


Global Connectivity and the Duty to Distant Others Land Grab Expansion in Sub-Saharan Africa

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A Dissertation Presented
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Submitted to
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Dedication

To my parents and siblings

Abstract

Those who are interested on the idea of global justice have been excessively preoccupied with the moral question why should affluent societies be concerned about poor societies? The consensus has been that affluent societies have duty of minimum assistance due to the *failure* of the poor and the *capacity* of the affluent to help. In contrast, Pogge argues for duty of justice due to the *harms* well-off societies impose on the poor. By adopting the concept of *distant others act closer* for examining the reasons why affluent societies harm the poor, this study calls the arguments for the failure of the poor into question in support of harm. To do so, an ideal type was constructed, based on contemporary global land grab expansion in Africa, to examine the reasons distant others act closer and to analyze the circumstances of global justice. Accordingly, the difference between the poor and the affluent can be attributed to the ability of the later to act closer to the former not only by designing, manipulating and imposing global order, but also by expanding abroad, accumulating resources and retaining value-additive production processes that localizes their motives and delocalize resources and livelihood spaces thereof. This work introduces harm as an exported risk from the affluent and internalized by the poor, hence it argues the poor are not failed rather made to fail. It debunks the idea of failure and capacity as duty triggering factor by offering the motive of the affluent to mitigate their own domestic risks as sources of moral duty. Finally, it proposes a moral duty of risk absorption that can be discharged by releasing retained value-additive production processes while expanding abroad.

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Acronyms

AU	African Union
BMZ	German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development
CAADP	Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Program
CDC	Commonwealth Development Cooperation
CFCs	Chlorofluorocarbons
DEG	Deutsche Investitions- und Entwicklungsgesellschaft mbH
DFI	Development Finance Institute
DFID	Department for International Development
DIDPs	Development Induced Displaced Persons
EPA	Economic Partnership Agreements
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FIAS	Foreign Investment Advisory Service
FMO	Netherlands Development Finance Company
GAP	Grow Africa Partnership
GCAP	Ghana Commercial Agricultural Program
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
GDA	Governmental Development Agencies
GRD	Global Resources Dividend
GTZ	German Organization for Technical Cooperation
HIV/AIDs	Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
IDI	Inclusive Development International
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
IFC	International Financial Corporation
IFU	Danish International Investment Funds
IIED	International Institute for Environment and Development
ILO	International Labor Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
LGIDPs	Land Grab Induced Displaced Persons
LP	Law of Peoples
MDG	Millennium Development Goals

NAFSN	New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
NORAD	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
NEPAD	New Partnership for African Development
OeEB	The Development Bank of Austria
OI	Oakland Institute
OP	Operational Policy
PBS	Promoting Basic Services
PPP	Public Private Partnership
PRAI	Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investments that Respect Rights, Livelihoods and Resources
REDD	Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
RPF	Resettlement Policy Framework
SAGCOT	Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor in Tanzania
SGSOC	Sithe Global Sustainable Oil Cameroon
SIDA	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SIFEM	Swiss Investment Fund for Emerging Markets
SP	Society of Peoples
SNNPR	Southern Nations and Nationalities and Peoples Region
SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programm
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugee
USA	United States of America
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VG	Voluntary Guidelines on Responsible Governance of Tenure of Lands and Fisheries in the Context of National Food Securities
WB	World Bank
WEF	World Economic Forum
WTO	World Trade Organization

1 Chapter One

Framing the Issue of Global Justice

These figures should help us avoid being unnecessarily surprised when we hear that, after all the efforts that have gone into ‘development’, the gap between the rich and poor countries continues to widen at an accelerating pace. Part of the reasons, if economists such as A. G. Frank, Samir Amin and Immanuel Wallerstein are correct, is that the world is not a collection of separate national economies, as depicted in the World Bank Report, but a single economic system that operates to transfer wealth from the poor to the rich countries. A big part of the ‘economic development’, i.e. the wealth, of the rich countries *is* wealth imported from the poor countries. The world economic system *generates* inequality and it *runs* on inequality. Just as the internal combustion engine is propelled by the difference in pressure above and below the piston, the world economy is propelled by the difference between rich and poor (Lummis 2007:46).

Introduction

The very essence of the above quote that we have a single global economy with component parts of national economies operating through the transfer of wealth from weak to strong economies upholds the premise that we live in an interdependent world. In this context, it is difficult to disagree with Nagel (2008:416) who asserts “we do not live in a just world”. Injustice exists within societies, and also with trans-border nature. While societies have their own domestic system of distribution based either on the idea of welfare, freedom, or virtue they deemed appropriate to their domestic conditions (Sandel 2009:19), the issue of global justice, the extension of the kind of justice that we have at the level of domestic societies towards other societies, is still at its early stage. Hence, this study contributes to that end.

Based on contemporary expansion abroad in the form of land grab, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa,¹ it proposes for a duty of risk absorption which can be discharged by *sharing value-additive production processes*. Its justification lies on the basic idea that we have an interrelated life experiences due to the globalized world we live as a result of which national communities

¹ Hereafter, depending on the context I interchangeably use the terms land grab and expansion abroad.

impact each other and found themselves in a multifaceted form of order and disorder. Also, we have reached a stage whereby no national community can be self-sufficient. Unless the global system differentially treat, affluent societies could not maintain their affluence the way they are now, while others remain poor. At the core of this we find a challenging issue of global justice, *why* and *how* to distribute benefits and burdens resulting from global cooperative activities. Yet, the agenda of global justice to date revolves around a narrow moral question of *why affluent societies are supposed to be concerned about the poor circumstances of distant others?* An Analysis of global justice based on this question will have the consequence of excluding the global poor from the equation of global justice. In short, it does not pay attention to the moral question of why the poor take the burdens of affluent societies. Though this, at first instance, does not seem plausible, I insist, it is a reality of our interdependent world.

Various principles of global distributive justice have been proposed, while some deny the possibility of extending justice to others, based on the above guiding moral question. Among others domestic responsibility and minimum assistance of Rawls, the need for global coercive institutions and minimum humanitarian assistance of Nagel, fair global cooperation and Global Resource Dividend (GRD) of Pogge, fair international cooperation of Miller, global resource redistribution of Beitz, and capacity principle of Singer are cases in point. In such battle of argumentation, this study has two major importance. The first, it identifies two serious flaws rooted in the underlining assumptions of the guiding moral question that most of the principles rely on their analysis of global justice. Firstly, though they intend to address global justice, they conceive justice from the perspective of the “we” and “they”. The “we” constitutes assistance providers and the “they” assistance recipients. National communities are conceived as affluent and poor than societies per se that are interdependent and have commonalities. In such a way the so-called poor societies, or the “they”, are considered as inactive and people who are incapable of changing their own circumstances as if they live in isolation from the so-called affluent. They are deemed to fail to establish the necessary basic domestic structures. In contrast, the affluent are considered as capable of changing their circumstances by establishing the necessary domestic structures, regardless of factors such as their domestic self-insufficiencies and risks, global interdependence, and the role of global institutions. Likewise, they are regarded as independent from the poor. Hence, secondly, as a result of this view, the contribution of the so-called poor societies to the wellbeing of well-off societies, whether willingly or forcedly, has remained unrecognized, invisible, and devalued.

The second importance of this work, in this regard, is that it brings the contribution of the so-called poor societies to the wellbeing of affluent societies to the fore, make it visible, valuable and give recognition. By doing so, it justifies the claims of the poor for their rightful share of the outcomes produced from their participation in global cooperative activities. Such claims can be made based on the fundamental premises that affluence does not mean self-sufficiency,² and poorness does not mean complete lack of resources, hence, in addition to their domestic capabilities the global order facilitates the affluent expand abroad, accumulate strategic resources, and value-additive production processes to maintain their position at the expense of depriving the poor. Affluence of well-off societies and deprivation of the poor are two sides of the same coin. The so-called poor societies actually forcedly contribute to the wellbeing of well-off societies and well-off societies egoistically accumulate both the resources they domestically lack and value-additive production processes. In this regard, the moral concern for the poor emanates not from their failure, rather it is the duty of the affluent to sustain their own wellbeing by giving the fair share of the poor. Equally, the poor have no obligation of forcedly deprive themselves to sustain the wellbeing of the affluent which is not acceptable to a self-respecting person.

Accordingly, affluent states and citizens are the main obligation holders to sustain their wellbeing without harming the poor. While states are responsible for changing their conduct of design, manipulation and imposition of the global order and international regulatory system on the poor (Pogge, 2008), citizens and civil society organizations have the obligation to influence their own states to change harmful conducts. The implication of this argument is that global institutions cannot change their harmful conducts towards weak societies by themselves unless affluent states who design and manipulate them change their conducts. Citizens and civil society organizations can discharge their obligation, firstly, by exerting pressure on their states to change their conducts of manipulation and imposition of global institutions and regulatory system; and secondly, by exerting pressure on domestic institutions and state organs to absorb the risks to be exported to the poor in exchange for benefits while expanding abroad.

² I mean by self-sufficient in terms of resources, production, reproduction, and consumption of human goods and the distribution of opportunities using only domestic resources, or without the contribution of other societies. This is a kind of autarkic society. All other premises rely on this basic premise.

The principle of sharing value-additive production process rests on an ideal condition of *constructive confrontation* of the poor and the affluent that transforms the bifurcated view of the notion of global justice to justice among societies who are interdependent and engage in collective activities. Constructive confrontation is a rational response we can provide to the questions why should the affluent be concerned about the poor? and why should the poor be concerned about the affluent? The gist of this main proposition is elaborated in the subsequent six chapters.

Chapter one problematizes and frames the concept of global justice. Instead of the dichotomous view of the world of the affluent and poor, global justice is framed on the basis of global interdependence whereby our way of life is interlinked due to domestic risks that drive societies to participate in global cooperative activities. The objectives, the problems intended to be tackled, and the adopted method are all represented in an ideal type namely “invisibly linked life”. The constructed ideal type is a representation of our invisibly linked everyday life experience without which the current level of development or way of life each society enjoys is not possible. From this interlinkage and interdependence a moral duty to distant others is sought to be generated.

Chapter two reviews selected theoretical perspectives. The chapter starts by reviewing the concept of human rights particularly basic rights in the context of global justice. Then it presents statist and cosmopolitan perspectives of global justice. Accordingly, the works of Rawls, Miller, Nagel from the former, and Singer, Beitz, and Pogge from the later are assessed. This will be followed by positioning and pinpointing the interventions of this study to the battle of argumentation on global justice.

Chapter three focusses on societal domestic self-insufficiencies and risks, driving forces of societal interdependence and expansion abroad, which are common to all societies. The chapter works out the thesis that no society, including affluent societies, is capable of satisfying the basic needs of its members and maintain current level of human goods, based only on domestic resources. Domestic capability to establish the necessary institutions and social structures is not a *sufficient condition* for the production and reproduction of human goods and just

distribution of the same. Taking the cases of contemporary domestic risks of food and biofuels crops and arable land needed for the production of the same, the chapter analyzes the level of domestic self-insufficiency and risks affluent societies faces and their expansion abroad in sub-Saharan African countries. Expansion abroad is the key concept employed to demonstrate the depth of domestic risks of the affluent and their expansion abroad in search of arable land.

Chapter four scrutinizes the global structures and cooperative activities that facilitate expansion of the affluent abroad. Though, so many societal domestic self-insufficiencies and risks exist, only important and common ones are vital driving forces to collaborate with others. Global structures and institutions are not only organized around those important and common issue-areas, national communities cannot tackle alone, but also collectively develop certain interventions meant for tackling common problems. While common issue-areas serve as driving and organizing forces for global cooperative activities, their interventions serve as a means of deprivation of the poor and provision of resources and human goods to the affluent. The chapter argues, like the historical systems of slavery and colonization, though both operate with full control of the others, contemporary global order and cooperation facilitate exportation of the domestic risks of affluent societies to poor societies, and importation of benefits or human goods and resources from the poor to the affluent. It further insists without the global structures we have today the current state of livelihood namely affluent and poor are not possible. Hence, we can trace the harms the poor experience and the affluence the well-off experience to the global institutions and cooperation shaped and imposed by affluent states.

Chapter five focuses on the domestic risks exported from affluent to economically weak societies. Such harms are nothing but exported risks from the affluent and internalized by the poor. The chapter shows how poor societies internalize imported risks due to their participation in global cooperative activities and consequent change of policies and regulation. Furthermore, it identifies the specific instances of risks or harms local communities experienced due to cooperative interventions of global and national actors meant for increasing agricultural productivity. In a nutshell, the chapter establishes important correlations between domestic risks of the affluent and internalized harms by the poor. Likewise, the benefits affluent societies generate out of their expansion abroad and internalized risks by the poor. These correlations are necessary conditions of global justice required for the analysis of global distribution of the

outcomes of global cooperative activities. This leads to a conclusion that affluent societies unfairly benefit at the expense of inflicting harm on the poor, a justification for moral concern.

Finally, chapter six presents and defends the proposed duty of risk absorption, sharing value-additive production processes. It relies on the conclusion that affluent societies have a duty towards the poor so long as they unfairly benefit from the harms they inflict on the poor. It emanates from their motive of sustaining their own wellbeing than helping the poor. Conversely, the poor have no obligation to deprive themselves for the sake of providing the affluent with human goods and resources unless the affluent absorb their domestic risks that they export to the poor. It is a complementation of Pogge's proposal for improving the operations of global institutions. It is argued that in order to make Pogge's proposal feasible, improvement of the operation of global institutions needs to be accompanied with local level operations too. For this, affluent societies have a duty of risk absorption that can be discharged by releasing the value-additive production processes they retain while expanding abroad. It works out in an ideal condition of constructive confrontation whereby both the poor and affluent confront each other for a condition acceptable for a self-respecting person. And that condition can be found by responding to the questions. First, why should affluent societies be concerned about the poor? Second, why should the poor internalize the risks of the affluent? As self-respecting persons, the condition acceptable to both should be a condition that respect and protect basic rights of both. A condition below basic rights is not acceptable to any self-respecting person (Shue 2008).

1.1 Justice and Objects of Justice

The issue of global justice revolves around justice at the global level. Bifurcated view of justice, based on the world of affluent and poor, poses a question of whether it concerns about all or not? In order to analyze it, a conceptual clarity is required on the parties to whom rights, duties, and opportunities should be distributed than assigning obligation only to the affluent. To begin with, justice is not about certain groups of a society. It concerns about all people who share common institutions and involve in common collective activities. Functionally, it concerns fair and equal treatment of all members of a national community whether poor or affluent, a common person or a position holder; and also, fair distribution of the products of cooperative activities. Although there are different definitions of justice, most of them share common ideas

and elements. This is evident from the following quote which summarizes definitions from Plato to Rawls:

For Plato, justice is a virtue establishing rational order, with each part performing its appropriate role and not interfering with the proper functioning of other parts. Aristotle says justice consists in what is lawful and fair, with fairness involving equitable distribution and the correction of what is inequitable. For Augustine, the cardinal virtue of justice requires that we try to give all people their due; for Aquinas, justice is that rational mean between opposite sorts of injustice, involving proportional distributions and reciprocal transactions. Hobbes believed justice is an artificial virtue, necessary for civil society, a function of the voluntary agreements of the social contract; for Hume, justice essentially serves public utility by protecting property (broadly understood). For Kant, it is a virtue whereby we respect others' freedom, autonomy, and dignity by not interfering with their voluntary actions, so long as those do not violate others' rights; Mill said justice is a collective name for the most important social utilities, which are conducive to fostering and protecting human liberty. Rawls analyzed justice in terms of maximum equal liberty regarding basic rights and duties for all members of society, with socio-economic inequalities requiring moral justification in terms of equal opportunity and beneficial results for all... (Pomerleau, n.d.)

The ideas major social thinkers have in common include fair and equal treatment and distribution. Likewise, respect and protection of liberty and property, and non-interference in the affairs and actions of the others. One difference between ancient and modern thinkers can be attributed to the emphasis they give to virtue and freedom. While the former emphasizes on virtue, the later emphasizes on freedom (Sandel 2009:9). The emphasize on virtue dictates first the principle of justice which considers the best way a society ought to live, and the emphasis on freedom let a person choose the kind of life he wants to live. Otherwise, in a broader sense we can say "justice is associated with the morally appropriate and, in particular, equitable treatment of persons and groups" (Pogge 2008:37). Basically, justice belongs to society and social structures. As Rawls contends justice is the virtue of social institutions that are supposed to equally and fairly distribute rights, duties, and opportunities. He insists justice refers to "the way in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from social cooperation" (Rawls 1971:7). Social institutions serve the distribution the objects of justice, a purpose that we as members of a society establish them to perform. Therefore, we need justice for a rational social order so that societies live in a cohesive and orderly manner. Likewise, we need global justice for a rational

global order too. Having said this, I delve into the issue of global justice by highlighting the wrongs of slave and colonial systems so that I can make my views clear in a comparative way.

The reason that we call system of slavery unjust is because a slave master has full control over a slave and his life. A slave master needs slaves for their labor. A slave does not control his own life that what he does, why he does, about his future, and many other issues concerning his life are decided and controlled by the master. Not only the master, but also the whole social system and structures control and promote the operations of slavery. The system promotes the acts of the master, while discouraging the slave from freeing himself from the bondages that control his life. If, in one or other way, a slave make himself free from those bondages, he might fall into the hands of another master or he may not live a life that he wants to live, so long as the whole system is based on slavery. Powerholders or those who control and run the system believe that their society which is based on slavery benefits from the products the system that harms its victims. Slaves cannot claim for the value of their labor and a slave master does not worry about the rightful claims of a slave. Hence, system of slavery is an illustrative of a system that is not based on fairness and equality.

The same applies to colonialism too. Colonial masters control colonies. They care only about the resources they need from the lands of the people they colonized. In order to maintain their control over resources they establish the necessary institutions and order, and reign over colonized societies. Colonies do not have control over their lives, resources, and destinies as they operate under colonial rule. They do not own their own country and affairs. They do not negotiate with other societies. They could not have their own leaders who design and implement a kind of policy that benefit them. They cannot have their own leaders that design and establish a kind of institutions and structures needed for their development and also a just system. Colonies do not have sovereignty. Overall, it is the colonial master who controls and decide on issues that affect the life of the people living under their colony. For that same reason, colonialism is an unjust and unfair system.

What can be deduced from the above examples is that in both systems the objects of justice are not meant for equal and fair distribution. The institutions are not designed to operate for that purpose. By objects of justice I refer to “income, and wealth, duties and rights, powers and

opportunities, offices and honors” (Sandel 2009:19). Rights as a human person naturally possesses, and human goods and opportunities as products of common institutions and collective activities. Though, in both systems, slaves and colonized people *forcedly* participate in the production and reproduction of human goods, the objects of justice belong to the slave and colonial masters and the society they represent. Slaves and subjects living under the rule of their masters are *excluded* from sharing the objects of justice in the production of which they participate. The rights of slaves and the colonized are unthinkable as the masters dictate their living conditions. Interests of the masters and societies they represent are the most important concerns, labor in the case of slavery and resources in the case of colonial rules. Both labor and resources are factors of production required by the masters and their societies. Without them the production and reproduction of human goods, in those systems, and the growth and development of those societies are not possible as labor and resources are the backbone of the systems. The products of slavery and colonial systems are sold and consumed in the societies of the masters or other societies too. They are not meant to be redistributed back to the colonized and enslaved societies. In the nutshell, the social institutions and structures serve the interests of the colonizing societies while oppressing the colonized and enslaved.

I interject these examples with three intentions. Firstly, to illustrate what an unjust or unequal society or system look like. Secondly, to emphasize that the contemporary world we are living is completely different from both systems. We live in national communities with defined borders having own domestic systems and sovereignty. Again, we live in a globalized and interdependent world, that means the global and the local become the same experiencing the global at local level. To further elaborate this our daily local experiences are not fully the product of our national communities, rather they are in one or another way connected with other localities somewhere else. Globally we have institutions and structures that organize and coordinate cooperation among national communities. Likewise, we have international norms concerning human rights, trade, equality, justice, and others. Thirdly, to emphasize the fact that though contemporary life conditions typify much progress in all aspects, particularly in terms of human rights and justice, global injustice remains to be a critical issue, even neglected. For example, labor and resources were respectively the most important causes of injustices during the slave and colonial eras. As in these two systems, labor and resources are the most important causes of global injustice today too. For that reason, I insist that when we talk about global justice, we need to go beyond statist arguments which rests on the failure of the poor. Instead

we need to look at our interdependencies which are rooted in the domestic risks and insufficiencies of every society, particularly affluent societies are resource hungry and thirsty. Our view of global justice needs to start from our own everyday life experiences which connect us with distant others rather than projecting poverty and inequality at distant others as if affluence and poverty are isolated incidents.

There are immense reasons for such an argument. A careful analysis of the literature on global justice demonstrates well-off societies as assistant providers. For instance, words or concepts like well-ordered and burdened societies, the latter being poor lacking the cultural, social, technological and know-how to be well-ordered people (Rawls 1999). Likewise, we have the idea that while the rest live in the world of material comfort, global travel and global interdependence, the so-called poor are symbolized as impoverished ghetto living in a fourteenth-century reality where civil-war, plague and ignorance are common (Collier 2008:x, 3). Other terminologies such as well-off and affluent designating the West, and poor and impoverished designating other societies are also widely used (Pogge 2008). We can list many forms of representations.³

From such a designation comes the idea that the well-off should have an obligation towards the poor. That is why many insist: “what reasons do people in the developed West have for being unconcerned with the persistence of severe poverty abroad?” (Ibid., 7), “well-ordered peoples have a *duty* to assist burdened societies” (Rawls 1999:106), and also “if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening ... we ought to do it” (Singer 2008:388). But, why affluent societies have that obligation? What is the source of such an obligation? Is it because of the poor circumstances of the poor per se? As I mentioned earlier, justice is not about the concern for certain groups. It is rather about all including both the well-off and the poor so long as they share common institutions and engage in common collective activities. For instance, we can connect the so-called affluent in well-off societies and a pastoralist in a so-called poor country. In the world of global travel many people travel to visit different places. A person might travel to certain protected areas in Africa to visit nature and for hunting. That

³ Regardless of their level of advancement, I conceive societies as self-insufficient and equal. With this background, I found inappropriate to use terms like affluent, well-off, rich, poor and other similar terminologies for designating societies. Alternative concepts such as global north and south also imply the same ideas as the others. Yet, I use these terms due to lack of alternative words and concepts, at this level of my work. Also, depending on the context I use words such as national communities, investing and investment receiving societies.

specific area is protected for that purpose. But local pastoral communities who live around rearing their animals are not allowed to graze or hunt. That means some activities for pleasure are allowed for someone from other societies, but livelihood activities for local communities are forbidden. So long as that area is protected and used for tourism, the living condition of local communities living around the protected area is conditioned while that of the tourists flourished. So, how can we conceive justice in such a condition, and also the role of global and national institutions that design and implement conducts concerning protected areas and differentially affects the life of the poor and affluent? In this regard, from the position of the poor we can raise two important questions. First, unless the affluent conceive the poor as inactive and completely incapable, why should they wait for the mercy of the affluent in the first place? Second, why the so-called poor forcedly contribute to the wellbeing of the affluent? Why should the pastoralist be forbidden from grazing his livestock in the protected areas and the affluent is allowed to use it for pleasure? That is why the source of the moral obligation of the affluent has to be inquired: is it because of the capacity of the affluent and failure of the poor? Or, is it due to the existence of a correlation between the affluence of the well-off and poorness of the poor? The central arguments of the my work revolve around these questions.

My core argument is that if justice concerns all who share common institutions and participate in collective activities, *we need to bring the other or the poor to the equation of global justice.* If we do that, *we can identify and define the conditions of justice so that we can apply justice to the global level.* In short, *there should be a correlation between the life experiences of the affluent here and the poor there.* Based on such a *correlation* it is possible to *extend* justice to distant others.

Global justice can be conceived as a combination of three important concepts - global, justice, and object of justice, things to be distributed like human goods, rights, duties and opportunities. When we talk about global justice we are referring to the extension of the kind of domestic justice to the global level. To do so, we need to identify local life experiences that have global relevance in terms of justice, something that have global and local relevance at the same time. The term global connotes: one, *connectivity* of people regardless of the distance that exists between them and that connectivity may take different forms. “Certainly, what is global must have something to do with *large distances*” (Held et al., 1999), simply trans-border; the second,

mobility of material and non-material things between societies; and the third, global structures and processes that facilitate and coordinate the mobility of those material and non-material things. By combining these ideas, it can be argued that affluence here and poverty there are the results of mobility of resources, human goods, and opportunities from there to here and vice versa facilitated by supranational structures. In this sense, global justice should be looked at from the perspective of an interdependent world than only from dichotomous world view of affluent and poor as most writers on global justice argues. At the same time, we need to connect local experiences with global processes that make local experiences of affluence and poverty possible. This impacts our view on global justice.

The understanding of global justice using the idea of interdependence of local experiences here and there is essential for assigning duty to distant others. This is mainly because our local experiences have become dependent on things done somewhere else. To further elaborate this: firstly, societies are not *self-sufficient* in terms of resources and production, reproduction, distribution, and consumption of basic human goods, and opportunities as well; secondly, we are closely *interconnected* through the processes of production, reproduction, and consumption of basic goods and opportunities; thirdly, some domestic, regional, and global problems cannot be solved only by national communities alone. Finally, our conception of national societies confined to the geographic borders that we know on a map is misleading. They expand abroad through their resident institutions occupying certain policy and strategic spaces, and geographic locations in other countries. For these very facts, the subject matter of global justice needs to capture our daily life conditions than dissociating our lives from the poverty and injustice it creates somewhere in so-called poor societies. In short, it is our endeavor to satisfy our needs of human goods and opportunities that cause poverty somewhere which has relevance to global justice. Hence, I hold the idea that global justice has to be looked at the perspective of global interdependence than conventional view of the failure of poor.

1.2 Poverty as a Concern for Global Justice

“Very broadly speaking, theories of global justice will seek to persuade us by pointing either to facts about the world or to facts about our nature as human beings” (Armstrong 2012:25). Those who rely on facts of the world provide us with a bifurcated world of the poor and affluent specifying the focus areas and perspectives of global justice. Facts related to severe poverty,

hunger, global inequality, sufferings due to natural disasters, human rights violations, torture, war, and others are widely documented and used to show inequalities and conditions of the poor. Particularly, facts on poverty, hunger, and global inequality take the center stages (Pogge 2008). Natural disasters are beyond one's control, they destroy properties, livelihood bases, and kill people due to which affected people require urgent humanitarian assistances and may also need infrastructural reconstructions. Most agree on humanitarian assistance towards people who need assistance due to such calamities for the reason they are caused by factors beyond human control. However, what most disagree is on what to do about global poverty and inequality as they differ from natural calamities. They are outcomes of human failures such as corruption, war, domestic policies, international structural problems, historical incidences like slavery, colonization, and others. They can also be tackled by better national and international policies and cooperation. For that same reasons, the responses and approaches to global poverty and inequality in the context of global justice are still controversial.

In fact, the level of global poverty and inequality has gone beyond its tolerable limits given the level of human progress the world has achieved. For instance:

About 870 million people are estimated to have been undernourished (in terms of dietary energy supply) in the period 2010–12. This figure represents 12.5 percent of the global population, or one in eight people. The vast majority of these, 852 million, live in developing countries, where the prevalence of undernourishment is now estimated at 14.9 percent of the population (FAO, WFP and IFAD 2012:8).

On its website, The Hunger Project presents the following basic data on global poverty and hunger (The Hunger Project, website, n.d.).

World Hunger

- 795 million people - or one in nine people in the world - do not have enough to eat.
- 98% of the world's undernourished people live in developing countries.
- Where is hunger the worst?
 - Asia: 525.6 million
 - Sub-Saharan Africa: 214 million
 - Latin America and the Caribbean: 37 million

Women and Children

- 60 percent of the world's hungry are women.
- 50 percent of pregnant women in developing countries lack proper maternal care, resulting in approximately 300,000 maternal deaths annually from childbirth.
- 1 out of 6 infants are born with a low birth weight in developing countries.
- Nearly half of all deaths in children under 5 are attributable to under-nutrition. This translates into the unnecessary loss of about 3 million young lives a year.
- Every 10 seconds, a child dies from hunger-related diseases.

HIV/AIDS and other Diseases

- 36.9 million people are living with HIV/AIDS.
- 50 percent of people living with HIV/AIDS are women.
- 88 percent of all children and 60 percent of all women living with HIV are in Sub-Saharan Africa.
- 6.3 million children died in 2013 - 17,000 a day - mostly from preventable health issues such as malaria, diarrhea and pneumonia.

Poverty

- 896 million people in developing countries live on \$1.90 a day or less.
- 22,000 children die each day to conditions of poverty.

Agriculture

- 70 percent of the world's poorest people live in rural areas and depend on agriculture and related activities for their livelihood.
- 50 percent of hungry people are farming families.

Water

- 663 million people lack access to clean water.
- 2.4 billion people do not have adequate sanitation.
- Each day, nearly 1,000 children die due to preventable water and sanitation related diarrhoeal diseases.

The above data demonstrates unfulfilled basic needs of hundreds of millions of people around the world whose life is "... too lacking, too impoverishing, to be human at all. Obviously, then, it could not be a good human life", as Nussbaum (2008:512-513) branded it. By implication, the rest of the world relatively live a life of abundance and affluence with efficient institutions

and access to health services, education, nutrition, job opportunity, technology, and others that can be labeled as a good life. Rawls (1999:108) attributed “the causes of the wealth of a people and the forms it takes lie in their political culture and in the religious, philosophical, and moral traditions that support the basic structure of their political and social institutions, as well as in the industriousness and cooperative talents of its members, all supported by their political virtues.”

Be that as it may, the gap between the life circumstances of the so-called poor and affluent societies pose major questions. To begin with, does poverty or affluence merely tell about global injustice? as inequality may also exist in affluent societies too. A just system does not guarantee absence of inequality. As a matter fact, how can such a global difference occur? Is there any association between the poverty there and affluence here? On the one hand, we have global institutions, processes and cooperation, on the other hand, we have movements of tradeable materials and none material things and also even different forms of institutions operating outside of their countries of origin. National and international policies and relations affect the domestic policies of national communities. In such global circumstances our search for the conditions of global justice oblige us to identify and critically analyze both domestic and global circumstances of justice.

Briefly, we deal with unfair global order for which various principles of global distributive justice, that differ in their identification of the duty bearers and the type of obligation ought to be assigned, have been proposed. For example, statist or minimalists commonly argue that well-off societies have a duty to provide minimum assistance, for example as shown above, to the 795 million people who do not have enough to eat, the 22,000 children dying everyday due to poverty, the 1000 children dying everyday due to water related diarrhoeal disease, the 2.4 billion people who lack adequate sanitation. The underlining idea here is that the *capability* of the affluent oblige them to help the poor who have failed to change their conditions. Some others *associate* global injustice to unfair global institutions and international cooperation. *Whatever the case, most writers don't acknowledge the existing correlations between the life experiences of the affluent and the poor which should have been the basis for global justice.* They rather bifurcate the spatially differentiated but interconnected life experiences, poor and affluent, and analyze global justice thereof. *This essentializes the need for shifting focus from*

poverty and capacity per se to the existing correlations between the life experiences of the poor and the affluent. The following ideal type, that can be applied to other conditions too, is constructed to accomplish this task.

1.3 Ideal Type: Invisibly Linked Life

The above elaboration needs to be put into context to define and narrow the scope of the discussion under consideration. To do so, the notion of connectivity is adopted to represent the interdependent life experiences of the affluent and the poor. Weberian methodology of “ideal type” is adopted to capture and represent possible connectivity of life experiences among national communities and conceptualize global justice. Also, land grab or transnational agricultural land deals, manifestation of domestic risks of food and biofuels and scarcity of arable land is taken as a case. It facilitates the construction of a correlation between domestic risks and expansion abroad of the affluent, and consequent risk exportation to the poor. At the same time, it establishes a correlation between harms and the benefits generated out of them. Finally, it helps to analyze the relationships between the life of lacking and impoverishing, on the one hand, and the life of affluent and fulfillment, on the other hand.

The correlation between domestic risks, expansion abroad, risk exportation, harms, and the benefits generated out of harm is crucial for illustrating our interdependence through a global system that differentially distribute benefits and burdens. The “ideal type” allows us to capture and connect the different parts of the system, biofuels and food security at national and global level. It is only when the way resources and human goods are produced, reproduced, and made accessible to individual persons are well constructed that we can talk about their just distribution. This substantiates the argument that the mere existence of affluence and poverty here and there does not explain unjust distributions.

The ideal type comprises five individuals from three continents and five countries. Three of them are land grab affected persons in investment host countries namely Cameroon, Ethiopia, and Tanzania. These three individuals represent more than 14 million land grab affected people in sub-Saharan Africa.⁴ The other two represent consumers of biofuels and food commodities

⁴ For details see page 101.

in investing countries namely Saudi Arabia, as representative of food security, and the United Kingdom (UK) as representative of biofuels purposes. Investing countries are wealthy but lack arable land, while investment host countries are poor but have abundant arable land. All the five countries represent the major countries involved in land grab investments, either as investors or investments hosts. Here, the main issue under scrutiny is how life experiences such as lacking, impoverishing, abundance, fulfillment of individuals and the societies they represent are affected. Based on that, it is possible to capture and analyze the causes and consequences of global poverty, affluence and the systems that make them possible.

Mr. A⁵ lives in London and is a citizen of the UK. He is a middle class and has a good job which he is proud of. He has a beautiful car that he likes very much and drives to and from his work place and to conduct his daily activities. He uses biofuels and fossil fuel as he wishes. His car gives him comfort that eases his daily routines. Without his car, he might not live like the way he is now. Some years back the issue of petroleum was the concern of the UK government. But in recent years thanks to biofuels technologies it seems things are going on well. However, the UK has a major problem of arable land. Hence, the government of the UK uses its soft power to acquire land abroad, in Africa. Like other Western states, the UK has seriously taken the issue and encourages both producers and consumers through various incentives. UK based multinationals acquired 66 projects in different countries, in Africa - for instance 2 deals in Ethiopia, 7 deals in Ghana, 8 deals in Mozambique, 9 deals in Tanzania, and 6 deals in Sierra Leon (Land Matrix Database, n.d. (hereafter refers LMD)). The UK acquired a total of 2,079,823 ha in different countries in Africa (Schoneveld 2011:6). If the population density of these lands assumed to be 25 persons per km², a total of 519,955 people is evicted by investments originating from the UK.⁶ By acquiring land abroad, the UK is able to expand its actual usable land size. Nationally, the UK is also able to maintain its national economy by expanding abroad than displacing its domestic spaces or land use patterns. If the UK produce biofuels crops domestically it would be forced to import the agricultural commodities that are displaced and can no longer domestically be produced. Like any other UK citizen, Mr. A has benefited from the expansion of the choice of human goods, in this case fuels, the macro and micro economy benefits of his country too.

⁵ Case A and B are compiled based on contemporary phenomena of biofuels and food security.

⁶ For the assumptions used to estimate this figure see page 101.

Another person Mr. B lives in Jeddah. He is middle class according to Saudi Arabia's standard of living. Mostly, he consumes rice. Rice is the staple food in that country. At his home, variety of delicious rice dishes are served which he and his family members enjoy very much. But, unfortunately Saudi Arabia is not self-sufficient in rice production. It has water and arable land scarcities. The government subsidizes and imports rice to satisfy the needs of its citizens. Particularly, since the 2008 international food crisis, the government adopted a strategy to acquire land and expand its actual usable land size abroad, in arable land abundant countries. Accordingly, investors from that country acquire land for large scale agricultures and import the products back home. Saudi companies have acquired land in Ethiopia and other African countries too. The Saudi has acquired 27 investment projects including 11 in Ethiopia and 6 in Sudan (LMD, n.d.). For instance, Saudi Star, a Saudi Arabia based company, acquired 139,000 ha of land in the Gambella regional state of Ethiopia to produce rice and soya (Rahmato 2011:29).

The third person Mr. O⁷ is an Ethiopian who fled to Kenya and lives there at a UNHCR migration camp. According to Anuwa and Gambellan community associations in Kenya, out of the 4,500 migrants from the Gambella region in Ethiopia 20% cases are due to the government's resettlement programs in that region. Though, the government claim there is no relationship between the resettlement program and large-scale investments, human rights organizations and affected communities believe the contrary. They claim foreign agricultural projects and government owned projects took their land. These projects have taken the land from the communities on which they rely for their survival for many centuries. Mr. O and others from indigenous communities in that region were forced to go to the resettlement area. Mr. O claims that he and his community members were abused as a result of which they left their residential places for Kenya. The governments of the UK and the USA, and the WB sponsored the resettlement program that evict communities. Mr. O assigned a lawyer to sue DFID of the UK. He is represented by a lawyer and the case has been filed in London. Because Mr. O alleges the support of the World Bank to the resettlement program that displaced him, the World Bank office in Nairobi held a hearing with Mr. O and his friends. As a result of the hearing, a human right abuse report was sent to the head office of the WB in New York. Mr. O

⁷ This is a real case compiled based on various reports. Mr. O is represented by a Law firm Leigh Day in the UK and Inclusive Development International in New York. The case has been reported by different media outlets too.

is also represented by an NGO called Inclusive Development International (IDI) to follow his case in New York against the WB. The US state department had also sent an investigation commission to the Gambella regional state to examine the situation in the area where Mr. O used to live. Again, Ethiopia hosts 118 transnational investment projects originated from 21 countries including 11 projects from Saudi Arabia, 2 from the UK, and 17 from India (LMD, n.d.). A UK based company, SunBiofuels and Sun Bio (NBC) respectively acquired 5,000 ha in Wallaita, SNNP Region, and 80,000 ha in Metekel, Benishangul Region to produce biofuels crops (Rahmato 2011:28). Likewise, a Saudi Arabia based company has acquired hundreds of thousands of hectares of land particularly in Gambella region from where Mr. O displaced.

Another person is Mr. X⁸, a Tanzanian. He was born and grew up in Kisarawe locality. He is a farmer, a profession he acquired from his parents. But since 2009, a UK based company called SunBiofuels acquired 9,000 ha of land in Kisarawe district. That land was previously designated as a village land where 10 adjacent villages collectively used for different purposes such as grazing, wood collection, charcoal production, water source, crossing roads, and others. SunBiofuels acquired the land without full consensus of the communities. But since the arrival of the company the communities from 10 villages lost access to the land and other resources. Still they are complaining about the promised compensation and return of their land, though the company discontinued its operations. Community members complain that villagers have died because of the pesticide chemicals used for the Jatropha plantation. Some of them are still sick. A woman explained to excursion participants which I personally participated, in September 2013 that her husband, who was a laborer in the project, is still sick. Like Ethiopia, Tanzania hosts 58 transnational investment projects including 9 from the UK (LMD, n.d.).

The fifth person is Mr. Y⁹, a Cameroonian living in a village where there is high forest resources and cash crop cultivation. He farms on a 5 ha of land which he inherited from his father. He earns more than \$2,300 per year from the products of his land. He cultivates cacao, palm oil, and different fruits. He also produces some food crops for family consumption and for sale in local markets. The government of Cameroon negotiated to lease 73,000 ha of land,

⁸ This case is compiled based on real story from Kisarawe district in Tanzania. I compiled it based on a one day excursion I participated in September 2013 as part of an international conference on 'Land justice for sustainable peace in Tanzania', September 9, 2013. Participants of the excursion had a chance to talk with representatives from ten adjacent villages affected by land grab investments about the processes that dispossess their village land.

⁹ For further details of this case see page 166-169.

including the land Mr. Y farms, to a US based multinational, namely Herakles Farms. Mr. Y is worried about his future as land demarcation was already conducted without his involvement. He ponders how the government of Cameroon is going to improve the life of his and other villagers by leasing the land at \$0,50 per ha per year while he already earns more than \$2,300 per year. The land is not yet fully transferred to the investor; however, he and the villagers are worried about their future. All in all, Mr. Y and the other villagers would like to retain their land and agricultural activities than offering the land to the company. A woman from that village wonders “why multinationals come and disturb our life”.

1.4 Global Interdependence

The purpose of the above ideal type is not to list cases, rather to make a representation of connectivity of real-life experiences of affluent and poor, based on concrete problems of food security, biofuels and arable land. It is constructed to scrutinize and characterize global justice in concrete terms. Based on this we can reflect and analyze on questions such as: what kind of correlation exists between the five persons presented in the ideal type? What kind of difference can we find between the representation of this ideal type and the bifurcated world view of the world of the affluent and the poor? How can this lead us to a different perspective of global justice? This is the puzzle I apply to solve the issue of duty to distant others, that differ from duty triggering factors like the failure of the poor (Rawls 1999), capacity of the affluent to help the poor (Singer 2008), the need for global coercive institutions (Nagel 2005) and the harm the affluent inflict on the poor (Pogge 2008). None of these fully explain the above ideal type and provide satisfactory reasons as to why Mr. A and B concern about the other three, except the notion of harm provides partial explanation. That is why I shift from mere poorness of Mr. O, X, and Y, and affluence of Mr. A and B to the correlation between their life experiences and the role played by their governments and global institutions. The notion of harm as advanced by Pogge provides partial explanation because he does not deal with the reason why affluent societies harm the poor in the first place. His thesis is that well-off societies have a duty to help the poor because their states manipulate and impose global institutions that harm the poor. He further postulates that they can help the poor by working to change the operations of those global institutions which engender harms. But, he does not see the root causes namely domestic risks of the affluent which are mitigated by exporting them to the poor.

At the core of this rests the extent of interdependence between life experiences and the moral obligation that should be generated thereof. The ideal type demonstrates that Mr. A and B are respectively provided with basic needs of biofuels and food that flourish their personhood, while Mr. O and X are already deprived of their livelihood bases, and Mr. Y is worried that the fate of Mr. O and X is close to happen to him too. The worst case is that of Mr. O who fled to a neighboring country and is living in a UNHCR migration camp in Kenya. If Mr. O comes to the UK or any EU countries to seek asylum his application is likely to be rejected on the basis that he is an economic migrant. The other observation is that the governments of the UK and Saudi Arabia are able to develop policies and strategies to satisfy the basic needs of their citizens. Both the UK and Saudi Arabia respectively have not only domestic risks, namely biofuels and food security, but also a lack of arable land to domestically produce them. As a consequence, they are prompted to expand their actual usable land size by expanding abroad. In biofuels adopting countries, incentives are applied to encourage producers and consumers so as to sustain the biofuels industry. Saudi Arabia on its part provides the financial support to investors. In contrast, the governments of Ethiopia and Tanzania have adopted agricultural led development strategy and designed policies and strategies to make their countries investors friendly. As a result, multinationals from the West, Gulf Region, and Asian countries flock to these countries.

Most importantly global institutions profoundly involve in promoting agricultural land markets in investment host countries. Some investment host countries signed Cooperative Frameworks with the G8 with the aim of increasing agricultural productivity through private commercial farming. This is evident that “today the interconnectedness between countries and regions is growing, and the perception of mutual interdependence should serve as motivation for collective action” (Bringezu & Bleischwitz 2009:5). Yet, in contrast to investing countries, by allowing foreign investors, investment host countries displace their own citizens, Mr. O and X, and reduce their actual land size by the amount they leased to multinational corporations (MNC). Both investor and investment host states have joined hand in displacing the spaces communities used to survive. If we closely examine the situation, investing countries like the UK and Saudi Arabia export their domestic risks to the others, thus the hypothesized risks of Mr. A and B are exported and experienced by Mr. O, X, and Y. The following quote reflects this reality:

Consequently, the prevailing phenomenon of problem shifting plays a central role in this book. We can demonstrate in both conceptual and empirical terms that material and energy efficiency of the European economy-as in other economies-is increasing. At the same time, resources are imported to a growing extent from other regions, with an over-proportional growth of so called 'hidden' flows: that is, resource extraction that burdens the environment but does not enter the traded product. In other words, Europe currently cleans up its environment- and related reporting- at the expense of others (Bringezu & Bleischwitz 2009:7).

The fact of the matter is that risk exportation is driven by the growing domestic demand for resources and its consequent risks. Like global poverty the level of domestic resource poverty is very alarming which indicates the level of domestic risks, a motivation for expansion abroad and risk exportation. For example, the global demand for arable land only for the production of biofuels crops by 2100 will jump to 2 billion hectares (IBRD/WB 2010:147). Also, "Europe's economy is based on global resource use. Material commodities are sourced from various regions in the world" (Ibid., 2009:1). In relation to biofuels policy and availability of arable land, the European Union (EU) is supposed to convert 38% of its current land use patterns to the production of biofuels crops to meet its 10% policy target of replacing the use of fossil fuel with biofuels (UNCTAD 2009:31). In another example, the US would become net importer of food crops worth of \$80 billion from net exporter of \$20 billion if it decides to domestically produce biofuels crops to meet its growing energy demands (Reilly & Paltsev 2007:1). The West, Middle East, North Africa, and Asia have low potential of arable land for agricultural expansion and intensification to meet their growing biofuels and food security demands. Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, in contrast, have land expansion and agricultural intensification potential as they possess abundant arable land.¹⁰ These examples are just a tip of an iceberg in connection to the above ideal type. In a nutshell, "our analysis reveals that resource requirements of industrial regions such as the EU are being increasingly supplied from other regions, and in particular from developing countries which have to carry a growing burden of resource extraction and refining" (Bringezu et al. 2009:52-53).

If that is the case, triggering moral duty towards distant others based on justifications none other than domestic risks and global interdependence would not be feasible. In the context of global justice, the issues to be dealt in the subsequent chapters include: how does the wellbeing

¹⁰ For further detail see chapter 3.3.2, page 85-91.

of Mr. A and B satisfied, while Mr. O and X impoverished? Whose livelihood experiences is lacking or fulfilled? What kind of correlation exists between the satisfaction of the needs of Mr. A and B, and deprivation of the well-being of Mr. O, X and Y? What kind of national and global processes either positively or negatively affect their life conditions? Do Mr. A and Mr. B including their states have any obligation towards Mr. O, X and Y? If yes, why and what kind of duty? And, do Mr. O, X and Y have any obligation to impoverish themselves for the sake of fulfilling the needs of Mr. A and B? Which moral duty oblige Mr. O, X and Y towards the wellbeing of Mr. A and B? Most importantly, what is the implications of such ideal type to the duty to distant others?

