

The Ambiguities of Appeasement: Great Britain, the United States and Germany, 1937–9

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From the late nineteenth century the rise of the United States to world power status was reflected in Washington's challenge to Great Britain's position as a Great Power.¹ Although the 'special relationship' of the two Great Powers of the English-speaking world was on occasion emphasised, rivalry with Britain nevertheless remained an important element of US foreign policy in the twentieth century. The First World War prompted the American government to develop systematic aspirations towards the inheritance of the British Empire. Recent research on Wilson's war aims policy has brought impressive evidence of this to light.² This American strategy, directed against British imperial policy, then clearly found concrete expression in plans for the amputation of the British Empire evolved during the Second World War. By 'outlining a general "pax Americana" for the future in the form of the Atlantic Charter', US President Franklin D. Roosevelt revealed that even before its entry into the Second World War the USA did not really consider Britain as a Great Power on an equal footing, but merely as a junior partner upon which American ideas on world order were to be imposed.³

In view of the fact that Roosevelt was aiming at 'indirect US world leadership'⁴ as early as the 1930s, it is surprising that the 'American factor' has so far been underestimated by historical research in its analysis of British foreign policy, in particular as regards relations with Germany, before the Second World War. The existence of the common Anglo-American front against the totalitarian states has certainly helped conceal the conflict of interests between Britain and America. How else can it be explained why an 'Anglo-American' appeasement policy is so often referred to? Such a homogeneous concept reinforces analyses of prewar British foreign policy which underrate the role of the United States in London's calculations. The lack of diplomatic activity in Washington's relations with Hitler's Germany up to the end of 1938 has always given historical research occasion to define US policy *vis-à-vis* Germany – parallel to that of Britain – as a policy of appeasement. The American historian Arnold Offner gave his work on American foreign policy and Germany in the years 1933–8 the title *American Appeasement* (published 1969).⁵ And more recently he has repeatedly maintained that the overriding aim of Washington's policy in Europe was 'to appease Germany during 1933–1940'.⁶ In his survey, *The Origins of the*

Second World War, Offner, referring to the similarities in British and American policy, speaks in general terms of 'an era of appeasement'.⁷ For 1938 he still comes to the conclusion that 'American diplomacy floundered in the sea of appeasement'.⁸ The British historian Ritchie Ovendale – to quote another example – comes to similar conclusions in his book *Appeasement and the English Speaking World*, published in 1975.⁹

Although it has often been assumed that Britain and America were following a uniform line *vis-à-vis* Germany, this will not withstand closer analysis. It is essential to include the domestic driving forces behind both London and Washington's policy as an integral part of our interpretation, and at the time of the World Depression this means first and foremost domestic economic forces. As regards British policy, particular reference must be made to Bernd-Jürgen Wendt's innovative work.¹⁰ In a major work, published in 1971, Wendt demonstrated in detail the overriding importance of economic considerations in Britain's policy towards the Third Reich. London wanted to keep the German market at least partially open for products of the 'old and declining industries'. The policy of an economic balance with National Socialist Germany, already reflected in the Trade and Payment Agreement of 1 October 1934, was consistently pursued throughout the following years. This policy of *economic appeasement* was not only aimed at reducing economic tension in bilateral relations but was also seen in London as a means of pacifying Europe politically and therefore regarded as an integral part of overall foreign policy. Economic agreements with Germany 'would obviously have great possibilities as a stepping stone to political appeasement', as Hudson, under-secretary in the Department of Overseas Trade, stated in July 1938.¹¹

The interdependence of economic and political aims is clearly evident from Foreign Office records. Particular emphasis was often given to the fact that 'economic and political appeasement must go hand in hand'.¹² Above all Chamberlain (as shown by C. A. MacDonald)¹³ assumed that concessions in the economic field would help to strengthen the position of the so-called 'moderates' within the Reich government. Reinforcement of the moderate elements within the Reich leadership in this way would make it easier to convince Berlin that *legitimate* German demands in the political and economic fields could be fulfilled without a massive armament programme and warmongering. Chamberlain's foreign policy calculations accorded closely with his assessment of the economic basis of Britain's position; he was influenced less by the prospect of possible British trade advantages than by the conviction that Britain could not bear the economic strain of an arms race with the Third Reich.

