“German Water Diplomacy in Central Asia” Master Thesis In the Study of Transition Management (M.Sc.) Faculty 09 – Agricultural Sciences, Nutritional Sciences, and Environmental Management Justus-Liebig University Gießen, Germany by Gerhard Max-Joseph Krupp Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Iskandar Abdullaev Second Reader: Prof. Dr. Martin Petrick Submission Date: 10.06.2024 2 Abstract: Central Asia has a long history of challenges with water management. The region does not suffer from water scarcity, but its water resources are unequally distributed temporally and spatially. As a legacy of the Soviet Union, the five states of Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) share a vast transboundary water infrastructure that necessitates transboundary cooperation on water management. However, attempts to cooperate on water management have not been successful. Water remains a highly contested resource and its provision is increasingly threatened by climate change. Germany has been engaging in water diplomacy in Central Asia since 2008 with the Water Initiative Central Asia, also known as the “Berlin Process”, to support the five Central Asian states in the development of system of sustainable transboundary water management. The initiative included activities aimed at rehabilitating infrastructure, fostering transboundary cooperation, expanding research and data collection capacities, and training water professionals and public servants with capacity building measures. In 2020, it was continued by the Green Central Asia Initiative, which expanded the scope, aiming at fostering cooperation on adapting to the impacts of climate change in general. Academic research on these two water diplomacy initiatives has been limited, so this master thesis provides a comprehensive account of both by means of a document analysis of over 100 sources which discusses the goals, involved actors, structure and realised activities of both initiatives. Based on an in-depth analysis of the reviewed literature, a conceptual framework of nine factors required for the establishment of a system of sustainable transboundary water management within the framework of water diplomacy has been developed. The nine factors are political assent, mutual benefit, financing, data, innovation, governance, capacity development, trust, and institutional anchoring. Each factor is required for a system of sustainable transboundary water management to be established between states and to persist over time, albeit at different stages of the water diplomacy engagement. This framework offers an analytical approach to assess the extent to which the respective water diplomacy activities contribute to fulfilling each of the factors, and therewith to the establishment of a system of sustainable transboundary water management. The analysis finds that Germany’s water diplomacy engagement in Central Asia has provided a comprehensive approach that has addressed each of these factors. Therewith, Germany has substantially contributed to advancing the process of establishing a system of sustainable transboundary water management in Central Asia; however, the process is still ongoing, thus a final assessment cannot be made yet. 3 Table of Contents List of Tables .............................................................................................................................. 4 Abbreviations ............................................................................................................................. 5 1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 7 2. Methodology .................................................................................................................... 10 a. Case Study Selection .................................................................................................... 10 b. Method of Data Collection and Analysis ..................................................................... 11 3. Theoretical Framework .................................................................................................... 13 a. Water Diplomacy ......................................................................................................... 13 b. Factors of Sustainable Transboundary Water Management ......................................... 16 4. Water Management in Central Asia ................................................................................. 20 a. Geography, Demography and Climate Change ........................................................... 20 b. History of Water Management ..................................................................................... 22 c. Competing Interests ..................................................................................................... 24 d. Past Conflicts and Cooperation Attempts .................................................................... 25 e. Non-German Water Diplomacy Activity in Central Asia ............................................ 27 5. German Water Diplomacy in Central Asia ...................................................................... 28 a. General German Water Diplomacy Policy ................................................................... 29 b. Germany’s Perspective on and Interest in Water Management in Central Asia: ......... 34 c. The Water Initiative Central Asia / The “Berlin Process” ............................................ 36 d. Green Central Asia Initiative ....................................................................................... 60 6. Analysing German Water Diplomacy in Central Asia ..................................................... 75 a. Conceptual Framework ................................................................................................ 75 b. Applying the Framework: The Impacts of German Water Diplomacy ........................ 77 7. Discussion and Conclusion .............................................................................................. 80 8. Reference List ................................................................................................................... 83 4 List of Tables Table 1 Instruments of German water diplomacy ................................................................... 32 Table 2 Interdisciplinary methodology of the GIZ .................................................................. 42 Table 3 Focus areas and goals ................................................................................................ 43 Table 4 Projects realised by the GIZ in Central Asia .............................................................. 44 Table 5 Projects implemented in the Isfarah River Basin during the WMBOCA project ....... 46 Table 6 Goals and activities of the RDCWRM project in Phase I ........................................... 48 Table 7 Activities organised by the UNECE during Phase I of the RDCWRM project ........... 49 Table 8 Goals and planned activities in Phase II of the RDCWRM project ........................... 51 Table 9 Meetings, workshops and seminars in Phase II of the RDCWRM project ................. 52 Table 10 Tasks and activities of the CAWa project .................................................................. 54 Table 11 Funding for the Berlin Process by the AA (2009–2012 and 2014–2018) ................. 58 Table 12 Outcomes of the Berlin Process ................................................................................ 58 Table 13 Pillars and Goals of the Green Central Asia Initiative ............................................ 63 Table 14 Planned activities of the Regional Action Plan ........................................................ 64 Table 15 Strategic objectives, goals, and proposed projects of the RCCAS ........................... 67 Table 16 Collaboration levels and planned activities of the CRMCA project ........................ 68 Table 17 Goals and planned activities of the CSWRMCA project .......................................... 70 Table 18 GCAI: International Conferences ............................................................................ 71 Table 19 Capacity building activities realised within the CAWa-Green Project ..................... 73 Table 20 Nine factors of sustainable transboundary water management ............................... 76 5 Abbreviations AA German Federal Foreign Office ASBP Aral Sea Basin Program BMUV German Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Nuclear Safety and Consumer Protection BMZ German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development BIMBF German Federal Ministry of Education and Research CAIAG Central Asian Institute of Applied Geosciences CAREC Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation Program CAWa Research Network “Central Asian Water” CRMCA Climate Risk Management in Central Asia CSWRMCA Climate-Sensitive Water Resources Management in Central Asia DAAD German Academic Exchange Service DKU German-Kazakh University DLR German Aerospace Centre EC-IFAS Executive Committee of the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea ETH Zürich Swiss Federal Institute of Technology EU European Union GIS Geographic Information System GIZ German Society for International Cooperation GFZ German Research Centre for Geosciences ICSD Interstate Commission on Sustainable Development ICWC Interstate Commission for Water Coordination of Central Asia IFAS International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea IO International Organisation IUCN International Union for Conservation of Nature IWRM Integrated Water Resources Management MLU Martin Luther University Halle-Wittenberg MODIS Moderate Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer NGO Non-governmental organisation PIK Potsdam Institute for Climate Research RAP Regional Action Plan RCCAS Regional Climate Change Adaptation Strategy for Central Asia 6 RDCWRM Regional Dialogue and Cooperation on Water Resources Management RWG Regional Working Groups SDC Swiss Development Cooperation Agency SDG Sustainable Development Goals SIC Scientific Information Center TIIAME Tashkent Institute of Irrigation and Agricultural Mechanisation Engineers UBAI Ulugh Beg Astronomical Institute of the Uzbek Academy of Sciences UN United Nations UNDP United Nations Development Program UNECE United Nations Economic Commission for Europe UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics WMBOCA Water Management and Basin Organisations in Central Asia Project 7 1. Introduction Water is essential for human life. The growing impacts of climate change are increasingly limiting the availability of water, which exacerbates water scarcity and creates challenges of water distribution (Pohl et al., 2017). Water scarcity creates competition between states over its use, which can create tensions or exacerbate existing ones, and even cause conflicts (Islam & Repella, 2015). As an estimated 90% of humanity lives in countries that share a basin with another country, there is a substantial conflict potential associated with water (Salmoral et al., 2019). One example is Central Asia, where water management is inextricably linked with energy and security politics (Abdolvand et al., 2015) and disagreements over water distribution have repeatedly led to regional tensions and conflict (EBRD, 2019; Rheinbay et al., 2021). Central Asia is considered a ‘hot spot’ of climate change, which is projected to severely impact water availability in the region (Karthe, Chalov & Borchardt, 2015). Germany has been engaging in water diplomacy in Central Asia since 2008, supporting efforts to establish a system of sustainable transboundary water management that fosters cooperation and prevents conflict over the use of the shared water resources (Auswärtiges Amt, 2015). Water diplomacy encapsulates a concept in academia and diplomatic practice aimed at preventing conflict and fostering cooperation over shared transboundary water resources (Sehring et al., 2022). There are over 276 transboundary river basins in the world, many without a joint system of sustainable transboundary water management (Choudhury & Islam, 