This study hypothesizes we live an interdependent life which essentializes the generation of the duty of justice from societal domestic risks rooted into domestic resource scarcity and expanding demands for human goods the mitigation of which require global cooperative activities, global institutions and regulatory system. As societies act to mitigate domestic risks, global interdependence facilitates risk exportation to others, distance others act closer. That is what the ideal type above attempts to demonstrate. As a matter of fact, the life experiences of the five persons presented in the ideal type are connected to each other. Without going to further details, the rice and biofuels made available to the two is due to the displacement and dispossession of the three others. Without deprivation of the three the provisions made to the others are not possible. Without the decisions of their states and global institutions the deprivation of the three and fulfilment of the two is impossible. Because food security and climate change are the concerns of the world, both have become common-issue areas of world society around which states organize themselves. As a result, certain global institutions are established, and initiatives are undertaken hence they engage in global collective activities. Accordingly, they have developed interventions, in the form of large-scale agricultural investments, aimed at increasing agricultural productivity. Those global cooperation and interventions are driven by the moto of “food for all” and “energy for all”. Yet, the global distribution of the outcomes of such collective activities, benefits and burdens, is not fair. As the ideal type demonstrates Mr. O, X, and Y are deprived of their livelihood bases for the sake of providing Mr. A and B with biofuels and food.

In summary, the ideal type is contextualized and adopted to analyze the moral duty to distant others based on the case of the global rush for land grab in sub-Saharan Africa. This is accomplished, first, by reviewing statist and cosmopolitan perspectives of global justice and duty triggering factors. Second, by demonstrating the level of societal domestic insufficiency and risks namely food and biofuels crops, and arable land needed for the production of the same. What is the volume of regional and global demands of food and biofuels crops, and the arable land needed for satisfying the growing demands? Where can those lands be found? What is the extent of land grab or expansion in sub-Saharan Africa? Third, by identifying and analyzing the global cooperative activities and organizations organized around common issue-areas of food and climate change. Designed and executed interventions aimed at attaining the missions of those cooperative activities are equally important. Which global institutions and processes are active in facilitating the cooperative activities related with land grab investments? Fourth, by analyzing the way affluent societies export their domestic risks and investments host countries internalize them together with the specific types of harms occurred due to expansion abroad. Specifically, domestic policy and regulatory changes imposed due to global cooperation, as means of risk internalization will be dealt. Displacement, dispossession and impoverishment risks local communities, where land grab occurs, experience will be examined too. In the fifth section, the root causes of land grab harms which is retention of value-additive production processes will be elaborated. Based on this, the proposal for duty of risk absorption together with its justifications and substantive contents will be presented. Finally, a general conclusion that deals with constructive confrontation of the leading moral questions as way forward will be presented.

2 Chapter Two

Justifications for the Concern to Others

Introduction

The previous chapter framed the issue of global justice. It shifts the perspective of global justice from the one that generate the moral duty to others based on their poorness and affluence to duty of justice based on domestic risks, interdependent life experiences and global cooperative activities. This chapter will involve in the battle of arguments on global justice by assessing selected concepts that generate the moral duty to distant others based on poverty, capacity and harm, and finally situating the interventions of this my study. It starts by discussing human rights and setting basic rights as benchmark for both triggering and assigning moral obligation to distant others. At the core of the debate on global justice we find the dilemma about the existence of the circumstances of justice among societies. The “‘Circumstances of justice’ specify those living conditions of human beings under which *any* principles of justice apply *in the first place*. Unless we live under such circumstance, no principles of justice apply to begin with” (Risse 2011:11). In strict conformity with Risse, the chapter argues we have not only circumstances of global justice but also global and domestic conditions of justice are inseparable hence they are equally important. Domestic conditions dictate global conditions of justice - their form, process, organization, and the relationship among societies.

This rests on the premise that no society is self-sufficient. In fact, domestic capabilities of one society depend on the domestic capabilities of other societies and their own ability to expand abroad, as a result of which we live in an interdependent world whereby societies contribute to each other’s welfare. We also have developed a global system that facilitate interdependence and cooperation which in turn affects global distribution of human goods and life chances the same like domestic structures. Against this background, the chapter argues that the concern toward distant others ought to be grounded on the circumstances of global justice including domestic self-insufficiency, global interdependence, global institutions and regulatory systems, and cooperation. For that same reason, harm is conceptualized as the result of expansion of the affluent, their egoistic accumulation of resources and retention of value-additive production processes, and finally exportation of risks to the poor. Resultantly, justice can be globally served if affluent societies assume duty to risk absorption that can be discharged by releasing retained value-addition, while expanding abroad, to the poor.

With this background, the chapter is organized into three sections. The first section presents the concept of human rights. It covers the meaning and substances of human rights so as to set the foundation for subsequent evaluation of the perspectives on global justice. The second section examines three statist and three cosmopolitan perspectives on global justice. In a nutshell, minimalists argue for domestic justice and promote duty of minimum assistance to others. For instance, Rawls justifies this view based on the ideas of *social structures and domestic responsibility*, while Miller emphasizes *nationality and national identity*. Nagel, on his part, contend for the importance of *coercive institutions* which he does not see at global level. All in all, though they claim that we have primary obligation towards our fellow countrymen, they promote duty of minimum assistance towards others, with a condition, if they fail to meet their basic needs.

In contrast, cosmopolitans argue on the basis of equal moral concern to all regardless of their backgrounds. However, when it comes to the analysis of global justice and developing principles of distributive justice, they provide divergent reasons. Singer, for example, argues based on the principle of the *capacity* of affluent societies to help the poor and alleviate global poverty. Against Rawls, Beitz claims the moral concern to others emanate from the right to access to resources that societies domestically lack and the existing global *social structures and cooperation*. In view of this, Beitz proposes principle of *resource redistribution*. Pogge (2008), on his part, invokes the notion of negative duty not to harm others. He directly traces global poverty to the conducts of well-off societies such as design, manipulate and impose global order and international regulatory system on poor societies. Such conducts *harm* the global poor as they exclude them from the benefits of the use of limited natural resources for the advantage of well-off societies. Accordingly, he insists on the need to reform global institutions and the idea of Global Resource Dividend (GRD), a mechanism of taxing the extraction of natural resources to be distributed to poor countries.

The last section presents two interventions aimed at enriching and promoting Pogge's idea. On one hand it *thoroughly elaborates* his idea of harm, on the other hand it complements his reform proposal of global institutions with duty of risk absorption to replace his proposal for GRD. *The first intervention focuses on the reasons why well-off societies manipulate and impose*

global institutions, by tracing harms back to *domestic risks* of human goods, resources, and expansion of the same. The second intervention focuses on the proposal for risk absorption that can be discharged by *sharing value-additive production processes*. Based on the six salient features of harms set by Pogge, I argue that to mitigate their domestic risks well-off societies violate their negative duty of not to harm others by expanding abroad, occupying and eliminating livelihood *spaces* of others, and retaining value-addition. As such, they have a duty of risk absorption such as sharing resources, human goods, and opportunities produced from resources they acquired abroad to mitigate their own domestic risks.

2.1 The Relationship between Human Rights and Justice

Henceforth, the importance of rights, particularly basic rights including its meaning, contents and relation with justice will be discussed. Basic right is used as a benchmark both for setting an obligation on duty holders and to draw the level right holders should not be left to go under and cannot be expected to tolerate violations. This is similar to Rawls, Miller, Nagel, and Singer who argue that well-off societies have a positive duty of assisting the poor, if they fail to meet their basic rights by themselves, and also Pogge's invocation of the negative duty not to harm others which violates the basic rights of the poor. In that sense, the importance of basic right in the relation to global justice has well grounded justifications.

One strong argument in this regard is that "a moral right provides (1) the rational basis for a justified demand (2) that the actual enjoyment of a substance be (3) socially guaranteed against standard threats" (Shue 2008:84). This reflects the core issues mostly raised on the discussions of human rights as it underlines the significance of the substances of rights which could be implicitly or explicitly stated whenever human rights are mentioned. They are the core of rights without which it loses its meaning. The rational claim of right holders for a social guarantee is grounded on the consideration of the substances of the rights under consideration. Meaning that, "to have a right is to be in a position to make demands of others, and to be in such a position is, among other things, for one's situation to fall under general principles that are good reasons why one's demands ought to be granted. A person who has a right has especially compelling reasons - especially deep principles - on his side" (Shue 2008). Compelling reasons correspond to the rights under consideration implicating the substances of rights which in turn indicates the area where to focus in dealing with rights and justice.

Yet, the sources of rights are open to debate, particularly due to the dichotomy between natural and legal rights and their implication to human practices. For example, one's rights "... are literally rights one has because one is a human" (Donnelly 2013:7). That means being human per se renders it importance, "we have human rights because we are human, and they legitimately exist because they are a prerequisite for anyone being human in the first instance" (Fagan 2009:8). Those compelling reasons and principles are in accord with being human, the denial of which reduce that humanness. This line of argument is in congruent with natural rights perspective which differ from legal right. The later generates rights from legal systems and laws. Legal right contenders argue "[r]ight, the substantive *right*, is the child of law; from *real* laws come *real* rights; but from *imaginary* laws, from 'law of nature' [can come only] '*imaginary* rights'" (Bentham, J. as cited in Sen 2004:325). Here, human rights are detached from human natural qualities, and conceived within the confines of manmade systems of law. In this case, rights can be referenced only by the prescriptions of legal documents.

On the other hand, it can be argued that legal rights are sub-sets of natural rights hence it is impossible to put each and every thing in legal form. Reference can be made to four main attributes of natural rights that differentiate it from legal rights, including 1) natural rights are independent of society's moral conventions and positive law, 2) natural rights are pre-institutional, 3) every person possesses natural rights every time at every place, and 4) every one possesses natural rights by virtue of being human (Beitz 2009:52-53). From this we can deduce that natural rights precede legal rights. That is why John Locke said that "the laws made by government were not valid if they conflicted with natural morality - as people sometimes say, 'an unjust law is not law' - and natural morality gave everyone the right to life, liberty and property" (Gorman 2003:11). As such, "human rights can be seen as primarily ethical demands. They are not principally 'legal,' 'proto-legal' or 'ideal-legal' commands. Even though human rights can, and often do, inspire legislation, this is a further fact, rather than a constitutive characteristic of human rights" (Sen 2004:319).

Admittedly, for the sake of advancing collective activities and preserving human qualities and interests of individual persons, societies need to have certain forms of social arrangements that serve as instruments of justice. Then within the context of national communities, we can say:

... a right has been guaranteed only when arrangements have been made for people with the right to enjoy it. It is not enough that at the moment it happens that no one is violating the right. Just as a proclamation of a right is not the fulfillment of a right and may in fact be either a step toward or away from actually fulfilling the right, an undertaking to create social guarantees for the enjoyment of various subjects of rights is by no means itself the guaranteeing and may or may not lead to real guarantee. But a right has not been fulfilled until arrangements are in fact in place for people to enjoy whatever it is to which they have the right. Usually, perhaps, the arrangements will take the form of law, making the rights legal as well as moral ones. But in other cases well-entrenched customs, backed by taboos, might serve better than laws - certainly better than unenforced laws (Shue 2008:87).

This shows the importance of social arrangements for guaranteeing the full enjoyment of rights. In addition to this, well-entrenched customs, norms and taboos which are not part of legal documents play vital role as part and parcel of the social, cultural, religious fabric and societal world view in general. Like legal instruments they dictate the dos and don'ts aspects of human behaviors. However, full enjoyment of rights requires certain social arrangements which may take different forms like laws or proclamations. In short "human rights define the moral and legal status of individual persons in sociopolitical institutions" (Chwaszcza 2007:21). That is why rights need to be legally elaborated and protected as forms of guarantee. This being so, one has to be clear about the substances of rights a person enjoys in real term.

In this sense, regardless of social arrangements and guarantees, actual enjoyment of the substance or an instance of right is vital for flourishing one's life.

The substance of a right is whatever the right is a right to. A right is not a right to enjoy a right - it is a right to enjoy something else, like food or liberty. ... Enjoying a right to, for example, liberty normally means enjoying liberty. It may also mean enjoying liberty in the consciousness that liberty is a right. Being a right is a status that various subjects of enjoyment have. Simply to enjoy the right itself, the status, rather than to enjoy the subject of the right would have to mean something like taking satisfaction that there is such a status and that something has that status (Shue 2008:86).

Obviously, this argument of Shue leads us to the subject matter of the content of rights. The status of having rights can be different from enjoying the instances a status contains. In actual terms, we enjoy those instances of the status of having rights. To put it simple, it is the content of rights or its substances that is part of a human being or personhood, though human right statuses can be prescribed in laws and conventions as a means of guaranteeing the enjoyment of particular instances of rights.

Although the significance of human rights for satisfying human wellbeing and promoting human agency has never been questioned, different writers have conceptualized its substantive contents in various ways. This is evident from different propositions such as the capabilities approach of Martha Nussbaum; capability of Amartya Sen; basic rights of Henry Shue; life, liberty and property of John Locke; basic goods of John Finnis; and autonomy, welfare and liberty of Griffin are cases in point. They all consider the absence of the substances of rights as violation or deprivation. Even Locke argues for the right to resistance in situations where rights to life, liberty and property are violated.

In a nutshell, “all human rights will then come under one or other of these three overarching headings: autonomy, welfare, and liberty. And those three can be seen as constituting a trio of highest-level human rights” (Griffin 2008:149). Finnis, on his part, offers seven basic goods that human rights contain. He says, “remember: by ‘good’, ‘basic good’, ‘value’, ‘well-being’, etc. I do not yet mean ‘moral good’, etc. What, then, are the basic forms of good for us?” (Finnis 2008:90-91). He lists issues such as life, knowledge, play, aesthetic experience, friendship, practical reasonableness and religion. He added that each of these seven goods comprises a wide range of descriptions that one values, given ones socio-economic and cultural backgrounds. According to him, the seven goods are insufficient due to the fact that they need to be furnished with other human objectives and aspects of life to facilitate their attainment.

Nussbaum commends human capabilities as the basis for human wellbeing and humanness. To her human capabilities include life; bodily health; bodily integrity; senses, imagination and thought; emotions; political reason; affiliation; relatedness to other species and to nature; play; and control over one’s environment political and material (Nussbaum 2003b:41-42). Though there is an overlap with Finnis’s basic goods, Nussbaum’s list provides additional substances

of rights crucial to human life. Notably, for Nussbaum (2003a:448) “failure to secure these to citizens is a particularly grave violation of basic justice, since these entitlements are held to be implicit in the very notion of human dignity and a life that is worthy of the dignity of the human being.” That being so, a life “... without this item would be too lacking, too impoverishing, to be human at all. Obviously, then, it could not be a good human life. So, this list of capabilities is a ground-floor or minimal conception of the good” (Nussbaum 2008: 512-513).

To put this more clearly, “human dignity and human rights are not lived as abstract concepts. They have tangible meaning and weight in the context and crucible of concrete human experience – history, freedom, reason, and community” (Carozza 2008:931). This implies that substances of human rights are practical everyday experiences. We live and exercise them in our daily life at any time anywhere. As one strives to pursue his personal interest others also do the same. One may want to enhance his capabilities to own properties, to improve skills and earn income, to satisfy basic needs, or improve his bodily integrity or relation with others. To do so a person needs to autonomously think, plan, and need to have his liberty to take an independent action. With this background natural right theories are grounded on human natural interests, qualities and capabilities.

To turn back to the core of the subject under consideration, global justice, the notions of basic rights and human dignity needs to be interjected here so as to strengthen what has been so far discussed, and highlight its evaluative purpose in terms of duty to distant others. As entitlements, all rights are important. But, we need to have a clear idea about the unique features of basic rights, in other word the least level no one is allowed to go under. Similarly, the justifiable limits duty holders may have reason, for instance for public interest, to deprive rights an individual person. At this point, we can make a reference to my ideal type. What is the condition acceptable to Mr. O, X, and Y, on the one hand, and Mr. A and B, on the other hand? Deprivation of the formers and provisions of human goods to the latter two are the conditions created by land grab investments and global cooperative activities. Cooperating states and global institutions they created to advance their common goals are supposed to equally treat citizens of cooperating states, but the life experiences of distant others show differential treatment. In relation to this, basic rights can provide a minimum standard that can serve as benchmark for their conducts.

But one of the chief purposes of morality in general, and certainly of conceptions of rights, and of basic rights above all, is indeed to provide some minimal protections against utter helplessness to those too weak to protect themselves. *Basic rights* are a shield for the defenseless against at least some of the more devastating and more common of life's threats, which include, as we shall see, loss of security and loss of subsistence. Basic rights are a restraint upon economic and political forces that would otherwise be too strong to be resisted. They are social guarantees against actual and threatened deprivations of at least some basic needs. *Basic rights are an attempt to give to the powerless a veto over some of the forces that would otherwise harm the most* (mine emphasis) (Shue 2008:89).

For two reasons, basic rights can be considered as inviolable. First, they provide the line that cannot be tolerated by right holders and at the same time duty bearers should not cross. In Shue's (2008:89-90) words "they are the rational basis for justified demands the denial of which no self-respecting person can reasonably be expected to accept." This is mainly because deprivation of certain rights below a certain level, for instance, security and subsistence rights, and in my case *the basic right to space the three persons in the ideal type are deprived of*, endanger the quality of "being human". Deprivation of these rights is dehumanizing that can be considered as an attack on human dignity and agency as illustrated by the experiences of Mr. O, X and Y. Second, basic rights can also be conceived as a right that is needed for the expansion of other rights. "The reason is that rights are basic in the sense used here only if enjoyment of them is essential to the enjoyment of all other rights" (Ibid., 90). Some rights can be important for life but, when compared to others, they might not help to advance the enjoyment of other rights. For instance, the right to free movement allow people to move from place to place for different purposes of satisfying his needs. But, deprivation of freedom of expression might not affect a person in the same way deprivation of freedom of movement does. A person who writes may be imposed to self-censorship and can still survive. The life of a person whose freedom of movement is denied fall in danger as he cannot move from place to place, for instance to earn income. Likewise, a community whose land is grabbed lose the basic right to space, a space they rely for their daily spatial activities and survival. Loss of space implicates denial of everything making life difficult. For such a reason, it can be argued that a self-respecting person cannot be expected to accept violation of basic rights. Hence, the idea of basic right is very crucial in the understanding of human rights and its relation to justice, particularly in the context of global justice. For that reason, in this study *space* is considered as basic right as it fulfils the two standards. Violation of the right to space can't be tolerated by right holders and duty holders couldn't have a justification to deprive it.

The importance of basic right rests on its close tie with human dignity. It has been argued that basic rights are not only lines a self-respecting person cannot be expected to tolerate but also help to advance other rights too. As a matter of fact, basic rights determine whether a person can continue as a functioning human being or not. Without human functional ability, a person's life is not worthwhile. For instance, how can a person sustain his life if he is denied of free movement or not allowed to work and earn income or if he is expelled and deprived of his natural social, cultural, religious, political, and environmental conditions in which he perform his daily spatial activities? Spatial activities are daily activities a person conducts to satisfy substances of rights and sustain his life. To make it clear:

Human life is different from the life of other animals. We human beings have a conception of ourselves and of our past and future. We reflect and assess. We form pictures of what a good life would be - often, it is true, only on a small scale, but occasionally also on a large scale. And we try to realize these pictures. This is what we mean by a distinctive *human* existence - distinctive so far as we know (Griffin 2008:32).

Moreover, “we value our status as human beings especially highly, often more highly than even our happiness. This status centers on our being agents - deliberating, assessing, choosing, and acting to make what we see as a good life for ourselves” (Ibid.). This fundamental argument indicates the very unique quality of human beings, the capacity to conceptualize and to take actions which is the core element of personhood. This means, the ability to function, both as individual and part of the social. To put it in another way, the idea of rational demand for a social guarantee for the respect and protection of the various substances of human rights, particularly basic rights, emanates from this very nature of personhood or being human. The importance of basic right, in this regard, becomes vivid when we look at it in light of the idea of personhood. Denial of basic rights affects a person's fundamental capability of autonomous functioning. For example, respect and protection of the right to subsistence is not merely about eating food, rather it is about the perpetuation of personhood and human agency. Undoubtedly, denial of rights, particularly of basic rights, reduces humans from their status of personhood and human functional abilities. In a nutshell:

Human rights can then be seen as protections of our human standing or, as I shall put it, our personhood. And one can break down the notion of personhood into clearer components by breaking down the notion of agency. To be an agent, in the fullest sense of which we are capable, one must (first) choose one's own path through life - that is, not be dominated or controlled by someone or something else (call it 'autonomy'). And (second) one's choice must be real; one must have at least a certain minimum education and information. And having chosen, one must then be able to act; that is, one must have at least the minimum provision of resources and capabilities that it takes (call all of this 'minimum provision'). And none of this is any good if someone then blocks one; so (third) others must also not forcibly stop one from pursuing what one sees as a worthwhile life (call this 'liberty'). Because we attach such high value to our individual personhood, we see its domain of exercise as privileged and protected (Griffin 2008:33).

This highlights the very important aspects that human rights entail. As free and autonomous agent, a person should not be blocked from his thought, action and accessing necessary resources and information needed for his agency. An autonomous person is capable of defining his wants, able to take actions and create his own conditions to lead the way of life that he aspires. By implication duty bearers, on one hand, are supposed to promote and create the necessary conditions for human agency, on the other hand, limit themselves from any conducts that hinder human agency. In that sense:

In what should we say that human rights are grounded? Well, primarily in personhood. Out of personhood we can generate most of the conventional list of human rights. We have a right to life (without it, personhood is impossible), to security of person (for the same reason), to a voice in political decision (a key exercise of autonomy), to free expression, to assembly, and to a free press (without them, exercise of autonomy would be hollow), to worship (a key exercise of what one takes to be the point of life). It also generates, I should say (though this is hotly disputed), a positive freedom: namely, a right to basic education and minimum provision needed for exercise as a person - something more, that is, than mere physical survival. It also generates a right not to be tortured, because, among its several evils, torture destroys one's capacity to decide and to stick to the decision. And so on. It should already be clear that the generative capacities of the notion of personhood are quite great (Ibid., 33).

This strong substantive justification about the importance and function of human rights rests on personhood. Because, it "grounds human rights not in formal features or a role in a larger moral structure, but directly in a central range of substantive values, the values of personhood"

(Griffin 2008:34). So, any hindrance duty bearers impose on individual persons that limit them from exercising these rights can be considered as a violation of rights.

From the above discussion we can draw a direct relationship between human rights and justice. I have made it clear that basic right is a point of untouchable as it is vital for life. Human rights provide individuals with the right to exercise their personhood, conception of one's interest and act accordingly to enjoy the substances of rights. Also, we need to recall that the substances of rights are not given, instead they are something a person strives to enjoy. On the other hand, justice is concerned with the distribution of benefits, burdens and opportunities generated from our collective cooperative activities.

The relationship between justice and human rights is complicated. However, three major relationships namely substantive, consequential, and in terms of duty and claim can be drawn. First, both human rights and justice have substantive relation in that the substances of rights are similar to the benefits and burdens that justice distribute. What we enjoy as substances of rights are the benefits that we get as our fair share from our collective activities. Second, they also have consequential relationship in a sense that violation or fulfillment of one implicate the other. Human rights violations implicate injustice the reverse of which hold true. The social institutions that meant to distribute benefits and opportunities may function in an unjust or just manner. An unjust functioning of a system means an unequal distribution of the objects of justice or a violation of the rights a person should have got his fair share from a system. Those who are favored can enjoy the substances of rights while those disadvantaged take the burdens. Those who are favored accrue the benefits in an unjust manner. For example, the deprivation of the right to space, an unjust act committed against Mr. O and X, and the provisions made to Mr. A and B are an unjust conduct though it flourishes the personhood of the later.

The third relationship concerns claim and duties which is the most complicated one. Human rights entail claims and duties, at the same time we find justice within claims and duties too. According to Griffin, "the content of a human rights is the content of the corresponding duty. What one party may demand as of human right, another party has some sort of obligation to supply. We have only to know the content of human rights" (Griffin 2008:97). What we claim

is our just share from our collective activities. Social institutions in this regard are tools of justice and they are duty holders guaranteeing that our claims are satisfied.

Being socially guaranteed is probably the single most important aspect of a standard right, because it is the aspect that necessitates correlative duties. A right is ordinarily a justified demand that some other people make some arrangements so that one will still be able to enjoy the substance of the right even if - actually, *especially* if - it is not within one's own power to arrange on one's own to enjoy the substance of the right (Shue 2008:86).

In that sense, rights naturally assign obligations on duty holders. To make things clear what a person claim as a right is the duty side of justice or social institutions. At this point human rights and justice become two sides of a coin. As Nussbaum (2003a:448) claims, failure to secure the basic rights or capabilities of individual citizens is a “particularly grave violation of basic justice”. To put it simple, talking about justice is also talking about human rights. In that case, the harm done to Mr. O, X, and Y is due to retention of certain duties that national and global actors did not discharge. Meaning that, the burdens inflicted on these three persons should have been retained or distributed back to the societies of Mr. A and B.

My intention in this section was not to engage in theoretical discourses of human rights, rather to set human rights, particularly basic rights, as a standard measure for global justice. From this perspective, individual persons are equal regardless of their backgrounds. Because of their natural personhood every individual person needs to enjoy the substances of rights so that he can live the type of life he wishes. Individual persons need not be hindered from pursuing their aspirations. In this regard, duty holders be it domestic or global have the duty to treat individuals equally. With this background, I beg to delve to the next level of reviewing how theories of global justice conceive the concern towards the world poor.

2.2 Global Distributive Justice

When it comes to the discussion of global justice, two contending perspectives exist. The conventional view, hereafter I refer to as statist, advocate the existence of justice only at the level of domestic societies. Such a view propagates justice as a distribution of rights, duties and opportunities should operate within a society under one system of government for the very

fact that citizens share and participate in common institutions and cooperative activities; share common identity, public culture and sympathy; and also, involuntarily subject themselves to coercive domestic institutions they themselves authored (Rawls 1971:7, 1999:23; Miller 2007:124-125; Nagel 2008:425). In addition, due to lack of global institutions having identical characteristics like that of domestic institution, Nagel deny the possibility of justice at global level. For that reason, statist propose for minimum duty of assistance in case others fail to meet their basic rights, which is different from duty of justice. But, the major problems I see in this view are: the first, societies are not self-sufficient; the second, how can we conceive justice when societies expand abroad to mitigate their own domestic risks and harm others?

In contrast, cosmopolitan conception of global justice transcends the domestic characteristics statist invoke. They rely on the idea of equal moral concern for individual persons regardless of their backgrounds. According to Pogge (2008:175)

Three elements are shared by all cosmopolitan positions. First, *individualism*: the ultimate units of concern are *human beings*, or *persons* - rather than, say, family lines, tribes, ethnic, cultural, or religious communities, nations, or states. The latter may be units of concern only indirectly, in virtue of their individual members or citizens. Second, *universalism*: the status of ultimate unit of concern attaches to *every* living human being *equally* - not merely to some subset such as men, aristocrats, Aryans, whites, or Moslems. Third, *generality*: this special status has global force. Persons are ultimate units of concern *for everyone* - not only for their compatriots, fellow religionists, or such like.

In this sense, cosmopolitans insist on the universality of human rights and the concern for distant others rejecting any form of restrictions. As such, it refutes the notion of applying justice only to a certain group bounded together be it by nationality, ethnicity or other qualifications. Instead, “[c]osmopolitan theory suggests that we should shift our moral attention from the local to the global, adopting a wider realm of responsibility to ensure the wellbeing of all the world’s citizens” (Silva 2014:129). This shift asserts a notion that violation of rights to everyone and anywhere is of moral importance to all.

2.2.1 Statist: The Concern for National Compatriot

We encounter with the dichotomy of the “we” and the “they” whenever we raise the issue of the concern for distant others which follows the structure of national communities, that we know the way world society is currently organized and each of us belongs to a national community. It is with this background statist theoreticians confine justice to the domestic sphere and held national communities responsible for establishing the basic structures for a just distribution of human goods and opportunities. Hereafter, I will examine the justifications they provide for treating domestic justice differently from the duty of justice to distant others or at global level.

2.2.1.1 “We” are Responsible for “Our” Domestic Justice

Statists writers argue for the primary concern for national compatriots. To understand this perspective, the unique attributes of the “we” and the “they”, based on which justice is limited only to domestic sphere, have to be examined. Basically, statist consider domestic attributes such as nationality, national identity, participation in common institutions and in collective cooperative activities, and common sympathy that exists among national compatriots as salient to domestic societies. In addition, lack of global coercive institutions, similar to domestic institutions, are considered as hindrance to the extension of justice beyond national borders. Broadly speaking they contend “... there is something very special about the relationship of sharing citizenship with someone, or being governed by the same state as them” (Armstrong 2012:25). This is because nations are ethical communities whereby nationality entails special bondage among citizens that they do not have with other nationals (Miller 2008:284).

In this sense, justice is wholly associated with those domestic characteristics. At the core of this view we find the idea that we neither have those features at global level nor we do have other factors that make the extension of justice to others possible. If that is the case, we need to further look at the purposes and nature of domestic institutions, on one side, and what we are missing at global level, on the other side. As a matter of fact, our interests and social, political, economic, and other collective activities are organized around institutions created for attaining our common goals. From this, statist draw the thesis that our engagement in same institutions and collective cooperative activities together with the common sympathy we have among our national compatriots urge us to limit our claim for certain rights and opportunities

from the respective institutions and social cooperation we share with our compatriots. At the same time, this excludes members of all other national communities from having similar claim for certain rights and opportunities from the institutions and collective cooperation that they do not participate and also a society they do not have common sympathy. Hence, the level of our living circumstances that we call just or unjust, is determined by the collective efforts we exert to the advancement of the social institutions and way of life we have in our respective societies.

This is evident from the arguments of Rawls, Miller, and Nagel. Particularly Rawls claims justice is a virtue of social institutions, “the way in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from social cooperation” (Rawls 1971:7). For him, a just society is the one he calls liberal constitutional democratic people which has a reasonably just constitutional democracy based on social contract, their citizens are united by common sympathies, and peoples have a moral nature (Rawls 1999:23). In the context of such a reasonable and just political and social institutions, governments are under institutional and electoral controls in a way that respect the interests of individual persons and minority groups too. Likewise, governments are not controlled by certain interest groups that manipulate power. Furthermore, in liberal democratic societies basic governance ingredients such as accountability, transparency and participation operate efficiently. Above all, members of such societies are bounded by common sympathies to cooperate for their common goods. As a result, they are willingly united by common feelings of togetherness to live under one government.

With this background, Rawls believes individual rights can be respected if societies are able to establish liberal constitutional democratic system based on social contract and translate it into their foreign policies that dictate and guide their relationship with others. In that case, global justice could reign if liberal democratic peoples join and expand the Society of Peoples and their relationships are governed by the Law of Peoples (LP) (Ibid., 37). Rawls, develops the LPs out of liberal idea of justice, which is based on the idea of social contract national communities craft for their domestic affairs (Ibid., 3-4). In that sense, “[o]ne part is worked up to apply to the domestic institutions of democratic societies, their regime and basic structure, and to the duties and obligations of citizens; the other part is worked up to apply to the societies itself and thus to the political relations between peoples” (Rawls 1993:48).

Miller and Nagel share similar view concerning social institutions and common sympathy. Miller directly associates justice with the ideas of nationality, citizenship, and common sympathy. Since the world is divided into nation states and we belong to our respective national community, our primary obligation goes to our own compatriots as such we do not have equal moral concern towards all individuals, rather our responsibility to others is to help them meet basic rights (Miller 2007:231). Similarly, Nagel strengthen this view by saying “[i]n short, state makes unique demands on the will of its members - or the members make unique demands on one another through institutions of the state - and those exceptional demands bring with them exceptional obligations, the positive obligation of justice” (Nagel 2008:426).

From these views of Rawls, Miller and Nagel we can note that statist are more inward looking as they emphasize the role of domestic institutions, collective activities, citizenship and nationality. At the same time, they belittle other factors like domestic resource capability, global interdependence and cooperative activities, and supranational institutions which are equally important for the production, reproduction, distribution and consumption of human goods within domestic societies. Recall that just distribution of human goods is the virtue of domestic institutions and structures. In this regard, *one may wonder how domestic institutions could deliver this purpose without the consideration of natural resources and international cooperation*. Unless we assume self-contained societies, this purpose of domestic institutions cannot be feasible, no matter how efficient domestic institutions are. For instance, let us assume that a society have the most efficient domestic structures based on liberal principles and also achieved the highest level of advancement that everybody wants to live. Then, can such a society sustain its level of advancement and way of life without any cooperation with other societies? In other words, can such a society produce and reproduce the object of justice relying only on domestic resources?

Basically, as agents of justice social institutions performs functions of distributing rights, duties, welfare and also opportunities that emanate from the nature of social institutions themselves. Nagel provides three strong attributes of domestic institutions. First, domestic institutions are *coercive* that they impose rules and regulations on all members of a society. Second, members of a society are *joint authors* of institutions, rules and regulations. Third,

members of a society *involuntarily* subject themselves to those rules and regulations and the operations of domestic institutions, even to those issues they do not agree with (Nagel 2008:425). In a nutshell, Nagel's point is that justice belongs to coercive institutions which people author together and at the same time involuntarily subject themselves. Conversely, those who did not author, participate and involuntarily subject themselves, are excluded from having any claim on such institutions. This is in accord with Rawls's assertion that justice is a virtue of social institutions (Rawls 1971:7). Yet, while this holds true at domestic level, we encounter a problem when it comes to global level. That is to say when institutions, be it state or non-state, differentially treat others in their operations abroad for the sake of realizing the duties of their national communities. To be specific, when they affect the global distribution of welfare, rights and opportunities between their citizens and others in their global operations. We know societies are not self-sufficient as a result of which they need to cooperate and interact with others. Hence, they should equally be concerned about the people they cooperate and interact with.

To make it short, from what I have presented so far, we can make note of the following five points. First, according to statist, justice is associated with certain unique characteristics of domestic societies including common sympathy, nationality, citizenship, social institutions and collective activities and cooperation. Second, these characteristics serve as inclusion and exclusion factors. Nagel (2008:424) describe this as follow:

Socioeconomic justice is different. On the political conception it is fully associative. It depends on positive rights that we do not have against all other persons or groups, rights that arise only because we are joined together with certain others in a political society under strong centralized control. It is only from such a system, and from our fellow members through its institutions, that we can claim a right to democracy, equal citizenship, nondiscrimination, equality of opportunity, and amelioration through public policy of unfairness in the distribution of social and economic goods.

Third, as factors of exclusion those domestic factors automatically bar all other persons, who are not part of national community, from the rights and duties they impose on their own members. To put it in another way, we are not entitled to the rights and duties of the institutions and social cooperation we are not a part of. Fourth, certain conditions have to be fulfilled to

transcend nationality, citizenship, and common sympathy, so that we can extend justice to distant others. Fifth, while focusing on the role of those domestic factors, statist theoreticians neglect the equal importance of resources, particularly natural resource, to the domestic production and reproduction of human goods. No matter how efficient domestic institutions are availability of resources equally determine the production, reproduction, distribution and consumption of human goods. Hence, statist implicit assumption of self-contained societies is far from reality. Likewise, the role of global institutions in coordinating internal and external conducts of national communities is also equally important.

2.2.1.2 “Their” Failure, “Our” Duty

With the fourth point, I jump to the discussion of the way statist extend the moral duty to distant others, at the core of which we find both duty triggering factors and the kinds of duties to be triggered. From the outset, it must be clear that though statist limit the scope of justice to the domestic arena they do not mean that we do not have any duty towards others. Of course, they propose *duty of minimum assistance*, but the point is that duty of assistance differs from duty of justice. In this sense, because we have non-domestic duty triggering factors towards others, Rawls and Nagel argue for duty of assistance, while depending on the duty triggering conditions Miller argues for duty of outcome and remedial responsibilities. To put this more clearly, let us look at three different duty triggering factors.

The first is Rawls’s domestic failure which is succinctly presented in his eighth principle of the LPs. He declares “[p]eoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under unfavorable conditions that prevent their having a just or decent political and social regime” (Rawls 1999:37). He directly associates duty of assistance with living under unfavorable conditions. In order to understand this claim, one needs to unpack this principle together with the overarching aim of his LPs. According to this principle the reality of *living under unfavorable conditions that holds burden societies back from achieving the level of well-ordered society* triggers duty of assistance. Hence, its aim should be “... to raise the world’s poor until they are either free and equal citizens of a reasonably liberal society or members of a decent hierarchical society. This is its target” (Ibid., 119). Meaning that he is not concerned about the welfare of the poor, rather the establishment of basic institutions for a just system and bringing them to membership of decent hierarchical societies.

Rawls conceives duty of assistance within the context of non-ideal theory which concerns about the way well-ordered peoples, liberal democratic and decent peoples, treat outlaw regimes and burdened societies. Well-ordered peoples are assumed to be able to establish basic social institutions and structures required for a just society. Likewise, they accept and respect the LPs. Consequent to these two reasons they can join the Society of Peoples (SP). “A Society of Peoples is reasonably just in that its members follow the reasonably just Law of Peoples in their mutual relation” (Rawls 1999:5). In that sense, “[t]he aim of the Law of Peoples would be fully achieved when all societies have been able to establish either liberal or a decent regime” (Ibid.). Accordingly, well-ordered peoples aim “... to bring all societies eventually to honor the Law of Peoples and to become full members in good standing of the society of well-ordered peoples” (Ibid. 93). Ultimately, duty of assistance can be read in the context of integrating burdened societies to the SP.

In that case, two potential conditions motivate duty of assistance. First, the intention of well-ordered societies to expand the family of the SPs which he assumes would eliminate war and historical evils like genocide and finally bring peace; and second, being burdened society or being found in unfavorable conditions together with their willingness to accept and follow the LPs make burdened societies eligible for duty of assistance. But, what are burdened societies? Why are they burdened? According to Rawls, they live in an unfavorable condition due to weak social, traditional, economic, political, know-how and technological conditions to uplift themselves to the status of well-ordered societies. Such societies lack the necessary basic structures to properly distribute rights, duties and opportunities to their members. Most importantly, they fail to achieve the level of well-ordered societies because they are unable to build basic structures. Hence, duty of assistance is aimed at assisting such societies build basic structures and institutions than focusing on the welfare of their citizens.

As in the case of well-ordered peoples, Rawls disregards the role of resources for domestic capabilities. Mainly because he believes burdened societies do not lack natural resources, rather they lack the capability to utilize their resources properly. He claims:

I believe that the causes of the wealth of a people and the forms it takes lie in their political culture and in the religious, philosophical, and moral traditions that support the basic structures of their political and social institutions, as well as in the industriousness and cooperative talents of its members, all supported by their political virtues (Rawls 1999:108).

In contrast, he asserts “[t]he great social evils in poorer societies are likely to be oppressive government and corrupt elites and the subjugation of women abetted by unreasonable religion, all with the resulting overpopulation relative to what the economy of the society can decently sustain” (Rawls 1993:77). The factors Rawls mentioned here are fully attributable to domestic responsibility that he does not see any external contributing factors for being burdened. Such a description represents partial truth which cannot be considered as the only *sufficient* factor. Even more his description might be feasible in self-contained societies that are impossible to find in contemporary world. In any case, his assertion is wholly untenable for the reason that he misses other factors like historical injustices, international relationship, trade, global institutions and structures, and many others. In addition, it is important to recall that he emphasizes the role of social institutions and structures over resources. As such, one can inquire Rawls about the contribution of externalities to unfavorable conditions, particularly in the context of global competition for strategic resources. In that case, we can discern an inherent assumption of self-contained societies from his argumentations which is not feasible to contemporary world. With his conceptualization we can jump to another duty triggering factors.

The second is Miller who focuses on domestic and external duty triggering factors. In contrast to Rawls, Miller provides three duty triggering conditions including domestic and external factors. The conditions he sets and the way he analyzes them reflect the complexity of his approach. The conditions that he lists include: past injustice committed by rich societies that left the others poor; failure to implement fair terms of international cooperation; and poverty per se that may occur independent of any relationship between rich and poor societies (Miller 2007:249). The first two are external factors, while the third one is domestic. This tell us about the role of both domestic and external factors of poverty and inequality. He succinctly analyzes them together with the type of duty they entail, outcome or remedial responsibility. In case of past injustices, he admits the possibility for inheriting responsibilities of past wrongdoings and the obligations they entail. Yet, he argues that this cannot be considered as remedial

responsibility because of the fact that such responsibilities could exist regardless of whether the affected society is currently poor or not. Rather they could exist as a matter of justice despite present status of affected societies.

But, what is important for Miller, in this regard, is the implication of past injustices to present level of poverty of affected people. He inquires whether there is a direct correlation between past wrongdoings and present impoverishments. He emphasizes historical moral evils of colonialism, genocide and slavery. Yet, he doubts, "... it is less clear that these evils *explain* present-day affluence and poverty (emphasis on the original)" as he underlines "I can see no reason to assume that their long-term results include impoverishment of the societies in which they occurred" (Miller 2007:251). Therefore, in his argument though those past wrongdoings can be presented as historical facts, there is no reason to link them to present day impoverishments. Simply, he pinpoints the developmental benefits of those historical evils to affected societies. What is more, he suggests the need for making individual case examinations to prove the assertions of others, like Pogge, than accept them at face value. Here, it seems he is balancing harm with the benefits.

In my view, although Miller raises historical incidents per se, he doubts the continuity of the global system even after those historical incidents passed. Mentioning the developmental benefits by itself may have consequence on his justification for the second condition that trigger responsibility. The major conflict I see in this regard is when we connect this with his second condition of implementing fair terms of cooperation.

With regard to the second condition, he argues that the global economic system entail different impacts on different societies. Most importantly, he sees the injustices imposed on countries of weak economy and the advantages affluent countries accrue from the global economic system. The continuity of such an unfair system, according to Miller, is not justifiable. As a result, *he maintains that poor countries have a legitimate claim for a fair cooperation and international order that protect them from economic vulnerability and offer them the opportunity to develop* (Ibid., 252-253). Besides, fair international cooperation needs to allow countries of weak economy to *follow a path of development they choose* (Ibid., 267). Hence, rich countries have a duty of justice to discharge such remedial responsibilities.

Remedial responsibility, according to Miller, may emanate from historical wrongdoings and unfair international cooperation. Unlike Rawls, he believes, the poor would tackle their condition if these responsibilities were properly discharged, and in such a case no further responsibilities would be required. Though, this argument is permissible to contemporary international relations, still we need to look at the conceptual inconsistency between these two cases of responsibilities. In the first case, Miller argues for the need to examine the contribution of historical wrongdoings to present day impoverishments as he doubts on their causal relation to contemporary poverty. Instead, he highlights the developmental benefits to those societies that he mentioned as success stories of Ghana and Malaysia. In the second case, he argues for fair international cooperation as he finds it unjust.

There are two major points Miller may have to reconsider. First, the second case by itself justify the causal contribution that he doubts in the first case. If present international economic cooperation is unfair, does he mean it is the creation of present time or the outcome of long years of international relationships? If it is the creation of present time, we can assume that the relationship before it was either fair or unfair. For sure history shows that it was unfair. If so, as the present unfair relationship generates poverty and injustice, it can also be assumed that the previous unfair relationship also contributes to the same at that time. From this it can be easily deduced that the effect of past wrongdoings persists to present circumstances too. Another way of proving it is just by taking the assumption that present international cooperation is the outcome of continues historical relationships. This can be a case as today's dominant international powers were also dominating the world in those historical incidents, except few newly emerging economic powers. Besides, they are the one who take the lead in international cooperation that determines the fate of most of the countries, both in the past and present.

The second point, Miller needs to reconsider, is the developmental benefits of historical wrongdoings to those societies. What is the implication of this? Does it have any relevance to the issue of global justice today? Let us assume that those colonized societies have benefited. But, the problem is when we apply the same logic to his second proposition for fair international cooperation. If Miller considers the benefits colonized societies accrued from colonization, we can also assume that countries also benefit from today's unfair international

cooperation. Hence, the reason as to why we need to have fair international cooperation is not clear. Nonetheless, regardless of his justifications, his identification of unfair international cooperation and historical evils are crucial factors for the consideration of global justice as they contribute to global poverty and inequality.

He also lists other forms of duties of justice and humanitarian. In this case, like Rawls, Miller lists domestic issues such as culture and institutions as causal factors of poverty even in a condition where the above two remedial responsibilities are discharged (Miller 2007:254). In relation to this, the third condition that either triggers duty of justice or humanitarian duty is poverty whereby people could not lead a decent life. Poverty in this case may occur without any causal relationship between poor and rich societies. Given the context of domestic responsibility, he argues, there is a need to identify the responsible section of a society and associate it with the type of duties they trigger. Accordingly, he identifies three potential scenarios: one, no member of a society could be responsible for the failures; a second, some members of a society could be responsible; a third, all could be responsible (Ibid.). In all three cases, affluent societies have the responsibility to help the poor meet their basic rights, but the types of duty differ.

In the first case, poverty may occur due to natural and other factors that the entire society has no control over. For this very fact, others have a *duty of justice* towards affected people. Such duty of justice arises “if people are unable to lead decent lives as a result of events outside of their society for which they cannot be held responsible” (Ibid.). Here duty of justice is associated with not being responsible for one’s fate. If affluent societies fail to discharge such duty of justice, they breach their responsibility which is a requirement of justice. But, in the following two cases Miller assigns *duty of humanitarian*, for the reasons that some or all members of a society could be responsible for their failures. One case is that certain groups of a society, for instance the leadership, may fail to implement the right policy or abuse resources instead of using it for the development of their people. At the core of this argument lies the idea that affected people deserve support mainly because they are exposed to poverty without their failure, but due to the failure of their leadership. Another case that triggers the same humanitarian duty is when all members of a society are collectively responsible for their conditions or poverty.

In this respect, both Rawls and Miller emphasize the role of nationality to confine justice to domestic sphere and also agree on duty of minimum assistance to distant others. Yet, they differ in that Rawls believes global justice will be realized when the SPs expand and integrate outlawed and burdened societies. In other words, when all societies accept and follow the LPs. This implies all societies should build basic social structures suitable for liberal democratic societies. Unlike Rawls, to some extent, Miller sees the role of external factors. The implication of his thought is that global poverty and inequality can be partially explained by external factors of unfair international cooperation.

The third is Nagel who focuses on lack of global coercive institutions as duty triggering factor. Nagel holds the view that there is no global injustice but a defect of the global system. This is mainly because, like domestic justice, “global justice would require global sovereignty” (Nagel 2005:122). In his own words, “... but the requirements of justice themselves do not, on this view, apply to the world as a whole, unless and until, as a result of historical developments not required by justice, the world comes to be governed by a unified sovereign power” (Ibid., 121). This is to say that justice exists where coercive institutions authored by people and they subject themselves to the institutions they authored together are found. In that sense, we have coercive institutions at domestic level and we can only have justice at that level. At the beginning of our discussion we have seen the three attributes of domestic institutions that entail justice namely coerciveness of institutions, joint authorship of the institutions, and citizens involuntarily subject themselves to the institutions they jointly author. According to Nagel, the global institutions we have today do not epitomize these characterizations. As a result, for Nagel the discussion of justice at global level is inappropriate at all and hence “on the political view, the absence of global justice need not be a matter of regret” (Nagel 2008:421). However, he claims both lack of global coercive institutions and the existence of abject global poverty trigger duty. The duty we have towards others, in this case, is humanitarian nature not of justice that require coercive institutions. He asserts, “I assume there is some minimal concern we owe to fellow human beings threatened with starvation or severe malnutrition and early death from easily preventable diseases, as all these people in dire poverty are. ... The urgent current issue is what can be done in the world economy to reduce extreme global poverty” (Nagel 2005:118). It is important here that, like Rawls, Nagel consider domestic causal factors to abject poverty. He does not see any connection between external factors and domestic poverty, if there is any then

poverty can be considered as the defect international system we have today. Hence, until coercive global institutions emerge global poverty entail a duty of humanitarian assistance.