As will be seen later, the political stratagem inherent in the British concept of *economic appeasement* on foreign affairs – was soon to be vitiated by Chamberlain himself by his intensification of economic co-operation with the USA.

Like Britain's relations with Germany, Washington's policy towards the Third Reich must also be seen within the context of domestic and, in particular, internal economic developments. The conclusion drawn by Offner and other historians that enormous internal economic difficulties

caused the Roosevelt administration to be so preoccupied with solving domestic problems that it was prevented from pursuing an active foreign policy, can only be considered valid on the basis of an artificial division between the economic and political spheres. Such an approach is in any case untenable if it is considered exactly *how* the US administration tried to overcome the Depression. Here it should be noted that the regaining of foreign markets was an essential part of measures taken to combat the internal crisis. Since so many American products were dependent on export, internal economic expansion alone was not regarded as a viable alternative. The growth of agricultural and industrial exports was to play a decisive role in the revival of the economy.

This line of thinking largely reflects William A. Williams's approach. Williams defines the overseas economic expansion of the USA from the late nineteenth century as an integral part of American domestic stabilisation policy and interprets expansive foreign trade policy, not only as one element of internal economic consolidation, but also as a crucial means of preserving the liberal-capitalist system.¹⁴ With regard to the implementation of expansive foreign trade policy, which President Roosevelt also considered necessary, the US administration was faced with the following alternative in its relations with Germany: given the sales prospects on the traditionally important German market, should Washington agree to trade concessions – similar to those made by London – thus recognising the bilateral German foreign trade system *de facto*, or should she concentrate on the re-establishment of multilateral world trade, even at the expense of losses on the German market?

Regardless of the forfeits on the German market, bound to be considerable in the immediate term, the second alternative policy, directed by Secretary of State Cordell Hull, was to prevail in the Roosevelt administration from 1934 onwards: by setting up a comprehensive trade agreement network on the basis of the most-favoured-nation clause, US economic interests were to be enforced worldwide and American hegemony established. The White House and the State Department propagated the new American trade agreement policy on the one hand as an active contribution towards the revival of the liberal world trading system which would automatically imply the reduction of economic tension. This development would more than compensate for losses on the German market. On the other hand, this strategy of *economic appeasement* was also defined as the prelude to the reduction of political tension, 'the promotion of peace through the finding of means for economic appeasement', according to a White House press release. 'There will not be military disarmament without economic appeasement', emphasised Secretary of State Hull.¹⁵

Similarly to Britain, the US administration also based its policy on a realisation of the close interdependence of economic and political problems, in particular questions of security. However, the American concept of *economic appeasement* begins to diverge *fundamentally* from the above-mentioned British interpretation when forces gained ground within the State Department advocating an uncompromising line towards the Third Reich and the enforcement of *economic appeasement* on American condi-

tions alone, that is, on the basis of the new foreign trade programme. As this trade agreement system was expanded, Germany would increasingly be subject to economic pressure in the field of foreign trade. This would be a basis for finally exerting political pressure on the Third Reich: Moffat, head of the Division of European Affairs noted at the beginning of 1938: 'The development of our trade agreement program will automatically put economic pressure on Germany and in this we have a ready forged weapon in hand to induce Germany to meet general world trade and political sentiment.'¹⁶ According to the hard-liners in the State Department, trade concessions, similar to those granted by London, would in the long term only make it easier for the National Socialist regime to gain hegemony in Europe and to carry out its plans of world domination.

Assistant Secretary of State George S. Messersmith, who as a former Consul-General in Berlin and Minister to Vienna was particularly well informed about National Socialist policy, stressed again and again that a hard line in the economic field would offer the opportunity of weakening National Socialist Germany both economically and politically to such an extent that the Reich would ultimately be forced to accept compromises in both the economic sphere and in foreign affairs. Heinrich Brüning incidentally put forward similar arguments at the beginning of 1938 when he implored the US administration to stick to trade agreement policy for political reasons. If, as a result of economic pressure, the National Socialist regime were forced to reform its economic system fundamentally, there would be people in Germany ready to introduce the necessary political reforms also.¹⁷

This forceful American policy had already been developed at a time when there was no question of a German threat to US security from the military and strategic point of view. It was a strategy formulated in response to the National Socialist economic offensive, above all in South America and south-east Europe. Whereas until 1939 British policy was aimed at finding a *modus vivendi* with German methods of conducting foreign trade, with the hope that this would result in their gradual liberalisation, American diplomacy, by exerting economic pressure, tried to force the Reich to return to a liberal multilateral trade system. Whereas the British conception of *economic appeasement* aimed at political détente by granting economic concessions, American diplomacy, by actively pursuing a contrary economic policy, was designed to deprive the National Socialist regime of its economic basis for military action; ideally economic pressure would even bring about a change of system inside Germany.