2015). With ongoing economic and population growth, future projections estimate global water demand to rise by 55% by 2050, while more than half of the world’s population will live in water-stressed conditions (BMUV, 2023). Consequently, the growing discrepancy between rising water demand and decreasing water supply poses a substantial conflict risk. Simultaneously, water can also serve as a basis of cooperation between states that otherwise do not cooperate (Pohl et al., 2014). However, establishing transboundary cooperation on water resources management is a complex process that requires the consideration of various policy issues and scientific insight and that is dependent on various factors to ensure ongoing engagement (Choudhury & Islam, 2015). In Central Asia, “water was and still is the most important and regularly contested natural resource” (Abdullaev & Rakhmatullaev, 2013, p. 849). Water is unequally distributed, both temporally and spatially (Schrader et al., 2009). Central Asia’s water management situation is peculiar because of the existence of an extensive transboundary water infrastructure, a legacy of the Soviet Union (Blumstein, Pohl & Tänzler, 2016). Hence, the 8 Central Asian states depend on transboundary cooperation for successful water management (Abdullaev & Rakhmatullaev, 2013). However, “non-cooperation tends to prevail” (Sorg et al., 2014, p. 72) and the Central Asian states utilise “all forces: political […], economical […] in order to achieve more control of water management at the interstate level.” (Abdullaev & Atabaeva, 2012, p. 111). The topic of water management and water diplomacy in Central Asia is very broad and complex, with extensive research within and between many different academic disciplines. While water diplomacy in general and the water management struggles of Central Asia in particular have received extensive academic consideration, there is little research on third-party water diplomacy activity or impacts (Sehring et al., 2022). German water diplomacy in Central Asia as a whole has been assessed in only five academic publications (Abdolvand et al., 2015; Boyarkina, 2018; Eschment, 2011; Hakala, Mustasilta & Hadi, 2023; Schrader et al., 2009). Germany is one of the states proactively engaging in water diplomacy efforts in basins across the world to promote peace, stability and regional cooperation (Hakala, Mustasilta & Hadi, 2023). The German government regards climate diplomacy as a preventive security policy, as climate change has become a factor and a threat in geopolitics (Auswärtiges Amt, 2022), and engages in conflict prevention by promoting the sustainable use of water and fostering transboundary cooperation between riparian nations (Bundesregierung, 2023). In 2008, the German Federal Foreign Office (AA) initiated the “Water Initiative Central Asia” together with the five Central Asian states Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Also called the “Berlin Process”, it was a project aimed at fostering regional stability and prosperity by supporting the establishment of a joint system of sustainable transboundary water management in Central Asia. It was continued by the “Green Central Asia” initiative in 2020 (Hakala, Mustasilta & Hadi, 2023). In this master thesis, three research aims are pursued to contribute to the academic discussion on water diplomacy in political science: First, writing a comprehensive account of German water diplomacy activity in Central Asia, specifically of the Berlin Process and the Green Central Asia initiative, to contribute to closing the existing research gap on German water diplomacy in Central Asia. Second, the development of a conceptual framework of nine fundamental factors required for the successful establishment of a sustainable transboundary water management. Finally, Germany’s water diplomacy activity in Central Asia is analysed with the framework to assess how Germany has been contributing to the establishment of a system of sustainable transboundary water management in Central Asia. 9 To this end, this master thesis seeks to answer the following research question: “How has German water diplomacy activity in Central Asia contributed to the establishment of a system of sustainable transboundary water management?” To answer this research question, it poses the following two sub-research questions: “What activities have been realised within the framework of German water diplomacy in Central Asia?” and “Which factors are required for the establishment of a system of sustainable transboundary water management?” The research focus of this master thesis is on German water diplomacy in Central Asia, specifically the activities realised by the involved state actors and the organisations and research institutes employed by the German government to implement the goals of its water diplomacy initiatives. As it is a very specific and contextual topic, its composite parts – water diplomacy, Central Asia’s challenges with water management, and Germany’s general water diplomacy policy - are first succinctly explained to provide the necessary context for the analysis. In the chapter on water management in Central Asia, references to publications providing more detailed analyses of the respective topic areas are provided. The geopolitical aspects influencing Germany’s water diplomacy engagement in Central Asia are not discussed. This master thesis is structured as follows: The second chapter explains the methodology applied in this master thesis. Subsequently, the third chapter discusses the emergence and importance of the theory of water diplomacy, providing a definition for this thesis, as well as assessing nine factors required for the establishment of a system of sustainable transboundary water management, which form the basis for the conceptual framework. In the fourth chapter, Central Asia’s water management struggles are succinctly explained. The chapter is separated in five subchapters, addressing the general geographic and demographic factors as well as the projected impacts of climate change on water availability in Central Asia, the history of water management in the region and its impact on water management today, the competing interests over water between the Central Asian states, past conflicts and cooperation attempts over water between the Central Asian states, and non-German water diplomacy activity in Central Asia. Next, the fifth chapter discusses German water diplomacy in Central Asia. The first subchapter analyses Germany’s general water diplomacy policy to situate it within Germany’s overall foreign policy, assessing the approaches and instruments it comprises. Subsequently, the second subchapter addresses the perspective of the German government on water management issues in Central Asia, assessing the reasons for Germany’s engagement in Central Asia. The third and fourth subchapters provide detailed accounts of the two programs of German water diplomacy in Central Asia, the Water Initiative Central Asia and the Green Central Asia Initiative, respectively. Next, the sixth chapter introduces the 10 conceptual framework, and then applies it to the findings of the fifth chapter to answer the main research question. Finally, the seventh chapter discusses the findings of the master thesis and provides a conclusion. 2. Methodology To answer the research questions and complete the research aims of this master thesis, a qualitative research approach is applied. The first research aim, constructing a comprehensive overview of German water diplomacy activity in Central Asia, is completed by means of a document analysis of academic, governmental and third-party publications. An in-depth inductive analysis of the gathered documents and reviewed literature is conducted to build towards the conceptual framework to fulfil the second research aim. Consequently, the findings of both research aims then serve to answer the main research question, by analysing the findings of the document analysis with the conceptual framework. The motivation for this research is twofold: In Central Asia, water is becoming scarcer due to the impacts of climate change, so the potential of conflict over transboundary water resources grows steadily, which increases the importance of water diplomacy; consequently, it merits further academic analysis. Additionally, there is a research gap regarding German water diplomacy in Central Asia, which this thesis aims to fill. a. Case Study Selection In Central Asia, water is inseparably linked to agriculture and energy production (Janusz- Pawletta, 2018). The Central Asian states share a high number of transboundary rivers (Karthe, Chalov & Borchardt, 2015), and, as a legacy of the USSR, a vast and complex transboundary irrigation system that covers over eight million hectares of irrigated lands (Abdullaev et al., 2012). Unequal water distribution, unsustainable water management and disagreements over water deliveries have repeatedly created political tensions, which are exacerbated by the growing threat of water scarcity caused by climate change (Boyarkina, 2018; Sehring, 2020). Regional attempts to establish a joint system of sustainable transboundary water management have not been successful (Sorg et al., 2014). Germany has been engaging in water diplomacy in Central Asia since 2008, seeking to contribute to stability and prosperity in the region by supporting the establishment of a system of sustainable transboundary water management (Auswärtiges Amt, 2013) with a wide array of activities and substantial funding in comparison to other water diplomacy initiatives in Central Asia (Boyarkina, 2018). The German 11 government considers water an important factor of regional cooperation and has attributed its water diplomacy initiative in Central Asia a possible model character (Bundestag, 2012). Water diplomacy in Central Asia has been the subject of multiple academic publications (Sehring, 2020). However, Sehring et al. (2022) in their analysis of academic publications on water diplomacy wrote that “[u]nderstanding the role that third parties can play, why and how such actors get involved, with which tools and on which tracks they do so, what the explicit or implicit objectives of these parties are, and why and under which conditions their engagement is actually conducive to certain desired outcomes clearly remains a research gap” (p. 218). This research gap exists for German water diplomacy in Central Asia, as it is discussed only in five academic publications: Schrader et al. (2009), Abdolvand et al. (2015), Boyarkina (2018), Eschment (2011), and Hakala, Mustasilta and Hadi (2023). The first three provide more extensive accounts, detailing the initiation of the process, its activities and focus areas, as well as discussing some of the impacts, while the latter two only provide short overviews; none provides a comprehensive overview of Germany’s water diplomacy activity in Central Asia from its initiation until 2024. Therefore, this master thesis seeks to provide an extensive account of German water diplomacy in Central Asia and analyse its contribution to the establishment of a regional system of sustainable transboundary water management. Given the existing research gap, the qualitative method approach has been chosen to allow for a broad assessment of non-technical publications on the topic in order to synthesise a comprehensive account of the activities realised within Germany’s water diplomacy activities in Central Asia. b. Method of Data Collection and Analysis The first research aim – constructing a comprehensive overview of German water diplomacy in Central Asia – is completed by means of a document analysis as described by Bowen (2009). Over 100 sources have been analysed, including research articles, policy papers, government- related publications and websites, to gather information and establish a comprehensive understanding. The document analysis is conducted by assessing available research articles on Germany’s water diplomacy activities in Central Asia, information published by the German government within its internet presence and official documents, publications