2.2.1.3 *Minimum Duty of Assistance*

As we have seen above, defenders of minimalist position rely on the relevance of national communities and the failure of others to lead a decent life. The former is used to localize justice only to domestic societies, while the latter is considered as duty triggering condition towards others. Now I turn back to the extent and aims of this minimum duty of assistance. The underlining consideration statisticians invoke is that national communities should exercise their domestic responsibility for establishing basic structures suitable for a just system. And, it is only when they fail to lead a decent life that others may assume duty of assistance which is different from domestic justice.

Rawls, Miller and Nagel advocate for duty of assistance, except Miller adds the notion of duty of justice in cases of factors beyond human control. I want to emphasize here that, overall, they disregard the issue of justice among societies. As a result, in all the three cases failure to meet basic needs or inability to lead a decent life is the benchmark for either providing or stopping provision of assistance. The meaning of decent life here merits a little elaboration. They realize that in addition to basic structures, the poor lack basic necessities such as food, sanitary, drinkable water, electricity and other basic amenities. Likewise, they lack basic health and educational services too. Children, women and men also die due to lack of these basic necessities. As a result, they enjoy limited opportunity to flourish their life. Above all, they are not in a position to change their circumstances. All in all, they lost their autonomy, welfare, and liberty as human beings. In simple terms, duty of assistance intends to restore basic level of decent life. Basic level in a sense that they realize basic structures and get basic human goods; food, cloth, water, basic education, health among others.

In this regard, Rawls contends that relatively well-off societies have a positive duty of assistance, if societies fail to *build basic domestic structures that respect basic rights and primary goods* (Rawls 1999:13) of citizens; in case of Miller if societies could not live a *decent life* due to domestic or external factors; and in case of Nagel because of merely the occurrence

of abject poverty. In all the three cases, the aim of assistance is to enable societies in need to lead a decent life or restore basic rights. To do so, we have two different approaches namely institutional and welfare.

At the same time, all the three proponents agree on the limit of duty of assistance. Assistance do not aim at narrowing the gap of global inequality or equalizing resources and opportunities among different societies. This is mainly because such things are determined by the basic structures of national communities and their unique domestic characteristics of nationality, common sympathy, culture and others. That is why Rawls “confines international distribution to weaker duties of assistance and sees justice beyond borders as a matter of mutual non-interference between states” (Valentini 2009:2) and Miller thinks about global justice which does not aim at equalizing human goods and opportunities among societies.

Rawls’s (1999:106) assertion is that well-ordered societies have a duty to assist burdened societies in a way different from distributive justice and it should not intend to equalize or reduce the gap of inequalities. Miller (2007:231) argues that global justice does not mean equalizing of opportunities or resources. He asserts “my aim in this book has been to find a way of thinking about global justice that is not in any strong sense cosmopolitan, but still recognizes that there are obligations of justice that across state and national boundaries” (Ibid., 263). In other words, the duty he advocates for is not based on the equality of rights, resources and opportunities of individual persons and it does not aspire equality at all. To make it clear, he asserts, “whatever global justice means, it does not mean global equality - of resources, opportunity, welfare, etc. - so we are not required to change the global order in such a way that inequalities between societies are leveled completely” (Ibid., 231).

As a matter of fact, statist contend the primary responsibility of changing their conditions lies on burdened societies themselves, but their failure to build basic structures and institutions to lead a decent life triggers duty of assistance. In line with this, according to Rawls, duty of assistance aims at enabling burdened societies achieve the conditions of well-ordered societies. This presupposes the establishment of a “just basic institutions for a free constitutional democratic society (or any well-ordered society) and to secure a social world that makes possible a worthwhile life for all its citizens” (Rawls 1999:107). From this one can note that

Rawls aims at only uplifting the status of burdened societies through institutional improvements than addressing poverty or reducing existing inequalities among societies which is evident from his remark that duty of assistance does not have the intention of resource distribution, and also assistance should have a cut-off point having defined aims and goals (Rawls 1999:106). As he sets integration of burdened societies into the SPs is both the aim and cut-off point of duty of assistance, assistance ceases once its goal of uplifting burdened societies to a condition of reasonable and rational management of their affairs and finally integrating them to the society of well-ordered societies is attained (Ibid., 111). Yet, this cut-off point can be reached while the society still remain poor. Recall that Rawls focuses on duty of assistance not on the welfare of a society, hence regardless of their level of development burdened societies phase out of assistance once basic structures are put in place. At the background of this it seems Rawls holds three major assumptions. First, lack of basic social structures has the upshot of affecting a decent life (Ibid., 38 footnote). Second, improvement of basic social structures creates conducive conditions for the betterment of basic rights. Third, he has no intention of reducing inequalities so long as the basic structures are improved.

In the case of Miller duty of assistance is meant to improve the basic rights of the poor. In his analysis of the problem of global justice, he identifies both domestic and external contributing factors respectively triggering duty of assistance and justice. On the one hand, he conceives the poor as incapable of meeting their basic rights, on the other hand, he acknowledges unfairness of international cooperation. Hence, his account of duty of assistance composes aid and fair international trade to allow national communities develop themselves. While aid is aimed at providing welfare to those in need, fair international cooperation is meant to allow poor countries improve their economies and development. Otherwise, he has no intention of narrowing the gap of inequality.

His work intends to find a way of global justice, “justice for a world of difference”, which is different from cosmopolitanism and global egalitarianism. Remember, Miller grounds his thought on the notion of nationality and citizenship. National communities have their own way of life, culture, history, religion and others that they aspire to preserve their identities and want that to be respected (Miller 2007:21). Such interests to preserve one’s way of life do not require change that equalize them with others. Furthermore, as we do not have equal concern to all, he

contends that we do not need to aspire to that direction. Because of this, the reality of justice at global level, according to him, may take different forms to different countries depending on the wishes and domestic conditions of the society concerned.

2.2.2 Cosmopolitan: Equal Moral Concern for All

At the beginning of this chapter, I sketched out the underlining ideas shared by cosmopolitans including individualism, universalism and generality. Instead of relying on salient attributes of domestic societies, cosmopolitans transcend them relying on the moral importance of individual person and assigning obligations to all. They mainly claim that we have equal moral concern to every person because of the universality of human rights. This shift accentuates the belief that violation of rights to anyone and anywhere is of moral importance to all. Moreover, it takes global interdependence and cooperation into account. “I will take the perspective that the principle of cosmopolitan right must be understood to have evolved in response to the greater density and intensity of international interdependence” (Anderson-Gold 2001:viii). For that reason, “Pogge pleads for a revolutionary transformation of the ‘law of peoples’, in which the ‘statist’ approach is rejected altogether and a much more utopian stance is adopted” (Mertens 2003:5). Beitz in his part claims if one accepts Rawls’s principle of domestic justice, the same principle of justice can apply to global level given arbitrary distribution of natural resources and global interdependence. Hereunder, I review the way Singer, Beitz, and Pogge invoke this cosmopolitan obligation.

2.2.2.1 Singer: The Need for Moral Transformation of Charity

The first principle I am going to deal with, in this regard, is the principle of *capacity* and the right not to live in poverty. Singer argues that well-off societies’ response to global poverty is not to the level required and this has no moral justification given their *capacity* to reduce it. Consequently, he calls for the transformation of the moral conception of charity to stringent duty of assistance. For this, he invokes two cardinal assumptions: one, “suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad”; second, “if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it” (Singer 2008:388). The ideas behind these assumptions are: first, bad things are morally unacceptable as they affect human capabilities; second, as a consequence human suffering from lack of basic necessities is bad; third, anyone

who has the capacity to help has the duty to contribute to the prevention of bad things from happening; finally, we do not need to prevent bad things from happening by incurring comparable bad things to ourselves or to others.

The main feature of this principle is the extension of responsibility to any capable person in general and well-off societies in particular. At the core of this we find the cosmopolitan notion that our concern should be *general and universal* to anyone who needs help. Unlike statist, it does not take the consideration of the notion of nationality, common sympathy or nearness of the poor and the affluent in to account. They could be closer or thousands of miles away. Instead, what is important is the ideas of impartiality, universalizability and equality, that do not have space for discrimination (Singer 2008:389). In other words, there is no special thing that differentiate compatriots from others.

Such conceptualization fits to the conditions of the globalized world we live today as it facilitates the transformation of our moral conception. Unlike earlier times, globalization has reduced the gap that distance used to create. Expansion of communication technologies and the existence of various forms of relief and civic organizations throughout the world enhance our knowledge base about distant others and ease the task of information dissemination, logistics, transportation and provision of assistances. Consequently, there can be no excuse for neglecting global poverty.

With this background Singer argues for the transformation of *Western moral conception and practices of charity*. After listing the occurrences of bad things in the world such as poverty, hunger, civil wars and refugees, he claims “the decisions and actions of the richer nations can prevent this kind of suffering to very small proportions. Unfortunately, human beings have not made the necessary decisions” (Ibid., 387). Our moral conception remains to be hindrance for making the right decisions as a result of which it needs to be altered. If it requires our way of life needs to be changed too, argues Singer.

Accordingly, he claims, the concept of charity as it is commonly understood, giving money is good but not giving money is not wrong, is inappropriate. Mainly because, first, those who do

not donate face no blame. Compared to the sufferings the poor endure, donors may use their money for something neither important nor urgent. Here, he compares the suffering of a person, which is bad, with the satisfaction an affluent person gets out of the extra expenditure after he reaches the point of marginal utility. Let us see this by example. Person A who is sick might need \$100.00 for treatment. Person B who is a middle class wants to buy a shoe with a Puma mark, but he already has Puma shoes at home in addition to other shoes and also he has been using same mark for many years. What Singer meant is that the satisfaction person B get from the additional Puma mark he buys is not comparable to the illness of person A. Person A could be saved if he gets that \$100.00. In contrast, the additional satisfaction from the shoe is minor as person B already has been using same marks for many years. Above all for person B that new shoe is not an urgent need because he already has lots of shoes at home. What Singer finds troubling is that such persons face no blame for not donating and saving the life of person A. So, in such a condition of global poverty, Singer (2008:390) concludes not giving money to help the poor by itself has no justification.

Second, those who donate are socially praised which is also inappropriate. We sacrifice nothing by donating instead of buying something not important and urgent. We do not need to be praised for something we donate without sacrifice. Let us see the same example above again. What if person B donates the \$100.00 instead of buying the shoe? Should he be praised? According to Singer the answer is no. The reason is that person B sacrifices nothing except giving the money. The satisfaction he lets go by not buying the shoe is negligible that make no difference in his life. Because of these two reasons, he argues for a stringent duty of assistance than conventional form of charity. Hence, we “ought to give money, and it is wrong not to do so” (Ibid., 391). At the core of this argument we find the idea that the support an affluent person provides to the poor cannot be justified as a charity. Rather, it has to be an enforceable duty, as well-off societies have the capacity to alleviate the sufferings of the world poor.

Such a conceptual shift will have an impact our understanding of the duty to distant others. Moral values dictate acceptable and unacceptable behaviors. If well-off societies seriously take the moral value of stringent duty, then prevention of hunger and suffering will be pressing. As a consequence, societies will give more weight to the sufferings of other societies than expending their money on nonessential things which is a common practice in consumer

societies. In the final analysis, Singer promotes provision of more and more aid to eradicate global poverty. However, Singer has no intention of equalizing opportunities to world population. Because, his principles do not apply in cases where there are no bad occurrences like famine or hunger. And alleviation of hunger and suffering do not mean equality of welfare or opportunities. Rather, his idea of stringent obligation emanates from equal moral concern for individual persons.

Yet, except the equal moral concern for individual persons, Singer does not see any form of connection between the life experiences of the poor and affluence. He does not take the impacts of global connectivity such as global interdependence, institutional or social cooperation on the life experiences of the poor and affluent. Global poverty and suffering may occur due to domestic and external factors. Also, he does not explain as to how human sufferings occur. Just recall my ideal type that Mr. A and B respectively provided with basic needs produced from the lands Mr. O, X and Y displaced and dispossessed from. If we follow Singer's theory, Mr. A and B and the society they represent are supposed to donate to those organizations who provide humanitarian assistance in the communities where Mr. O, X and Y live. In such a case, one may wonder if his idea contributes to the reduction of societal risks and also the reduction of systemic injustices emanating from global interdependence.

2.2.2.2 Beitz: Importance of Resources and Global Cooperation

In another version of cosmopolitan approach, we find Charles Beitz who brings the issue of justice to the global arena by arguing “[i]nternational distributive obligations are founded on justice and not merely on mutual aid” (Beitz 1999:128). Accordingly, he reinterprets Rawls's domestic difference principle to global level. It is recalled that Rawls confines principles of justice only to domestic arena by associating justice with domestic basic structures. For Rawls, social cooperation and institutions are sources of social justice as they produce and distribute rights, benefits, burdens, and opportunities.

Beitz completely negates this statist position. He confirms the existence of global social cooperation and structures as a result of which we can apply same concept of justice to global level. For this, he refutes Rawls's implicit assumption of *national self-sufficiency*. Instead he contends Rawls's view of international justice makes sense only if states are self-sufficient and

this assumption is invalid as it is empirically incomplete due to arbitrary distribution of natural resources (Beitz 2008:22). He works out the implications of this assertion on the idea of domestic justice and reinterprets it to global level.

The consideration of *resource and social cooperation* makes Rawls's idea of domestic justice unrealistic. First, societies are not self-sufficient mainly because of the arbitrary distribution of natural resources. Recall our discussion above that Rawls belittles the role of resource for domestic justice. The implication of this is that national communities have limited capability to sustain a just domestic distributive system as they have different domestic natural resources potential. If so, one can wonder how can they sustain their just system? It can be possible only if societies get access to resource they domestically lack. As a consequence, Rawls's domestic principle of justice turns out to be incomplete.

Second, the global community has developed an interdependent system of cooperation which is an empirical fact. Beitz claims "... international relation is coming more and more to resemble domestic society in several respects relevant to the justification of principle of (domestic) social justice" (Beitz 1999:128). If that is the case, the principle of justice can be applied to global institutions and cooperation too. "It would be better to say that the requirements of justice apply to institutions and practices (whether or not they are genuinely cooperative) in which social activity produces relative or absolute benefits or burdens that would not exist if the social activity did not take place" (Ibid., 131). That means benefits and burdens emanate from global institutions and cooperation cannot exist if the institutions and cooperative activities are not in place. "In view of these empirical considerations, Rawls's passing concern for the law of nations seems to miss the point of international justice altogether. In an interdependent world, confining principles of social justice to national societies has the effect of taxing poor nations so that others may benefit from living in 'just' regimes" (Ibid., 2008:33-34). For the very fact of this, "[t]he state-centered image of the world has lost its normative relevance because of the rise of global economic interdependence. Hence, principles of distributive justice must apply in the first instance to the world as a whole, derivatively to nation-states" (Ibid., 1999:170). Eventually, Beitz concludes Rawls's principle of justice can be applied as the best principle of global distributive justice.

The consequences of such an assertion on Rawls's idea of the LPs is paramount. First, Rawls's notion of state centered global justice is feasible only if societies are self-sufficient. This lacks empirical evidence. Consequently, such assumption turns out to be incomplete. Second, the very existence of global interdependence and cooperation also make the idea of the LPs unrealistic. Mainly because the idea of the LPs presupposes self-contained societies. Since this has no empirical evidence, the idea of the LPs loses its foundation. According to Beitz, this creates a condition whereby the very idea of justice can be applied to global level. In order for the domestic arena to be just the global has to be just.

Beitz's principle of global distributive justice rests on the principle of resource redistribution. He held the position that resources are arbitrarily distributed among nations and "the appropriation of valuable resources by some will leave others comparatively, and perhaps fatally, disadvantaged. Those deprived without justification of scarce resources needed to sustain and enhance their lives might well press claims to equitable shares" (Beitz 1999:139). With this background, the parties to the original position, as Rawls argues, would know the arbitrary distribution of natural resources and their importance for a just domestic society. As such, under the cover of the veil of ignorance "... the parties would agree on a resource redistribution principle that would give each society a fair chance to develop just political institutions and an economy capable of satisfying its members' basic needs" (Ibid., 141). This allow everyone to get access to natural resources, and at the same time it removes the statist justification of excluding others from resources. Such a principle will offer assurance to citizens of resource poor countries that their lack of resource would not undermine their right to develop a just system that guarantees basic needs. Fundamentally, such a condition at global level entails the advancement of the position of the world poor.

What is important for our discussion is the implication of this idea of Beitz to the non-ideal case or towards burdened societies. According to Beitz, burdened societies are assumed to lack domestic structures that a just system requires. And, the duty to help the poor involves the establishment of such institutions, as Rawls proposes. The assistance committed to establish the institutions may entail certain unintended consequences and generate certain claims which are not part of a cooperative schemes. Such a claim may in turn entail the duty of mutual aid and an appeal to the principles of global justice. In this case, principle of justice imposes

removal of statist restrictions, for example, on domestic reinvestment of surpluses, as they exercise their decision according to the principles of justice (Beitz 1999:171-172). This necessitates well-off societies release investments to poor countries.

This view of Beitz will have twofold consequences. One, the notion of aid will become more stringent due to the obligations generated out of cooperative activities and global distribution. Like Singer, Beitz believes aid has been considered as an act of benevolence and subject to political restrictions. But now the notion of charity will no more be feasible and could be replaced by duty of justice, if global distributive obligation based on justice is recognized. Accordingly, aid ought to be tuned to develop poor countries and benefit the worst-off in those countries so as to guarantee basic rights. Second, the operations of global institutions need to be improved as they influence global distributions and widen inequalities. He believes the rules and operations of major global institutions should be adjusted in a way that promote equal distributions and maximize the benefits of the world poor (Ibid., 173-174).

In a nutshell, the gist of Beitz's theory is to apply Rawls's domestic difference principle to global level. His major interventions in this regard include: first, unlike Rawls he identifies global structures, and cooperation; second, he removes exclusive domestic right for natural resources and allow open access to all; thirdly, at the same time, he releases other resources such as surplus profits and reinvestments from their country of origin to poor countries. By doing so he managed to distribute both natural and other resources globally. In addition, he assigns duty of justice in the form of stringent development aid to the world poor. In all these cases aid and resources distributions are aimed at advancing basic rights.

2.2.2.3 Pogge: Imposition of Global Order and Harm on Others

From the above discussions, we can identify two important issues related to duty to distant others, the importance of natural resources and the issue of global institutions and structures. In this regard, first, Beitz brings the importance of natural resources for domestic justice and the role of global cooperation in to the fore. Second, Rawls and Nagel reject the existence of global structures, while Beitz and Miller identify unfairness of the international cooperation. The next discussion will focus on this issue. My theoretical intervention in this regard is that

unfairness of international cooperation is the result of natural resource poverty of well-off societies and their intention to meet the wellbeing of their own citizens that harm the poor.

Unlike the others, Pogge seriously takes the notion of negative duty in to account and obligates well-off societies for their harm of the poor by upholding unfair global system. He comes up with a different approach based on the idea that since we have harmed the poor, hence we have the obligation to help them. Without rejecting the importance of positive duty, Pogge does strongly argue that wealthy societies have a *negative* duty not to impose unjust global institutions, rules and regulations on poor societies. Succinctly, he associates global inequality and poverty with impositions of unjust global order.

Minimalists rest on domestic social structures and cooperation for their analysis of justice. They decline the existence of such structures at global level as a result of which they reject appropriateness of the discussion on global justice. In contrast, the cosmopolitan Beitz confirms the existence of global structures and extends Rawls's difference principle to that level. Though, Pogge shares similar view, with Beitz, regarding global structures, he further argues that wealthy countries *impose and manipulate* them, for their own benefits, inflicting injustice on the poor. This is a special feature of his work. Unlike the others, he contends, “[t]he worse-off are not merely poor and often starving, but are *being* impoverished and starved under our shared institutional arrangements, which inescapably shape their lives” (Pogge 2008: 207). Those institutional arrangements are nothing but global institutions and structures imposed on the poor. Hence, well-off societies should be responsible for the harm they inflict on the poor.

For the very fact of this Pogge insists “... any institutional design is unjust if it foreseeably produces massive avoidable human rights deficits. Such an institutional order, and participation in its creation or imposition, harms those whose human rights avoidably remain unfulfilled” (Ibid., 25). *Harm has a special place in Pogge's work. He stresses harming others for the sake of benefiting ourselves is morally unacceptable conduct.* Moreover, participation in the creation and implosion of harmful institutions entail direct responsibility. Contemporary economic order, in this case, harms the poor as the *global institutions define and impose* the rules of the game to the benefit of well-off societies. Consequently, he constructs causal relationship

between conducts of the global order and global poverty, likewise assign responsibility on citizens of well-off societies for their participation.

Pogge provides specific qualifications of what he meant by harm. He emphasizes foreseeability and avoidability of harms as an indicator of *intentionality of harmful conducts*. In view of that, the scope of harm, he refers to, is restricted to the following six conditions: institutional conducts should, 1. hinder the satisfaction of most basic needs or violate human rights of the poor; 2. those violations should be causally traceable to social institutions; 3. as a result, those who actively cooperate in the design and impositions of relevant institutions should be obligated; 4. harms or human rights violations should be foreseeable; 5. those harms and violations should be avoidable; and 6. those alternative means of avoiding harms should be known in advance (Pogge 2008:26). As such, elements of harm with these salient features generate obligations. There could be harms outside of this scope which are beyond the control of the designers of the institutions. As they might not be foreseeable and preventable designers of the global institutions could not have alternative design of the institutions under their control. For that reason, such harms may not generate corresponding obligation. But, the kind of harm that fall within the scope specified with those six salient features trigger compensatory obligation as duty holders fail to make alternative institutional design.

Notably, Pogge analyzes the mechanics of harm, namely preventive barriers and resource privileges, demonstrating how the global order operates and perpetuate global poverty. Preventive barriers refer to the conduct of well-off states not only withhold rightful share of the poor from their participation in collective activities but also impose harms as a result of not giving their due. Well-off states exert their power and expertise in shaping international negotiations and terms of trades.

The design of this order is fashioned and adjusted in international negotiations in which our governments enjoy a crushing advantage in bargaining power and expertise. And our representatives in international negotiations do not consider the interests of the global poor as part of their mandate. They seek to shape each such agreement in the best interests of the people and corporations of their own countries (Ibid., 26-27).

Meaning that well-off states knowingly use their power and expertise in defense of their interest that disadvantaged the poor. Harms as an upshot of these conducts are *foreseeable* since they know their consequences in advance, but they prioritize the interests of their own nationals. It is evident that:

... the better they succeed, the more people die of poverty. Our foreign and trade ministers and our presidents and prime ministers know this, and so do many journalists and academics, as well as the experts at the UN and especially the World Bank, which bills itself as the official champion of the global poor even while its management and decision-making are controlled by affluent states (Pogge 2008:27).

As a consequence, “[m]ost obviously, many trade treaties, tariffs, antidumping laws, agricultural subsidies, and intellectual property rights unfairly provide special advantages to wealthy and powerful countries which are already reaping unjust benefits from their violent role in a world history characterized by conquest, colonization, exploitation, and genocide” (Jaggar 2010:2-33).

Resource privileges refers to the misuse of power and resources on the part of leaders of poor countries and the manipulation of such tendencies by well-off states. The leaders of rich and poor countries share common responsibilities for their collaborative conducts. Like Rawls, Pogge argues leaders in developing countries are corrupt, autocratic, brutal and unresponsive to the interests of their populations. They go after their own interest than their populations, whenever they negotiate or sale resources. But, while Rawls solely hold leaders of poor countries responsible, Pogge claims the global economic order encourage those leaders to continue in their harmful conducts. Also, well-off states instigate change of government, by providing and selling weapons to corrupt leaders and oppositions, in case leaders of those countries try to defend their own independent choice of development. Such change of governments could be the consequence of not aligning to the interests of well-off states’ policies. Likewise, they cultivate culture of corruption and provision of safe heaven for illicit money (Pogge 2008:28-29). In short, leaders of poor countries do not have alternative choices than abide by the dictates of the global order for which they are allowed to get access to international resource privileges like loans and diplomatic support. As a consequent, “[t]he international privileges benefit us and poor-country elites and autocrats at the expense of the poor populations of less developed countries” (Ibid., 29). On the whole, “... the citizens and

governments of the affluent state are therefore violating a negative duty of justice when they, in collaboration with the ruling elites of the poor countries, coercively exclude the poor from a proportional resource share” (Pogge 2008:209).

It is notable that Pogge directly links poverty in poor countries to the combined operations of well-off states, the global institutional order, and leaders of poor countries. This is entirely different from the above approaches to global justice. As shown earlier, global actors violate their negative duty of justice not to harm others. *The nitty-gritty of Pogge’s thesis lies on unacceptability of imposing harms on others.* What is more appealing here is not only the construction of *causal relationships* between poverty in developing countries and the role of the global institutional order, but also the *benefits* wealthy nations generate out of harming the poor. Because strategic resources are arbitrarily distributed throughout the world, we can relate the benefits Pogge talks about with vital resources needed for the growth, development and wellbeing of well-off societies.

As shown above, for Pogge, the justification for assigning obligation is a direct consequence of institutional conducts and the outcomes of unbalanced distribution of benefits and burdens. As such, “... the existing radical inequality is unjust, that coercively upholding it violates a negative duty, and that we have urgent moral reason to eradicate world poverty” (Ibid., 210). It is clear and direct that those institutional conducts that perpetuate global poverty and inequality have to be stopped in order to improve the conditions of the global poor. To that end, he assigns two types of compensatory obligations - reforming the global institutional order and the GRD. Because, wealthy nations manipulate the global institutional order to maintain their benefits, contrary to Rawls, “Pogge claims that stopping the imposition of unjust global political and economic institutions, legal regimes and procedures is the primary obligation of better-off societies” (Hanisch 2007:5). And, “... we affluent Western states could design this order to be more poverty avoiding (perhaps by including some redistributive tax scheme like the Tobin Tax)” (Pogge 2008:14). This proposal of Pogge underscores the necessity and possibility of reforming the status quo that unequally distribute benefits and burdens. Pogge’s proposition for the reformation of the global institutional order aims at creating fair international negotiations and trade to create conducive environment for poor countries. The institutions to be reformed may include those that have to do with shaping international

relations and trades, like the UN, WB, IMF, WTO and others. Although the justifications vary this obligation seems similar to Miller's and Beitz's proposition of 'fair terms of international cooperation' that benefit the poor.

Reformation of the global institutions shall be accompanied by resource distribution too, without which poor countries may face difficulties in their efforts of poverty alleviation. Pogge's analysis is centered at the exclusion of the poor from the benefits of natural resources and those who benefit the most out of the use of natural resources should compensate the excluded. In this regard, he proposes the notion of GRD that states shall not have full rights to natural resources, rather they are supposed to share small parts of its value. Accordingly, certain tax shall be collected from the sale of natural resources to be distributed to the global poor. This way it is possible to respect their inalienable right to limited natural resources (Pogge 2008:202). "Under this proposal a 1 per cent tax would be levied on all resources at the point of their extraction" (Armstrong 2012:146) to be distributed to poor countries.

2.3 Pogge: Why the Affluent Harm the Poor?

Pogge predominantly focuses on global institutions and harm, and generate duty of justice thereof. He strongly correlates global poverty with harmful conducts of well-off societies and global institutions. He defends this view by illustrating the level of global poverty and demonstrating the mechanics of harm or global order. Finally, he assigns compensatory obligation to well-off societies due to their conducts of harming the poor. This view of Pogge attracts criticisms too.

As we have seen earlier, statist generate moral obligation from the failure of the poor to satisfy basic needs. While agreeing to Pogge's insight on the contribution of external factors, still some emphasize domestic factors too. Yet, Pogge does not play down domestic factors, rather he stresses the ability and leverages of global forces to impose externalities for changing national policies and if needed leaders of weak states. Some also raise the difficulty to differentiate local and external causes of poverty. Others like Wendy Mitchell ponder why Pogge assign collective responsibility or held individual persons responsible for the harms their leaders and multinationals inflict on the poor (Mitchell 2006). Besides, Miller contends "I have argued that

his attempt to assign outcome responsibility for poverty to the international order, and through that to citizens of rich states and their governments, is implausible” (Miller 2007:247). I consider these and other related ideas as a query for more *elaboration* on the level of impacts of external factors and their verification, also the correlation between affluence and poverty. Otherwise, such views do not counter the imposition of harms, but query us to make a deeper analysis of the root causes of harms so that we can make Pogge’s case stronger. Furthermore, such inquiries prompt us to look into the reasons affluent societies harm the poor.

What I find rather important and share to some extent is the issue some raise concerning the possibility of alleviating global poverty by minor reforms at global level and his proposal of GRD. Unless we complement his reform proposal with *duty of risk absorption*, the badly needed results might not be achieved. Given the level and complexity of poverty coupled with societal domestic risks, reforms at global level need to be complemented with realistic local level actions namely delocalization of resources from the affluent and localization of the same in poor societies. The doubt on GRD is that “..., if implemented, the GRD’s likely effects would at best be rather less predictable than Pogge supposes and at worst could actually be counterproductive to his main aim” (Hayward 2005).

Overall, the basic tenet of his theory is tenable. This study makes an intervention by *elaborating* his idea of harm and complementing his compensatory obligation, following an alternative path from harms to domestic risks of societies which is the root cause of harm. Pogge himself acknowledges “[o]bviously, these matters deserve a far more elaborate treatment than I can give them here” (Pogge 2008:56). In that sense, first, I elaborate harm as exported risks, and second complement his proposal with duty of risk absorption. By understanding the level of domestic risks, we can know the benefits well-off societies accrue from the harm they impose on others. Besides, we can establish a correlation between affluence of the well-off and deprivation of the poor. Such a correlation is required for defending and advancing his ideas.


Pogge has done great work using data on global poverty and also cases of extractive industries. But, if one argues well-off societies benefit out of harms, one needs to provide empirical evidence regarding the benefits affluent societies domestically lack but abundantly have by importing from abroad. For example, he demonstrates the percentages of malnutrition and

hanger in poor countries, but he does not show us the volume of food commodities or resources related with food commodities that are imported from the poor to the affluent or controlled by the affluent in poor countries. Likewise, he does not show us the amounts of deficits or demands the affluent need to import from abroad. He demonstrates the means of harms that he calls protective barriers like global structures, international agreements, conventions, trade and others. But, the kind of evidence I am referring enrich his work. Besides, those correlations help us to explain the reason behind the way the global system designed and operate. Ultimately, this provides us with strong justifications for the kind of compensatory obligation Pogge proposed, comparable to the domestic risks not to the harm exported to the poor. Otherwise, one may interpret Pogge's idea of harm that well-off societies harm the poor for the sake of harming them which he does not mean. In this regard, I focus on two major issues so as to *ground global justice and advance his work*. The first, the reason well-off societies harm the poor; and the second, the possibility of making his compensatory obligation feasible in a way that defend and promote the basic rights of both the poor and the affluent. The following five premises are adopted to that end:

1. Societies are *not self-sufficient*, as such they live with persistent potential risks due to the expansion of demands for basic human goods, resources and also innovation. *Affluence is not the same as self-sufficiency and poverty does not mean complete lack of resources*. I call this basic conception of societies regardless of their level of development.
2. Domestic capability of societies to contain risks (1) *depends on*: 2.1. the domestic capability of another societies; and, 2.2. on their own capability to *expand abroad*.
3. Domestic self-insufficiency and risks (1) are the driving forces of *global interdependence*. Important and shared risks develop into common issue-areas leading to interdependence.
4. Global order, institutions, initiatives, and processes organize around common issue-areas (1) to facilitate *internal and external conducts* of societies and bolster interdependence (3).
5. Harming others or global injustice is the result of expansion abroad (2.2) and accumulation of resources and value-additive production processes meant for mitigating own risks (1).

Based on these premises, the idea of global justice is analyzed not from the point whether societies are poor or affluent rather from the condition that *virtual expansion* of national communities (2.2) driven by the intention to mitigate own domestic risks (1) and the operations of global order (4) differentially treat and harm others in cooperating societies (2.1). Fig. 2.1 demonstrates this.


Fig. 2-1 Representation of Risk Exportation



Source: By the author

What Pogge did is that he explains harms independent of the domestic conditions of well-off societies except saying that they benefit from the harm they impose on other societies. He does not show us the correlation between domestic risks of the affluent and the risks and harms they export, and also the benefits they accrue from it as well. Fig. 2.1 accomplishes this purpose. It represents virtual expansion of well-off societies. Like poor societies, well-off societies face with domestic risks. By expanding abroad, they export their risks to the poor and import benefits. *Those risks transform to harms in poor societies which in turn create perpetual risks.* This happens when they retain the rightful share of the poor namely value-additive production processes. What is important here is that harms are created when affluent societies withhold value-additive production processes while expanding abroad. The retained value-addition is the rightful share of the poor from their participation in global cooperation. Therefore, such harms could be avoided if retained value-additive production processes are released to poor societies while expanding to other societies. Fig. 2.2 represent this.

Fig. 2-2 Representation of Duty to Risk Absorption



Source: By the author

This theoretical intervention namely *duty of risk absorption* can be discharged by *releasing retained value-additive production processes*. As the poor and well-off have become interdependent, due to domestic self-insufficiency and risks, they have rightful reciprocal claims towards each other. The claim of well-off against the poor could be, for instance, access to natural resources or land or other strategic resources, likewise the claim of the poor against affluent societies could be value-additive production processes. This reciprocal claim arose from their cooperative engagement.

The following successive chapters will examine and verify the above five assumptions and finally elaborate the duty to risk absorption. The next chapter covers domestic self-insufficiency and expansion abroad. This will be done based on the case of domestic risks of food and biofuels crops, and arable land scarcity; and land grab investments, meant for the production of both food and energy crops, in sub-Saharan Africa as expansion abroad. The chapter aims at examining societal self-insufficiency and risks, and analyze their causation as an impetus for global interdependence and expansion abroad. This will lead to the fourth chapter which examines the global structures organized around issue-areas of food security and climate change, facilitating expansion abroad through investments on agriculture with the Moto of “food for all” and “energy for all”.

3 Chapter Three

Domestic Risks and Expansion Abroad

We are confronting a formidable problem in our global political economy: the emergence of new logics of *expulsion*. The past two decades have seen a sharp growth in the number of people, enterprises, and places expelled from the core social and economic orders of our time. This tipping into radical expulsion was enabled by elementary decisions in some cases, but in others by some of our most advanced economic and technical achievements. The notion of expulsions takes us beyond the more familiar idea of growing inequality as a way of capturing the pathologies of today's global capitalism. Further, it brings to the fore the fact forms of knowledge and intelligence we respect and admire are often at the origin of long transaction chains that can end in simple expulsion (Sassen 2014:1).

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to lay the foundation for triggering duty of justice based on Pogge's idea of harm. Harm is a strong duty triggering factor than failure and capacity, given an interdependent world we live. Many writers belittle the impacts of the conducts of well-off states and global institutions as such they resort to benevolence. Hence, in order to strengthen Pogge's assertion and debunk the latter's, a thorough investigation on the reasons why affluent societies harm the poor, in the first place, is needed. This is mainly due to the fact that though Pogge (2008:32) mentions minor gains as a reason, he does not profoundly deal with it. The thorny issues, in this regard, would be the benefits well-off societies accrue from the harms they impose on the economically weak societies and the way they manifest in global context and an interdependent world we live. By examining these thorny issues, the chapter accomplishes an essential verification on insufficiency of domestic capabilities for a just domestic system which is the root cause of harms well-off societies inflicts on poor societies. With this verification we will be able to debunk Rawls's assertion and ground Pogge's notion of harm.

Pogge's idea of harm is elaborated by constructing a correlation between domestic risks of the affluent and the harms they export abroad, and also between the harms and the benefits they accrue thereof. This can be done by examining the case of domestic food and biofuels risks, and the expansion of the affluent through land grab in sub-Saharan countries. The concept of

domestic risks is used to explain the reasons affluent societies harm the poor. Also, the notions of expansion and compression of livelihoods abroad are used to diagnose the relationship between benefits and harms. Accordingly, it is possible to show the way affluent societies expand beyond their geographic boundaries to produce and reproduce human goods. Furthermore, international trade is not the only way societies rely for exchanging goods and services, depending on emerging domestic risks, they design other means like expansion abroad through land grab. As slavery was motivated by labor and colonization by natural resources, expansion abroad is driven by domestic scarcity of arable land, water, and food and biofuels crops. Finally, this central argument is coined as; affluence does not mean self-sufficiency, and poorness does not mean complete lack of resources. The difference between the affluent and the poor is that the affluent are able to expand abroad, compress livelihood spaces of the poor, and export their domestic risks to the later.

The chapter is organized in three parts. The first part defines the concept of land grab. The second part discusses three major contending perspectives on land grab. In the third part, three central issues related with the main thesis societies are not self-sufficient are presented. Firstly, it examines the expansion of domestic demands for human goods anemly food and biofuesl. Secondly, it scrutinezes scarcity of arable needed for the expanding demand for food and biofuels crops. Thirdly, it analyzes the expansion of affluent societies abroad in the form of land grab investments meant for mitigating domestic risks of food and biofuels in investing affluent societies. Altogether, the chapter intends to verify the thesis societies are not self-sufficient and debunk the idea of domestic capability as the only explanatory factor of domestic justice.

3.1 Defining Land Grab

In order to clearly specify and delineate the object and scope of the subject under consideration, land grab is defined from the outset. The conventional understanding of contemporary land grab is vague and misleading. Sometimes land grab is interchangeably used with large scale agricultural investment. In fact, land grab is a subset of large-scale agricultural investment. For instance, Borras Jr. & Franco (2010:2) suggests that “[t]he phrase ‘global land grab’ has emerged as the catch-all framework to describe the explosion of (trans)national commercial land transactions (and land speculation) that has been occurring in recent years around the

large-scale production, sale, and export of food and biofuels”. According to this definition, the term has emerged as a catch-all framework, but the problem is that it also incorporates large scale agricultural investments. As such, it is difficult to make a difference between the two.

The difference between the two dictates our subsequent argumentation as it defines the thing we are talking about. For example, in his December 6, 2012 interview with an Al Jazeera Television journalist, the prime minister of Ethiopia articulates that “it is not [land grab] who are those saying it is a land grab. First of all, it is not a land grab. When you said a land grab it means that you are giving a land from the poor to somebody else” (Talk_to_Al_Jazeera, 2012, from 00:12 - 00:14 minutes). And when the journalist challenges him that is exactly what they are doing, he argues “that is not what we are doing. You cannot give a single person who can say I have been giving my land over to a rich or whatever to an investor. This is a barren land, this is an open land, a savanna land which there is no resident in the land, which is also a productive land, which can also be given for production, and increase our food production in the country. I think there is no such land grab in my country.” Key terms in this interview are “it is not land grab” and “it is a barren land” meaning that no one person has been using the lands before they are handed over. What the prime minister is referring to is clearly a large-scale agricultural investment scenario. However, given Borras's definition how can one distinguish the prime ministers’ explanation from land grab?

Such a rhetoric on large-scale agricultural investment mostly comes from global and national actors. The issue I want to pin point here is not the existence of land grab per se but the presentation of the arguments and implicit intention of avoiding ensuing obligations. While, Ethiopia is one of the top global destination of investments on land, various empirical reports demonstrate population displacements and even the government has executed a planned population resettlement program in the Gambella Regional State, one could be curious about the concept and the argument of the Prime Minister. Similar narratives also come from other investment host states, investing well-off states, multinational corporations and those international organizations which promote global biofuels and food security agendas.

One may ask how is it possible that hundreds of thousands of hectares of land can be acquired by an investor without displacing or dispossessing communities or without harming

communities. For instance, 100,000 ha potentially expandable to 300,000 ha of land is offered to an Indian investor in Gambella Regional State in Ethiopia.¹¹ Is it possible to find such an area of “unused” land in Africa, let alone in Ethiopia? Is it possible to accept such a rhetoric at face value? Against this fact, I argue that there are land grabs and they should be delineated from large scale agricultural investments, in order to properly advance the type of agricultural development and productivity those states are committed to. To that end, both concepts should be revisited as they are inappropriately presented, both in the literatures and discourses.

Let us see the definition “... large-scale land acquisitions, broadly defined as acquisitions (whether purchases, leases or other) of land areas over 1,000 ha” (Cotula, et al., 2009:3). This is a general definition that can be used for both type of investments, because it states only acquisition of land with a minimum size of 1000 ha. It lacks necessary qualifications like whether that land was used or unused, an important indicator to know the type of acquisition. Another similar definition presents land grab as “taking possession and/or controlling a scale of land which is disproportionate in size in comparison to average land holdings in the region” (Aubry, et al., 2011:23). This definition also focuses on the size of acquired land in relation to land holding system in the surrounding region disregarding previous status of the land whether used or not and transnational nature of the investments.

These definitions are incomplete in terms of investment characterization like their origin, destination and purpose that distinguish land grab from that of large-scale agricultural investments. In this regard, Daniel and Mittal’s definition seems better positioned as it incorporates such requirements. “The term *land grab* refers to the purchase or lease of vast tracts of land by wealthier food-insecure nations and private investors from mostly poor, developing countries in order to produce crops for export” (Daniel & Mittal 2009:1). The salient features of this definition include investment direction from wealthier food-insecure to developing countries, and purpose of the investments which is agricultural production for export. This is crucial as it illustrates transnational nature of the investments that indicate causation of harms abroad. Such investments could be transnational and either displace people or not. However, still it lacks a major characteristic that fundamentally distinguish land grab

¹¹ Project agreement signed on 25.10.2010 between Ethiopian Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development and Karuturi Agro. Products Plc. The agreement is effective for 50 years from 04.08.2008 to 03.08.2058.

from large scale agricultural investments. Otherwise, large scale agricultural investment cannot be problematic as the way it is presented in literatures and discourses. Additionally, biofuels as a purpose is not incorporated. Yet, this definition can be useful if we incorporate the information it lacks.

I modified this definition as “the term *land grab* refers to the purchase or lease of vast tracts of land, *displacing or dispossessing land and resources from local communities*, by wealthier food-insecure *and biofuels adopting* nations, and private investors from mostly poor, developing countries in order to produce crops for export” (Teddlä 2013:104). What is modified in this definition is mainly the addition of investment impacts, any investment that cause either *displacement or dispossession* of local communities can be considered as land grab, if not it is merely a large-scale agricultural investment. In line with such a definition, the claims made by proponents of land grab investments can be empirically tested. To that end, Table 3.1 is formulated to differentiate the two investment types showing their similarities and differences.

Table 3-1 Land Grab vs. Large-scale Agricultural Investments

Parameter	Large scale agricultural investment	Land grab
Size of land	Large	Large
Investment origin	Foreign investors	Foreign investors
What?	Acquisition of land use right	Transfer of land use right
Ownership	State	State, community/village, private
Purpose	Export, food & biofuels crops	Export, food & biofuels crops
Status	Unused or used by government	Used land by community, private
Impact	No displacement and dispossession	Involve displacement, dispossession

Source: By the Author, based on conceptual definition.

Table 3.1 illustrate similarities and differences of the two types of investments. They are similar in terms of size of acquired land, origin of investors and purpose of land acquisition. Origin of investors is deliberately considered as foreign in both cases excluding domestic investors. This is mainly because we deal with global justice. There could be domestic land grabs but that is domestic sphere of the societies concerned. Foreign investors are agents of their societies to mitigate domestic risks of increasing demand for basic goods. In that sense, their aim is to

acquire lands abroad, produce and import the crops, they produced abroad, back to their societies. Furthermore, domestic and foreign investors operate in different political and economic environments. While foreign investors have the political and economic backing of their states and international law, domestic investors, on the other hand, lack such backings. Even in legal terms foreign investors operate under bilateral and/or multilateral trade agreements like Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), WTO regulations, and others. This is more pervasive, if the role of the global institutional order is taken in to account. Therefore, the consideration of local investors for the kind of topic under consideration is not appropriate.

The modified definition provides conceptual and operational relevance. Conceptually it clearly defines the object of the discussion while operationally it facilitates efforts in evaluating the consequences of those investments causing displacement and dispossession. In that case the conceptual definition can be operationalized. At this level, land grab lends itself to such scrutiny, to which large scale agricultural investments are not suitable as they do not involve displacement and dispossession.

The salience of large-scale investment is that land is owned by government and it may or may not be used by government. It can be a barren land or used by state for different purposes. It is important to note that in terms of land ownership, for instance in Ethiopia, state owns all lands and there is no consideration of communal or private land ownership. Individuals or communities only have the right to use the land. Land transactions and leases are the sole responsibilities of the state. The reason that makes land grab in Ethiopia and other investment host African countries peculiar is application of government power and authority in deciding and imposing changes on land use rights on certain lands being used by communities and individuals. In general, the conceptual definition can be presented as follows: *All land grab investments cause population displacement or dispossession. Some large-scale agricultural investments cause population displacement or dispossession. Therefore, all land grab investments are large scale agricultural investments.* From this extract, we can deduce that land grab investments are subsets of large-scale agricultural investments and there are large scale agricultural investments which are not land grab. I solely rely on land grab investment as it causes eviction. Large scale agricultural investment does not fall in to the scope of this work.

3.2 Competing Perspectives on Land Grab

During the last two decades, we have observed that many countries have been experiencing landmark risks of either food or energy crisis triggered by domestic and external factors. In the context of such real and potential risks, “the year 2008 witnessed a truly extraordinary number of negotiations on the part of governments and private firms looking to sign agreements that would confer ownership of, or long-term leases on land abroad” (Speildoch & Murphy 2009:39). Although, before this time around, there were many such agreements, a number of observers stress major global phenomenon like financial and food crisis responsible for triggering changes in national strategy from importer of agricultural commodities to producer abroad. “These pressures are part of a global phenomenon that dates to the oil price spikes of the mid-2000s, accelerated rapidly in the wake of the ‘food price crisis’ of 2007–2008, and gathered further momentum with the crisis in world financial markets in 2008 and the onset of global recession into 2009” (Hall 2011:193). “One of the more permanent effects of the food and financial crisis was that it prompted some food import-dependent countries to reconsider their policies to reduce vulnerability from what is considered to be an ‘undue dependence’ on imports” (Deininger, et al., 2011:1). Indeed, this felt threat of ‘undue dependence’ has to be accentuated as it signals deep rooted domestic risk that necessitates a shift in national policy from importer of agricultural commodities to producer of the commodities abroad on acquired lands. It is this strategic change and logic of expansion that leads to population expulsion abroad. Hence, I situate exported risks to this wider view of domestic risks of well-off societies.

