Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorGüth, Werner
dc.contributor.authorKliemt, Hartmut
dc.date.accessioned2021-12-08T22:10:09Z
dc.date.available2021-12-08T22:10:09Z
dc.date.issued2013
dc.identifier.urihttps://jlupub.ub.uni-giessen.de//handle/jlupub/467
dc.identifier.urihttp://dx.doi.org/10.22029/jlupub-400
dc.description.abstractContrary to communitarian market criticism institutions relying on money and bidding can strengthen faculties of `self-governance'. Securing procedurally egalitarian bidding on the basis of declared monetary evaluations guarantees that all realized changes of a status quo are in an `objective' (pecuniary) sense equally advantageous for all members of the community. We show how to use this idea in the context of Elinor Ostrom type common(s) projects. Empirical evidence on `procedurally fair bidding' is presented. The practical scope and limits of procedural egalitarianism need further empirical exploration but money may be the best means to express moral values in `communitarian consent'.de_DE
dc.language.isoende_DE
dc.subjectFair Proceduresde_DE
dc.subjectGoverning the Commonsde_DE
dc.subjectCommunitarianismde_DE
dc.subjectContractarianismde_DE
dc.subjectEgalitarian Mechanismsde_DE
dc.subjectUnanimityde_DE
dc.subject‘Crowding out’de_DE
dc.subject.ddcddc:100de_DE
dc.subject.ddcddc:330de_DE
dc.titleFairness That Money Can Buy. Procedural Egalitarianism in Practicede_DE
dc.typearticlede_DE
dcterms.isPartOf2536124-7
local.affiliationExterne Einrichtungende_DE
local.source.spage28de_DE
local.source.epage38de_DE
local.source.journaltitleRationality, markets, and morals: RMMde_DE
local.source.volume4de_DE


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record