by and internet presences of the implementing partners, and other pertinent publications. The governmental sources used include publications of the AA, the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), the Federal Ministry for the Environment (BMUV), the Federal Government (“Bundesregierung”) and the Federal Parliament (“Bundestag”) of Germany. No 12 primary data has been collected for this master thesis. The overview starts with Germany’s perspective on Central Asia and the interests that have motivated Germany to proactively engage in Central Asia, also with respect to its official water diplomacy policy, to explain the initiation of Germany’s water diplomacy engagement in Central Asia. Next, the first part of German water diplomacy in Central Asia, the Water Initiative Central Asia, is discussed, from its inception to its end, assessing the structure, involved actors, goals and the realised activities, as well as the outcomes. Subsequently, the successor of the Water Initiative Central Asia, the Green Central Asia initiative, is discussed and presented in a similar manner, albeit to a more limited extent given the fact that it is still ongoing. While this master thesis seeks to provide a comprehensive overview, it cannot guarantee an exhaustive account, and only includes information published until May 2024. Moreover, given the limited extent of this master thesis, it can neither provide in-depth information on every activity realised within the framework of German water diplomacy in Central Asia. The second research aim of this master thesis is the development of a conceptual framework to analyse the impact of water diplomacy activity on the establishment of a system of sustainable transboundary water management. Based on the thorough document analysis of policy papers and academic literature to complete the first research aim, a conceptual framework of nine factors was developed through an in-depth analysis with an inductive method. The framework is the result of the application of an explorative process conducted in an iterative manner. During the analytical review of the literature used for this thesis, nine different factors were identified that are always required for the establishment of a system of sustainable transboundary water management, irrespective of the geographical and political circumstances of the basin. The factors are based on research by other scholars, but the framework and its conceptualisation are the work of the author. These nine factors describe the different aspects that are involved in the process of establishing a system of transboundary water management through water diplomacy engagement, from the initiation of the process to the long-term consolidation of the system. While the framework shall be applied for the analysis in chapter six, it shall also guide the structure of chapter four and the first subchapter of chapter five to determine which factors are not given in Central Asia, and which factors are addressed by Germany’s general water diplomacy policy. Lastly, to answer the main research question “How has Germany water diplomacy activity in Central Asia contributed to the establishment of a system of sustainable transboundary water management?”, the findings of the document analysis are analysed with the conceptual framework by means of a qualitative analysis. Each factor is discussed 13 separately, analysing how the activities of the German water diplomacy activities have contributed to developing or achieving the respective factor. The goal of this analysis is not to evaluate the impact of German water diplomacy in Central Asia, as this would require a larger, quantitative study that is beyond the scope of this master thesis, but to assess how Germany’s water diplomacy engagement in Central Asia has contributed to each of the nine factors that are necessary for the establishment of a system of sustainable water management according to the discussed literature. 3. Theoretical Framework a. Water Diplomacy Water diplomacy is a relatively new concept in both academia and politics (Keskinen, Salminen & Haapala, 2021). It has emerged in response to the global politicisation of water in the 1990s, when the international community started to concern itself with its increasingly limited availability (Mollinga, 2008). The concept is used by academic scholars, policy makers and think tanks, who have created not one but multiple definitions (Sehring et al., 2022). This chapter discusses various understandings and definitions of water diplomacy to streamline the concept and to propose a working definition for this thesis. Water diplomacy’s relevance stems from the central importance of water: Water is at the heart of life and society. Humans need it to live and survive, to produce energy and food, as well as for agricultural and industrial production (Sehring et al., 2022). There is no substitute for water, and it is already scarce in some parts of the world (Pohl et al., 2014). It is a mobile resource: it can only be stored temporarily and in limited quantities, and is simultaneously present and moving across borders, thus it cannot be owned in terms of state sovereignty like other natural resources. Moreover, water is variable, as its natural provision and availability differ and fluctuate from year to year, due to a variety of factors (Sehring et al., 2022). A major factor influencing, and increasingly threatening water availability and access is climate change: Precipitation patterns change, increasing temperatures lead to higher evaporation and accelerate glacier melting, and extreme weather events like floods and droughts become more prevalent (Auswärtiges Amt, 2013, 2019b; Sehring et al., 2022). Water pollution and salinification of groundwater supplies put additional strains on water supply and further exacerbate water scarcity (Auswärtiges Amt, 2019b; Musie & Gonfa, 2023). At the same time, the continuous growth of populations and economies steadily increases water demand, which can no longer be met by conventional solutions (Boltz et al., 2019). 14 In the 1990s, as part of the global dialogue on sustainable resource use, a rhetoric of potential conflict over vital resources such as water emerged (Endres, 2014). Consequently, the dialogue on water resources shifted from the technical realm to the political, from water management to water control (Mollinga, 2008). Ensuring and maintaining access to sufficient water resources became a question of national security and thus a political task, complicating the process of agreeing on mutually beneficial water management solutions in many transboundary basins (Pohl et al., 2014). Between its absolute indispensability, growing demand and diminishing supply, water has a substantial conflict potential: A study by De Stefano et al. (2010) has determined water as one of the two most controversial points of contention between states since 1948. Despite its conflict potential, however, water has only been the cause of one war in recorded history, 4500 years ago in Mesopotamia (Wolf, Yoffe & Giordano, 2003), and disputes over water have overwhelmingly been resolved in a cooperative manner (De Stefano et al., 2010). Scholars attribute a unique potential for cooperation to the universal demand for water, even between actors who otherwise do not cooperate with each other (Salmoral et al., 2019; Sehring et al., 2022). Nonetheless, Zeitoun and Warner (2006) argue that “the absence of war does not mean the absence of conflict” (p. 437) because many conflicts over water take place silently due to a power imbalance between the states that share the basin. Water has been a substantial point of contention in many national and subnational conflicts and can exacerbate other conflicts (Pohl, Blumstein & Schmeier, 2021). Moreover, water disputes can already create damage before they escalate into a conflict by creating political tensions and regional instability that negatively affect society and economy (Pohl et al., 2014). Warner and de Man (2020) argue that water conflicts are often influenced by regional power dynamics. In transboundary basins where two or more states with different interests vie for access to and control over the same critical resource, conflict is a likely possibility, especially if there is a previous history of conflict between them (Choudhoury & Islam, 2015). The regional tensions and instability created by water, including the threat of conflict, have far-reaching global implications and negative impacts on human security, peace, development and prosperity (Pohl, Blumstein & Schmeier, 2021). Additionally, the exponential impact of climate change is projected to fundamentally alter the availability of water in unpredictable, hitherto unforeseen dimensions, which could increase the uncertainty of assumptions based on past behavioural patterns regarding water conflicts. Thus, the urgency to resolve existing conflicts over water and establish systems of sustainable transboundary water management is exponentially growing (Pohl et al., 2014). These diplomatic activities specifically aimed at preventing conflict in the short term and 15 fostering cooperation over shared water resources in both the short and long term are summarised under the term water diplomacy. There is no official definition of water diplomacy but a variety of different ones in academic publications, reports and policy documents, often depending on the context and purpose of the publication (Keskinen, Salminen & Haapala, 2021). Sehring et al. (2022) reviewed several publications on water diplomacy, determining that water diplomacy is often defined by its goals: improved water management, mutual benefits beyond the scope of water, and conflict resolution. Other definitions include normative values of equity and fairness in water use. Keskinen, Salminen and Haapala (2021) attribute five key aspects to water diplomacy: inherently political interactions between stakeholders, mediation and conflict prevention, integration of all stakeholders from different political levels and economic circumstances, focus on cooperation and mutual benefits, and technical solutions to control the water cycle. According to Mirumachi (2020), various water diplomacy definitions converge on the common theme of “a deliberative process that addresses contested shared waters and seeks dividends beyond those specific to water” (p. 86). Sehring et al. (2022) argue that fundamentally, various water diplomacy definitions consider water diplomacy as a sub-form of diplomacy that addresses the political dimension of transboundary water conflicts, that involves non-state actors in the search for a mutually beneficial solution, is mainly defined by negotiations and corresponding analyses, and that serves the broader goal of regional cooperation and integration beyond water management. Keskinen, Salminen & Haapala (2021) consider water diplomacy as the interstate practice specifically focused on resolving intra- and international disputes over shared water resources, such as basins or rivers, seeking to prevent conflict and instead foster cooperation between the involved stakeholders to jointly manage and use the shared water resources sustainably and responsibly. A common theme of several actors engaging in water diplomacy is the attempt to depoliticise water by trying to find a technical solution that leaves all states better off (Pohl et al., 2014). Cooperation on water has substantial benefits for all involved actors and creates economic benefits beyond the advantages of better water management, as it influences a region’s political stability and future development (Pohl et al., 2017). Pohl, Blumstein and Schmeier (2021), however, argue that a positive-sum solution might not work in a basin where interstate relations are defined by political tensions and devoid of trust. Warner and de Man (2020) furthermore argue that power imbalances can influence the success of water diplomacy efforts if the power asymmetries are not addressed. 