The magnitude and pace of land acquisitions abroad receive different responses that can be bundled into three perspectives based on resource, development opportunity, and corruption and mismanagement. These perspectives explain the various reasons considered as causes of harms imposed on the poor. The consideration of resources takes not only the motives of the investments that means societal interest to be relaxed from import dependency but also the control of the production and distribution systems into account. In this regard, “large transnational land acquisitions, though rarely via market processes, were first observed in the context of conquests and colonial expansion” (Arezki, et al., 2011:5) and it “has been described as a new neo-colonial push by foreign companies and governments to annex key natural resources” (Hall, 2011:194). Some even argue to the extent that “rich countries are buying poor countries’ soil fertility, water and sun to ship food and fuel back home, in a kind of neo-colonial dynamic” (Leahy 2009, as cited in Hall 2011:194). This position underlines the rush for the

control of land, soil and water resources abroad as a means to satisfy the growing domestic demands for food and biofuels commodities. It is a plausible observation given the volume of expanding domestic demands for agricultural crops to sustain both the biofuels industry and human consumptions.

The governance perspective on the other hand blame the multifaceted governance weaknesses in investment receiving countries. The scale of the investments and capacity of host states to handle the deals concerns those who argue on this line. The motives of land acquisition coupled with lack of good governance, statutory land law, corruption and other capabilities complicate the problems in targeted land abundant countries. Yet, it must be noted that governance aspects can be considered as contributing factors than root causes since the problems in investing countries are beyond their domestic capabilities, in spite of the fact that they have the financial and technological capabilities. Also, investors invest not because of weak governance structures which may attract them, rather it is because of availability of arable land in target countries. Empirical findings confirm both availability of land and weak governance structures attract investors. “Countries attracting investor interest include those that are land abundant and those with weak land governance” (Deininger, et al., 2011:xxx). An IMF report shows “[i]n all cases, the potentially cultivable area outside of forests or the potential value of output on suitable non-forest area is highly significant, suggesting that land availability is a primary motivation for such investment” (Arezki, et al., 2011:16). Likewise, “[d]ata on governance suggest that, overall, regulatory quality, protection of investors’ rights, and land governance are significantly weaker in destination countries” (Ibid.). “Furthermore, the effect of land governance is striking. Instead of land acquisition projects being contingent on good land governance and the associated strong protection of rights, we find that weak land governance makes a country more attractive for land-related investment” (Ibid., 17).

Here we can see lack of land use rights protection for local communities and also lack of investment protection too. Yet, investors knowingly take the risks. In that case, existence of arable land attracts investors even with foreseeable potential investment risks. In some cases, investors are forced to divert to countries with better governance structures because of weak governance structure and poor rights protection. For instance, “[w]ith their farming projects in some of the poorest African nations sometimes arousing local hostility, wealthy Arab investors

are turning to those developed countries that comfortably produce more food than they consume” (El Daha 2013). Incidents like attack and burning of investment projects, owned by Indian and Saudi Arabian investors in the Gambella Regional State of Ethiopia by disgruntled local communities due to weak governance, displacement and dispossession are cases in points where investors face potential challenges.¹² This is a clear indication of the search for land being the main interest than the other way round, because the motive for land remain the same in countries with both good and bad governance structures.

The third perspective concerns the developmental benefits of the investments to host countries and societies. The WB, the G8, EU, investment originating and host states, multinationals, development partners, and those who promote global food security, climate and biofuels agendas are main proponents of this position. The benefits attributed to the investments include job creation, agricultural modernization, and government revenue and foreign currency generation. However, no clarification is offered about how the investments are going to be integrated to national and local economies. In addition, issues of losers and winners or marginalization and inclusion effects of the investments are not considered. In comparison to the risks exported to poor societies and the benefits accrued to investing societies, the anticipated benefits to local communities are very minimal and the idea itself overshadow imposed harms on displaced and dispossessed communities. Above all, global distributional effects of the investments are not well elaborated.

The prime challenge to proponents of this position is to provide satisfactory answers to questions like; what difference land grab investments entail from other sectors that are mainly controlled by foreign multinationals for many decades? Is the global economic system land grab operating now is different from that of the existing one host countries operate other sectors? Or is it duplicating the same existing system? The developmental position is flawed, if the global economic relationship remains unchanged. Duplication of the same system confirms continuity of resources supply to multinationals and well-off societies at the expense of the livelihood of local communities. This is evident from the fact that land grab investments

¹² See: <http://farmlandgrab.org/20417> according to the report a Saudi owned company, Saudi Star, was attacked and a total of ten people, six foreigners, died and another eleven wounded. The property of an Indian Company called Vandanta Harvets Plc. also attacked in the same region. See also: <http://www.thereporterethiopia.com/index.php/news-headlines/item/1168-residents-in-gambella-set-indian-owned-farm-on-fire>

entail control of the whole system of agricultural production and distribution so as to avoid dependence on imported agricultural commodities.

Besides, the EPAs and Cooperation Frameworks African states signed with the G8 and Western countries and the conducts of the global food security, climate and biofuels regimes validate continuity of the global system. For instance, “The Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), heavily promoted by the EU, provide further incentives for land grabbing by curtailing the respective States’ policy space to protect their resources and markets for domestic use” (Graham, et al., 2010:7). Graham et al calls this a “wild trade”:

Which ignores the human rights standards of civilized nations and serves the wild appetites of transnational corporations and investors. EPAs contribute to land grabbing by making corporate production in the South more profitable and thereby increasing pressures on land, which in turn increases the likelihood of the poor to be deprived of their prime lands – and to be left with marginal lands (Ibid., 61).

In addition, the inherent displacement and impoverishment risks land grab entails make the development perspective weak. Promotion of the investments by the WB and other development partners contradict their own long-standing position on sustainable development. Any development that comes at the cost of restricting livelihoods used to be rejected, instead the concepts of participatory and sustainable development models were promoted. Most of the proponents of this view were against development programs causing population displacements. They still consider human right standards as the cornerstone of development cooperation, and donor countries and organizations are strict on this. For that reason, the WB developed its own internal monitoring system and codes of conducts with regards to development programs and the Bank used to distance itself from supporting programs causing population displacements. However, the Bank and other donors and Development Financial Institutions support land grab projects and population resettlement programs in the context of industrial agricultures.¹³ Such

¹³ For this see initiatives such as Grow Africa and the New Initiative for Food Security and Nutrition. Those countries participating in such initiatives are expected to develop national agricultural development programs based on which they sign Cooperation Agreements with the G8. While the WB and other major donors mobilize their financial and technical supports, multinationals invest on agricultural lands. In this context among others Burkina Faso, Mozambique, Tanzania have developed agricultural corridor schemes, where multinationals are expected to invest. The environmental and social impact assessments of the schemes show potential population displacements, and yet donors promote the programs. For instance, The WB and the government of UK are alleged

changes on the part of the institutions and well-off states seems tolerate population eviction so long as it serves their interest.

At the core of this, we find domestic insufficiency and risks of both well-off and the so-called poor societies. In the context of the subject I am dealing with, we need to further look at and held clear understanding about domestic self-insufficiency. For this, I demonstrate global and regional domestic expansion of demands for agricultural commodities and potential for agricultural production so that we can see the extent of domestic self-insufficiency and risks. The following sections addresses this issue.

3.3 Food, Energy and Land: The Great Domestic and Global Challenges

When I say domestic sufficiency, I mean the ability of societies to domestically produce and reproduce human goods and opportunities required to sustain the basic needs of their members. This is an ideal case whereby we have no interdependence and exchange among societies. Such an ideal case is impossible to exist. The reality is that what we have at the moment is an interdependent and globalized societies. The volume of demand and supply of the required agricultural products demonstrate the extent of domestic insufficiency. Particularly, global and regional demands for food and biofuels crops are alarming. They indicate the required land size in food importing and biofuels adopting countries and regions, and also the supply side of arable land in investors originating and host regions too. Demand and supply side projections are taken as indicators of the motives of well-off countries to expand abroad and investment directions. The next part covers these issues.

3.3.1 Expansion of Demands for Human Goods

I have made it clear that contemporary expansion abroad is driven by domestic risks.

To be sure, land in the global South has been coveted for multiple reasons, historically. But today, there is momentum building behind an apparently newer idea: that long-term control of large landholdings beyond one's own national borders is needed to supply the food and

for supporting Basic Public Service project in the Gambella regional state of Ethiopia where indigenous people are forcefully resettled. Though the government of Ethiopia claims otherwise.

energy needed to sustain one's own population and society into the future (Borras Jr. & Franco 2010:4).

Another observation claims that “the last five years or so have been a very particular context and moment, when the phenomenon which has been dubbed ‘land grabbing’ was clearly unfolding rapidly in certain parts of the world, potentially with major consequences for both economies and livelihoods” (Scoones, et al., 2013:472). By unpacking the reasons behind this expanding contemporary phenomenon causal relationships between domestic risk and expansion abroad can be established which is important for the discussion on global justice. Evidently food security and biofuels motives are the main drivers of land grab.

One of the most significant drivers of these acquisitions was found to be the perception by ‘northern’ investors, particularly from Europe, of a long-term demand for biofuels in industrialized countries. Another important driver is the demand for food products in ‘southern’ countries, notably from South Asia and the Middle East, which face domestic land resource constraints and food insecurity. Ultimately, the underlying factors driving farmland investments into sub-Saharan Africa are essentially the same: growing domestic resource scarcity in the face of rising consumption, and declining self-sufficiency for agricultural products. As a result, sub-Saharan Africa is increasingly internalizing the costs of global resource scarcity while its gains are exported. This not only calls into question the distributional effects of globalization, but also the efficacy of global market governance (Schoneveld 2011, Abstract).

This observation illustrates the association between domestic land scarcity and insecurity of human goods, on the one hand, and expansion abroad, on the other. *It indicates a shift in national strategies from purchasing food commodities from unpredictable international markets experienced in 2008 to producing own products abroad.* We can substantiate this by using demand and supply data on agricultural products and arable lands needed for the production of the same. We have substantial data projecting the gap between global demand and supply up to the year 2050 and beyond. World population growth, demographic changes and technological innovations are responsible factors for increasing demand for agricultural products. For instance, “by 2050 the global population will reach 9 billion, barring substantial changes in demographic trends, with 2.5 billion more people in today’s developing countries” (IBRD/WB 2010:40). Table 3.2 illustrate population projections.

Table 3-2 Population of the world and regions, 2017, 2030, 2050 and 2100, according to the medium-variant projection

Regions	Population (millions)			
	2017	2030	2050	2100
World	7 550	8 551	9 772	11 184
Africa	1 256	1 704	2 528	4 468
Asia	4 504	4 947	5 257	4 780
Europe	742	739	716	653
Latin America and Caribbean	646	718	780	712
North America	361	395	435	499
Oceania	41	68	57	72

Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2017:1

As Table 3.2 depicts, one can assume population growth “... put pressure on ecosystems and natural resources, intensify the competition for land and water, and increase the demand for energy” (IBRD/WB, 2010:40). For instance:

Urbanization will continue at an accelerated pace, and about 70 percent of the world’s population will be urban (compared to 49 percent today). Income levels will be many multiples of what they are now. In order to feed this larger, more urban and richer population, food production (net of food used for biofuels) must increase by 70 percent. Annual cereal production will need to rise to about 3 billion tones from 2.1 billion today and annual meat production will need to rise by over 200 million tones to reach 470 million tones (FAO 2009:9).

Another estimate indicates by 2030 the “demand for food, water, and energy will grow by approximately 35, 40, and 50 percent respectively owing to an increase in the global population and the consumption patterns of an expanding middle class” (National Intelligence Council, 2012:iv). Global rate of food consumption has been increasing and the trend will continue. Rising population and demographic changes coupled with the economic growth many countries are experiencing will complicate availability of food commodities in significant quality and quantity. Experiences of emerging economies shows that “simulation of the North’s model of production and civilization is also reflected in worldwide eating habits. Recent years have seen fundamental changes in the demand for food worldwide. Rising incomes are enabling the middle classes in various regions throughout the world to consume more meat and

wheat (white bread instead of rice)” (Unmüßig, et al., 2012:22). According to FAO (2009:11) “For the developing countries as a group, per capita consumption is expected to increase at an annual rate ranging from 2.2 to 2.4 percent during 1990 – 2010, that is, from 237 kilograms a year during 1989 – 91 to around 250 – 255 kilograms in 2010.” Likewise, “the global average daily calorie availability would rise to 3050 kcal per person, a 10 percent increase over its level in 2003/05. To this, global cereal production would need to increase by 40 percent overall, or by some 900 million tons between the 2006/08 average and 2050” (Ibid.). Moreover,

Agricultural production would still need to increase by 70 percent (nearly 100 percent in developing countries) by 2050 to cope with a 40 percent increase in world population and to raise average food consumption to 3130 kcal per person per day by 2050. This translates into an additional billion tones of cereals and 200 million tones of meat to be produced annually by 2050 (as compared with production in 2005/07) (Bruinsma 2009:2).

This being the case countries have different agricultural production potentials. Existing estimates shows persistent reduction in agricultural productivity as of 2005/2007, due to lack of arable land. Table 3.3 illustrates potential agricultural crop production by regions.

Table 3-3 Annual crop production growth (percent p.a)

Regions	1961-2007	1987-2007	1997-2007	2005/ 2007-2030	2030-2050
World	2.2	2.3	2.3	1.3	0.7
Developing countries	3.0	3.1	3.0	1.4	0.8
idem, excl. China and India	2.8	2.8	3.2	1.7	1.0
Sub-Saharan Africa	2.6	3.3	3.0	2.4	1.9
Latin America and the Caribbean	2.7	2.9	3.7	1.7	0.7
Near East / North Africa	2.9	2.5	2.4	1.4	0.9
South Asia	2.6	2.4	2.1	1.5	0.9
East Asia	3.4	3.6	3.2	1.1	0.3
Developed countries	0.8	0.4	0.5	0.8	0.3
44 countries with over 2700 kcal/person/day in 2005/2007*	2.6	2.9	2.1	1.1	0.4
* Accounting for 57 percent of the world population in 2005/2007.					

Source: Alexandratos & Bruinsma 2012:97

Table 3.3 shows compared to pre-2005/07 all regions experience reduction in crop production growth for the period 2005/07 - 2030 and 2030 - 2050. As of 2030 annual agricultural crop production in the developed and East Asian countries will grow only by 0.3 percent which is below the world average growth of 0.7 percent for the same period, while sub-Saharan Africa region grow by 1.9 percent, the highest during the same period. The figure for Latin American region is the same as world average 0.7 percent. *This underlines, ceteris paribus, potential-insecurity in those regions, making the situation by 2050 grim.*

Notably, holding availability of arable land constant, agricultural productivity, distribution and access to food is determined by complex factors like price, income, technology and others. In this regard, the 2010 WB report identified complex contributing factors among others price.

A combination of factors will drive up food prices in the next few decades. They include increased demand for food from growing and increasingly rich populations. They also include increased production of biofuels, which could result in competition for agricultural land and water. Furthermore, it will become more difficult to grow food because of climate change (IBRD/WB 2010:167-8).

The Bank's report interjects a most important factor namely the role of biofuels in complicating availability and access to food as it competes for crops and arable land. UNCTAD (2009: xi) defines "the term biofuels is commonly used with reference to liquid transportation fuels - i.e., ethanol and biodiesel - derived from agricultural, forest or any other organic material (feedstock)". IBRD/WB (2010:147) further reports "the cultivation of biofuels to mitigate climate change will create even more competition for land". Hence, biofuels exert direct impacts on availability of food. FAO (2009:11) claims:

The advent of biofuels has the potential of changing all that and causing world demand to be higher, depending on the energy prices and government policies. Without biofuels, much of the increase in cereals demand will be for animal feed to support the growing consumption of livestock products. Meat consumption per caput for example would rise from 41 kg at present to 52 kg in 2050 (from 30 to 44 kg in the developing countries).

The consideration of biofuels as an investment driver on land is related to “the increasing incorporation of biofuels into the energy mix, which, largely in response to the introduction of consumption mandates in industrialized countries and partly due to record oil prices, increased from 35 billion to 86 billion liters per year between 2005 and 2010” (EIA 2011 as cited in Schoneveld 2011:1). In addition, the environmental and economic justifications for adopting biofuels as sources of energy can be traced to the West that:

More specifically, two major factors triggered the latest renaissance of biofuels. First, methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE) was eliminated as a gasoline oxygenate in California, and later in all states in the United States, as it was found to be a serious ground water pollutant. Ethanol was the next oxygenate available to the oil refinery industry to comply with the Clean Air Act of 1990. Second, the European Union (EU) decided to use biofuels as a tool to comply with its commitments under the Kyoto Protocol. It is worth noting that both triggers were based on environmental concerns. Rising oil prices and the related concerns about economic growth in the United States and in the EU pushed the production and use of biofuels even further (UNCTAD 2009:ix).

On the whole, “countries such as the United States, Member States of the European Union, China, India, Indonesia, South Africa and Thailand have all adopted policy measures and set targets for the development of biofuels” (Fischer 2009:19). Biofuels adopting countries have enacted various policy implementation tools with paramount national and global consequences.

The driving forces of biofuels expansion have been foremost huge subsidies and the mandates and targets set by national governments. Whilst the justification of biofuels targets to enhance fuel energy security and to contribute to climate change mitigation and agricultural rural development is appealing, the reality is complex since the consequences of biofuels developments result in local, national, regional and global impacts across interlinked social, environmental and economic domains, well beyond the national setting of domestic biofuels targets (Ibid).

The rising demand for biofuels directly impacts the demand for arable land needed for the production biofuels crops. Rice (2010) estimates the demand for biofuels will “jump from about 70 billion liters in 2008 to 250 billion liters in 2020. For the EU, this increase will be steeper from 13 billion to about 55 billion liters”. Another projection indicates “in the OLSR model biofuels account for almost 17% of primary energy demand the reference case in 2100,

and 32% in the policy case. With the PCCR version 20% of the primary energy is supplied by biomass in the reference at the end of the model horizon, and 35% in the policy case” (Gurgel, et al., 2008:27). What is more “[d]ifferent scenarios of stabilization of greenhouse gases increase the global biomass production to 40-150 EJ/year by 2050 and 220-250 EJ/year by 2100” (Reilly & Patsev, 2007:15). Though, “at the moment, biofuels make up only a small proportion of world energy use, but this is expected to increase, due in part to targets and policies that are encouraging uptake of biofuels for transport” (Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2011).

The aviation industry’s demand for biofuels reveal the extent of sectoral demands. As an illustration, the European Advanced Biofuels Flight Path 2020 initiative, a joint initiative composed of airlines and biofuels industries and the European Commission, is worth to mention. “The goal of Flight Path 2020 is to achieve yearly production of 2 million tonnes of sustainable biofuels, to be used by the EU civil aviation sector by the year 2020. That represents approximately 4% of total EU airlines’ fuel needs, or about 10% of the needs of a major EU airline” (Environmental Branch of the International Civil Aviation Organization Review 2011:21). “In fact, if the IATA is to reach its target, roughly 75% of the carbon savings must come from biofuels. This means that the airline industry will require 13.6 million barrels of biofuels per day, roughly seven times the amount of first generation biofuels currently being produced” (Oakland Institute 2013:6).

The conversion of food crops to biofuels compete with human and livestock consumptions. Admittedly, both food consumption and biofuels demand cannot be met with current level of agricultural production. Policies and strategies aimed at meeting projected demands for food and biofuels will fail unless sustainable access to land is secured. Arable land is arbitrarily distributed throughout the world. Particularly affluent biofuels adopting countries lack arable land to the level that sustain current level of production and meet additional demand for biofuels. Overall, given arbitrary distribution of arable land, and the looming food and biofuels demands, we can assume a state of global human goods insecurity and potential competition for food and energy. It is true that poor societies are in an imminent food insecure state, yet we can also say in potential terms affluent societies are also potentially food insecure, given current and future availability of land and agricultural productions. Fundamentally, societies compete

not for food and energy rather to get access to arable land and fertile soils. Meaning that they compete for the control of agricultural production and distribution systems. *Accordingly, it can be argued that availability and access to land underlines future security of human goods in all societies.* Availability and arbitrary distribution of arable land throughout the world show the level of societal self-insufficiency and domestic risks.

3.3.2 Domestic Resource Scarcity: Land and Soil

As a matter of fact, availability of arable land and agricultural production growth potential are found at the center of domestic risks of food and biofuels security that complicate international commodity markets. Alexandratos & Bruinsma (2012:106) declare “[r]ecently concerns have been voiced that agriculture might, in the not too distant future, no longer be able to produce the food needed to sustain a still growing world population at levels required to lead a healthy and active life. The continuing decline of arable land (in use) per person ... is often cited as an indicator of impending problems.” Land is finite, immovable and un-expandable beyond certain limits and also globally arbitrarily distributed. In addition, access to land is determined by various domestic and international factors. Importantly, most of the available arable lands are found in actual food-insecure societies. In this regard, the required size of arable land for the production of the needed amount of food and biofuels, *ceteris paribus*, elucidate the motives behind the contemporary expansion abroad. To look at this issue in detail, we need to answer questions such as what is the size of arable land available? What is the quantity of arable land required? Where do we find lands? How much of this land is already acquired? Who is acquiring land and where?

With special reference to biofuels, for instance, “under some scenarios for mitigating climate change, projections beyond 2030 suggest that land allocated to producing biofuels by 2100 will grow to more than 2 billion hectares ...” (IBRD/WB 2010:147). Concerning the EU’s demand for land “... we estimate that 11.2 Mill. ha is required for target compliance production in 2010. Given that the total arable land in the EU25 is gauged by the JRC (2004:24) to amount to 82.4 Mill. ha, 11.2 Mill. ha represents 13.6% of the total arable land in the EU25” (Frondel & Peters 2005:7). Similarly, UNCTAD (2009:31) reported that “an IEA (2004) study estimates that replacing 10 percent of fossil fuels by bioenergy in 2020 would require 38 per cent of the total acreage in the EU-15.” The same report revealed:

Recent research from NIPE/Unicamp (Leal, 2006) indicates that if there was a global biodiesel blend obligation of 10 per cent, production and consumption of biodiesel would reach 136 billion liters per year (36 billion gallons). Producing such an amount of biodiesel would require a total area of 76 Mha. These calculations assume 50 percent of biodiesel coming from palm oil (with a productivity of 3,000 L/ha) and 50 per cent from castor oil (productivity of 600 L/ha). Assuming an increase in the agricultural yield, the same 10 per cent would represent 200 billion litres a year (52.9 billion gallons) and an area of 57 Mha in 2025, considering a higher productivity for palm and castor oil (6,000 L/ha and 1,000 L/ha respectively) (UNCTAD 2009:7).

Other studies provide a wider picture concerning the volume of land size needed to satisfy the growing biofuels demand. For instance, “the area of land required to produce 180-250 EJ/year is about 2Gha, an equivalent of the current global total crop area” (Reilly & Paltsev 2007:15). The Aviation industry alone requires 270 million ha or 2,7 million km² of land only to meet its current jet fuel demand which is more than one-third of the size of Australia measured at 7,617,930 km² (ATAG, 2011:16).

In this sense, direct correlation exists between the level of domestic risks and factors such as domestic demands for food and biofuels crops and availability of arable land. Two major examples are worth to mention here. Though, the EU is both major producer and importer of biofuels, it lacks the amount of arable land needed to sustain its food and biofuels demands, at the same time. The EU is supposed to convert 38% of its total acreage in the EU-15 in order to meet its target of replacing 10 percent fossil fuel by biofuels in 2020 (UNCTAD 2009:31). For the US the situation looks very critical. Reilly and Petsev (2007:16) estimate “if we restrict USA biofuels to those produced domestically, as much as 500 million acres of land would be required in the USA for biofuels production, which would be enough to supply about 55% of the country’s liquid fuel requirements. The result would be the USA would need to become a substantial agricultural importer.” And, if such amount of land is converted to biofuels crops production, existing land use patterns needs to be completely displaced with paramount environmental, social and economic impacts. To put this more clearly:

The significant effect of forcing biofuels to be produced domestically under a stringent climate policy is significant reduction in USA agricultural production. Instead of the USA being a significant net

exporter of agricultural commodities, it becomes a large net importer. Whereas net exports today are on the order of \$20 billion, by 2050 in the *167 bmt NobioTR* case the USA grows to be a net importer of nearly \$80 billion of agricultural commodities (Reilly and Peltsev 2007:16).

The same effects of displacement of existing land use patterns for the production of biofuels crops applies to the EU too. In that case, the EU, the USA and other land scarce countries face the dilemma of domestic agricultural intensification and displacement of existing agricultural systems having great impact on their economy and ultimately human goods and opportunities. Instead, they opted for expanding abroad and export their domestic risks by occupying virtual lands and compressing others. That means they export their potential domestic risks and import potential security from countries having arable lands. It is possible to know the direction of expansion abroad, investments and risk exportation by knowing global distribution pattern of arable lands. The Table below serves this purpose as it shows regional distribution of arable land and potential for agricultural expansion up to the year 2050.

Table 3-4 Total arable land in use: data and projection

	Arable land in use					Annual growth		
	1961/ 1963	2005/ 2007	2005/ 2007 adjusted	2030	2050	1961 -2007	1991 - 2007	2005/2007 -2050
	million ha.					percent p.a.		
World	1 372	1 548	1 592	1 645	1 661	0.28	0.13	0.10
Developed countries	678	624	624	608	586	-0.17	-0.51	-0.14
Developing countries	693	923	968	1 036	1 075	0.65	0.60	0.24
idem excl. China and India	427	604	668	734	775	0.74	0.70	0.34
Sub-Saharan Africa	133	200	240	266	291	0.83	1.25	0.44
Latin America	105	167	202	235	251	0.98	0.61	0.49
Near East/ North Africa	86	97	84	84	84	0.31	-0.17	0.00
South Asia	191	204	206	210	213	0.14	0.06	0.08
East Asia	178	255	236	241	236	0.93	0.87	0.00

Source: Alexandratos & Bruinsma 2012:109

Table 3.4 illustrates for the period 2005/07 to 2050, with the exception of sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America regions, the other regions lack adequate arable land for further expansion.

The figure for the developed countries is negative while for East Asian and Near East/North African countries is 0.00%. Arable land growth in sub-Saharan and Latin American regions will respectively be 0.44% and 0.49% which is above world annual growth 0.10%. Certainly, sub-Saharan and Latin American regions will dominate future agricultural land growth. This is in congruent with Table 3.3 that illustrates regional crop production potential. *What is revealing is that the 1.25% annual growth potential for sub-Saharan Africa for the period 1991-2007 decline to 0.4% for the period 2005/07-2050 and it is at this particular period countries lacking arable land and experiencing low land growth potential acquire land and expand in the region.* On the whole, the balance of globally used and available land can be summarized as follows:

According to FAOSTAT, in 2005/2007 about 12 percent (more than 1.5 billion ha) of the globe's land surface (13.0 billion ha, excluding 'inland water') is used for crop production (arable land and land under permanent crops). Arable land at present takes up some 28 percent of the prime (very suitable) and good (suitable and moderately suitable) land (see Table 4.7). This leaves a gross balance of unused prime and good land of some 3.2 billion ha and a net balance (i.e. excluding forests, strictly protected land and built-up areas) of some 1.4 billion ha. These balances of land with crop production potential suggest that there is still scope for further expansion of agricultural land (Alexandratos & Bruinsma 2012:101).

And yet, one may wonder what this 1.4 billion ha balance really represent, "unused" or used land. The idea of "unused" land is questionable as it is difficult to exactly know land use patterns at global scale. Besides, we shouldn't forget the existence of various land use patterns in developing countries. Land can be used for various purposes like agriculture, fallow, human settlements, leisure, human nature relationships, and others. Nomadic societies, for example, use land on seasonal basis as they rotate locations following water and grazing for their cattle, additionally flood and retreat agriculturalists shift areas seasonally as well. In such societies, certain lands seem unused for outsiders, however they will be used sometimes later.

Coming back to the issue of land use expansion, either agricultural expansion or intensification would be a source of arable land or growth in crop production. Alexandratos & Bruinsma (2012:97) argue that "growth in crop production comes on account of growth in crop yields and expansion in the physical area (arable land) allocated to crops which, together with increases in cropping intensities (i.e. by increasing multiple cropping and/or shortening of

fallow periods), leads to an expansion in the actually harvested area.” Expansion can be achieved at the expense of shifting existing land use patterns, particularly in the case of biofuels crops existing land use patterns including forest areas could be diverted to biofuels crops production. Therefore, “[c]entral in the debate on the impact of biofuels production is the question to what extent current policies are causing alienation of land from food and feed production. Key is the way increased biomass requirements are to be met by area expansion, yield improvement or by increased cropping intensity” (Langeveld, et al., 2013:5).

Various projections have been made on future land expansion, intensification and incorporation in to agricultural production system. For instance, a projected 80% of agricultural growth up to 2050 in developing countries would be through intensification increasing yield (71%) and high crop intensity (8%) (Alexandratos 2009:6); direct conversion and indirect land use changes in natural and semi-natural ecosystems (Compbell & Doswald 2009); and natural forests and pasture land (Gurgel, et al., 2008:29). Furthermore, “[a]rable land would expand by some 70 million ha (or less than 5 percent), the expansion of land in developing countries by about 120 million ha (or 12 percent) being offset by a decline of some 50 million ha (or 8 percent) in the developed countries” (Bruinsma 2009:2). This is a clear indication of where future agricultural expansion could occur. Yet, we have critical constraints limiting the realization of the assumed arable land expansion.

Summing over all the crops covered in GAEZ and the technology levels considered (‘mixed level of inputs’), about one-third (34 percent) of the world’s land surface, or 4.5 billion ha, is estimated to be of prime (very suitable) or good (suitable and moderately suitable) quality for rainfed agriculture. Of this area, some 1.6 billion ha is already under cultivation. It is interesting to note that of this 1.6 billion ha, some 300 million ha (or 19 percent) of agricultural land is on areas the GAEZ deems only marginally suitable or even not suitable, at least for rainfed agriculture (Alexandratos & Bruinsma 2012:104).

A decline of cultivable land in affluent societies and inappropriateness of the 300 million ha of the projected existing land exert stress on further expansions. “This favourable impression needs to be qualified by a number of considerations and constraints” (Ibid., 105). Major constraints include disregard of land uses patterns other than agricultural production, arbitrary distribution of arable land, suitability of some lands only for certain types of crops and other

constraints that reduce productivity such as fragility, low fertility, disease, and infrastructural problems. Furthermore, climate change casts doubt on the estimated figures of available land.

Climate change analysis suggests that the severity of existing weather patterns will intensify, with wet areas getting wetter and dry and arid areas becoming more so. Much of the decline in precipitation will occur in the Middle East and northern Africa as well as western Central Asia, southern Europe, southern Africa, and the US Southwest (National Intelligence Council 2012:iv).

For that reason, most of the expansions would be on prime lands. Table 3.4 shows sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America as regions where future land use growth potential is possible. In brief, lands in sub-Saharan and Latin America regions have high potential of attracting agricultural investments and concentration of investors from land scarce, biofuels adopting and food import dependent countries as those regions have both high crop production and land use growth potentials. Table 3-5 illustrates this well.

Table 3-5 Annual crop production and land use growth projection (percent p.a)

Regions	Crop production growth					Land use growth		
	1961/ 2007	1987/ 2007	1997/ 2007	2005/7 - 2030	2030- 2050	1961- 2007	1991- 2007	2005/7 -2050
World	2.2	2.3	2.3	1.3	0.7	0.28	0.13	0.10
Developed countries	0.8	0.4	0.5	0.8	0.3	-0.17	-0.51	-0.14
Developing countries	3.0	3.1	3.0	1.4	0.8	0.65	0.60	0.24
idem excl. China & India	2.8	2.8	3.2	1.7	1.0	0.74	0.70	0.34
Sub-Saharan Africa	2.6	3.3	3.0	2.4	1.9	0.83	1.25	0.44
Latin America	2.7	2.9	3.7	1.7	0.7	0.98	0.61	0.49
Near East / North Africa	2.9	2.5	2.4	1.4	0.9	0.31	-0.17	0.00
South Asia	2.6	2.4	2.1	1.5	0.9	0.14	0.06	0.08
East Asia	3.4	3.6	3.2	1.1	0.3	0.93	0.87	0.00

Source: By the Author, adopted from the Table 3.3 and Table 3.4 above

Table 3.5 combines and summarizes the data presented in Table 3.3 and Table 3.4. It combines crop production and land use variables by regions. It demonstrates the regions with annual percentage of land use and crop production growth. Both Latin America and sub-Saharan

Africa are in good position in crop production and land use growth. Table 3.5 substantiates the main premise of societal self-insufficiency and risks which is the driving force of expansion abroad and risk exportation. Well-off societies experience high risks of human goods due to the increasing demand for human goods and reduction in arable land. In contrast, sub-Saharan Africa experience relatively higher potential of land expansion and intensification given the demand for human goods there. Table 3.5 clearly demonstrates the driving forces of expansion abroad and direction of contemporary land grab investments to sub-Saharan Africa. These facts substantiate and justify existing correlations between land scarcity, decline in crop production and investment motives. Besides, it indicates, the common issue-areas among well-off and poor societies. Once these correlations are established, now it is possible to look into the level of land grab expansion in sub-Saharan African region.

3.3.3 Virtual Expansion Abroad: in Sub-Saharan Africa

So far, I have shown societal self-insufficiency or domestic risks in terms of demand for food, biofuels crops, and also arable land required for the production of the same. This is sufficient reason and motive for well-off societies to expand abroad. Henceforth, I will illustrate the amount of land well-off societies acquired in sub-Saharan Africa. In the context of global justice, I use key concepts of *expansion and compression* with intention to show global distributional effects of expansion abroad. As well-off societies *expand abroad*, investments host arable land abundant countries *actually compressed*.

As has been noted biofuels adopting and food import dependent countries lack the amount of arable land to sustain their growing domestic demands. Those countries and regions find themselves in a potential-insecure condition, though they have strong domestic capabilities of financial, technological and others. They are not in a position to generate the needed amounts of agricultural commodities using their own domestic resources including land; even agricultural technologies and inputs are not at sufficient levels. The international commodity market is also not dependable. Hence, they expand to Latin American and particularly sub-Saharan countries that respectively have 0.49% and 0.44% projected annual land use growth, and 0.7% and 1.9% annual crop production growth potentials in the coming decades.

Yet, given human settlement and land use patterns in those regions, the underlining assumption of “unused” land lack empirical evidences. A case in point is the assumption that “[m]uch of the suitable land not yet in use is concentrated in few countries in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa, i.e. not necessarily where it is most needed, and much of the potential land is suitable for growing only a few crops not necessarily the crops for which there is the highest demand” (Bruinsma 2009:2). One can take note here that it insists the existing lands which are “not yet in use”, are not in place where they are most needed, in potential insecure countries, and they are suitable for the type of crops not highly demanded by biofuels adopting and food import dependent countries - in short well-off societies. Such a narrative promotes the motive to target arable land abundant countries as it prioritizes demands of well-off societies which are domestically insecure. It is aimed at justifying expansion abroad, though the narrative contradicts the realities on the ground by disregarding the wellbeing of local communities in investments host societies. Similarly, it indicates the motives and direction of investments that land scarce affluent societies target land abundant countries in identified regions for acquiring virtual land in order to produce biofuels and food crops they badly needed. It “shows how the perceived long-term demand for biofuels in the EU, and food insecurity in the Middle East and South Asia are the primary drivers of these farmland acquisitions” (Schoneveld 2011:1). Consequently, “[i]n recent years, sub-Saharan Africa has become one of the most significant targets for large-scale land acquisitions for plantation agriculture and forestry” (Schoneveld 2011, Abstract; Sassen, 2014:80-116).

The narratives revolving around global food security and biofuels systematically provides problem identification and possible solutions. They elaborate the amount needed to meet the growing food and biofuels demands and set target up to 2050 and afterwards. World leaders organized themselves and mobilized their political will and commitments to that end. Subsequently, agricultural development strategies and industrial agricultures evolved as main development cooperation agenda to translate their aims to agricultural investments. As a result, land commercialization, privatization and foreign direct investments become a reality. Various reports documenting the amount of land acquired by land scarce but affluent countries in sub-Saharan Africa have been produced (see: Schoneveld 2011; Anseeuw, et al., 2012). In this regard, two major reports deserve mention due to their scope and relevance.

The first is Schoneveld’s report which analyzes projects involving land acquisition with size of more than 2000 ha dividing the data in to three categories. “Category 1 data has the highest level of accuracy and is derived exclusively from verifiable sources. Category 2 data includes data that could not be verified, though it is considered to be reliable by meeting certain criteria. Category 3 data includes all miscellaneous data and is omitted from this analysis” (Schoneveld 2011:4). Furthermore, only project agreements concluded as of 2005 considered, due to the global changes that trigger land grab this time around. The report summarizes that:

A total of 353 projects larger than 2000 ha were identified across 32 countries in sub-Saharan Africa, covering an area of 18,104,896 ha. This is equivalent to about 8.3% of the annual area harvested in sub-Saharan Africa (calculated from FAOSTAT). A total of 297 projects (15,094,911 ha.) fulfill Category 1 requirements, and 56 (3,009,985 ha.) fulfill Category 2 requirements. Within Category 1, seven projects (734,718 ha.) had conditional leasehold agreements. The median project size is 18,512 ha. and the mean project size 50,856 ha. A total of 53 projects exceeded 100,000 ha. with the largest project included in this analysis being the 892,000 ha ... (Ibid)

Table 3.6 summarizes the above data on the 353 projects as follow:

Table 3-6 Large-scale farmland acquisitions in numbers

Variable	Area (in ha)
Total area acquired	18,104,896
Category 1 data (total)	15,094,911
Category 1 data (conditional)	734,718
Category 2	3,009,985
Mean	50,856
Median	18,512

Source: Schoneveld, 2011, Table 2

Table 3.6 provides a clear picture of the level of expansions in sub-Saharan Africa. Various arable land scarce affluent states already acquired a total of 18,104,896 ha of land in the continent, equivalent to 8.3% of annually harvested land. Alarming, the size of each of the 53 projects is measured at more than 100,000 ha, while the size of the largest project measured at 892,000 ha. What is more, the size of 176 projects is measured at more than the median size

of 18,512 ha. Table 3.7 below illustrates percentage of leased land in selected 14 target sub-Saharan countries from available arable land.

Table 3-7 Land acquisitions and land availability


Country	Total area available ^a (in million ha)	Land acquired as % of available land	
		Category 1 data	All data categories
Ghana	3.24	47.1	61.6
Ethiopia	4.73	37.6	42.9
Gabon	0.95	35.1	35.1
Nigeria	1.31	26.8	29.0
Republic of the Congo	3.48	23.6	23.6
Mali	3.91	20.1	21.5
Zambia	13.02	13.5	14.3
Madagascar	16.24	9.3	10.8
Mozambique	16.26	8.8	9.9
Tanzania	8.66	5.7	8.7
Kenya	4.62	6.7	7.5
Cameroon	4.65	2.9	3.9
Angola	9.68	1.5	2.1
Democratic Republic of the Congo	22.50	1.0	1.3

a: Figures on land available are based on total land suitable for cultivation, minus cultivated, forested and protected land, and areas with a population density >25 people/km². For some countries (e.g. Liberia, Sierra Leone and South Sudan) data was unavailable. Availability data for Ghana does not account for population density - therefore, the presented figure overstates availability.
Source: Availability data from Fischer and Shah (2010)

Source: Schoneveld, G. C., 2011, Table 4.

According to Table 3.7, based on verified data, in Category 1, seven out of the fourteen countries such as Ghana (47.1%), Ethiopia (37.6%), Gabon (35.1%), Nigeria (26.8%), Republic of the Congo (23.6%), Mali (20.1%) and Zambia (13.5%) have already allocated more than 10% of their available arable land. Four other countries Madagascar (9.3%), Mozambique (8.8%), Kenya (6.7%) and Tanzania (5.7%) have transferred more than 5% of their available arable land. Only Cameroon (2.9%), Angola (1.5%) and Democratic Republic of Congo (1.0%) have leased below 5.0%. This percentage would be much higher if Category 2 and Category 3 projects are considered. Furthermore, Fig. 3.1 demonstrates actual size of acquired land in 16 investment destination countries in sub-Saharan African.


Fig. 3-1 Primary investment destination by total land area acquired



Source: Schoneveld, G. C., 2011, Figure 1

The top ten destination countries in that order include Zambia, Ghana, Madagascar, Mozambique, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Liberia, Republic of the Congo, Mali and Tanzania. In contrast, Fig. 3.2 depicts country of origin of the investors in destination countries.

Fig. 3-2 Origin of non-domestic investments by total land area acquired



Source: Schoneveld, G. C., 2011, Figure 2


Fig. 3.2 depicts fifteen major investors originating countries. Predominantly foreign investors acquiring land in sub-Saharan Africa originate from the West including the UK, US, Norway, Germany, Portugal, Canada, Italy, Switzerland, and Sweden. Investing countries from Asia include India, Malaysia, Singapore and China. Saudi Arabia is the only country from the Gulf countries, and South Africa from Africa. In general, the top ten expanding countries are the UK, USA, India, Norway, Germany, Malaysia, Portugal, Canada, South Africa, and Singapore. This tallies with the previous sections where I have shown the domestic risks of scarcity of arable land and growing domestic demands for food and biofuels crops in countries of the West, Asia and Middle East.

The second report is authored by Anseeuw et al. (2012) based on Landmatrix Database (LMD). It demonstrates the extent of expansion abroad by providing the quantity of acquired lands with purpose of acquisition. Unlike the previous report that focuses on sub-Sahara Africa, this report assesses global level data covering all regions, which is important for comparative analysis (Anseeuw, et al., 2012). This analytical report provides facts on global destination and origin of investments, size, trends of acquisition, and purposes of investments which are essential for examining global distributional effects of the global order and expansion abroad.

Methodologically, the report “records transactions that entail a transfer of rights to use, control or own land through sale, lease or concession; that cover 200 hectares (ha) or larger; and that have been concluded since the year 2000” (Ibid., vi). In addition, it covers foreign investments meant for agricultural purposes. “The Land Matrix contains reports of 1217 agricultural land deals, amounting to 83.2 million ha of land in developing countries. This is equivalent to 1.7% of the world’s agricultural area. Data for 625 (51.4%) of these deals, covering 43.7 million ha (39.3%) have been evaluated as coming from a reliable source of information” (Ibid., vii). Anseeuw et al (Ibid) noted “out of 1217 agricultural land deals, 403 (32%) were reported as signed, corresponding to 26.2 million ha. 330 (27%) of the reported deals have so far led to implementation activity, affecting approximately 21 million hectares.” However, due to the difficulty of tracing all investment deals, both reports cannot be considered as comprehensive. Yet they are indicative enough of the pattern and level of the contemporary expansion abroad and risk exportation.

Fig. 3.3 illustrates the global distribution of land acquisitions. Majority of expansions occur in Africa which is in congruent with the previous report and also Table 3.5 above which demonstrates data on future available arable lands and crop production potential. “Of the 1217 publicly reported deals, 62% of the projects covering a total area of 56.2 million hectares are located in Africa, while some 17.7 million hectares are reported in Asia, and 7 million hectares in Latin America. The remaining 2.2 million hectares are in other regions, particularly Eastern Europe and Oceania” (Anseeuw, et al., 2012:7). Though, Latin America was confirmed to have land, the size of acquired land in the region is below Asia. This report claims Africa has so far transferred 4.8% of its agricultural land, which is equivalent to the size of Kenya; compared to 1.1% and 1.2% transferred by Asia and Latin America respectively (Ibid).

Fig. 3-3 Land acquisition by region, number of projects and size




Source: Anseeuw, W., et al., 2012, Figure 2

Regional distribution and analysis of investments data also provides more details. Fig. 3.4 shows the highest expansions in Eastern and South Eastern Africa regions. Anseeuw and company (2012:7) confirm

Eastern Africa is clearly the most targeted area in the world with 1/3 of the reported projects and areas affected. The concentration of deals in this part of the world is even more significant (45%) if we only consider reliable data. West Africa appears to be the third most targeted area (15% of all projects) after South Eastern Asia (19% of all the projects; 25% according to reliable data).

Fig. 3-4 Land acquisitions by sub-region in Africa, number of projects and size



Source: Anseeuw, W., et al., 2017, Figure 3

Another important point to note, in this regard, is that a large number of countries (84) are reported to be targeted by foreign investors, but just 11 of them concentrate 70% of the reported targeted surface. Among those 11 countries, 7 are African, namely Sudan, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Tanzania, Madagascar, Zambia and DR Congo. In South-East Asia, the Philippines, Indonesia and Laos are particularly affected (Anseeuw, et al., 2012:vii). Furthermore, majority of the expansions are located in the Eastern and Southern Africa. This is a very important indicator of the relationship between the projections of available land and targeting countries with abundant land. Such a relationship would be more vivid if Fig. 3.4 is read in conjunction with Figures and Tables presented earlier that show land availability, crop production potential, investment originating countries and regions. Yet, we still have one major

issue that remains to be addressed which is the reasons for expansion abroad. In order to ascertain my original assumptions an association between the domestic risks of human goods in expanding societies and their expansion abroad has to be constructed. Table 3.8 accomplishes this task.

Table 3-8 Sectors affected by land deals


	All reported deals		Reliable data	
	Number of deals	Hectares (millions)	Number of deals	Hectares (millions)
Agriculture	1162	82.9	591	32.5
Forestry	78	3.1	65	2.2
Livestock only	55	0.4	34	0.2
Mining	91	3.9	51	1.6
Tourism	23	2.3	8	2.3
Industry	20	0.3	17	0.1
Conservation	2	0.3	2	0.3
No information	237	12.8	31	3.8
Total	1668	106.0	799	43.1
Source: Land Matrix data				

Source: Anseeuw, W., et al., 2012, Table 6

Table 3.8 indicates the vast majority of the investments, 82.9 million ha of all reported deals and 32.5 million ha from reliable data, are meant for agricultural purposes; while 3.1 million ha of all reported cases, and 2.2 million ha from reliable data are meant for forestry. If we add forestry, livestock, and conservation purposes to this, we can conclude the purposes of majority of the deals are meant for food and biofuels purposes. This is in congruent with Fig. 3-5 that demonstrates specific investment purposes and the size of acquired land.

The report categorizes the investments in to four types of investment purposes including food crop, non-food crop, flex crop and multiple use. “‘Food crops’ are crops that do not have a likely non-food usage, while ‘non-food crops’ do not have likely food use. ‘Flex crops’ are those that are commonly used as both food and for biofuel production” (Borras, et al, 2001 cited in Anseeuw, et al., 2012:27). Flex crops includes crops like soybean, sugarcane, and oil palm. “The final category, ‘multiple uses’ refers to deals meant for more than one purpose is proposed” (Ibid).

