percent of the eastern German population belong to this lifestyle that has no equivalent in the old *Länder* and no pure, political representation in any of the "western" parties.<sup>48</sup> The PDS may thus represent both the deprived and supporters of communism in this lifestyle group.

On the other hand, the SPD might win those members of this lifestyle group who are basically satisfied with the development and who want a political representation of their group interests. This could result in the reinforcement of the cleavage "work versus capital" in reunified Germany since the eastern German workers to a larger extent present the traditional working class than the workers in the west.<sup>49</sup> The cleavage "work versus capital" may also revive in the east with the take-over of the western German policy of social market economy. As emphasised in Chapter 3.2.2 a slight tendency in this direction was indicated at the 1998 federal election.

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<sup>48</sup> In this context "western" also means those eastern parties whose organisation and politics were influenced by West German sister parties, such as the FDP, the SPD and the CDU.

<sup>49</sup> Recall the different developments in the industrial and the service sector in the two Germanys presented in Chapter 4.1.3.

"The left-intellectual alternative person" and "the bourgeois-humanistic person" might have their political representation in Bündnis 90/die Grünen. No post-materialistic lifestyle group existed in the GDR that can be compared to the west. Although the eastern "left-intellectual alternative person" and the western "post-materialistic, left-alternative younger person" and the "left liberal integrated post-materialist" all represent modern values and the demand for social changes, their primary goals were of a different nature. This is not surprising regarding the different situation in the east and the west, which led to the focus on different issues, e.g. democracy and human rights versus ecology and social equality. Due to the Christian value orientation of "the bourgeois-humanistic" lifestyle the members of this group may also incline to the CDU. The "status and career orientated person" may have a preference for the PDS as they often belonged to the leadership in the past. With regard to all three groups the following should be kept in mind; they are all characterised by a high level of education – often university degree. According to analyses there is an above average support for the PDS among the highly educated. This can be traced back to the special situation of higher education in the former GDR; an intensive ideological indoctrination took place which was based on a socialist value orientation (cf. Bürklin/Klein 1998:172; Chapter 4.1.2 in this thesis).

The second largest lifestyle group in the former GDR is "the petty bourgeois-materialistic person". Their wish for materialist satisfaction and importance of family as well as the desire to express a belonging to the upper middle class might imply a preference for the CDU or the FDP. The question is how this has been influenced by the ongoing economic recession and to which extent this lifestyle group has remained optimistic or turned against the government.

Looking at the East German lifestyle groups presented above the religious cleavage is missing almost completely; only the "bourgeois-humanistic person" possesses - according to the analysis of Becker et.al. - some Christian value orientations (cf. Becker et.al 1992:105). This can be traced back to the governmental opposition against religion presented in Chapter 3.2.2. Besides, the East German population is almost purely Protestant and, as also stressed in Chapter 3.1.3, it was the Catholic milieu which represented the religious cleavage in the German Empire and Weimar Republic.

In addition to the cleavages between the deprived and satisfied and the supporters of communism and the supporters of opposition, an old cleavage seems to revive in reunified Germany, the cleavage between the centre and periphery (cf. Chapter 3.1.2). Although Berlin

became the German capital again in 1991 and the parliament started to move from Bonn to Berlin in 1999 there are still tensions between the old and new *Länder*. As emphasised by Bertram (1992:126):

“Gerade angesichts der deutschen Wiedervereinigung ist es noch sinnvoller als vor der deutschen Wiedervereinigung, sich mit der Frage auseinanderzusetzen, ob Konflikt- und Spannungslinien im sozialen und politischen System nicht nur oder zunehmend weniger entlang sozialer Schichtungsgrenzen verlaufen und möglicherweise sehr viel stärker entlang bestimmter regionaler Differenzierungen.”

Whether this will actually result in a regional cleavage represented by the PDS in the former GDR, comparable with the way the CSU represents Bavaria, remains to be seen.

Reunified Germany thus seems to be characterised by a complexity of cleavages – both latent and manifest – which have different strengths and also cross-cut. These are the cleavages centre - periphery, religion - secularism, work - capital, left - right, materialism - post-materialism, communism – opposition and deprived – satisfied.

In addition to the above mentioned cleavages others have been discussed in research literature which are also reflected in the lifestyle groups presented. Vester et. al (1993:36), for example, argue that there is a post-modern or post-industrial cleavage which distinguishes the younger generation who have profited from the educational reforms and occupational modernisation from the rest of the population. Furthermore, they see a rise of new social inequalities which are based on group affiliation; in particular women, older people, foreigners, groups with little occupational qualification and people from disadvantaged regions are affected by this development. Another example is Kriesi (1998:181-182) who argues that there is an evidence for the existence of a social division between two segments of the new middle class. These have both different value orientations and make different political choices: the social and cultural service professionals develop ‘left-libertarian’ values whereas the managers through their identification with the opposite camp reinforce their social and cultural distinctiveness as well (cf. Kriesi 1998: 171-172).

In this chapter I have – on the basis of previous lifestyle studies – discussed how lifestyle groups, cleavages and voting behaviour may be related. No discussion on the existence of social milieus was possible due to the limited information with regard to organisational membership, interest representation and party preference. This will thus be discussed on

the basis of my own analysis which will be presented in Chapter 7. Before this, though, the hypotheses, variables and strategy of data analysis will be presented in the following chapter.



## **6. HYPOTHESES, DATA AND STRATEGY OF DATA ANALYSIS**

This chapter presents the hypotheses which will be tested in the empirical section, as well as the data and variables which will be used in the empirical analyses. Finally, an overview of the strategy of data analysis will be given in Chapter 6.3.

### **6.1 Hypotheses**

Before elaborating the hypotheses, I will sum up the major findings so far in the thesis. The starting point was the presentation of the traditional social milieus which developed during the German Empire and the Weimar Republic. These social milieus were based on the traditional social structural cleavage dimensions and the members were characterised by similar lifestyles, values systems, social positions etc. Furthermore, the milieus were strengthened by their entanglement with organisations which the individuals belonged to during their whole lifetime. These organisations presented both leisure activities - like sports and choir - as well as job interests and ethnic and religious interests etc. At the national level these groups had established alliances with political parties which represented the interests of the respective groups. It was this interwoven system which according to Lepsius got too rigid over time, and by the end of the Weimar Republic resulted in a break-up of these tight relationships between social groups and parties; due to social transformations the social milieus had changed. However, the parties had not changed and were focusing too strongly on their original support basis. Nevertheless, two social milieus – the Catholic and the workers' milieu survived World War II and were still significant in the West German post-war era.

The major social transformations in both Germanys, with respect to socio-economic changes, changes in the social structure and value changes, were presented and discussed in Chapter 4. There is now doubt that the western German population - and to some extent also the eastern – changed significantly in the post-war decades. Which impact these developments have had on the German population could be seen in the lifestyle groups presented in Chapter 5. The lifestyle groups and “social milieus” found in today's surveys reflect the increased differentiation of the German population which can be traced back to these social transformations. As argued by Hradil (1997:507), the “social milieus” of the post industrial society are – when compared to the social moral milieus in previous decades - both less

obvious with respect to their social structural distinctions and with respect to their individual affiliations. Above all, however, the “milieus” differ because nowadays individuals may - through their own actions - quite easily change “milieus”. These changes are also reflected in the changing composition of the western German population during the past decades as was presented in chapter 5.2.1; some “milieus” have disappeared, some have increased, some decreased and some new ones have been found. As emphasised by Scheuch and Scheuch (forthcoming), however, this shows that it is not correct to characterise these groups as social milieus because real social milieus cannot have such a high level of instability.

For this reason my argument – throughout the thesis – has been that it is necessary to distinguish between lifestyle groups and social milieus. Looking at Figure 2.3 in Chapter 2.3.2, both lifestyle groups and social milieus may exist in society. However, they differ with respect to strength and stability. Whereas the social milieus are characterised by manifest cleavages, organisational membership and political representation, lifestyle groups are based on group solidarity and affinity.

Thus, the assumption is that:

**There is a *core of social milieus* in the German population. Some of them are traditional and others are new; they may change in size over the years. Nevertheless their main characteristics remain the same and they offer a certain stability in the volatile electorate. In addition, there are several lifestyle groups. They are far more short lived than the social milieus and reflect the trends of a certain epoch or decade. By conducting lifestyle analyses on a continuous basis it may be possible to trace the changes and even disappearance of existing social milieus and lifestyle groups and the rise of new ones.**

Modern societies are in continuous rotations and changes seem to go faster and faster. In today’s reunified Germany changes take place as well; the former GDR is catching up with the modernisation process, the service sector is continuously growing in the west and both Germanys are influenced by the EU integration process and by the globalisation of the world economy. All these developments influence large parts of the population and may bring new cleavage dimensions and social milieus in the German – and of course - other societies into existence.

Of all surveys on lifestyles and “social milieus” presented in Chapter 5 the one by Vester et.al. is the one which is closest to the approach applied in this thesis. They too analyse the existence of cleavages in the modern society, “social milieus”, lifestyles, organisational membership and party preference. However, one important distinction exists in the fact that, I only define a social milieu as such if there is a significant relationship in a lifestyle group with respect to cleavages, organisations and party preference and if this relationship is consistent i.e. the members of a modern, post-materialistic orientated lifestyle group should, for example, not have a preference for the CDU/CSU (cf. Oedegaard 2000). Thus, the definition of a social milieu is

**a social milieu exists if there is a relationship between a lifestyle group, cleavage(s), organisational membership(s), interest representation and party preference.**

As emphasised several times so far in the thesis, the assumption is that both old and new social milieus exist in the German population; old milieus are featured by traditional lifestyles and are still formed on the basis of social structural cleavages, like class, religion and region which to a certain extent are reflected by organisations that are closely linked with specific political parties. In order to detect potential new milieus, new lifestyles also have to be considered that reflect the modernisation process which has taken place in the German population during the past decades. These lifestyles incorporate different aspects of the individual’s way of living and his or her aims in life. They might indicate the existence of other cleavages than the ones expressed by traditional lifestyles and milieus. The membership structure of lifestyle groups, their interest representation and their connection to specific political parties is important for the establishment of new social milieus which influence the party system. Furthermore, it is expected that different milieus exist in the old and new *Länder* as the social developments in the east and west since World War II have been of different natures.

**Based on the above presented definition the following single hypotheses can be formulated:**

**H1: It is assumed that a religious milieu still exists in the west which is characterised by individuals with a traditional and religious orientated lifestyle, who have a religious affiliation and are member of religious organisations, see the churches as an interest**

representation and have a party preference for the CDU/CSU who they also consider to represent their interest. This milieu is not assumed to exist in the east.

**H2: It is assumed that a worker's milieu still exists in the west which is characterised by individuals with a work orientated lifestyle, who are blue-collar workers, trade union members, see their interests represented by the trade union and have a party preference for the SPD which they also consider to represent their interest. This milieu is not expected to exist in the east.**

**H3: It is assumed that a Green milieu exists in the west which is characterised by an education-orientated lifestyle, where the individuals possess post-materialistic value orientations, are members in student organisation(s) and/or alternative political organisations, see their interests represented by environmental organisation(s) and have a party preference for Bündnis 90/die Grünen which they also consider to represent their interest. This milieu is not assumed to exist in the east.**

**H4: It is assumed that a regional milieu exists in the east characterised by left-orientation, membership in political organisation(s) and/or student organisation(s), interest representation by and party preference for the PDS.**

The aim of the analysis is to explore whether the above presented milieus – which are assumed to exist based on previous analyses presented earlier in this thesis – also exist under the definition of a social milieu as applied in this thesis. Furthermore, it is the aim of the analysis to explore whether other social milieus may be found.

Based on the presentations in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 the assumption is that both traditional social milieus still exist in the old *Länder*, i.e. the religious and the workers' milieu, and that there will also be signs of new milieus with features typical for the modernised society, for example, a post-materialistic, Green milieu. In the new *Länder* the traditional social milieus will no longer exist in the population, social milieus which are typical for the advanced industrialised society will not exist either, but a milieu will exist covering specific eastern German features. Finally, the increased tendency towards non-voting raises the question to which extent this is coincidental or whether it is a systematic development taking place in particular parts of the population, in particular among the so-called losers of the modernisation process. If the latter is the case, the question is whether

this is also reflected by the existence of an “unpolitical milieu” characterised, for example, by low social status, dissatisfaction, feeling of deprivation, apathy and the like, as was indicated in the presentation of lifestyle analyses in Chapter 5. A fifth hypothesis might thus be formulated

**H5: It is assumed that unpolitical milieus exist both in the east and west which are characterised by a low social status, passivity both with respect to lifestyle, memberships and political interest and whose members do not have any interest representation and tend not to vote.**

With regard to the cleavages, several latent and manifest cleavages are expected to exist in reunified Germany as was discussed in Chapter 5.2.3. Only a few have been included above, and should be considered to be minimum requirements for the formation of a social milieu. Further discussion on the cleavages will take place in Chapter 6.2.2.

## **6.2 Presentation of data and variables**

The ALLBUS survey (*Allgemeine Bevölkerungsumfrage der Sozialwissenschaften*) 1998 will be used in the empirical analysis.<sup>50</sup> The reasons are several. First of all, the survey contains a module on lifestyles and an extensive list of questions concerning organisational memberships of the respondent - both former and present - and party preference. All these variables are important for the analysis of social milieus according to the definition applied in this thesis. Secondly, the survey was conducted both in the new and old *Länder* which facilitates a comparison. Thirdly, the survey was conducted in 1998 and it might thus be assumed that the Germans have had some time to adjust to the consequences of the reunification. The 1998 ALLBUS module neither includes questions regarding party preference nor questions about perceived conflicts<sup>51</sup> in Germany. Nevertheless, I will use different issues to measure possible cleavage dimensions in German society and vote intention as a measurement for party preference. Thus, although ALLBUS 1998 has some

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<sup>50</sup> The data used in this analysis is based on the ALLBUS survey from 1998 (ZA study number 3000). The author is responsible for the analysis and the interpretation of the data presented in this thesis.

<sup>51</sup> In 1980, 1982 and 1990 questions were asked about perceived social conflicts in the West German society. Some of these refer to traditional cleavages like, for example, between left and right orientated people and between workers and employers. Others refer to social conflicts which are not (yet) manifest cleavages like conflicts between rich and poor and immigrants and Germans.

shortcomings it is – at least for the time being – the only available data set suitable for the research question of this thesis.

Several surveys have compared the lifestyles of the eastern and western population and some of the results of these studies were presented in Chapter 5 (i.e. Becker et.al. 1992 Spellerberg 1996). In particular, concerning party preference and interest representation, it can be reasonably assumed that some time was necessary for the eastern Germans to get an overview of the party system and party choices in a democratic country and to figure out which institution might actually represent their own interests. Thus, even though it might be premature to expect long-lasting party ties in the east, tendencies might possibly become visible eight years after reunification.

### **6.2.1 Lifestyle groups**

As can be seen from Figures 2.2 and 2.3 and discussed in Chapter 2.3 a lifestyle group is in this thesis defined as a

**group of people expressing similar values, leisure activities and aesthetic preferences in everyday life**

where the expressed lifestyle is a product of both the economic situation and individual socialisation and values. Like Spellerberg, I expect that the lifestyle is closely associated with social structure and that – based on the dominant lifestyle characteristics of a group - assumptions about the dominant social structural characteristics of the members can be made. Social structural characteristics will not be included directly in the empirical analysis of the lifestyle groups. However, the association between a lifestyle group and the social structural characteristics will be explored at a later stage to expand the knowledge of the lifestyle group and to analyse to what extent social structural cleavages between the lifestyle groups exist.

Both in Chapter 2.1.2 and Chapter 5 several lifestyle surveys were presented and discussed and, in general, lifestyle is understood as the individual organisation of everyday life. Empirically this is often measured by leisure activities both in the domestic and non-domestic areas. In addition to the specific leisure activities, several studies include aesthetic characteristics in, for example, music, food, furniture etc. (cf. Bourdieu 1982; Schulze 1992a; Spellerberg 1996). Furthermore, several surveys include questions about

individual values, life goals etc. Thus, there are many sets of variables which can be used as an indicator for lifestyle.<sup>52</sup> Nevertheless, a distinction might be drawn between the aesthetic dimension covering music, literature etc. and the ethical dimension including life goals, values of the individuals and the like (cf. Koch et.al. 1999:22).

In ALLBUS 1998 the lifestyle module includes questions about leisure activities, life areas important to the respondent and aesthetic preferences in the area of music, television and newspapers. Items in these areas will be used in the analysis of this thesis and are presented in detail in Table 6.1.<sup>53</sup>

As emphasised throughout, this thesis focuses on the political impact of social milieus in reunified Germany. I have tried to prove theoretically that the concepts of lifestyle and milieu are related and that both traditional and new social milieus may be reflected in the lifestyle groups. With the increasing variety and supply of culture, the individual lifestyle expresses a social and cultural affiliation (cf. Koch et.al. 1999:21) and accordingly one might assume that individuals would prefer to socialise with other individuals with the same cultural and social lifestyle. Since the variables presented in Table 6.1 give a more differentiated picture of attitudes and behaviour of individuals in today's Germany, new patterns of affiliations may be easier to uncover than when analysing, for example, solely the traditional social structural variables such as age, education, denomination, occupation and the like.

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<sup>52</sup> Cf. Chapter 2.1.2

<sup>53</sup> Leisure activities included in the ALLBUS survey have been selected on the basis of their empirical significance in other surveys. Important categories are the place of the leisure activity (whether domestic or non-domestic), orientation towards family and relatives, political and social engagement and the aesthetic schemes excitement, - trivial- and high culture (Koch et.al 1999:22 ff.).

**Table 6.1 Lifestyle variables in the area of leisure activities and at the ethical and aesthetic dimensions**

<b>Leisure activities</b> <sup>54</sup>		
Read books; read magazines; listen to LP's, CD's, cassettes; watch video; occupy oneself with the computer; use internet and on-line services; educate oneself privately; do nothing, be lazy; walk, wander; yoga, meditation, relaxation through self-hypnosis, body experience; go eating or drinking; visit friends, neighbours acquaintances; visit family, relatives; party games with family; trips or short journeys; participation in politics; honorary activities; church attendance, attend religious meetings; artistic and musical activities; do-it-yourself, repairs in the house/car, gardening; do active sports; visit sport events; go to the cinema, visit pop-or jazz concerts, go dancing; go to the opera, classical concerts, theatre, exhibition		
<b>Important life areas</b> <sup>55</sup>		
Own family and children; occupation and work; leisure and recreation; friends and acquaintances; relatives; religion and church; politics and public life; neighbourhood		
<b>Aesthetic characteristics</b>		
<b>Music taste</b> <sup>56</sup>	<b>Television taste</b> <sup>57</sup>	<b>Interest in contents of daily newspaper</b> <sup>59</sup>
Folk music; German pop music; pop- and rock music; classical music; jazz	Television- and quiz shows; sports; feature movies; news; political magazines; arts and culture; Heimatfilme <sup>58</sup> ; thrillers; action movies; family- and entertainment series	Politics; economy; culture; sport; local news; "all over the world" and miscellaneous; advertisements and small advertisements

## 6.2.2 Cleavages

A cleavage is in this thesis understood as a

**characteristic or issue which is represented by one particular lifestyle group and which is also connected to organisational membership and organisational interest representation.**

<sup>54</sup> Question: "Now, some questions concerning your leisure time. Please indicate with respect to every activity on this list how often you do this in your leisure time: daily, at least once a week, at least once a month, seldom or never" (English translation).

<sup>55</sup> Question: "On these cards different life areas are written down. We would like to know, how important each of these life areas are for you." and here the values range from 1= not important to 7= very important" (English translation).

<sup>56</sup> Question: "In the following, I will mention different sorts of music. Please tell me – based on this list – how much you like listening to this kind of music." The values range from 1= very much to 5= not at all (English translation).

<sup>57</sup> Question: "I have some cards here on which different television programmes are listed. Please tell me how much each of these programmes interest you: very much, much, medium, little or not at all?" (English translation).

<sup>58</sup> A *Heimatfilm* is a sentimental film in an idealised regional setting (cf. Pons Collins 1997:335).

<sup>59</sup> Question: "I have some cards here on which different contents of the daily newspaper are listed. Please tell me with regard to each contents how much those contents interests you: very much, much, medium, little or not at all?" (English translation).

As elaborated in Chapter 2.1.1, a distinction might be drawn between cleavages which originate from socio-economic structures and cleavages which to a lesser extent can be traced back to such structures. These are called *ideological cleavages* and are, according to Valen, defined as “contradictions which exist in the consciousness of individuals and which can be identified on the basis of their opinion and evaluation of certain issues” (cf. Aardal 1994:229). Furthermore, a distinction can be drawn between latent and manifest cleavages. Latent cleavages can be understood as social structural characteristics or issues which may have the “quality” and importance of becoming real societal cleavages, i.e. analyses show that societal groups differ with respect to certain characteristics or evaluations, but these have not yet reached the surface (cf. Figure 2.3). In contrast, a manifest cleavage implies that a particular characteristic or issue has been defined as a contradiction and has been institutionalised by organisations and parties. Nevertheless, a manifest cleavage may retreat into a state of latency, but become activated at short notice should interests be challenged. An example is the religious cleavage and its revival as presented in Chapter 3.1.3. A cleavage is, in this thesis, thus understood as a characteristic or issue which is represented by one particular lifestyle group and which is also connected to organisational membership and organisational interest representation. This is a rather broad definition, but it might be a suitable way of detecting new theoretically and empirically relevant social divisions and to study their political formation in times where the traditional cleavages seem to retreat into the background (cf. end of Chapter 2.3).

### **1) Social Structural cleavages**

As emphasised in Chapter 6.2.1 an association is expected between the lifestyle groups and social structural characteristics. Rather than measuring the existence of social structural cleavages separately these will thus be analysed in association with the lifestyle groups in order to expand the knowledge of the lifestyle groups as well. The following social structural characteristics which may also be expected to point at cleavages will be included in the analysis: education, occupation, denomination, religious affiliation, church attendance, age, gender, income, family status and community size. These variables measure the possible representation of traditional cleavages in the lifestyle groups as they were also presented in chapters three and five. Although church attendance is not really a social structural characteristic, but rather an activity and is thus included in the definition

of lifestyle groups as well (cf. Table 6.1). However, with the decreasing impact of objective characteristics like denomination, church attendance is one of the most important measurements of the strength of religiosity. Thus, it has been included here too.

In the old *Länder*, for example, the traditional impact of social structural variables on voting behaviour was visible also in 1998. An analysis of the 1998 ALLBUS data proved that the highest preference for the SPD could be found among the blue-collar workers (57.1%). Among those with trade union membership this number even increased to 67.3%. With regard to the impact of religion, 66.1% of those who go to church more than once per month have a preference for the CDU/CSU, whereas only 37.5% of Protestants have a preference for the CDU/CSU, compared to 43.8% for the SPD.

As mentioned previously, questions which directly address perceived social conflicts – and thus both latent and manifest cleavages - between population groups in the German society were not included in the 1998 ALLBUS module. Looking at the frequency distributions of some of the social conflicts which were asked in previous surveys it might look as if they are of no significance anymore, as the percentage of respondents perceiving conflicts as “very strong” has dropped continuously with regard to almost every conflict. As does the number of people who consider the conflict between people located at the left and people located at the right “very strong” decline from 39.3% in West Germany in 1980 to 18.6% in 1990 (ALLBUS 1980-1998:95). This should not ignore the fact that the number of people considering this conflict “quite strong” has remained stable at about 48.0 % from the early 1980s until the 1990s. With regard to the traditional cleavage, work vs. capital, the number of people considering this a strong cleavage dropped from 41.3 % in 1980 to 20.2 % in 1990 (ALLBUS 1980-1998:103). Nevertheless, taking into account the changes that have taken place in the German labour market during the past ten years, this cleavage might have gained importance. With regard to this cleavage as well, it should be emphasised the number of people considering the cleavage “quite strong” has remained quite stable at about 40% during the past decade. The only conflict which does not show a significant decrease over the past decade is the one between foreign workers and Germans. The number of respondents considering this conflict “very strong” has remained stable at 23-24% during the past decade, whereas the number considering this cleavage “quite strong” has increased from 42.1% in 1980 to 47.2% in 1990 (ALLBUS 1980-1998:104). It

might be assumed that this conflict has also increased with the labour market problems after the reunification.

## 2) Ideological cleavages

As discussed in Chapter 2.1.1 *ideological cleavages* have become more important in recent decades as the impact of social structure on voting behaviour has decreased. According to Aardal (1994:229), Valen defines ideological cleavages as “contradictions which exist in the consciousness of individuals and which can be identified on the basis of their opinion and evaluation of certain issues”. These cleavages are based on socio-economic structures to a lesser extent than the traditional social structural ones. However, as was emphasised in Chapter 2.1.1 as well, it is necessary to differentiate between short-term issues and more permanent ideological contradictions which may be considered as cleavages.

The following issues will be used to analyse possible *ideological cleavages* in the empirical part of this thesis:

- In general, I think that social differences in our country are fair.
- Worries about unemployment
- Worries about the number of immigrants to Germany
- Worries about the costs of the reunification
- Socialism is in principle a good idea which was carried out badly
- Worries about the environment
- Post-materialism vs. materialism (Inglehart-Index)
- Ideological left-right placement

Whereas the first two variables address cleavages - which might have arisen as a consequence of modernisation - the third variable addresses the possible cleavage between immigrants and Germans which might become increasingly important due to the globalisation process. The following two variables are related to the reunification and a possible regional cleavage between the east and west. Furthermore, the question addressing environmental worries and post-materialism vs. materialism measure the existence of the so-called value cleavage (cf. Chapters 2, 3 and 5). In addition to the

above-mentioned variables, I will include the question whether it is the duty of the citizens' to regularly participate at the elections. As emphasised in Chapter 4.3.2.6 this may also be considered as a measurement of value change. Finally, the left-right self-placement of the individual has been included as a measurement for the existence of the left-right ideological cleavage.

There are no issues in ALLBUS 1998 related to religious or ethical questions which facilitates the analysis of a moral - religious ideological cleavage. Denomination is included in the social structural variables presented above and church attendance may be used as a measurement for the strength of religiosity. The impact of denomination and church attendance on voting behaviour in West Germany was shown earlier in this section. However, as church attendance is decreasing, in particular in the younger generations, it would have been interesting to analyse whether attitudes to abortion, divorce etc. are better indicators of religiosity than church attendance. Other conflict dimensions which seem to be relevant are, for example, the one between supporters of nuclear power or globalisation and those that are against, as well as the conflict between Christianity and Islam. Nevertheless, as these variables are not available at present the analysis of their relevance in society has to be left for future analysis. Such analyses should then include several different issues that may measure old and new cleavage dimensions which are expected to be relevant in the German society. For example, in the 1997 Norwegian election study more than 40 issues were included and arranged into four ideological dimensions by means of principal components analysis. These four dimensions were: 1. immigration 2. public - private 3. environment/growth – protection and 4. moral - religion (Aardal 1999:74-75). Questions loading on the first dimension were, for example, "Immigration constitutes a serious threat to our national culture", "In difficult times, we should concentrate on providing work for our on people rather than immigrants". The public-private dimension included questions such as "Employment can easier be secured if the government is given more control of the banks and industry" and "It is more important to develop public services than to reduce taxation". With regard to the third dimension, environment/growth-protection, issues like "To secure economic growth we still need to develop industry even if it conflicts with environmental considerations" and "We should start building gas power plants in Norway" could be found. Finally, issues like "We should promote a society where Christian values are more prominent" and "We should introduce legislation to

ensure a Christian upbringing in municipal kindergarten” loaded on the fourth dimension (cf. Aardal 1999:65ff.).