16 Scholars such as Schmeier and Shubber (2018) and Janusz-Pawletta (2015) argue that a long-term, sustainable transboundary water management solution requires an institutionalisation of the agreements reached through water diplomacy in form of a river basin organisation, which can be empowered by the participating states to manage the shared water resources as agreed upon. Blumstein, Pohl & Tänzler (2016) add that such a river basin organisation needs a flexible capacity to adapt water distribution quotas according to water levels and availability, and an integrated dispute resolution mechanism to avoid the re- emergence of political conflicts over technical disagreements. However, Salmoral et al. (2019) argue that the analytical lens of the theory of water diplomacy is limited in an important aspect: While water diplomacy accounts for the political intricacies and various stakeholders’ interests involved in transboundary water contexts, it disregards the implications of water management solutions on energy production and agriculture. The interdependence of water, energy and agriculture is defined as the ‘water- energy-food nexus’ (Jalilov et al., 2016). By including both aspects, the scope of the analysis can be expanded to highlight the various implications of water on the regional economies, which allows for a more comprehensive understanding of the different national interests. Moreover, considering this water-energy-food nexus and the far-reaching implications broadens the analysis to include further respective benefits of cooperation, which can help convince the involved stakeholders of the mutually beneficial consequences of engaging in transboundary water management cooperation (Salmoral et al., 2019). This analytical nexus is reflected in the prevalent paradigm on water resource management, Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM). The Global Water Partnership defines IWRM as: “a process which promotes the coordinated development and management of water, land and related resources in order to maximise economic and social welfare in an equitable manner without compromising the sustainability of vital ecosystems and the environment.” (GWP, 2011). In this thesis, water diplomacy is defined as follows: Water diplomacy encapsulates a foreign policy strategy consisting of a variety of diplomatic and other activities that seek to prevent or stop conflict between states over shared water resources and facilitate cooperation by supporting the establishment of a mutually beneficial system of joint water management. b. Factors of Sustainable Transboundary Water Management Competition over water use within countries and across borders, paired with inefficient water management and wasteful water use can create tensions over the use of shared water resources. To ensure continuous interstate cooperation, the long-term goal of water diplomacy is the 17 establishment of a system of sustainable transboundary water management, which considers and meets the needs of all stakeholders across borders, distributing the resources fairly and sustainably to facilitate long-term water provision and provide mutual benefits (Sehring et al., 2022). Establishing such a system is a lengthy, multifaceted and complex process without a uniform approach because every transboundary basin has different geographic, geological, environmental, sociological and political characteristics. Additionally, the process must consider the “different political needs, boundaries, knowledge, know-how, management capacity, and political power of the disputants” (Choudhury & Islam, 2015, p. 45). Nonetheless, there are several factors discussed in academic literature that can be considered generally required for the successful establishment of a system of sustainable transboundary water management through the approach of water diplomacy. Nine factors have been determined, based primarily on the six factors described in the UN’s SDG 6 Global Acceleration Framework (UN Water, 2020) and the research article by Hearns, Henshaw & Paisley (2014) on the design of institutional architecture for effective transboundary water governance. These nine factors are: political assent, mutual benefit, financing, data, innovation, governance, capacity development, trust, and institutional anchoring. Further in-depth research of the reviewed literature has confirmed this selection and provided further aspects for the importance of each of the nine factors. The factors are explained in detail subsequently and form the basis of the conceptual framework, which is developed in the sixth chapter. Political Assent: Water diplomacy seeks to support states in finding a sustainable mode of cooperation over the shared water resources. For this process to be established, the involved states need to be willing to participate in and commit to the process, as well as to its outcome. As water diplomacy is a reaction to the politicisation of water management, any solution seeking successful water management needs to consider and navigate the national and regional politics to garner political assent. Without the agreement of each state involved, no solution can be implemented, independent of its prospects (Hearns, Henshaw & Paisley, 2014; Pohl et al., 2014; Sehring, 2020; Sehring et al., 2022). Mutual Benefit: The proposed solution must consider the interests of all involved states and stakeholders and provide a mutually beneficial solution that is better for all involved states than the status quo – a positive sum game – as a motivation to establish and maintain a system of shared water management (Choudhury & Islam, 2015; Pohl et al., 2017). Without deriving a substantial benefit by cooperating on joint water management, states have no incentive to participate in the process or commit to the outcome (Hearns, Henshaw & Paisley, 2014). This analysis must consider the different economic dependencies on water, especially the water- 18 energy-food nexus (Salmoral et al., 2019). Pohl et al. (2017) argue that cooperating on joint transboundary water management always outweighs choosing unilateral approaches. The benefits of cooperation extend beyond economic gains from improved water management because cooperation provides political stability in the region, which allows for greater economic development of the entire region (Pohl et al., 2017). Financing: The process of establishing a system of sustainable transboundary water management is cost-intensive, as it involves a variety of activities, trainings, and infrastructure development, amongst others – the subsequent factors will describe that in more detail. For the process to take place and be successful, sufficient funding must be ensured, either by the involved stakeholders or third-party actors. Currently, most institutions managing transboundary basins are financed mostly by third party donors (Pohl et al., 2014; Salmoral et al., 2019; UN Water, 2020). Data: Managing water resources efficiently and sustainably requires accurate and ample data as well as modern information technologies (Abdullaev et al., 2012). This includes data collection infrastructure, the research capacity to analyse the collected data, and political consideration of the findings in the further development of water management strategies. In practice, this can involve research cooperation between the stakeholders and the involved water diplomacy actor(s). Successful transboundary water management furthermore requires states to share their data amongst each other: As water is a resource of high political interest, its data is often treated as a national secret and thus not shared, to the impediment of efficient water management. One possible resolution is the establishment of joint fact finding and data collection missions by all involved states, which produces data and can furthermore contribute to building trust between the stakeholders (Blumstein, Pohl & Tänzler, 2016; Salmoral et al., 2019; Sehring et al., 2022). Innovation: An essential aspect of sustainable transboundary water management is the reduction of water demand, which can be achieved by reducing water losses as well as by increasing water use efficiency in infrastructure, agriculture, economy and society. This includes improved irrigation technology, expanding non-water based renewable energy production capacity and improving or rehabilitating existing infrastructure, as well as wastewater treatment and recycling (UN Water, 2020). Governance: Implementing a system of sustainable transboundary water management requires functioning public administrations responsible for water supply that ensure and manage the universal access to and fair distribution of water (Wegerich et al., 2015). This involves the principles of good governance of transparency, accountability, stakeholder 19 participation and the rule of law (Abdolvand et al., 2015). Moreover, the system must be implemented across all sectors and on all political levels through establishing clear roles and responsibilities, and strengthening public institutions (UN Water, 2020). Capacity development: Skilled workers are required for the use and operating of the transboundary water management system because it requires technical knowledge, basin planning capacities and expertise. Through capacity building, workers can be trained to operate the water management infrastructure and ensure its continuous functioning. Skilled workers in different branches of the water sector furthermore contribute significantly to integrating the water economy and improving its efficiency (Schrader et al., 2009). Moreover, it includes educating the general population on water saving techniques and using improved technology to save water, as well as training public administration officials on principles of good governance (Abdolvand et al., 2015; UN Water, 2020). Trust: While political assent is required for the deliberative process to take place, several authors discuss trust as a necessary component for all stakeholders to agree to the implementation of a joint management approach. In a context of politicised water management, states will only agree to relinquish some or all their control over the water resources if they can believe that the other states will equally relinquish theirs and follow the joint plan (Keskinen, Salminen & Haapala, 2021; Penny et al., 2021; Pohl, Blumstein & Schmeier, 2021). This is especially complicated in basins where the stakeholders have little trust in each other. However, trust can be built over time between the stakeholders, and several activities under the aforementioned factors can contribute to it (Pohl, Blumstein & Schmeier, 2021). Institutional anchoring: To depoliticise the question of water distribution and ensure the fair application of the agreed-upon system of sustainable transboundary water management over time, many authors discuss the establishment of a transboundary institution tasked with managing the shared water resources. This institution, designed according to the interests of the involved states, can operate the water distribution regime based on an agreed-upon quota and provide a conflict resolution mechanism to resolve disputes and tensions according to the agreed-upon protocol and without political escalation (Hearns, Henshaw & Paisley, 2014; Pohl et al., 2014; Schmeier & Shubber, 2018). Janusz-Pawletta (2015) posits the importance of basing the institution on an explicit and comprehensive legal framework to clearly delineate the mandate and responsibilities of the institution, while simultaneously designing the distribution quota to allow for flexibility based on natural or climate change induced fluctuations in water availability to prevent future conflict over the institution in situations of increased water scarcity. Hearns, Henshaw and Paisley (2014) furthermore argue that the 20 institutional design must be based on financial feasibility – the larger and more ambitious the institution and its mandate, the higher the costs. To ensure the continued application and use of the system of sustainable transboundary water management, it must reflect the needs of the stakeholders and its funding must be ensured in the long-term, as it will otherwise fail (Hearns, Henshaw & Paisley, 2014). 