For Washington *economic appeasement* admittedly also implied the reduction of political tension by economic means. However, this was to be achieved by *pressure*, not by granting concessions. The fact that the term 'economic appeasement' is used to describe both Washington and London's essentially divergent outlooks, that is, the fact that the same term is applied in contemporary usages, doubtless helps to explain why the theory that the USA was also following a policy of appeasement *vis-à-vis* the Reich has so stubbornly persisted.

If we assume that British and American concepts of *economic appease-*

ment can be interpreted as *divergent* strategies of foreign policy and further that the two powers were not following a homogeneous policy as regards Germany, then we must also reassess the Anglo-American *rapprochement* from 1937/8, reflected above all in the Anglo-American Trade Agreement.

For the American government the Trade Agreement with Britain was not only the logical follow-up to its foreign trade policy; it was regarded as the climax of Washington's foreign policy, in particular as far as relations with Germany were concerned. In March 1937 US Under-Secretary of State William Phillips had already described a trade agreement of this kind as the most important step the State Department could at that time take in foreign affairs. Assistant Secretary of State Sayre also interpreted the Agreement as an outstanding American contribution towards economic and political stabilisation, upon which the well-being of the whole of humanity was dependent.¹⁸

Secretary of State Hull in particular repeatedly stressed that a trade agreement with London was indispensable and warned the British Ambassador of the consequence of a break-down in bilateral negotiations:

If a *great trading* country like Great Britain and another great trading country like the United States became inert and undertook further self-containment alone, such countries as Japan, Germany, and Italy with their armies and navies would in two or three years dominate nearly every square foot of trade territory other than that under immediate control of Great Britain and the United States. That would leave our two countries in an amazingly disadvantageous situation.¹⁹

The combined political/economic function of the Anglo-American Trade Agreement was again and again emphasised by the State Department in particular and has also been recognised by historical analysis, with the political aspects standing out even more prominently. In view of the isolationist trends in American public opinion and Congressional neutrality legislation, the only instrument open to the Roosevelt administration in foreign affairs up to 1939 was trade policy. Even if we reject the theory of the great influence of economic driving forces behind US foreign policy, focusing instead on the political and ideological aspects of Roosevelt's prewar diplomacy, the *instrumental* use of trade policy for the achievement of the Roosevelt administration's aims in foreign policy nevertheless remains unaffected.

The importance of American trade policy in foreign affairs was clearly diagnosed by the British government for whom the political aspects of the trade negotiations with Washington were in fact of central importance. It was, for example, purely for political reasons that in October 1937, even before the opening of official trade agreement negotiations, the British Cabinet agreed to accept a number of the 'essentials' put forward by the USA, although some members of the Cabinet were to protest against this unusual procedure. After the Board of Trade had drawn up its instructions for the British negotiating delegation in Washington, the Foreign Office put

Your general instructions are to use your best endeavours to obtain from the Government of the United States an agreement which represents a reasonable balance of mutual commercial advantages and is, therefore, fair and commercially valuable to both sides. At the same time it must always be borne in mind that the commercial advantages of the agreement may be relatively inferior to its political importance. It is recognised that the fact of an agreement being reached between the two countries . . . is likely to have a very great effect on the international situation, and may be of special importance in view of the present position both in Europe and in the Far East. The Prime Minister in his address to the principal delegates to the Imperial Conference on the 27th May last year said that the moral and psychological effect of such an agreement throughout the world would be tremendous, that it was through economic co-operation that American sympathy was to be won and that that sympathy would be of incalculable value if we were once again involved in a great struggle. You are so fully aware of the political background of these negotiations that there is no need to elaborate further this aspect of your task. It is desirable, however, to emphasise this in the forefront of your instructions, since the following paragraphs necessarily deal with the purely commercial aspect.