### 3) The manifestation of cleavages through organisations and interest representation

As was discussed in Chapter 2.1.1 and presented in Figure 2.3, a cleavage does not get institutionalised before parties, trade unions or other organisations are established. Furthermore, organisational memberships are important in order to distinguish lifestyle groups from social milieus as was discussed in Chapter 2.3. ALLBUS 1998 offers both an extensive list of occupational organisations and other organisations ranging from sports to alternative political groups. The list of memberships in trade unions and other occupational organisations and the respective frequencies in the east and west are presented in Table 6.2. Thereafter an overview of other organisational memberships is given in Table 6.3.

**Table 6.2 Membership in trade unions and other occupational organisations in the west and the east (in %)<sup>60</sup>**

Present membership	West	East
<i>Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB)</i> Trade union	8.7	11.9
<i>Deutsche Angestelltengewerkschaft (DAG)</i> Trade union of the employees	3.8	1.2
<i>Christlicher Gewerkschaftsbund Deutschland (CGB)</i> Christian trade union	0.1	0.2
<i>Union der Leitenden Angestellten (ULA)</i> Union of the leading employees	0.5	0.0
<i>Deutscher Beamtenbund (DBB) oder sonstige Beamtenorganisation</i> Association of Civil servants	1.5	0.2
<i>Bauernverband (Deutscher Bauernverband oder sonstige</i> Farmer’s association	1.0	0.4
<i>Einzel-oder Gerwerbeverband des Handwerks Einzelhandels und</i> <i>ähnlichem</i> Trade association of the manual worker’s and the like	1.8	2.1
<i>Unternehmerverband (BDI) oder sonstiger</i> Unternehmerverband Association of employers	0.5	0.4
<i>Berufsverband der freien Berufe</i> Association of the self-employed	1.3	1.5
<i>Sonstiger Berufsverband</i> Other	4.7	2.8
Total	N = 2212	N = 1022

(Source: ALLBUS 1998 ZA-Nr. 3000)

<sup>60</sup> Question “Are you presently member of a trade union, an occupational organisation or an association of employers? Please go through the list and tell me where you are a member” (English translation). 77.2% of the respondents in the west and 79.5% in the east answered that they are not member of any trade union or other occupational organisation at present (west N=2212, east N=1022). The numbers include multiple answers.

**Table 6.3 Former and present memberships in organisations in the east and west (in %)<sup>61</sup>**

Organisational membership	Present		Former	
	West	East	West	East
Choral society	5.4	1.8	5.8	3.6
Sports club	25.2	10.9	18.0	15.9
Other hobby club	9.3	4.1	3.6	2.1
Local- and citizens organisation	5.6	1.2	2.2	0.0
Other social organisation	6.3	2.6	2.6	1.9
Organisation of the expelled	1.3	0.6	0.6	0.2
Social welfare, war victim organisation	3.7	1.2	0.9	0.7
Church or religious organisation	3.0	0.8	1.4	0.4
Youth, student organisation	0.9	0.4	2.8	22.9
Political party	2.2	1.6	1.3	6.0
Citizens' initiative	1.6	0.8	1.2	0.3
Alternative political group (environment, peace etc.)	1.6	0.9	3.3	1.1
Other memberships	5.8	5.6	1.5	5.4
Total	N = 2212	N = 1022	N = 2212	N = 1022

(Source: ALLBUS 1998 ZA-Nr. 3000)

As can be seen from Table 6.2 and 6.3 the number of people who are members in organisations is quite low. Still, the decision was made not to exclude any variables from the analysis a priori as the assumption is that organisations which have not previously been significant in distinguishing between social groups may (have) become so.

Past memberships seem crucial to include as well, since one might assume that even if no longer a member, the impact of the organisation on the socialisation process of the individual might still be reflected in the behaviour and attitudes of the individual (cf. Chapter 2.3.1). As argued by Gensicke this is particularly important when comparing the old and new *Länder* because it facilitates the analysis of voluntary engagements in the former GDR and the consequences the social transformations have (had) on voluntary engagements in the new *Länder* (cf. Gensicke 2001:26).

<sup>61</sup> Question: Past memberships were asked the following way: "And in which organisations or associations were you a former member, but are not anymore?" (English translation). In the west, 53.2% of the respondents answered not to be member in any of the organisations at present and 64.2% answered not to be former members of any of the organisations (N=2212). In the east 72.9 % of the respondents are not members in any of the organisations at present and 54.4% answered not to be formers members of any of the mentioned organisations The numbers include multiple answers.

**Table 6.4 Organisations representing the interests of the respondent (in %)<sup>62</sup>**

Organisations representing the interests of the respondent	West	East
Trade union	32.4	33.5
Catholic Church	15.8	3.9
Protestant Church	13.3	9.6
Environmental organisation	43.0	28.0
CDU	19.6	11.8
CSU	14.3	4.4
SPD	26.9	27.8
FDP	5.5	2.3
Bündnis90/Grüne	12.7	10.6
Republikaner	1.6	1.5
PDS	0.9	15.3
Total	N = 2212	N = 1022

(Source: ALLBUS 1998 ZA-Nr. 3000)

The organisation(s) representing the interests of a group is significant for the manifestation of a cleavage. As argued in Chapter 2, the establishment of ties between interest organisations and specific groups indicate that a process of *Vergesellschaftung* might be taking place (cf. Figure 2.1 and 2.3). In this process latent cleavages become manifest. In ALLBUS this question has been asked with respect to 11 organisations and parties and these are presented in Table 6.4.

### 6.2.3 Social milieus

The definition of a social milieu, as it is applied throughout this thesis and elaborated in Chapter 2.3, is that

**a social milieu will be defined if a relationship exists between a lifestyle group, cleavage(s), organisational membership, organisational interest representation and party preference.**

Furthermore, this relationship should be consistent in the sense that a religious orientated lifestyle group should not correspond with a secular party like, for example, the PDS. As ALLBUS 1998 does not include any variables on party identification or attachment, vote

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<sup>62</sup> Question: “On this list you will find organisations, of which many citizens feel represented. Independent of whether you are a member of an organisation, please tell me with respect to every organisation whether it represents your interests or is against your interests” (English translation). The numbers include multiple answers. West N=2212, East N= 1022.

intention<sup>63</sup> will be used in this final step of the analysis of social milieus. This measurement may be more easily exposed to short-term volatility than party preference. In particular, this may be the case in an election like the one in 1998 where voters wanted to get rid of 16 years of Chancellor Helmut Kohl and where the election was more *a vote against the CDU/CSU than a vote for the SPD* (cf. Forschungsgruppe Wahlen 1998:74)

Nevertheless, as can be seen from Table 6.4, the list of interest organisations embed both organisations and political parties. All organisations are expected to also be related to the political parties represented in the table; the churches to CDU/CSU, the trade union to the SPD and environmental organisations to Bündnis90/die Grünen. Thus, if members of a lifestyle group consider the trade unions to represent their interest, it would also be expected that they consider the SPD to represent their interest. Furthermore, it may also be assumed that individuals are inclined to vote for the same party they claim to represent their interests or to parties closely linked organisations which are considered to represent the interests of a particular group (cf. Weßels 2000:142). Interest representation by political parties can thus be used as an extra measurement of milieu stability as well (cf. Figure 2.3).

### 6.3 Strategy of data analysis

In most lifestyle analyses factor analyses of the lifestyle variables are carried out prior to the cluster analysis (cf. Chapter 5). The benefit of this procedure is that the influence of random measurement errors is reduced through the creation of factors or components. Furthermore, as lifestyle analyses often include more than 50 variables the interpretation of the clusters become clearer when the number of variables have been reduced before they are included in the cluster analysis (cf. Bacher 1994:126).

In the first step of the analysis the items used to measure lifestyle groups are extracted. Cases will be deleted if one or more of the input variables have missing values (casewise deletion). The items were presented in Table 6.1 and cover leisure activities (24 items), life areas important to the individual (8 items) and aesthetic preferences in the field of music (5

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<sup>63</sup> Question: "If there was a parliamentary election next Sunday which party would you give your 2. vote?" (English translation). At the *Bundestagswahl* the voters have to vote – the 1. vote for the candidate and the 2. vote for the party. It is the 2. vote which decides which party will win the election.

items), television (10 items) and newspaper contents (7 items). As the reduction of lifestyle variables in this analysis is of an exploratory nature, with no underlying statistical model, principal components analyses (PCA) will be carried out in the second step of the analysis based on the items extracted in step 1. Principal components analysis is a statistical technique that linearly transforms an original set of variables into a substantially smaller set of uncorrelated variables that represents most of the information in the original set of variables. Such a small set of uncorrelated variables is easier to understand and use in further analysis than a larger set of correlated variables (cf. Dunteman 1989:7). Although principal components analysis is similar to factor analysis, as both techniques try to explain part of the variation in a set of observed variables on the basis of a few underlying dimensions, important differences exist between the techniques. Principal components analysis is an explorative approach with no underlying statistical model of the observed variables. This approach focuses on the maximum variance properties of principal components where the first component explains the maximum variance, the second component the second highest variance and so on. Factor analysis, on the other hand, is a confirmatory approach which has an underlying statistical model. In contrast to PCA, factor analysis focuses on explaining the common variance rather than the total variance, in the observed variables on the basis of relatively few underlying factors (cf. Dunteman 1989:9). The factor analytic model is thus applied when considering the correlation between two observed variables to be a result of their sharing of common sources or factors, and not as a result of one being a direct cause of the other (Kim/Mueller 1978:22).

In the next step (Step 3 cf. Figure 6.1) cluster analysis will be carried out on the basis of the components found in the previous step. The aim of the cluster analysis is to group persons who are as homogeneous as possible with respect to the components (cf. Bacher 1994:2). The cluster analysis will be carried out using K-means cluster analysis in SPSS 10.0. K-means cluster attempts to identify relatively homogeneous groups of cases based on selected characteristics, using an algorithm that can handle large number of cases. In this procedure distances are computed using simple Euclidean distances (SPSS index, release 10.0). The K-means algorithm requires the user to specify the number of clusters and if an inappropriate number of clusters have been chosen the results may be misleading (SPSS index release 10.0). SPSS does not offer any test to determine which cluster number offers the best solution. Nevertheless, Bacher (2001:71ff) has shown how test criteria can

be computed in SPSS with a syntax programme in order to get some indications which solution may be the appropriate one. The following test criteria will be calculated 1.  $ETA^2(k)$ : the explained variance of all active characteristics of a cluster solution i.e. the improvement of  $k$  clusters compared to the zero-model where no cluster structure exists. The explained variance ( $eta^2$ ) is equal to  $1 -$  the not explained variance (i.e. the error sum of squares within the clusters divided by the total sum of squares) where the error sum of squares are equal to the squared euclidian distances between object and cluster centre  $k$  (Bacher 1994:308f.). 2.  $PRE^2(k)$ : The relative improvement compared to the previous cluster solution. Finally,  $F-MAX(k)$  is calculated based on the association between the explained and non-explained variance. Whereas the explained variance in  $ETA^2$  is dependent on the number of clusters and the explained variance thus automatically increases with a larger number of clusters, this interdependence is removed in  $F-MAX$ . The appropriate number of clusters is equal to the solution with the maximum  $F-MAX$  value. In this step the stability of the chosen cluster solution will be tested as well.

The clusters - or lifestyle groups – will then be named on the basis of the most dominant characteristics of each single cluster where only components which are at least 0.4 standard deviations above or below the total mean will be considered meaningful for characterising a cluster. No general rule could be found in statistical books with respect to which components might be considered significant for describing a cluster. Nevertheless, criteria such as at least 1/3 or 0.4 standard deviation above or below the total mean (cf. Giegler 1994:261f, Otte 1997:313) could be found in the literature. In this thesis the criteria of 0.4 standard deviations above or below the total mean will be applied in order to facilitate a clear distinction between the lifestyle groups as regards content. Further details on the principal components analyses and cluster analyses will be presented in Chapter 7.

I have several times emphasised in this thesis that – from a theoretical perspective - it is expected that a lifestyle is rooted in the social structure and that differences between the lifestyle groups with respect to dominant social structural characteristics can be expected to exist. The lifestyle clusters found in the previous step will thus be compared with respect to social structural characteristics, to expand the knowledge of the lifestyle groups and simultaneously analyse to which extent social structural cleavages are reflected in the lifestyle groups. The relationships between the clusters and social structural variables will

thus be carried out in the fourth step by using cross-tabulations. In this step an analysis of the associations between the lifestyle groups and issues presented in Chapter 6.2.2 is carried out as well, with the aim of detecting possible (latent) ideological cleavages. Thereafter, the association between lifestyle groups and organisational membership will be measured too, in order to see whether some lifestyle groups are more inclined to prefer one kind of membership to another (cf. Tables 6.2. and 6.3). In this context the relationship between the lifestyle groups and the organisations representing the interests of the respective groups will be analysed as well (cf. Table 6.4). As argued in the previous section, interest organisations are important to the manifestation of cleavages, but may also be used as a measurement of milieu stability. In addition, the association between the lifestyle groups and two other variables will be explored here; political interest and satisfaction with democracy. Both variables are important to understand an individual's acceptance of the existing political system. In particular with respect to the analysis of a possible "unpolitical milieu" (Hypothesis 5, Chapter 6.1), it might be expected that both political interest and democratic satisfaction would be lower here than in the other milieus.

Finally, the association between lifestyle groups and party preference are analysed and if significant relationships exist between lifestyle groups, cleavages, organisational membership, organisational interest representation and party preference social milieus will be defined (Step 5).

The strategy of data analysis described above is of an explorative nature; the existence of social milieus is analysed on the basis of simple associations between lifestyle groups and the selected variables i.e. cleavages, organisational membership, interest representation and party preference. The definition of a social milieu is thus taking place based on the empirical coincidence between lifestyle groups and these groups of variables. Nevertheless, two criteria will be applied which facilitate to distinguish the *core of social milieus* from the lifestyle groups. Firstly, the relationship between lifestyle groups, cleavages, organisational memberships, interest representation and party preference has to be consistent. This means, for example, that a lifestyle group characterised by religious values should be above average represented with regard to membership in religious organisations, consider the churches as their interest representation and have a voting preference for the CDU/CSU. Secondly, only in those cases where there is a significant


relationship between a lifestyle group, cleavage(s), organisational membership(s), interest representation and party preference this lifestyle group will be defined as a social milieu. The existence of such milieus would then again imply that the German party system is still characterised by relationship(s) between political parties and specific population groups which offer a certain level of stability in the volatile electorate.

As the statistical meaningfulness of the proportions are dependent on the size of a cluster and the standard deviation, these have to be considered when interpreting the relationship between the lifestyle groups and the other variables (see Bacher 1994: 330ff.). For every variable in a cross-tabulation a significant test will thus be carried out; firstly, the mean will be calculated and secondly a t-test will be carried out between a variable in the total cluster using the mean which was found in the previous step as a test value. Only if the cluster specific proportion of a variable is significantly different from the whole sample, will the variable be considered statistically significant for describing a cluster.<sup>64</sup> An overview of the strategy of data analysis is given in Figure 6.1.

Due to their different socio-economic and socio-cultural developments the old and new *Länder* will be analysed separately. The results found in the west are presented in Chapter 7.1, those in the east in Chapter 7.2. A comparison of the lifestyle groups found in the east and west will be discussed in Chapter 7.3, in particular with respect to the (possible) existence of a regional milieu (cf. Hypothesis 4, Chapter 6.1).

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<sup>64</sup> If the relationship between a variable and a cluster is significant at  $p \leq .05$  (i.e.  $t = 1.96$  or above or  $t = -1.96$  or below) this variable will be considered significant for this specific cluster.

**Figure 6.1 Strategy of data analysis**



## **7. THE ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL MILIEUS IN GERMANY**

In this chapter the existence of social milieus in reunified Germany will be analysed. Separate analyses will be carried out for the east and the west. As was shown in the previous chapter the strategy of data analysis is the same for both parts, though. Firstly, principal components analyses will be used to reduce the number of lifestyle variables. Secondly, a cluster analysis including the components will be carried out to find lifestyle groups. Thirdly, analyses between lifestyle groups, cleavages, organisational membership, interest representation and party preference are carried out in order to analyse the existence of social milieus. Finally, a summary of the results found in the west and east will be given in Chapter 7.1.4 and 7.2.4, respectively. Although separate analyses will be carried out for the east and the west a comparison of the results will be summarised in Chapter 7.3.

### **7.1 The formation of social milieus in the west**

#### **7.1.1 The analysis of latent variables using principal components analyses**

Altogether 20 principal components could be extracted by means of principal components analyses compared to 59 original items. Five single variables were excluded from the analyses and four of them were included as standardised variables (z-scores) in the cluster analysis. These variables could not be arranged to a principal component. However, four of them were considered theoretically important and thus included in the cluster analysis. The principal components found within the three different groups of lifestyle variables are summarised in the following. In those cases components with eigenvalues less than 1 were included in the final solution this has been emphasised. The results of the principal components analyses are shown in Tables 7.1 until 7.5.

1. Leisure activities: Within the area of leisure activity eight principal components were found based on 22 single items. These were: sports/modernity, culture, technology, social engagement, social contact, read magazines/walk and wander, active, party games in the family. This eight components solution had 62% explained variance and component seven

and eight had eigenvalues of 0.99 and 0.95 respectively as can be seen from Table 7.1.<sup>65</sup> The items “church attendance and attend religious meetings” and “educate oneself privately” were not included in the analysis, but included as standardised variables in the cluster analysis as they were considered to be important lifestyle variables from the theoretical perspective. The first item “church attendance and attend religious meetings” is a traditional variable whose importance is assumed to have decreased over the past decades as presented in Chapter 4.3.2.4, but is expected to still be significant in the older lifestyle groups. The second item “educate oneself privately” is expected to be important because it may be expected that it differentiates the more cultural-orientated and highly-educated lifestyle groups from the more trivial-orientated ones. The principal component named “active” has a positive loading on the variable “do-it-yourself and repairs in the house/car/gardening” and a negative loading on the non-active variable “be lazy, do nothing”.

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<sup>65</sup> Number of valid cases N = 1970.

**Table 7.1 Components based on leisure activities (west)**

	Components							
	Sports/ Modernity	Culture	Technology	Social engagement	Social contact	Read magazines/ walk, wander	Active	Party games in family
V17 Read books	-5.915E-02	<b>.652</b>	.247	-3.878E-03	4.013E-02	.314	-6.222E-02	.139
V18 Read magazines	.104	1.277E-02	.203	-5.322E-02	2.161E-02	<b>.689</b>	-3.502E-02	.244
V19 Listen to LP's, CD's, cassettes	<b>.563</b>	.294	.212	-.202	9.876E-02	-2.074E-02	-1.609E-03	.319
V20 Watch video	<b>.591</b>	1.414E-02	.189	-7.878E-02	-1.189E-03	-6.492E-02	-.131	.450
V21 Occupy oneself with the computer	.280	.131	<b>.817</b>	7.655E-02	4.177E-02	-4.696E-02	5.414E-02	2.854E-02
V22 Use internet and on-line services	.155	.100	<b>.844</b>	.121	-1.153E-02	1.869E-02	-2.631E-02	-4.503E-02
V24 do nothing, be lazy	.259	-.121	-8.561E-02	8.193E-03	2.232E-02	.315	<b>-.654</b>	8.133E-03
V25 Walk, wander	-7.539E-02	.139	-.224	5.085E-03	8.460E-02	<b>.667</b>	2.184E-02	-.106
V26 Yoga, meditation, relaxation through self-hypnosis etc.	.214	<b>.506</b>	5.997E-04	.257	-.129	6.965E-02	-3.775E-02	.178
V27 Go eating or drinking	<b>.692</b>	9.425E-02	9.855E-02	.103	.109	.135	-6.908E-02	-.211
V28 Visit friends, neighbours, acquaintances	.277	7.625E-02	1.729E-02	-5.035E-02	<b>.782</b>	5.273E-02	-.104	-4.063E-02
V29 Visit family, relatives	-9.380E-02	9.787E-03	1.017E-02	.106	<b>.810</b>	7.752E-02	8.321E-02	.192
V30 Party games in family	7.587E-02	.150	-7.647E-02	.204	.157	.119	8.989E-02	<b>.739</b>
V31 Short trips	.400	.252	1.366E-02	.190	.204	.336	.181	-6.362E-02
V32 Participation in politics	6.361E-02	.187	.128	<b>.758</b>	-1.186E-02	-5.751E-03	-.120	4.656E-02
V33 Honorary activities	4.820E-02	.122	4.651E-02	<b>.703</b>	8.731E-02	-2.065E-02	.189	6.125E-02
V35 Artistic and musical activities	.153	<b>.716</b>	1.161E-02	.103	8.810E-02	-7.610E-02	.173	.107
V36 Do-it yourself, repairs, gardening etc.	.229	8.469E-03	-5.567E-02	8.895E-02	3.061E-03	.223	<b>.752</b>	6.033E-02
V37 Do active sports	<b>.619</b>	.266	.129	9.916E-02	4.863E-03	5.189E-02	.192	9.759E-02
V38 Visit sport events	<b>.615</b>	-.116	5.389E-02	.428	-4.359E-02	2.160E-02	.107	.139
V39 Go to the cinema, visit pop- or jazz concerts etc.	<b>.672</b>	.357	.224	-1.015E-02	7.600E-02	-.121	-9.481E-02	4.908E-02
V40 Go to the opera, classical concerts etc.	.291	<b>.680</b>	9.258E-02	.132	8.535E-02	7.692E-02	4.127E-02	-.175

Rotated Component Matrix. Extraction Method: Principal Components Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.  
a. Rotation converged in 11 iterations.

2. Importance of life areas: In the second group of lifestyle variables three principal components were found based on six single items. These were: leisure time and recreation/friends and acquaintances; religion and church/neighbourhood; work/ politics and public life. The three components solution had 73% explained variance and the third component had an eigenvalue of 0.94 (cf. Table 7.2).<sup>66</sup> The items “importance of own family and children” and “relatives” were not included in the principal components analysis, but included as standardised variables in the cluster analysis as these variables,

<sup>66</sup> Number of valid cases N = 1997.

too, may be expected to be theoretically significant as they emphasise the importance of primary networks.

**Table 7.2 Components based on important life areas (west)**

	Components		
	Leisure time and recreation/friends and acquaintances	Religion and church/Neighbourhood	Work/politics and public life
V10 Occupation and work	.300	-.265	<b>.763</b>
V11 Leisure and recreation	<b>.840</b>	-6.808E-02	.194
V12 Friends and acquaintances	<b>.856</b>	.194	4.982E-02
V14 Religion and church	-.106	<b>.813</b>	-1.643E-02
V15 Politics and public life	-8.511E-03	.403	<b>.781</b>
V16 Neighbourhood	.310	<b>.738</b>	9.102E-02

Rotated Component Matrix. Extraction Method: Principal Components Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

a Rotation converged in 5 iterations.

3. Aesthetic characteristics: In the final group of lifestyle variables covering the aesthetic preferences of the respondents separate analyses were carried out in the areas music, television and newspaper contents (cf. Tables 7.3 until 7.5).

In the field of music taste two principal components were found based on five single items. These were: folk music/German pop-music and classical music/jazz. The two components solution had 68% explained variance).<sup>67</sup> Furthermore, the principal component “Folk music/German pop-music” has a negative loading on pop-and rock music (cf. Table 7.3).

**Table 7.3 Components based on music preference (west)**

	Components	
	Folk music/German pop-music	Classical music/Jazz
V41 Folk music	<b>.916</b>	-2.534E-02
V42 German pop music	<b>.710</b>	-7.929E-02
V43 Pop- and rock music	<b>-.724</b>	.139
V44 Classical music	4.091E-02	<b>.879</b>
V45 Jazz	-.251	<b>.815</b>

Rotated Component Matrix. Extraction Method: Principal Components Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

a Rotation converged in 3 iterations.

With respect to television taste four principal components were found based on 10 items: entertainment series/Heimatfilme; movies; reports/news and sports. The four components

<sup>67</sup> Number of valid cases N = 2027.

solution had 68% explained variance and the fourth component had an eigenvalue of 0.96.<sup>68</sup> The results are given in Table 7.4.

Until this point 170 cases are excluded from the analyses due to the casewise deletion of missing values on lifestyle items where no answer was given (cf. Chapter 6.3).

**Table 7.4 Components based on preference for television programmes (west)**

	Components			
	Entertainment series/Heimatfilme/Quiz	Movies	Reports/News	Sports
V53 Television and quiz shows	<b>.783</b>	.110	-7.155E-02	.263
V54 Sports	-2.392E-02	.149	.140	<b>.901</b>
V55 Feature movies	.293	<b>.688</b>	2.817E-02	-2.631E-02
V56 News	3.133E-02	-.172	<b>.711</b>	.173
V57 Political magazines	-9.850E-02	-4.303E-02	<b>.807</b>	.224
V58 Arts and culture	-5.064E-02	.112	<b>.736</b>	-.283
V59 Heimatfilme	<b>.820</b>	-5.268E-02	7.805E-02	-.179
V60 Thrillers	.141	<b>.788</b>	3.214E-02	3.191E-02
V61 Action movies	-.161	<b>.767</b>	-.228	.225
V62 Entertainment series	<b>.749</b>	.276	-.144	-8.471E-02

Rotated Component Matrix. Extraction Method: Principal Components Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

a Rotation converged in 6 iterations.

Turning to the last area of aesthetic preferences, the interest in newspaper contents, another 128 cases are missing. The reason is that those respondents who expressed never to read newspaper in the previous filter variable are excluded from the following variables where the respondents are asked to rank their preferences for different kinds of newspaper contents. Three principal components were found based on six items (cf. Table 7.5). These are: reports/news; local news/ all over the world; sports. The three components solution had 75% explained variance and the third component had an eigenvalue of 0.98. The item “advertisements” was excluded from the principal components analysis as the analysis showed that this was the only item which could not be arranged to any component and the inclusion of this variable reduced the explained variance of the three components solution with about 10%. As emphasised in the first paragraph of Chapter 7.1.1 altogether five variables were not included in the principal components analyses, but four of these were included in the cluster analysis as they were considered to be important from the theoretical point of view. With regard to the variable “advertisements” no particular important contribution was expected from this item from a theoretical point with regard to

<sup>68</sup> Number of valid cases N = 1972.

the existence of lifestyle groups. The variable was thus not included in the cluster analysis.<sup>69</sup>

**Table 7.5 Components based on preference for newspaper contents (west)**

	Components		
	Reports/News	Local News/all over the world	Sports
V67 Politics	<b>.825</b>	1.743E-02	.236
V68 Economy	<b>.837</b>	4.556E-03	.257
V69 Culture	<b>.724</b>	.166	-.310
V70 Sports	.149	6.565E-02	<b>.911</b>
V71 Local news	-3.816E-02	<b>.850</b>	.135
V72 All over the world	.155	<b>.839</b>	-7.256E-02

Rotated Component Matrix. Extraction Method: Principal Components Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

a Rotation converged in 5 iterations.

In the next step the 20 latent variables and four manifest variables described above were included in the cluster analysis in order to find lifestyle groups in the West German population. This procedure will be described in further detail in the following section.

### 7.1.2 The analysis of lifestyle groups using cluster analysis

Several cluster analyses were carried out for the West German population<sup>70</sup> using QUICK CLUSTER in SPSS 10.0. As emphasised in Chapter 6.3 this procedure is based on the K-means algorithm which requires the user to specify the number of clusters and if an inappropriate number of clusters have been chosen the results may be misleading (SPSS index release 10.0). Although SPSS does not offer any test to determine which cluster number offers the best solution a procedure offered by Bacher (2001:71ff, cf. Chapter 6.3) will be followed in order to receive indications which solution may be the appropriate one. The results of the test criteria are given in Table 7.6.