Fig. 3-5 Land acquisition by category of production



Source: Anseeuw, W., et al., Figure 14

Fig. 3-5 demonstrates the percentage share of investment projects meant for purpose of food crops 34%, non-food crops 26%, flex crops 23% and multiple crops 17%. The percentage of investment purposes change, if acquired land size is considered. In that case, 31% of acquired land is used for multiple crops, 26% for flex crops, 26% for food crops and 17% for non-food crops. *To sum up, the above Figures and Tables tally with the initially identified domestic risks of food and biofuels crops in arable land scarce well-off countries.* We can summarize that the globally identified problems and implemented strategies particularly virtual expansion abroad in the form of agricultural investments is fully materialized. As a consequence, while well-off investing societies *expand abroad* by the size of land they occupy, investment host poor societies *compressed* by the size of land they dished out. Those African countries involved in land grab investments and covered by Anseeuw et al.'s report collectively compressed by 56.2 million ha. of land and the investing countries expand by same amount of land size.

The upshot of all this is that expansion abroad entail population displacement and dispossession. To put it bluntly, in addition to the harms imposed on local communities in land grab investments host African countries, see Chapter Five, more than 14 million people are either displaced or dispossessed from their land by the investments. I arrived at this conclusion using the following assumptions based on the projections of “unused” lands and data on actual expansion abroad. One of the assumptions is that:

They point toward the availability of some 445 million hectares (ha) of currently uncultivated, non-forested land that would be ecologically suitable for rain fed cultivation in areas with less than 25 persons/square kilometer (km²). This implies that projected future demands could in principle be satisfied without cutting down forests. Much of this land is concentrated in a limited number of countries, many in Africa, and some of it is far from infrastructure (Deininger, et al., 2011:77).

This commends expansion towards Africa due to availability of land with population density of less than 25 persons per km². In contrast, Anseeuw, et al. (2012:20) asserts “conversely - and probably more importantly - more than 60% of all land deals target areas with population densities of more than 25 persons per km². This strengthens further the conclusion that land deals may often result in strong competition with local land users.” From these two reports it is possible to assume that investment projects on average affect 25 persons per km². In that case, if we take Schoneveld’s 353 investment projects in Africa with a total size 18,104,896 ha (equivalent to 181,048.96 km² multiplied by 25 persons) the number of directly affected persons would be 4,526,224. If we make an estimation based on Anseeuw et al’s report which come up with 56.2 million ha (equivalent to 562,000 km² multiplied by 25 persons) of acquired land in Africa, the number of directly evicted persons would be 14,050,000. Such a huge number of people are evicted from their vital resources like land, water, forest and others. This is what I mean by livelihood compression.

Conclusion

The purpose of the chapter was to verify the thesis societies are not self-sufficient as such they always struggle with the challenges of persistent domestic risks, and to examine the implications of this thesis for global justice. Accordingly, the data on demands for food and biofuels crops, and arable land together with land grab investments in sub-Saharan Africa demonstrate the existence of direct correlation between societal domestic risks, expansion abroad and risk exportation. The West, the Middle East and some Asian countries experience an increasing demand either for food or biofuels crops. Likewise, they experience reduction in crop production potential due to lack of domestic arable land. In contrast, most of the needed arable lands of the world exists in sub-Saharan African countries. Although, most of the sub-Saharan countries experience real food insecurity, well-off societies virtually expand in those countries by grabbing arable lands. Hence, it can be concluded that a direct relationship exists between expansion abroad of the affluent and livelihood compression of the communities whose lands are grabbed. This conclusion substantiates the premise that societies are not self-sufficient but interdependent. Also, *affluence does not mean self-sufficiency, and poorness does not mean complete lack of resources*. At the core of this we find domestic risks and the importance of resources for domestic production, reproduction and fair distribution of human goods at societal level. Likewise, in contemporary interdependent world domestic self-insufficiencies and risks are the driving forces of expansion abroad and participation in global cooperative activities which is sufficient and necessary condition for global justice. This conclusion implies that the analysis of global justice should start from the domestic risks of respective societies and their motive to cooperate with others and expand abroad than merely looking at poorness or affluence of distant others. “They” can be well-off or poor and “we” can also be well-off or poor. *But, all of us are self-insufficient* as a result of which no one society is in a position to establish a just domestic system without cooperating with others. Finally, this conclusion debunks those principles that generate the duty to others based on the *failure* of the poor and the *capacity* of the affluent for the reason they don’t explain the domestic risks of the affluent and the way they get access to the resources they domestically lack and need.

4 Chapter Four

Global Cooperation as Means of Risk Exportation

It is like someone climbing a tree and finding a poisonous snake and below him there's a crocodile in the water. So, if he stays on the tree, the snake will bite him. If he goes into the water, the crocodile will get him. That's the situation we're in (Oakland Institute, 2012).¹⁴

Introduction

The above quotation is an accurate representation of the theme this chapter intends to discuss. It is the words of a displaced person due to Agrisol's Land Deal in Tanzania. In fact, it reflects the life circumstances of millions of evicted people due to land grab investments in Africa. According to his analogy, the person finds himself stuck in the middle of two life threatening animals - snake and crocodile. As such, he cannot go up or down from the tree. If he moves upward or downward one of the animals will attack and kill him. He is compressed and restricted to that position. This chapter will unpack the symbolic representation of the snake and crocodile within the context of global cooperation and justice. The person might not mean that way but for us it is very important as distant others act closer, to put it more clearly global, regional, national and local structures condition the life circumstances of individual persons.

We can talk about justice in the context where social cooperation and institutions exists. Where there is social cooperation there is the issue of justice. In the absence of cooperation, we cannot ideally talk about justice. Social structures and institutions are important because they are needed for expediting cooperation and distribution. In this context, one of the reasons states limit justice to the domestic sphere is the rejection of the existence of global institutions or they belittle the role of global structures. Some like Nagel require global structures that are similar to that of domestic structures, in his word “global justice would require global sovereignty” (Nagel 2005). This chapter intends to debunk such an assertion based on the fact contemporary

¹⁴ Sembuli Masasa, a resident of Katumba in Tanzania, describes the fate of residents who are displaced from their land for to give way for foreign investors. Quoted from Oakland Institute, Understanding Land Investment Deals in Africa: Lives on Hold the Impacts of Agrisol's Land Deals in Tanzania, Land Deal Brief, July 2012.

societies are incapable of satisfying the basic needs of their members without global cooperation.

The core argument of the chapter revolves around the role of global and national *structures and processes* that are responsible for the realization of the *expansion* of well-off societies and *compression* of investments receiving sub-Saharan African societies. This is in line with Pogge's thesis that wealthy states manipulate and impose the global order for minor gains. By employing the concept of expansion abroad, it is possible to elaborate this thesis in two ways. First, wealthy societies not only manipulate and impose global institutions, *but also displace policy spaces and occupy geographic places* in cooperating countries. Second, affluent societies *institutionally expand and operate in cooperating countries*. In that sense, expansion, policy penetration and occupation of places and locations make affluent societies and global actors direct complicit to consequent harms. Harm is conceptualized as exported risks, hence it can be traced back to global and national institutional actors. Accordingly, five types of institutional actors responsible for expansion abroad are identified namely state, governmental development agencies, intergovernmental organizations, multinational corporations, and emerged amalgamated institutions and initiatives.

These institutions can be understood at three levels. First, at the level of the ideals and common issue-areas around which they are organized. Important and widely shared problems by different societies develop into common issue-areas. Second, existing and newly formed structures and institutions organized around those common issue-areas and operate towards the realization of the common goals of mitigating shared problems. Third, the interventions of those institutions at the various levels including global, national and local. In the context of the discussion under consideration, these institutional actors cooperate and work hand in hand to attain the visions and missions of food security and climate change regimes. Globally they are organized around the so called global common issue-areas producing and reproducing different forms of institutions and initiatives that propagate investments on land. They promote large scale industrial agricultural investments in the name of feeding hungry people in Africa and the world at large, by increasing agricultural productivity in the continent.

As land grab is a global phenomenon, its actors are widely spread and connected with intertwined networks. They operate within the spaces and places they have produced and reproduced in identified locations and organizational networks. The chapter analyses land grab spaces in which pertinent regimes, initiatives, structures and organizations deal with issues of global food security, biofuels, and climate change as root causes. All together trigger expansion abroad. What is important here is the organization and operation of global actors around common issue-areas of food security and climate change. The discussion begins with historical precedents of contemporary land grab phenomenon and then analyses the specific types of institutional actors, their roles and interventions.

4.1 Global Issue-areas: Climate Change and Food Security

As land grab is the upshot of global common challenges, it is worth to look at the historical precedents that led to the emergence of specific global actors organized around common issue-areas of food security, climate change and their interventions. According to Sachs (1992:107) “since the late 1960s, another image of ‘one world’ has edged its way into contemporary consciousness – the globe in its physical finiteness. We share in ‘humanity’, we are connected by the ‘world market’, but we are condemned to one destiny because we are inhabitants of one planet.” Such an idea dictates the conducts of contemporary global world which has its own justifications. Singer (2016:16) further argues “there can be no clearer illustration of the need for human beings to act globally than the issues raised by the impact of human activity on our atmosphere.” Human actions meant to improve human wellbeing generated various common risks too. The world has recognized among others the potential dangers of climate change, the growing world population, decline of agricultural productivity and others. Likewise, impacts of biofuels adoption on availability of food commodities have got recognition. *Indeed, if both food security and biofuels demands are to be satisfied, agricultural productivity needs to be increased to the level required.* However, societies have various financial, technological and natural resources capabilities. Differential capability essentializes mobilization of collective efforts and resources among cooperating societies. Like any other sectors, the only way the world can cope with the so called common challenges is to collectively strive for food security for all and energy for all (see: UN General Assembly, A/RES/65/151, 16 Feb. 2011; <https://www.un.org/press/en/2012/ga11333.doc.htm>). Yet, mobilization of collective efforts has to pass through certain prerequisite processes to bring stakeholders onboard.

Mobilization of the political will and commitments of states and various global stakeholders are the prime prerequisite. This has been realized that today we have food security and climate regimes with different stakeholders onboard playing various roles at global, regional, national and local levels. For instance, at the World Food Summit in 1996 world leaders declare “[w]e pledge our political will and our common and national commitment to achieving food security for all and to an ongoing effort to eradicate hunger in all countries, with an immediate view to reducing the number of undernourished people to half their present level no later than 2015” (FAO, 2009:33). The Millennium Development Goal (MDG) which is phased out in 2015 and its successor the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) or officially known as “Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development” are the results of continuous UN and other similar Summits. It is evident that “..., various countries have indeed demonstrated such political will by taking successful action to reduce the prevalence of hunger and malnutrition” (Ibid), for instance, in the implementation of the defunct MDGs and its successor SDGs.

In the context of the discussion under consideration, political will brings stakeholders together to undertake collective actions. They cooperate if they are convinced with the problems at hand and ensuing benefits and burdens. In any case, at the core of cooperation lies urgent and common problems at hand. In that sense, the notion of “one world” entails the idea that unless societies cooperate in good time they would face anticipated problems, for instance impacts of climate change. Yet, at earlier stages of mobilization, all possible stakeholders might not be convinced due to the fact of their different level of awareness and severity of the problems. But, through process common issue-areas pull most stakeholders to the center. Essentially, the extent and severity of the problems of food security and climate change have shown their potential for mobilization. For instance, poverty, hunger, health problems, climate and inequalities are core global problems that brings world leaders to the agendas of the MDGs and its successor.

FAO (2009:34) confirms “mobilizing political will to fight hunger must therefore have high priority if the vision of a world without hunger by 2050 is to become reality.” Hence, one can argue, “... there can be no doubt that the series of Summits of the 1990s and early 2000s,

including FAO, the UN and the G8, raised awareness and created commitment at highest levels. As the world seeks to strengthen and accelerate the necessary action, the substance of the action plans, in particular the plan adopted at the WFS need to be recalled” (FAO 2009:34). As a catalyst organization FAO further calls for enhancing commitments among and within nations by stressing the need for ongoing dialogue.

Following the Summits and international pledges of recent decades, a new and additional momentum could now be sought through dialogues on food **security** at the level of individual countries. Two types of dialogue could be envisaged; one at intra-national level involving governments and domestic stakeholders, and another involving the governments concerned together with their international development partners (Ibid.).

From this, it can be deduced that an ongoing dialogue, at different levels, creates awareness and motivation for collective actions. The same like political will and commitments at global level, consequent interventions are also equally important. Once political commitment is secured, *food security regime* took shape with the motto of *food security for all*. A regime, in this case, is understood as “sets of principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area” (Krasner 1983:1). Issue-areas are *central driving forces* around which world leaders and major international actors organized. Parallel to global food security regime which is organized around the motto of *food security for all*, climate regime organized around issue-area of climate change and emission reduction. Both regimes unleashed contemporary land grab.

The historical precedents of climate regime can be traced back to the 1970s when political leaders started committing themselves concerning ozone depletion and recognize the idea of common world. This is to mean that the idea “[t]hat we all share the same planet came to our attention in a particularly pressing way in the 1970s when scientists discovered that the use of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) threatens the ozone layer shielding the surface of our planet from the full force of the sun’s ultraviolet radiation” (Singer 2016:16). Since then various in-depth scientific researches were conducted on the level of impacts and mitigation measures leading to the signing of protocols and development of norms. “Once the science was accepted, concerned international action followed relatively and rapidly with the signing of the Montreal

Protocol in 1987” (Singer 2016:16). The Protocol aims at curbing human actions that create the problem by phasing out the use of CFCs in countries where it is produced.

The concern for human wellbeing is the core value of climate regime. In its preamble the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer asserts “[m]indful of their obligation under that Convention to take appropriate measures to protect human health and the environment against adverse effects resulting or likely to result from human activities which modify or are likely to modify the ozone layer” (UNEP, Ozone Secretariat 2000:1), and “[r]ecognizing that world-wide emissions of certain substances can significantly deplete and otherwise modify the ozone layer in a manner that is likely to result in adverse effects on human health and the environment” (Ibid), the parties have “[d]etermined to protect the ozone layer by taking precautionary measures to control equitably total global emissions of substances that deplete it, with the ultimate objective of their elimination on the basis of developments in scientific knowledge ...” (Ibid). The signing of this and other related Conventions bestow political leaders with the responsibility to save the common world and at the same time institutionalized climate regime. Ultimately, the whole processes evolve to global, regional and national governance structures.

Further scientific studies have been conducted on the dynamics of climate change, its consequent impacts and necessary measures that should be taken by the global community. As a consequence, different institutions with specialized roles have evolved. For instance, “[s]ome twenty years ago, as scientists first became aware of the changes taking place in the global climate, the world recognized that there was a potential problem and decided to study it. In 1998, the UN created the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), ...” (Stiglitz 2006:168) with the aim to “... provide policymakers with an authoritative view of climate change and its causes” (Singer 2016:17). The IPCC published its results indicating potential risks of climate changes. Based on the IPCC results and pressures from different groups and lobbyists, “[i]n 1992 more than 100 heads of state gathered in Rio de Janeiro and resolved to do something about the problem” (Stiglitz 2006:168). They committed themselves to stabilize “... greenhouse gas concentration in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system ... within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally” (Ibid., 169). This has also resulted in the signing of an agreement

by “[t]he United State and 152 other countries ... which became the cornerstone of the international community's attempt to come to grips with one of the most serious threats to our planet” (Stiglitz 2006:168). Thus, “Rio placed the environment firmly on the global institutional agenda such that the G7, the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO have all acquired a growing political interest in environmental problems” (Held, et al., 1999:389). The Kyoto Protocol is also a major stepping stone towards the evolution of climate regime.

In 1997, more than 1,500 delegates, lobbyists, and heads of state from over 150 countries gathered in the historic Japanese city of Kyoto for the purpose of coming up with a treaty to cut greenhouse gas emissions worldwide. Their task was to devise a way of cutting emissions that was fair and efficient, that minimized the economic costs of reducing emissions and shared the burden equitably among the countries of the world (Stiglitz 2006:169).

The common denominators of The Montreal Protocol, The Vienna Convention, The Rio and Kyoto Summits and others are the potential dangers the world faces due to our own conducts and the need for agreeable solutions with the core value of “one world”. As a result of this global environmental governance structures take shape. Authoritative scientific researches and documents served as sources of knowledge. From this discussion it can be deduced that The Summits paved the way for today’s *climate change regime* leading to the emergence of various state and non-state actors. Held et al. (1999:380) summarizes global environmental governance structures and institutional arrangements as

cultural, intellectual and scientific networks that both track and expose global and regional forms of environmental degradation and are able to construct and disseminate global environmental interconnectedness; international and transnational political networks and organizations that seek to regulate environmental degradation; global and regional environmental institutions, laws, conventions and protocols seen in terms of their numbers, coverage and intrusiveness; and these two foregoing factors as they interact with, shape and determine the conduct of domestic political institutions, environmental movements and struggles.

We can note that there is no single institution that represent climate regime, rather we have different forms of institutions, laws and regulations that play specific roles operating under one central common issue-area of climate change to save the world. It is pervasive that climate

change regime and its various institutions have been engaging with a range of activities affecting world economic system, resources utilization, and people's way of life in different parts of the world.

The green economy, a case in point, is the product of *climate regime*. Its promises tally with the essence and visions of climate regime. "A Green Economy can be defined as one that results in improved human wellbeing and social equity, while significantly reducing environmental risks and ecological scarcities" (UNEP 2010:4-5). It has been aptly described as follows:

A Green Economy is characterized by substantially increased investments in economic sectors that build on and enhance the earth's natural capital or reduce ecological scarcities and environmental risks. These sectors include renewable energy, low-carbon transport, energy-efficient buildings, clean technologies, improved waste management, improved freshwater provision, sustainable agriculture, forestry, and fisheries. These investments are driven by, or supported by, national policy reforms and the development of international policy and market infrastructure (Ibid.).

The United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) "has positioned itself as the leading player in elaborating the idea of the green economy" (Unmüßig, et al., 2012:23). As a matter of fact, the green economy *overhauls* major sectors including energy, technology, agriculture, market and others, to make them environment friendly. Biofuels is one of the recent developments of green economy. It is believed to satisfy the promises of curbing potential climate change damages and technological transformations. In line with this sustainable agriculture is reformulated as a means to adopt the emerging new green technologies and energy sources. Agricultural productivity reinvigorated to meet the concerns of both *food security and climate change regimes* at the same time. This is required due to the fact that biofuels compete for agricultural products and lands which in turn aggravates food insecurity. Therefore, it can be argued that both regimes emerged and inherently operate hand in hand.

In summary, these processes are historical antecedents of contemporary global *food security and biofuels regimes* that triggers the phenomena of land grab. The reason for revisiting these facts is to put the present situations into historical perspectives; yesterday's vision is today's reality. The 2007/08 food crisis and proliferation of large-scale agricultural investments are not

separate incidents. They are results of the measures taken with regard to climate change and adoption of the so-called environment friendly green technologies. They are transitions toward the next levels of technological advancement and way of life. Unless we understand the situation from its inception and relevance to the world in general, we may lose the fundamental justifications for its ensuing concern for global distributive justice.

Overall, the primary global achievement of the regimes is the *organization* of the world around common issue-areas and value systems. Stakeholders of the regimes are supposed to commit to the values stipulated thereon, save the world and improve human wellbeing. Successive Summits at UN, G8, G20, Rio, and others, and signed agreements signify the ongoing activities the regimes have so far accomplished. Once, they *organized* around common issue-areas - mobilize political will and commitment - *specific interventions follow toward achieving the common goals*. The interventions are tuned towards overhauling pertinent institutions and systems, and adjust them to environment friendly. Specific measures have been executed within the space and places stretched and located in different countries in line with their comparative advantages and disadvantages. Some countries and institutions may adjust their technological capabilities, to renewable energy and clean technology, in a way that reduce climate problems, while others may provide necessary natural resources particularly land, forest and others. Such differential capabilities require new forms of *cooperation*, among states, on identified sectors, for instance, "... renewable energy, low-carbon transport, energy-efficient buildings, clean technologies, improved waste management, improved freshwater provision, sustainable agriculture, forestry, and fisheries" (UNEP 2010:4-5). And also, nations are supposed to implement their programs and projects in line with these sectors. In the North technological transformations and necessary policy and regulation are already implemented. That is why, nowadays most policy discussions around the world are overwhelmed by issues related with these sectors.

Some of the adopted instruments of the Kyoto Protocol dictate certain mechanisms as to how nations implement the agreed upon issue-areas and interact with each other. *Instruments such as privatization, commercialization and commoditization of natural resources and assets are the corner stone of relationship among countries*. For instance, "[t]o assist countries in reaching their targets, the Kyoto Protocol accepted the principles of 'emissions trading,' by which one

country can buy emissions credits from another country that can reach its target with something to spare” (Singer 2016:28). Carbon Trade Watch (2013:4) elaborates this as follow:

... carbon trading comprises two market-based mechanisms: cap and trade, and offsets. Under cap and trade, governments or intergovernmental bodies, such as the EU, set an overall legal limit of carbon emissions in a certain time period and then grant industries a certain number of licenses to pollute (carbon permits). Companies can trade those permits between one another in order to comply with their reduction targets and/or trade them in the financial carbon markets.

Likewise, “[c]arbon offsets, meanwhile, are ‘emissions-saving’ projects created for ‘compensating’ continued pollution from Northern countries and companies. Each tonne of ‘saved’ carbon in the South generates a (cheap) credit that allows another tonne to be emitted somewhere else” (Ibid). To that effect “[w]ithin this neoliberal framework another international mechanism that would allow payments to Southern countries for *reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD)* became widely popular since the early 2000s” (Ibid). Ultimately, REDD later on upgraded to REDD+ and REDD++, is adopted as a mechanism for monitoring and controlling the level of emission based on which payments among countries could be carried out.

Consequently, “[s]ince the introduction of international carbon markets through the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, policies based on placing a monetary value on pollution became increasingly prominent as the ‘only possible’ way of tackling climate change” (Ibid) that provides market actors with the way for intervention. As such “in response to heavy corporate lobbying, mainly by the US, carbon markets give Northern governments and companies ‘flexible’ market-based options for reaching their targets, that is, a way out of reducing emissions at source” (Ibid). Hence, we can say that interventions like commoditization of natural resources including land and forest is the upshot of practical interventions of the regimes. Fairhead et al. (2012:238) claims “across the world, ecosystems are for sale. The commodification of nature, and its appropriation by a wide group of players, for a range of uses – current, future and speculative – in the name of ‘sustainability’, ‘conservation’ or ‘green’ values is accelerating”, particularly Africa internalizes the costs of the interventions of agriculture and forest-based investments.

So far, I have discussed the historical precedents that "... land grabbing is occurring in the context of late capitalism and global multiple food-energy-climate-finance crisis in which we can see the changing character of global production and consumption, including an integrated global food-energy complex" (Margulis, et al., 2013:2). Since the 1970s, both climate change and food security concerns have been central themes of major gatherings of world leaders. They have been discussing about the problems and potential solutions. At the end, they organized themselves around same issue-areas and institutionalized their activities. Those discussions, Protocols, Conventions and also institutionalization of their activities are sufficient forms of global cooperation. The main issue at hand is that without such cooperation individual societies might not be able to curb the environmental and food security problems their respective societies are faced with. An important observation for my discussion is whether such cooperative activities could be entertained in the context of global distributive justice or not. My take is positive, so long as they participate in collective activities, benefits and burdens have to be fairly distributed. Those institutions need not be similar to that of domestic institutions and structures, what matters is their effect on the life circumstances of individual persons through their interventions. The next level of discussion addresses this point, the roles of different forms of institutions that have to do with land grab or expansion abroad.

4.2 Global Institutional Actors and Interventions¹⁵

What has been discussed above is the major global issue-areas that have to do with the origin of land grab, and how the world organized around common issue-areas of food security and climate changes. The next subsequent sections will deal with major institutional actors of *food security and biofuels regimes*, responsible for the expansion and compression of livelihoods. *The main interventions of the regimes can be boiled down to the promotion of agricultural investments in arable land abundant countries, particularly African countries.* The agricultural investments are not like any other forms of investments, which means conventional private investments, rather they are agents of their societies and tools of transforming globally agreed upon solutions in the context of issue-areas of food security and climate change into practical interventions or production of outcomes. And that outcome is the production of the needed food and biofuels crops and import them back to countries of investment origin.

¹⁵ Here the conducts of global institutional actors and their interventions can be represented by the concept of distant others act closer. The discussions, decisions, interventions, etc. they perform affect the life circumstance individuals persons living in different parts of the world.

Thomas Pogge's perspective on global justice emphasizes the role of the global institutional order. This is crucial not only because of their capacity to identify, define and impose issue-areas but also to bring targeted states on board and organize them around the interests of wealthy nations for their implementations. Formation of certain value systems and organizing state actors at that level eases subsequent interventions even at the expense of the livelihood of local communities. Land grab is a case in point that once African states join the "unobjectionable structures or decisions" (Pogge & Moellendorf 2008), they willingly cooperate subsequent interventions.

As a matter of fact, land grab is "... an issue that will not be governed by a distinct, elemental regime, but rather by an intermingling of institutions" (Stephens 2011:8). It requires enormous resources and networks of global governance structures. "Land grab is facilitated by ever more extensive and rapid flows of capital, goods, and ideas across borders and these flows occur through axes of power that are far more polycentric than the North-South imperialist tradition" (Margulis, et al., 2013:2). For that reason, we can "situate land grabbing in an era of advanced capitalism, multiple global crises, and the role of new configurations of power and resistance in global governance institutions" (Ibid., 1). Because of this, I argue that focusing solely on governance or other domestic weaknesses of host states and profit seeking behavior of multinational corporations or narrow explanation of global institutional order reducing *the domestic risks and deep involvement* of investing states and global institutions will be too simplistic as it disregards whole range of global land grab governance. Hence, we need to equally deal with the domestic risks of well-off societies, as I did in the previous chapter, and their operations abroad particularly in societies where they expand.

Accordingly, five forms of institutional land grab actors can be identified including states, governmental development agencies, intergovernmental organizations, multinational corporations comprised of those directly investing on land and those in the supply and processing chains, and lastly emerged amalgamated institutions and initiatives composed of the other actors. Each category of actors plays specific role in their respective areas of specialization while emerged amalgamated institutions are produced and reproduced for the sake of facilitating the implementation of specific programs in host countries. Sometimes, it is difficult to locate some actors into explicit category as they involve in areas outside of their

conventional spheres. For instance, we find states in all other categories including multinational corporations. This categorization helps to examine how distant others act closer and trace harms for assigning appropriate obligations.

4.2.1 State and Its Many Faces

State actors refers to both investing and investment host governments. Major roles such as signing of International Conventions and Protocols, bilateral and multilateral agreements, national policy and program design, decision making, execution and others belong to states. With specific to land grab, they are the one to engage in food and biofuels regimes. They are parties to the Montreal and Kyoto Protocols and subsequent Directive. Accordingly, they engage in different international and regional strategies that they transform to domestic programs and projects. Domestically they execute certain policies in line with the agreements they have signed. Northern states have already adopted different policies for transforming to clean technologies and energy, among others biofuels. Externally, they design policies for promoting investments abroad, particularly land acquisitions. African states, on their part, actively engaged in creating conducive investment environment for attracting foreign investors in the name of enhancing agricultural productivity. Overall, while Northern states advance policy penetration strategies in Africa, states in Africa open not only their policy and program spaces but also land market.

The core argument of my study is that well-off societies are faced with domestic risks of biofuels and food security, and also scarcity of arable land that tests the wisdom of states. Together with poor arable land abundant states, they engage in global cooperation aimed at increasing agricultural productivity. In this sense, the role of states in policy design and implementation, both domestic and foreign, shade light on land grab dynamics in Africa. Biofuels are priority and urgent for the EU, as food security for the Gulf Arab and Asian countries. “European involvement in land grabbing is first due to the policies of both the EU and individual member States, which are directly and indirectly stimulating these factors, and hence this increased demand for land” (Graham, et al., 2010:5). The “EU Directive 2009/28EC (April 2009) sets new mandatory targets for member states: a minimum 10% share of renewable energies which in the end will be supplied mainly by agrofuels within the total consumption of fuel for transport in every member state by 2020” (Ibid., 47). This Directive bound member states to exert maximum efforts to meet the common target. Accordingly,

domestically they encourage relevant stakeholders and economic actors using various incentives. “The EU biofuels market largely depends on consumption mandates and incentives. The main emphasis of these measures is clearly on the consumption side. Direct production incentives do exist on the Member State (MS) level but are in the minority” (USDA Foreign Agricultural Service 2009:1). Likewise, consumer incentives are also applied to encourage consumers.

To meet their consumption targets, member states at their discretion are introducing a process of support measures, including consumption incentives (fuel-tax reductions), production incentives (tax incentives, loan guarantees, direct subsidy payments) and mandatory consumption requirements. These include reduced tax on limited quantities of biodiesel and bioethanol (France, Germany, and UK). In Slovenia, in accordance with the Excise Act, distributors of fuel for motor transport vehicles qualify for an exemption from excise duties, provided that the fuel is blended with agrofuels. Other incentives cover use such as the British Government's Renewable Transport Fuel Obligation requires UK fuel suppliers to ensure that a certain percentage of their aggregate sales are made up of agrofuels or they face a 15 pence per liter penalty (Graham, et al., 2010:48).

The same applies to China. “In the first half of 2008, it emerged that China’s Ministry of Agriculture was drafting a central government policy to encourage domestic firms to acquire (lease or purchase) land abroad for farming purposes, especially to assure China’s long-term soybean supplies. Five state-owned firms were reportedly targeted to implement the plan” (GRAIN 2008). Countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) namely Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirate also adopted their own strategies too. They are mainly concerned about food security due to their dependence on imported food. The 2007/08 surge in food commodity prices compelled them to look for reliable alternatives. “Under the aegis of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), they banded together with Bahrain and the other Gulf nations to formulate a collective strategy of outsourcing food production” (Ibid., 4). As Shepherd (2013:1) noted “one strategy being pursued by GCC members along with other nations, notably China and South Korea, is the acquisition of arable land—henceforth ‘land deals’—in foreign countries. The purpose is to establish intensive farming overseas and import produce back to their domestic markets.” Yet, the distinction between governmental and corporate investments originating from these countries is blurred. A case in point are “... the investments made by Qatar’s Hassad Food Corp, which is a wholly state-

owned enterprise, and investments made by Saudi Arabian corporations that are underwritten financially by the Kingdom's Agricultural Development Fund" (Shepherd 2013:3). All in all, GCC states involvement in land acquisition is pervasive than others. With regard to this "[o]ne of the questions that arises from the blurring of state and corporate activity is whether the primary objectives of the investments are purely for profit—whether from speculation or sales revenues—or to deliver on national food availability objectives" (Ibid). That probability of state involvement in land grab investments would be high if the investments were related to national priority objectives.

By the same token, it can be argued that because biofuels are priority interest of Western states, they also play multiple roles. "The home country governments of investors may play a major supportive role, providing diplomatic, financial and other support to private deals. Equity participations in investment projects by home country governments, through state-owned enterprises, development funds or sovereign wealth funds, may also be growing" (Cotula & Vermeulen 2009:1-2). Similarly, state owned enterprises involve in investments on land abroad. As an example, "Eni, formerly the Italian state oil company, is one of the top ten energy companies in the world. It is still 30% owned by the Italian state. Eni is undertaking a new multi-billion dollar investment in Congo in developing tar sands, oil palm for food and bio-diesel and gas-fueled electricity" (Heinrich Boell Stiftung 2009:3). From this, it can be noted that contemporary investments on land cannot be treated as conventional businesses, rather national interest to satisfy the wellbeing of citizens override profit seeking. As such, unlike conventional business practices, multinationals are not solely profit driven, instead majority of the investments on land are national priority interest driven, regardless of their origin.

To strengthen this argument, the case of a Swedish municipally owned company namely SEKAB is worth to be mentioned. It depicts the level of the use of public resources to the attainment of national interest.

SEKAB is a municipal owned company and hence directly accountable to Swedish tax payers (three municipalities in northern Sweden own 70% of the company while 30% is privately owned by EcoDevelopment in Europe). SEKAB can thus be seen to stand somewhat apart from the excessive profitability demands on international capital by its owners. The company also has a long

experience and a high international reputation. SEKAB is strongly involved in the promotion of certification processes for biofuels globally and in developing second generation technologies for bioenergy production. SEKAB initiated two biofuel projects in Tanzania in 2005, in Bagamoyo and Rufiji districts. The Bagamoyo project (planned for 22 000 ha) was seen as pilot for the larger scale Rufiji project (originally planned for 3-400 000 ha) (Havnevik 2011:5).

We can take note that SEKAB is majority state-owned company engaged in technological transformations, certification and operate in Tanzania by acquiring land. It is a state business entity operating in third world country. Ironically, while Western states are heavily involved in multinationals investing on large scale agricultures, *African states have been forced to pull out of major economic sectors like public large-scale agriculture through the structural adjustment programs.*

Another case worth to mention is India which is one of the major investing countries on land abroad. The situation of food security in the country is grim.

India has limited farmland resources and at the same time has a rapidly increasing population. The country is experiencing a “Green Revolution Fatigue” manifested by stagnant yields and marginal or no response to farm inputs in recent years. In the last decade, national food grain production has been more or less stagnant while the population has increased by almost 90 million, thereby increasing the country's dependence on international food imports (Rowden 2011:9).

Rowden has exactly elaborated the domestic risks of India. Scarcity of land, increasing population, stagnation of agricultural production and others lead to import dependence. As a consequence, the government of India encourages expansion abroad.

The Indian government has supported a host of various initiatives to facilitate Indian agricultural companies in their overseas investments in Africa and elsewhere, including through support for conventional new greenfield foreign direct investments, merger and acquisition (M&A) purchases of existing firms; public-private partnerships (PPPs); specific tariff reductions on agricultural goods imported to India; through the negotiation of regional bilateral trade and investment treaties (BITs); and double taxation (avoidance) agreements (DTAs) (Ibid., 15).

India has also employed bilateral development cooperation as a tool for advancing land acquisition abroad mainly to facilitate entry for its agricultural investors in host countries. This includes "... concessional Lines of Credit (LoCs) to various developing country governments, banks, and financial institutions, as well as to regional financial institutions, through the Indian Export-Import Bank (Exim Bank)" (Rowden 2011:9). Such credits are meant for national development programs in host countries. However,

... where these projects involve agricultural development, Indian foreign investors stand ready to win concessions and contracts for agricultural development in the form of their foreign direct investment. The Exim Bank also gives soft loans and lines of credit directly to Indian companies, although it is difficult for the public to obtain details on this activity for specific companies (Ibid).

Unlike India, China, and the GCC, EU's development cooperation approach is characterized by policy penetration and alignment with African states and continental policies. Here policy penetration is understood as distant others act closer for the reason distant others overwhelmingly control African states' and continental agricultural policy spaces, by targeting specific policy segments that are relevant for the attainment of their own ultimate goals. Graham et al. (2010:6) contends "EU member states have been promoting different land policies in Official Development Aid with varying emphasis on market led land reform." Furthermore,

In 2008 only, African countries signed 12 new BITs, 8 of them were concluded with European countries. BITs usually include provisions that strengthen the legal power of the investors. However, they subsequently weaken the policy space for national states and the power of host local communities. The Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), heavily promoted by the EU, provide further incentives for land grabbing by curtailing the respective States' policy space to protect their resources and markets for domestic use (Ibid., 6-7).

Evidently, EU states predominantly use their Development Financial Institutions (DFI) to advance their motive of expansion abroad and act closer by financing land grab investments. "Development Finance Institutions are specialized development banks that are usually majority owned by national governments" (APRODEV 2013:2). In that case, European governments

are direct complicit through financial institutions, whenever these institutions finance in land grab investments. This has been confirmed from the analysis APRODEV conducted on nine DFIs, namely FMO (Netherlands), DEG (Germany), CDC (UK), Norfund (Norway), Finnfund (Finland), Swedfund (Sweden), SIFEM (Switzerland), OeEB (Austria) and IFU (Denmark).

All nine European DFIs under analysis invest in the agriculture sector in the form of agriculture funds or investments in equity in companies. Their combined investment in agribusiness is estimated at over €1billion. Agribusiness clients include companies active in seeds and fertilisers; primary production and farming; infrastructure; commodity and food processing and trade and distribution (APRODEV 2013:3).

Client agribusiness companies of the DFIs are major participants in African agricultural investments, hence EU states act closer through their financial arms.

Equally their counterparts, investment host African states are also major actors in land grab. Apart from their involvement in food and climate regimes, they are responsible for designing policies and creating conducive business environment for foreign investors. Mainly “host governments tend to play a key role in allocating land leases, not least because they formally own all or much of the land in many African countries” (Cotula & Vermeulen 2009:9). In addition to their role in creating conducive pull factors, policy environment to foreign investors, they solicit investing states and foreign investors to come and invest in their countries too.

A case in point, African investment host states have submitted proposals to the Indian Ministry of Agriculture based on which the ministry asked potential domestic agricultural associations and agri-business organizations to assess the proposals for engagement (Rowden 2011:12). The Ministry acknowledges that “this department is receiving a number of proposals from several countries offering opportunities for acquisition of land for farming by companies, for meeting their commercial objectives, as well as Indian farmers or their conglomeration for taking up smallholdings for agriculture” (Ibid). Those African states who submitted proposals to the Ministry include Egypt, Ethiopia, Senegal, Sudan, and Tunisia.

The role host states play can be summarized into “(i) invention/justification, (ii) definition, reclassification, quantification, (iii) identification, (iv) acquisition/ appropriation and (v) re-allocation/ disposition of land” (Borras Jr. & Franco 2012:4). States execute these roles

through, “(i) simplification of land-based social relations, (ii) the assertion of sovereignty and authority over territory, (iii) and the use of state-sanctioned armed force to ensure compliance, extend territorialisation, and broker for private capital accumulation” (Scott as cited in Borras Jr. & Franco 2012:4). These and other roles of African host states and the whole range of land grab governance complexities was addressed at the African Farmers Workshop held in Cameroon, 4 - 5 May 2011. The conference declares,

African governments are tending to compete to obtain these new investment flows by offering cheap and easy access to resources. In this they are aided by permissive investment regulations promoted under Bilateral Investment Treaties and the policy advice of the International Finance Corporation of the World Bank group. Unaccountable governance and corruption is also an issue. The collusion among Foreign Direct Investment, national authorities and national capital is widespread but insufficiently documented. There is also collusion between corporate interests and development partners and philanthropic foundations that act as front runners for multilateral corporations in areas like that of introducing the products of biotechnology research and permissive bio-safety regulations (ROPPA, PROPAC and EAFF 2011:4).

In conclusion, the role of state actors can be traced back to their participation in food and climate change regimes and their subsequent commitments and interventions within the capacity and specific context of their respective countries. They promote specific domestic and foreign policies and strategies. Domestically they employ certain incentives targeting both economic actors and consumers. Likewise, they adopt incentives for investors to go abroad for land acquisition. The majority of investing states use development cooperation as a tool to get access to land. Host governments, on their part, utilize competitiveness measures, promoted by global actors like the WB, to open their land markets and attract foreign investors, while domestically employ policies of localization and delocalization.

4.2.2 Governmental Development Agencies

Though government development agencies are development cooperation wings of states, they can be treated as separate actors due to the fact they are specialized in development cooperation. In addition, this helps us to clearly understand the way distant others act closer and see the various roles different state machineries play. While states are responsible for designing policy and strategies, as operational wings of state development agencies implement them. It has been

discussed that development cooperation is one of the tools investing states employed to expand abroad. Basically, development cooperation is channeled either through governmental development agencies or in collaboration with other international structures such as the WB, IMF, UN Organs and others. “In Mozambique, for instance, the embassy of Italy in cooperation with the World Bank sponsored a study on the agrofuels potential in this country” (Graham, et al., 2010:49). According to Graham et al who referenced resolution 29/2009, the government of Mozambique adopted a “Biofuel Policy and Strategy” out of the report of this study conducted in cooperation with the WB. Furthermore, in its December 2011 Land Deal Briefing “Understanding Land Investments Deals in Africa: the role of development agencies” the Oakland Institute has meticulously reported the involvement of various development agencies in Africa. Among others USAID has pushed privatization of land in Mozambique and promoted investments in South Sudan. NORAD (Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation) and SIDA (Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency) have also financed the development of agrofuels policy and development of legal frameworks in Tanzania. “The GTZ has been commissioned to survey the issue of ‘fluid bio-fuels for transportation’ in a global environment guided by the principles of sustainable agriculture, energy and transport and to bring the results of the analysis in the international debate” (GIZ 2005:3).

African agricultural development corridors are an important aspect of development cooperation. The 2013 Grow Africa report describes in collaboration with multinationals and international organizations, USAID is actively involved in Burkina Faso, Kenya, Mozambique and Tanzania. For instance, African Cashew initiative (ACi) is partnering with USAID, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, and the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) in staffing, process and funding activities. The report further states Vodafone has negotiated \$10 million Connected Farmer Alliance partnership agreement with USAID and TechnoServe. All these activities are in connection with the promotion and expansion of Agricultural Corridors and Poles in partner countries. So, governmental development agencies implement government policies and programs in collaboration with stakeholders depending on specific type of project on the ground. What is important here is their motive of ensuring the realization of large-scale agricultural investments in host countries. Such a role is well discussed under the emerging amalgamated institutions, in the next section.

Moreover, USAID, DFID and the WB have been funding the Promoting Basic Services Project (PBS) in Ethiopia. This is a resettlement project in the Gambella Regional state where indigenous people are forced to settle in small villages, like Mr. O in my ideal type. They were forced to quit their semi nomadic and flood and retreat agricultural cultivation systems. The project happened to be highly controversial as communities are forcedly resettled and lands were distributed to foreign investors, though the government argue to the contrary that there is no correlation between the villagization project and land grab. However, displaced migrants in Kenya and civil society organizations operating abroad filed appeals against the WB, the DFID and USAID.

Inclusive Development International (IDI), an organization that represent the case at the WB, states that “a legal submission accompanying the complaint, prepared by IDI, presents evidence that the PBS project is directly and substantially contributing to a program of forced villagization, which has been taking place in the Gambella Region since 2010” (see: <https://www.inclusivedevelopment.net>). In July 2013, the IDI reported that the WB Board of Executive Directors approved full investigation on whether the Bank has breached its policies or not. It was approved based on the recommendations of the preliminary report prepared by the Bank’s internal watchdog, Inspection Panel, conducted after it received the complaints from people like that of Mr. O.

Similarly, a UK law firm namely Leigh Day (Leigh Day 2014) issued a proceeding at a High Court against DFID. The firm represents an Ethiopian refugee and his colleagues who are living in Kenya. They claim their government forcedly relocated and violate their rights with the support of DFID. The refugee’s claim was that DFID has directly funded the PBS project that damaged the life of the villagers as a result of which they flee to Kenya to save their life, Mr. O is one of them. At the moment, they live in Dadaab, Kakuma and Nairobi refugee camps in Kenya. In addition, according to the appeal submitted to the President of the WB by two community organizations, Gambella Community Dadaab Refugee Camp and Anywaa Community Association in Kenya, out of the 4,500 refugees and asylum seekers from the Gambella region 20% are due to the villagization program in the region.¹⁶

¹⁶ *An Appeal to Stop Funding Villagization Programme in Gambella Regional State, Southwest Ethiopia*. The appeal was submitted by Gambella Community Dadaab Refugee Camp and Anywaa Community Association in Kenya, addressed to the President of the World Bank Dr. Jim Jong Kim. Ref:AC/037/WB 001/12, See: <http://www.anuakjustice.org/downloads/120916-Appeal-to-stop-funding-villagization.pdf> (Accessed on 14.07.2017)

Furthermore, in its 2012 report the Human Right Watch (HRW) presented the complex relationship between donors and the Ethiopian government. It states:

Ethiopia's foreign donors have a complicated relationship with Ethiopia's villagization program. On the one hand, they clearly understand the risks associated with relocating large numbers of people and have actively encouraged the Ethiopian government to follow best practice and to refrain from using force. On the other hand, through their ongoing budgetary support to regional and local governments, they are, in part, paying for the construction of schools, health clinics, roads, and water facilities in the new villages. They are also funding agricultural programs directed towards resettled populations and the salaries of the local government officials who are implementing the policy (HRW 2012).

In fact, the Gambella regional state is the most land grabbed region in the whole country. A single investor from India acquired 100,000 ha expandable to 300,000 ha. The main complaints of the community against the support to the PBS project is related to the involvement the donors by financing a program that devastates their life through the implementation displacement and forced villagization. The villagers are also convinced that the villagization program is meant for clearing land for investors. In that case, the role of states through their developmental agencies is visible in advancing land grab. At least in this case DFID, USAID and the WB are complicit in forced resettlement, while others like GTZ, NORAD, SIDA, and USAID involved by supporting national policy design and enactment of different regulation related with land and others. Particularly, DFID and USAID use public resources to programs that involve forced relocation.

4.2.3 Intergovernmental Organizations

At this level the role of the EU, AU, UN, WB, NEPAD, GCC and others is most significant. Like states, intergovernmental organizations also play decision making roles. Member states are duty bound to execute the decisions. The EU's decision on biofuels blending and compulsory target is a key factor in imposing member countries to work towards their common goal. It has been mentioned above that EU member states are required to meet 10% biofuels consumption level by 2020, making them duty bound to provide the necessary financial and policy incentives to actors involved in the production and distribution chain. As a consequence, "[m]any studies, including from the World Bank, confirm this trend and reliable data shows

that between 3 and 5 million ha have already been directly or indirectly secured by EU companies to grow biofuel feedstock in Africa” (Aubry, et al., 2011:5).

“European development cooperation is actively supporting the introduction of agrofuel policies in African countries” (Graham, et al., 2010:5). EU’s role focuses on policy harmonization both domestic and foreign. Continentally it standardizes policies pursued by member countries and also provide directives for achieving intended common goals. Externally it harmonizes agricultural strategies with African countries. EPA is a typical case in point that provides the basis for land grab. The purpose of EPAs is, on the one hand, to enforce land market opening mechanisms, on the other hand it limits African state’s policy from protecting resources and products, ultimately creating a level ground for European markets and economic actors (Ibid., 61). In relation to this, five crucial points of EPAs which the EU encourages most can be identified: first, EPAs opens African markets for almost all imported items from EU, except 20% of goods that are labeled as “sensitive products”. Second, it incorporates a “standstill clause” which can be translated as freezing of import tariffs by African states at current rate. Third, it contains “most favored nations clause” requiring African states to treat European goods with same tariffs with other trading countries. Fourth, it urges the adoption of treaties (UPOV 1991) which prevent African farmers from saving and exchanging local seeds so that they depend on seeds supplied by multinationals. Finally, the fifth point involves freezing of export tariffs and duties.

