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dc.contributor.authorFrederick, Danny
dc.date.accessioned2021-12-10T14:08:04Z
dc.date.available2021-12-10T14:08:04Z
dc.date.issued2013
dc.identifier.urihttps://jlupub.ub.uni-giessen.de//handle/jlupub/486
dc.identifier.urihttp://dx.doi.org/10.22029/jlupub-415
dc.description.abstractI argue that social-contract theory cannot succeed because reasonable people may always disagree, and that social-contract theory is irrelevant to the problem of the legitimacy of a form of government or of a system of moral rules. I note the weakness of the appeal to implicit agreement, the conflation of legitimacy with stability, the undesirability of `public justification' and the apparent blindness to the evolutionary critical-rationalist approach of Hayek and Popper. I employ that approach to sketch answers to the theoretical, historical and practical questions about the legitimacy of government or of systems of moral rules.de_DE
dc.language.isoende_DE
dc.subjectcritical rationalityde_DE
dc.subjectdisagreementde_DE
dc.subjectevolutionde_DE
dc.subjectlegitimacyde_DE
dc.subjectsocial contractde_DE
dc.subject.ddcddc:100de_DE
dc.subject.ddcddc:330de_DE
dc.titleSocial Contract Theory Should Be Abandonedde_DE
dc.typearticlede_DE
dcterms.isPartOf2536124-7
local.affiliationExterne Einrichtungende_DE
local.source.spage178de_DE
local.source.epage190de_DE
local.source.journaltitleRationality, markets, and morals: RMMde_DE
local.source.volume4de_DE


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