Looking firstly at  $ETA^2$  the total explained variance increases with 3% and 4% from cluster solutions two until five, between solutions five and seven with 2% and from solution eight until 11 the explained variance increases only with 1% per solution. Finally, between solution 11 and 12 the explained variance increases again, although only with 2%. The results indicate that cluster solution five and seven might be appropriate, but also 12

<sup>69</sup> Number of valid cases N = 1898.

<sup>70</sup> The sample includes residents in the old *Länder* who have the German citizenship only N = 2037.

might be a possible solution as the total explained variance increases again between solution 11 and 12.

**Table 7.6 Descriptive statistics for determining the number of clusters (west)**

Cluster number (k)	Explained variance $ETA^2(k)$	Proportional reduction of error PRE (k)	F-MAX-Value (k)
1	0,00	-99,00	-99,00
2	0,10	0,10	191,20
3	0,16	0,07	167,92
4	0,19	0,04	137,59
5	0,23	0,04	126,32
6	0,25	0,03	115,99
7	0,27	0,02	105,74
8	0,28	0,02	96,72
9	0,29	0,02	89,46
10	0,30	0,01	83,45
11	0,30	0,00	74,08
12	0,32	0,02	72,59

Now, looking at PRE (k) which is the relative improvement of k clusters compared to the previous cluster solution with k-1 clusters (proportional reduction of error) the following number of solutions might be considered appropriate. Until cluster solution three the PRE-coefficient has a value of 7%, until the five cluster solution of 4%. Thereafter, the improvement stagnates or declines minimal continuously from cluster solution four until 11 and then rises again. PRE (k) would thus indicate that the appropriate number of clusters could be three, five or 12.

Whereas the explained variance in  $ETA^2$  is dependent on the number of clusters and the explained variance thus automatically increases with a larger number of clusters this interdependence is removed in the F-MAX (k) statistics (cf. Chapter 6.3). The appropriate number of clusters is equal to the solution with the maximum F-MAX value. Looking at the numbers in Table 7.6 the highest F-MAX value can be found in cluster solution two.

Obviously, the indications given by these test criteria are too divergent to offer a clear basis for deciding the number of clusters. Thus,  $ETA^2$  was calculated for each of the 14 principal components with the highest explained variance and each of the four single items in cluster solutions from five until nine. The seven cluster solution proved to have the highest  $ETA^2$  on most active principal components/variables as can be seen from the results which are presented in Table 7.7.

**Table 7.7 Measures of association between important active cluster variables and cluster solutions (west)**

Number of clusters:	Eta Squared CLU 5	Eta Squared CLU 6	Eta Squared CLU 7	Eta Squared CLU 8	Eta Squared CLU 9
Leisure activity: Technology	.485	.528	.476	.415	.464
Music: Folk music/German pop-music	.457	.479	.472	.495	.468
Zscore: Leisure activity: Educate oneself privately	.414	.403	.431	.423	.398
Newspaper: Sports	.395	.350	.394	.353	.431
Leisure activity: Culture	.374	.351	.389	.364	.374
Television: Entertainment/Heimatfilme	.367	.389	.375	.401	.416
Leisure activity: Sports/modernity	.338	.360	.370	.361	.366
Newspaper: Reports/news	.344	.340	.355	.358	.372
Life areas: Religion and church/neighbourhood	.281	.301	.338	.325	.355
Music: Classical music/jazz	.292	.294	.325	.288	.306
Television: Reports/news	.306	.314	.321	.342	.380
Life areas: Work/politics and public life	.265	.284	.288	.289	.278
Life areas: Leisure time and recreation/friends and acquaintances	.014	.234	.253	.287	.301
Zscore: Leisure activity: Church attendance and religious meetings	.178	.165	.249	.177	.242
Zscore: Importance: Relatives	.119	.238	.231	.228	.233
Television: Feature movies	.085	.118	.163	.131	.191
Zscore: Importance: Own family and children	.069	.121	.129	.346	.358
Newspaper: Local news/all over the world	.041	.093	.102	.108	.102

In some cases the highest values of a principal component or variable could be found in the six or eight cluster solution. However, the deviations between the six and eight cluster solutions for these latent and manifest variables compared to the seven cluster solution were relatively small. Thus, the seven cluster solution was considered as the appropriate one and includes  $N = 1739$  cases. Excluded in this cluster solution are the 170 cases which were lost due to the missing casewise deletion in the PCA analyses as well as the 128 cases which were not included in the principal components analysis of preferences for newspaper contents as these person answered never to read newspapers. A discussion of possible problems which might arise due to the loss of these 128 cases will take place after the presentations of the result of the cluster analysis in Table 7.8 and 7.9. The numbers in the table are based on z-scores or factor scores with a mean of zero and standard deviation of one. In order to test the stability of the seven cluster solution, several analyses were calculated using random samples on the basis of 80% of the cases. When compared to the original cluster solution, the seven cluster solutions found on the basis of random samples turned out to be quite similar with respect to both the dominant characteristics of a cluster and with respect to the size of a cluster.

**Table 7.8 Final cluster centers of the active variables<sup>71</sup> (west)**

	Cluster						
	1 (N = 221) 12.7%	2 (N = 233) 13.4%	3 (N = 284) 16.3%	4 (N = 273) 15.7%	5 (N = 331) 19%	6 (N = 172) 9.9%	7 (N = 225) 13%
Life areas: Leisure time and recreation/ friends and acquaintances	.00713	-.21472	.25002	.07587	.37615	<b>-1.40615</b>	.32297
Life areas: Religion and church /neighbourhood	<b>-.54072</b>	<b>.40322</b>	<b>.68349</b>	<b>.60937</b>	-.28793	-.18784	<b>-.95053</b>
Life areas: Occupation/ Politics and public life	<b>.41658</b>	<b>.57739</b>	.32931	<b>-1.08118</b>	.12174	-.16135	-.06815
Leisure activity: Sports/modernity	<b>.48412</b>	-.13713	-.13964	<b>-.91336</b>	.29169	<b>-.55808</b>	<b>1.09913</b>
Leisure activity: Culture	.20146	<b>1.22746</b>	<b>-.48921</b>	-.27476	<b>.45301</b>	<b>-.45920</b>	<b>-.69635</b>
Leisure activity: Technology	<b>1.80771</b>	-.07605	-.34300	-.29168	-.37574	-.31835	-.08916
Leisure activity: Social engagement	.02106	<b>.68076</b>	<b>.51520</b>	-.22154	<b>-.49077</b>	.04713	-.23016
Leisure activity: Social contact	-.04047	.00286	.11593	.26019	.14470	<b>-.57995</b>	-.06875
Leisure activity: Read magazines /walk and wander	.15771	-.13718	<b>.44506</b>	.15234	.04248	-.28408	<b>-.43330</b>
Leisure activity: active	-.04729	.28178	.31625	-.36105	.08397	.02140	-.25666
Leisure activity: Party games in the family	-.21135	.02888	.00597	-.20491	.26438	-.26877	.26999
Music: Folk music/German pop-music	<b>-.75875</b>	-.16255	<b>.72939</b>	<b>.92540</b>	-.32014	<b>.45372</b>	<b>-.95533</b>
Music: Classical/jazz	<b>.41398</b>	<b>.96047</b>	.00106	-.35552	.35235	<b>-.61069</b>	<b>-.84294</b>
Television: Entertainment/ Heimatfilme	<b>-.76468</b>	<b>-.51618</b>	<b>.53307</b>	<b>.99968</b>	-.18614	.06450	<b>-.57135</b>
Television: Feature movies	.12370	-.26824	-.02874	<b>-.44138</b>	.38434	<b>-.62902</b>	<b>.64164</b>
Television: Reports/news	.30064	<b>.85156</b>	<b>.57003</b>	<b>-.46678</b>	-.03160	-.35041	<b>-.88033</b>
Television: Sports	.20492	<b>-.49818</b>	<b>.76341</b>	<b>-.65980</b>	<b>-.55711</b>	<b>.40032</b>	<b>.75847</b>
Newspaper: Reports/news	<b>.53784</b>	<b>.93715</b>	.35996	<b>-.76825</b>	-.08502	-.36530	<b>-.72387</b>
Newspaper: Local news/all over the world	-.39210	-.08773	.30016	.36715	.05121	<b>-.65945</b>	.03094
Newspaper: Sports	.21357	<b>-.44331</b>	<b>.75280</b>	<b>-.81796</b>	<b>-.54301</b>	.28969	<b>.89332</b>
Zscore: Life areas: Own family and children	-.19069	.21788	.36574	.26750	.27950	<b>-.64985</b>	-.32896
Zscore: Importance: Relatives	-.28527	.23308	<b>.47048</b>	<b>.53327</b>	.08959	<b>-1.04131</b>	-.35518
Zscore: Leisure activity: Educate oneself privately	<b>1.22543</b>	<b>.77783</b>	<b>-.41192</b>	<b>-.74886</b>	-.04047	<b>-.59360</b>	.00327
Zscore: Leisure activity: Church attendance and religious meetings	<b>-.46133</b>	<b>.60591</b>	.30075	<b>.66578</b>	<b>-.40679</b>	-.13901	<b>-.64172</b>

<sup>71</sup> Due to the different scales used in the questionnaire the results in the areas leisure activities and aesthetic preferences have been pooled in order to make the interpretation clearer i.e. in the area of values a negative value = not important, positive value = important; leisure activity a negative value = never, positive value = daily; aesthetic preferences a negative value = not at all, positive value = very much.

The main characteristics of the lifestyle groups have been summarised in Table 7.9. In every of the five areas the items have been listed according to their strength, i.e., for example, in the first cluster technology has the highest positive value with respect to leisure activities followed by private education and sports/modernity whereas the highest - and in this case only - negative value can be found with respect to church attendance. Please recall that only values of 0,4 and more or -0,4 or less will be considered meaningful for characterising a cluster (cf. Chapter 6.3). The clusters have been named according to the most dominating characteristics of a cluster.

**Table 7.9 Lifestyle groups in the Western German population<sup>72</sup>**

12.7% (N = 221) Technologically and educationally orientated, modern person (TEDUMO)	Leisure activities: Preference for: Technology; educate oneself privately and sports/modernity. Distance towards: Church attendance and attend religious meetings. Life areas: Work/politics and public life are important. Religion and church/neighbourhood are not important. Music taste: Preference for: Classical music/jazz. Distance towards: Folk music/German pop-music. <sup>73</sup> Television taste: Distance towards: Entertainment series/Heimatfilme. Newspaper contents: Preference for: Reports/news.
13.4% (N = 233) Cultural and educational orientated, socially engaged religious person (CUEDSO)	Leisure activities: Preference for: Culture; educate oneself privately; social engagement and church attendance and attend religious meetings. Life areas: Work/politics and public life and religion and church/neighbourhood are important. Music taste: Preference for classical music/jazz. Television taste: Preference for: Reports/news. Distance towards: Entertainment series/Heimatfilme and sports. Newspaper contents: Preference for: Reports/ news. Distance towards: Sports.
16.3% (N = 284) The sports interested, traditional-orientated, socially engaged person (SPTRSO)	Leisure activities: Preference for: Social engagement and read magazines/walk and wander. Distance towards: Culture and educate oneself privately. Life areas: Religion and church/neighbourhood and relatives are important. Music taste: Preference for: Folk music/German pop-music. Television taste: Preference for: Sports; Reports/news; Entertainment series/Heimatfilme. Newspaper contents: Preference for: Sports.
15.7% (N = 273) The traditional-orientated, religious person (TRAREL)	Leisure activities: Preference for: Church attendance and attend religious meetings. Distance towards: Sports/modernity and educate oneself privately. Life areas: Religion and church/neighbourhood and relatives are important. Work/politics and public life are unimportant. Music taste: Preference for: Folk music/German pop-music. Television taste: Preference for: Entertainment series/Heimatfilme. Distance towards: Sports; reports/news and movies. Newspaper contents: Distance towards: Sports and reports/ news.
19% (N = 331) The culturally active, anti-sports orientated person (ANSPCA)	Leisure activities: Preference for: Culture. Distance towards: Social engagement and church attendance and attend religious meetings. Life areas: No particular characteristics. Music taste: No particular characteristics. Television taste: Distance towards: Sports. Newspaper contents: Distance towards: Sports.
9.9% (N = 172) The no value-orientated, rather passive person (NOVAPA)	Leisure activities: Distance towards: Educate oneself privately; social contact; sports/modernity and culture. Life areas: Leisure time and recreation/friends and acquaintances; relatives and own family and children are unimportant. Music taste: Preference for: Folk music and German pop-music. Distance towards: classical music/jazz. Television taste: Preference for: sports. Distance towards: Movies. Newspaper contents: Distance towards: Local news/all over the world.
13% (N = 225) The modern, anti-religious, sports-orientated person (MODSPO)	Leisure activities: Preference for: Sports/modernity. Distance towards: Culture; church attendance and attend religious meetings and read magazines/walk and wander. Life areas: Distance towards Religion and church/neighbourhood. Music taste: Distance towards: Folk music/German pop-music and classical music/jazz. Television taste: Preference for: Sports and movies. Distance towards: Reports/news and entertainment series/Heimatfilme. Newspaper contents: Preference for: Sports. Distance towards: Reports/ news.

In order to test how the respondents who never read newspapers (128 cases) are distributed among the lifestyle groups the following procedure was carried out. Firstly, a cluster analysis was carried out with all variables listed in Table 7.8 **except** for the newspaper components, but **with** the standardised filter variable asking about how often the

<sup>72</sup> The size of the lifestyle groups have been calculated on the basis of the number of respondents included in the cluster analysis. Total sample N = 1739.

<sup>73</sup> Please recall that the component Folk music and German pop-music included a negative loading on pop- and rock music.

respondents reads newspapers (0.0 = never until 7.0 seven days a week). Thereafter, the old and new seven cluster solutions including the missing values were cross-tabulated. The results showed that the largest number of people who never read newspaper could be found in the “modern, anti-religious, sports-orientated person” (43 cases), followed by the “traditional-orientated, religious person” (23 cases) and the “no-value orientated, rather passive person” (22 cases). The rest of the respondents who do not read newspaper were evenly distributed among the other lifestyle groups. Although the first three mentioned groups would have been larger if these respondents would have been included, the number is rather small and there seems to be no systematic bias in the distribution, so that the effect of these missing values on the following analyses presented in Chapter 7.1.3 can be expected to have – if any at all – only minimum impact on the results.

### **7.1.3 The relationship between lifestyle groups, cleavages, organisational memberships, interest representation and party preference**

In this chapter the results of the analyses between the lifestyle groups and the external variables are presented and discussed. As elaborated in Chapter 6.3 the aim is to analyse to which extent social milieus still exist which are based on a relationship between lifestyle groups, cleavages, organisational membership, organisational interest representation and party preference. As argued in Chapter 6.3 only if the cluster specific proportion of a variable is significantly different from the whole sample, the variable will be considered statistically significant for describing a cluster. In most cases it is the above average significant values which are of interest as most hypotheses assume a positive relationship between certain variables. However, if results come up which are contradictory to the expectations, i.e. either not significant where this would have been expected or below average or above average significant where the opposite would have been expected this will of course be discussed as well. In order to facilitate the interpretation of the results the numbers which proved to be significantly above or below average have been marked in bold in the respective tables.

### **7.1.3.1 The association between lifestyle groups and cleavages**

#### **1) Social structural cleavages**

As was emphasised in Chapter 6.3 certain expectations exist with respect to the social structural characteristics based on the lifestyle characteristics of a group. It may, for example, be expected that the first group the “technologically and educationally-orientated, modern person” will be dominated by younger, highly educated people, who belong to no religious society and hardly ever go to church. The lifestyle group of the “traditional-orientated religious person” is on the other hand expected to be dominated by older, rather lower educated people who often go to church. Nevertheless, in order to explore whether these expectations can also be confirmed empirically the association between social structural characteristics and the lifestyle groups are analysed. The results are presented in Table 7.10.

**Table 7.10 The association between social structural characteristics and the lifestyle groups (west)<sup>74</sup>**

	TEDUMO (12.7%)	CUEDSO (13.4%)	SPTRSO (16.3%)	TRAREL (15.7%)	ANSPCA (19%)	NOVAPA (9.9%)	MODSPO (13%)	Total	$\chi^2$	Cramer's V
<b>Religious cleavage:</b>										
Denomination:									15*	.102
Roman-Catholic	46.0	52.5	57.4	52.4	43.6	46.7	56.4	50.9		
Protestant	54.0	47.5	42.6	47.6	56.4	53.3	43.6	49.1		
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%		
	N = 161	N = 183	N = 263	N = 254	N = 250	N = 150	N = 163	N = 1424		
<b>Religious affiliation:</b>										
Yes	74.5	86.0	95.8	96.3	82.0	91.2	73.7	85.9	107***	.249
No	25.5	14.0	4.2	3.7	18.0	8.8	26.3	14.1		
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%		
	N = 220	N = 229	N = 284	N = 273	N = 328	N = 171	N = 224	N = 1729		
<b>Church attendance:</b>										
Once a month or more	10.0	39.7	35.1	47.1	10.7	23.2	4.5	24.6	323***	.252
Several times a year	18.5	21.1	27.9	20.5	22.6	20.2	17.6	21.5		
Seldom	36.0	27.2	27.5	25.5	38.8	25.6	33.8	31.0		
Never	35.5	12.1	9.4	6.8	27.8	31.0	44.1	22.8		
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%		
	N = 211	N = 232	N = 276	N = 263	N = 327	N = 168	N = 222	N = 1699		
<b>Occupational cleavage/ social status:</b>										
Self-employed	20.8	7.9	3.6	0.7	5.6	6.6	2.8	6.4	505***	.273
Upper white-collar	22.2	19.4	5.0	(0.0) <sup>75</sup>	10.2	6.0	5.6	9.4		
Lower white-collar	22.2	17.2	11.8	7.0	26.2	9.6	31.3	18.1		
Blue-collar	9.9	5.3	16.1	1.5	11.1	15.0	32.7	12.6		
No main occupation	25.0	50.2	63.6	90.8	46.9	62.9	27.6	53.5		
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%		
	N = 212	N = 227	N = 280	N = 271	N = 324	N = 167	N = 214	N = 1695		
<b>Education:</b>										
No education/primary school	9.6	18.7	71.7	87.5	40.7	77.5	48.9	51.0	614***	.422
Middle school	38.4	33.9	22.3	11.0	37.6	16.0	40.6	28.7		
High school level	52.1	47.4	6.0	1.5	21.7	6.5	10.5	20.3		
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%		
	N = 219	N = 230	N = 283	N = 273	N = 327	N = 169	N = 219	N = 1720		
<b>University degree or degree in applied sciences:</b>										
No/ in education/no answer	69.7	66.1	96.5	99.6	88.8	94.2	97.8	88.0	257***	.384
Yes	30.3	33.9	3.5	0.4	11.2	5.8	2.2	12.0		
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%		
	N = 221	N = 233	N = 284	N = 273	N = 331	N = 172	N = 225	N = 1739		
<b>Income:</b>										
< or = DM 1999	32.7	41.0	30.9	72.3	59.2	50.8	40.1	47.4	177***	.260
DM 2000 – 3999	40.3	39.2	60.8	25.2	34.3	44.4	52.4	42.2		
DM 4000 and above	27.0	19.9	8.3	2.5	6.5	4.8	7.5	10.4		
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%		
	N = 159	N = 166	N = 217	N = 202	N = 245	N = 126	N = 187	N = 1302		
<b>Stadt-Land cleavage:</b>										
<b>Community size:</b>										
Small	10.9	10.3	21.5	20.9	8.8	12.2	10.2	13.7	82***	.153
Medium	39.8	48.9	56.7	54.2	51.4	51.7	51.6	50.9		
Large	49.3	40.8	21.8	24.9	39.9	36.0	38.2	35.3		
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%		
	N = 221	N = 233	N = 284	N = 273	N = 331	N = 172	N = 225	N = 1739		
<b>Gender:</b>										
Male	71.0	38.2	68.0	12.8	24.8	55.8	70.2	46.6	357***	.453
Female	29.0	61.8	32.0	87.2	75.2	44.2	29.8	53.4		
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%		
	N = 221	N = 233	N = 284	N = 273	N = 331	N = 172	N = 225	N = 1739		
<b>Age:</b>										
18-29	28.5	6.4	2.1	1.1	19.0	1.7	40.9	14.1	755***	.380
30-44	43.9	28.8	10.9	6.2	40.5	18.0	40.0	26.9		
45-59	22.2	36.1	34.5	18.3	26.9	30.8	15.6	26.3		
60 and above	5.4	28.8	52.5	74.4	13.6	49.4	3.6	32.7		
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%		
	N = 221	N = 233	N = 284	N = 273	N = 331	N = 172	N = 225	N = 1739		
<b>Family status:</b>										
Married	52.0	62.2	73.9	52.4	61.9	61.0	40.9	58.3	486***	.305
Separated/ Divorced	5.4	9.9	9.2	2.6	11.2	11.6	11.6	8.7		
Widowed	2.7	9.4	14.1	41.8	7.9	19.8	1.3	14.1		
Single	39.8	18.5	2.8	3.3	19.0	7.6	46.2	18.9		
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%		
	N = 221	N = 233	N = 283	N = 273	N = 331	N = 172	N = 225	N = 1738		

<sup>74</sup> Significance levels:  $p \leq .05 = *$ ,  $p \leq .01 = **$  and  $p \leq .001 = ***$ . The percentage distribution of the lifestyle groups are not based on the total number of respondents in the analysis, but on the total number of respondents in the respective clusters. The 71.0% men in the first cluster is, for example, based on the subpopulation with N=221.

<sup>75</sup> No cell counts.

In the following the main social structural characteristics of the lifestyle groups are given:

The technologically and educationally orientated, modern person: single men, age 18-44 with a middle school or high school level, university degree or degree in applied sciences who live in large cities are above average represented in this group. They work above average as self-employed, lower and upper white-collar and are above average represented in the highest income category. Finally, this group has an above average number of people with no religious affiliation and number of people who never go to church.

Cultural and educational orientated, socially engaged religious person: This lifestyle group is above average represented among women age 45-59 with a high school level, university degree or degree in applied sciences who have a high level of income. They work above average as upper white-collars and go to church more than once a month.

The sports interested, traditional-orientated, socially engaged person: married men, age 45 and above with no education or primary education and a middle level of income are above average represented in this group. They live above average in small communities, have no main occupation and go to church once a month or several times a year.

The traditional-orientated, religious person: Widows age 60 and above with no education or primary education who have a low level of income, no main occupation and live in small cities are above-average represented in this lifestyle group. Finally, they go to church more than once a month.

The culturally active, anti-sports orientated person: This group is above average represented by separated/divorced, Protestant women, age 18-44 with a medium level of education and low level of income. They work above average as low white-collars and are above average represented by people who never or seldom go to church.

The no value-orientated, rather passive person: Men, age 60 and above with no education or primary education and no main occupation who never go to church are above average represented in this group.

The modern, anti-religious, sports-orientated person: Single men, age 18-44 with a middle level of education and middle level of income who work as lower white-collars and blue-collars are above average represented in this group. Finally, they are above average represented by people who never go to church and who have no religious affiliation.

As can be seen from the summary above, the expected relationships between lifestyle characteristics and social structural characteristics can also be found empirically. So do the lifestyle groups of the cultural-orientated and the technologically-orientated ones relate to the higher educated who work above average as self-employed and white-collar workers and who have a high level of income. Furthermore, the modern, technologically-orientated lifestyle groups are younger and higher educated than the traditional-orientated ones and they are less religious.

Table 7.10 and the summary of the results make clear that the lifestyle groups differ significantly with respect to social structural characteristics. Looking first at the traditional religious cleavage which has changed from being one between Protestants and Catholics to religious and secular people (cf. Figure 3.1) the following becomes evident; whereas denomination does not distinguish between the lifestyle groups, the question about

religious affiliation versus no religious affiliation distinguishes significantly. In both younger, modern orientated lifestyle groups i.e. the “technologically and educationally orientated, modern person” and the “modern, anti-religious, sports-orientated person” the number of people with no religious affiliation is significantly above average (25%) whereas in the traditional-orientated and older lifestyle groups the number of people with no religious affiliation is below average. With respect to church attendance the picture is the same. Although this is no objective social structural characteristic it is often used as a measurement of the strength of religiosity (cf. Chapter 6.2.2). As can be seen from the table the two groups with the lowest number of people with no religious affiliation, the “sports-interested, traditional-orientated, socially engaged person” and the “traditional-orientated religious person” have an above average number of people who go to church once a month or more. Furthermore, the second highest number of people who go to church more than once a month can be found in the group of the “cultural and educational orientated, socially engaged religious person” which is not surprising considering the religious-orientated lifestyle of the members of this group. Finally, the two modern-orientated lifestyle groups with the highest number of people with no religious affiliation also have the highest number of people who never go to church, although both the passive lifestyle group and the “culturally active, no-sports-orientated” group follow closely. In summary, there is a clear indication that the cleavage between religious and secular people exists in the West German population.

With regard to the other traditional cleavage between work and capital which in the 1950s and 1960s changed to one between trade union orientated employees and self-employed orientated, bourgeois middle class (cf. Figure 3.1) the results can be summarised as follows. The first two lifestyle groups are above average dominated by self-employed and upper white-collars whereas in the other groups there is a below average or average number of people in these occupational categories. On the other hand the highest number of blue-collar workers and lower white-collars can be found in the “modern, anti-religious, sports-orientated person”. The cleavage between workers and employers thus still seems to be present in the West German society as well, although the relationship with organisations still has to be analysed and discussed. This will take place in section three later in this chapter.

Finally, a few words can be said about the traditional *Stadt-Land* cleavage. As can be seen from the results the modern lifestyle group dominated by highly educated, younger people has the highest number of members who live in large cities (49.3%) whereas the two traditional-orientated lifestyle groups have the lowest number of members living in large cities (21.8% and 24.9%) and the highest number of people who live in small cities (21.5% and 20.9%).

As can be seen from Table 7.10 the lifestyle groups differ significantly with respect to the other social structural characteristics as well. The three variables education, university degree and income may be seen as indicators for the social status of the members of a lifestyle group. With regard to all three variables clear differences exist between some of the lifestyle groups. So do the “technologically and educationally orientated, modern person” and the “cultural and educational orientated, socially engaged religious person” both have the highest numbers of members with high school level, university degree or degree in applied sciences and with an income of an income of DM 4000 or above. The traditional-orientated lifestyle groups do on the other hand have the highest number of people with primary school or no education, the highest number with people without university degree and the highest number of people with an income at the lower or middle level. A similar pattern can also be found in the group of the “no value-orientated, rather passive person”.

Also with regard to the other social structural characteristics interesting differences exist. So are three of the lifestyle groups, for example, mainly represented by men and two by women. Furthermore, two lifestyle groups are to approx. 70% dominated by the younger age groups, one is to 75% dominated by people above 60 years and another two lifestyle groups are to approx. 50% dominated by people over 60 years. With regard to family status it is not surprisingly that the highest number of singles can be found in the two modern-orientated lifestyle groups.