4. Water Management in Central Asia In this chapter, the challenges of water management in Central Asia shall be succinctly discussed to provide context for the subsequent chapter. Extensive accounts on Central Asia’s water struggles have been written by Abdolvand et al. (2015), Pohl et al. (2014, 2017), Sorg et al. (2014), and Zhiltsov et al. (2018), amongst others. a. Geography, Demography and Climate Change Central Asia is a semiarid to arid region with low precipitation, cold winters and hot summers (Sorg et al., 2014). The region is comprised of five nations – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan (see Figure 1) – with over 70 million inhabitants (Zhiltsov et al., 2018). According to estimates of the UN, the population of Central Asia will grow to over 90 million by 2100 (Jalilov et al., 2016). Figure 1: Map of Central Asia Source: (Pohl et al., 2017, p. 1). 21 The main freshwater supply comes from melted glacial water from the Tien-Shan, Alai, Altai and Pamir glaciers in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (Bens, 2023; Sorg et al., 2014). The water is distributed in the region by the two main rivers, the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya, and their tributaries (see Figure 2). These rivers are the primary water sources of Central Asia, flowing through all five states and leading into the Aral Sea (Blumstein, Pohl & Tänzler, 2016; Karthe, Chalov & Borchardt, 2015). However, their water flows vary substantially from year to year, and consecutive years of low water-levels are a common occurrence (Zhiltsov et al., 2018). Water is the determining factor of socioeconomic development and prosperity in Central Asia, generating hydropower in upstream countries and irrigating agriculture in downstream countries (Didovets et al., 2021). Consequently, it is the most contested natural resource in the region (Abdullaev & Rakhmatullaev, 2013). Figure 2: Water resource use in the Aral Sea Basin Source: (Pohl et al., 2017, p. 9). Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the upstream countries, are comparatively small countries with few natural resources for energy production but have primary control over the water coming from the Syr Darya and the Amu Darya rivers. During winter, they use hydropower production to meet their countries’ increased energy needs. Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, the downstream countries, have large agricultural land and fossil fuel resources but little hydropower energy production possibilities, and need water especially during the 22 summer months for irrigation (Abdolvand et al., 2015; Pohl et al., 2017). The downstream countries are considered to possess greater non-material and material power than the upstream countries, which creates asymmetrical regional power relationships (Sorg et al., 2014). Central Asia is one of the regions worst affected by climate change (Blumstein, Pohl & Tänzler, 2016). Precipitation patterns have changed over the last decade with increasing rates in low altitudes and decreasing rates in high altitudes, and future projections expect rainfall to increase during winter and decrease during summer (Sorg et al., 2014). Temperatures have been steadily increasing since the 19th century (Karthe, Chalov & Borchardt, 2015). Scientific estimates calculate a temperature increase of 6.5°C by 2100 (Didovets et al., 2021). Negative mass balances have been detected in the Central Asian glaciers in the last decades: Smaller glaciers have disappeared, and larger glaciers have significantly shrunken, creating temporary increased water flow levels (Karthe, Chalov & Borchardt, 2015). However, water shortages will become more frequent during summer with decreasing precipitation and decreased glacial meltwater quantities in the future (Sorg et al., 2014). The region is also affected by desertification and is increasingly experiencing weather extremes such as droughts and floods, landslides and dust storms (Eurasianet, 2023; GIZ, 2023b; Green Central Asia, 2024a). In short, water supply in Central Asia depends on transboundary rivers and is threatened by climate change. Simultaneously, the population and economies of all five Central Asian states have grown strongly within the last decades – both of which consequently lead to increased water demand, which puts a further strain on the existing water resources (Pohl et al., 2017). However, the problem with water availability is not an issue of water scarcity yet but rather one of water access (Rheinbay et al., 2021). An extensive assessment of the impacts of climate change in Central Asia can be found in Sorg et al. (2014), Karthe, Chalov and Borchardt (2015), and Mosello et al. (2023). Climate change’s socio-economic consequences are discussed by Didovets et al. (2021) and the security implications by Rheinbay et al. (2021). b. History of Water Management Water management has a long history in Central Asia, which influences the present situation (Abdolvand et al., 2015). Initially, water management was organised locally by each community. When Russia colonised the region in the 1860s, the central government began to exert control over water management, establishing small-scale water bureaucracies, while irrigation structures were still managed and maintained locally. In the 1920s, the USSR began to pursue the water management paradigm of hydraulic mission, which subordinated water to human control by means of hydraulic engineering with the goal of maximising water extraction 23 (Abdullaev & Atabaeva, 2012). Water became an exclusive state property (Abdolvand et al., 2015) and its management a purely technical issue to be managed by state water bureaucracy (Abdullaev & Mollinga, 2010). To achieve its goals, the USSR expanded education on and research into water management, increasing its funding and making water managers an essential component of the state apparatus (Abdullaev & Atabaeva, 2012). Seeking to achieve energy independence, the USSR constructed a vast network of large- scale hydropower structures within ten years, becoming one of the largest hydropower producers by the 1940s. After 1945, the USSR began to expand agricultural production in Central Asia, especially of cotton and grain (Abdullaev & Atabaeva, 2012). Local subsistence farming was replaced with large-scale farms focused on mass production (Abdullaev & Rakhmatullaev, 2013). Given the low precipitation in Central Asia, the USSR constructed a vast infrastructure network of canals and irrigation systems to supply the required water quantities (Sorg et al., 2014), including major dams and reservoirs in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan mainly for water storage purposes to release water in summer (Blumstein, Pohl & Tänzler, 2016). The scale of the agricultural production and the choice of crop – especially cotton is a very water intensive-crop – caused a strong increase in water demand, which was supplied through increased water abstraction from the Aral Sea, the Syr Darya and the Amu Darya (Abdolvand et al., 2015). As water was a state property, the USSR did not charge for its use, which led to excessive water abstractions without concern for the environmental consequences (Janusz- Pawletta, 2018). Consequently, fixed water quotas were implemented, with 90% of the water being directed to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, mainly withdrawn during summer to meet the agricultural irrigation needs (Abdolvand et al., 2015). To compensate the upstream countries for their reduced hydropower production, the central government established a unified water- energy system in the region, in which the downstream countries provided fossil fuels to the upstream countries in exchange for storing water in winter and releasing it in summer (Janusz- Pawletta, 2018). The increased, continuous water extraction, together with the environmental pollution caused by fertilisers and pesticides, had a calamitous impact on the Aral Sea, which had shrunken to a tenth of its original size by the mid-2000s (Blumstein, Pohl & Tänzler, 2016). The dissolution of the USSR created various institutional, technical and political challenges for water management in Central Asia: Newly established borders made the rivers and canals in the region transboundary, which halted the previously existing regional water management system (Sorg et al., 2014). Bureaucratic structures and decision-making processes changed with the general political decentralisation in the region, and with the separation of the 24 large collective farms into smaller units, vacuums of responsibility, governance and decision- making emerged in local water management and canal maintenance (Sehring, 2020). Consequently, the responsibility of water delivery and infrastructure maintenance was often returned to the local governments, who did not possess the capacities to fulfil that responsibility. Funding for the water sector was drastically decreased, which reduced the frequency of water infrastructure maintenance, repair and rehabilitation (Abdullaev & Rakhmatullaev, 2013). Many of the meteorological and hydrological monitoring stations built by the USSR stopped their operations, especially in remote regions (Karthe, Chalov & Borchardt, 2015). As water became a topic of national security (Sorg et al., 2014), national interests began to dictate national water policies that were often contradictory (Waśkiel, 2018). Data access was restricted and transboundary data sharing prohibited (Abdullaev et al., 2012). Due to the interdependence on water in Central Asia, water-related conflicts thus became more likely (Karthe, Chalov & Borchardt, 2015). More extensive discussions of the history of water management in Central Asia can be found in Abdullaev & Atabaeva (2012) who also discuss how Russian and Soviet water bureaucracies have influenced the establishment of regional cooperation institutes in Central Asia. Abdullaev & Rakhmatullaev (2013) assess governmental processes that influenced and designed the post-Soviet water management. Waśkiel (2018) discusses how political relations have influenced water management after 1990. Sehring (2020) offers a comprehensive review of the academic publications discussing the development of water governance in Central Asia. c. Competing Interests The central problem of finding a long-term water management solution in Central Asia are the competing interests between the five Central Asian states (Pohl et al., 2017). Disputes arise over disagreements regarding the schedules of water delivery (Boyarkina, 2018). The agricultural production in the downstream countries requires water release in summer, while the upstream countries release water mostly in winter for hydroelectricity production (Jalilov et al., 2016). With limited water resources, these diametrically opposed interests pose a threat to regional stability (Rheinbay et al., 2021). The construction of hydropower dams has been a frequent source of interstate tensions (Pohl et al., 2014). Climate change further exacerbates the competition between the different interests, as it decreases water availability, changes precipitation patterns and affects water levels in rivers. The current projections of changes in river runoff could for instance force the upstream countries to increase their water storage to 25 ensure sufficient energy production in winter, to the detriment of the agricultural production in the downstream countries (Blumstein, Pohl & Tänzler, 2016). The different economic interests and their impact on water management in Central Asia are discussed by various scholars: Gleason (2001), for instance, discusses the relation between water and energy in Central Asia and how it affects regional stability and relations. Thevs et al. (2015) discuss the water demand of agriculture in the Lebap Province in Turkmenistan and the impact on the Amu Darya River. Sorg et al. (2014) assess how a decrease in water availability affects economic production and transnational relations in the Syr Darya Basin. Jalilov et al. (2016) have conducted a study on the water-energy-food nexus and optimised water distribution in the Amu Darya River Basin. d. Past Conflicts and Cooperation Attempts Diverging national interests have led repeatedly to conflict over water resources between the Central Asian states. These conflicts are usually resolved by means of bilateral or multilateral agreements, which however only resolve the temporary conflict but have not yet led to the establishment of a lasting transboundary water management system (Zhiltsov et al., 2018). In 1992, the newly independent states codified the Soviet water management system into the ‘Almaty Treaty on Cooperation in the Field of Joint Water Resources Management and Conservation of Interstate Sources’ (Sorg et al., 2014). To institutionalise the agreement, the treaty established the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination (ICWC), which was given the responsibility for policy formulation and water allocation. However, the treaty had neither an explicit definition of transboundary waters, nor a clear scope of application, nor a clearly defined process governing the cooperation and barter mechanisms. Moreover, the agreed-upon water quotas were deemed inacceptable and had to be adjusted through several bilateral and multilateral agreements (Abdolvand et al., 2015). The treaty also created the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea (IFAS) to coordinate the various national Aral Sea organisations (Schrader et al., 2009). Growing national interests started to complicate the adherence to the agreement - Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan increased their hydropower production to meet their power needs, releasing water in winter, while Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan further expanded their agricultural production (Pohl et al., 2017). Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan were increasingly unwilling and even incapable to provide the set water quotas of the agreement, and the downstream countries did not provide financial support for the infrastructure maintenance, which led to emerging regional tensions (Abdolvand et al., 2015). 26 The first interstate conflict arose in 1993, when Kyrgyzstan did not pay its debts to Uzbekistan, which in turn ceased its gas deliveries (Zhiltsov et al., 2018). Faced with insufficient energy resources and lacking funds to pay its debts, Kyrgyzstan started to release water from the Toktogul reservoir in winter to expand its hydropower energy production. This caused floods in downstream Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan and impacted their agricultural production in summer, which created interstate tensions and the need to renegotiate water release schedules every winter (Abdolvand et al., 2015). In 1995, the Nukus Declaration was signed to resolve conflicts peacefully and reaffirm the adherence to prior interstate agreements. A drought in 1997 further exacerbated the tensions, which started to gather the attention of the international community (Blumstein, Pohl & Tänzler, 2016). In 1998, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan agreed on an official sharing mechanism for the Syr Darya river, but it failed due to its energy exchange design causing a dispute over energy prices between the signatories (Abdolvand et al., 2015). Subsequent attempts to establish a regional system of water management through international agreements and with regional water management institutions have also been unsuccessful (Zhiltsov et al., 2018). Uzbekistan has obstructed attempts at regional water solution, as it benefits from the continuation of the 1992 Agreement (Abdolvand et al., 2015). In 2012, the Uzbek President Islam Karimov threatened an escalation of tensions with the possibility of “water wars” over the planned Rogun Dam construction in Tajikistan and the Karambata-1 power station in Kyrgyzstan (Reuters, 2012). Kyrgyzstan has paralysed the IFAS by not formally leaving but ceasing participation in all activities and meetings of the organisation, challenging the IFAS’ decision-making ability and subsequent legitimacy of these decisions (Schmeier & Shubber, 2018). Due to the geographic circumstances and existing transboundary water infrastructure, the Central Asian states need to find a mutual solution on transboundary water resources (Abdolvand et al., 2015; Karthe, Chalov & Borchardt, 2015). However, this has been complicated by a variety of reasons: Central Asia has not developed a regional identity, lacking political integration and a developed community of interests. Instead, national interests lead to often contradictory national policies (Waśkiel, 2018). Due to the deterioration of the Soviet data collection infrastructure, there is a lack of comprehensive data on water resources, especially in high mountain areas (Mosello et al., 2023). The absence of data exchange mechanisms and political communication on planned regional measures has created distrust in water resources management, while the separation of national decision-making processes concerning agriculture, energy and water into various ministries has complicated the national 27 and regional integration of effective water management structures (Sorg et al., 2014). The legal frameworks of the regional water agreements were inadequate to provide a sustainable solution (Janusz-Pawletta, 2015), and the existing institutions of water management in Central Asia have not been able to resolve the situation, either (Schmeier & Shubber, 2018). Efforts to establish a lasting cooperative water management solution are further complicated by unresolved border disputes (EBRD, 2019; Peña-Ramos, Bagus and Fursova, 2021) that sometimes escalate into conflicts (Auyezov, 2021; IFCR, 2023; Valieva, 2014). To conclude, the Central Asian states have a history of repeated conflicts over water due to diverging national interests. Attempts to establish a regional system of sustainable transboundary water management have been unsuccessful due to several reasons. Comprehensive accounts of the interstate conflicts over disagreements relating to transboundary water management treaties, the subsequent interstate agreements reached between the Central Asian states to resolve the conflicts, and the reasons for the failures to establish lasting water management systems have been written by Abdolvand et al. (2015), Janusz-Pawletta (2015, 2018), Pohl et al. (2017) and Zhiltsov et al. (2018), amongst others. e. Non-German Water Diplomacy Activity in Central Asia There are various international actors engaging in water diplomacy in Central Asia besides Germany (Schrader et al., 2009). International donors have attempted to support the establishment of a regional solution by implementing projects with local water governance structures based on the principles of IWRM since the mid 1990s (Sehring, 2020). The Swiss Development Cooperation Agency (SDC) engages in water diplomacy with its Blue Peace initiative, providing political support in finding joint solutions for competing interests on water, and has funded and implemented projects on cryosphere monitoring, IWRM, forecasting and research in long-term climate impacts (Hakala, Mustasilta & Hadi, 2023; Wegerich et al., 2015). The UNDP has implemented a project offering workshops on climate- resilient water resources management in the Ferghana valley. Finland provides technical and financial assistance in the region with a special focus on water quality monitoring (Hakala, Mustasilta & Hadi, 2023), and has funded the water management program FinWaterWEI, which sought to capacitate state institutions to ensure universal water access. The program included support for national policy dialogues and projects of inter-institutional cooperation between Finish, Kyrgyz and Tajik ministries aimed at improving water management and protection (SYKE, n.d.), as well as the provision of instruments of economic and financial analysis and IWRM in cooperation with the OECD (Hakala, Mustasilta & Hadi, 2023). 28 The Organisation for Security and Cooperation (OSCE) funded the launch of the interdisciplinary and bilingual e-Journal “Integrated Water Resources in Central Asia” to support academic research on issues of water management (Unger-Shayesteh et al., 2015c), as well as an analysis into climate risks in Central Asia (Mosello et al., 2023). The Stockholm International Water Institute promotes the inclusion of female water professionals in decision making and governance in the water sector with its Women, Water Management and Conflict Prevention Program, and has established a network of female water experts in Central Asia together with the OSCE and the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation Program (CAREC). The United Nations Regional Centre for Preventative Diplomacy for Central Asia promotes dialogue on transboundary water management, facilitates information exchange and offers capacity building on water diplomacy and legal reform of regional agreements on water, as well as the provision of monitoring and analysis to the Central Asian governments. The World Bank has been promoting energy and water security with its Central Asia Water and Energy Program since 2009 in cooperation with the EU, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom by providing data analyses, capacity building and investment support (Hakala, Mustasilta & Hadi, 2023). The EU has furthermore financed the Aral Sea Water Resources Programme in the 1990s (Schrader et al., 2009), as well as the EU Water Initiative to expand access to water and sanitation and to support transboundary cooperation (Boyarkina, 2018). 5. German Water Diplomacy in Central Asia German water diplomacy in Central Asia encompasses a variety of state and non-state actors that have contributed to the implementation of the two initiatives. While the AA has been the leading force, other ministries have been involved, including the BMZ, the BMUV and the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BIMBF). Since the initiation of the process in 2002 that led to the establishment of German water diplomacy activity in Central Asia, Germany has had six different governments and three different chancellors. Assuming governmental continuity, this chapter will not discuss the impacts of these government changes on German foreign policy in Central Asia. Unless otherwise specified, the different state actors shall be jointly referred to as ‘German government’. There are various non-governmental German actors also involved in the implementation, which are introduced later. Unless otherwise specified, all state and non-state actors engaged in the implementation of the initiatives are subsumed under the term ‘German water diplomacy’. 