In July 1938, following American demands for further economic concessions, the British Cabinet again reviewed the trade agreement negotiations in great depth. Members of the Cabinet agreed to 'place on record the importance that they attached, from a political and international point of view, to the conclusion of a Trade Agreement with the United States of America'.²¹ With reference to this central political aspect, the President of the Board of Trade was asked to inform the Premier at once of any difficulties which might arise during the negotiations; failure was to be avoided at all costs. Chamberlain emphasised his personal interest in a trade agreement with the United States. A conversation with the US Ambassador had convinced him 'that the practical results of the agreement might not be very great, but that the psychological effect on the world was of great importance. The more the impression could be created in Europe that the United Kingdom and the United States were getting together, the less would have to be spent on armaments.'²²

The extent to which London was prepared to pay for political *rapprochement* with the USA in economic concessions can be seen for example in the so-called 'cotton-rubber barter deal' in the spring of 1939. The Foreign Office, above all, was 'certainly anxious for major political reasons that everything should be done that might prove to be materially possible to meet the American suggestion . . . Our sole interest in the matter is the effect on Anglo-American relations.' London obviously wanted to avoid everything that might undermine the success of the Trade Agreement of November 1938.²³

In Berlin, especially in the Wilhelmstrasse and the Ministry of Propaganda, the Trade Agreement was also interpreted as a political step—levelled

importance that these aspects of foreign policy should not be discussed in public. Before the Agreement was concluded the Ministry of Propaganda had confidentially let journalists be given an indication of its political significance, but at the same time instructions had been given that the Trade Agreement 'should not give rise to speculation about a close political alliance of the western democracies'. When the Agreement was signed, the Press, following a Foreign Office proposal, was once again expressly forbidden from 'indulging in polemics about the Agreement so as not to create the impression that we consider this as a victory of the democracies'.²⁴

The fact that the Anglo-American Trade Agreement was seen in Berlin as proof that the two powers were pursuing an anti-German policy leaves no doubt that Chamberlain, if only because of the internal contradictions in his policy, had miscalculated that *economic appeasement* would also lead to the establishment of a political balance with the Third Reich. For in his considerations Chamberlain was banking on the so-called 'moderates' whose moderate influence on Hitler's policy was to be backed up by economic concessions from Britain. However, with his policy towards America Chamberlain had himself knocked the very bottom out of his policy towards Germany from 1937/8. As for Wendt's hypothesis that with his *economic appeasement* policy Chamberlain had a 'type of European economic block clearly directed against the United States in mind', such a generalising statement is hardly tenable.²⁵ If Chamberlain's policy *vis-à-vis* America from 1937/8 is interpreted as an attempt to find an alternative to a policy of appeasing Germany – at least in the medium and long term – then British foreign policy on the eve of the Second World War, as far as the Third Reich is concerned, must appear much less of a 'Diplomacy of Illusion' than is generally assumed.²⁶

Despite the fact that British policy began to be orientated towards Washington in the years 1937–8, London nevertheless maintained its efforts to strike an economic balance with the Third Reich into 1939. In view of the rising unemployment figures (over 2 million in January 1939) and a £70 million trade deficit, Chamberlain had no alternative to this policy of *economic appeasement*, as MacDonald for example points out.²⁷ Indeed, for economic reasons – especially in the immediate term – due to the recession in the USA, too close economic ties with Washington did not appear a viable alternative. In Britain's relations with the United States, interest was centred on political and strategical considerations while economic questions were primarily of functional importance.²⁸

The economic containment strategy manifested in the Anglo-American Trade Agreement against the economic and politico-military expansion of National Socialist Germany was doubtless at the centre of Washington's calculations. At the same time the US concept of *economic appeasement*, based on 'Open Door' policy, was directed against British imperial preference and in essence against Britain's position as an empire. Thus in American criticism of London's imperial policy it was pointed out that it was inappropriate to demand that 'have-nots' should lift foreign trade controls and to press for the bilateralisation of foreign trade 'while the "have" countries maintain their empires and zones of interest . . . A German closed

area and a British Empire closed area are different simply in degree, and the instruments used to effect the German and British purposes are of secondary importance.'²⁹

The chief reasons why these divergent aims – the British imperial preference on the one hand and US free trade imperialism on the other, incompatible at least from the American point of view – did not lead to open conflict between Washington and London lay in the joint front formed by Britain and America against the totalitarian states. The internal policy considerations of members of the American government and the course of Anglo-American Trade Agreement negotiations leave no doubt about the fact that the US offensive in foreign trade from 1934 was aimed at undermining Britain's status as a world power. The demand for tariff concessions therefore fulfilled a dual function for Washington: the opening up of markets and the fundamental erosion of the British preference system. The economic expansion of the United States at international level, dictated by internal economic reasons, and Washington's claims to overall hegemony complemented each other perfectly.