The essence of these five elements of the EPA are very important for the discussion under consideration. One, import and export activities of African countries is affected in a way EU product override national productivities and economic exchanges. Two, “most favored nations” clause stunt regional cooperation and economic exchanges. Third, African farmers are restricted from saving and exchanging local seeds, which is perplexing that communities are denied their right to exchange what they have, want and afford. Also, it is an interference by its nature. In the context of land grab, the upshot of this would perpetuate existing system that European producers remain as producers and distributors of seeds acquiring unrestrained access to land and their products dumped in African markets. Importantly agricultural products on acquired land can easily be taken out with low costs possible. All in all, Graham et al. calls this a “wild trade”,

[W]hich ignores the human rights standards of civilized nations and serves the wild appetites of transnational corporations and investors. EPAs contribute to land grabbing by making corporate production in the South more profitable and thereby increasing pressures on land, which in turn increases the likelihood of the poor to be deprived of their prime lands – and to be left with marginal lands (Graham, et al., 2010:61).

Similarly, WB's involvement on land grab is well documented. Its role has mainly been in the form of financial assistance and also direct policy advisory services. The Bank argues for huge agricultural investments on under productive lands in investments host countries. A case in point, "in 2007, the World Bank's Annual World Development Report tackled the issue of agriculture for the first time since 1982. Under the headline 'Agriculture for Development', the report come to the conclusions that the agricultural and rural sectors have suffered from neglect and underinvestment over the past 20 years" (WB as cited in Zimmerle 2012:10). So, the Bank proposes for an increase in investments so as to enhance productivity. Furthermore, "in May 2009, the World Bank Group took the lead in the international arena following the food and financial crisis, with the formation of programmes such as the Global Food Crisis Response Programme (GFRP) – part of what World Bank President Robert B. Zoellick called the "new Deal on Global Food Policy" (Zimmerle 2012:11). It has become imperative that this "new deal" dictates today's mobilized commitments and investments on land. Since then, "the World Bank is the central organizer in a multilateral Agriculture and Food Security Initiative, with the G20 asking the World Bank in October 2009 to work with interested donors and organizations to establish a special multilateral trust fund to support a multibillion dollar food security initiative" (Daniel & Mittal 2010:6). Consequently, the WB is highly involved in African Agricultural Development Corridors. For instance:

The Government of Ghana has received an advance on the proceeds of a credit from the International Development Agency (IDA – World Bank Group) to finance the preparation of the Ghana Commercial Agriculture Project (GCAP). ... The development objective of GCAP is to improve the investment climate for agri-business and establish inclusive Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) aimed at increasing on-farm productivity and value addition in selected value chains in both the Accra Plains and the Savanna Accelerated Development Authority (SADA) regions (Republic of Ghana, Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MOFA) 2013:1).

It is also involved in similar projects in Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Tanzania, and other African countries. Concurrently, the Oakland Institute (OI) argued for direct contribution of the World Bank to land grab through its private sector arms namely International Finance Corporation (IFC) and Foreign Investment Advisory Service (FIAS). In its December 2011 Land Deal Brief, the OI lists specific services the Bank provides including financing for agricultural developments, provision of land-related products, shaping the legislative environment, creation and enhancement of promotion agencies, developing doing business ranking and provision of multilateral guarantees of non-commercial risks. Specifically:

Through the Africa Agricultural Finance Project (AAFP), an advisory and investment programme, it is encouraging African banks and other financial institutions to establish or expand lending to the agricultural sector in countries including the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Malawi, Nigeria and Zambia (Oakland Institute, 2011b:1).

Moreover, “IFC and FIAS are also providing technical assistance to governments in the drafting and revision of laws and policies. WBG officials are directly involved with client government leaders in their policy-making processes with the goal of making legislative environments more investor-friendly” (Ibid., 2).

IFC and FIAS also work with client governments to create or improve existing Investment Promotion Agencies (IPAs). IFC and FIAS encourage IPAs to streamline and consolidate all investment-related activities to create investor “one-stop shops.” In recent years, FIAS has helped to create or bolster IPAs in Sierra Leone, Cape Verde, Senegal, Zambia, and Tanzania, among many others (Ibid).

Overall, “IFC/FIAS products and services facilitate land grabs, for instance in Sierra Leon, Liberia and Ethiopia, where IFC/FIAS advisory services have resulted in regulatory and legislative reforms, thereby increasing investor entry into land markets. The land laws are very favorable for foreign investors” (Zimmerle 2012:2). By doing business rankings the Bank measures host countries’ business environment so that foreign investors could easily know where to invest. In other words, by assisting host states to improve their business environment the Bank creates easy entry for foreign investors on land or expansion abroad.

4.2.4 Multinational Corporations

These are economic actors either through direct investments on land or operation at the production or supply chain sides. It is difficult to strictly demarcate the scope of multinationals because of the involvement of a wide range of actors other than conventional multinationals solely investing on large scale agriculture. Rather we find a whole system building process encompassing a range of sectors including investment on agricultural land, processing, and agricultural input provision (eg. Monsanto, United Phosphorous Limited, Yara International), distributions, logistics, agricultural risk management (eg. Swiss Re), agricultural infrastructure construction (eg. Jain Irrigation), financial institutions, supply and value-chain development (eg. Unilever, Vodafone, Yara International) and many others (Grow Africa Secretariat 2013). At the current stage of land grab progress, most of these economic actors are piloting their projects at small scale levels while whole range of Agricultural Development Corridors and Poles are designated and necessary infrastructures are under construction like the Bagré Growth Pole in Burkina Faso, Beira Corridor in Mozambique, SAGCOT Corridor in Tanzania. But the trend seems there is an establishment of a kind of large-scale agricultural development and export system contrary to the promises of the various global initiatives, improving local food and nutrition security.

According to FAO, “private sector actors include investment funds, pension funds, hedge funds, agricultural and agro-industrial companies, and in some cases, energy companies. Public sector actors include governments, sovereign wealth funds and other state-owned companies” (Liu 2014:10). The fact that land grab investments are aimed at increasing food and biofuels crops production for now and the future, it attracts multinationals from a wide array of sectors. Another remarkable point is that governments are directly involved in investments. The 2009 IIED briefing corroborate that “private sector deals account for about 90 per cent of allocated land areas. Government-owned investments make up the remainder” (Cotula & Vermeulen 2009:1). However, states acquisition of shares in multinationals has to be underscored. A case in point the Italian Government owns 30% of ENI (Graham, et al., 2010:47), while the government of Norway owns 36.2% share at Yara International through the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fishery (Yara International, n.d.). Also, three Swedish municipalities own 70% share of SEKAB which invested in biofuels projects in Bagamoyo and Rufiji districts in Tanzania (Havnevik 2011:5).

Hence, due to the nature of the investments and composition of multinationals there is a need to take all potential investors into account, as long as they are involved in investments or own shares in multinational corporations investing on land grab related businesses. Multinationals operating at the production and supply chains should also be considered as well, because of the fact they have strong interest in promoting land grab in anticipation of profits. In that case multinationals supplying pesticide, fertilizer, seeds and others are most active both in advancing African Agricultural Growth Corridors or Poles. According to Grow Africa multinationals such as AGCO, Cargil, Diageo, Jain Irrigation, Monsanto, SABMiller, Uniliver, United Phosphorous Limited (UPL), Vodafon, Yara International and others have already submitted letter of intents for investment to governments in countries like Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Kenya, Ghana, Mozambique, and Tanzania (Grow Africa Secretariat 2013). They are expressions of intentions to invest in government designed agricultural development programs.

There are also multinationals like Kuruturi Global Ltd. investing on large tracts of land though they are not directly involved in Corridor schemes. Such investors are numerous operating in different countries. So far, most of the reported land grab acquisitions by Schoneveld, G.C., Anseeuw, W. et al and others fall to this category of investments operating outside of the Corridors. What makes the former multinationals investing in Corridor schemes unique is their participation in various global initiatives making themselves pioneers of global changes and innovations. For instance, in the G8, G20, and UN summits they insist global mobilizations and targeted investment strategies. In the name of public private partnership, they actively participate in initiatives such as Grow Africa, New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition, and New Vision for Agriculture. By so doing, they are able to easily mobilize government commitments and support. Their role can be summarized as investors and, at the same time, catalysts in global initiatives. Those mobilizations have led to the formation of emerged amalgamated institutions and initiatives.

4.2.5 Emerged Amalgamated Institutions and Initiatives

Unlike the above actors, emerged amalgamated institutions are institutions, initiatives, programs or projects solely produced and reproduced to mobilize commitments at global, regional and national levels, and catalyze the implementation of the aims of food security and biofuels regimes. They are amalgamated because different existing international institutions

and state actors create and participate in them. They are also initiatives because the actors took initiatives to tackle certain specific problems and establish those institutions to that end. In the case of land grab, the regimes or the above four categories of actors have produced various new initiatives and institutions to bring stakeholders on board for realizing specific *interventions* pledged at global level. Through these initiatives and institutions some global actors create a venue to get access to local levels in investment host countries. Investing state actors may be represented through their development agencies, sponsoring international institutions or host state's projects, while host states, on their part, may be represented through their line ministries.

Initiatives justify their conducts under the auspices of filling resource gaps that African states lack. In fact, they are the outcomes of the political wills and commitments of world leaders that can be traced back to the various summits held by the G8, G20 and UN, spearhead by World Economic Forum (WEF) proposals. Another important feature is that initiatives and amalgamated institutions partner with the same actors that created them, particularly at leadership and ministerial levels, which define their composition. According to the Grow Africa report (2013), they maintain closer contact and cooperate with high level leaderships including ministers in African countries. In majority of the cases their focus areas are mobilization of investments, public private partnership, privatization and commercialization. In that case, the full understanding of the dynamics of land grab calls for close examination of the origin, operations and performance of some of the major global initiatives.

In this regard, the 2010 report published by the WEF "Realizing a New Vision for Agriculture: a roadmap for stakeholders" highlights the emerging forms of cooperation among land grab actors. *The document draws a roadmap with quantifiable objectives and time frame for potential participating stakeholders in the African agricultural productivity mission, envisioned by the regimes.* In congruent with global challenges, this document claims:

Given the stakes, the world must deliver on agriculture's full potential. The approaches of the past simply cannot meet the challenges ahead. Building on successes, we must proactively factor in the cost of natural resources, the need to boost production in developing countries and ways to provide hungry people with basic nutrition. This will be one of the greatest challenges of our generation (WEF 2010:10).

To that end it identifies three major required changes; one, *small holder green revolution*; second, *robust commercial agriculture*; and third, *responsible land expansion*. In the context of land grab these envisioned changes have meaningful implications. *Three of them are mirror images of the purposes of the amalgamated institutions and initiatives, as they are produced and reproduced to implement the visions of the food security and biofuels regimes*. They exactly tally to the transfer of land rights from communities to multinationals, currently happening in targeted African countries, which are indicators of the whole package of activities the initiatives sought to execute. According to the aforementioned document, so far stakeholders from research and development, input distribution and adoption, farming, trading and processing, manufacturing and retail and consumer table are already engaged under the motto of “holistic approaches” involving national sector transformation, value-chain-intervention, *infrastructure corridor and breadbasket*. In line with this, the performances of various global initiatives depict the roles of wide range of actors. Yet, the interests of expanding societies and the motive of increasing agricultural productivity to feed hungry people in developing countries are incompatible.

A case in point, the *New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition (NAFSN)* is worth to mention. It is the brainchild of the May 2012 G8 Summit held at Camp David in the USA. The NAFSN:

Comprises the G8 governments, the private sector and African governments. So far, Country Cooperation Frameworks have been agreed with six African countries: Ethiopia, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Mozambique and Tanzania. Benin, Nigeria and Malawi will join the initiative this year and first steps to develop a Cooperation Framework with Senegal have been initiated. The contents of the partnership agreements show that the predominant aim is to create conditions in African countries that are conducive to investment and to promote private-sector investments (German NGO Forum on Environment and Development 2013:1).

Here one can notice that these countries are among the most land grabbed countries, covered under the previous chapter. Besides, countries such as Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, Mozambique, and Tanzania have already developed partnership initiative projects designating specific areas where infrastructure developments are under preparation as per the emerging “holistic approaches” of the New Vision for Agriculture. One can deduce the connection between land grab and participation in such kinds of initiatives and global cooperation.

Yara International, a Norwegian fertilizer producer which has an interest in African agricultural investment, is one of the first private sector participants in the New Alliance (see: Yara International, website). It is also involved in agricultural development programs in countries such as Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana and Tanzania. Together with Syngenta, Yara International led Tanzania's corridor activities. Syngenta "in partnership with Yara, for instance, its Environment and Climate Compatible Agriculture (ECCAg) project aims to test the environmental sustainability of intensifying smallholder agriculture through improved agronomic and input protocols, while also improving farmer productivity and profitability" (Grow Africa Secretariat 2013:106). Hence, the two multinationals are working with both small holder farmers and large-scale farmers at the same time, testing rice products. That means they become direct on-site implementers testing feasibility of their projects. Given their intent, this can be taken as an entry to communities and ultimately paving the way for large scale agriculture as stated earlier. *Significant to the discussion under consideration is the role multinationals and states play. Yara International for instance is a business entity, promoter, and participant of the initiatives at the same time. It is also a majority state owned multinational.* Hence its nature, roles, and visions are very complicated to make explicit examination as multinational, state or other forms of institutions. The same may apply to the other actors too. *For instance, as a majority shareholder in Yara and SEKAB the governments of Norway and Sweden respectively can be considered as major players in these multinationals too due to their conducts as investors, promoters and participants of the initiative programs. In that case, states play multiple roles by changing their colors as state, multinationals, development financiers and also development agencies.* Thus, it can be argued, emerged amalgamated institutions and initiatives create such a blurred governance environment. Yet, NAFSN envision a big aim.

This *New Alliance* will lift 50 million people out of poverty over the next decade, and be guided by a collective commitment to invest in credible, comprehensive and country-owned plans, develop new tools to mobilize private capital, spur and scale innovation, and manage risk; and engage and leverage the capacity of private sector partners – from women and smallholder farmers, entrepreneurs to domestic and international companies (The White House, Office of Press Secretary 2012).

Country owned plans are crucial for the subject under discussion. *They facilitate the transformation of global visions and initiatives into practical programs in investment host countries. Through them investing countries are able to occupy policy spaces and physical places, as they provide direction to participants of the initiatives, what and how to intervene.* The Camp David Declaration announces “today we commit to launch a *New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition* to accelerate the flow of private capital to African agriculture, take to scale new technologies and other innovations that can increase sustainable agricultural productivity, and reduce the risk borne by vulnerable economies and communities” (Ibid).

However, most of the promises are tailored towards opening land market for private large-scale agricultural investments. Here two points need to be underscored; first, country-owned plans are nothing but agricultural plans host countries develop for signing Cooperation Framework agreements with the G8; second, the flow of private capital means foreign direct investment on land and associated investments for which participating African countries designated huge lands. And whenever multinationals acquire land we can assume the governments of investment originating countries control the land as in some cases they are majority shareholders of multinationals, for instance Yara International, ENI, and SEKAB.

Moreover, these combinations make the institutional arrangements very clear, because such private capital flows are mostly targeted at participating countries. Other countries are not considered, either not being ready for engagement or lack arable land. In any case, global actors define and occupy both policy spaces, and physical places and locations in host countries. And this can take Pogge’s argument to further extension, that wealthy countries expand and act closer to poor countries in addition to harmful conducts of manipulation and imposition of global institutions. The German NGO Forum make the following reflection:

The contents of the partnership agreements show that the predominant aim is to create conditions in African countries that are conducive to investment and to promote private-sector investment. No poverty alleviation criteria or indicators are included. Smallholders, who are supposed to benefit from the initiative, have so far not been involved in the development of the initiative. It has to be feared that the initiative is intended more to open up African markets to the purchase of agricultural commodities, access to land and the distribution of

commercial seed, fertilizer and pesticides (German NGO Forum on Environment and Development 2013:1).

As the NGO Forum suspects, The L'Aquila Joint Statement also confirmed the necessity for targeted investments, like the one happening in Africa, to meet the global food crisis. The Statement declares “[s]ustained and predictable funding and increased targeted investments are urgently required to enhance world food production capacity” (see: L'Aquila Joint Statement on Global Food Security L'Aquila Food Security Initiative 2009). Thus, “the key interventions are to mobilize domestic and foreign private investments in African agriculture, bring agricultural innovations to scale ...” (see: Yara International website).

Though those promises seem pro poor, at the core of their implementation we find the transfer of land rights from the poor to multinationals and exportation of crops to wealthy countries. In simple terms, the expansion of the affluent in poor societies that compress them. In relation to this, GRAIN, a Barcelona based NGO, witnessed that the “G8 countries are implementing a New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition in six African countries that will facilitate the transfer of control over African agriculture from peasants to foreign agribusiness” (GRAIN 2013). As an illustration:

Under its Cooperation Framework, Côte d'Ivoire promises to reform its land laws and make other policy changes to facilitate private investment in agriculture. In exchange, it gets hundreds of millions of dollars in donor assistance and promises from eight foreign companies and their local partners to invest nearly US\$ 800 million in the development of massive rice farms (Ibid).

The end effect, according to GRAIN, is that multinationals occupy places and locations as they control land facilitated by the Cooperation Framework, while major global actors provide financial and technical resources too. The following statement from the 2012 G8 Camp David Declaration confirms this.

As part of that effort, we commit to fulfill outstanding L'Aquila financial pledges, seek to maintain strong support to address current and future global food security challenges, including through bilateral and multilateral assistance, and agree to take new steps to accelerate

progress towards food security and nutrition in Africa and globally, on a complementary basis (The White House, Office of Press Secretary 2012).

Like NAFSN, Grow Africa Partnership (GAP) is another initiative that needs to be unpacked under the same context. “The Grow Africa Partnership was founded jointly by the African Union (AU), The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the World Economic Forum in 2011. Grow Africa works to increase private sector investment in agriculture, and accelerate the execution and impact of investment commitments” (see: <https://www.growafrica.com/about/who-we-are>). Partnering African countries include Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Rwanda and Tanzania. With the exception of Kenya and Rwanda, the others are participants of the NAFSN too. In its 2013 report the GAP indicate G8’s announcement of investment commitments worth over \$3.5 billion, pledged by multinationals to invest across the eight countries participating in the program. The commitments are found at different level of progresses, which includes “100% with internal approvals underway; 94% with external preparations proceeding: market research, field visits, partnership negotiations, stakeholder consultations; 61% in pilot phase: initial on-the-ground progress awaiting scale-up; and 40% in investment phase: operational activity moving to scale” (Grow Africa Secretariat 2013:2). In the near future, they are expected to be fully operational, depending on the progress made on the infrastructural development activities of the Agricultural Corridors. When they are operational, the whole system of agricultural input supply, production, logistics, transport and others will be fully functional enabling shipment of the products to investor countries.

One of the contradictions of GAP, important to the discussion of global justice, is its commitment to African small holder farmers and the promotion of export oriented industrial agricultures, which is clearly reflected in its 2013 report. The over \$3.4 billion planned investment by multinationals comes from wide spectrum of sectors primarily meant for the principal interest of their country of origin producing food and biofuels crops. The multinationals are mainly from sectors like fertilizer, seed, pesticide, infrastructure, and production and supply chains, to which European DFIs provide financial supports, as it was covered in the above section. Just as bird’s-eye view, multinationals such as AGCO, Agriserve, Armajaro Trading Ltd. (ATL), Cargil, Diageo, Jain Irrigation, Monsanto, SABMiller, Syngenta, Unilever, United Phosphorous Limited, Vodafon, Yara International, and others are

among those pledged and operate in most of the countries. This is a clear indication of the role of multinationals playing a role at all levels. It has been described that Yara participated in the 2012 G8 meeting where NAFSN announced.

Yara was the primary private sector representative at the G8 event in Washington DC in 2012, where President Barack Obama delivered an opening keynote speech and launched the New Alliance. The symposium was partly inspired by the Grow Africa partnership, which Yara played a key role in establishing, and co-chairs. The African Growth Corridors is a backdrop and inspiration. In Washington, several global businesses signed Letters of Intent committing to invest in Africa. Yara has committed to develop our business and invest in Ethiopia, Ghana, Burkina Faso and Tanzania (see: http://www.yara.com/sustainability/how_we_engage/africa_engagement/new_alliance/index.aspx).

As extensively presented, the case of Yara International shows the complexity of the emerged amalgamated institutions and initiatives.

Conclusion

One of the requirements Pogge has set for generating duty of justice is that *human right deficits or harms should be traceable to institutional actors*. We call certain conducts harmful if we are able to trace them to institutional actors. In line with this, so as to uncover the global structures responsible for transforming potential domestic risks from land scarce well-off countries to arable land abundant countries, I have listed three important issues that have to do with land grab institutional actors. One, issue-areas of food security and climate change. Two, the various institutions organized themselves around those issue-areas. Three, the policies they adopted and the interventions followed in order to realize the visions and goals of globally agreed upon issue-areas. Accordingly, from the above discussion it can be concluded that, in the case of land grab, biofuels adopting arable land scarce well-off states are able to organize world leaders around global issue-areas and develop specific interventions to act closer for attaining their objectives of acquiring land in land abundant countries. Once they organize around issue-areas, they produce and reproduce institutions and initiatives that mobilize, coordinate, and implement specific *interventions*.

However, Pogge's notion of global institutional order need further extension to fully explain the specific land grab context. Pogge has focused on wealthy nations' capacity to manipulate global institutions and impose rules and regulations on poor countries. In addition to this, the case of land grab shows the ability of wealthy states to bring targeted states on board at global and regional levels, produce and reproduce institutions and initiatives that can penetrate into national borders, and define and occupy certain policy spaces and geographic places and locations. Organizing around issue-areas paved the way for the institutions to enter into investment host countries and occupy policy spaces and physical places and locations becoming sole actors in issues related to land grab, within the space, places and locations they defined and occupied. They become major actors in the agricultural sector including activities of fertilizer and seed production and distribution, agricultural production and distribution.

Overall, the operations of global institutions do not remain at global level, rather like any other domestic institutions those identified institutional actors are actively act closer at national and local levels in investment host countries. Furthermore, the notion of global institutional order should not be narrow, that means global institutions should not be seen in isolation from the interest of wealthy countries. The way they are designed and operate is in line with the interests of well-off societies. The case of land grab also demonstrates one very important aspect of states that investing states play multiple roles as a state, development agency, development financier, and business entity in cases when they are major shareholders in multinationals. Though, I develop the five categories for the reason of depicting the various areas of operations, states exist in all the categories. As states, they are participants of climate and food security regimes as they sign Conventions and Protocols. As states, they design policies and make decisions. Development agencies and DFIs respectively perform their duties as development cooperation and financial wings of states. At the same time many states hold shares in multinational corporations. All in all, they represent their states and societies in their global operations. Hence, states remain major institutional actors both in their domestic and foreign operations. On the whole, any harm caused due to the occupation of places and locations in investments host countries, or expansion abroad, can be traced back to the above five categories of actors, mainly states.

5 Chapter Five

Harm as an Exported Risk to Distant Others

Agriculture is now a motorized food industry, the same thing in its essence as the production of corpses in the gas chambers and the extermination camps, the same thing as blockades and the reduction of countries to famine, the same thing as the manufacture of hydrogen bombs (Davis 2007:257).

Introduction

The above quote that Davis cited Heidegger draws similarities between various means of human extermination experienced during the Second World War and modern food industry. Those similarities lie on modernity, i.e. the focus on technological efficiencies and productivity. In a like manner, this chapter intends to demonstrate the harms imposed on local communities in investments host African countries due to the need to increase agricultural productivity through human displacement and dispossession. As innovation and adoption of biofuels technologies necessitates new resource namely arable land, being arable land become the focus of delocalization and localization processes that expropriate land from communities.

In this regard, the chapter establishes vital correlations between the domestic risks, food insecurity and biofuels, of affluent societies and the harms imposed on local communities abroad. To do so, the chapter explicates both the way global common issue-areas and cooperation translated into national and local level changes in investment host countries and *ensuing harms experienced by the distant others; displaced persons*. National policy and strategy level changes are important indicators of internalization of imported risks. Land grab harms, in this sense, are inherent to the process of global changes and continuity including national and local level changes that dictate processes of *localization and delocalization*. While localization establishes incoming large-scale agricultural investment projects, delocalization alienates local communities from land and resources through eviction and dispossession. To that end, certain values or tokens are inherited from the global issue-areas and cooperation, and incorporated into national policies of host countries. Among others, *localization* policy and regulatory changes include investment and land deals; seed production, distribution and ownership; and also land use right transfers. Likewise, actions conducted in relation to

delocalization include enactment of regulations like land demarcation, land readjustment and banking, resettlement, compensation and others. The same like the extermination camps, *the upshot of localization and delocalization processes eliminate spaces and spatial practices local communities rely for their survival*. This chapter is structured in a way that show the plans that triggered land grab, ensuing land use changes and the harms affected people experienced. At the core of the argument is the fact that land grab harms are systemic and inherent to industrial agricultural investments, hence they are traceable to global and national land grab actors.

5.1 Structural Internalization of Risks

From the outset, I want to clarify the way the concepts of risk and harm are employed. Risk can be potential or actualized. Potential risk may not harm people, but actualized risk harm. In order for risk to be actualized certain actions needs to be conducted or omitted. Harm is an actualized risk. Depending on the context and type of harm, it may generate further risks. In this regard, agricultural investment receiving states internalize the risks of affluent societies by changing their policies and strategies. These changes entail potential risks. When those policies implemented or large-scale agricultural lands acquired by foreign entities, risks convert to harm which may generate further risks. I use the term harm for instances of actualized risks, although further risks could be generated due to harms too. In this section, I will show the processes of risk internalization, and the next section will cover actualized risks experienced by communities

The aim of the global cooperation I discussed in the previous chapters is to increase agricultural productivity. To that end, global actors have organized themselves and developed specific interventions. Large scale agricultural investment has been adopted as a major intervention for enhancing agricultural productivity and tackling global challenges of food security and climate change. Well-off states pledge to mobilize financial and technological resources, African states, on their part, commit themselves to make arable land accessible to foreign investors. In essence, agricultural sector in African land abundant countries has become a catalyst of national growth and development, and also the world at large; as a result of which “agricultural led development” strategy happened to be trendy. For instance, Ethiopia embraced Agricultural Development led Industrialization (ADLI) that aimed at transforming the country’s economy (see: Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Ministry of Agriculture,

<http://ethioagp.org/background/>), Kenya also enacted “the national economic development ‘Vision 2030’, a series of five-year plans with the first one for 2008-2012, considers foreign investment as key to agricultural development. The Kenyan government sought to attract investors with the particular intent to grow cash crops both for export and for domestic consumption” (FIAN 2010:18). Similarly, “‘modernizing agriculture’ remains the overarching theme of Ghana’s agricultural policy as well as the new private sector development strategy. It focuses on a stronger role for the private sector in transforming agriculture from a low-productivity subsistence-based sector to one characterized by high-productivity, integrated value chains, and extensive value addition” (see: Republic of Ghana, Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MOFA) 2013). To that end, the government of Ghana’s “... interventions are focused on the enabling environment and other targeted measures to facilitate such investment, alongside more direct interventions targeted at food insecure areas” (Ibid., 2013).

Similarly, well-off biofuels adopting and food import dependent countries want to see increased African agricultural productivity, albeit for different reasons. They turn their commitment to reality by aligning to continental and national plans of African countries. In this regard, particularly large scale industrial agricultural investment happens to be a common agenda among African states and biofuels adopting and food import dependent countries. As a result, development cooperation is tailored to that end with a focus on *private investments on large scale industrial agricultures*. With this background, to show the level of risk exportation and internalization, the discussion hereunder will focus on the interventions at two levels including national level policy commitments and local level impacts of investment projects.

Let me now focus on risk internalization. Collective continental motive of African states to develop their agricultural sector can be found organized around the Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Program (CAADP).

The Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Programme (CAADP) is a continent-wide agriculture initiative of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). Its goal is to eliminate hunger and reduce poverty through agriculture. To do this, African governments have agreed to increase public investment in agriculture by a minimum of 10 per cent of their national budgets and

to raise agricultural productivity by at least 6 per cent per annum (see: UN Human Settlement Program 2013:6).

CAADP identifies four major pillars including 1) sustainable soil, land and water management, 2) rural infrastructure and trade related capacity for improved market access, 3) increased food supply and hunger reduction, and 4) agricultural research and dissemination that serve as vital instrument of agricultural cooperation between African states and their development partners (<http://www.nepad.org/publication/introducing-comprehensive-africa-agriculture-development-programme> pp.3-6). Though African states commit to increase their annual budget for agriculture to 10%, most of them fail to meet that commitment. Lack of financial resources provided an excuse for aligning with global partners through *the various initiatives*. For that matter, many African states have been trying to get access to international financial sources for modernizing their agricultural sector which the international community never respond, but this time around development partners mobilize their financing in turn to get access to arable land.

As development cooperation, this alignment necessitates national agricultural plans and strategies that emphasis *investments on industrial agriculture, the first step of localization process*. With the intention to tap incoming foreign investments, those African states participating in the global cooperation and initiatives, like the GAP and NAFSN, have developed national plans. Based on this, they have signed Cooperation Framework agreements with the G8 and major development partners. Countries such as Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Mozambique and Tanzania have already joined the initiative and developed “framework of the implementation of the specific national agricultural development plan” (GRAIN 2013) to which resources and investments channeled. In view of that, Burkina Faso developed “the Rural Sector National Programme (PNSR)”, Côte d’Ivoire developed “the National Agricultural Investment Program or PNIA”, Ethiopia designed “Agriculture Sector Policy Investment Framework or PIF”, Ghana issued “the Medium Term Agriculture Sector Investment Plan or METASIP”, Mozambique in its part introduced “Plano Nacional de Investimento do Sector Agrário – PNISA”, and Tanzania enacted “Agriculture and Food Security Investment Plan or TAFSIP”. These plans provide frameworks for entry and localization of incoming investments.

In addition, the Cooperation Frameworks require signatory African states to take further localization measures. It promotes public private partnership (PPP) governance structure, a model that brings global, state and non-state actors together to enhance their focus, efficiency and impacts. In other words, the five categories of land grab actors organized themselves under the newly emerged initiatives and institutions. Among other, in the context of agricultural investments, the GAP and NAFSN are the highest level of PPP. As a PPP

The Grow Africa Partnership comprises over 200 companies and governments in 12 countries. These companies have made formal commitments with the government in the respective country to invest in agriculture. Ten of these countries are part of the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition, a partnership in which stakeholders – public and private sectors, and donors - commit to specific policy reforms and investments, outlined in Cooperation Frameworks that accelerate implementation of African country food security strategies (Grow Africa, website, ‘who we are’).

Initiatives like GAP promote localization. For instance, GAP “... is co-convened by the African Union Commission, NEPAD Agency and the World Economic Forum, who form an executive committee for oversight of activities. A steering committee of high-level cross-sector leaders provides strategic direction. Grow Africa leverages resources among partner organizations and has a small secretariat to catalyse, broker and facilitate the process” (UN Human Settlement Program 2013:6). GAP aims at economic growth and widening opportunities to various sections of societies through the realization of full potential of agricultural sector in arable land abundant African countries. To this end, “Grow Africa brokers collaboration between governments, international and domestic agriculture companies, and smallholder farmers in order to lower the risk and cost of investing in agriculture, and improve the speed of return to all stakeholders” (Grow Africa, website, ‘who we are’).

We need to underscore country level activities of GAP which is formed solely to realize the visions and missions of common issue-areas by enhancing agricultural productivity through private investments. Specifically, GAP promotes multi-stakeholder partnership in the participating nine African countries. On the other hand, signed Cooperation Framework agreements serves as means of localizing agricultural investment projects. “Known as a Cooperation Framework, the agreement is part of the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition – a partnership between the G8, a number of African governments, transnational

corporations and some domestic companies” (GRAIN 2013:2). This is a clear indication of the PPP model whereby state, intergovernmental, non-state, and business entities joined together to realize what they committed at global level. NAFSN is spearheaded by the G8. Being party to the agreements, host African states are bound to *create conducive environment for the operations of the multinationals for localizing intended agricultural development plans*. Conducive environments are specific policy commitments that facilitate investment operations. On their part, G8 member states mobilize the necessary resources while multinationals realize investment projects. The signed Cooperation Framework asserts:

Three years after the G8 Summit at L’Aquila, Italy, the international community recognizes the importance of food security to development, inclusive economic growth and the dignity of all women and men. In that spirit, we welcome the success of the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program (CAADP) in demonstrating African ownership and leadership, its call for expanded public and private investment in agriculture and desire to build on the progress that African governments have made in advancing a vision for agricultural development in Africa (New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition, n.d., p. 1).

From this one can note the G8’s effective penetration into national agricultural policies of signatory African countries. For example, the G8 confirms its alignment with Burkina Faso in the Cooperation Framework agreement signed between the two:

The G8 members, consistent with the commitments made at L’Aquila, reaffirm their intention to align their agricultural financial and technical support with the priorities of the CAADP National Investment Plan for Agriculture and Food Security (referred to in Burkina Faso as the Rural Sector National Programme (PNSR)), which is the national implementing framework for CAADP for the Agricultural Policy of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAP/ECOWAS), and for the WAEMU Common Agricultural Policy (PAU) (Ibid., 2).

Similar alignments are made with other signatory African states too. Policy alignments facilitate multinationals to enter in to expand abroad and act closer to host countries. The promised financial and technical supports are nothing but large-scale agricultural investments that are supposed to be localized. The G8 provides resources through the Newly Emerging Amalgamated Institutions and Initiatives, like the GAP platform.

The G8 members intend to provide support within the agricultural sector to accelerate implementation of the PNSR, including through the Grow Africa platform, with the overall goal of facilitating increases in private investment and scaling innovation. The G8 members intend to engage the relevant agencies of their member governments and also to bring to bear appropriate enabling actions to accelerate progress in the areas of finance and markets, science and technology, and risk management. To address the underlying causes of food insecurity, the G8 members intend to focus key resources and other contributions on high-priority, high-impact investments which have been or will be identified in the framework of the implementation of the PNSR (New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition, n.d., p. 2).

G8's intervention in "high-priority and high-impact" investment is indicative enough of the level of its involvement in controlling spaces and places, *that should have been left to national and local actors*. Problem of land scarcity and the need for biofuels and food crops in investing countries are the driving forces of the commitments. Such an engagement is not compatible with a positive duty to feed the poor in host countries as it appears in their deliberations, rather they are manifestations of the motive to get access to land. In relation to this, "the L'Aquila communiqué went beyond emergency response and food aid and placed a strong focus on the development of agricultural markets, trade and rural economic growth as the cornerstones of food security" (Kuhlmann, et al., 2011:1). This is a clear indication of intended localization of foreign investments in investment host countries.

National agricultural plans dictate the type of investments and interventions needed. The volume of the investment interventions demonstrates high potential of occupying and controlling local social, economic and governance spaces and geographic places. In that sense, they become major actors in dictating and leading the social, political and economic transformations of the agricultural sector. Therefore, because of these interventions and cooperative activities G8 member states, international organizations and multinationals avail themselves to macro, meso and micro level roles in signatory African countries. Since the agricultural sector already designated as a motor of transformation, these actors *play a primary role* while national and local actors relegated to a *secondary role* in high impact projects. *From global justice perspectives, these new developments of shifting role from macro level cooperation to micro and meso-level interventions and involvements suggest the need for closer examination which neither statist nor global institutional order perspectives addressed.*

Functionally, policy commitments are means of risk exportation and internalization. Localization and delocalization processes have been advanced by policy commitments and efforts to create conducive business environment that make investment projects economically viable. African states facilitate localization by changing their laws, policies and regulations with regard to *land use, investment, seed regulations and others*. For instance, in Ethiopia “pursuant to the current investment law, two regulations have been issued that specify the areas of investment eligible for incentives as well as the type and extent of entitlements to incentives that equally apply to both domestic and foreign investors including for those engaged in large scale agricultural investments” (Tamrat 2010:14). Other African states have also carried out the necessary preconditions for smooth localization of foreign investments, particularly related with *land transfer, seeds production and dissemination*, paving way to monoculture. Table 5.1 demonstrates summary of such commitments in six African countries that have signed the Cooperation Frameworks with the G8.

Table 5-1 Some policy commitments dealing with land and seeds made by African countries within the Cooperation Frameworks signed with the G8

	Land	Seeds
Burkina Faso	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Develop/rehabilitate 18,500 ha of irrigated areas and 35,000 ha of lowlands (Dec. 2015) - Adopt and disseminate a policy framework for resettlement in the developed areas (Dec. 2013) - Draft transparent procedures for access to land in State or local government developed areas, delineate, register the land areas already developed and issue documents relative to land use rights in all the developed areas (Dec. 2014) 	
Côte d'Ivoire	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The Rural Land Act implemented through programs to demarcate village lands and through the issuance of land tenure certification (June 2015) - The land information system extended and operationalized throughout the country (Dec. 2013) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The draft seed act finalized and adopted; procedures for the approval of seed varieties and their entry in the official catalogue simplified (Dec. 2014)

Ethiopia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Establish a one-window service that assists agriculture investors to obtain a business license, secure access to land, obtain market information on pricing and production availability, etc. (Apr. 2013) - Implement policy measures, as necessary, that secure ownership and crop trading rights for commercial farms (Dec. 2013) - Extend land certification to all rural land holders (June 2015) - Refine land law, if necessary, to encourage long-term land leasing and strengthen contract enforcement for commercial farms (Dec. 2013) - Further develop and implement guidelines of corporate responsibility for land tenure and responsible agriculture investment (June 2013) 	
Ghana	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Database of suitable land for investors established: 1,000 ha registered (Dec. 2013); 4,500 ha registered (Dec. 2014); 10,000 ha registered (Dec. 2015) - Pilot model lease agreements for 5,000 ha of land in database established (Dec. 2015) - Clear procedures to channel investor interest to appropriate agencies completed (to provide a transparent and structured way for investors of all types to avoid extra transaction costs and reduce the perceived risk of approaching government to manage access to, and security of land (Dec. 2013) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Seed registry system established (June 2013) - Protocols for variety testing, release and registration, authorization to conduct field inspections, seed sampling, and seed testing developed (June 2013) - Standards for seed classification and certification established (June 2013)
Mozambique	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Adopt procedures for obtaining rural land use rights (DUATs) that decrease processing time and cost (Mar. 2013) - Develop and approve regulations and procedures that authorize communities to engage in partnerships through leases or subleases (cessao de exploração) (June 2013) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Systematically cease distribution of free and unimproved seeds except for pre-identified staple crops in emergency situations (Nov. 2012) - Implement approved regulations governing seed proprietary laws which promote private sector investment in seed production (June 2013)
Tanzania	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - All village land in Kilombero demarcated (Aug. 2012) - All village land in SAGCOT region demarcated (June 2014) - 20% of villages in SAGCOT complete land use plans and issued certificate of occupancy (June 2016) - Instrument developed that clarifies roles of land implementing agencies in order to responsibly and transparently allocate land for investors in the SAGCOT region (Dec. 2012) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Revised Seed Act that aligns plant breeder's rights with the International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV) system. (Nov. 2012)

Source: GRAIN, 2013, Annex

Policy commitments are directly related to *localization and delocalization* processes. This includes land demarcation and certification, provision of investment land, design of regulations concerning land transfer and related procedures, promotion of long-term land leases, strengthening contract enforcement mechanisms for commercial farms, and establishment of one-window service. Issuance of regulations about *ownership and crop dissemination rights for commercial farms, provision of seed registration and certification, and standard for seed classification* directly affects seed markets. *Above all systematic abolishing of distribution of free and unimproved seed in Mozambique and the Revised Seed Act to protect the rights of plant breeders in Tanzania show the nature of the Corridor Schemes, the investments and monoculture.* Notably, these changes have to do with the local level implementation of the global initiatives and Cooperation Frameworks. In addition, with the anticipation of population dislocations some countries have developed resettlement and compensation measures for smooth *delocalization of land and resources*. With this background, it is relevant to see some characteristics of the large-scale agricultural schemes that have a bearing on local communities and spatial activities. My intention here is to show the specific actions and processes that leads to risk exportation from well-off to the poor and their transformation to harms.

There is also agricultural development corridor and zone schemes. “High-priority and high-impact” investments for the G8 and GAP are mainly those investments which fall under Agricultural Development Corridors. They are master plans for implementing agreed upon agricultural development plans. While the above list of policy commitments creates conducive investment environment, the Corridor schemes provide the physical spaces for project and institutional localization. Two justifications can be provided for the schemes; first, it reduces the problems arose due to patchy allocation of land in different places and associated infrastructural inefficiency; second, it organizes the means of production, resources, activities and infrastructures in arable land abundant regions. It also eases the production, packaging and exportation of products, delocalization of products in general.

“Some countries, like Tanzania, Mozambique and Burkina Faso, have designated specific geographical areas as agricultural corridors, connecting distant food-producing areas with ports and cities and ensuring the infrastructure is there to bring in large-scale investment” (The Economist 2013:1). The Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor (SAGCOT) in Tanzania, the

Beira Agricultural Corridor in Mozambique, Bagré Growth Pole in Burkina Faso and Ghana Commercial Agriculture Project (GCAP) in Ghana are cases in point. As public private partnership programs, they involve actors from states, international organizations and multinational corporations. SAGCOT "... combines the Tanzanian government and farmer organisations with dozens of international and domestic companies and development organisations in a 20-year programme to invest \$3bn-plus in infrastructure, create 420,000 rural jobs and produce enough food to export to region and around the world" (The Economist 2013:1). SAGCOT envision to incorporate 350,000 ha of arable land to agricultural production which is going to be disbursed through: 1. leasing of land to commercial investors, 2. contract farming, 3. out growers, farmer associations and cooperatives, and 4. individual, farmer led investment, indirectly stimulated by SAGCOT (The United Republic of Tanzania, Prime Minister's Office 2013:192). As a consequence, they may entail four potential types of impacts on communities depending on the nature of each allocation mechanisms. Furthermore, to attain its objectives SAGCOT plans four major areas of activities such as "... public investment, small and medium enterprise (SME) investments, larger-scale commercial investments, and policy reforms" (Ibid., 2013:8). The GCAP also intend:

[T]o improve the investment climate for agri-business and establish inclusive Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) aimed at increasing on-farm productivity and value addition in selected value chains in both the Accra Plains and the Savanna Accelerated Development Authority (SADA) regions. GCAP is a World Bank category A project and a Ghana EPA ESIA –mandatory undertaking (Republic of Ghana, Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2013:vi).

As category A World Bank project, GCAP is supposed to meet displacement and resettlement standards. Overall, Agricultural Corridor schemes are local level realizations of the visions that emanates from global issue-areas and cooperation. The SAGCOT environmental and social assessment report depicts this very clearly,

The programme [SAGCOT] has evolved as part of the 'Grow Africa' concept initiated by governments, the private sector and donors at the Africa World Economic Forum (WEF) in 2010, to promote coordinated public-private investment and policy reforms in key agricultural corridors around Africa. SAGCOT is the second such agriculture focused corridor in the region, the other being the Beira Agricultural Growth Corridor (BAGC) in Mozambique (The United Republic of Tanzania, Prime Minister's Office 2013:8).

Delocalization transforms internalized risks into harms. The characteristics of the intended investments to be *localized namely investment projects* highlights the replacement of existing local spaces by new spaces. The agricultural development initiatives and cooperation can be linked to the *transfer of land to foreign investors*. First and for most, the initiatives and cooperation exist due to the so-called global challenges and availability of arable land in those countries. From the outset, I have argued biofuels adopting and food important dependent countries lack arable land that they design strategies to get access in poor countries.

Salient features of the investment projects, their implications, and the displacement experiences local communities undergone due to localization of the investments provide us with clear pictures of the impacts of localization and delocalization processes on communities as they involve elimination of spaces, occupation of places, and locations. Investment characteristics such as size of acquired land, ownership, nature of contracts, types of harvested crops, access to resources, labor, displacements and resettlements demonstrate the level of localization and delocalization. They are crucial indicators for potential short and long-term harms. Table 5.2 demonstrates the various characteristics of land grab investments.

Table 5-2 Dimensions of land grabbing in Southern Africa

Dimension	Range of experiences documented
Size of investment	Focus of studies is on deals over 1000 ha; a huge variation ranging up to deals of 500,000 ha and plans of deals up to 10 million ha
Duration of investment	Short- to medium-term, but mostly long-term, as in 15–25-year (often renewable) leases, and up to 50- or 99-year leases
Source of investment	Domestic private investors, foreign private investors (both individuals and large companies), parastatals, foreign sovereign wealth funds
Commodity	Jatropha, sugar, rice, other foods, forestry, various minerals, also tourism experiences
Business model	Large commercial estates, nucleus estates without growers, out growers and processor, smallholder model
Tenure arrangements	Purchase (rare), lease, concession, illegal enclosure
Resources accessed	Land, water, minerals, marine resources, wildlife, forestry (and labor)
Lease/compensation payments	Vary according to value, the method of calculation, timing (once-off or payments repeat, e.g. annual payments) and distribution to local communities; traditional leaders; and local, district, provincial and national government
Degrees of displacement	‘Vacant’ and ‘unused’ land, claimed land, grazing land, cultivated lands, lands used for natural resource harvesting
Labor regimes	Locally hired labor, imported labor, self-employment as outgrower
Settlement	Changes in settlement (e.g. villagization), de-agrarianisation
Infrastructure	Investment in infrastructure for production, processing, transport (roads, ports), and social infrastructure (schools, clinics)

Source: Hall, 2011, Table 1

Table 5.2 lists important delocalization and localization measures that converts risks to harms. Most transferred lands are contiguous and big in size ranging from minimum size of 1,000 ha to 500,000 ha. This is in accord with the data presented in the previous chapters concerning expansion abroad. In this case, there is direct correlation between size of transferred lands and population eviction. Definitely, people living around or using the lands and resources there on will be directly or indirectly affected.

The nature of contracts is important too as it determines the transfer of land and resources rights. In most cases in Africa sale of land is very rare or do not exist instead acquisition involve leaseholding titles (Cotula 2013:37; Schoneveld 2011:13). The transfer of land use rights excludes communities from the use of resources and potential capital formation as they are kept out of land transactions. Land transfers to multinationals entail a shift in entitlement to basic livelihood resources of land, water and forest use rights from local communities to multinationals. *This is what delocalization of resources is all about. Whenever lands are transferred to multinationals individuals and communities automatically lose their use rights to resources, while multinationals acquire the rights to use the resources.* Delocalization involves two stage processes - policy and regulations, and actual transfer of rights. As I have demonstrated earlier, the various enacted land use regulations such as demarcation, certifications, resettlement policies and others as promoted by the global actors and implemented by African states aimed at executing the transfer of land use rights. In African context, this results in the transfer of not only land use rights but also multiple services that land, water and forests and other indigenous resources provide to communities. For that matter communities lose their livelihood sources.