29 a. General German Water Diplomacy Policy Germany’s water diplomacy policy is part of its broader climate foreign policy strategy, which in turn is one aspect of Germany’s overall foreign policy. As a member of the EU, Germany aligns its foreign policy with the overarching EU foreign policy and supports the implementation of the EU’s Water Law. Moreover, Germany proactively contributes to the implementation of the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDG), in this context especially the sixth goal, which aims to secure the availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all humans (BMUV, 2023; Bundesregierung, 2023). The German government acknowledges the global dimension of climate change and, accordingly, the need for concerted international action to mitigate its effects. It perceives climate change as a substantial threat to global security and stability and considers its climate foreign policy an important tool of preventative foreign policy (Auswärtiges Amt, 2013). Germany also recognises the geostrategic impacts of climate change – altering trade routes, shifting modes of production, and affecting supply chains, amongst others – and therefore subordinates its climate foreign policy goals to its general foreign policy interests. Germany’s overall foreign policy is based on the tenets of promoting its values – human rights, humanitarian assistance, sustainability, economic development and ecosystem preservation – and maintaining Germany’s economic and security interests: The climate foreign policy of the German government explicitly seeks to design its measures as not to compromise Germany’s prosperity and economic competitiveness (Bundesregierung, 2023). Given the global economic interdependence and Germany’s position as a trade nation, Germany proactively supports other nations in adapting to the challenges of climate change (Auswärtiges Amt, 2013; BMUV, 2023; Bundesregierung, 2023). In short, the German government considers its climate foreign policy to be value-led and employs it to act in the economic and security-political interests of Germany, which by extension also applies to its water diplomacy (Bundesregierung, 2023). The German government models its water diplomacy policy around three key aspects of water: that it is fundamental and irreplaceable for society, economy and environment to function and thrive; that access to it is a human right; and that its scarcity or absence can and will cause societal tensions and violent conflict, which will create suffering, instability, migration and economic losses beyond the affected region (Auswärtiges Amt, 2019b; BMUV, 2023; Bundestag, 2008b). Especially water scarcity can have far-reaching consequences: It threatens agricultural production and therewith food security, causes migration, hinders energy 30 production, and can create tensions and conflict in and between nations, which then might threaten the stability and security of entire regions (Auswärtiges Amt, 2013; BMUV, 2023). German water diplomacy perceives water as a resource of peace with the potential to become a catalyst for cooperation: Most conflicts over water have been resolved peacefully if a mutually beneficial solution was available and achievable, and some have even offered a pathway to extending transnational cooperation between states to areas other than water (Auswärtiges Amt, 2019b; BMUV, 2023; BMZ, 2019). Shared transboundary water resources can also become a source of tensions and conflict between states, so the German government considers helping other states establish transboundary water management cooperation as an essential aspect of the preventive security policy dimension of water diplomacy (Auswärtiges Amt, 2013). Given its indispensability for humans, society and nature, the German government seeks to preserve water as a resource for current and future generations with its water diplomacy policy (BMUV, 2023). Thus, Germany’s water diplomacy policy aims to ensure the universal application of the human right to water access for everyone, to contribute to achieving global water security to avoid conflict and enable economic development, and where and when possible, use conflicts over water resources as a chance to expand interstate cooperation beyond water in the affected region (Auswärtiges Amt, 2019b; BMZ, 2019). Moreover, German water diplomacy extends beyond international politics into development cooperation. Germany has a long history of engagement in the water sector as one of the largest donors for creating access to clean water. Through development cooperation, Germany has worked for decades to provide access to drinking water and clean sanitation for millions of people on several continents (Auswärtiges Amt, 2019b; BMZ, 2019). One central driver of conflict over water is its scarcity. The German government distinguishes between two types of water scarcity: economic and hydrological. Economic water scarcity is human made, the consequence of inadequate management or inefficient use. Hydrological scarcity exists where there is a natural limit of available water resources so that even highly efficient water management cannot sustainably meet growing water demand. With economic water scarcity, the German government considers inefficient water management as the main problem in most cases, which can be resolved by helping the affected nation to improve their water management system (Bundestag, 2008b). For instance, agriculture is the sector with the largest water footprint, with irrigation being the main driver of increasing water use; by improving irrigation efficiency, water scarcity can already be avoided in many situations (Auswärtiges Amt, 2019b). In cases of hydrological water scarcity, the challenge becomes more complex, requiring increased water use efficiency and reduced water demand 31 to allow for sustainable water use. Both types of water scarcity are further complicated by climate change, which alters precipitation patterns and water availability, especially in regions whose water supply depends on glacial meltwater, and which increases the frequency of extreme weather events (Auswärtiges Amt, 2013; Bundestag, 2008b). Demographic growth and economic development put an additional strain on available water resource. With growing demand and decreasing supply, finding lasting and sustainable water management solutions is becoming increasingly urgent (Auswärtiges Amt, 2019b). To achieve global water security, Germany’s water diplomacy policy suggests a variety of necessary steps: First, the existing shortcomings of water management must be overcome, and water management must be specifically adapted to the future challenges of climate change. Second, water bodies and catchment areas need to be sustainably managed and improved for long-term use. Third, ecosystem services and biodiversity must be protected. Fourth, agricultural and food production need to become more water-use efficient. Fifth, current water demand needs to be reduced. Sixth, water use efficiency must be improved. And last, the sustainable management and use of water resources and ecosystems must be ensured (BMUV, 2023). Moreover, the German government aims to support its partner countries in increasing their resilience and adaptive capacity to climate change, and to unite prosperity and social and economic development in the process of adapting to climate change (Bundesregierung, 2023). At the core of German water diplomacy are precautionary measures to prevent conflict and scarcity from emerging at all and lobbying for the global implementation of the universal human right to water and sanitation (BMUV, 2023). To reach the goal of transboundary water cooperation to avoid conflict over water, Germany believes in taking a proactive and pre- emptive approach promoting it because establishing interstate cooperation is a lengthy process while climate change is limiting the window of opportunity (Bundestag, 2008b). The German government follows the IWRM approach in its water diplomacy policy: Recognising the nexus of water with agriculture and energy production, it seeks to involve all stakeholders in the decision-making process regarding shared water resources and promotes positive-sum benefit sharing as an advantage of cooperation on water management over conflict (Bundestag, 2008b). Additionally, Germany uses the Water Stewardship approach to specifically involve actors from businesses and civil society in the process. Thereby, Germany seeks to find an efficient solution that meets the various water demands, making cooperation more desirable than conflict (BMZ, 2019). German water diplomacy comprises a variety of diplomatic measures to promote Germany’s vision of sustainable transboundary water management as a contributor to regional 32 stability and cooperation (Bundestag, 2012). However, the establishment of a sustainable transboundary water management structure requires more than an agreement between all stakeholders, so German water diplomacy commands a variety of technical and financial instruments and tools that support the practical implementation. These measures extend beyond diplomatic tools into the area of development cooperation. Germany agrees with the accelerators of sustainable water management as proposed by UN Water (UN Water, 2023) and has included them in its water diplomacy policy (BMUV, 2023). Table 1 provides an overview of the instruments of German water diplomacy. Based on the factors of sustainable transboundary water management as discussed in the theoretical framework, they are separated into the categories of diplomatic measures, data, capacity building, innovation, governance, and financing, Table 1 Instruments of German water diplomacy Type Instrument Diplomatic measures Advocacy for Germany’s stance on international climate protection in embassies c Water as a resource for peace: active support for transboundary water management b Bi- and multilateral engagement to develop and strengthen international dialogue, coordination and cooperation on sustainable water resource management a, b, c Advise partner countries and international organisations (IOs) on transboundary river cooperation, joint data management, knowledge transfer activities, cooperative use of planning and financing mechanisms a Participate in multi-donor partnerships and international pioneer initiatives to accelerate global climate adaptation processes c Promote ratification of international treaties on protection and use of transboundary water resources in the UN and other IOs c Advocate for a UN interstate process to resolve water disputes c Advocate for strengthening the mandate of UN Water as a UN cooperation mechanism on water-related issues a Active engagement for and support of a coherent UN approach to achieve the SDGs a Establish cooperation in transboundary water as a task field of IOs d Engage in bi- and multilateral initiatives for regular global freshwater resources status assessments a Data Promote the use of regional climate models c Improve existing data sets and early warning systems c Help development of research strategies as well as data collection structures and capacities to continuously collect, manage and interpret hydrological and meteorological data as a reliable basis for future planning and decision-making a, b Support the mapping of distribution networks b Support real-time information collection on water infrastructure conditions in remote rural areas b Establish international partnerships with the Water Stewardship approach to facilitate knowledge transfers and to share technical innovations and management solutions b Implement results of scientific research in water planning and management practice a 33 Foster international cooperation and networks between researchers and political actors a Support creation of scientific knowledge and specific water resource management tools to better understand the relationships between water resources, aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems, and human activity a Support creation of recognised joint databases of jointly used water resources as a starting point for transboundary cooperation d Capacity building Provide vocational education and training of water management staff, especially for newer technologies like desalination or wastewater treatment b Introduce standardised planning instruments in river catchment areas to improve analysis of water supply and demand and to identify areas for investment b Innovation Moderate water demand to facilitate water management d Introduce efficient technologies, e.g., drip irrigation to improve water productivity b Support construction of resilient infrastructure, e.g., storm- and wastewater drainage systems b Support prevention of water pollution and overuse a Support protection and restoration of water-based ecosystems and their biodiversity a Improve coordinated access to drinking water, sanitation, and hygiene in development cooperation context a Promote spread of hydropower plants to increase renewable energy production and increase water storage capacities b Develop alternative energy sources to relieve stress on drinking water b Support use of water recycling technologies such as pumping, desalination or water treatment to expand water availability b Use grey water or dry cooling technology in thermal power plants b Support effective and energy-efficient water management and supply strategies, e.g., using alternative water resources like treated wastewater and desalinated sea water b Governance Apply existing water management strategies for climate variability events on climate change