Britain's dependence on the USA in the political and strategical fields, a result of increasing tension on the critical international scene, was consistently exploited by the Roosevelt administration to achieve both these ends. Since 1938 the State Department in particular greatly increased diplomatic pressure on Great Britain and its means of doing so was not always altogether gentlemanly. Growing criticism of Hull's foreign trade programme within America may have been partly responsible for this. In August 1938, for example, the US Secretary of State told Lindsay, British Ambassador in Washington, that

I must admit my great and growing concern in regard to the failure of the British Government thus far to make a single utterance in support of the broad program of reciprocal trade and peace based on mutually profitable commerce and equality of treatment; that I had been wondering whether there is not a real connection between this lack of support by the British Government, in Europe as well as elsewhere, of the philosophy and the spirit and the letter of this wholesome peace-making program of trade restoration and their apparent indisposition to grant what is to that country the paltry concession of these commodities (lumber, lard, tobacco, and hams) as requested by this Government . . . When I emphasized the lard proposition, the Ambassador said there was a terrific controversy in the British Cabinet about reducing the 10% Empire preferential rate to 5%. I replied that that must explain the British indisposition to grant the four final concessions we are asking; that if the great British Cabinet would have a serious controversy about reducing the duty of 10% on lard to 5% . . . I could begin to understand how on some other theory the British Cabinet has been indifferent to our strong claims for concessions on these four commodities mentioned by me.³⁰

Hull declared on a number of occasions that there was no alternative to the conclusion of a trade agreement between London and Washington and

in negotiations with the British he was not afraid – against his better judgement – of conjuring up images of American isolation:

We hope that the British seek this agreement, not primarily for the dollars and the cents immediately involved. . . We seek it primarily as a powerful initiative to help rectify the present unstable political and economic situation everywhere. . . Should this opportunity be lost, I am convinced . . . it would result in the American people turning this country in the other direction and moving definitely toward political and economic isolation.³¹

In the dispute on trade policy with the USA, the British government had originally hoped to avoid any discussions in principle of the world economic order and on imperial preference in particular. 'It may well be unpleasant to have extent of Imperial preference turned into a subject of discussion with a foreign Power but the alternative is to have the whole principle of it attacked at its very root by the most powerful economic unit in the world', argued Ambassador Lindsay.³²

The conclusion of the Trade Agreement with the USA did not, however, mean the long-term recognition by the USA of British imperial preference. The initial undermining of imperial preference, manifested in the Anglo-American Trade Agreement of November 1938 (and the US-Canadian Trade Agreement concluded at the same time), was merely the first step in Washington's endeavours ultimately to apply its 'Open Door' policy to Britain as well. The Lend-Lease Programme of January 1941 gave the Roosevelt administration an excellent means of challenging imperial preference even more effectively.³³

Not only did the 'synchronisation of Japanese, Italian and German attacks on central, vital British positions and interests' call 'secure rule in the Empire' into question;³⁴ London's imperial policy was also being increasingly undermined by the Roosevelt administration's indirect economic influence from 1937/8. This multiple threat to British interests can doubtless partly explain the contradictions in Chamberlain's policy *vis-à-vis* the Reich.

Notes: Chapter 26

1 cf., for example, H.-U. Wehler, *Der Aufstieg des amerikanischen Imperialismus. Studien zur Entwicklung des Imperium Americanum 1865–1900* (Göttingen, 1974).

The following notes essentially give references for quotations made. The following abbreviations are used: BA (Bundesarchiv Koblenz), FRUS (Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States), NA (National Archives, Washington, DC), PRO (Public Record Office, London), RG (Record Group).

