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dc.contributor.authorGauthier, David
dc.date.accessioned2021-12-08T22:05:25Z
dc.date.available2021-12-08T22:05:25Z
dc.date.issued2013
dc.identifier.urihttps://jlupub.ub.uni-giessen.de//handle/jlupub/466
dc.identifier.urihttp://dx.doi.org/10.22029/jlupub-399
dc.description.abstractI begin with two simple, similar interactions. In one, maximizing agents will reach a Pareto-optimal equilibrium, in the other, they won't. The first shows the working of the Invisible Hand; the second, its limitations. Using other simple interactions in which equilibrium and P-optimality are incompatible, I argue that the rational outcome of interaction answers to optimality rather than maximization, and requires agents to cooperate in realizing an agreed outcome, rather than to seek their best reply to their fellows. The terms of cooperation are set by a social contract, which coordinates choices to achieve a Pareto-optimum when the Invisible Hand is absent.de_DE
dc.language.isoende_DE
dc.subjectbest-replyde_DE
dc.subjectequilibriumde_DE
dc.subjectInvisible Handde_DE
dc.subjectmaximizationde_DE
dc.subjectPareto-optimalityde_DE
dc.subjectrational choicede_DE
dc.subject.ddcddc:100de_DE
dc.subject.ddcddc:330de_DE
dc.titleAchieving Pareto-Optimality: Invisible Hands, Social Contracts, and Rational Deliberationde_DE
dc.typearticlede_DE
dcterms.isPartOf2536124-7
local.affiliationFB 01 - Rechtswissenschaftde_DE
local.source.spage191de_DE
local.source.epage204de_DE
local.source.journaltitleRationality, markets, and morals: RMMde_DE
local.source.volume4de_DE


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