## **2) Ideological cleavages**

Now turning to the ideological cleavages, the results of the analyses are presented in Table 7.11. Starting with the value cleavage measured by materialism vs. post-materialism, “worries about the environment” and “voting as a duty of the citizens” the picture is as

follows: there are significant differences with respect to post-materialist vs. materialist attitudes among the lifestyle groups. Whereas the “technologically and educationally orientated, modern person” and the “cultural and educational orientated, socially engaged religious person” have the highest number of post-materialists, the lifestyle group of the “traditional orientated, religious person” has the highest number of materialists. This would support the theory of Inglehart that the younger, more highly educated generations develop post-materialist attitudes whereas the older, lower educated ones stick to the materialist values, although it should not be ignored that in all groups the mixed values category is the biggest one (cf. also Chapter 4.3.1). With respect to “worries about the environment” the picture is quite similar; the “cultural and educational orientated, socially engaged religious person” has the highest number of people with big worries and the “traditional orientated, religious person” has the lowest number of people with big worries. With regard to this item, the “technologically and educationally orientated, modern person” does not prove a significant number of people with big worries as might have been expected. Altogether, it should be emphasised though that the number of people having big worries about the environment is fairly high in most groups. Turning to the third value variable included here, “voting as a duty”, not surprisingly the “traditional orientated, religious person” is above average represented by people who consider voting as a duty and the “youngest” lifestyle groups are those with the highest number of people who do not agree with this statement. Looking at Table 7.11 it becomes clear, though, that the number is even higher in the second and third lifestyle group and altogether in all groups more than  $\frac{3}{4}$  consider voting as a duty. However, in summary the result indicate that a value cleavage exists in the West German population.

Looking at the cleavages which might have developed as a consequence of modernisation, “social differences are fair” and “worries about unemployment” the picture is the following; whereas the first variable turns out not to be significant in distinguishing between the lifestyle groups the second one was not included in the overview because 28,6% of the cells had counts less than five. In general, there seems to be a consensus among the groups that social difference in Germany are not fair, although as can be seen from Table 7.11 the number who disagree to this statement are the highest in the “no value-orientated, rather passive person” and the lowest in the “technologically and educationally orientated, modern person”. Based on the above presented variables, no clear

indications of a cleavage between winners and losers of the modernisation process can be found. With regard to a possible globalisation cleavage, measured by the issue “worries about the number of immigrants” the highest numbers of those with big worries (over 60%) can be found in the traditional-orientated and “oldest” lifestyle groups i.e. the “sports interested, traditional-orientated, socially engaged person”, the “traditional-orientated, religious person” and the “no value-orientated, rather passive person”. Simultaneously, these lifestyle groups have the highest number of people with no education or only primary school (cf. Table 7.10). In contrast the first two lifestyle groups which are educationally orientated and which also embed the highest number of people with high school and university degree have an under average representation of people with big worries about number of immigrants.

A regional cleavage between eastern and western Germany is measured on the basis of the issues “worries about costs of the German reunification” and “socialism is in principle a good idea which was carried out badly”. The results show that over 50% of the members of the “sports interested, traditional-orientated, socially engaged person” and the “no value-orientated, rather passive person” have big worries about the costs of unification. Considering the fact that these groups also had they highest number of people with big worries about immigrants and rather low social status (cf. Table 7.10) the assumption arises that both groups may represent losers of the modernisation process who are afraid that the more people who have to share the available jobs and money available the less will be available to them. In western Germany there seems to be an agreement among all groups that socialism is not a good idea. More than 50% of the members of all groups do not agree to the statement that “socialism is in principle a good idea which was carried out badly”. Only the group of the “no value-orientated, rather passive person” has with almost 75% a significantly higher number of people who do not agree to the statement. Finally, the subjective left-right placement shows that more than 70% of the members of the different lifestyle groups place themselves in the middle. Only the “traditional-orientated, religious person” and the “no value-orientated, rather passive person” place themselves significantly less to the left and the “sports interested, traditional-orientated, socially engaged person” places itself significantly above average to the right. It is not surprisingly that the traditionally-orientated and older lifestyle groups place themselves significantly less to the left or above average to the right. However, what is missing is an above average

support of the left which could have been expected, for example, in the “modern, anti-religious, sports-orientated person” due to the high number of blue-collar workers and lower white-collars in this group. The high number of people placing themselves in the middle of all lifestyle groups raises the question to which extent it is correct to talk about “the middle” as if this is a uniform group.

**Table 7.11 The relationship between ideological cleavages and lifestyle groups (west)<sup>76</sup>**

	TEDUMO (12.7%)	CUEDSO (13.4%)	SPTRSO (16.3%)	TRAREL (15.7%)	ANSPCA (19%)	NOVAPA (9.9%)	MODSPO (13%)	Total	$\chi^2$	Cramer'sV
<b>Values:</b>										
Post-materialist index:	N = 214	N = 229	N = 281	N = 270	N = 329	N = 164	N = 221	N = 1708	199***	.241
Post-materialists	<b>39.3</b>	<b>34.9</b>	<b>12.5</b>	<b>7.0</b>	22.2	<b>12.8</b>	17.2	20.5		
Materialists	<b>8.9</b>	<b>7.9</b>	20.3	<b>38.9</b>	15.8	18.3	14.9	18.4		
Mixed	<b>51.9</b>	57.2	<b>67.3</b>	<b>54.1</b>	62.0	<b>68.9</b>	<b>67.9</b>	61.1		
<b>Worries about environment:</b>										
Big	52.3	<b>61.2</b>	51.1	<b>37.7</b>	55.6	<b>40.1</b>	52.2	50.4	65***	.137
Some	40.9	<b>33.6</b>	42.6	<b>51.3</b>	41.7	44.2	37.1	41.8		
None	6.8	5.2	6.4	11.0	<b>2.7</b>	<b>15.7</b>	10.7	7.8		
<b>Voting as duty:</b>										
Agree	85.6	<b>90.5</b>	<b>90.1</b>	<b>89.7</b>	83.1	85.8	<b>76.8</b>	86.1	29***	.130
Do not agree	14.4	<b>9.5</b>	<b>9.9</b>	<b>10.3</b>	16.9	14.2	<b>23.2</b>	13.9		
<b>Modernisation:</b>										
Social differences fair:	N = 214	N = 228	N = 274	N = 246	N = 315	N = 160	N = 217	N = 1654	n.s.	
Agree	41.6	32.9	39.1	36.2	33.7	29.4	30.0			
Do not agree	58.4	67.1	60.9	63.8	66.3	70.6	70.0			
<b>Globalisation:</b>										
Worries about number of immigrants:	N = 220	N = 232	N = 282	N = 273	N = 329	N = 172	N = 224	N = 1732	92***	.163
Big	<b>38.6</b>	<b>42.2</b>	<b>69.1</b>	<b>60.4</b>	<b>46.5</b>	<b>62.8</b>	59.8	54.2		
Some	<b>42.7</b>	41.4	<b>24.5</b>	32.2	<b>42.9</b>	30.2	32.6	35.4		
None	<b>18.6</b>	<b>16.4</b>	<b>6.4</b>	<b>7.3</b>	10.6	7.0	7.6	10.5		
<b>West –East:</b>										
Worries about costs of German unification:	N = 220	N = 232	N = 282	N = 273	N = 330	N = 172	N = 225	N = 1734	57***	.128
Big	44.5	<b>32.3</b>	<b>58.9</b>	43.6	41.2	<b>52.9</b>	43.6	45.2		
Some	39.5	45.7	<b>29.8</b>	41.0	<b>47.9</b>	37.8	44.0	41.0		
None	15.9	<b>22.0</b>	11.3	15.4	10.9	<b>9.3</b>	12.4	13.8		
<b>Socialism good idea:</b>										
Agree	46.0	39.0	45.7	42.2	46.2	<b>26.9</b>	39.9	41.9	20**	.113
Do not agree	54.0	61.0	54.3	57.8	53.8	<b>73.1</b>	60.1	58.1		
<b>Left-right placement:</b>										
Left	16.7	19.8	15.2	<b>8.3</b>	17.9	<b>8.7</b>	15.7	14.9	31**	.097
Middle	74.8	70.7	71.9	<b>81.9</b>	76.4	<b>82.6</b>	77.1	76.2		
Right	8.6	9.5	<b>13.0</b>	9.8	<b>5.7</b>	8.7	7.1	8.9		

<sup>76</sup> Results including variables with 20% or more cells with counts lower than 5 were not included in the table. Significance levels:  $p \leq .05$ =\*,  $p \leq .01$ \*\*\*,  $p \leq .001$ \*\*\*, n.s. = not significant. The percentage distribution of the lifestyle groups are not based on the total number of respondents in the analysis, but on the total number of respondents in the respective clusters. The 39.3% post-materialists in the first cluster is, for example, based on the subpopulation with N=214.

The results seem to indicate that within the different lifestyle groups the majority seems to place themselves in what they consider to be the middle. The question would then be how to politically address the “middle” of, for example, the modern and traditional lifestyle groups simultaneously. The issues presented above can of course only be simple measurements of possible manifest and latent cleavages as a detailed analysis would require sets of variables as was discussed in detail in Chapter 6.2.2.

### **3) The association between lifestyle group, organisational membership and organisational interest representation**

As presented in Figure 2.3 in Chapter 2.4 and discussed in Chapter 2.1.1 and 6.2.2 cleavages become manifest if they are perceived by social groups and if they are represented by organisations and parties. In Table 7.12 the association between organisational memberships and lifestyle groups are presented. With regard to the occupational organisations an above average representation of DGB members can be found among the “sports interested, traditional-orientated, socially engaged person” and the “modern, anti-religious, sports-orientated person”. In particular in the latter group this might be connected to the high number of blue-collar workers in this group (cf. Table 7.10). Although the DAG has the highest support of member in the lifestyle groups which have the highest number of people working as upper or lower white-collars, the t-test did not prove any significant relationships when cluster size was taken into consideration (cf. Chapter 6.3). Looking at the other organisations the members in the modern, younger lifestyle groups are significantly above average members in sports organisations and the traditional religious group and passive group below. With regard to “choral society” the only group which is significantly above average represented here is the “sports-interested, traditional-orientated, socially engaged person”. As this group is dominated by men age 60 and above the assumption that might be that these are members of male choirs. A significant number of members in choirs among the religious lifestyle groups which might have been expected was not found, although the “cultural and educational orientated, socially engaged religious person” has the second highest number of members in choirs and the traditional-orientated, religious one has the highest number of people with past memberships in choirs, even though this variable is not significant. Now, turning to the membership in church or religious organisations not surprisingly the modern, younger

secular lifestyle groups has hardly any members in such organisations. The only above average number of members can be found in the group of the “cultural and educational orientated, socially engaged religious person”. This fits with the overall religious profile of this group. The other religious orientated group did not show a significant number of members in church and religious organisations which could have been expected. This might be connected to the big number of people above 60 years in this group. The only lifestyle group which is significantly above average members in political parties and local and citizens organisations is the “sports-interested, traditional-orientated, socially engaged person”. With regard to social welfare, war victim organisations and other organisations the “cultural and educational orientated, socially engaged religious person “ is the only group with an above average representation. The above average memberships in different kinds of organisations among the above mentioned two lifestyle group could have been expected as these are the only two groups who have a lifestyle orientated social engagement (cf. Table 7.9).

Turning to the past memberships the “technologically and educationally orientated, modern person” and the “cultural and educational orientated, socially engaged religious person” are the only groups with an above average number of people in alternative political organisations. Furthermore, the first group also has an above average number of people who are former members in youth, student organisations. Although the second group has the second highest number here it is not significant. Nevertheless, with both types of organisations the higher number in these lifestyle groups would have been expected considering their high education and post-materialist attitudes. Finally, the “culturally active, anti-sports orientated person” has an above average number of people with past memberships in sports organisations. Obviously the anti-sports attitude of this group is related to television and newspaper (cf. Table 7.9) and not sports in general. Considering the fact that this group is to  $\frac{3}{4}$  represented by women mainly between the age of 30-44 this result is not very surprising.

Both with respect to the occupational and the other organisations one thing gets obvious and that is the low number of people who are members of any organisation at all (cf. also Tables 6.2 and 6.3). The “traditional-orientated, religious person” is, for example, under average members in altogether nine organisations and the “modern, anti-religious, sports-

orientated person” in eight, followed by the “culturally active, anti-sports-orientated person” who is below average represented in five organisations. This does not necessarily mean that people are not longer willing to engage. As research shows, in particular the younger generation simply does not want to participate in the traditional organisations with rigid structures. With regard to political issues they involve without being members, for example, in demonstrations organised by the anti-globalisation movement *attac*. Nevertheless, the results presented above still prove that there are differences in the organisational membership structure between the lifestyle, but obviously organisations have lost the position – at least the traditional strong position - as a link between social groups and political parties. In the following the association between the lifestyle groups and interest representation, both by organisations and parties will be presented. As argued previously the fact that parties have been included here as well does not have any impact on the analysis of the impact between lifestyle groups and party preference as all analyses are single bivariate measurements. Thus, if a lifestyle group has both an interest representation by a particular party and the members of this group above average vote for this party, this might be seen as an indication of a stable relationship between a lifestyle group and a political party. The relationship between lifestyle groups and parties follow in Chapter 7.1.3.2.

**Table 7.12 The association between organisational membership and lifestyle groups (west)<sup>77</sup>**

	TEDUMO (12.7%)	CUEDSO (13.4%)	SPTRSO (16.3%)	TRAREL (15.7%)	ANSPCA (19%)	NOVAPA (9.9%)	MODSPO (13%)	Total	$\chi^2$	Cramer'sV
Membership in organisations:	N = 221	N = 233	N = 284	N = 273	N = 331	N = 172	N = 225	N = 1739		
DGB	10.0	6.0	<b>14.1</b>	<b>2.6</b>	7.3	9.3	<b>13.8</b>	8.9	34***	.139
DAG	5.9	5.6	3.2	<b>(0.0)</b> <sup>78</sup>	4.2	4.1	7.1	4.1	20**	.108
Sports club	<b>40.3</b>	33.0	30.3	<b>5.9</b>	22.7	<b>16.9</b>	<b>45.3</b>	27.3	137***	.281
Choral society	<b>2.3</b>	9.0	<b>14.8</b>	<b>2.9</b>	3.9	6.4	<b>1.8</b>	6.0	63***	.190
Church or religious organisations	<b>0.9</b>	<b>9.9</b>	3.9	4.0	<b>0.9</b>	2.9	<b>(0.0)</b>	3.2	52***	.173
Political party	5.4	5.6	<b>6.3</b>	<b>0.4</b>	<b>0.3</b>	1.2	<b>(0.0)</b>	2.7	49***	.167
Local and citizen's organisations	3.6	7.7	<b>10.2</b>	8.8	<b>2.1</b>	5.8	<b>1.8</b>	5.8	33***	.138
Social welfare, war victim organisations	<b>1.4</b>	<b>9.4</b>	6.3	5.1	<b>2.4</b>	2.9	<b>1.3</b>	4.2	32***	.136
Other organisations	9.5	<b>10.7</b>	8.8	<b>2.2</b>	<b>3.6</b>	5.8	<b>2.2</b>	6.0	34***	.140
Other hobby organisations	12.2	11.2	13.0	<b>5.1</b>	10.3	7.6	10.2	10.0	13*	.086
Other social organisations	5.9	6.4	9.9	6.6	8.2	3.5	7.1	7.1	n.s.	
Past memberships in organisations:	N = 221	N = 233	N = 284	N = 273	N = 331	N = 172	N = 225	N = 1739		
Alternative political group	<b>7.7</b>	<b>6.9</b>	<b>1.4</b>	<b>0.4</b>	4.2	<b>0.6</b>	<b>0.9</b>	3.2	44***	.159
Sports club	24.0	23.6	15.5	<b>9.9</b>	<b>25.7</b>	14.5	18.2	19.0	36***	.143
Youth, student organisations	<b>6.8</b>	4.7	<b>1.1</b>	<b>0.7</b>	2.4	2.3	2.2	2.8	25***	.119
Local and citizen's organisations	1.4	<b>0.4</b>	4.2	4.4	1.5	2.9	<b>0.4</b>	2.2	20**	.106
Choral society	6.3	6.9	7.0	8.4	6.3	4.7	1.8	6.1	n.s.	
Other hobby organisations	4.1	3.0	6.0	4.8	3.3	3.5	2.2	3.9	n.s.	
Other social organisation	1.8	2.1	3.9	3.3	2.1	5.8	2.7	3.0	n.s.	

The association between the lifestyle groups and interest representation is presented in Table 7.13. With regard to the interest representation by the Catholic and Protestant church the traditional orientated lifestyle groups have an above average representation whereas the two younger, modern-orientated groups and the “culturally active, anti-sports-orientated“ feel below average represented by the churches. This is not surprising considering the fact that these lifestyle groups have the highest number of people with no religious affiliation and who never go to church. Although the “cultural and educational orientated socially

<sup>77</sup> Variables with 20% or more cells with counts lower than 5 were not included in the table. Significance levels:  $p \leq .05=*$ ,  $p \leq .01=**$ ,  $p \leq .001=***$  and n.s. = not significant. The percentage distribution of the lifestyle groups are not based on the total number of respondents in the analysis, but on the total number of respondents in the respective clusters. The 10.0% DGB members in the first cluster is, for example, based on the subpopulation with N=221.

<sup>78</sup> No cell counts.

engaged, religious person” has the third highest number who considers the Catholic Church to represent their interest, this value is not significant. A significant above average interest representation by the Protestant Church can be found here, though. Looking at the interest representation by the parties which are supposed to be close to the churches, the CDU and CSU only the “sports-interested, traditionally-orientated, socially engaged person” is above average represented here, but in this group the number of people who consider the SPD to represent their interests is above average, too, which certainly does not fit with the theoretical assumptions. Actually, this group is the only one which also has an above average representation for the SPD. Although the “modern, anti-religious, sports-orientated person” is the only group which feel represented by the trade unions (50.7%) they do not feel above average represented by the SPD. With regard to environmental organisations and Bündnis 90/die Grünen the association is not as clear as could have been expected, either. Whereas the “technologically and educationally orientated, modern person” feel above average represented by both environmental organisations and Bündnis 90 /die Grünen, the other post-materialist orientated group, the “cultural and educational orientated, socially engaged, religious person” feel above average represented by environmental organisations, but not by Bündnis 90/die Grünen. Considering the fact that this is a religious orientated group this outcome is not surprising, but questions of course the validity of the lifestyle group. A possible explanation might be the high level of education among the members of this group as this is often related to post-materialist value orientations. Oppositely, the “modern, anti-religious, sports-orientated person” does not consider environmental organisations to represent their interest above average, but has the second highest number who considers Bündnis 90/die Grünen to represent their interests. Finally, FDP is neither above nor below average represented in any of the lifestyle groups, although the “technologically and educationally orientated, modern person” and the “cultural and educational orientated, socially engaged religious person” which also have the highest number of self-employed have the highest number of people who consider the FDP to represent their interest.

**Table 7.13 The association between organisational interest representation and lifestyle groups (west)<sup>79</sup>**

	TEDUMO (12.7%)	CUEDSO (13.4%)	SPTRSO (16.3%)	TRAREL (15.7%)	ANSPCA (19%)	NOVAPA (9.9%)	MODSPO (13%)	Total	$\chi^2$	Cramer'sV
Interest representation:	N = 221	N = 233	N = 284	N = 273	N = 331	N = 172	N = 225	N = 1739		
Catholic Church	<b>6.8</b>	21.5	<b>25.0</b>	<b>31.1</b>	<b>7.9</b>	12.8	<b>5.8</b>	16.2	117***	.259
Environmental Organisations	<b>56.1</b>	<b>56.7</b>	33.8	<b>36.3</b>	<b>56.5</b>	<b>25.6</b>	42.7	44.7	91***	.229
Trade Union	33.9	33.9	38.7	<b>15.4</b>	36.9	<b>25.0</b>	<b>50.7</b>	33.6	81***	.215
Bündnis90/Grüne	<b>21.3</b>	16.7	<b>7.4</b>	<b>1.5</b>	15.7	<b>5.8</b>	<b>20.0</b>	12.5	78***	.212
Protestant Church	<b>8.6</b>	<b>21.9</b>	<b>19.0</b>	<b>22.0</b>	13.3	<b>7.6</b>	<b>3.1</b>	14.3	65***	.193
CDU	22.2	25.8	<b>29.2</b>	24.5	<b>14.8</b>	18.6	<b>12.0</b>	21.1	36***	.144
CSU	19.5	21.0	<b>21.1</b>	17.6	<b>10.0</b>	14.5	<b>8.4</b>	15.9	31***	.134
SPD	23.5	26.2	<b>36.6</b>	25.3	28.7	23.8	30.2	28.2	16*	.096
FDP	9.5	7.7	5.3	2.9	5.7	5.2	5.8	5.8	n.s.	

### 7.1.3.2 The association between lifestyle groups and party preference

Now, looking at the last criteria which has to be fulfilled in order to define a lifestyle group as a social milieu, the association between lifestyle groups and party preference will be analysed. As seen from Table 7.14 there is a significant above average support for the CDU/CSU among the traditional-orientated lifestyle groups and a significant above average support for the SPD among the “culturally active, anti-sports orientated”, the “no value-orientated, rather passive” and the “modern, anti-religious, sports-orientated person”. The FDP is not supported above average from any of the lifestyle groups, but has the highest number of support from the first to lifestyle groups which might have been expected based on the above average number of self-employed in these groups (cf. Table 7.10). Furthermore, the Bündnis90/die Grünen they receive above average support from the member of the “technologically and educationally orientated, modern person” and the “culturally active, anti-sports orientated person”. In particular with regard to the first group this relationship would have been expected based on the high number of post-materialists and people who consider environmental organisations and Bündnis90/die Grünen to represent their interests. It should not be ignored, however, that both the CDU/CSU and

<sup>79</sup> Variables with 20% or more cells with counts lower than 5 were not included in the table. Significance levels:  $p \leq .05=*$ ,  $p \leq .01=**$ ,  $p \leq .001=***$  and n.s. = not significant. The percentage distribution of the lifestyle groups is not based on the total number of respondents in the analysis, but on the total number of respondents in the respective clusters. The 21.3% who see their interests represented by Bündnis90/die Grünen in the first cluster is, for example, based on the subpopulation with N=221.

SPD have a higher support among the members of this group than Bündnis90/die Grünen (between 30-40%). This does not diminish the fact, though, that this group has the highest number of voters for Bündnis90/the Greens. Finally, the highest number of non-voters can be found in the passive group and the modern, sports-orientated group. To which extent this above average inclination not to vote in these groups is also related to political interest and democratic satisfaction is explored in Table 7.15.

**Table 7.14 The association between lifestyle groups and party preference (west)**<sup>80</sup>

	TEDUMO (12.7%)	CUEDSO (13.4%)	SPTRSO (16.3%)	TRAREL (15.7%)	ANSPCA (19%)	NOVAPA (9.9%)	MODSPO (13%)	Total	$\chi^2$	Cramer'sV
Vote next election:	N = 156	N = 171	N = 234	N = 188	N = 231	N = 120	N = 148	N = 1248	120***	.155
CDU/CSU	30.8	36.3	<b>43.2</b>	<b>49.5</b>	<b>22.5</b>	31.7	<b>17.6</b>	33.7		
SPD	<b>37.2</b>	<b>39.2</b>	44.9	44.7	<b>56.3</b>	<b>57.5</b>	<b>56.8</b>	47.8		
FDP	9.6	8.8	5.1	<b>1.1</b>	5.2	3.3	6.1	5.5		
Bündnis90/die Grünen	<b>16.0</b>	12.3	<b>3.8</b>	<b>1.6</b>	<b>13.4</b>	<b>4.2</b>	12.2	9.0		
Other parties	6.4	3.5	3.0	3.2	2.6	3.3	7.4	4.0		
Would not vote	N = 161	N = 173	N = 239	N = 203	N = 248	N = 135	N = 167	N = 1326	33***	.156
	<b>3.1</b>	<b>1.2</b>	<b>2.1</b>	7.4	6.9	<b>11.1</b>	<b>11.4</b>	5.9		

As can be seen from Table 7.15 the first three groups there is a significantly above average strong political interest among the members and in the last four groups there is a below average strong political interest. Almost 60% of the “culturally active, anti-sports-orientated person” has a medium political interest, though, whereas 53.1% of the traditional religious group and 36.4 % of the “modern, anti-religious, sports-orientated person” has an above average weak political interest. Looking at democratic satisfaction more than 60% in all groups express to be satisfied. The only significant above average number can be found in the traditional, religious group (82.2%) whereas a below average number of people who are satisfied with democracy can be found among the “culturally active, anti-sports orientated person” and the passive group. Alt least with regard to the “no value-orientated, rather passive person” the assumption that the below average political interest and democratic satisfaction might be linked to the inclination not to vote seems confirmed.

<sup>80</sup> Significance levels:  $p \leq .05=*$ ,  $p \leq .01=**$  and  $p \leq .001=***$ . The percentage distribution of the lifestyle groups are not based on the total number of respondents in the analysis, but on the total number of respondents in the respective clusters. The 30.8% CDU/CSU voters in the first cluster is, for example, based on the subpopulation with N=156 and the 3.1% non-voters on a subpopulation of 161.

**Table 7.15 The association between political interest, democratic satisfaction and the lifestyle groups (west) <sup>81</sup>**

	TEDUMO (12.7%)	CUEDSO (13.4%)	SPTRSO (16.3%)	TRAREL (15.7%)	ANSPCA (19%)	NOVAPA (9.9%)	MODSPO (13%)	Total	$\chi^2$	Cramer'sV
Political interest:	N = 220	N = 233	N = 284	N = 273	N = 329	N = 172	N = 225	N = 1736	437***	.355
Strong	55.0	60.1	40.1	5.9	16.7	20.9	12.9	29.4		
Medium	36.4	34.8	48.2	41.0	58.1	48.8	50.7	46.0		
Weak	8.6	5.2	11.6	53.1	25.2	30.2	36.4	24.5		
Democratic satisfaction:	N = 220	N = 233	N = 282	N = 264	N = 328	N = 170	N = 222	N = 1719	29***	.131
Satisfied	78.2	78.1	75.9	82.2	68.9	64.7	68.5	74.1		
Not satisfied	21.8	21.9	24.1	17.8	31.1	35.3	31.5	25.9		

#### 7.1.4 Summary – the formation of social milieus in the west

The analyses presented in Chapter 7.1.3 made clear that differences exist between the lifestyle groups with respect to cleavages, organisational memberships, interest representations and party preferences. In this chapter I will summarise the main characteristics of each lifestyle group with regard to the above mentioned areas and discuss to which extent each lifestyle group fulfils the criteria of being a milieu. At this point, I thus once again want to emphasise that **a social milieu will be defined if a relationship exists between a lifestyle group, cleavage(s), organisational membership, organisational interest representation and party preference.** Furthermore, this relationship should be consistent in the sense that a religious orientated lifestyle group should not correspond with a secular party like, for example, the PDS.

The technologically and educationally-orientated, modern person: *Cleavages:* With regard to social structural cleavages this group is above average represented by younger to middle-aged, non-religious, single men with a high social status who live in large cities. Concerning the ideological cleavages it is characterised by an above average proportion of post-materialists and below average number of materialists and mixed types. Furthermore, a below average number has big worries about number of immigrants and an above average have some and no worries. *Organisational membership:* They are members in sports clubs at present and have past memberships in alternative political groups and youth, student organisations. Furthermore, members of this group are below average members in traditional organisations like choral societies, church or religious organisations and social welfare, war victim organisations. *Interest representation:* Members of this group feel represented by environmental organisation and Bündnis 90/die Grünen and not represented by the churches. *Party preference:* Members of this group have an above average preference for Bündnis 90/die Grünen, a below average preference for the SPD as well as a below average inclination not to vote. Finally, the members of this group have a strong political interest. ***Social milieu: As the members of this group have a post-materialist value orientation, were past members in alternative political groups and youth,***

<sup>81</sup> Significance levels:  $p \leq .05=*$ ,  $p \leq .01=**$  and  $p \leq .001=***$ .