2 cf. in particular C. P. Parrini, *Heir to Empire. United States Economic Diplomacy, 1916–1923* (Pittsburgh, Pa, 1969).

3 A. Hillgruber, *Der Zenit des Zweiten Weltkrieges; Juli 1941* (Wiesbaden, 1977), pp. 32–3.

4 *ibid.*, p. 31.

5 A. A. Offner, *American Appeasement. United States Foreign Policy and Germany, 1933–1938* (Cambridge, Mass., 1969).

6 A. A. Offner, 'Appeasement revisited: the United States, Great Britain, and Germany, 1933–1940', *Journal of American History*, vol. 64 (1977/8), p. 373.

- 7 A. A. Offner, *The Origins of the Second World War. American Foreign Policy and World Politics, 1917–1941* (New York, 1975), pp. 104 ff.
- 8 *ibid.*, p. 124; cf. also Offner's contribution in this collection.
- 9 R. Owendale, 'Appeasement' and the English Speaking World. *Britain, the United States, the Dominions, and the Policy of 'Appeasement', 1937–1939* (Cardiff, 1975).
- 10 B.-J. Wendt, *Economic Appeasement. Handel und Finanz in der britischen Deutschlandpolitik 1933–1939* (Düsseldorf, 1971); cf. also Wendt's contribution in this volume.
- 11 Hudson minute, 8 July 1938, FO 37/21647; cf. also quoted from C. A. MacDonald, 'Economic appeasement and the German "moderates" 1937–1939. An introductory essay', *Past and Present*, no. 56 (1972), p. 117.
- 12 Ashton-Gwatkin minute, 14 November 1938, FO 371/21704.
- 13 cf. in particular MacDonald's and Wendt's publications quoted in notes 10 and 11.
- 14 W. A. Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (New York, 1972).
- 15 *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, Vol. 1938 (New York, 1941), p. 248; C. Hull, *Foreign Trade, Farm Prosperity and Peace* (Washington, DC, 1938), p. 16.
- 16 Moffat memorandum, 31 January 1938, NA, RG 59, 611.6231/1002 1/2.
- 17 Messersmith memorandum, 31 January 1938, Messersmith Papers, Newark/Delaware.
- 18 Phillips to Sayre, 24 March 1937 and Sayre to Harold Hartley, 27 May 1937, Sayre Papers; Library of Congress, Washington, DC.
- 19 C. Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull* (New York, 1948), p. 522.
- 20 Balfour to Stirling, 24 January 1938, FO 371/21490.
- 21 Cabinet 36 (38), PRO, CAB 23/94.
- 22 As above.
- 23 Perowne minute, 23 May 1939, FO 371/22797.
- 24 Instructions to the Press, 19 November 1937 and 18 November 1938. BA Koblenz, Brammer collection, vol. 10, Traub collection, vol. 10.
- 25 Wendt, *Economic Appeasement*, p. 526.
- 26 See K. Middlemas, *Diplomacy of Illusion. The British Government and Germany 1937–39* (London, 1972).
- 27 MacDonald, 'Economic appeasement', especially pp. 125–30.
- 28 This is in contrast to R. N. Kottman, *Reciprocity and the North Atlantic Triangle 1932–1938* (Ithaca, NY, 1968). However, the unpublished British documents were at that time not available to Kottman.
- 29 Grady to Hull, 3 April 1937, FRUS 1937 I, p. 814.
- 30 Hull memorandum, 19 August 1938, FRUS 1938 II, p. 52.
- 31 Hull to Kennedy, 25 July 1938, *ibid.*, p. 41.
- 32 Lindsay to Foreign Office, 9 June 1937, FO 371/20660.
- 33 cf., for example, W. F. Kimball, 'Lend-lease and the open door: the temptation of British opulence, 1937–1942', *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 86 (1971), pp. 232–59.
- 34 G. Niedhart, 'Appeasement. Die britische Antwort auf die Krise des Weltreichs und des internationalen Systems vor dem Zweiten Weltkrieg', *Historische Zeitschrift*, vol. 226 (1978), p. 82; cf. also A. Hillgruber, 'Forschungsstand und Literatur zum Ausbruch des Zweiten Weltkrieges', in W. Benz and H. Graml (eds), *Sommer 1939. Die Grossmächte und der Europäische Krieg* (Stuttgart, 1979), especially pp. 344–5.