impacts, and further develop these mechanisms for upcoming challenges d Support public institutions such as regulatory authorities, water utilities and river commissions to improve efficiency and effectiveness of local water management b Establish transparent budget processes b Regulate water extraction, e.g., of groundwater b Support reforms aiming to modernise the water sector b Support introduction of legislation to regulate responsibilities at all levels b Set socially equitable tariffs and water extraction quotas b Define standards for water provision b Advocate for transparent appointment procedures in public institutions b Support the establishment of anticipatory and integrative, national and regional water management structures d Support measures to eradicate corruption, inequality and discrimination at all levels of water supply, allocation and distribution b Expand access to water and sanitation in schools and health care facilities b Support creation and implementation of regulations to protect water bodies a Support the application of best practices in urban sanitation and industrial wastewater management a Halt blanket water subsidies that warp the macroeconomic costs of water provision d Ensure institutional agency of water management institutions by resolving present inadequacies and strengthening their adaptive, institutional and financial capacities d Use and further develop existing protocols for climate variability to prepare water management structures for future water provision challenges d Financing Policy-based loans to support water sector reform efforts b Invest in construction of resilient infrastructure in other countries b 34 Climate financing: Financial support for climate protection measures and economic transformation c Focus on local capital markets to develop innovative finance mechanisms b Sources: a(BMUV, 2023). b(BMZ, 2019). c(Bundesregierung, 2023). d(Bundestag, 2008b). Table 1 provides a comprehensive but not exhaustive overview of instruments of German water diplomacy to foster and establish sustainable water management structures in partner countries. In each situation, an approach is chosen based on the requirements of the situation at hand (BMUV, 2023). The instruments of German water diplomacy include diplomatic tools aimed at garnering political assent from states in shared river basins to attempt establishing a system of transboundary water management and involving the UN and international water cooperation mechanisms in the implementation process. With the analytical approach of IWRM, German water diplomacy seeks to find solutions beneficial for all involved stakeholders. The tools also include funding mechanisms to finance the process, the development of data infrastructure and data exchange to facilitate water management, the construction of infrastructure and new technologies to reduce water loss and increase water use efficiency, and capacity building to expand technical knowledge and governance capacities of the responsible authorities of the involved countries. Additionally, Germany seeks to foster trust in public authorities and between neighbouring states of a shared river basin with its measures and supports the establishment of a transboundary water management institution. b. Germany’s Perspective on and Interest in Water Management in Central Asia In an address to the German parliament in 2008, the German government expressed concerns for the threat of water scarcity in Central Asia, given that it is a semi-arid region mainly depending on glacial meltwater for its water supply, and the possible impacts of failed regional water cooperation in Central Asia in times of water stress, considering the past conflict history in Central Asia (Auswärtiges Amt, 2008a; Bundestag, 2008b). The scientific council to the German government assigned Central Asia a particularly high conflict vulnerability due to the socio-economic circumstances in the region and the projected exacerbating impacts of climate change. Moreover, the German government argued that it had a responsibility to support other states in developing approaches of sustainable resource management, for example by supporting the development of sustainable transboundary water management in Central Asia as part of the EU’s Central Asia strategy (Bundestag, 2008b). The German government furthermore provided a future projection for Central Asia if the water management situation were to remain the same: With growing temperatures, the 35 Central Asia glaciers are projected to shrink by 20% in size and their volume to decrease by a third by 2050, substantially limiting water availability. At first, the increased temperatures will lead to higher glacial meltwater runoff and subsequent increased water availability in summer. To avoid damaging the existing water infrastructure and hydropower plants, runoff will be increased, and agricultural areas flooded. The subsequent decreasing water volume will impair hydropower production and drastically curtail agricultural production, leading to stark increases in poverty and unemployment in rural areas, which will cause migratory streams. Inefficient irrigation and cultivation processes will cause desertification, and the agricultural sector will not be able to adapt to the challenges of climate change. With increasing water scarcity and desertification, sand and dust storms will become more frequent, causing substantial health hazards in areas with high pesticide application. Social disparities will further expand, and weak institutions remain prevalent, leaving the population without a reliable provision of public goods. Recurring droughts and high water demand between the opposing interests of upstream and downstream countries will further create tensions and conflict over water resources between the Central Asian states (Bundestag, 2008b). Additionally, the scientific council to the German government provided two possible fictious future scenarios for Central Asia – one of conflict and one of cooperation. The conflict scenario foresees the growing impacts of climate change leading to conflicts over water use: the upstream countries increase their hydropower production to meet their energy needs as fossil fuel prices rise, while the downstream countries require larger quantities of water in summer due to the growing temperatures. In absence of a shared water management system, the mutual dependencies are ignored, and each country follows only their national interest, causing repercussions and conflict - albeit no outright war – between the upstream and downstream countries. Without efficient water irrigation technologies and expanding droughts, the rural population is affected the worst and increasingly discontented, leading to growing domestic and interstate conflicts along religious and ethnic lines. State-sponsored repression will increase in turn, further exacerbating the conflict into a downward spiral, to the detriment of the population and stability of the region. As the national governments increasingly fail to maintain public order, organised crime and extremists use the power vacuum to expand their influence (Bundestag, 2008b). In the cooperation scenario, the Central Asian states recognise the long-term drastic increase of water scarcity and proactively effectuate a structural change of the economy, investing especially the proceeds from natural resource exports into new business sectors. One of these sectors is wind energy: Production capacities are starkly expanded, mainly in 36 Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan but accessible to all Central Asian states, to meet the existing and growing energy demand and to reduce the dependency on fossil fuels and hydroelectricity. With the support and development cooperation of the international community, this structural change can be achieved without expanding the social disparities in the region. By introducing sustainable resource management and integrated water resource management in the agricultural sector, the extent of land degradation and water scarcity can be confined and slowly reduced, preventing an expansion of social disparities while rather strengthening social structures. Trust building measures reduce border conflicts, to the benefit of the region’s population and economic development (Bundestag, 2008b). In short, the German government perceived a substantial future risk and conflict potential in 2008 stemming in case of the continued absence of a sustainable transboundary water management system in Central Asia, arguing that stability in Central Asia is only certain if the water resources are used sustainably, reasonably, eco-sensitively and with consideration of the neighbouring states (Abdolvand et al., 2015). Therefore, following its policy of proactive diplomatic engagement to help ensure water security, Germany engages in water diplomacy in Central Asia to support the development of a regional system of sustainable transboundary water management as a means of preventive foreign policy (Auswärtiges Amt, 2015). However, there are further reasons for Germany’s particular interest in Central Asia. After the German reunification, the German government pursued a proactive policy of supporting post-Soviet states, in part due to a significant number of ethnic Germans living amongst their populations. Germany furthermore has economic interests in Central Asia, which is one of its largest trading partners, and security interests, given the geostrategic location of the region, as well as the intention to foster regional cooperation and environmental protection, all of which depend on water (Boyarkina, 2018; Bundestag, 2018). c. The Water Initiative Central Asia / The “Berlin Process” Germany began its water diplomacy engagement in Central Asia with the “Water Initiative Central Asia” as a part of the EU’s 2007 Strategy for Central Asia (Auswärtiges Amt, 2008b). The initiative is also known as the “Berlin Process”, and both names will be used interchangeably in this chapter. German water diplomacy engagement in Central Asia was the result of a lengthy diplomatic process, after the Central Asian states had started to detect the impact of climate change on water availability and, having had no success establishing a regional system of sustainable water management so far, petitioned the EU for assistance in the matter. In particular, the Central Asian states requested support and knowledge on 37 transboundary water law, automated collection of hydrological data, sustainable management concepts for catchment areas and the conduct of independent expert studies on projects of cross-border significance (Schrader et al., 2009). While the EU started diplomatic relations with the five Central Asian states in 1992 at the start of their independence, there was little progress until the US-led invasion in Afghanistan in 2001, which elicited a more frequent diplomatic exchange (Matveeva, 2023). After consultations and joint meetings with the German government, the topic of water was first adopted into the EU’s Central Asia Strategy Paper 2002–2006. Germany expressed explicit interest in aiding the Central Asian states with their water management challenges, while the other EU member states showed limited interest in the region (Boyarkina, 2018). During its EU Council presidency in 2007, the German government prioritised the development of a regional strategy for Central Asia and proactively suggested and lobbied for the inclusion of the action field of sustainable water management in Central Asia in the EU Strategy for Central Asia 2007–2013. This strategy was then also adopted during Germany’s EU Council presidency, paving the way for the inception of the Berlin Process in 2008 (Abdolvand et al., 2015; Auswärtiges Amt, 2008a; Bundestag, 2008b). On April 1st, 2008, the AA hosted the international ministerial conference “Water Unites”, attended by delegations from all five Central Asian states, to discuss the security challenges posed by water and how to prevent future conflicts over it. The conference was planned to serve as a starting point for a political dialogue on how to manag