**student organisations, feel represented by environmental organisations and Bündnis 90/ die Grünen and have a party preference for Bündnis 90/ die Grünen this may be considered a Green social milieu.**

Cultural and educational orientated, socially engaged religious person: *Cleavages:* This group is above average represented by middle aged, religious women with a high social status. An above average proportion of post-materialists and below average number of materialists can be found in this lifestyle group. A below average number have big worries about the number of immigrants and an above average number have no worries. Furthermore, the majority of this group has big worries about the environment whereas a below average number has big worries about the costs of the German reunification and an above average proportion has no worries. The highest proportion of people agreeing to the statement that voting is the duty of the citizen can be found in this lifestyle group. *Organisational membership:* Members of this lifestyle group presently involve in church or religious organisations, social welfare, war victim organisation and other organisations. They were previously members in alternative political groups. *Interest representation:* The Protestant church and environmental organisation are considered to represent the interests of the members of this group above average (the Catholic Church was only nearly significant). *Party preference:* A below average preference for the SPD exists in this group. Not surprisingly this group has the lowest number of persons who would not vote. Finally, this group has the highest number of people with a strong political interest. ***Social milieu: The characteristics of this group may indicate that this is an upper conservative social milieu, although the members of this group do not have a party preference for the CDU/CSU above average which might have been expected. However, it has a below average preference for the SPD. Still the preference for the SPD was higher than for the CDU/CSU (cf. Table 7.14). Furthermore, this group seems to be quite heterogeneous as an above average number of post-materialists and people considering environmental organisations to represent their interest can be found in this group and this is not a typical characteristic of the upper conservative (cf. also Chapter 5.2.1). In summary, the characteristics of this group are to divergent to define it as a social milieu.***

The sports interested, traditional-orientated, socially engaged person: *Cleavages:* This group is above average represented by middle aged to older men with a low/medium social status who live in smaller cities and go to church above average. However, they have no other particular religious characteristics. With regard to the ideological cleavages, the members of this group have a below average number of post-materialists and above average number of mixed types. Furthermore, the majority of this group has big worries about the number of immigrants as well as a below average proportion of members with only some or no worries. Also with respect to the costs of reunification the majority has big worries. The second highest number of people agreeing to the statement that voting is the duty of the citizens can be found here. Finally, an above average proportion of the members place themselves to the right. *Organisational membership:* They are above average members in the trade union (DGB), choral society, political party and local and citizens organisation. A below average proportion of the members of this group are past members in alternative political groups and youth and student organisations. *Interest representation:* The churches, the CDU, CSU and SPD are considered to represent the interests of the members of this group above average and environmental organisations and Bündnis90/die Grünen below average. *Party preference:* Not surprisingly, an above average party preference exists for the CDU/CSU and below average preference for the Bündnis90/die Grünen. Also this group has a below average number of non-voters. Finally, this lifestyle group has the third highest number of people with strong political interest. ***Social milieu: According to the characteristics this group includes a mixture of both traditional workers and traditional conservatives. This group is thus obviously too heterogeneous and thus cannot be considered a social milieu.***

The traditional-orientated, religious person: *Cleavages:* With regard to social structural cleavages this group is above average represented by religious widows with a low social status who live in small cities. Of all lifestyle groups this is the only one with an above average number of materialists. This coincides with the below average number of post-materialists and mixed types. The majority has big worries about the number of immigrants and a below average proportion of people with no worries. With respect to worries about the environment this group has a significant number of people with some worries and a below average number with big worries. Furthermore, most members of this group consider voting a duty and place themselves in the middle of the left-right scale. *Organisational membership:* The members of this group are characterised by the below average membership – both past and present – in almost all of the analysed organisations. *Interest representation:* The Catholic and Protestant churches represent the interests of the members of this group above average and environmental organisation, trade union and Bündnis90/Grüne below average. *Party preference:* They have a preference above average for the CDU/CSU and below average for the FDP

and Bündnis90/die Grünen. Finally, the majority of the members of this group have a weak political interest, but over 80% are satisfied with democracy. **Social milieu: Although this group is missing the organisational link of religious organisations all other characteristics of this group clearly indicate that this may be seen as a traditional religious milieu.**

The culturally active, anti-sports orientated person: *Cleavages:* This group is rather vague with respect to social structural cleavages. The clearest characteristic is the non-religious profile of the members of this group. In addition, they are above average represented by young to middle-aged divorced women with a low/medium social status. With regard to the ideological cleavages a below average number of people of this group has big worries about immigrants, but an above average number do have some worries. Furthermore, a below average number has no worries about the environment, but almost half of the members of this lifestyle group has some worries about the costs of the reunification. Finally, they place themselves below average on the right. *Organisational membership:* This lifestyle group, too, is characterised by a below average participation in organisations. The only significant membership was found in the past membership in sports club. *Interest representation:* Environmental organisations represent the interests of this group above average and the Catholic Church, the CDU and CSU below average. *Party preference:* There is an above average preference for the SPD and Bündnis 90/die Grünen among the members of this group and a below average preference for the CDU/CSU. Finally, the majority has a medium level of political interest and more than 1/3 of the members of this group are not satisfied with democracy. **Social milieu: The characteristics of this group are too weak to make any indications with respect to a milieu.**

The no value-orientated, rather passive person: *Cleavages:* Non-religious, older men with a low social status are above average represented in this group. It has the highest level of mixed types and is also characterised by a below average number of post-materialists. Furthermore, this group has the second highest number of people with big worries about the number of immigrants, the second lowest number of people with big worries about the environment and the highest number of people with no worries about the environment. In addition, the majority of this group has big worries about the costs of reunification. Of all lifestyle groups this one is the only one who differs significantly with respect to the evaluation of socialism; almost ¾ do not agree to the statement that “socialism” is a good idea. Not surprisingly, a below average number of people of this group place themselves to the left whereas over 80% place themselves in the middle. *Organisational membership:* The members of this group are not characterised by any organisational preferences. However, they are below average represented in sports clubs as well as with respect to past memberships in alternative political groups. *Interest representation:* No organisations are considered to represent the interests of this lifestyle group above average, but environmental organisation, trade union, Bündnis 90/ die Grünen and the Protestant Church are considered to represent the interests below average. *Party preference:* The majority has a preference for the SPD and a below average preference for Bündnis 90/die Grünen. Furthermore, this group has the second highest number of people who would not vote. Finally, this group is characterised by a below average number of people with strong political interest and of all groups this one has the highest number of people who are not satisfied with democracy. **Social milieu: This group as well has too few characteristics to make any indications about a social milieu. Interesting with this group, however, is the above average level of materialists and above average level of worries about immigrants and costs of reunification. And, although this group below average considers socialism as a good idea an above average proportion have a party preference for the SPD. Furthermore this is the only group which does not feel represented by any organisation. Finally, they are above average represented among non-voters and people dissatisfied with democracy. All these characteristics may indicate that this is a “passive, dissatisfied milieu”, although it does not really fulfil the criteria of a social milieu as it is characterised by a lack of memberships, interest representations and party preference rather than the existence of a relationship between these variables.**

The modern, anti-religious, sports-orientated person: *Cleavages:* This group is above average represented by non-religious, single, younger to middle-aged, single men with a low/medium social status. The majority of this group has a mixed type value orientation and this group has the highest number of people (almost ¼) who do not agree to the statement that voting is a duty. *Organisational membership:* Almost half of the members of this group are in sports clubs and an above average number are also members in the DGB (trade union). With respect to all other memberships – both past and present – this group is either below average represented or it does not differ significantly from the other groups. *Interest representation:* Trade union and Bündnis 90/ die Grünen are considered to represent the interests of this group above average and the churches, the CDU and CSU below average. *Party preference:* This group has an above average preference

for the SPD or not to vote and below average preference for the CDU/CSU. Finally, more than one third of the members of this group have a weak political interest and the second lowest proportion of people with a strong political interest. ***Social milieu: The members of this group are above average represented among those with a middle level of education and income who work as lower white-collars and blue-collars (cf. Table 7.10). Furthermore, the association with the DGB, interest representation by the trade union and party preference for the SPD indicates that this might be a worker's milieu.***

To facilitate a comparison between the lifestyle groups and the respective variables some of the results presented above – which are particularly important in analysing the existence of social milieus in the West German population - have been summarised in Figure 7.1. The figure should be read vertically, for example, the lifestyle group of the “technologically and educationally-orientated, modern person” (TEDUMO) is characterised by non-religious, young to middle-aged single men with a high social status who live in large cities. The members of this group have post-materialists value orientations, no worries about immigrants, are at present members of sports clubs and are former members of alternative political groups and youth student organisations. Finally, this group considers environmental organisations and Bündnis90/die Grünen to represent their interest and have a party preference for the Bündnis90/die Grünen. In summary, this lifestyle group may be considered a Green milieu.

**Figure 7.1 Social milieus in the West German population**

Lifestyle groups ⇒ ----- Criteria ↓	TEDUMO (12.7%)	CUEDSO (13.4%)	SPTRSO (16. 3%)	TRAREL (15.7%)	ANSPCA (19%)	NOVAPA (9.9%)	MODSPO (13%)
<b>Cleavages</b>							
Social structure	Non-religious, high social status, young to middle-aged, men, single, large cities	High church attendance, high social status, middle-aged women	High church attendance, low/medium social status, middle-aged and older married men, small cities	High church attendance, low social status, older widows, small cities	Low church attendance, low/medium social status, separated/divorced, young medium-aged women	Low church attendance, low social status, older men	Non-religious, Low/medium social status, young to middle-aged, single men
Post-mat index	+ Post-materialist - Materialists - Mixed	+ Post-materialist - Materialists	- Post-materialists + Mixed	- Post-materialists + Materialists - Mixed		- Post-materialists + Mixed	+ Mixed
Worries about environment		+ big - some		- big + some	- none	- big + none	
Voting as duty		+ agree	+ agree	+ agree			- agree
Worries about number of immigrants	- big + some + none	- big + none	+ big - some - none	+ big - none	- big + some	+ big	
Worries about costs of reunification		- big + none	+ big - some		+ some	+ big - none	
Socialism good idea						- agree	
Left-right placement			+ right	- left + middle	- right		
Present organisational memberships	Sports club	Church and religious organisations; social welfare, war victim organisations; other	DGB; Choral society; political party; local and citizen's organisations				DGB; sports club
Past organisational memberships	Alternative political group; youth, student organisations	Alternative political group			Sports club		
Interest representation	Environmental organisations; Bündnis 90/die Grünen	Protestant church; Environmental organisations	Catholic church; Protestant church; CDU; CSU; SPD	Catholic church; Protestant church	Environmental organisations		Trade union; Bündnis 90/die Grünen
Party preference	Bündnis 90/die Grünen		CDU/CSU	CDU/CSU	SPD ; Bündnis 90/ die Grünen	SPD; non-vote	SPD; non-vote
Political interest	Strong	Strong	Strong	Weak	Medium	- Strong	Weak
Democratic satisfaction				Satisfied	- Satisfied	- Satisfied	
<b>The formation of social milieus</b>							
Social milieu	<b>Green milieu</b>			<b>Religious milieu</b>		<b>Passive, dissatisfied milieu</b>	<b>Worker's milieu</b>

As presented in Figure 7.1 a religious milieu exists in the west which is characterised by a religious orientated lifestyle, religious affiliation and high church attendance, materialist and conservative value orientations, interest representation by the churches and party preference for the CDU/CSU. The link to religious organisations is missing, nevertheless this will be considered a social milieu as all other characteristics are clear. Furthermore, a worker's milieu seems to exist. Although no particularly work-orientated lifestyle exists, this milieu has the largest proportion of lower white-collar as blue-collar workers, trade union (DGB) membership, interest representation by the trade unions and party preference for the SPD. A Green milieu of post-materialists with a technology/modern and education-orientated lifestyle, high social status, past memberships in alternative political groups and youth, student organisations, interest representation by environmental organisations and Bündnis 90/die Grünen was found as expected as well.

Finally, two “social milieus” were indicated; the “upper conservative” and the “passive dissatisfied” milieus, although these do not really fulfil the criteria of being defined social milieus. The “upper conservative” is too heterogeneous as it includes both an above average number of religious conservatives which are above average members in traditional social and religious orientated organisations and an above average number of post-materialists, members in alternative political groups and people who consider environmental organisations to represent their interest. Finally, this group has no particular party preference. Altogether, this lifestyle group does not fulfil the criteria of being defined as a social milieu. The “passive dissatisfied” is quite interesting compared to the other groups due to its passive lifestyle, lack of important life areas, low social position and lack in organisational memberships and interest representation. Furthermore, the members are below average satisfied with democracy and incline above average not to vote. Although it cannot be defined as a social milieu in the traditional sense the societal disintegration of this group should nonetheless be considered important, also with respect to voting behaviour. This lifestyle group will thus be considered as a social milieu.

Turning to the question of latent and manifest cleavages, the results indicate the existence of the following manifest cleavages in the West German society; the one between religiosity - represented by the religious milieu - and secularism which is represented by the three other milieus. With regard to other traditional social structural cleavages, there is

slight difference between the social milieus with respect to community size and the so-called *Stadt-Land* cleavage. Whereas the Green milieu is above average represented in large cities, the religious milieu can be found in the smaller communities (cf. Chapter 7.1.3.1 and Figure 7.1).

Furthermore, a value cleavage could be found between the Green milieu representing post-materialist values above average and the religious milieu and passive, dissatisfied milieu which are both above average materialists and/or below average post-materialists. With respect to the variable “voting as a duty” which was assumed to be another measurement of value change, the religious milieu agrees above average to this statement and the worker’s milieu below average. This might be traced back to the fact that the worker’s milieu consists of a younger to middle-aged generation whereas the religious milieu is represented by the older generation. Actually, considering all groups, and not just the social milieus, those with the highest age level agree to this statement whereas among the younger groups the support of the statement is either below average or insignificant. Finally, the last cleavage which showed significant differences between the social milieus is the globalisation cleavage; whereas the Green milieu has below average worries about the number of immigrants, both the religious and the passive milieu have above average worries.

Now, looking at the differences between all analysed groups, i.e. both the social milieus and the lifestyle groups which could not (yet) be defined as social milieus, the following latent cleavages seem to exist in the West German population; the cleavage between work and capital between the worker’s milieu on the one side and those with a high social status and high number of self-employed, i.e. the “cultural and educational orientated, socially engaged religious person”, but also the Green milieu on the other side. As discussed previously, although the latter fulfils the criteria of being a Green milieu the preference for CDU/CSU and SPD is higher than for Bündnis90/die Grünen in this group.

Concerning the cleavage between east and west, big worries about the costs of unification can be found among those groups in the west which have an above average number of lower white-collars and blue-collars and people with low/medium social status. The explanation may be that these groups see their jobs and general social position to a larger extent threatened than people with higher education who work as upper white-collars or


self-employed. As discussed in Chapter 7.1.3.1 all groups seem to agree that socialism is not a good idea, only the passive milieu agrees below average to this statement. However, as was also emphasised both variables become more important when comparing the differences between the west and the east in Chapter 7.3.

Finally, the social milieus and lifestyle groups do not seem to have any significant differences with regard to the ideological cleavage measured by left-right self-placement. Although the worker's milieu could have been expected to be above average represented at the left this is not the case. However, this may also confirm the move of the *modern worker* towards the middle.

With regard to the other social structural cleavages like gender, age and family status clear differences exist between the social milieus and lifestyle groups as well and this may indicate the existence of latent cleavages. For example, if the younger to middle-aged population with a high social status remain single throughout the life cycle.

A summary of the results found in the west is presented in Figure 7.2. Only lifestyle groups which fulfil the criteria of being defined as social milieus are included in the overview. Those characteristics which are of particular importance to the definition of the milieus have been marked in bold.

Figure 7.2 Social milieus in the west



## 7.2 The formation of social milieus in the east

### 7.2.1 The analysis of latent variables using principal components analyses

Altogether 21 principal components could be extracted by means of principal components analyses compared to 59 original single items. Seven single variables were excluded from the analyses and six of them were included as standardised variables (z-scores) in the cluster analysis. As was the case in the west, these variables could not be arranged to a component. However, six of them were considered theoretically important and thus included in the cluster analysis.

The principal components found within the three different groups of lifestyle variables are to a great extent similar to those found in the analysis of western Germany and are summarised in the following. In those cases components with eigenvalues less than 1 were included in the final solution this has been emphasised. The results of the principal components analyses are shown in Tables 7.16 until 7.20.

1. Leisure activities: Within the area of leisure activity eight principal components were found based on 19 single items. These were: modernity, culture, sports, technology, social engagement, social contact, active and read (cf. Table 7.16). The eight components solution had 67% explained variance and component seven and eight had eigenvalues of 0.97 and 0.856 respectively.<sup>82</sup> The items “church attendance and attend religious meetings”, “educate oneself privately”, “party games in family”, “walk and wander” and “go on short trips” were not included in the analysis, but included as standardised variables in the cluster analysis. The first two items were included in the analysis for the same reason as in the west: “church attendance and attend religious meetings” is a traditional variable whose importance has decreased since World War II and will probably be of even less importance in the east than the west due to the forced secularisation in the east (cf. Chapter 4.3.2.4). “Educate oneself privately” was included as it might be expected that this item, too, is an indication of cultural-orientated and education-orientated lifestyle group(s). The other three items were included as it can be expected that these relate with other lifestyle variables; “party games in family” and “walk and wander” may, for example, overlay with “importance of family and children” as these are typical activities families do.

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<sup>82</sup> Number of valid cases N = 977.

This may also be the case with the item ”go on short trips”, although this may also be an activity of the upper lifestyle groups who go on weekend trips to golf, visit a concert etc. In the east, too, the component “active” has a positive loading on the variable “do-it-yourself and repairs in the house/car/gardening” and a negative loading on the non-active variable “be lazy, do nothing”.

**Table 7.16 Components based on leisure activities (east)**

	Components							
	Modernity	Culture	Sports	Technology	Social engagement	Social contact	Active	Read
V17 Read books	1.766E-02	.445	-.109	6.543E-02	.129	-1.198E-02	-3.127E-02	<b>.657</b>
V18 Read magazines	.140	-1.695E-02	.149	7.622E-02	4.193E-02	7.593E-02	-3.604E-02	<b>.856</b>
V19 Listen to LP's, CD's, cassettes	<b>.819</b>	.159	-1.172E-02	6.755E-02	6.526E-02	3.231E-02	3.481E-02	.147
V20 Watch video	<b>.779</b>	2.192E-03	.178	8.488E-02	9.103E-02	-8.835E-02	4.011E-02	6.817E-03
V21 Occupy oneself with the computer	.238	.221	.130	<b>.735</b>	.114	-7.753E-02	.116	.108
V22 Use internet and on-line services	6.453E-02	6.911E-02	2.394E-02	<b>.893</b>	.100	2.548E-02	-3.572E-02	3.489E-02
V24 do nothing, be lazy	4.189E-03	-9.656E-02	8.046E-02	-3.435E-02	-7.918E-02	.176	<b>-.740</b>	.123
V26 Yoga, meditation, relaxation through self-hypnosis etc.	-8.396E-02	<b>.657</b>	.373	7.711E-02	4.714E-02	-.165	7.245E-03	.119
V27 Go eating or drinking	.462	.252	.286	.202	-9.404E-02	.180	-.127	.119
V28 Visit friends, neighbours, acquaintances	7.425E-02	8.460E-02	.129	.115	-2.573E-02	<b>.754</b>	-.211	-8.199E-03
V29 Visit family, relatives	-3.858E-02	1.566E-03	-.114	-.143	8.780E-02	<b>.768</b>	.150	7.522E-02
V32 Participation in politics	-2.793E-02	.168	9.231E-02	.192	<b>.777</b>	-3.484E-02	-5.636E-02	5.075E-02
V33 Honorary activities	.117	7.401E-02	.112	7.496E-03	<b>.806</b>	9.348E-02	.122	7.403E-02
V35 Artistic and musical activities	.271	<b>.697</b>	-5.976E-02	7.691E-02	.137	9.250E-02	.125	5.099E-02
V36 Do-it yourself repairs, gardening etc.	1.862E-02	-2.322E-02	.232	1.254E-02	-1.644E-02	.134	<b>.770</b>	6.828E-02
V37 Do active sports	.228	.425	<b>.617</b>	.104	.118	9.400E-03	.138	4.553E-02
V38 Visit sport events	.189	5.074E-02	<b>.802</b>	4.499E-02	.174	-3.542E-03	8.025E-02	4.742E-02
V39 Go to the cinema, visit pop- or jazz concerts etc.	<b>.552</b>	.359	.399	.145	-5.133E-02	.111	-4.736E-02	-5.694E-02
V40 Go to the opera, classical concerts etc.	.187	<b>.679</b>	.162	.149	.119	.134	-3.147E-02	7.544E-02

Rotated Component Matrix. Extraction Method: Principal Components Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.  
a. Rotation converged in 8 iterations.

**2. Importance of life areas:** In the second group of lifestyle variables four principal components were found based on seven single items (cf. Table 7.17). These were: leisure time and recreation/friends and acquaintances; work; family/neighbourhood; religion and church/politics and public life. The four components solution had 73% explained variance.

The third and fourth component had eigenvalues of 0.989 and 0.882 respectively.<sup>83</sup> The item “importance of relatives” was not included in the analysis, but included as a standardised variable in the cluster analysis.

**Table 7.17 Components based on important life areas (east)**

	Components			
	Leisure time and recreation/friends and acquaintances	Work	Family/Neighbourhood	Religion and church/politics and public life
V9 Own family and children	3.751E-02	.192	<b>.889</b>	-.120
V10 Occupation and work	.115	<b>.864</b>	5.366E-02	-4.677E-02
V11 Leisure and recreation	<b>.749</b>	.381	2.179E-02	-.105
V12 Friends and acquaintances	<b>.865</b>	-5.659E-02	.147	7.521E-02
V14 Religion and church	-7.178E-02	-.196	-.102	<b>.761</b>
V15 Politics and public life	.106	.454	.171	<b>.669</b>
V16 Neighbourhood	.352	-.284	<b>.598</b>	.385

Rotated Component Matrix. Extraction Method: Principal Components Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.  
a. Rotation converged in 7 iterations.

3. Aesthetic characteristics: In the final group of lifestyle variables covering the aesthetic preferences of the respondents separate analyses were carried out in the areas music, television and newspaper contents.

In the field of music taste two principal components were found based on five items (cf. Table 7.18). These were: folk music/German pop-music and classical music/jazz. The two components solution had 68% explained variance. As was also the case in western Germany, the component Folk music and German pop-music had a negative loading on pop-and rock music here as well.<sup>84</sup>

**Table 7.18 Components based on music preference (east)**

	Components	
	Folk music/German pop-music	Classical music/Jazz
V41 Folk music	<b>.900</b>	-4.371E-02
V42 German pop music	<b>.748</b>	4.135E-02
V43 Pop- and rock music	-.722	.301
V44 Classical music	9.394E-02	<b>.839</b>
V45 Jazz	-.285	<b>.790</b>

Rotated Component Matrix. Extraction Method: Principal Components Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.  
a. Rotation converged in 3 iterations.

With respect to television taste four principal components were found based on ten items: reports/news; entertainment series/Heimatfilme/Quiz; movies; sports. The four

<sup>83</sup> Number of valid cases N = 997.

<sup>84</sup> Number of valid cases N = 998.

components solution had 68% explained variance and the results are presented in Table 7.19. The fourth component had an eigenvalue of 0.946.<sup>85</sup>

Until this point 68 cases were excluded from the analyses due to the casewise deletion of missing values on lifestyle items where no answer was given (cf. Chapter 6.3).

**Table 7.19 Components based on preference for television programmes (east)**

	Components			
	Reports/News	Entertainment series/Heimatfilme/Quiz	Movies	Sports
V53 Television and quiz shows	-4.498E-02	<b>.724</b>	.187	.279
V54 Sports	.145	-6.341E-02	8.412E-02	<b>.909</b>
V55 Feature movies	.122	.303	<b>.691</b>	-5.765E-02
V56 News	<b>.765</b>	5.417E-02	-2.890E-02	.264
V57 Political magazines	<b>.826</b>	-.147	5.663E-02	.171
V58 Arts and culture	<b>.754</b>	-1.770E-02	-5.632E-02	-.239
V59 Heimatfilme	9.798E-03	<b>.771</b>	-.108	-.162
V60 Thrillers	2.262E-02	5.049E-02	<b>.820</b>	1.008E-02
V61 Action movies	-.224	-.192	<b>.744</b>	.252
V62 Entertainment series	-8.050E-02	<b>.803</b>	.104	-.119

Rotated Component Matrix. Extraction Method: Principal Components Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.  
a. Rotation converged in 6 iterations.

Turning to the last area of aesthetic preferences, the interest in newspaper contents, another 61 cases are missing. The reason is that – as was the case in the west - those respondents who expressed never to read newspaper in the previous filter variable are excluded from the following variables where the respondents are asked to rank their preferences for different kinds of newspaper contents. Three principal components were found based on six items (cf. Table 7.20). These are: reports/news; local news/all over the world and sports. The three components solution had 75% explained variance and the third component had an eigenvalue of 0.931.<sup>86</sup> The item “advertisements” was excluded from the principal components analysis in the east as well as the inclusion of this variable reduced the explained variance of the three components solution with about 8%. As emphasised in the first paragraph of Chapter 7.1.1 altogether seven variables were not included in the principal components analyses, but six of these were included in the cluster analysis as they were considered to be important from the theoretical point of view. With regard to the variable “advertisements” no particular important contribution was expected from this item from a theoretical point with regard to the existence of lifestyle groups. The variable was thus not included in the cluster analysis in the east either.

<sup>85</sup> Number of valid cases N = 976.

<sup>86</sup> Number of valid cases N = 937.

**Table 7.20 Components based on preference for newspaper contents (east)**

	Component		
	Reports/News	Local News/all over the world	Sports
V67 Politics	.817	.162	.219
V68 Economy	.852	1.655E-02	.186
V69 Culture	.754	.119	-.166
V70 Sports	.104	8.765E-02	.963
V71 Local news	-1.568E-02	.866	3.536E-02
V72 All over the world	.245	.787	7.779E-02

Rotated Component Matrix. Extraction Method: Principal Components Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.  
a. Rotation converged in 4 iterations.

In the next step the 21 latent variables and six manifest variables described above were included in a cluster analysis in order to find lifestyle groups in the East German population. This procedure will be described in further detail in the following section

### 7.2.2 The analysis of lifestyle groups using cluster analysis

As for the West German population several cluster analyses were carried out for the East German population<sup>87</sup> as well using QUICK CLUSTER in SPSS 10.0. In order to find indications of the most appropriate number of clusters for the eastern German population  $ETA^2(k)$ , PRE (k) and F-MAX (k) was carried out for cluster solutions from one until 12 as well. The results are shown in Table 7.21.

**Table 7.21 Descriptive statistics for determining the number of clusters (east)**

Cluster number (k)	Explained variance $ETA^2(k)$	Proportional reduction of error PRE (k)	F-MAX-Value (k)
1	0,00	-99,00	-99,00
2	0,09	0,09	86,77
3	0,14	0,06	73,61
4	0,17	0,03	60,52
5	0,20	0,03	53,02
6	0,21	0,02	47,19
7	0,23	0,02	43,96
8	0,24	0,01	39,99
9	0,26	0,02	38,60
10	0,27	0,02	36,27
11	0,29	0,02	35,32
12	0,30	0,01	32,92

Looking at the results of  $ETA^2$  the largest increase in explained variance can be found up till the 5-cluster solution. Thereafter, the explained variance grows with 2% between solutions six and seven, eight and nine and ten and eleven. According to these results the appropriate number of clusters could be five, seven, nine and eleven.