As part of delocalization and localization process contract duration is another important indicator of risk exportation and internalization. Contracts vary from country to country and also from project to project within same country. “Short- to medium-term, but mostly long-term, as in 15–25-year (often renewable) leases, and up to 50- or 99-year leases” (Hall 2011:203) are common. Another study lists contracts ranging from 20 to 99 years; including in Ethiopia 25-50 years, in Ghana 50 years and 99 years for domestic investors, in Liberia ranges from 23-60 years, in Mali 30 to 50 years, in Mozambique 50 years, in Serra Leone 50 years and 99 years for domestic, in Tanzania 99 years, but for biofuels up to 25 years, and in Zambia up to 99 years (Schoneveld 2011:14). Contracts may start with performance conditions

whereby they remain binding until companies comply with certain preconditions in the first few years of project operation. Long term contracts effectively alienate communities from land for generations to come and guarantee long term project and institutional localization.

Land lease contracts may contain issues including contract duration, land size, types of crops to be cultivated, scope of resource utilization, infrastructure, security and others. As an example, in 2010 the government of Ethiopia, through its Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, and an Indian company Karuturi Agro Products Plc. signed a 50 year contract, with possible renewal (see: <https://www.oaklandinstitute.org/sites/oaklandinstitute.org/files/Karuturi-Agreement.pdf>). The contract bestows land and resources use right to the company over 100,000 ha (extendable to 300,000 ha) of land in the Gambella Regional State, Nuer Zone, Jikao District and Itang Special District. The contract states that the company should start to develop the land within the first six months. The 50,000 ha should be developed within one year time and by the end of the second year the 100,000 ha has to be fully developed. Then the company may acquire additional 200,000 ha of land. The predetermined crops to be cultivated include main crop palm, cereals and pulses, states the contract. The scope of use rights includes the right to use ground and river waters for irrigation and other purposes the company needs for its operation. If need arise, it may clear trees from the field. Moreover, it can erect infrastructures necessary for its operation like dams, roads, bridges, water bores, fuel/power supply out lets, health dispensaries, and educational facilities, at the discretion of the company. There is no mention of community access to the infrastructures, as such they are assumed to be constructed for the use of the company and its employees. Such contract agreements demonstrate the scope and content of localization of the project on the place and location it occupies, and also alienation of communities and resource delocalization.

To ensure the continuity of the project, the contract further provides security measures to be taken by the government. Article 6.1. of the contract dictates “the lessor shall be obliged to deliver and hand over the vacant possession of leased land free of impediments to the lessee with thirty (30) days from the execution of this land Lease agreement” (Ibid.). This specific article refers to preparation and handover of land to the lessee. Article 6.6. of the same went further to security issues by stating:

The lessor shall ensure during the period of lease, Lessee shall enjoy peaceful and trouble free possession of all the premises and it shall be

provided adequate security, free of cost, for carrying out its entire activities in the said premises, against any riot, disturbance or any other turbulent time other than force majeure, as and when requested by Lessee (see: <https://www.oaklandinstitute.org/sites/oaklandinstitute.org/files/Karuturi-Agreement.pdf>).

This suggests the inherent problems associated with *localization and delocalization processes*. Hence, it can be assumed community members that unfairly lost their land are considered as security threat to the project. Such security arrangement confirms existential sustainability challenges to projects. As it is explicitly mentioned, riots and disturbances are anticipated from disgruntled locals.

Investment model also determine impacts on communities. Various models generate different impacts depending on whether it *displace, dispossess or integrate* communities into the industrial agricultural production system. For example, three investment models are adopted in Tanzania including “1. large scale plantations – whereby biofuel companies control all aspects of production and processing, 2. contract farmers and independent suppliers – whereby biofuel companies enter into contracts with local farmers, 3. hybrid models – which combine production from large plantations and small-scale farmers” (Sulle & Nelson 2009:24).

The first model entails *occupation of places and locations, and creation of new spaces* with high probability of eliminating existing spaces due to the control over places and locations. On the other hand, the second model may involve less displacement and dispossession risks mainly because multinationals sign contract with farmers to produce specific types of products with predefined standards. However, it has its own drawbacks. Farmers might be forced to allocate their land for predefined crops. It may also displace locally needed crops and seeds as they may be forced to use supplies from multinationals, particularly monocultures. In that case, the probability of reduction on the availability of food in local markets will be high. This has to do with the commitment states have made and the regulations enacted to implement the Cooperation Frameworks. It has been mentioned above that necessary regulations concerning seed production and dissemination rights and ownership are already in place as a precondition for executing the Cooperation Frameworks. The third model combines the other two. In this case, multinationals acquire certain lands and they incorporate neighboring farmers through contract farming and out grower schemes whereby multinationals supply seeds, fertilizers, and

other important supplements. Multinationals may use acquired lands to produce and disseminate seeds to farmers. It has to be recalled that the policy commitments, for instance in Mozambique and Tanzania, prohibit free exchange of un-improved seeds so that farmers rely on suppliers. This may generate the same consequences as the other two models. Therefore, these processes may lead to population displacement, dispossessions, control of farming activities and products, and shift in spatial practices. All in all, the plans, agreements, and investment characteristics indicate the extent of localization and delocalization processes. These processes make African countries institutionalize major changes and internalize exported risks. They are precedents to harms experienced by local communities. The next level of discussion addresses major harms realized and experienced by local communities due to localization and delocalization processes.

5.2 The Making of Harm

Actualized risk or harm is the major issue that trigger correlative obligation. In the above discussions, I tried to show the necessary and sufficient conditions that internalize potential risks. These conditions are the global common issue-areas and global cooperation organized around them, the specific interventions, and localization and delocalization processes. Harm is inevitable once these conditions are fulfilled. In this regard, I argue that harms generated due to these conditions are risks exported from well-off societies. In other words, these harms occur due to externally imposed conditions than internal conditions. Equally important is that those harms would not exist, if those conditions were not imposed. African states internalize them by changing their policies and regulations in a way that open access to land to multinationals as a result of which the poor experience the harms in their daily life. Accordingly, hereunder, I demonstrate the specific types of harms or instance of risks that arose due to the externally imposed conditions. I do that by illustrating local level changes occurred including land use pattern changes, displacement induced impoverishments, elimination of spaces, foreseeability of risks, and issues related with continuity of those changes.

5.2.1 Land Use and Cover Changes

Land use and cover changes are the first and major changes that occur on acquired lands. At the core of these change lie impacts on spaces and spatial activities. First and foremost, occupation of land by multinationals alter the purpose of land use and resource utilizations.

The characteristics of large-scale industrial agriculture are different from that of small and subsistence farmers and pastoralist communities. The means of productions and inputs used in the production processes and the type of products are completely different. For local communities, land and its surrounding areas represent a *space* composed of *places and locations* where life experiences are learned and spatial practices are conducted. For multinationals, the new spaces represent only production places. Their life experiences are not dependent on the land and its surroundings. *Their life experiences and world views are that of their countries of origin which is detached from the production places.* Their spaces take global dimension of which occupied lands are tiny parts but play significant role. The services wanted from those lands are to organize labor, inputs and produce crops. However, the changing purpose and role of land either evict communities or incorporate communities to the new production system through contract and out grower farming schemes depending on project plans. Shifting role of land due to occupation of space, places and locations brings parallel impacts on community’s spatial practices. Therefore, population displacements and dispossessions should be looked in line with the wider shift in the role of land and space.

In order to understand the level of expansion abroad, change in land use patterns has to be properly understood. Changing purpose of land use has direct relation to *intentionality* of population eviction and the production of crops well-off societies badly needed. Figure 5.1 illustrates land use changes land grab entail which “... give us a better idea on how and why changes in land use occur, and with what effects for those who use it. It brings in important dynamics missing from the dominant land grab narrative, and enables us to situate our analysis of land-use changes in the latest wave of capitalist penetration of the countryside of the world” (Borras Jr. & Franco 2012:38-39).

Fig. 5-1 The main directions of land-use today

Type A: Food to food	Type B: Food to biofuel
Type C: Non-food to food	Type D: Non-food to biofuel

Source: Borras Jr. & Franco, 2012, Fig. 1

Fig. 5.1 demonstrates four types of potential land use changes due to land grab. Both Type A and B represent changes on previous lands used for food productions. Land was used to

produce crops for local consumption, national or in some cases export markets. Predominantly rural lands are used for subsistence consumptions and local markets. After transfer of the land, Type A land is used for food production, while Type B is used for biofuels crops production. In case of A the purposes of land remain the same, but in the case of B we see a change. In the context of land grab, the aims of the products change too, from local consumption to export to multinationals originating countries.

On the other hand, before transfer, Type C and D lands were used for non-food purposes. This may include forests, grazing lands, ceremonial places, burial grounds, crossing roads, fallow lands and others. These services are vital local livelihood bases representing spatial practices. Type C lands are converted to food production, while Type D lands changed to biofuels crops production. In that case, the purposes of resource and land uses alter as well. Likewise, the products are meant for exporting out of the host countries alienating local communities not only from the land and associated services but also from use of the new products too.

Multiple concerns are associated with these changes. Replacement of existing spaces by new ones validate the original assumptions about the nature and purposes of localization and delocalization processes. In other words, they are in line with the aims and objectives of the global and national actors reflected on the various Cooperation Agreements and national agricultural development plans. Notably, they are in congruent with the global issue-areas around which the world organized, subsequent interventions, and the purposes and conducts of the amalgamated institutions and initiatives discussed in the previous chapters.

A very important point here is that in the cases of Type A and B multinationals acquire food productive lands than unproductive lands. For that reason, it can be argued that communities have lost their livelihood capability while that capability is acquired by affluent societies. In terms of spatial practices unlike local communities, large scale industrial agricultures produce single or few multiple crops employing various inputs. Particularly, monocultures control the agricultural fields in the occupied lands. Local production systems, spatial activities, and other services those lands used to provide are effectively *delocalized or displaced*. The concerns on Type C and D relate to *dispossession* of resources and deforestations. Multinationals acquire important life sustaining resources with severe impacts on local communities. Forests are

destroyed to give way to industrial agriculture. For instance, the lease agreement signed between the government of Ethiopia and Karuturi Agro Products Plc. permit the company to cut down forests, if need arise. Likewise, grazing lands are incorporated into industrial agriculture to the detriments of local communities. Particularly Type C and D have paramount consequences related to economic, social and cultural practices as the spaces used for different spatial activities are dispossessed. In general, these four categories of land use changes demonstrate changes on spaces, spatial activities and the purpose and direction of land use changes. Naturally, this entails multifaceted risks to local communities. The next section will present exported risks or actualized harms.

5.2.2 Population Evictions and Instances of Harms


In juxtaposition to land use changes, *localization and delocalization processes* cause population displacement and dispossessions. Though, land grab is a real phenomenon its impacts on eviction are not yet properly researched. In fact, it is difficult to find the exact number of displaced and dispossessed people due to agricultural investments in Africa (Cotula 2013:127). Sensitivity of the issue and lack of empirical researches on this regard make it hard to come up with a comprehensive data. However, based on existing empirical data I estimate 14 million directly affected people in Africa due to occupation of more than 56.2 million ha of land.¹⁷ *Three considerations* have been taken to substantiate this fact; firstly, change in land use patterns of acquired lands; secondly, environmental and social impact assessments of planned programs, and involuntary population resettlement plans; and thirdly, sample cases from existing reports on displacement and dispossession. The first two ascertain foreseeability and immanency of evictions, the third one shows life experiences of displacements.

As described above, incoming investment projects occupy local spaces, certain places, and locations changing previous land use patterns. If former land use patterns are replaced with new forms, former land users are therefore replaced by new land right holders. *Thus, this leads to a legitimate question of what happened to the original land users.* The answer to this question is either eviction or dispossession. For instance, Fig. 5.2 shows former land use patterns of 82 studied projects. From the 82 transferred lands 56 (68,29 %) were used for small holder agriculture, 16 (19,51 %) for common pool, 7 (8,53 %) for forest and conservation, and

¹⁷ For detail of this estimation see Chapter Three, page 101.

3 (3,65 %) for commercial agricultural purposes. Majority of the transferred lands were used for smallholders farming. Common pool lands are those lands community members commonly share for purposes such as animal grazing and others. Communities also used to benefit from forest services. Some communities use forests for income generation as they collect and sale wood and charcoals and also produce furnitures. This is in congruent with the four types of land use changes we saw earlier. Fig. 5.1 and 5.2 can be combined to make the case stronger. In that case, small holder agriculture (56 projects) and commercial agricultures (3 projects) could fall under Type A and Type B land use changes, while common pool (16 projects) and forest/conservations (7 projects) can respectively fall under Type C and D. The combination of Fig. 5.1 and 5.2 provide strong evidence for the occurrence of eviction and dispossession.

Fig. 5-2 Former land use




Source: Anseeuw, et al., 2012, Fig. 23

The design of resettlement framework is another indicator of population displacement and dispossession. From planning point of view displacements are known to land grab actors, both national and global. As planners, designers of those plans have designed various mechanisms aimed at mitigating potential risks, regardless of their effectiveness. The existence of such mechanism by itself confirm knowledge of the planners about the risks of displacement in advance. Cases in point include the governments of Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, Tanzania and Mozambique designed a Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF) with the anticipation of involuntary dislocations. Those RPFs aimed at people who are targeted for resettlement, hence they are evidence for their knowledge in advance. The underlining idea here is the intended purposes of the frameworks and their target groups. If there is an RPF, population displacement is well known in advance. The target groups of the framework are potential would be *displaced*

people who live in targeted lands; therefore, these people could be taken for granted as displaced people since the resettlement policies themselves recognize them. To put this into the context of risk, RPFs indicate potential risks and risk groups in advance. This point serves to illustrate the fourth requirement of harm that Pogge set, namely *foreseeability*.

Another important issue is whether localization and delocalization, or harms of displacement, are actualized or not, by looking at the first requirement of harms namely *human rights deficits* set by Pogge. This leads to the third justification, quantified displacement cases. Existing few reports show population eviction in different countries and locations. We have a study conducted on 40 projects with reported cases of displacements (Anseeuw, et al., 2012; see also Schoneveld, 2011). Though, the report covers projects all over the world, the share of Africa is assumed to be high due to the high percentage of projects in Africa compared to other continents, according to the same report. About 70% of the investments are located in 11 countries, 7 of which are in Africa; and half of the top 10 investment target countries are from Africa (Anseeuw, et al., 2012:vii). Countries such as Ethiopia, Ghana, Mozambique, and Tanzania are among the top investment target countries and at the same time they participate in initiative such as the GAP and NAFSN. Fig. 5.3 show displacement cases.

Fig. 5-3 Number of projects with reported evictions



Source: Anseeuw, et al., 2012, Fig. 26

Fig. 5.3 can be substantiated with two other considerations - population density of targeted locations and size of acquired lands. The larger the size of acquired land and the higher the density of population suggests high probability of risks of displacement and dispossession.

Global actors have been promoting investments on land with population density of less than 25 persons per km² (Deininger, et al., 2011:77). And yet, “conversely – and probably more importantly – more than 60% of all land deals target areas with population densities of more than 25 persons per km²” (Anseeuw, et al., 2012:20). In that case, 60% of the investment projects evict at least 25 persons. Using this basic data, it is possible to estimate the number of dislocated and dispossessed persons. A total of 56.2 million ha of land has already been leased out in Africa which is equivalent to 562,000 km². If population density of 25 persons per km² is considered for land acquisition, then 14,050,000 people are evicted from their land in Africa.

Concerning the size of acquired land, from 353 projects in Africa, the size of 53 projects is more than 100,000 ha. The mean and median size of the projects respectively measured at 50,856 ha and 18,512 ha. That means, 176 projects are measured at more than 18,512 ha. Since the minimum land size examined is 2000 ha, it can be argued that majority of the projects are measured at more than 10,000 ha suggesting high probability of population displacements (Schoneveld 2011:4). This can be further validated, if analysis is made in combination with the data presented in Figure 5.3 above. The Figure shows that only 15 projects out of the 40 evicted less than 999 people and 5 projects displaced between 1,000 – 2,499 people. While 4 projects dislocated 2,500 – 4,999 people, another 6 and 10 projects respectively dislocated 5,000 – 10,000 people and more than 10,000 people. This covers only evicted people. The number of affected people could be much higher if those dispossessed are considered.

In this regard, both the numbers and instances of harms experienced by displaced persons are important for the discussion on duty to distant others. The numbers show the magnitude of affected persons, while the later demonstrates the level and severity of harms in relation to global distribution of benefits and burdens. Recall my quote at the beginning of the previous and this chapter. In the previous chapter, the Tanzanian symbolizes the global and national or local actors by snake and crocodile. His life is restricted within the space between the two deadly animals that he cannot move either up or downwards. At the opening of this chapter I quoted the words of Martin Heidegger that compares modern agricultural system with various ways of mass killings. Likewise, the impoverishment experience of millions of displaced persons is the result of the global system whereby distant others act closer. The interventions of large-scale agricultural production pushes millions of people into the margins of hunger and

elimination, but they are still invisible from mainstream agendas. Surprisingly, many consider such people as failed by themselves.

Now let us see *harms of impoverishment or actualized risks*. In relation to this, once the existence of displacement and dispossession is proved, the next step of examination would be the experiences of affected people. What happen to land grab affected persons (LGAPs)? What happen to their social, economic, cultural, livelihood, and political life? *The experiences of harms, in this case, can be seen within three interrelated displacement phases namely before, during and after displacements, each entailing interrelated risks and harms*. Fear of displacement and ensuing risks characterize the situations before displacement which is associated with lack of full information on displacement processes and livelihood recovery packages. During the occurrence of displacement communities remain in limbo condition suspending their daily spatial practices until they settle. At this stage, availability of livelihood recovery packages determines the level of realization of risks. The earlier the rehabilitation processes started, the lesser the risks. However, various empirical reports suggest lack of comprehensive rehabilitation measures though states design RPF. For instance, existing specific data from few countries reflect instances of eviction and dispossessions. Among others the California based OI has conducted country specific researches in many countries. HRW also published reports on Ethiopia too (HRW, 2012). In its 2011 country report on Ethiopia, the OI states:

On a 3,000 ha domestic site in Benishangul, the investor told OI that there were numerous farmers with plots on his land (both indigenous Gumuz and Highlanders) and that none had been displaced. As a result, he had only cleared 300 ha so far. However, there is increasing hostility between the farmers and the investor. The woreda [woreda is one level higher from the lower local level administrative structure in Ethiopia] has therefore pledged to “demarcate” his land and relocate the farmers (Oakland Institute, 2011a:44).

This highlights the contentions between the investor and communities as a result of which only 300 ha out of the 3,000 ha could be cultivated. According to this statement the investor should have cultivated the 3000 ha, but because the farmers are not willing to handover their land only 300 ha can be made available for cultivation. However, the investor still expects the administration to vacate the community. This is a typical case for pre-displacement phase.

Though the investor knows his land, from the administration, communities are not willing to allow project expansion beyond 300 ha. The intervention, i.e. land *demarcation*, by the Wereda administration will definitely solve the situation to the benefit of the investor. The same report also lists similar incidents in Bako, Oromia Regional State, where Karuturi Agro Products Plc. farm acquired 10,000 ha. In Gambella Regional State indigenous people such as the Annua, Nuer and others have lost their land, according to the report. In this region “[s]ome farm land, either currently under cultivation or part of shifting cultivation techniques, has been lost in all of the large land investment areas visited by OI (>1,000 ha)” (Oakland Institute, 2011a:44). As it has been elaborated earlier, land used by indigenous people is more targeted because of several reasons including: suitability of the lands, availability of water resources, and the nature of land use patterns like pastoralist, shifting, flood and retreat cultivations. The following case from Kisarawe district in Tanzania shows the experiences of dispossessed communities because of land grabbing by a UK based SunBiofuels Company.

Dispossession Case: SunBiofuels Company in Kisarawe District, Tanzania¹⁸

A UK based SunBiofuels had a presence in Kisarawe district in Tanzania. According to the narratives of community representatives, their first contact with the company was during the time when representatives from the company and district officers appeared for community sensitization to each of the 10 villages. Accordingly, they explained to community members about the intended project and its benefits to them. Finally, they were asked to handover the village land to the investor. In return the investor promised to create jobs and construct social services such as water, schools, health stations, feeder roads, open small businesses and others. The community representatives asserted that the first meeting was concluded without consensus. Then after, the company representatives and district officers were never seen again for a long time. After sometimes, the company representatives came with certain surveyors to demarcate the land. Since then the community learned that the investor has finalized the negotiation with government representatives, without their full consensus.

The investor took 9000 ha of land, which was under *village* land title. The company used the land for *Jatropha* plantation to produce biofuels. The land was used by 10 surrounding villages for various purposes. Few villagers were compensated for trees and other crops they planted. Estimation was made by the surveyors. Villagers were neither asked nor involved in the estimations. Community members still complain about the compensation as they were not fully paid. A total of 840,000,000 TS was earmarked for compensation, from which 290,000 TS disbursed to 152 villagers. The remaining was paid to the administration. This was done

¹⁸ This case is compiled to depict dispossession experiences. I compiled the case based on the stories told by community representatives in Kisarawe district, Tanzania, during a one day excursion I participated on 09.09.13. The excursion was arranged as part of an international conference 'Land Justice for Sustainable Peace in Tanzania' organized by SEKOMU in collaboration with the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Tanzania, Sept. 09 - 13, 2013.

in 2007-2008 when the project started its operation. Following this, community representatives went to the concerned ministries for complaining, but they received no satisfactory responses. They went to the Tanzanian Investment Commission, Land Commission, and Municipal Councils. Finally, they learned seriousness of land grab from the Kisarawe district Members of Parliaments themselves. Since then they start to follow the case seriously.

The villagers also complain about unfulfilled promises. The promised employment opportunities were not as to their expectation. Only manual and seasonal labour were available. Good jobs were given to others who came from outside of Kisarawe district and also to the relatives of administrators. The salary was not sufficient to sustain families. As villagers lost access to vital land, used for various purposes like grazing, firewood, charcoal, water source and others, they are still exposed to food insecurity. Crossing roads are blocked disconnecting neighboring villages. And promised services are not realized.

Community representatives also complain about health problems. They recall that the company brought physicians to conduct medical examination of the workers without giving any explanations. And yet, the result was not declared. Afterwards, some workers were laid-off which the community suspect because of the result of the medical examination. Probably they might be ill. In fact, some workers were sick. A woman told to the participants of the excursion that her husband is still suffering from wounds. She suspects that the spray or chemicals used for the *Jatropha* plantation might cause his illness. The community representatives claim that some of the workers were ill and died before the plantation stops its operation. Still people are dying for reasons the community members do not know. Something special is happening compared to the time before the arrival of the SunBiofuels company.

Furthermore, one community representative from Killoso village in Kisarawe district claim that 'this land is given to us from God.' He was born and still live there. The communal land that he used to make use of is now gone, debilitating his livelihood. Another community representative from Morogoro village added that pastoralists are told to reduce their cattle in the name of environmental protections. As a pastoralist, cattle are their property and life that they cannot live without them, according to him.

For reasons unknown to the villagers the company stopped its operation. The land which was taken from the villagers has never been returned to them which is still left barren. The *Jatropha* plants are seen in the field. The villagers are concerned about the ownership of the land even after the company quits its operation. The government is also reluctant to return the land to its original right holders.

These kind of life experiences of affected people need to be looked at seriously. First and foremost, the *life experiences* of displaced and dispossessed people through the lenses of delocalization. Impoverishment risks involve different risk instances depending on the context


it occurs. After examining the experiences of displaced people due to WB funded development projects Michael Cernea came up with at least *eight potential impoverishment risks of displacements including landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, marginalization, food insecurity, increased morbidity and mortality, loss of access to common property resources, and community disarticulation* (Cernea & McDowell 2000:20). These are just potential risks communities fear before displacement phase and those risk may be actualized during and after displacement. Other risks could occur depending on the nature of projects, and the social and political context it takes place. Such experiences are complicated as they are related to social, economic, psychological, cultural, political and other aspects. Coupled with loss of power to control the space, places, and locations used to sustain their ways of life and livelihoods, land grab impoverishment risks could be much complicated. In addition, the larger the size of acquired land, the higher the probability of smaller ethnic groups to be displaced as a whole endangering their whole life and indigenous knowledges.

It has been confirmed that displacement and dispossession experiences are the upshots of *localization of transnational investments and delocalization of land and resources*. Localization and delocalization processes dismantle the livelihood bases of affected people who depend on land, water, grassland, forests and other resources for their survival. Because these resources are delocalized, former right holders are effectively alienated from using them. In turn transnational investments acquire the same resources which were used by communities. Although, there are arguments concerning provision of replacement lands and resettlement programs, replaced lands are not as good as previous lands and lack essential livelihood resources. In fact, these lands are targeted due to their quality and resourcefulness. Besides, displaced persons cannot successfully rehabilitate with a single measure of land replacement or meager amount of financial compensation. For that matter, one can raise a moral issue which is the reason a person should be dislocated, in the first place.

Cernea demonstrates the economic impacts of displacements with Fig. 5.4. Line *NR* (normal curve with no displacement) represents income growth and asset accumulation at normal circumstances, before displacement. Point *D* at time *t* illustrates the occurrence of displacement and sudden fall of income and asset accumulation which is represented by the downward arrow *D-DI*. Then followed by *adjustment or transition period DI-t*. During adjustment period, income and asset accumulation remain lower than before displacement or point *D*. Adjustment

period is very important as displaced people potentially experience multiple interrelated harms of landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, marginalization, food insecurity, increased morbidity, loss of access to common property resources, community disarticulation and others. Though, Fig 5.4. illustrates the decline of income, other risks persist until they are fully recovered. For displaced and dispossessed persons, income recovery is determined by other risk variables too. For instance, a displaced family may lose a home, experience reduction in number of cattle, lose farming activities, separate from neighbors and relatives due to increased distance of new resettlement sites and blocked roads, lose important forest areas where they collect firewood, charcoal, wild fruit, honey, and others. Combined effects of all these loses contribute to the decline of economic activities and income. Informal social networks are also very important for villagers as they exchange various commodities and labor during farming seasons and other activities. As such, adjustment period is crucial for displaced people as it determines severity of the problems and duration of recovery. It is also vital for the discussion under consideration, examination of the level of harms too. That is why it is argued that compensation and land replacement may not guarantee livelihood rehabilitation and should not be considered as full conducts of justice.

Fig. 5-4 Re-settlers' Income Curve During Displacement and Relocation



Source: Cernea 1995, Fig. 1

The next important point is time $t+n$ where recovery starts. It is determined by rehabilitation packages, obligation of the actors to *respect, protect, and fulfill* the rights of affected persons. Displaced persons may attain income level C on line NR, represented by the arrow R, only if *necessary and sufficient* rehabilitation packages arranged in advance. Else they remain

struggling by themselves as represented by the arrow A-R1. *Incidents of harms and human right violations at this point generate correlative obligation of the actors.* At this juncture *land grab actors violate the economic, social, cultural, political and other rights of displaced persons.* As long as livelihood recovery mechanisms lack comprehensiveness, the actors should be obligated for the multifaceted harms they engendered. *And the obligation should include recovery of income at least to the pre-displacement level NR and also include social services addressing the social, residential, cultural, environmental and other needs in a sustainable manner.*

The experiences of land grab induced displaced persons demonstrate lack of necessary and sufficient rehabilitation packages. Instead we observe limited amount of compensation, resettlement efforts and land replacements. As a result, “as subsistence farming is the foundation of many developing country communities, land grabs could restrict people’s access to vital resources and plunge already poor populations further into poverty” (Stephens 2011:2). For instance, affected person in Mozambique says “now I don’t know what is better, but I would prefer things to be as they were, at least then I had my farm, I planted what I could and never went hungry. Now I can’t cultivate, when I try to farm in another area they tell me to leave. I don’t know where to farm and because of this project my children and I go hungry” (Matavel & Cabanelas 2011:41). From this we can note that he is found at an *adjustment period* and he is explaining about lack of proper recovery packages. He compares his before and after displacement situations. Previously, his family never go hungry because he owns a farm, cultivate, produce and feed his family. But, after *localization of the project and delocalization of land and resources* he lost his farm and hunger start to visit the family. *Most importantly, he is not only telling us his status of landlessness but also lose of spaces in general, that he is told not to farm here or there.* He has no place to continue his former way of life. As a farmer, he was self-employed but now he neither farm nor employed in the new project. In that case, people like him encounter with multiple harms and perpetual risks of landlessness, joblessness, food insecurity, marginalization and others. In other words, the *capability* of such people is reduced by investment projects. *Ultimately, he is challenging the motives of the global order. The challenge is that how can localization of investment projects, and delocalization of land and resources make him better off, while they actually made him worse off? So, what is the fate of the people whose basic rights are violated?*

Similar experiences exist in other countries too. In 2009 Sithe Global Sustainable Oil Cameroon (SGSOC), a subsidiary of a US based company called Herakles Farms, signed an agreement with the government to acquire 73,000 ha land in the South-West of the country for palm oil plantation (see: Herakles Debacle). The area is known for its forest resources and cash crop plants on which farmers and cooperatives rely for their survival. The company cleared 100 ha of forest for nursery purposes without direct authorization of concerned ministry and authorities, and also together with the Chief of Security of the Manyemen village demarcated the land without participation of the community. According to the Chief of Security, the company's representatives and himself entered the forests and farms for demarcation, without the knowledge of the villagers. He further elaborates that they did not have any permission to calculate demarcations, which is against the national law. He also confirms dissatisfaction of the villagers. Furthermore, most of the villagers would like the company to get out their area.

Most importantly, the economic benefits they could get from the company would be detrimental compared to their cash crops farming. Standing inside her farm, a cassava CIG member at Ntala village bitterly argues:

This is my cassava farm, it is our group farm. We are ten in numbers. Then why should I need SGSOC to come in our land? I sell my cassava, one basing is 12,000 Franc (\$22.96) for gari, a bag of water fufu is 10,000 Franc (\$19.13). So, we have everything in our village: cassava, cocoa farm, palm oil, mace, bush mango that we sell, kola nuts, bita kola. We don't have only one thing in our land we have so many things that give us money. So, we don't need people to come and disturb us. [She took a cassava plant and describe] This is a nine months cassava, so how we say we are suffering; we are not suffering in our land. We use cassava to make miondo, we use cassava to make gari. Water fufu, then why should you say we are suffering? If you don't eat gari, you eat miondo; if you don't eat miondo, you eat coumcoum; if you don't eat coumcoum, you will buy the cassava itself. Then why should you say we are hungry, we don't need you (Ibid.).

The attitude of this woman is that she is better off without the presence of the company. Hence, the interventions the global order designed and implemented is counter to the interest of the communities. Interestingly, she listed the type of plants and variety of food she got from her farm. She is also confident about her *capability and flexibility* to handle her economic and livelihood strategies. That is why *she emphasized* “we don't need people to come and disturb us”. *Localization* of the project is ‘disturbance’ to her life. *This is a very important point in the*

context of the duty to distant others, global justice, meaning that disturbing and harming the life of a decent person in distant land. As I elaborated in the previous chapters the assumptions taken to estimate 'unused' land is not realistic (Bruinsma 2009). Besides, poorness does not necessarily mean inactive and incapable of changing one's life circumstances. Above all, the assumption that the poor merely waits for the help of the affluent is untenable. On the contrary, what the woman argues is that they do not want the affluent to come to their community for disturbing their life circumstance.

Furthermore, the president of Nature Cameroon also argues that “what is outrageous to me is how do you pay \$0.5 per ha. of land. I think the local people themselves in my village can earn more than 20,000 Franc (\$37.54) per kg or more than 100,000 Franc (\$187.70) per ha. of land of cocoa cultivation.” Similarly, a young farmer, a member of small co-operative in Ekita village, explains how his income could drop if the government of Cameroon proceed with the *localization* of the project. He argues:

I am telling like this, this farm you see like this is about 5 ha. I will harvest about 15 bags of cocoa from here, which we use to sell our buyers from here. A bag of cocoa is about 68,000 Franc to 70,000 Franc (\$131.39), about 1,233,00 Franc that we get every year (\$2,314), if we do out deductions of chemicals that is our own surplus that we usually have. But I read a document that says for this 5 ha. of land that I will get about 15 bags of cocoa going to 1,233,000 Francs, I have read that document saying SGSOC will pay 500 Franc (\$1) to 250 Franc (\$0.5) per ha. of cultivated land. I am wondering how you can pay somebody's farm worth a million, you pay only about 1,500 Franc to the government (see: Herakles Debacle).

It seems local communities in this Cameroonian village are much more capable of *articulating their interest and choice than the global actors including their government. This man is providing us with a cost benefit analysis that most African states and global actors never express in terms of land grab.* I have never come across any cost benefit analysis on the benefits of local communities presented by global actors except documents listing the state of poverty and availability of “unused” land. In contrast this farmer articulates his benefits and costs which is a basic decision-making process. He can give his land only if the benefits he earns from land transfer are higher than his costs.

He argues that as a self-employed farmer and land owner he earns more than \$ 2,314 per year from the five ha of land, and yet the government is leasing that same land for about \$ 2.5. *Like*

the woman presented earlier, this farmer is also challenging that how can he be better off with the project taking his land and even how can the government improve his life while receiving only \$ 2.5 for same 5 ha land compared to what he is getting at the moment. Significantly, which social services are the government going to provide collecting \$ 0.5 per ha. If we analyze his argument based on Fig. 5.4, in order to give up his land to the investor, being other things constant, this man needs to earn at least \$ 2,314 per year from alternative means of livelihoods so that his income remains as the same as pre-displacement, line NR. Else, his income falls to point D and then D1-A, then after either A-R if sufficient and necessary rehabilitation packages exist or A-R1. This is only where income is concerned. But there may be other risks such as homelessness, joblessness, food insecurity, loss of access to resources, community disarticulation and others. Based on this reality, it can be argued that incoming investments could not provide alternative livelihoods capable of replacing pre-displacement level of income and other needs of displaced persons. This is a typical case of risk exportation. Because, investors and their states do their own cost benefits analysis and negotiate in a way that maximize their benefits and minimize their costs. This is similar to what Pogge calls protective barriers and resource privileges. Though Pogge showed us the global and national level operations, the same happens at local level too, even individuals have no right to negotiate on issues concerning their life circumstances when it comes to trans-border issues like land grab investments.

Though, this person is found at pre-displacement phase, he is disturbed about the possibility of displacement. Because of the demarcations conducted, other villagers and himself are afraid of about their future. He said "...but now they have just started doing their painting and putting on their pegs in people farms, passing their line wherever they feel as to do. I do pray that the government looks into this, that the future generation of Ekita, and not only Ekita, but Nguti subdivision as a whole, they should grow up and see what is known as a forest" (see: Herakles Debacle). Another young farmer from Ekita village complains about the same issue. He claims, he inherited the land from his deceased father. But the demarcation disturbed him too. He said:

SGSOC has already given me a boundary that I cannot pass. As you can see, this is my farm that people come and give me limit, a point that I shouldn't cross. This number is 1,200. The day they come to do this thing I was not around I was not inside the farm. Now they want to come and ground it and do not give me anything, I don't know how I will keep myself, and I have my mother, my children, my brother, and my sister, my cousin with me.

Like others, this person is expressing lack of participation of right holders in the process of land demarcation, as a result of which he is worried about loss of his land and the fate of his extended family. Lack of participation and transparency is common in majority of land grab displacement and dispossession cases. I have shown with cases from Ethiopia, Mozambique, Tanzania, Cameroon and other countries.

Employment opportunity is one of the main promises of agricultural investments that land grab actors promote. Empirical observations however depict the contrary. First, the notion of job creation by itself is not tenable, if it is about the creation of *new jobs* communities are already self-employed agriculturalists or pastoralists. Hence, any employment the investments provide them with is not new, rather it is a shift to laborer from self-employment. Second, the employment opportunities as daily laborer does not guarantee sustainable livelihood. The amount they earn is not comparable to their former agricultural activities. In most cases communities complain about the number, type and seasonality of employments. The case in Mozambique shows the following:

The eucalyptus plantations are known to be low maintenance and the provision of work is also temporary or seasonal, if there is no mechanization. However, in the area of Nipiode, Ntacia did not take advantage of the local manpower in the first few years, as of 2008, instead admitting workers from other areas. The company representative admitted that it was a big mistake and has officially confirmed that Ntacia is changing its policy accordingly (Matavel & Cabanelas 2011:48).

Another study conducted in Ethiopia indicate limited job opportunities:

The findings indicate that 31% of the respondents got work directly on the farm while the remaining did not. In addition, 21% said that their household member(s) got the opportunity to work in the farm and the remaining 79%, said they did not. The job type is mainly as a casual laborer form and is temporary and seasonal in nature. When we analyze the respondents, who got the chance to work on the farm (45 households), 43 households were employed for temporary/casual laborer work and two of them received a contractual job opportunity (Gobena 2010:34-35).

In this sense, displaced and dispossessed people strive to sustain their life with limited seasonal job opportunities? Again, if we analyze this in light of Fig. 5.4 even those family members who got job opportunities cannot easily catch up point C on line NR from A. So, they remain on line A-R1 which is impoverishment. In fact, this kind of employment is not comparable to pre-displacement phase and is not appropriate to the adjustment phase too. In order to maintain the income of displaced persons, incomes from the new jobs and alternative sources should be equal to the amount he earns before displacement and that amount has to continue for many years as they do not have other sources. Otherwise, they will fall into poverty trap prolonging rehabilitation period. Similar cases are also reported by study conducted in the Benishangul-Gumuz, Afar, Somalia and SNNPR Regional states in Ethiopia:

In one case, according to an official in Benishangul-Gumuz, local people destroyed the crops of an investment project because they were angry about the lack of employment opportunities. In some cases, local people are more likely to get on-going work, such as weeding, and labour is brought in for harvesting periods. Officials in Benishangul-Gumuz were very aware of local regulations that jobs should go to people from the region, unless there is no demand or availability of labor. In Afar, interviews suggested that local people were rarely employed on farm projects (Keeley, et al., 2014:41).

The amount of wages and working conditions discourage people from taking advantage of available job opportunities. “In some cases, wages on farms are considered too low. In a case study in Somalia region, local people felt wages were unreasonable and even tried to block outside workers from coming to the farm site” (Ibid., 42). In the Southern Nations and Nationalities Peoples Region (SNNPR) of Ethiopia

People are also sometimes unwilling to take up jobs because of difficulties travelling to the farm location, or because of a lack of services like clinics in these areas. Communities interviewed at an investment site in SNNPR also complained of a lack of temporary insurance to cover the costs of accidents. Concern about absence of contracts was also expressed in interviews (Ibid).

This is similar to the above case in Tanzania where communities complain on health hazards due to sprays or chemicals. A company in Tanzania conducted medical examinations on the workers, the purpose and examination results of which are not announced to the workers. Community representatives confirmed cases of death and a woman participated in the group

discussion claim her husband is still ill even after the company stopped operation.¹⁹ This is in congruent with one of Cernea's list of risks, increased mortality and morbidity. Though the factors may vary, the direct cause of the Tanzanian case could be lack of health insurance, exposure to sprays and chemicals used in industrial agricultures. In a wider context of displacement, exposition to food insecurity, hostile resettlement environments could also contribute to morbidity and mortalities. “Usually casual farm workers are deprived of different work benefits such as maternity leave, annual leave, sick leave etc.” (Gobena 2010:35).

Moreover, land grab imposes limitations on community access to necessary natural resources such as forests, water, and others, and communication with adjacent communities mainly due to dispossession of resources and closure of crossing roads by localized investment projects. For instance, a case in Mozambique illustrate “[o]ne of the limiting factors for communities is access to water. With the arrival of projects, some communities now have to travel great distances in search of water for consumption, since in some cases, especially that of Chikwetii in Niassa Province where they closed off areas once used by communities as a route to access water” (Matavel & Cabanelas 2011:25). Water is a basic need for survival. Rural communities in Africa fully depend on river and spring waters. The same report from Mozambique confirms, “[r]egarding the primary sources of water for the interviewed communities, 73%, 67%, and 76% in the Southern, Central, and Northern zones respectively confirm that the closest rivers to their communities are their primary source of water” (Matavel & Cabanelas 2011:25). Meaning that majority of the people in the three studied zones in Mozambique predominantly use rivers as water sources. Interestingly multinationals invest near water sources.

Regarding the location of projects close to water sources, 90%, 58%, and 65% of the respondents in the Southern, Central, and Northern zones confirm that the projects are located close to these sources and that in the Southern and Northern zone they also make use of these sources, whereas in the Central zone only 30% of the respondents said that the projects use these resources for their activities. It is important to highlight that according to 50% and 16% of the respondents in the Southern and Northern zone, the existing projects have blocked passage of the communities to the water source, putting up gates with a guard to impede passage of the communities (Ibid., 27).

¹⁹ See: Page 161-162 dispossession case in Tanzania.

These observations are typical cases of the upshots of localization and delocalization processes. Majority of the people in the research areas predominantly use river waters. Investments are located near water resource for their use. The people of Southern and Northern zones are blocked from accessing the water sources with detrimental effects on their livelihood. The companies have put guards to impede community access. Similar cases exist in Tanzania where “participants in FGDs and interviews at Mtemba village complained against investor’s blockade of the land that has denied them access to water source, firewood collection, shortcut to neighborhood villages, access to ancestral burial grounds, and wood chopping” (Lawyers' Environmental Action Team (LEAT) 2011:66). Such projects are detrimental to the spatial activities of the communities. Loss of access to community resources expose people to food insecurity, reduce economic activities and income, and resources related to social and cultural activities. Compensation and resettlement plans truncate such impacts and loss of income represented by the area DCAD1 in Fig. 5.4.

In addition, land grab has social, cultural and environmental impacts as well. In rural Africa, social and cultural practices are directly related to land and natural environments. “At the same time, ancestral land impacts on people’s identity – on the ways they are bound to the land and relate to their natural surroundings, as well as to fundamental feelings of ‘connectedness’ with the social and cultural environment in its entirety” (BV, Nikolova 2007). The SGSOC project, in Cameroon, causes environmental and biodiversity damages. The Chief of Forestry and Wildlife Control Post in Nguti village describe the damages created by three km road construction and nursery as follow:

They created a road to go to the site which has been given by the village Talanaye, you have many Azobe, and if you go along you will see the Azobes serves, even to cross one small water there. They used the Azobe to build the bridge. I have not seen any authorization, but there is a rumor going on that they don’t have an authorization and may be they want to start work before the authorization. I cannot really tell. As per the habitat of the animals, because normally when all the trees are destroyed, because this is a reserve area, you have the sanctuary, you have the Bakossi national park and this area because of the scarcity of the trees if and may be they do any felling, these animals will normally lose their habitat (see: Herakles Debacle).

Similar environmental destructions have been reported from Tanzania and Ethiopia too. “Other threats include environmental degradation due to large scale clearing of bushes and forests,

destruction of biodiversity, land grabbing, and inequitable access to, ownership and control over land by the communities” (see Land Rights Research and Resources Institute (LARRRI) and Joint Livelihood Initiative for Tanzania 2008:5). In the Benishangul-Gumuz Regional State of Ethiopia, “the negative environmental effect of deforestation was regularly raised by large number of farmers and key informants in this specific study area. The lion’s share of the respondents, 90% replied that the forest cover in the field has decreased after investment started” (Gobena 2010:5).

Coupled with land grab, limitation of access to basic environmental resources entail high potential of instigating conflict among communities and also with project holders. This has been observed in different African countries like Mozambique and Ethiopia. A case in point, in Mozambique, “[a]ccording to the interviewed communities, some companies do not respect the boundaries of their concessions, invading communal areas and so creating conflicts between the communities and the company. As a result of this, many communities believe that they are losing access to land– their most precious resource” (Matavel & Cabanelas 2011:37). Empirical report in Ethiopia indicate:

Although deforestation was raised as the major threat from the farmers and experts from the ministry of agriculture, an increased incidence of environmental (Land) conflict between the investor and the local farmers, soil erosion and decrease in honey production were mentioned as additional environment related problems. This study found out that, 90% of the farmers reported environmental conflict (social conflict about environmental issues) between the investors and the local community as a major observed problem (Gobena 2010:33).

The cumulative effects of economic, food insecurity, loss of access to basic resources, and other harms result in social disarticulation and marginalization. Social disarticulation in the context of displacement can be understood as follows:

Forced displacement tears apart the existing social fabric. It disperses and fragments communities, dismantles patterns of social organization and interpersonal ties; kinship groups become scattered as well. Life-sustaining informal networks of reciprocal help, local voluntary associations, and self-organized mutual services are disrupted. This is a net loss of valuable 'social capital' that compounds the loss of natural, physical, and human capital (Cernea & McDowell 2000:30).

Overall, involuntary nature of displacement and power imbalance push displaced communities to marginal positions. Particularly the loss of land, resources, and lack of proper compensation and rehabilitation measures, and lack of protection from their own state. This coupled with their own inability to defend their rights increase their downward mobility, as explained below:

Marginalization occurs when families lose economic power and spiral on a 'downward mobility' path. Middle-income farm households do not become landless, they become small landholders; small shopkeepers and craftsmen downsize and slip below poverty thresholds. Many individuals cannot use their earlier acquired skills at the new location; human capital is lost or rendered inactive or obsolete. Economic marginalization is often accompanied by social and psychological marginalization, expressed in a drop in social status, in resettlers' loss of confidence in society and in themselves, a feeling of injustice, and deepened vulnerability. The coerciveness of displacement and the victimization of resettlers tend to depreciate resettlers' self-image, and they are often perceived by host communities as a socially degrading stigma (Cernea & McDowell 2000:30).

In a nutshell, it is difficult for displaced persons to cope with such complicated displacement harms by themselves. This is represented by the arrow *A-RI*, Fig. 5.4. In this context, the issues that needs to be addressed now is the way land grab actors claim to *protect, provide and fulfill* the rights of affected people. As presented above compensation and resettlement measures are not properly put in place. The motives of these measures are not the way they should be, rather they are designed to facilitate the changes and continuities associated with access and transfer of land and resources use rights.

5.2.3 Violation of Basic Right to Space

Given the above elaborations, we need to identify the most basic right violated and ask what is the implication of trans-border harm or risk exportation to global justice? I conceptualize human rights after natural rights. Human rights are associated with the life of individual person without which a person's life fall in danger. Spatial practices are conducted in social spaces created and recreated by societies. So as to evaluate the case under consideration and assign obligations to land grab actors, *basic right* is set as a benchmark. *This standard is about the necessary and sufficient conditions either flourishing or depriving the rights of displaced and dispossessed people caused by the global intervention. As there could be different forms of basic rights, the right to space is considered to be the fundamental violated basic right, in the*

context of land grab. Space is not something like food or water, but it is a platform in which social interactions and spatial activities for producing and reproducing basic goods are practiced. Enjoyment and exercise of other forms of basic rights such as capability, freedom, basic goods and others require a space for conducting spatial practices. Therefore, space is a fundamental right of all other rights for the reason that other basic rights can only be enjoyed if the right to space is respected and protected. Without space, none of these are possible. *That is why I argue for the basic right to space rather than focusing on other forms of basic rights.*

Respect and protection of the right to space provide the foundation for further expansion and enjoyment of other rights. Since, space allow people to organize and perform spatial activities, harms of displacement and dispossession are severe. In the case of land grab, displacement impacts such as food insecurity, landlessness, joblessness, social disarticulation, loss of access to resources, and others are the upshots of elimination of spaces.

