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dc.contributor.authorGadenne, Volker
dc.date.accessioned2021-12-08T21:59:38Z
dc.date.available2021-12-08T21:59:38Z
dc.date.issued2013
dc.identifier.urihttps://jlupub.ub.uni-giessen.de//handle/jlupub/464
dc.identifier.urihttp://dx.doi.org/10.22029/jlupub-397
dc.description.abstractThe idea of external validity, which is well-known in the social sciences, has recently also been emphasized in experimental economics. It has been argued that external validity is an important criterion in experimental research, which has been neglected by philosophy of science. In connection with this criterion, a methodology has been advanced in which inductive generalization and analogical inference play a central role. The hypotheticodeductive methodology is said to be untenable, or at least insufficient. In this paper, hypothetico-deductivism is defended. The idea of external validity, and the new plea for inductivism, is critically discussed. It is pointed out that the fundamental problems of inductivism are still unsolved. The criterion of external validity is superfluous and misleading. And the problems in experimental research associated with external validity can well be solved on the basis of deductivism.de_DE
dc.language.isoende_DE
dc.subject.ddcddc:100de_DE
dc.subject.ddcddc:330de_DE
dc.titleExternal Validity and the New Inductivism in Experimental Economicsde_DE
dc.typearticlede_DE
dcterms.isPartOf2536124-7
local.affiliationExterne Einrichtungende_DE
local.source.spage1de_DE
local.source.epage19de_DE
local.source.journaltitleRationality, markets, and morals: RMMde_DE
local.source.volume4de_DE


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