<sup>87</sup> The sample includes residents in the new *Länder* who have the German citizenship only N = 1003.

With regard to PRE (k) the relative improvement decreases between solutions three and four, five and six, seven and eight, increases again between eight and nine and falls again between eleven and twelve. This would indicate that a 3-cluster solution, a 5-cluster solution, a 7-cluster solution, a 9-cluster solution and an 11-cluster solution might be appropriate. Finally, the highest F-MAX value could be found at the 2-cluster solution.

As was the case in the west, these test criteria did not offer a clear and satisfactory basis for deciding the number of clusters in the eastern German population. Thus,  $ETA^2$  was calculated for each of the 17 principal components with the highest explained variance and each of the six single items in cluster solutions from five until seven. The six and seven cluster solutions proved to have quite high  $ETA^2$  values on all latent and manifest variables. Only in the case of technology and church attendance a higher value could be found in the seven cluster solution. When comparing the six and seven cluster solution it turned out that the major difference was the existence of a cluster with only 26 respondents in the seven cluster solution whose main characteristic was that they considered religion and church/politics and public life an important value in life. A cluster with so few respondents and only one dominant characteristic did not seem to be a meaningful contribution.<sup>88</sup> Thus, the six cluster solution was considered as the appropriate one and includes  $N = 1003$  cases. Excluded in this cluster solution are the 68 cases which were lost due to the missing casewise deletion in the PCA analyses as well as the 61 cases which were not included in the principal components analysis of preferences for newspaper contents as these persons answered never to read newspapers. A discussion of possible problems which might arise due to the loss of these 61 cases will take place after the presentations of the lifestyle groups in Table 7.24.  $ETA^2$  on most latent and manifest variables included in the five until seven cluster solutions can be found in Table 7.22 and the results of the cluster analysis is given in Table 7.23. As in the west, the numbers in the Table 7.23 are based on z-scores or factor scores with a mean of zero and standard deviation of one.

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<sup>88</sup> The solution includes  $N = 874$  cases.

**Table 7.22 Measures of association between important active cluster variables and cluster solutions (east)**

Number of clusters:	Eta Squared CLU5	Eta Squared CLU6	Eta Squared CLU7
Music: Folk music/German pop-music	.396	.426	.373
Life areas: Work	.297	.363	.412
Television: Entertainment/Heimatfilme	.353	.354	.374
Leisure activity: Modernity	.334	.330	.301
Leisure activity: Sports	.122	.326	.285
Zscore: Leisure activity: Educate oneself privately	.373	.318	.337
Life areas: Own family and children/neighbourhood	.399	.318	.382
Newspaper: Sports	.143	.308	.345
Television: Reports/news	.348	.300	.314
Newspaper: Reports/news	.348	.295	.306
Television: Sports	.143	.291	.314
Music: Classical music/jazz	.272	.256	.230
Zscore: Life areas: Relatives	.238	.214	.248
Leisure activity: Culture	.208	.188	.217
Life areas: Religion and church/politics and public life	.169	.184	.196
Zscore: Leisure activity: Walk/wander	.086	.135	.153
Zscore: Leisure activity: Short trips	.121	.132	.126
Television: Movies	.132	.131	.109
Life areas: Leisure time and recreation/friends and acquaintances	.087	.126	.162
Zscore: Leisure activity: Party games in family	.097	.125	.124
Leisure activity: Technology	.120	.114	.314
Newspaper: Local news/all over the world	.094	.109	.140
Zscore: Leisure activity: Church attendance and attend religious meetings	.090	.044	.109

In order to test the stability of the six cluster solution, several analyses were calculated using random samples on the basis of 80% of the cases. When compared to the original cluster solution, the six cluster solutions found on the basis of random samples was considered acceptable with respect to the similarity the dominant characteristics of a cluster and with respect to the size of a cluster.

**Table 7.23 Final cluster centers of the active variables<sup>89</sup> (east)**

	Cluster					
	1 (N=179) 20.5%	2 (N=139) 15.9%	3 (N=139) 15.9%	4 (N=194) 22.2%	5 (N=139) 15.9%	6 (N=84) 9.6%
Leisure activity: Modernity	<b>-.82645</b>	-.11133	-.33630	.34853	<b>.91971</b>	.31677
Leisure activity: Culture	-.36115	.25360	<b>-.41286</b>	<b>.63624</b>	<b>-.40275</b>	.30016
Leisure activity: Sports	-.36517	<b>.98868</b>	-.39388	<b>-.53071</b>	<b>.40292</b>	<b>.60830</b>
Leisure activity: Technology	-.27175	.09887	-.18281	.00684	-.07117	<b>.99244</b>
Leisure activity: Social engagement	-.18502	.28707	-.13782	.31065	-.38389	.13551
Leisure activity: Social contact	.37306	-.02277	<b>-.46964</b>	.11793	-.16040	-.03900
Leisure activity: Active	<b>-.52557</b>	.36176	.27652	.24152	-.06924	<b>-.43863</b>
Leisure activity: Reading	-.07074	.33802	<b>-.60791</b>	.37929	-.17277	-.18526
Zscore: Leisure activity: Educate oneself privately	<b>-.78177</b>	<b>.56451</b>	<b>-.55870</b>	<b>.45028</b>	.00841	<b>.68256</b>
Zscore: Leisure activity: Walk and wander	<b>.52029</b>	.08100	<b>-.49782</b>	.21241	-.37943	-.14632
Zscore: Leisure activity: Party games in family	-.29145	<b>.77562</b>	-.19439	.06264	-.07770	-.17251
Zscore: Leisure activity: Short trips	<b>-.43085</b>	<b>.42972</b>	-.38098	.17335	-.12702	<b>.53692</b>
Zscore: Leisure activity: Church attendance and religious meetings	.12171	-.05722	-.21569	.22182	-.34775	.11414
Life areas: Leisure time and recreation/friends and acquaintances	-.02765	.30363	<b>-.63099</b>	.22360	.29874	<b>-.47587</b>
Life areas: Work	<b>-1.08709</b>	<b>.41551</b>	.06777	<b>.49578</b>	.31322	.12108
Life areas: Own family and children/neighbourhood	.23236	<b>.41017</b>	.22323	.22321	-.23842	<b>-1.63856</b>
Life areas: Religion and church/politics and public. Life	.15145	.09347	<b>-.48338</b>	.39814	<b>-.67623</b>	<b>.57578</b>
Zscore: Life areas: Relatives	.34255	.25609	-.33876	.27683	-.05944	-.122123
Music: Folk music/German pop-music	<b>.96932</b>	.04428	.29126	-.07416	<b>-.95105</b>	<b>-.87051</b>
Music: Classical music/jazz	-.39522	<b>.50331</b>	<b>-.51961</b>	<b>.64074</b>	<b>-.45268</b>	<b>.44986</b>
Television: Reports/news	.04999	<b>.42707</b>	<b>-.61502</b>	<b>.72766</b>	<b>-.70231</b>	.13341
Television: Entertainment/ Heimatfilme/Quiz	<b>.94268</b>	.09322	.28590	-.32883	<b>-.59366</b>	<b>-.88160</b>
Television: Movies	<b>-.54448</b>	.22196	-.02789	-.00066	<b>.60044</b>	-.11197
Television: Sports	-.14910	<b>.93741</b>	<b>-.47735</b>	<b>-.54826</b>	<b>.45517</b>	.15148
Newspaper: Reports/news	-.33099	.37667	<b>-.56977</b>	<b>.75071</b>	<b>-.62719</b>	.34652
Newspaper: Local news/all over the world	.30103	.17659	<b>-.51581</b>	.23084	.01719	<b>-.57614</b>
Newspaper: Sports	-.26719	<b>.93490</b>	<b>-.53622</b>	<b>-.52316</b>	<b>.41942</b>	<b>.44332</b>

The main characteristics of the lifestyle groups have been summarised in Table 7.24. In every of the five areas the items have been listed according to their strength, i.e., for example, in the first cluster walk/wander has the highest positive value with respect to leisure activities and modernity the highest negative value followed by private education. Please recall that only values of 0,4 and more or -0,4 or less will be considered meaningful for characterising a cluster. Again the clusters have been named on the basis of the most dominating characteristics of a cluster.

<sup>89</sup> Due to the different scales used in the questionnaire the results in the areas leisure activities and aesthetic preferences have been pooled in order to make the interpretation clearer i.e in the area of values a negative value = not important, positive value = important; leisure activity a negative value = never, positive value = daily; aesthetic preferences a negative value = not at all, positive value = very much.

**Table 7.24 Lifestyle groups in the Eastern German population<sup>90</sup>**

20.5% (N = 179) Traditional, non-working person (TRANWO)	Leisure activities: Preference for: Walk and wander. Distance towards: Modernity; educate oneself privately; active and short trips. Life areas: Work is not important. Music taste: Preference for: Folk music/German pop-music. <sup>91</sup> Television taste: Preference for: Entertainment series/Heimatfilme/Quiz. Distance towards: Movies. Newspaper contents: No particular characteristics
15.9% (N = 139) Sports-,work- and family-orientated person (SPWOFA)	Leisure activities: Preference for: Sports; party games in family; educate oneself privately and short trips. Life areas: Occupation and family/neighbourhood are important. Music taste: Preference for classical music/jazz. Television taste: Preference for: Sports and reports/news. Newspaper contents: Preference for: Sports.
15.9% (N = 139) Passive, not- interested person (PANOIN)	Leisure activities: Distance towards: Reading; educate oneself privately; walk and wander; social contacts and culture. Life areas: Leisure time/friends and acquaintances and religion and church/politics and public life are not important. Music taste: Distance towards: Classical music/jazz. Television taste: Distance towards: Reports/news and sports. Newspaper contents: Distance towards all three components.
22.2% (N = 194) Cultural-orientated, educated person (CULEDU)	Leisure activities: Preference for: Culture and educate oneself privately. Distance towards: Sports. Life areas: Work and religion and church/politics and public life are important. Music taste: Preference for: Classical music/jazz. Television taste: Preference for: Reports/news. Distance towards: Sports. Newspaper contents: Distance towards: Sports.
15.9% (N = 139) Modern, sports-orientated person (MODSPO)	Leisure activities: Preference for: Modernity and sports. Life areas: Religion and church/politics and public life are not important. Music taste: Distance towards: Folk music/German pop-music and classical music/jazz. Television taste: Preference for: Movies and sports. Distance towards: Reports/news and entertainment series/Heimatfilme/Quiz. Newspaper contents: Preference for: Sports. Distance towards: Reports/news.
9.6% (N = 84) Technologically interested, not network orientated person (TECNON)	Leisure activities: Preference for: Technology; educate oneself privately; sports; short trips. Distance towards: Active. Life areas: Family/neighbourhood, relatives and leisure time and recreation/friends and acquaintances are unimportant. Religion and church/politics and public life are important. Music taste: Preference for: Classical music/jazz. Distance towards: Folk music/German pop-music. Television taste: Distance towards: Entertainment series/Heimatfilme/Quiz. Newspaper contents: Preference for: Sports. Distance towards: Local news/all over the world.

In order to test how the respondents who never read newspapers (61 cases) are distributed among the lifestyle groups the following procedure was carried out in the east as well. Firstly, a cluster analysis was carried out with all variables listed in Table 7.23 **except** for the newspaper components, but **with** the standardised filter variable asking about how often the respondents reads newspapers (0 = never until 7. seven days a week). Thereafter, the old and new six cluster solutions including the missing values were cross-tabulated. The results showed that the largest number of people who never read newspapers could be found in the “cultural-orientated, educated person” and the “modern, sports-orientated person” (altogether 22 cases) and the “traditional, non-working person” (11 cases). The rest of the respondents who do not read newspaper were evenly distributed among the other lifestyle groups. Although the three groups would have been larger if these

<sup>90</sup> The size of the lifestyle group have been calculated on the basis of the number of respondents included in the cluster analysis N = 874.

<sup>91</sup> Please recall that the component Folk music/German pop-music included a negative loading on pop- and rock music.

respondents would have been included, the number is rather small in the east as well and there seems to be no systematic bias in the distribution, so that the effect of these missing values on the following analyses presented in Chapter 7.2.3 can be expected to have – if any at all – only minimum impact of the results.

### **7.2.3 The relationship between lifestyle groups, cleavages, organisational memberships, interest representation and party preference**

In this chapter the results of the analysis between the lifestyle groups and the external variables in the east are presented and discussed. Again, the aim is to analyse to which extent social milieus still exist which are based on a relationship between lifestyle groups, cleavages, organisational membership, organisational interest representation and party preference. As argued in Chapter 6.3 and repeated also in Chapter 7.1.3 only if the cluster specific proportion of a variable is significantly different from the whole sample, the variable will be considered statistically significant for describing a cluster. In most cases it is the above average significant values which are of interest as most hypotheses assume a positive relationship between certain variables. However, if results come up which are contradictory to the expectations, i.e. either not significant where this would have been expected or below average or above average significant where the opposite would have been expected this will of course be discussed as well. In order to facilitate the interpretation of the results the numbers which proved to be significantly above or below average have been marked in bold in the respective tables here as well.

#### **7.2.3.1 The association between lifestyle groups and cleavages**

##### **1) Social structural cleavages**

As was the case in the west, too, certain expectations exist with respect to the social structural characteristics of the members of a lifestyle groups. So does the first group, for example, obviously consist of rather old people, who no longer work. The members of the second group seem on the other hand to be in their middle ages, working and married with children. The highly educated people in higher job positions with higher income probably represent the fourth group, the “cultural-orientated, educated person”. However, as in the

case of West Germany these expectations will be tested empirically. The results can be found in Table 7.25.

**Table 7.25 The association between social structural characteristics and the lifestyle groups (east)<sup>92</sup>**

	TRANWO (20.5%)	SPWOFA (15.9%)	PANOIN (15.9%)	CULEDU (22.2%)	MODSPO (15.9%)	TECNON (9.6%)	TOTAL	$\chi^2$	Cramer's V
<b>Religious cleavage:</b>									
Denomination:	n.s.								
Catholic	10.2	12.0	20.7	19.6	20.0	32.0	16.7		
Protestant	89.8	88.0	79.3	80.4	80.0	68.0	83.3		
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%		
	N = 88	N = 25	N = 29	N = 46	N = 20	N = 25	N = 233		
Religious affiliation:	64***								.271
Yes	<b>53.1</b>	<b>22.6</b>	24.6	28.9	<b>15.8</b>	32.5	30.5		
No	<b>46.9</b>	<b>77.4</b>	75.4	71.1	<b>84.2</b>	67.5	69.5		
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%		
	N = 179	N = 137	N = 138	N = 194	N = 139	N = 83	N = 870		
Church attendance:	57***								.150
Once a month or more	9.6	3.6	<b>1.5</b>	<b>11.1</b>	<b>3.0</b>	7.6	6.5		
Several times a year	10.7	<b>2.9</b>	7.7	8.5	<b>0.7</b>	8.9	6.7		
Seldom	29.4	31.4	19.2	19.0	19.4	31.6	24.5		
Never	<b>50.3</b>	<b>62.0</b>	<b>71.5</b>	61.4	<b>76.9</b>	51.9	62.3		
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%		
	N = 177	N = 137	N = 130	N = 189	N = 134	N = 79	N = 846		
<b>Occupational cleavage/social status:</b>									
Occupation:	214***								.250
Self-employed	<b>0.6</b>	7.3	5.1	5.3	2.3	9.9	4.6		
Upper white-collar	<b>0.6</b>	10.2	<b>1.4</b>	<b>11.1</b>	<b>3.0</b>	13.6	6.2		
Lower white-collar	<b>3.4</b>	19.7	14.5	<b>25.9</b>	23.5	17.3	17.2		
Blue-collar	<b>0.6</b>	<b>25.5</b>	21.0	15.3	<b>34.1</b>	16.0	17.8		
No main occupation	<b>94.9</b>	<b>37.2</b>	58.0	<b>42.3</b>	<b>37.1</b>	<b>43.2</b>	54.3		
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%		
	N = 178	N = 137	N = 138	N = 189	N = 132	N = 81	N = 855		
Education:	332***								.437
No education/primary school	<b>83.8</b>	<b>18.7</b>	<b>47.1</b>	<b>18.3</b>	<b>14.8</b>	<b>14.3</b>	35.6		
Middle school	<b>9.5</b>	<b>55.4</b>	44.9	49.7	<b>74.1</b>	40.5	44.5		
High school level	<b>6.7</b>	25.9	<b>8.0</b>	<b>31.9</b>	<b>11.1</b>	<b>45.2</b>	20.0		
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%		
	N = 179	N = 139	N = 138	N = 191	N = 135	N = 84	N = 866		
University degree or degree in applied sciences:	66***								.275
No/ in education/no answer	<b>95.0</b>	79.9	<b>93.5</b>	<b>73.2</b>	<b>94.2</b>	<b>72.6</b>	85.2		
Yes	<b>5.0</b>	20.1	<b>6.5</b>	<b>26.8</b>	<b>5.8</b>	<b>27.4</b>	14.8		
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%		
	N = 179	N = 139	N = 139	N = 194	N = 139	N = 84	N = 874		
Income:	71***								.217
< or = DM 1999	<b>79.2</b>	<b>42.6</b>	<b>78.2</b>	<b>49.1</b>	70.0	57.7	62.7		
DM 2000 –3999	<b>20.8</b>	<b>53.3</b>	<b>21.8</b>	<b>48.5</b>	28.3	39.4	35.6		
DM 4000 and above	<b>(0.0)</b> <sup>93</sup>	4.1	<b>(0.0)</b>	2.3	1.7	2.8	1.7		
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%		
	N = 154	N = 122	N = 110	N = 171	N = 120	N = 71	N = 748		
<b>Stadt-Land cleavage:</b>									
Community size:	38***								.147
Small	35.8	36.7	<b>44.6</b>	28.4	32.4	<b>21.4</b>	33.8		
Medium	<b>44.1</b>	31.7	36.0	33.5	38.8	33.3	36.6		
Large	<b>20.1</b>	31.7	<b>19.4</b>	<b>38.1</b>	28.8	<b>45.2</b>	29.6		
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%		
	N = 179	N = 139	N = 139	N = 194	N = 139	N = 84	N = 874		
Gender:	103***								.343
Male	<b>29.6</b>	<b>61.9</b>	<b>33.8</b>	<b>26.8</b>	<b>57.6</b>	<b>73.8</b>	43.5		
Female	<b>70.4</b>	<b>38.1</b>	<b>66.2</b>	<b>73.2</b>	<b>42.4</b>	<b>26.2</b>	56.5		
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%		
	N = 179	N = 139	N = 139	N = 194	N = 139	N = 84	N = 874		
Age:	436***								.408
18-29	<b>(0.0)</b>	10.8	<b>3.6</b>	12.4	<b>36.0</b>	<b>40.5</b>	14.6		
30-44	<b>4.5</b>	<b>41.0</b>	33.8	35.6	<b>48.9</b>	33.3	31.7		
45-59	<b>14.0</b>	28.1	<b>36.0</b>	<b>32.5</b>	<b>12.9</b>	19.0	24.1		
60 and above	<b>81.6</b>	<b>20.1</b>	26.6	<b>19.6</b>	<b>2.2</b>	<b>7.1</b>	29.5		
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%		
	N = 179	N = 139	N = 139	N = 194	N = 139	N = 84	N = 874		
Family status:	281***								.327
Married	50.3	<b>71.9</b>	<b>63.3</b>	60.8	<b>43.9</b>	<b>26.2</b>	54.8		
Separated/ Divorced	<b>7.3</b>	10.1	18.0	10.3	12.9	19.0	12.1		
Widowed	<b>39.1</b>	<b>2.9</b>	10.8	9.8	<b>1.4</b>	<b>2.4</b>	12.8		
Single	<b>3.4</b>	15.1	<b>7.9</b>	19.1	<b>41.7</b>	<b>52.4</b>	20.3		
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%		
	N = 179	N = 139	N = 139	N = 194	N = 139	N = 84	N = 874		

<sup>92</sup> Significance levels:  $p \leq .05=*$ ,  $p \leq .01=**$ ,  $p \leq .001=***$  and n.s.= not significant. The percentage distribution of the lifestyle groups are not based on the total number of respondents in the analysis, but on the total number of respondents in the respective clusters. The 83.8% with no education/primary education in the first cluster is, for example, based on the subpopulation with N=179.

<sup>93</sup> No cell counts.

In the following the main social structural characteristics of the lifestyle groups are presented:

Traditional, non-working person: The majority of the members of this group are widows age 60 and above with no or only primary education, no main occupation and a low level of income. Finally, they live above average in medium size communities.

Sports-, work- and family-orientated person: The majority of the members of this group are married men with a middle level of education, no religious affiliation and a middle level of income. The age group 30-44 are above average represented in this group and so are blue-collar workers.

Passive, not- interested person: Married women age 45-59 with no or only primary education, a low level of income who never go to church and live in small communities are above average represented in this group.

Cultural-orientated educated person: Women age 45-59 with a high school degree (or equivalent) and university degree or degree in applied sciences who work as upper white-collars or lower white-collars are above average represented in this group. Furthermore, about half of the members have a middle level of income and an above average proportion live in large cities and go to church more than once a month.

Modern, sports-orientated person: This group is above average represented by single men age 18-44 with a middle level of education. The majority has no religious affiliation and never goes to church. Finally, an above average number of members of this group work as blue-collar workers.

Technologically interested, not network orientated person: Single men age 18-29 with a high school degree (or equivalent) and university degree or degree in applied sciences who live in large cities are above average represented in this group.

As can be seen from the summary above, expected relationships between lifestyle groups and social structural characteristics exist in the east as well. So is the lifestyle group of the “traditional, non-working person” above average represented by older people with no main occupation, the “cultural-orientated educated person” is characterised by higher educated people working as white-collars and the technologically and modern orientated lifestyle groups are above average represented among younger people.

With regard to the religious cleavage there is no significant difference between Protestants and Catholics in the east which could also be expected due to the fact that the east is a dominantly Protestant area. Furthermore, in all groups – except the “traditional, non-working person” - the number of people with no religious affiliation is almost 70% and higher. This is very different to the finding in the west where the situation was the opposite. This is reflected in church attendance as well. In all groups above 50% of the members answer never to go to church, although among the “traditional, non-working person” this number is below average. Not easy to explain is the significant number of people who go to church more than once a month among the “cultural-orientated educated person” combined with the below average number of people with religious affiliation

among the members of this group. A possible explanation of this phenomenon could be the special situation of the Protestant Church as a meeting place for peace and citizen's movements in the former GDR. Should this be the case, church attendance would in this case not be a measurement of religiosity. In the east there is thus no indication of a religious cleavage between the lifestyle groups.

Now, looking at the existence of a possible cleavage between work and capital the results in Table 7.25 show that the "sports-, work- and family-orientated person" and the "modern, sports-orientated person" have an above average number of blue-collar workers and the "cultural-orientated, educated person" has an above average number of upper white-collars and lower white-collars. No groups are above average represented among the self-employed, although the group of the "technologically interested, not network orientated person" and the "sports-, work- and family-orientated person" have close to 10% self-employed. In contrast to the results found in the west, there are no indications of a cleavage between employees and self-employed in the east, although the higher number of self-employed and lower number of blue-collars in the west than in the east might indicate the existence of a work-capital cleavage when considering the whole of Germany. Another obvious difference between the east and west is the high number of members with a low income in all lifestyle groups and low number of people with high income. Although the "sports-, work- and family-orientated person" and the "cultural-orientated educated person" are below average represented among those with low income and above average among those with a medium income, the number of people with a high income varies from 0% to 4.1% in the east compared to 2.5% to 27% in the west. I will get back to the discussion of possible east-west cleavages in Chapter 7.3. With regard to education the oldest, traditional-orientated group has the highest number of people with no or a low education followed by the "passive, not-interested person". The "cultural-orientated, educated person" and the "technologically interested, not network orientated person" have the highest number of people with higher education and university degree whereas the "sports-, work- and family-orientated person" and the "modern, sports-orientated person" have an above average number of people with a medium level of education. Certain differences thus exist with respect to social status in the east as well, but these are not as easy to interpret as in the west. For example, about 70% of the members of the highly educated "cultural-orientated, educated person" are between 30-59 years. Still 42.3% of

the members have no main occupation. This may be related to the special situation which arose after unification where many highly educated lost their jobs due to close connections with the SED regime and/or because skills demanded and thus emphasised in the educational system of the GDR were not required anymore in reunified Germany. Finally, both highly educated lifestyle groups are above average represented in larger cities which was the case in the west as well, whereas the passive orientated lifestyle group is above average represented in small cities. The difference between the lifestyle groups are too small, though, to argue that a *Stadt-Land* cleavage might exist. Significant differences exist with respect to the social structural characteristics gender, age and family status as well. Whereas the modern and technologically orientated lifestyles are above average represented by younger at partly middle-aged, single men, the traditional orientated lifestyle is, not surprisingly, dominated by widows age 60 and above. Both the “sports-, work-, and family-orientated” and the “modern, sports-orientated person” are dominated by men age 30-44, but 70% of the members of the first group are married, the members of the second group are above average single. Finally, the passive group is dominated by middle-aged, married women.

## **2) Ideological cleavages**

With regard to the value cleavage which is measured by the items post-materialism, “worries about the environment” and “voting as a duty” the group with the highest number of post-materialists is the “technologically interested, not network orientated person” whereas the “traditional, non-working person” is below average represented among the post-materialists (cf. Table 7.26). Not surprisingly this group has the highest number of materialists, closely followed by the “passive, not interested person” whereas the “cultural-orientated, educated person” and the “modern, sports-orientated person” are below average represented in this category. As was the case in the west, though, in all lifestyle groups over 50% of the members belong to the mixed value types. Looking at the next item - “worries about the environment” - the “traditional, non-working person” has a below average number of people with big worries and above average number of people with no worries. This might have been expected due to the materialist value orientation of this group. Although the group of the “technologically interested, not network orientated person” has an above average number of people with post-materialist value orientation,

this group does not differ significantly with regard to worries about the environment. The only group which expresses a significant concern in this field is the “cultural-orientated, educated person”. Over 50% of the members of this group have big worries about the environment and only 2.1% none. Finally, an above average number of the traditional and educated group consider voting to be a duty and a below average number of the “sports-, work- and family-orientated person” and the “modern, sports-orientated person” consider voting to be a duty. Altogether, though, the level the level of people who agree to the statement that voting is a duty was lower in the east than the west (cf. Table 7.11).

Turning to the items which are assumed to indicate cleavages related to the modernisation process "worries about unemployment “ and “social differences are fair” the following results can be found. With regard to unemployment over 80% of all lifestyle groups have big worries. Although the highest number can be found among the “sports-, work- and family-orientated person” and the “cultural-orientated, educated person” there thus seems to be a consensus among all groups that unemployment is a problem. Concerning the question whether social differences are fair this variable was not significant in distinguishing between lifestyle groups in the east either. In all groups over 85% do not agree to the statement that social differences are fair. Although the number of people not agreeing to this statement was high in the west, too, the level was lower than in the east with respect to this item as well.

