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dc.contributor.authorHanisch, Christoph
dc.date.accessioned2021-12-10T12:43:13Z
dc.date.available2021-12-10T12:43:13Z
dc.date.issued2013
dc.identifier.urihttps://jlupub.ub.uni-giessen.de//handle/jlupub/479
dc.identifier.urihttp://dx.doi.org/10.22029/jlupub-408
dc.description.abstractSen's critique of the homo economicus conception of choice asserts that agents who `displace' their goals, and instead choose on the basis of others', are not therefore irrational. I first defend Sen against the objection that violations of "self-goal choice" undermine coherent deliberation. My critique of Sen then introduces the notion of `negative goals' and shows that the process of adopting others' aims remains constrained by those `goals' that determine the spectrum of actions that an agent considers permissible. Only on rare occasions are we pushed to violate even these negative goals that play a central role for our identities.de_DE
dc.description.sponsorshipSonstige Drittmittelgeber/-innende_DE
dc.language.isoende_DE
dc.subjectRational choice theoryde_DE
dc.subjecthomo economicusde_DE
dc.subjectpractical identityde_DE
dc.subjectself-goal choicede_DE
dc.subjectcommitmentde_DE
dc.subject.ddcddc:100de_DE
dc.subject.ddcddc:330de_DE
dc.titleNegative Goals and Identity: Revisiting Sen’s Critique of Homo Economicusde_DE
dc.typearticlede_DE
dcterms.isPartOf2536124-7
local.affiliationExterne Einrichtungende_DE
local.source.spage157de_DE
local.source.epage172de_DE
local.source.journaltitleRationality, markets, and morals: RMMde_DE
local.source.volume4de_DE


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