| dc.contributor.author | Bühler, Axel | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-12-08T17:36:25Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2021-12-08T17:36:25Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2009 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://jlupub.ub.uni-giessen.de//handle/jlupub/405 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://dx.doi.org/10.22029/jlupub-338 | |
| dc.description.abstract | An individualistic social ontology attributes mental states merely to individuals, and denies the existence of collective attitudes such as we-intentions. Furthermore, if collectives cannot be bearers of minds, then collective mental states cannot serve as explanatory factors. In my paper, I first show that we-intentions do serve considerable explanatory purposes within developmental psychology. I then propose an account of weintentions as complexes of intentions of different individuals. These intentions are of a distinct kind: de-re-intentions, grounded in external objects in a specific situation. This grounding is achieved by embodied cognition, through appropriate senso-motoric activities. I conclude that my account of we-intentions is compatible with an individualistic social ontology. | de_DE |
| dc.language.iso | de | de_DE |
| dc.subject.ddc | ddc:100 | de_DE |
| dc.subject.ddc | ddc:330 | de_DE |
| dc.title | Wir-Absichten in der individualistischen Sozialontologie | de_DE |
| dc.type | article | de_DE |
| dcterms.isPartOf | 2536124-7 | |
| local.affiliation | Externe Einrichtungen | de_DE |
| local.source.spage | 83 | de_DE |
| local.source.epage | 93 | de_DE |
| local.source.journaltitle | Rationality, markets, and morals: RMM | de_DE |
| local.source.volume | 0 | de_DE |