With regard to the “worries about immigrants”, the only group which has above average worries in this area is the “sports-, work- and family-orientated person” whereas the “cultural-orientated, educated person” and “technologically interested, not network orientated person” worry below average. The reason for the big worries in the first group might be the worry that more immigrants might make the situation at the job market even tighter. Although the “cultural-orientated, educated person” has a below average number of people with big worries about immigrants almost 50% have some worries. As argued previously, this might be related to the fact that although the members of this group are highly educated many lost or were in danger of loosing their job after reunification as academic qualifications achieved during the SED regime was not demanded anymore. Furthermore, almost ¼ of the “technologically interested, not network orientated person” do not worry about immigrants. This is probably related to the young age and high

educational level of the members of this group. As over 40% of the members of this group have no main occupation and are between 18-29 it might also be assumed that parts of the members of this group are still in education and are thus not yet confronted with the job market and its problems.

Both items which are supposed to measure the existence of a regional cleavage between the east and west, “worries about the costs of reunification” and “socialism is a good idea”, do not distinguish between the lifestyle groups in the east. Most people have some or no worries about the economic consequences of the reunification and almost 70% and more of the members of the lifestyle group think that “socialism was a good idea which was carried out badly”. These results obviously differ significantly to those found in the west and will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 7.3. Finally, over 70% of the members in all lifestyle groups place themselves in the middle of the left-right scale and only the passive lifestyle group is above average represented in the middle and below average represented at the left whereas the members of the cultural and educated lifestyle group place themselves above average to the left and below average in the middle. Compared to the results in the west the level of left placement is higher in the east than the west and the level of right placement is higher in the west than in the east.

**Table 7.26 The association between ideological cleavages and lifestyle groups (east)<sup>94</sup>**

	TRANWO (20.3%)	SPWOFA (15.9%)	PANOIN (15.9%)	CULEDU (22.2%)	MODSPO (15.9%)	TECNON (9.6%)	TOTAL	$\chi^2$	Cramer'sV
Values:									
Post-materialist index:	N = 179	N = 136	N = 136	N = 186	N = 139	N = 83	N = 859	53***	.176
Post-materialists	<b>5.6</b>	10.3	8.8	14.5	13.7	<b>26.5</b>	12.1		
Materialists	<b>38.5</b>	27.9	<b>36.0</b>	<b>16.7</b>	<b>19.4</b>	20.5	26.9		
Mixed	55.9	61.8	55.1	<b>68.8</b>	66.9	53.0	61.0		
Worries about environment:	N = 178	N = 138	N = 138	N = 194	N = 139	N = 84	N = 871	42***	.155
Big	<b>27.0</b>	43.5	31.9	<b>52.6</b>	36.7	39.3	38.8		
Some	60.1	52.2	58.0	<b>45.4</b>	53.2	54.8	53.6		
None	<b>12.9</b>	4.3	10.1	<b>2.1</b>	10.1	6.0	7.6		
Voting as duty:	N = 174	N = 138	N = 130	N = 193	N = 131	N = 82	N = 848	25***	.171
Agree	<b>78.2</b>	<b>62.3</b>	67.7	<b>80.8</b>	<b>61.8</b>	69.5	71.2		
Do not agree	21.8	37.7	32.3	19.2	38.2	30.5	28.8		
Modernisation:									
Worries about unemployment:	N = 178	N = 137	N = 138	N = 194	N = 139	N = 84	N = 870	25**	.119
Big	<b>87.6</b>	<b>96.4</b>	95.7	<b>95.9</b>	94.2	<b>84.5</b>	92.9		
Some	<b>11.2</b>	3.6	3.6	<b>3.6</b>	5.8	<b>14.3</b>	6.6		
None	1.1	<b>(0.0)</b> <sup>95</sup>	0.7	0.5	<b>(0.0)</b>	1.2	0.6		
Social differences fair:	N = 174	N = 139	N = 130	N = 191	N = 136	N = 83	N = 853	n.s.	
Agree	8.0	10.1	7.7	11.5	8.1	14.5	9.7		
Do not agree	92.0	89.9	92.3	88.5	91.9	85.5	90.3		
Globalisation:									
Worries about number of immigrants:	N = 178	N = 137	N = 138	N = 194	N = 139	N = 84	N = 870	33***	.137
Big	50.0	<b>56.9</b>	54.3	<b>39.2</b>	49.6	<b>32.1</b>	47.6		
Some	38.8	35.0	<b>30.4</b>	<b>46.9</b>	42.4	44.0	39.8		
None	11.2	<b>8.0</b>	15.2	13.9	<b>7.9</b>	<b>23.8</b>	12.6		
West-East:									
Worries about costs of German unification:	N = 178	N = 137	N = 138	N = 194	N = 139	N = 84	N = 870	n.s.	
Big	18.0	25.5	19.6	16.0	21.6	17.9	19.5		
Some	43.8	43.8	39.9	50.5	43.2	42.9	44.5		
None	38.2	30.7	40.6	33.5	35.3	39.3	36.0		
Socialism good idea:	N = 160	N = 135	N = 117	N = 189	N = 131	N = 78	N = 810	n.s.	
Agree	80.0	70.4	82.9	74.6	75.6	67.9	75.7		
Do not agree	20.0	29.6	17.1	25.4	24.4	32.1	24.3		
Left-right placement:	N = 173	N = 138	N = 133	N = 187	N = 138	N = 79	N = 848	27**	
Left	17.3	24.6	<b>12.8</b>	<b>31.6</b>	17.4	22.8	21.5		
Middle	77.5	72.5	<b>84.2</b>	<b>65.2</b>	74.6	72.2	74.1		
Right	5.2	2.9	3.0	3.2	8.0	5.1	4.5		

### 3) The association between lifestyle group, organisational membership and organisational interest representation

As cleavages become manifest if they are perceived by social groups and if they are represented by organisations and parties analyses of the association between organisational memberships and lifestyle groups were carried out for the east as well. The results of the organisational membership structure of the lifestyle groups is given in Table 7.27 and the interest representation by organisations and parties follow in Table 7.28.

<sup>94</sup> Variables with 20% or more cells with counts lower than 5 were not included in the table. Significance levels:  $p \leq .05=*$ ,  $p \leq .01=**$ ,  $p \leq .001=***$  and n.s.= not significant. The percentage distribution of the lifestyle groups are not based on the total number of respondents in the analysis, but on the total number of respondents in the respective clusters. The 5.6% post-materialists in the first cluster is, for example, based on the subpopulation with N=179.

<sup>95</sup> No cell counts.

**Table 7.27 The association between organisational membership and lifestyle groups (east)<sup>96</sup>**

	TRANWO (20.5%)	SPWOFA (15.9%)	PANOIN (15.9%)	CULEDU (22.2%)	MODSPO (15.9%)	TECNON (9.6%)	TOTAL	$\chi^2$	Cramer'sV
Membership in organisations:	N = 179	N = 139	N = 139	N = 194	N = 139	N = 84	N = 874		
DGB	<b>1.1</b>	<b>23.7</b>	9.4	16.0	15.8	7.1	12.2	45***	.227
Sports club	<b>2.2</b>	<b>20.9</b>	<b>4.3</b>	11.3	17.3	17.9	11.4	42***	.220
Other hobby organisations	2.2	<b>10.1</b>	<b>1.4</b>	5.7	2.2	<b>1.2</b>	4.0	22***	.157
Choral society	<b>0.6</b>	5.0	<b>(0.0)<sup>97</sup></b>	2.1	0.7	2.4	1.7	14*	.127
Other organisations	4.5	7.2	2.9	8.8	5.0	2.4	5.5	n.s.	
Past memberships in organisations:	N = 179	N = 139	N = 139	N = 194	N = 139	N = 84	N = 874		
Sports club	<b>7.8</b>	<b>25.2</b>	<b>7.2</b>	15.5	23.0	25.0	16.2	35***	.201
Youth, student organisations	<b>8.4</b>	25.2	22.3	26.8	<b>34.5</b>	21.4	22.8	34***	.198
Choral society	4.5	2.2	2.2	5.2	4.3	3.6	3.8	n.s.	
Political party	6.7	6.5	5.8	7.7	5.8	1.2	6.1	n.s.	
Other organizations	7.8	4.3	6.5	5.7	4.3	6.0	5.8	n.s.	

In the east the problem with the low number of people who are members in any organisation at all is even more visible than in the west. Except for trade union, all other occupational organisations had about 50% cells with counts less than five and with regard to memberships – both past and present – in other organisations the picture is not much better. Nevertheless, looking at the present memberships the “sports-, work- and family-orientated person” is significantly above average represented among trade union members and the “traditional, non-working person” below average. Actually almost ¼ of the members of the first group are DGB members. Also with regard to membership in sports clubs and other hobby organisations the “sports-, work- and family-orientated person” is the only group which is above average represented whereas both the traditional group and passive group are below average represented among the sports clubs and the passive group with regard to other hobby organisations as well. Furthermore, the traditional and passive group are below average members in choral societies and although the “sports-, work- and family-orientated person” has the highest number of members here as well this number is not significant when taking cluster size into account.

<sup>96</sup> Variables with 20% or more cells with counts lower than 5 were not included in the table. Significance levels:  $p \leq .05 = *$ ,  $p \leq .01 = **$ ,  $p \leq .001 = ***$  and n.s. = not significant. The percentage distribution of the lifestyle groups are not based on the total number of respondents in the analysis, but on the total number of respondents in the respective clusters. The 1.1% DGB members in the first cluster is, for example, based on the subpopulation with N=179.

<sup>97</sup> No cell counts.

With regard to past memberships the “sports-, work- and family-orientated person” is above average represented here as well and the traditional and passive groups below average. Interesting is the high level of past memberships in youth, student organisations in the east which is more than 20% in all groups except for the “traditional, non-working” one where a below average number of members can be found and the “cultural-orientated, educated person” where the highest number of former members can be found (34.5%). In the west the number of members in this category is much lower. The reason for this high number of former memberships in youth, student organisations in the east can probably be traced back to memberships in the *Freie Deutsche Jugend* (FDJ). The FDJ was the socialist youth organisation of the GDR and became over the years more or less the youth organisation of the SED. In 1981 the FDJ had 2.3 million members i.e. 77.2% of the population between 14 and 25 years. With the reunification in 1990 the organisation lost its political influence and in 1992 the organisation had only 850 members (cf. Chronik der Wende:2002, see also van Deth 2001:211).

In summary, the results – and lack of results due to the low number of people who are members in organisations in the east - indicate that organisations do not play a major role in the east. This can probably be traced back to the strong state control which restricted the establishment of free organisational structures. To which extent organisations have managed to develop links after the reunification or maintain links to particular social groups throughout the SED-regime will be analysed in the following. Table 7.28 includes the association between the lifestyle groups and interest representation, both by organisations and by parties. As argued previously the fact that parties have been included here as well does not have any impact on the analysis of the impact between lifestyle groups and party preference as all analyses are single bivariate measurements. Thus, if a lifestyle group has both an interest representation by a particular party and the members of this group above average vote for this party, this might be seen as an indication of a stable relationship between a lifestyle group and a political party. The relationship between lifestyle groups and parties follow in Chapter 7.2.3.2.

**Table 7.28 The association between interest representation and lifestyle groups (east)<sup>98</sup>**

	TRANWO (20.3%)	SPWOFA (15.9%)	PANOIN (15.9%)	CULEDU (22.2%)	MODSPO (15.9%)	TECNON (9.6%)	TOTAL	$\chi^2$	Cramer's V
Interest representation:	N = 179	N = 139	N = 139	N = 194	N = 139	N = 84	N = 874		
Trade Union	<b>15.6</b>	<b>43.2</b>	33.1	<b>43.8</b>	41.0	26.2	34.1	46***	.229
Bündnis90/Grüne	7.8	7.9	<b>2.9</b>	13.9	7.9	<b>27.4</b>	10.3	41***	.215
Environmental Organisations	28.5	27.3	<b>19.4</b>	<b>36.1</b>	<b>17.3</b>	<b>44.0</b>	28.3	30***	.185
Protestant Church	<b>15.1</b>	7.9	<b>4.3</b>	13.9	<b>0.7</b>	10.7	9.3	29***	.182
PDS	11.2	16.5	<b>9.4</b>	<b>23.2</b>	14.4	11.9	15.0	17**	.138
CDU	15.6	7.9	<b>5.8</b>	13.9	<b>6.5</b>	13.1	10.8	14*	.128
Catholic Church	5.6	2.2	2.2	5.2	1.4	6.0	3.8	n.s.	
SPD	31.8	34.5	23.7	26.8	24.5	27.4	28.3	n.s.	

Both the “sports-, work- and family-orientated person” and the “cultural-orientated, educated person” consider the trade union to represent their interests above average (above 40 %) whereas the “traditional, non-working” group consider the trade union to represent its interest below average. The number is quite high among the “modern, sports-orientated person as well, but this number was not significant when taking cluster size into account. Although the highest number of people who consider the SPD to represent their interests can be found among the “sports-, work- and family-orientated person” as well the level of interest representation by the SPD is so similar among all lifestyle groups that the variable is not significant in distinguishing between the lifestyle groups.

Furthermore, the “technologically interested, not network orientated person” has the highest number of people who see their interests represented by Bündnis90/die Grünen, whereas the “passive, not-interested” group has the lowest number in this category. Looking at the interest representation by environmental organisations the “technologically interested, not network orientated person” has the highest number here as well (44%) followed by the “cultural-orientated, educated person” (36.1%). The traditional group and the “modern, sports-orientated group” are below average represented in this category. Looking at the interest representation by the churches the “traditional, non-working” group feel above average represented by the Protestant Church and the passive and modern, sports-orientated groups below average. The Catholic Church is very low in all groups and

<sup>98</sup> Variables with 20% or more cells with counts lower than 5 were not included in the table. Significance levels:  $p \leq .05 = *$ ,  $p \leq .01 = **$ ,  $p \leq .001 = ***$  and n.s. = not significant. The percentage distribution of the lifestyle groups are not based on the total number of respondents in the analysis, but on the total number of respondents in the respective clusters. The 15.6% who consider the trade unions to represent their interests is in the first cluster, for example, based on the subpopulation with N=179.

does not distinguish between the lifestyle groups. Again this could have been expected considering the Protestant dominance in the east. Although the highest number of people who consider the CDU to represent their interests can be found among the “traditional, non-working” group, this number is not significantly above average when taking cluster size into account. The passive and modern, sports-orientated groups see their interests below average represented by the CDU, though. Finally, almost  $\frac{1}{4}$  of the members of the “cultural-orientated, educated person” consider the PDS to represent their interests. This might be traced back to both the above average left-placement of the members of this group and the above average number of members with past memberships in youth, student organisations (cf. Table 7.24 and Table 7.27).

### **7.2.3.2 The association between lifestyle groups and party preference**

Finally, the last criteria which has to be fulfilled in order to define a lifestyle group as a social milieu, the association between lifestyle groups and party preference will be analysed. As can be seen from Table 7.29 the highest support for the CDU/CSU can be found among the traditional group, although this number is (only nearly) not significant when taking cluster size into account. This would coincide with the traditional value orientation and interest representation by the Protestant Church and the CDU, even though in the case of the latter the level was not significant either (see Table 7.28). The “sports-, work- and family-orientated person” is below average represented here which coincides with the DGB membership and interest representation by the trade union, although no above average support for the SPD can be found in this group. Nevertheless, over 50% had a preference for the SPD. The highest support for the SPD, although not significantly above average, can be found in the passive group and a below average SPD support among the “cultural-orientated, educated person” even though the number is over 40%. As this latter group considers the trade union to represent their interest above average a support for the SPD would have been expected as well. However, the high support for the PDS in this lifestyle group indicated that the PDS obviously catches parts of the left-orientated members in this group. Looking at the support for Bündnis90/die Grünen the “technologically interested, not network orientated person” is significantly above average represented here and receives altogether 18.9% of the votes from this group. This coincides with the interest representation by Bündnis90/die Grünen and environmental

organisations presented in Table 7.28. The traditional and passive groups are - on the other hand - below average represented here. With regard to the passive group this is also reflected in the below average representation by Bündnis90/die Grünen and environmental organisations. Finally, the PDS is – as could have been expected – significantly above average represented among the “cultural-orientated, educated person” which coincides with the high level of interest representation by the members of this group. Now, looking at the inclination not to vote, the passive group is above average represented in this category. Over 20% of the members of this group intend not to vote. The second highest number can be found among the “modern, sports-orientated person”, although this number is not significant taking the cluster size into account. The “sports-, work- and family-orientated person” and the “cultural-orientated, educated person” are below average represented among the non-voters. To which extent the tendency not to vote may also be connected to political interest and democratic satisfaction is analysed in Table 7.30.

**Table 7.29 The association between party preference and lifestyle groups (east)<sup>99</sup>**

	TRANWO (20.5%)	SPWOFA (15.9%)	PANOIN (15.9%)	CULEDU (22.2%)	MODSPO (15.9%)	TECNON	TOTAL	$\chi^2$	Cramer'sV
Vote next election:	N = 124	N = 101	N = 66	N = 126	N = 82	N = 53	N = 552	87***	.199
CDU/CSU	26.6	<b>11.9</b>	15.2	20.6	17.1	17.0	18.8		
SPD	58.9	56.4	62.1	<b>40.5</b>	43.9	39.6	50.5		
Bündnis90/die Grünen	<b>1.6</b>	7.9	<b>(0.0)</b> <sup>100</sup>	7.9	4.9	<b>18.9</b>	6.2		
PDS	<b>10.5</b>	22.8	19.7	<b>25.4</b>	14.6	<b>9.4</b>	17.8		
Other parties	<b>2.4</b>	<b>1.0</b>	3.0	5.6	<b>19.5</b>	15.1	6.7		
Would not vote	N = 131	N = 104	N = 85	N = 130	N = 93	N = 57	N = 600	35***	.241
	5.3	<b>2.9</b>	<b>22.4</b>	<b>3.1</b>	11.8	7.0	8.0		

As can be seen from the table the “sports-, work- and family-orientated person” and the “cultural-orientated, educated person” are above average represented among those with a strong political interests and below average among those with a weak interest. Among the “traditional, non-working person”, the passive, not-interested person” and the “modern,

<sup>99</sup> Significance levels:  $p \leq .05=*$ ,  $p \leq .01=**$  and  $p \leq .001=***$ . The percentage distribution of the lifestyle groups are not based on the total number of respondents in the analysis, but on the total number of respondents in the respective clusters. The 10.5% PDS voters in the first cluster is, for example, based on the subpopulation with N=124. FDP and *Republikaner* were included in the category “other parties” as well as analyses showed that the number of cells with counts less than five increased dramatically if one and/or both parties were included separately.

<sup>100</sup> No cell counts.

sports-orientated person” the situation is the opposite. Here the strong political interest is below average and a weak political interest above average in all groups. In the passive group the number of people with weak political interest is the highest with over 50%. As this is also the group with the lowest level of democratic satisfaction it might be assumed that the tendency not to vote might be linked to the low political interest and low level of democratic satisfaction.

**Table 7.30 The association between political interest, democratic satisfaction and lifestyle groups (east)<sup>101</sup>**

	TRANWO (20.5%)	SPWOFA (15.9%)	PANOIN (15.9%)	CULEDU (22.2%)	MODSPO (15.9%)	TECNON (9.6%)	TOTAL	$\chi^2$	Cramer's V
Political interest:	N = 179	N = 139	N = 139	N = 192	N = 137	N = 84	N = 870	179***	.320
Strong	17.3	38.1	9.4	46.4	13.1	36.9	27.0		
Medium	35.8	54.0	40.3	46.4	46.7	44.0	44.3		
Weak	46.9	7.9	50.4	7.3	40.1	19.0	28.7		
Democratic satisfaction:	N=175	N = 139	N = 131	N = 192	N = 138	N = 82	N = 857	14**	.127
Satisfied	55.4	61.2	42.7	58.3	48.6	59.8	54.4		
Not satisfied	44.6	38.8	57.3	41.7	51.4	40.2	45.6		

#### 7.2.4 Summary – the formation of social milieus in the east

The analyses presented in Chapter 7.2.3 showed that differences exist between the lifestyle groups with regard to cleavages, organisational memberships, interest representations and party preferences. In this chapter, I will summarise the main characteristics of each lifestyle group in the above mentioned areas and discuss to which extent each lifestyle group fulfils the criteria of being defined as a milieu:

Traditional, non-working person: *Cleavages:* This group is above average represented by older widows with a low social status who live in medium sized cities. With regard to the ideological cleavages, this lifestyle group is characterised by an above average proportion of materialists and below average number of post-materialists. Furthermore, a below average number has big worries about the environment and an above average has no worries. The majority agrees to the statement that “voting is a duty” and although the majority has big worries about unemployment the proportion is below average when compared to the other groups. Nevertheless, an above average has some worries about unemployment. *Organisational membership:* They are below average members in most organisations – both past and present. *Interest representation:* Members of this group feel above average represented by the Protestant Church and below average represented by the trade union. *Party preference:* Members of this group have the highest preference for the CDU/CSU (although this number is not significantly above average) and a below average preference for Bündnis 90/die Grünen, PDS and other parties. Finally, the members of this group are above average represented among those with weak political interest. **Social milieu: The characteristics indicate that this**

<sup>101</sup> Significance levels:  $p \leq .05=*$ ,  $p \leq .01=**$  and  $p \leq .001=***$ .

could be a traditional, conservative milieu. However, even though, this group has the highest number of people who have an interest representation for the churches and the CDU and party preference for the CDU/CSU, the number of people who consider the trade union and the SPD to represent their interests and number of people who have a preference for the SPD is much higher. Hence, this lifestyle group does not fulfill the criteria of being defined a social milieu.

Sports-work- and family-orientated person: *Cleavages:* The members of this group are above average represented by non-religious, middle-aged, married men with a medium social status. A below average number of this group consider voting a duty. Furthermore, an above average number have big worries about the number of immigrants and about unemployment whereas a below average number has no worries. *Organisational membership:* Members of this lifestyle group are above average members in DGB, sports clubs and other hobby organisations and were also above average former members in sports clubs. *Interest representation:* The trade union is considered to represent the interests of the members of this group and the number of people who consider the SPD to represent their interest is also the highest in this group, although this variable is not significant. *Party preference:* Although the majority of the members of this group have a party preference for the SPD (56.4%) this is not significantly stronger than in the other groups. However, the members of this group have a below average preference for the CDU/CSU, FDP and other parties. Finally, this group has the lowest number of persons who would not vote and the majority of its members have a strong or medium level of political interest. ***Social milieu:* This is a work-orientated lifestyle group with an above average number of blue-collar workers with a medium level of income, high worries about unemployment, trade union membership and interest representation by the trade union. All this may indicate the existence of a worker's milieu although no significantly higher preference for the SPD exists among the members of this group compared to the other groups.**

Passive, not-interested person: *Cleavages:* Non-religious, middle-aged, married women who live in small cities and have a low social status are above average represented in this group. The members of this group have an above average number of materialists. Furthermore, the group is below average represented among those with only some worries about the number of immigrants. The majority places themselves in the middle of the left-right scale and a below average number to the right. *Organisational membership:* The members of this group are below average represented in almost all organisations, both past present *Interest representation:* Furthermore, they do not feel above average represented by any organisation, but below average represented by Bündnis90/die Grünen, environmental organisations, Protestant Church, PDS and CDU. *Party preference:* This group has a below average preference for the Bündnis90/die Grünen and the highest support for the SPD, although this number is not significant. This group has the highest number of non-voters, too. Finally, the majority of the members of this group have only weak political interest and they are below average satisfied with democracy. ***Social milieu:* This group as well has too few characteristics to make any indications about a social milieu. Interesting with this group, however, is the above average level of materialists and above average level of some worries about immigrants. Furthermore, this is the only group which does not feel represented by any organisation and the only group except the “traditional, non-working person” who involves below average in organisations. Finally, the members of this group are above average represented among non-voters, among people with a weak political interest, and among people dissatisfied with democracy. All these characteristics – together with the lifestyle characteristics (cf. Table 7.24) - may indicate that this is a “passive, dissatisfied milieu”, comparable to the “no value-orientated, rather passive person” found in the west although this “milieu”, too, does not really fulfil the criteria of a social milieu either as it is characterised by a lack of memberships, interest representations and party preference rather than the existence of a relationship between these variables.**

Cultural-orientated educated person: *Cleavages:* With regard to social structure this group is above average represented by middle-aged women with a medium/high social status who live in large cities and go to church once a month. This lifestyle group has a below average number of materialists and above average number of mixed types. The majority has big worries about the environment and a below average proportion of people has some or no worries. With respect to worries about the number of immigrants almost half of the members have some worries and a below average number has big worries. Again, unemployment is the area where most worries exist, although the level of worries is high in all East German lifestyle groups. Furthermore, most members of this group consider voting a duty and place themselves above average on the left of the left-right scale and below average in the middle. *Organisational membership:* The members of this group are not characterised by any particular organisational structure, neither past nor present. *Interest*

*representation:* Trade union, environmental organisation, PDS represent the interests of the members of this group above average. *Party preference:* They have a preference above average for the PDS and below average for the SPD and are below average inclined not to vote. Finally, almost half of the members of this group have a strong political interest. ***Social milieu:* Although the members of this group have big worries about the environment and consider environmental organisations to represent their interests, this does not go to the benefit of Bündnis 90/die Grünen. Similarly, the SPD does not profit from the above average interest representation by the trade unions and left placement of the members; the preference for the SPD is even below average in this group. Although not significant above average this group has the second highest number of people who were former members in youth, student organisations and has the highest number of former members in political parties. Furthermore, this is the only group which has an above average interest representation by the PDS and party preference for the PDS, the PDS seems to win voters in the east located at the left spectrum. Considering the fact that the members of this group also belong above average to the highly educated and the advanced age groups, this attachment to the PDS may be a result of their status during the SED regime (cf. Chapter 4.1.2). However, the characteristics of this group are not completely homogenous and possible to explain from the theoretical point of view. Obviously, the cultural, educated lifestyle embeds different kinds of groups. So does, for example, this group – as the only group of all - also have an above average number of people who go to church more than once a month. This indicates that this may also be a group of “bourgeois-humanists” (cf. Chapter 5.2.2) although this cannot be proved empirically. Nevertheless, it may be correct to consider this at least partly a left-orientated milieu.**

Modern, sports-orientated person: *Cleavages:* Non-religious, young to middle-aged, single men with a low/medium social status are above average represented in this group. With regard to ideological cleavages this group is characterised by a below average number of materialists and a below average number agreeing to the statement that voting is a duty. Furthermore, a below average number of people of this group has no worries about immigrants and no worries about unemployment. *Organisational membership:* This group has the highest number of people with past members in youth, student organisations. *Interest representation:* Environmental organisations, the Protestant Church and the CDU represent the interest of the members of this group below average. *Party preference:* An above average number have a preference for “other” parties. Separate analyses showed that the number of people intending to vote for the *Republikaner* was the highest in this group.<sup>102</sup> Finally, an above average number of this group has a weak political interest and a below average number has a strong one. ***Social milieu:* The characteristics of this group are too weak to make any indications with respect to a milieu. However, the rather passive lifestyle, the domination of single men age 18-44 working above average as blue-collar workers with worries about immigrants and unemployment and -although not significant - high number of people who place themselves to the right and have a preference for the *Republikaner* and not to vote -may indicate that this is a group embeds dissatisfied protest voters or right-wing minded people.**

Technologically interested, not network orientated person: *Cleavages:* With regard to social structural characteristics this group is above average represented by young, single men who live in large cities and have a rather high social status. This group has the highest level of post-materialists. Furthermore, this group has the highest number of people with no worries about the number of immigrants and a below average number of people with big worries. With respect to unemployment the members of this group have a below average number with big worries and an above average number with some worries. *Organisational membership:* The members of this group are not characterised by any organisational preferences, but are below average members in hobby organisations. *Interest representation:* Bündnis90/die Grünen and environmental organisations are considered to represent the interests of this lifestyle group above average. *Party preference:* An above average prefer Bündnis90/die Grünen and a below average the PDS. Finally, this group is characterised by a below average number of people with weak political interest. ***Social milieu:* Although this group is missing the relationship to membership in alternative political groups, parallels may be found to the west German Green milieu; this group, too has an above average post-materialist value orientation, feel represented by Bündnis 90/die Grünen and environmental organisations and have an above average party preference for Bündnis 90/ die Grünen.**

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<sup>102</sup> To avoid a high number of cells with no counts, the vote intention for the *Republikaner* was included into “other parties” in the final analysis.

To facilitate a comparison between the lifestyle groups and the respective variables some of the results presented above – which are particularly important in analysing the existence of social milieus in the east German population - have been summarised in Figure 7.3. Again, the figure should be read vertically, for example, the lifestyle group of the “traditional, non-working person” (TRANWO) is characterised by older widows with a low social status who live in medium size cities. The members of this group have materialist value orientations, have no worries about the environment, consider voting a duty and have no worries about unemployment. Furthermore, the members of this group are not above average members in organisations, neither present nor past and consider the Protestant Church to represent their interests. In summary, this lifestyle group does not fulfil the criteria of being defined as a milieu as clear links are missing both with regard to organisations and party preference.

**Figure 7.3 Social milieus in the East German population**

Lifestyle Groups ⇒ Criteria ↓	TRANWO (20.5%)	SPWOFA (15.9%)	PANOIN (15.9%)	CULEDU (22.2%)	MODSPO (15.9%)	TECNON (9.6%)
Cleavages:						
Social structure	Low social status, older widows, medium size cities	Non-religious, medium social status, middle-aged, married men	Low church attendance, low social status, married, middle-aged women, small cities	High church attendance, medium/high social status, middle-aged women, large cities	Non-religious, low/medium social status, young to middle-aged, single men	Young, single men, medium/high social status, large cities
Post-mat index	- post-materialist + materialist		+ materialist	- materialist + mixed	- materialist	+ post-materialist
Worries about environment	- big + none			+ big - some - none		
Voting as duty	+ agree	- agree		+ agree	- agree	
Worries about unemployment	- big + some	+ big - none		+ big - some	- none	- big + some
Worries about number of immigrants		+ big - none	- some	- big + some	- none	- big + none
Left-right placement			- left + middle	+ left - middle		
Present Organisational Memberships		DGB; sports club; other hobby organisations				
Past Organisational Memberships		Sports club			Youth, student organisations	
Interest representation	Protestant Church	Trade union		Trade union; environmental organisations; PDS		Bündnis 90/die Grünen; environmental organisations
Party preference			No-vote	PDS	Other party	Bündnis 90/die Grünen
Political interest	Weak	Strong and medium	Weak	Strong	Weak	- Weak
Democratic satisfaction			- Satisfied			
<b>The formation of social milieus</b>						
Social milieu		(Worker's milieu)	Passive, dissatisfied milieu	(Partly, left-orientated milieu)		Green milieu

In the east no milieu could be found which prove a clear relationship between the analysed variables, although a Green milieu fulfilled almost all criteria except that it missed the organisational membership in alternative political groups. As the development of new social movements like those which emerged in western democracies were impossible in the former GDR (cf. Schmitt-Beck/Weins 1997:324) this lack of organisational infrastructure is not very surprising. The existence of such a Green milieu in the east is rather surprising, though, and may be a statistical artefact, in particular since it is based on such a small number of cases. Nevertheless, as both the lifestyle and social structural characteristics of this group is quite similar to the Green milieu found in the west, its existence seems quite plausible and will thus be considered a milieu here. Furthermore, **indications** of three other milieus - “worker’s milieu”, “passive-dissatisfied milieu” and “left-orientated milieu” – could be found, although the latter obviously includes different kinds of left-orientated groups and can thus only partly be considered a social milieu. A religious milieu could not be found as was stated above, although the group of the “traditional non-working” consider the Protestant Church to represent their interests and vote above average for the CDU/CSU. The “worker’s milieu” may develop from the sports, work and family-orientated lifestyle group as this group has an above average number of blue-collar workers, an above average number of trade union members and of people who consider the trade unions to represent their interests. However, although over 50% of the members of this group have a party preference for the SPD, this is not very different from the SPD preference found in other groups. This might be related to both the general inclination to the left rather than the right in the east as well as the fact that there was a wish in the electorate to replace the coalition of CDU/CSU and FDP at the general election which took place in the same year as the ALLBUS-survey was carried out, i.e. in 1998. The, although only partly “left-orientated milieu”, may be considered a specific eastern German social milieu as it is the only one proving a close relationship with the PDS, nevertheless as was discussed in the overview summary this group is not homogeneous and has no link to any specific organisation. Finally, as in the west, there is also a group of passive and dissatisfied people in the east which may be considered a social milieu. The group is characterised by a passive lifestyle, lack of important life areas, low social position and lack in organisational memberships and interest representation.

Furthermore – as in the west - the members are below average satisfied with democracy and incline above average not to vote and will thus be considered a social milieu.

With respect to manifest and latent cleavages in the east the picture is not as clear as in the west as too few social milieus could be found which fulfilled the criteria of being characterised as milieus. Thus, only the existence of possible latent cleavages between the Green milieu, passive milieu, the “partly social milieus” and the lifestyle groups will be discussed in the following. Looking at the possible social structural cleavages there is a difference between the “partly, left-orientated milieu” and the other groups with regard to church attendance. As discussed in Chapter 7.2.3.1 there is no particular religious group in the east, but the “partly, left-orientated milieu” is the only group with a high church attendance. As argued previously as well, this might be traced back to the special situation of the Protestant Church in the GDR as a meeting place for oppositional groups and would not be a measurement for religiosity in the traditional sense. There seems to be no cleavage between work and capital. As emphasised previously the number of self-employed in the former GDR is very low and even though two groups can be found which have a medium to high social status, no lifestyle group could be found in the east which has a significant number of people in the highest income category. Turning to the *Stadt-Land* cleavage there is a slight difference in the east as well. Whereas the members of the Green milieu and “partly, left-orientated milieu” live above average in large cities the members of the passive milieu live in small cities.


Concerning ideological cleavages, the following latent cleavages could be found; a post-materialist-materialist cleavage between the Green milieu on the one side and the “passive milieu” and the “traditional, non-working person” on the other side. With regard to worries about the environment the “traditional, non-working person” has less worries. This coincides with the materialist orientation of this group. The “partly left-orientated milieu” has – on the other hand - big worries about the environment which coincides with the below average materialist orientation in this group.

Furthermore, as in the west, there is an indication of a cleavage related to the globalisation process (worries about number of immigrants) and a cleavage related to the modernisation process (worries about unemployment). Both the “worker’s milieu” and the “partly, left-orientated milieu” have big worries with respect to unemployment whereas the members of

the Green milieu and the “traditional, non working person” have below average big worries. Nevertheless, as emphasised previously in all groups the numbers of those with big worries are above 80%. The “worker’s milieu” is the only group with big worries concerning the number of immigrants. The “partly, left-orientated milieu” is above average represented among those with some worries whereas the Green milieu is below average represented among those with big worries and above average among those with no worries about immigrants. Finally, although the members of the “partly, left-orientated milieu”, for example, place themselves above average to the left, there is no group located on the right which may indicate a left-right cleavage in the east.

A summary of the results found in the east is presented in Figure 7.4. With regard to the east as well, only lifestyle groups which wholly or partly fulfil the criteria of being defined as social milieus are included in the overview. Again those characteristics which are of particular importance to the definition of the milieus have been marked in bold. Those social milieus which do not fully fulfil the criteria of a social milieu are presented in a weaker print to emphasise their heterogeneity and instability.


Figure 7.4 Social milieus in the east




### **7.3 A comparison of lifestyle groups and social milieus in the west and the east**

The results presented in Chapter 7.1 and 7.2 prove that similarities - but also some significant differences - exist between the eastern and western German population with respect to lifestyle groups and social milieus. As can be seen from Figure 7.5 some of the lifestyle groups are comparable and some partly comparable. The comparison is based both on lifestyle characteristics and social structural characteristics. The most similar groups are the technologically-orientated and the modern, sports-orientated groups in the east and the west. Furthermore, the cultural-orientated and educated, the traditional-orientated and the passive groups are partly comparable. A main difference can be found in the fact that no particularly religious lifestyle group can be found in the east. The lifestyle group of the "cultural-orientated, educated" considers religion and church/politics and public life important and is the only group which proves an above average level of church attendance, but the group nevertheless does not fulfil the definition of a milieu as was emphasised in Chapter 7.2.3. This lack of a religious social milieu in the east could have been expected on the basis of the developments since World War II (cf. Chapters 3.2.2 and 4.3.2.4). Also, none of the East German lifestyle groups can be found in the higher income group.

I would like to emphasise at this point, that it is not the purpose of this thesis to prove that the lifestyle groups found here are better than those found of the other surveys. Rather the solutions found here were considered the "best" ones both from the empirical criteria and theoretical perspective on the basis of the data available in the ALLBUS 1998. Nevertheless, similarities exist to lifestyle groups and "social milieus" found in other surveys as, for example, to post-materialist, conservative and religious "milieus" in the west (cf. Chapter 5.2.1) and the bourgeois-humanistic and left-intellectual "milieu" in the east (cf. Chapter 5.2.2). A direct comparison between all groups is rather difficult, though, due to the different research designs and definitions of the concepts used in the respective surveys.

**Figure 7.5 A comparison of lifestyle groups in the west and the east**

Summarising the findings with regard to social milieus (cf. Figure 7.6) a Green milieu and a passive milieu could be found in both the east and west. Furthermore, a worker's milieu could be found in the west and indications of one in the east, although here the above average party preference to the SPD is still missing. Finally, a religious milieu could be found in the west and a "partly, left-orientated, milieu" could be found in the east.

**Figure 7.6 A comparison of social milieus in the west and the east**

Finally, the separate analyses of east and west makes it necessary to look at some of the differences beyond the lifestyle groups and social milieus found in the empirical part, in particular with respect to the assumed regional cleavage in reunified Germany. Whereas “worries about unemployment” did not differ significantly between the lifestyle groups in the west it did so in the east. Now, in both parts the number with big worries is very high – although a little higher in the east compared to the west. With regard to the question whether social differences are fair, the majority both in the east and west do not think that such differences are fair, although - here as well – the number of those who do not agree to the statement is higher in the east than the west.

Furthermore, the variables “worries about costs of reunification” and “socialism is in principle a good idea which was carried out badly” were not significant in distinguishing between the lifestyle groups in the east. Whereas in the east more than 2/3 of the respondents seem to support the idea of socialism more than half of the respondents in western Germany do not agree to the statement “socialism is a good idea”. Regarding the costs of reunification the West German population have bigger worries than the East Germans. Also a bigger proportion of the eastern Germans seem to place themselves at the left and less to the right compared to the western Germans. Finally, probably the most important difference is that the PDS has a fairly high support in the eastern German population whereas in the west the number was too low to even be included in the analysis. There thus seems to exist a regional cleavage between east and west which is characterised by a general higher support for socialism in the east and less worries about the costs of the reunification compared to in the west. At the party level this difference is expressed by a higher support for the PDS in all eastern German lifestyle groups compared to the west where the PDS has no influence. Although the PDS lost its faction in the German parliament after the 2002 general election as the party did neither manage the 5% threshold nor manage to win three direct candidates, the support for the PDS is still significantly higher in the east than the west. At the 2002 general election the PDS won 16.8% (-4.6 compared with 1998) of the votes in the east compared to 1.1% (-0.1) in the west (Forschungsgruppe Wahlen 2002:9). To which extent this development will continue and in the end the PDS will lose its support base in the east completely, only future elections can tell.

## 8. CONCLUSION

The aim of this thesis was to analyse 1. Whether social milieus which were established in the German Empire and Weimar Republic still exist in reunified Germany. 2. Whether any new social milieus have arisen in the old and new *Länder* and finally - based on the results found in 1. and 2. - whether social milieus still contribute to understand the voting behaviour in reunified Germany (cf. page 2).

### **A summary of the research strategy**

The starting point of the thesis were the traditional social milieus of Lepsius and how these developed during the German Empire and Weimar Republic and the post World War II era until today. As these social milieus have declined over the past decades the argument was that in order to detect new social milieus, the lifestyle concept might be fruitful as it differentiates the population of modern societies to a larger extent. However, lifestyle groups and social milieus are not to be treated equally; rather lifestyle groups might reflect existing social milieus as well as indicate possible new social milieus in the society. Thus, the concepts of lifestyle and social milieus are considered to relate as was elaborated in detail in the theoretical part in Chapter 2. In Chapter 3 the traditional social milieus and their cleavage bases were presented and their separate developments in the east and the west after the Second World War were discussed. The decline of traditional milieus and the development towards more differentiated lifestyle groups is often considered to be a consequence of the individualisation process which has taken place in modern societies during the past decades. As the individualisation process is related to both socio-economic changes and value changes in the society the most important developments in these areas in both the east and west after 1945 were presented in Chapter 4. In particular, the differences between the east and west were assumed to be important to understand how different the preconditions were in the east and west with regard to the development of the traditional milieus and their traditional cleavage bases and the possible establishment of new social milieus with other cleavage structures. In Chapter 5 several lifestyle and milieu surveys were presented and the results of two surveys – one carried out in the east and one

in the west – were presented in detail and discussed with regard to cleavages and voting behaviour.

In Chapter 6, the hypotheses were elaborated and the data and variables which were going to be used in the empirical analysis were presented. Due to the differences in socio-economic transformations since World War II the assumption was that the old and new *Länder* would differ with respect to social milieus. The hypotheses (cf. Chapter 6.1) were that 1. A religious milieu would exist in the west characterised by a traditional and religious orientated lifestyle, religious affiliation and church attendance, membership(s) in religious organisations, interest representation by the churches and party preference for the CDU/CSU. A religious milieu was not assumed to exist in the east. 2. Furthermore, a worker's milieu would exist in the west characterised by a work-orientated lifestyle, blue-collar workers, membership in trade union, interest representation by the trade union and party preference for the SPD. A worker's milieu was not expected to exist in the east either. 3. Also, a Green milieu with an education-orientated lifestyle, post-materialist value orientations, membership in student organisations and/or alternative political organisations, interest representation by environmental organisation(s) and party preference for Bündnis 90/ die Grünen was expected to exist in the west. This milieu was not expected to exist in the east. 4. In the east only a typical eastern German milieu characterised by left-orientation, membership in political organisations and/or student organisations with an interest representation by and party preference for the PDS was expected to exist. 5. Finally, it was assumed that an unpolitical milieu would exist both in the west and east characterised by a low social status, passivity, lack of interest representation and an inclination not to vote.

To test the hypotheses in the empirical part in Chapter 7, I chose a different approach than usually applied in the analysis of social milieus. Instead of considering lifestyle groups and social milieus as equivalent as some researchers do a strict separation of the concepts was applied: the formation of lifestyle groups in the first step was considered a useful way of finding more differentiated social groups in the society than what is often found when solely social structural characteristics are being applied. However, as was confirmed in the empirical analysis, even if no objective social structural characteristics are included in the analysis of lifestyle groups, the groups still differ with respect to these characteristics (cf. Chapters 7.1.3.1 and 7.2.3.1) and to a certain extent still point at social structural cleavages

in the society. Thus, a lifestyle is not decoupled from the social structure or from the social position (cf. Spellerberg 1996:224). Rather social structural preconditions for the differentiation of lifestyles exist – a relationship which according to Konietzka (1995:254) is often ignored.

In the second step the existence of social milieus was analysed using the differentiated lifestyle groups found in the previous stage, analysing significant relationships between these groups and the cleavages, organisational memberships, interest representations and party preference.

### **A summary of the results**

Based on the criteria that a relationship must exist between a lifestyle group, organisational membership, interest representation and party preference in order to define a social milieu the following results were found:

1. In the west a religious milieu exists which is characterised by a religious orientated lifestyle, religious affiliation and high church attendance, materialist and conservative value orientations, interest representation by the churches and party preference for the CDU/CSU. The link to religious organisations is missing, nevertheless this was considered a social milieu as all other characteristics were clear. A religious milieu was not found in the east. Hypothesis 1 thus seems confirmed.

2. Furthermore, hypothesis 2 may be considered to be confirmed as well, as a worker's milieu seems to exist in the west. Although no particularly work-orientated lifestyle exists, this milieu has the largest proportion of lower white-collars and blue-collar workers, trade union (DGB) membership, interest representation by the trade unions and party preference for the SPD. In spite of the former "*Arbeiter- und Bauernstaat*" no worker's milieu could be found in the east, but there are indications that a worker's milieu may develop from the "sports-, work- and family-orientated" lifestyle group as this group has an above average number of blue-collar workers, an above average number of trade union members and of people who consider the trade unions to represent their interests. However, although over

50% of the members of this group have a party preference for the SPD, this was not very different from the SPD preference found in other groups.

3. Also a Green milieu of post-materialists with an education-orientated lifestyle, high social status, past memberships in alternative political groups and youth, student organisations, interest representation by environmental organisations and Bündnis 90/die Grünen and party preference for Bündnis 90/die Grünen was found in the west as was expected. Surprisingly, a Green milieu which fulfilled almost all criteria except that it missed the organisational membership in alternative political groups could be found in the east, too. Thus, although it was assumed that no milieu characteristic for the modernised society would be found in the east, there is evidence of a Green milieu in the east. Hypothesis 3 may thus only be confirmed for the west. With regard to the east hypothesis 3 was falsified.

4. A “partly left-orientated milieu” was indicated in the east characterised by left-orientation, interest representation by and preference for the PDS. This might be considered a specific eastern German social milieu as it is the only one proving a close relationship with the PDS. Nevertheless, as was discussed in previous chapters this “milieu” is not homogeneous and has no link to any specific organisation, although it has the second highest number of people who were former members in youth, student organisations and the highest number of former members in political parties. Thus, the fourth hypothesis can only partly be confirmed.

5. Finally, passive dissatisfied milieus were found both in the east and the west. These were characterised by passive lifestyles, lack of important life areas, low social positions and lack in organisational memberships and interest representations. Furthermore, the members were below average satisfied with democracy and tend above average not to vote. Hypothesis 5 could thus be confirmed as well.

In summary, all hypotheses could be confirmed with regard to the west; a religious milieu, worker’s milieu, post-materialist milieu and unpolitical milieu were found. With regard to the east the hypothesis that a religious milieu and worker’s milieu would not exist were confirmed. The hypothesis that a Green milieu would not exist was falsified, whereas the

hypothesis that an eastern German milieu would exist could only be partly confirmed. Finally, the existence of an unpolitical milieu was confirmed for the east as well.

Looking at the cleavages, the results seem to support the existence of more or less the same cleavages as those which were assumed to exist in reunified Germany and which were discussed in Chapter 5.2.3; a regional cleavage between the east and the west, a cleavage between post-materialist and materialist value orientations, religiosity and secularism and work and capital. Furthermore, a cleavage between the deprived and the satisfied seems to exist which is related to both globalisation and modernisation and the impact these processes have had on the respective groups. Finally, some differences exist with regard to the left-right cleavage. However, both in the east and west 70% and more place themselves in the middle of the left-right scale. As discussed in Chapter 6.2.2, though, the items included in the analysis of possible cleavages are rather few. Future analyses should include sets of variables facilitating the analysis of attitudinal dimensions in order to distinguish between the impact of short-term issues and long-term ideological positions in the German population. Further methodological aspects will be discussed in the following.

### **Methodological considerations and outlook**

Although the strategy of data analysis applied in the empirical part of this thesis was of an explorative nature the formation of social milieus the way this has been done in this thesis might nevertheless be quite fruitful. This approach facilitates the analysis of short-term lifestyle groups compared to long-term social milieus in the society. As argued in Chapter 6.1 the analysis of the relationship between lifestyle groups and the external variables may point at a *core of social milieus* at a given time; some of these may be known to us others are new. Whether these old and new ones will exist in five or ten years as well, whether they grow or decline is not known. Also with respect to the lifestyle groups some may become more settled over the years and develop into real social milieus, others will be replaced by other lifestyle groups. Conducting surveys on a regular basis including lifestyle variables, cleavage dimensions, organisational memberships, interest representation and party preference would facilitate the transition of social milieus and lifestyle groups in the society and their impact on voting behaviour.

Furthermore, surveys of lifestyle and social milieus are today often criticised for finding too divergent results and too different numbers of groups; some find six, other eight, ten or twelve etc. Although some prove to have significant similarities as was discussed in Chapter 5.1, 7.3 and shown in Appendix 1 the tendency of researchers to give the impression that all groups/social milieus found in an analysis prove the same level of stability and cohesion restricts the fruitfulness of the concepts and their contribution to explaining attitudes and behaviour in a dynamic society (see also Hölscher 1998:303f.). I would argue that how many lifestyle groups have been found at one period in time by different researchers and how many lifestyle groups can be found five or ten years later is rather unimportant. Important is that researchers within the same discipline find the same – or at least almost the same - *core of social milieus* at a given time.

However, even though it may seem quite fruitful to use the lifestyle concept in order to find the core of social milieus and related cleavages which may contribute to understand voting behaviour in the modern society, there is no doubt that certain problems arise. The concept does among others not work out very well for distinguishing between all kinds of groups. In the west, for example, those preferring a traditional lifestyle with a preference for folk music and Heimatfilme etc. obviously embed a very heterogeneous group and this is also the case with respect to a high culture lifestyle. Whether this is a problem of the concept or may be solved by a better operationalisation or improvements in the statistical procedure needs to be explored further. A more general problem is that actually all groups - even though some have a more homogeneous pattern which facilitated the formation of a social milieu – are more heterogeneous in today's society than decades ago. With further specialisations on the labour market and differentiations in ways of living this process of pluralisation will probably increase in modern societies. Thus, the social milieus – if any new will be found in the future – will probably not be of the size and stability as the traditional ones (cf. Weßels 2000:152f.).

Although many similarities exist between the new and old *Länder*, the differences show that *Einheit ist nicht gleich Einheitlichkeit* (Becker 1992:103) and that integration is not just a matter of economy, but also of mentalities and individuals. When considering the differences between the east and west the mistake of asking how fast the former GDR will assimilate into the old Federal Republic should be avoided since the consequences of western German

development into "risk society" are not only positive. Cultural features and the pre-modern problems of the new *Länder* can serve as a pause for thought for western Germans to evaluate the social results of their own continuous modernisation and the gap between the winners and losers of this process. According to Kronauer and Vogel a new group of unemployed has, for example, emerged in the west. This group consists mainly of men in the 40s who worked in industrial branches which were hit by the crisis and where the majority has been without a job for two years and more (cf. Kronauer/Vogel 1998:343). In addition to the economic consequences of long-term unemployment on these members they experience social exclusion (cf. Kronauer/Vogel 1998:347).

It might be correct that the existence of social moral milieus in the Weimar Republic restricted democratic developments because the existing political parties could not absorb new cleavages and social groups. However, a stable democracy needs social groups, interest groups, and political parties who know they can rely on one another and who they can expect to represent their interests. As argued by Lipset (2001:8)

“As noted, to endure, political parties require a base which is uncritically loyal, which will work or support them even when conditions go bad.”

A consequence of the decrease in loyalties is what we experience in almost all western societies today; politics is based on short-term issues and political candidates show-off in the media to catch the volatile voter in the middle. As argued by Vester (2001:13f.), social milieus are no longer strongly rooted large social groups which are sharply separated from one another and fighting against each other - the “family tree” of social milieus has become considerably differentiated and modernised. In everyday life, however, traditional styles and principles of living still exist. Today there is thus no crisis of social milieus as a result of value change, as Vester argues, but rather a crisis of political representation which is a consequence of the increasing distance between elites and milieus. Less and less the problems and needs of a particular social group in the society are in the focus of party strategies, but rather the creation of a political party image which can be a sufficiently attractive product for many social groups. Whether the “new middle” actually represents a new social milieu and whether the parties will be successful in the long run in their strategy to concentrate on the voter in the middle remains open, in particular, as long as clear characterisations of this electoral group are still missing (cf. Eith/Mielke 2000:112ff.; Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger 2001:16). The results of this thesis indicate that the majority of all lifestyle groups place themselves in the middle. The

“middle” is thus no uniform group, but may work as a marketing concept of the political parties which has an appeal to the electorate on a cognitive level, but is not itself rooted in the social behaviour of the respective target groups.

In conclusion, milieus can only to a limited extent contribute to understand voting behaviour in today's Germany; large social milieus decline, new social milieus – where they can be found – are smaller and their long-term stability still needs to be proven. Nevertheless, the analyses of lifestyle groups and social milieus might contribute to understand differences in behaviour and attitudes between the eastern and western Germans. Furthermore, the analyses may give indications of which cleavages are latent in society and should not be ignored, but be brought to the surface and solved before they find loyalties in undemocratic movements or parties. The existence of passive-dissatisfied milieus in both the east and the west indicate that losers of the modernisation process are already politically important. As argued previously a reason why the lifestyle approach may seem so insignificant to electoral research may be that the lifestyle groups are simply not (yet) politicised or electoral researchers have not (yet) found those cleavages which uncover social conflicts between modern lifestyle groups or between traditional and modern lifestyle groups. Thus, in order to analyse the impact of social milieus on voting behaviour in modern societies it would be a big challenge to include lifestyle groups, cleavage dimensions and organisational membership structures – formal or informal - in one survey to properly test the relation and impact of these three dimensions on electoral behaviour.

## APPENDIX

### Appendix 1 A comparison of lifestyle groups in West Germany

Schulze	Sinus	Gluchowski	Giegler	Spellerberg	Otte
Niveaumilieu	Konservatives gehobenes Milieu	Gehobene Konservative	Konservatives gehobenes Großbürgertum	Ganzheitlich kulturell Interessierte	Niveautypus
			„urban professionals“ (partly)	Etablierte beruflich Engagierte	
Selbstverwirklichungsmilieu	Technokratisch-liberales Milieu	Aufstiegorientierter jüngerer Mensch	Alternative Hedonisten	Postmaterielle aktive Vielseitige	Selbstverwirklichungstypus
	Hedonistisches Milieu	Linksliberaler integrierter Postmaterialist			
	Alternatives linkes Milieu	Postmaterialistisch linksalternativ eingestellter Mensch			
Integrations-Milieu	Aufstiegorientiertes Milieu	Aufgeschlossener integrierter Normalbürger	Alternative Asketen (partly), „urban professionals“ (partly)	Traditionelle freizeitaktive Ortsverbundene	Integrationstypus
		Integrierter älterer Mensch (partly)		Expressiv Vielseitige	
Harmonie-Milieu	Kleinbürgerliches Milieu	Pflichtbestimmter konventionsbestimmter Arbeitnehmer	Ältere Kleinbürger, familienzentrierte Frauen	Traditionelle zurückgezogen Lebende	Harmonietypus
		Integrierter älterer Mensch (partly)			
	Traditionelles Arbeitermilieu	Isolierter alter Mensch			
Unterhaltungsmilieu	Traditionsloses Arbeitermilieu	Unauffälliger, eher passiver Arbeitnehmer	Junge „fast-food“-Männer	Pragmatisch Berufsorientierte	Sportorientierter Unterhaltungstypus
				Freizeitsorientierte Gesellige	Passiver Unterhaltungstypus
				Häusliche Unterhaltungssuchende	

Source: The overview is based on Tables 5.1. and 5.2. in Hartmann 1999:138-139. For further detail concerning the assignments see Hartmann.



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