For Simmel, space is a crucial and fundamental element in human experience because social activities and interactions are and must be spatially contextualized. That is, the form in which social interactions are experienced and manifest are operative in delimited, delineated and prescribed space. Space then is both a determining aspect of interactions, but which is also simultaneously socially constructed by such interaction (Zieleniec 2008:34-35).

Furthermore:

... the space we inhabit, make use of, and imagine in our everyday lives is one that is inherently social. As such it is subject to the forces and processes to which all of social life has been subject. As collectivities and societies, the space that is associated with and which is fashioned to represent and to perpetuate that culture and that society's values, goals and ideologies is not only historically contingent but also socially produced. The social world then is one which makes its own space, of leisure and pleasure, or of play and imagination. Space is created to enact, to embody and to symbolize the dreams, aspirations and achievements of society in each stage of development. What kinds of space are produced and created has consequences for the quantity and quality of social relations. The kinds of activities that are allowed, encouraged, prohibited, etc. is influenced by the design, shape, size, organization and ultimately control over delimited and functionalized space. Places for production and for

manufacturing for example, are made to permit the maximum and most efficient processes of production (Zieleniec 2008:xii).

One important aspect here is the production and reproduction of space which is also the case in land grab. Societies create and recreate spaces in a way that suit their circumstances. In the process of creating new space meant for the production of large-scale food and biofuels crops distant others eliminate existing spaces. New space can be created on the land expropriated from the communities changing existing land use patterns and social structures. Consequently, existing life styles like subsistence and small agricultures, pastoralist, and others replaced by large scale industrial agricultures. *That is what localization and delocalization processes accomplish.* All in all, the culture, social structures and interactions, and also the relationship with natural environment built for generations disappear altogether. “The main point to be noted, therefore, is the production of a social space by political power - that is by violence in the service of economic goals. A social space of this kind is generated out of a rationalized and theorized form serving as an instrument for the violation of an existing space” (Lefebvre 1991:151-152). Besides, “[w]ho owns and ultimately regulates the activities that can occur or are allowed in space is rooted in a process that enhances the contradictions and conflicts inherent in its production” (Zieleniec 2008:71). Naturally, global and national land grab actors create and control the new spaces as a result of which communities are completely marginalized and subjugated to the detriment of their production systems and life styles.

To give an example, the life of pastoralist communities stretched over a vast space, different places and locations. While spaces allow multiple spatial activities, places provide specific activities such as grazing, water source, leisure or cultural practices. Pastoralists move from place to place within their own social and geographic spaces looking after specific locations that they can graze or drink their cattle or perform other activities. Their spatial activities depend on seasons and availability of water, grass and other resources for their animals and themselves. They stay in one place for specific period of time for conducting specific activities. They shift places and locations following seasonal cycles. Such rotations continue throughout the year. Yet, they remain within the territory of their geographic space. Importantly, their geographic space is recognized by neighboring communities and they also recognize the geographic spaces of their neighbors. In addition, different social groups have their own social spaces within the bigger social space. Women, children, elderly, youngsters have specific roles

and social spaces that are meaningful for themselves and the community at large. The property they have, for instance, the type and number of cattle, determine their social relations, positions and spaces. Each and every group performs socially meaningful activities in a certain places and locations. Space offer members the capability to satisfy their basic needs such as sustenance, leisure, play, freedom, and others regardless of the level of their development.

The same applies to small and subsistence farmers too. Places are particular areas where specific activities are performed. Grazing, forests, water sources, religious and ritual, burial, markets, gardens, and other places where people perform their daily activities. Their mobility from one place to another to conduct spatial activities is what space composes. Such mobility is purposeful towards certain direction to conduct certain activities. Purpose, movement, and conducting activities offer spaces vital meaning in life. For example, a person goes to an agricultural field for the purpose of farming or weeding or to forest to cut wood to build a house or to sale it in the market and earn some money. A person may go to a ritual site to perform a religious duty together with others. He may also sit under a big tree to get rest after farming or to mediate a conflict or other purposes. That same tree and its surrounding might be a place and location representing different practices. The loss of such a single tree affects the whole activities the community perform under it and its social and historic significance.

Spaces and spatial activities in land grab targeted regions are now contested between affluent arable land scarce societies organized around common issue-areas and local communities in arable land abundant countries. Like any commodity markets the contest should have been at global arena, at international agricultural commodity markets based on economic logics of demand, supply and prices. Arable land scarce affluent societies directly compete for places and spaces abroad not only because of their domestic risks but also globalization means that the intensity and density of global institutions, global interdependence and erosion of national sovereignty. This scenario reflects a shift from contest for food and other commodities at the international markets *to the sources of food and other commodities, physical spaces, and define and create their own spaces there on. For that very reason, I consider space as basic right. As such, in the context of land grab elimination of space is an appropriate benchmark for evaluating deprivation of other rights. Because the contest is on the source of the commodities,*

the harm is severe and devastating. Hence, displacement and dispossession should be considered as an indicator of invocation of negative duties not to harm others.

The control of space is vital for enjoying one's interest. Basic rights like basic goods, capability, freedom, and others cannot be enjoyed without space. The social, economic, cultural, religious, and political structures are crucial for the satisfaction of basic right of human goods, capability and freedom. Those important structures are built upon spaces, and in turn social interactions recreate spaces too. Such a process bestows space, as a social construct, a special position to be a basic right. In the context of contest over space, this assertion takes further considerations into account. Firstly, affluent arable land scarce societies target on the control of arable land abroad. Investing countries need spaces for themselves to organize the means of production, labor and the production of agricultural crops. Secondly, displaced and dispossessed people used the spaces for organizing social, economic, cultural, religious and other daily practices. They have been creating and recreating those spaces and spatial practices for generations. Thirdly, spaces are basic infrastructures for advancing social, political, economic, cultural, religious practices. Fourthly, basic goods, capabilities, freedom, and rights can flourish on existing social, political, economic, cultural, and religious practices. It is true that spaces could be improved through progress. However, the fundamental structures remain the same or take time to change. Fifth, displaced social, economic, cultural, religious, and political structures and practices cannot be *transplanted to resettlement areas* with the same quality and quantity. Importantly, they cannot be fully incorporated into the calculations of *compensation*. Sixth, national and global actors wield political power and law to ensure their control over space. A group that defines spaces and spatial activities is the one that wield power, while the groups that lose the control over spaces lose power. The use of power marginalizes the losers. Seventh, spaces have intrinsic values. That means each place, location, and spatial practices and the whole space provide certain values individually and in group. Eight, the time dimension and historical significance of space and spatial practices provide not only unique values, psychological satisfaction, association and belongingness but also intergenerational connections. All in all, displacement and dispossessions dismantle all these fundamental essences of spaces that compensation and resettlement measures cannot fully address.

Hence, the basic right to space is a moral demand targeted community could claim against land grab actors. This is grounded on the following basic idea:

Basic rights, then, are everyone's minimum reasonable demands upon the rest of humanity. They are the rational basis for justified demands the denial of which no self-respecting person can reasonably be expected to accept. Why should anything be so important? The reason is that rights are basic in the sense used here only if enjoyment of them is essential to the enjoyment of all other rights. This is what is distinctive about a basic right. When a right is genuinely basic, any attempt to enjoy any other right by sacrificing the basic right would be quite self-defeating, cutting the ground from beneath itself (Shue 2008:89-90).

As Shue asserts a rational self-respecting person cannot be expected to accept displacement and dispossession for the interest of near person let alone the interest of distant others, unless force is involved. Hence, displacement and dispossession are indicators of violation of the most basic right to space and life at large. For that reason, the right to space guarantee communities' right not to be dislocated or expropriated invoking a strong negative duty on the actors. Any dislocation or expropriation is a denial of the most basic right with paramount consequence to other basic rights a displaced person cannot be expected to accept. The occurrence of either displacement or dispossession is therefore the basis for the assignment of correlative obligations.

5.2.4 Foreseeability and Avoidability of Harms

Among others, according to Pogge in order to call an incident harm, they have to be foreseeable and avoidable. Foreseeability of harms entail an obligation to avoid them by putting the necessary and sufficient avoiding measures in place. Omission of essential measures automatically invoke correlative obligations. To assign proper duty to distant others, in the context of this work, we need to look at foreseeability and avoidability of land grab induced harms. Evidence from *agricultural development plans and land transfer processes coupled with reports from empirical data confirm both predictability and avoidability of land grab harms.*

Social and environmental risk assessments have been conducted for Agricultural Development Corridor schemes. But, in most cases similar assessments lack for investments outside of Corridor scheme, before land acquisitions. For example, Article 4.1.d of the contract agreement signed between the Government of Ethiopia and the Indian Karuturi Agro Products Plc. oblige the company to “conduct environmental impact assessment and deliver the report within three months of execution of this agreement” (see: <https://www.oaklandinstitute.org/sites/oaklandinstitute.org/files/Karuturi-Agreement.pdf>). As such, environmental impact assessment will be conducted once the company acquire the land. Yet, the agreement doesn't state the consequences of the assessments on the contract agreements in case the environmental impacts or costs outweigh the benefits.

Notably, *various social and environmental impact assessments specifically conducted within the context of Corridor schemes confirm the need for population displacements and resettlements for localizing the planned agricultural investments and infrastructural projects.* They are conducted under the context of amalgamated institutions and initiatives to which the WB provides financial resources and the G8 signed Cooperation Frameworks. Some of the assessments not only identify the risks but also consider the level of displacement risks as *high and major* requiring appropriate risk mitigation mechanisms. For that reason, resettlement and compensation measures are invoked to meet the requirements of global actors and to secure finances from the WB, and also to get acceptance from the public. Hence, the global actors are aware of the risks of their actions in advance. However, compensation and resettlement measures are not sufficient to maintain the pre-displacement status of affected people.

The evidence gathered from social and environmental impact assessment reports contradict the assumptions behind “unused” lands. Because, we do not require plans for displacement and dispossessions, and adopt compensation and resettlement measures for investments to be implemented in barren or “unused” lands. In fact, *the origin of displacement is misrepresentation of land use patterns in targeted countries and the assumptions associated with it.* From the beginning, arable land abundant regions are labelled as “dispersedly” populated, “underproductive”, “unused” or “idle” land. Such labelling discriminates the populations and devalue local land use systems and livelihoods without proper consideration of the objective realities on the ground, and used to justify the intentions of the actors. For

instance, in projecting land availability by 2050, Africa and Latin America are not only identified as target regions, but also it is argued that those lands found not where they are most needed, land scarce regions, and the products harvested there are considered to be inappropriate for countries most needed them (Bruinsma 2009:2). This misrepresents basic rights of people like Mr. O, X and Y to life and property as such the assumptions undermine the role of land, spaces and spatial activities. Importantly, the products they produce is considered to be irrelevant to Mr. A and B, hence companies from countries of Mr. A and B are promoted to occupy the lands Mr. O, X and Y live on and sustain their own production spaces. This argument confirms the extent of the motives of land grab actors. The global actors have effectively publicized and instituted this through amalgamated institutions and initiatives that overwhelm the discourses of global challenges.

Furthermore, the Social and Environmental Assessments, and national RPF are part and parcel of *delocalization* process. The documents envisage various risks associated with displacement. The SAGCOT Strategic Regional Environmental and Social Assessment Report, for example, identifies three major risks that may lead to lose-lose condition than win-win. Among others, *land transfer from village to general land title* identified as one of the risks. The Government of Tanzania, in its National Land Use Planning Framework, declares to "... transfer 17.9% of lands from villages into the General Land category which may lead to displacement of villagers, loss of grazing rights, migratory corridors and water sources for pastoralists, and risks igniting land-based conflict..." (The United Republic of Tanzania, Prime Minister's Office 2013:39). The risks listed here are forms of spatial activities local communities conduct in their daily life. As village lands used by villagers, the report confirms the negative consequences of the transfer of those lands and impacts on the livelihoods of local communities. For that reason, the SAGCOT assessment report considers the program in general as "high risk from accelerated agribusiness investment for the same reasons as given above for the Kilombero Valley, especially if SAGCOT cannot adequately resolve existing and intensifying competition for environmental resources and services" (Ibid., viii). Therefore, if there were "unused" lands, village lands wouldn't have been converted to General lands. Consequently, it can be deduced Tanzanian decision makers and SAGCOT's partners are aware of the risks.

The same applies to the programs in other countries. According to the Ghanaian RPF “possible cases of involuntary resettlement are expected during construction of warehouses and farmlands” (Republic of Ghana, Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MOFA) 2013:vii) in the Savana Accelerated Development Authority regions, and “the project in the Accra Plains will involve the need to physically move people or displace their rights to use land as a result of the construction of irrigation canals and farmlands” (Ibid., 2013:vii-viii). In Burkina Faso, Bagré project, “the potential resettlement of local populations and the allocation of land for State and private investors pose substantial risks to the Project” (WB 2011:20). Since the G8 and World Bank support the programs, they are also aware of the risks in advance.

Additionally, land grab actors took further measures in a bid to facilitate the control of spaces that also confirm intentionality of the actions and predictability of harms. Among others, countries like Burkina Faso, Ghana, Tanzania and Mozambique have developed RPF. Resettlement physically move people from certain places to others. According to the Ghanaian Ministry of Food and Agriculture, the RPF is “both a way to comply with the triggering of the Involuntary Resettlement policy (OP/BP 4.12) and a requirement for projects that may entail involuntary resettlement, acquisition of land, impact on livelihood, or restricted access to natural resources under the World Bank safeguard policy on involuntary resettlement” (Republic of Ghana, Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MOFA) 2013:vi). As such, “the RPF will provide project stakeholders with procedures to address *compensation* issues as related to affected properties/livelihoods including land and income generated activities during project implementation” (Ibid., 2013:vi).

The SAGCOT Strategic Regional Environmental and Social Assessment report recommends a “resettlement policy with implementing regulations and mechanisms to supplement and extend the existing legal framework governing compulsory land purchase, bringing national land acquisition and compensation practice into line with international best practice (and taking advantage of current Ministerial support for development of such a policy)” (The United Republic of Tanzania, Prime Minister's Office 2013:xiv). Likewise, the Burkina Faso RPF “... outlines the overarching framework through which potential resettlement issues would be addressed. It includes principles and procedures for resettlement and/or compensation for

affected people and establishes standards for identifying, assessing, and mitigating negative impacts” (WB 2011:25). It lists the type of projects that cause population eviction as:

The Involuntary Resettlement Policy is triggered because the irrigation network, land development and possible land consolidation by the Project, construction and rehabilitation of paved and feeder roads, and the development of collective infrastructure such as business centers, collective storage facilities, and collective areas for SMEs and industries may all have major resettlement impacts (Ibid., 26).

Overall, we have plenty of evidence concerning foreseeability and avoidability of displacement and dispossession harms. The Social and Environmental Assessment reports, and RPF are instruments of foreseeability and avoidability. Although, these tools inform potential harms, land grab actors knowingly carried out their predefined objectives of transforming potential risks to harms, in other words realize risk exportations. Both resettlement and compensation measures applied as instrument of population eviction than respect and protect basic rights. These measures generate correlative obligations. Basically, those actions are intentional with predefined plans and incomplete risk mitigation measures. Hence, the obligation sought should look at ways of filling omitted measures. But, this requires further examination of omitted actions. In my view this part of the work, identifying the omissions, is an examination of the type of duty to distant others.

5.2.5 Commission and Omission of Actions

I have shown predictability or foreseeability land grab harms. Yet important measures that could have made affected persons better off than pre-displacement are omitted. This has been evident from the designed resettlement policies and strategies. In this regard, three basic questions can be raised for a justifiable assignment of obligations. The first, what actions do land grab actors have taken so that risks are realized? The second, what actions do they have taken to avoid the realization of harms? The third, what actions are omitted so that risks are realized? *At the core of this lies an assertion land grab actor have displaced people, and expropriated land and resources for the benefit of well-off societies with full knowledge of the harms.* The first question helps us to evaluate the specific actions that cause harms, while the second is important for evaluating the measures taken to prevent displacements. These strategic questions lead us to strategic decisions that allow eviction to happen. By and large, it is about

the respect and protection of basic rights for space. For that same reason, those who participate in those decisions have the highest obligation. The third question is a follow up that focuses on those actions supposed to be taken but were not.

I have discussed the first question on how localization and delocalization are conducted and the resultant harms caused. They are planned, organized and executed by respective land grab actors from the global to the local level. Communities are physically moved from their residential and agricultural land. In case of pastoralist communities, they are either physically restricted to live in a specific resettlement places or restrictions are imposed on access to pasture land and water resources. In addition, there is also huge transfer of arable lands, water, forest and other resources to multinationals for the production of food and biofuels crops to be exported to arable land scarce well-off societies.

In relation to the second question global actors have adopted two major instruments namely Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment that Respect Rights, Livelihoods and Resources (hereafter abbreviated PRAI) (WB, UNCTAD, IFAD and FAO 2010); and Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Lands, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security (hereafter abbreviated VG) (FAO 2012). Both are voluntary code of conduct developed by global institutions and to be followed by pertinent actors. But, being voluntary they are not enforceable to the level the rights of LGAPs is respected and protected. However, voluntary guidelines are not comparable to the level of the actions taken and ensuing harms. Contrarily, they are focused on the process of expropriation and the *obligation to fulfill* which is appropriate for during and after displacement phases.

The *purpose and relevance* of these two instruments is questionable. Essentially, investments host countries have business laws, and there are also international trade laws and codes governing transnational investments. So long as these laws and codes exists, what special objectives are the VG and PRAI going to fulfill? Do businesses operate by codes of conducts or business laws? There are also business ethics. Laws and ethics govern business operations, and illegal or unethical business operations face consequences. Laws govern business operations and various rights, including property and consumer. Laws protect people from forced displacement, hence the right to uproot others has no moral foundation whether we apply

the codes of conducts. It might also be argued that business ethics and laws might not be properly exercised, but there is no guarantee for the application of the VG and PRAI too. From this perspective, the purpose of the VG and PRAI seems to facilitate and guide localization and delocalization processes.

As elaborated in the previous sections, communities are displaced and dispossessed of their land and resources which is a clear violation of basic rights. *Therefore, the priori question needs to be answered with regard to moral obligation is whether expropriation, or displacement and dispossession of others is morally acceptable or not? If acceptable what makes it acceptable?* In relation to this, why are business laws not sufficient in restraining harmful conducts of land grab actors? Why are constitutions not sufficient for the same purpose? For example, Article 40.4 and 40.5 of the Constitution of The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia stipulates “Ethiopian peasants have the right to obtain land without payment and the protection against evictions from their possession” and “Ethiopian pastoralist have the right to free land for grazing and cultivation as well as the right not to be displaced from their own land.” Concerning property rights Article 40.1 of the same constitution states “every Ethiopian citizen has the right to the ownership of private property. Unless prescribed otherwise by law on account of public interest, this right shall include the right to acquire, to use and, in a manner compatible with the rights of other citizens, to dispose such property by sale or bequest or to transfer it otherwise.” Likewise, other African countries have similar provisions too. Such rights are enshrined in international human rights and related conventions. The question here is, are they not sufficient? If not how can VG and PRAI make a difference? If lack of proper application of laws is the reason for the development of the VG and PRAI instruments, it can be argued that VG and PRAI defuse legal and ethical norms, and open new spheres for treating land grab harms outside of laws and ethics. And this is nothing but facilitation of the smooth transfer of land rights and continuity of the changes brought by land grab. Fundamentally, this is nothing but a political decision. So, land grab actors make references to the VG and PRAI than basic constitutional and legal rights. In other words, political decision override constitutional rights. Citizens have offered the authority to protect and respect these rights to states which they are acting against. Voluntary guidelines are not in a position to protect and respect basic rights.

Before addressing the characteristics of the VG and PRAI, I should clarify about LGIDPs so that omitted actions will be easily identified. Existing literatures on population displacements identify development induced displaced people (DIDP), conflict, natural disaster induced displacements and refugees (see: de Wet 2006; Cernea & McDowell 2000). This classification is based on the causes of displacement. Development and conflict induced displacements are manmade with potential of producing refugees, while natural disasters are out of human control. Displaced persons can be categorized as internally displaced people (IDP) and refugees. “‘Refugees’, for the purpose of this discussion, are people who have left their own country because of persecution and violence and who are unable or unwilling to return to it” (Turton 2006:14). IDPs are people displaced due to various cause, while DIDPs are people who are displaced due to development projects meant for improving people’s wellbeing (see: de Wet 2006; Cernea & McDowell 2000:12).

Causes of land grab induced displacements are different from the others, though they share similar impacts. DIDPs are upshots of the motives of states to “improve people’s lives, provide employment, and supply better services” (Cernea 2000:2). Furthermore, “forced displacement results from the need to build infrastructure for new industries, irrigation, transportation highways, or power generation, or for urban developments such as hospitals, schools, and airports” (Ibid., 11). Such projects may displace people, but their purpose, size of land allocated to projects and the number of affected people is not comparable to that of land grab.

DIDPs and LGIDPs displacement processes share common principles. DIDPs are justified by the notion of “the greater good for the larger members” (Ibid., 12) within national development context. However, “[t]he outcome is an unjustifiable repartition of development's costs and benefits: some people enjoy the gains of development, while others bear its pains” (Ibid). The fundamental difference between DIDPs and LGIDPs lies on the motive of the displacement itself. DIDPs are displaced due to national development programs, *while LGIDPs extended this scope to global level*. In other words, “the greater good for the larger members” is extended beyond national boarder. *The greater good generated out of land grab induced displacements benefits the greater member of people in investing countries*. This distinguishing mark should have a corresponding implication on the obligation bearers and the type of measures to be taken for respecting, protecting and fulfilling the rights of affected persons.

Consequently, VG and PRAI need to include additional measures that obligate global actors too, mainly because of the extension of the principle beyond national borders. The VG contain similar principle which states *food security for all*. It asserts, “the purpose of these Voluntary Guidelines is to serve as a reference and to provide guidance to improve the governance of land, fisheries and forests with the *overarching goal of achieving food security for all* and to support the progressive realization of the right to adequate food in the context of national food security” (FAO 2012:iv). If food security is for all, then the obligations that emanate from the harms engender have to be distributed to all. The burdens of land grab should also be shared too. Still such a principle does not hold water as it does not provide a moral justification for the eviction and deprivation of the poor for the sake of providing the affluent with basic human goods.

Furthermore, it has to be recalled that global actors have played significant roles in realizing land grabs. Investing countries have employed tools of development cooperation, mobilized their DFI and Governmental Development Agencies to penetrate the policy spaces of host states to improve business environment and promote large scale agricultural investments. For that same reason, the WB, on its part, assisted investment host countries in improving their legal frameworks, land markets and create investment promotion agencies. Hence, land grab harms are the upshots of the actions land grab actors executed. And yet, all these activities could not change the objective reality in targeted places that land is used by local communities. This necessitates practical measures of displacement of spaces. As a result, the purpose of VG and PRAI has to be explained within the context of changing land rights, creation of new spaces and its continuities. Accordingly, they need to be evaluated from the perspectives of whether they facilitate the continuity of localization and delocalization or respect and protect the rights of communities not to be evicted. If people are displaced or expropriated necessary and sufficient livelihood reconstruction measures should be put in place.

Supposedly, the VG and PRAI should serve the obligations to respect, protect and fulfill land use rights of communities. These obligations should be discharged incongruent with the pre, during and post displacement and dispossession phases. The obligation to respect and protect fits to pre-displacement phase, while the obligation to fulfill is suitable for during and after

displacements phases. All in all, the VG concerns about how land transfers should be conducted than respect and protect existing rights to space, land and resources. It sets conditions as to how legitimate rights can be rescinded. For instance, it states “[s]ubject to their national law and legislation and in accordance with national context, states should expropriate only where rights to land, fisheries or forests are required for a public purpose” (FAO 2012). Likewise, the PRAI proposes “that expropriation, in kind rather than cash, is strictly limited to situations that affect the public interest than routinely applied to transfer of land to private investors” (WB, UNCTAD, IFAD and FAO 2010:3). Both documents acknowledge expropriation with the condition of public purposes.

VG and PRAI were issued at the time land grab become highly controversial. In the context of global rush for land or land grab, the condition that refers to *public purpose and interest* is vague. It mirrors the principle of “the greater good for the larger members”. In case of land grab public interests of food security and biofuels are globally and nationally promoted. In fact, global actors organized themselves around common issue-areas to which they designed specific interventions of large-scale agricultural investments and commoditization of land. African states developed National Agricultural Development plans that promote public interest, based on which they signed Cooperation Frameworks with the G8.

Furthermore, the scope and limit of public interests is not clear, since all activities under these plans and agreements are meant for public interests, national and global. In this connection, *the problem lies when communities and individuals become worse off than their previous status due to expropriation for the interests of distant others, in other words uprooting of Mr. O, X and Y for the interest of Mr. A and B in my ideal type*. From global justice perspective, promotion of the notion of public interest fall into question as it produces unbalanced global distribution of benefits and burdens among the affluent and the poor.

Given the size of acquired lands and the number of affected people, 14 million in Africa, the idea of public interest is untenable. The interests of such millions of affected people remain unfulfilled. Furthermore, the moral question the VG and PRAI failed to address is *why communities (like Mr. O, X & Y) sacrifice their wellbeing for the sake of satisfying the wellbeing of the citizens of investing countries (Mr. A & B)?* Likewise, why investing states

and citizens not reciprocate by sacrificing their wellbeing for the sake of host countries interest? As it is argued in the previous chapters, land grab is not locally and nationally triggered phenomenon, rather it is triggered by food security and biofuels demands of investing countries. For that reason, the extension of the notion of the “greater good for the greater members” beyond national borders cannot justify expropriation of local communities, for the reason it *needs to be reciprocated with proportional actions and obligation which land grab actors omitted.*

There is also another major flaw related to *private interest*. In the case of land grab private interest is embedded in *public interest*. The distinction between private investment and public interest has become blurred. Global and national actors promoted private investments as major strategies for increasing agricultural productivity. Private investments are profit making entities. The PRAI itself claim “[p]rivate investments in the agricultural sector offers significant potential to complement public resources (WB, UNCTAD, IFAD and FAO 2010:1)” and economic viability of projects guarantee generation of benefits. In that case, this leads us to further challenge related to *expropriation of land* for the sake of transferring to private entities for the purpose of profit making. As stated above existing lands were used by communities. The PRAI also confirms this that countries like “many countries, e.g. China, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Nigeria, Sudan, and Zambia, require expropriation of land before it can be transferred to private investors” (Ibid., 5). In that sense, it is difficult to understand the justifications for expropriating communities for private interest. Besides, compatibility of expropriation and private investment is blurred. The dominance of foreign private large-scale investments over domestic private economic actors fall into question too. The potential of domestic private investments is so huge in terms of enhancing domestic capability and expanding freedom of small farmers to act the way they like as it avails them with competitive environment. Such moral issues remain unclear and need to be unpacked.

What is more, the VG proposes possible means of transfer and change in land rights including land consolidation, adjustment, markets, and investments. It prescribes “[w]here appropriate, States may consider land consolidation, exchange or other voluntary approaches for the readjustment of parcels or holdings ...” (FAO 2012:23). Moreover, “[w]here appropriate, States may consider the establishment of land banks as a part of land consolidation programs to

acquire and temporarily hold land parcels until they are allocated to beneficiaries” (Ibid., 24). In line with this, for instance “[...], the Ethiopian government has established a ‘land bank,’ further facilitating the process through which investors acquire land. Lands in the federal land bank are large contiguous blocks of land that will be given to foreign investors in lease areas of at least 5,000 ha” (Oakland Institute 2011a:16). A total of 2,111,486 ha. of land is reserved at the Federal Land Bank (Ibid., 21). Land can be readjusted by resettling communities or reallocating land so that large pieces of land left for the purpose of land banking to be disbursed to investors. Again, neither land consolidation nor land bank mechanisms provide satisfactory response as to why communities should be expropriated. For that reason, the prime objective of consolidations can be considered as facilitation of the transfer of land rights. *Still the lingering problem is lack of unused land that states could lease to investors without impoverishing communities. The fact of the matter is if there are “unused” lands, land consolidation would not be necessitated.*

For that reason, land consolidation and related measures generate correlative obligations. Mainly because, firstly, there are no unused lands. Secondly, land grab actors have planned for land transfer from communities to multinationals. Thirdly, land grab actors have executed the plans. Fourthly, communities are evicted and physically moved to other places. Fifth, communities are exposed to multiple impoverishment risks. Sixth, eviction and ensuing harms are foreseeable and avoidable. Finally, harms can be traced back to global and national institutional actors.

More significantly, although the VG and PRAI recognize existing rights to land and natural resources, they are not firm enough in protecting and guaranteeing the same rights they recognized. Inherently, they are more concerned about commoditization of land and the way those rights transferred to multinationals than guaranteeing and enabling communities to enjoy their rights in a way they want. In most countries, only states can transact land. Individuals have only use rights. They cannot transact land or independently decide on how to use their land like rent, sale or other means. Overall, local communities are excluded from land markets, land related economic transactions and the benefits they could generate out of it. If land markets are open to existing land right holders, they could have alternative means of using their lands. They could make independent decision whether to use, lease or sale their land. But, the irony

is that while former land right holders prohibited from market processes, states and foreign investors are the only land market actors. In that sense, political decisions from global to national level dominate issues concerning large scale land transactions. Hence, communities are denied of their rights to fully engage in land market to make free and independent decisions. They are denied of their freedom both as a process and opportunity (Sen 1999:17). As a result, they are not in a position to expand and flourish their basic goods, capabilities and freedom. In contrast, *localization and delocalization processes diminish the opportunities communities already had as farmers and pastoralists.*

The notion of *existing right holder* is a unique feature of VG and PRAI documents. The term *existing right holder* is restricted to current land right holders excluding landless people from potential land redistributions. Both people living in high population density areas and future generations are excluded from land rights for now and the future. Given the growing population in host countries land is very significant for present and future generations. The transfer of land to multinationals, if there is any, and expropriation endanger not only present generations but also future generations too. At the core of this argument is denial of the possibility of future land redistribution policies given population increase and resource scarcities. Fundamentally, the promotion of large-scale agricultural investments disregards these two major categories of the societies, landless and future generations.

Food security is also a major concern of both VG and PRAI. These documents intend to promote food security, particularly the VG advocate food security for all. Yet, the means to protect and defend the right to food in the context of large-scale investments is not clear. The assumption behind is that food security will be attained through increased agricultural productivity and job creation both of which are not tenable. Food security depends on the availability of products and/or the capacity to purchase from markets. It is true that the investments may increase agricultural productivity in host countries. But, the products are not meant for local markets in host countries. Investing states invest to satisfy the needs of their own population. Moreover, as private profit-making entities, there is no reason to impose restriction on investors to sell at local markets where they produced the crops.

Farming communities are self-sufficient. To the contrary, the proposed land expropriation and job creation hinders food security. While, expropriation reduces agricultural production of small farmers, lack of permanent jobs incapacitates them from buying from local markets. Therefore, both VG and PRAI are not critical about the real circumstances and root causes of land grab. In fact, the VG made it clear that “the Voluntary Guidelines seek to improve governance of tenure of land, fisheries and forests. They seek to do so for the benefit of all with an emphasis on vulnerable and marginalized people ...” (FAO 2012:1). It further claims that “these Guidelines are intended to contribute to the global and national efforts towards the eradication of hunger and poverty, based on the principles of sustainable development and with the recognition of the centrality of land to development by promoting secure tenure rights and equitable access to land, fisheries and forests” (Ibid., iv). If we critically examine this we can make note of two contradictory motives. On the one hand, it encourages expropriation as it proposes means of delocalization like compensations, resettlements, land bank and others, on the other hand, it promotes secure tenure rights.

In that sense, I can say the promises of the VG have no empirical substances. For instance, the 2014 World Bank report which examines the approaches of social, economic, and environmental responsibility of 39 large scale agricultural investments in Africa and Southeast Asia illustrate the situation of job creation and its implication to food security as follows:

A significant number of jobs created were casual and seasonal, with limited stability. Around half of jobs provided by our investors were temporary, casual, or seasonal. This varied by investment. For about 30 percent of investments surveyed, the share of permanent employment was less than a quarter of jobs provided. This lack of employment stability was a frequent complaint in stakeholder interviews. Contractual terms and conditions tended to be weaker for temporary or casual labor. In some cases, there was no contract at all. Interviewees spoke of arriving at the company gates each morning, not knowing whether they would be employed that day or not (WB 2014:23).

With such a scenario, the contribution of VG and PRAI to the right to food is very minimal and unthinkable in a future world where countries will experience population growth and dwindling agricultural land expansion and potential of agricultural productivity. In reality they promote

food security and biofuels securities of investing countries. Imagined job creations are not realistic to contribute to food security.

Furthermore, the VG and PRAI promote delocalization mechanisms such as compensation, consultation and participatory methods for the transfer of land rights. “States should ensure that the planning and process for expropriation are transparent and participatory. Anyone likely to be affected should be identified, and properly informed and consulted at all stages” (FAO 2012:27). It is important to note that issues of planning, transparency and participatory, as they are presented here, are means of delocalization that facilitate during and after displacement phases than the pre-displacement phase that defend the rights of communities not to be evicted. In fact, as I have made it clear earlier global actors already decided on global common issue-areas, design and implement specific interventions in the form of large-scale agricultural investments. In that context, the proposed mechanisms of land transfer processes are part of execution of the already designed interventions. Hence, one can imagine how a person voluntarily hand over his land to multinationals whether or not he is consulted and participated in the process of executing already planned goals. Land is the only asset communities own, and no self-respecting person will ever be willing to vacate his land.

Once again it is worth to recall Shue’s argument that how come a self-respecting person is supposed to accept displacement and dispossession in a condition where he becomes worse off. Communities are not provided with options for negotiating on the motives of expropriation and their rational claim to share from the benefits of the land they are handing over. In that sense, the purpose of compensation, consultation, transparency and participation is questionable. Firstly, they are intended to persuade communities to handover their lands before they are forcedly displaced. It has been shown in the above case from Tanzania, Cameroun and other countries that communities are told about the benefits of employment creation and other supports after displacement. Moreover, there is no mention about the use of social services, in case multinationals made available, by local communities. For example, though contractual agreement signed between the government of Ethiopia and the Indian Karuturi Agro Products Plc. states the company may establish social services for its workers, there is no mention about community access to the services. Secondly, communities are not required to discuss on the motives of expropriation and make their own decision. Thirdly, the possibility of respecting

the decisions of the communities in case they prefer to remain on their land is minimal. Such processes do not guarantee the right to space. Above all, there is no guarantee over security of rights over the new resettlement lands as communities could be displaced for second and third times from resettlement places. Inherently, security of land rights is not guaranteed. If land right is not respected for the first instance, there is no guarantee for the next instances. On the whole, the VG pays little attention to the idea of justice. Particularly concerning to vulnerabilities arises from evictions. For instance, it states:

Evictions and relocations should not result in individuals being rendered homeless or vulnerable to the violation of human rights. Where those affected are unable to provide for themselves, states should, to the extent that resources permit, take appropriate measures to provide adequate alternative housing, resettlement or access to productive land, fisheries and forests, as the case may be (FAO 2012:28).

The assumption behind this statement is that states should fulfill the livelihood of those *unable to provide for themselves*. However, this shade doubt on the justice of the proposition itself. It holds grave misconceptions about the social, economic and development statuses of host countries and put the burdens on respective states. It lets global actors free from correlative obligations that arises from their global cooperation organized around the common issue-areas. Essentially, eviction entails variety of human right violations including homelessness. For insistence, *the above statement anticipate evicted persons to cover the costs of housing and rehabilitations, and require states to provide services only if resources permit*. This is unjust given that lands are going to be handed over to foreign private investors for the benefits of their population. It is not clear as to why evicted persons should cover the costs incurred due to imposed evictions, even when they are able to do so, for the benefits of investing countries? Why should they fall under the minimum right a self-respecting person is not expected to accept? To put this into context, why Mr. O, X, and Y cover their cost of rehabilitation for the sake of providing Mr. A & B with their basic needs? Moreover, most poor states do not have the resources to provide evicted persons with the necessary and sufficient services. Again, it is not clear why these states should evict people, in the first place, if they are unable to recover lost livelihood. By disengaging themselves from their obligation that arose from global cooperation, well-off societies effectively export their domestic risks to the poor. It is such omitted obligations that needs to be incorporated through practical interventions.

So far, I have shown what the VG and PRAI propose as means of mitigating risks. Obviously, there are plenty of omissions that makes population displacements and dispossessions possible. Hence, there is a need to assess other conventions that may apply to land grab induced displaced persons too, if properly applied. This will help to look at the weaknesses of VG and PRAI which are developed in the context of land grab investments. This will also highlight the *actions land grab actor omitted* so that harms are occurred. The WB has the experiences of working with large scale development projects with potential of evictions. The Bank has an Operational Policy (OP) concerning involuntary resettlements, adopted in 2001.

The World Bank's guideline as expressed in OP 4.12 require planned resettlement (para. 6), compensation (para. 6(a)(iii)) and rehabilitation (para. 2(c)) when displacement is absolutely necessary for the development project (para. 2(a)). The guidelines go beyond simple compensation in that they require measures that actually restore the living standard of project-affected people (PAPs). The right to rehabilitation is the protection the PAPs who do not benefit fully from compensation can receive in order to become established and economically self-sufficient (Barutciski 2006:82).

As the Bank uses these requirements for financing large scale development projects, the OP provides better guarantee than the VG and PRAI. Unlike the VG and PRAI, the OP ensures the recovery of damaged livelihoods. Despite the difference between the motives of LGIDPs and DIDPs, the Bank's policy might be applicable to LGIDPs. Particularly, it can serve in cases where the Bank finances infrastructural project in the context of large-scale agricultural investments. In addition to this, Article 14 of the ILO Convention No. 169 provides indigenous and tribal peoples with strong protection against forced eviction and for property. It affirms:

(1) The rights of ownership and possession of the peoples concerned over the lands which they traditionally occupy shall be recognized. In addition, measures shall be taken in appropriate cases to safeguard the right of the peoples concerned to use lands not exclusively occupied by them, but to which they have traditionally had access for their subsistence and traditional activities. Particular attention shall be paid to the situation of nomadic peoples and shifting cultivators in this respect. (2) Governments shall take steps as necessary to identify the lands which the peoples concerned traditionally occupy, and to guarantee effective protection of their rights of ownership and

possession. (3) Adequate procedures shall be established within the national legal system to resolve land claims by people concerned.

The above Article is cognizant of the role of space for nomadic people, and shifting and cultivation systems. Traditionally utilized lands provide services though they might look idle for some seasons. The same applies to the areas subsistence and small farmers traditionally use in their daily spatial activities. Such recognitions are still relevant for LGIDPs. Moreover, Article 16 of Convention No. 169 contain the following provision:

(1) Subject to the following paragraphs of this Article, the peoples concerned shall not be removed from the lands which they occupy. (2) Where the relocation of these peoples is considered necessary as an exceptional measure, such relocation shall take place only with their free and informed consent. Where their consent cannot be obtained, such relocation shall take place only following appropriate procedures established by national laws and regulations, including public inquiries where appropriate, which provide the opportunity for effective representation of the peoples concerned. (3) Whenever possible, these peoples shall have the right to return to their traditional lands, as soon as the grounds for relocation cease to exist. (4) When such return is not possible, as determined by agreement or, in the absence of such agreement, through appropriate procedures, these peoples shall be provided in all possible case with lands of quality and legal status at least equal to that of the lands previously occupied by them, suitable to provide for their present needs and future development. Where the peoples concerned express a preference for compensation in money or in kind, they shall be so compensated under appropriate guarantees. (5) Persons thus relocated shall be fully compensated for any resulting loss or injury.

This firm Article recognizes and defends the full rights of indigenous people for land, resource, and properties. Its essence is valid for the case of land grab too. Inherently it protects people from dislocations, if it happens it should be executed according to their wish. Although LGIDPs differ from DIDPs, existing codes such as the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the ILO Convention No. 169, World Bank Operational Policy, and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination are applicable for the *respect and protection* of the rights of LGIDPs. The VG and PRAI are much weaker instruments. Most of the actions stipulated in these instruments, particularly the right not to be dislocated, are missed from the VG and PRAI.

As a result, the human right abuses land grab entails are much severe than DIDP and other displacement cases. *Hence, it can be argued that both VG and PRAI are aimed at serving the interests of land grab actors to avoid public criticisms than respect and protect the rights of affected persons.* In fact, from land grab actors' point of view such strong instruments are costly and hindrance to their objectives. If strong instruments are put in place and strictly followed, the ultimate goal of acquiring arable lands, as the way it happens now, would not be possible. This is evident from the European Parliament justification for the need for "codes of conduct for European enterprises operating in developing countries". It asserts that:

In the present context of globalization of trade flows and communications as well as of increased vigilance of NGOs and consumer associations, it seems to be increasingly in the interest of multinational undertaking to adopt and implement voluntary codes of conduct if they want to avoid negative publicity campaigns, sometimes leading to boycotts, public relation costs and consumer complaints (Barutciski 2006:94).

The EU's suggestion about codes of conducts is not about genuine respect of rights. It relegates the risks the EU exports to the poor and subsequent harms caused by transnational investments, and resort to avoid negative public campaigns and related costs. In context of land grab, code of conducts is not only in the interest of European enterprises, but mainly the European Parliament itself. European enterprises investing on land in Africa are promoted by the decisions of the EU parliament and member states for the sake of attaining their biofuels policy, ultimately the wellbeing of their citizens. It has been shown that the EU is much concerned about the expanding demands for biofuels and badly needed arable land. Codes of conducts, in this regard, are in the interest of EU and other investing states to fend off public criticisms and sustain localization and delocalization at whatever costs incurred to local communities and omitting necessary actions needed to strictly respect and protect human rights.

5.2.6 Change and Continuity: Perpetual Poverty

Expansion abroad is not the end of the story. It includes the continuity of changes gained through expansion. Both investing and investment host countries have already experienced systemic changes, although the type of changes vary. The changes in affluent countries are mainly related to the adoption of renewable energy, particularly biofuels, and also food

production systems in the case of food import dependent countries. So as to maintain those changes, the system being established need to sustain for many decades. Overall, this system involves land governance, agricultural productions, biofuels processing and production, food processing, distributions, and consumption. All the economic actors involved are beneficiaries of investing states incentives. The same economic actors, except consumers, may operate abroad too, increasing the intensity and density of transnational institutions in those countries.

The change in investing countries may not replace existing systems, rather they complement the existing ones. Biofuels complement fossil and other forms of fuels. Emerging industries add values to those already existing. Likewise, food importing countries produce and process their own products than buy from international markets. These changes will expand the choices and wellbeing of the consumers in investing states. Citizens are provided with more choices than totally replacing previous energy sources or food commodities. Ultimately, it expands availability of human goods, capability, opportunity and choices for citizens.

Moreover, these changes add values to the national economies. Investing countries are not supposed to displace their land use systems, as they expand and acquire virtual lands in investment host countries. If they had replaced existing land use systems with the production of biofuels crops, they would have imported the crops replaced with the production of biofuels crops. A case in point, the U.S. would become net importer of agricultural commodities worth \$ 80 billion from a net exporter of agricultural commodities worth of \$20 billion per year, if the U.S. intend to domestically produce biofuels crops. By expanding abroad, the U.S. is able to maintain its economic status. Hence, countries investing abroad expand their economic potential and divert potential macroeconomic risks to host countries.

The agricultural sector in investment host countries is changing in a very different way. Commercialization of land involves the transfer of land use rights from local communities to foreign investors. Foreign investors predominantly produce biofuels and food crops to be imported back to their own countries or international markets. The means of production and the products are controlled by the investors. As elaborated earlier, local communities are alienated from the lands, resources and exposed to various impoverishment risks. Unlike citizens of investing countries, communities in host countries are de-capacitated. Displaced and

dispossessed communities are deprived of their basic rights. Most importantly communities have lost the space and places that used to sustain their life. Underneath, land use systems and the type and spatial activities on acquired lands are eliminated.

These are systemic changes concurrently occurring in investing and investors originating countries. They are not separate changes instead they are one and the same. Thus, expansion of well-off societies and compression of poor societies are two sides of the same coin. But they are inversely related; as investing countries expand abroad and flourishing the wellbeing of their citizens; host countries, on the other hand, reduce their actual usable land and deprive the wellbeing of their citizens. In fact, this underlines dependency of the continuity of the changes in affluent societies on the continuity of the changes in host countries. Without the acquisition of virtual lands abroad, investing countries couldn't sustain the biofuels sector for now and the future. The same applies to food import dependent countries. The acquisition of land abroad is the bloodline of the biofuels sector and food security of investing countries. In order to sustain these systems, acquired lands abroad should remain in the hand of the new land rights holders. Otherwise, the results attained due to the changing land use rights will be challenged. Hence, continuity of the changes is important in assigning correlative obligation and the necessity of sustainable solutions.

At the core of virtual land and space expansion found the issue of national expansion and the whole systemic global transformations. Through virtual land countries enlarge their total actual usable land size. For instance, let us take country X with a total land area of $Z \text{ km}^2$. If this country acquires land size of $Y \text{ km}^2$ abroad, then the total land size of country X would be $Z \text{ km}^2 + Y \text{ km}^2$. This total land size remains under the use of country X for the contract period. A real case can be substituted here. The total land area of UK, for example, is $241,930 \text{ km}^2$ (see: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/AG.LND.TOTL.K2?locations=GB-US-AE>). The UK has so far acquired 2,079,823 ha (Schoneveld 2011:6) of land in Africa which is equivalent to $20,798.23 \text{ km}^2$. In that case the UK has a total actual land size of $262,728.23 \text{ km}^2$ under its control. This actual land size is usable land under the control of the UK and multinationals based in that country. The acquired land size by EU based multinationals in Africa is 7,068,041 ha (Ibid) which is equivalent to $70,680.41 \text{ km}^2$. So long as acquired lands are protected by the WTO, national and international laws and bilateral and multilateral agreements, investing countries

will have full control of the land for the purpose the lease agreement signed for. Likewise, the actual land and space size of African countries that leased land reduces by the same amount they trade out.

Unfair distribution of the benefits and risks perpetuate as changes continues. Investing countries continue benefiting from the investments, investment host countries continue struggling to improve the wellbeing of deprived citizens. To come back to the case presented above, while the governments of Saudi Arabia and the UK thrive to satisfy the wellbeing of their citizens; the governments of Cameroon, Ethiopia and Tanzania also do their best to improve the life of impoverished citizens due to land grab. As the VG and PRAI stipulates the latter states have the duty to compensate or resettle displaced and dispossessed people. Host African states take the burden of perpetual impoverishment due to land grab. They neither feed their population from the products produced on leased lands nor have the capacity to compete and buy from international markets.

To reflect the same on individual citizens, while Mr. A and B satisfy their wellbeing, Mr. O, X, and Y and next generations endure perpetual harms. Mr. A and B consume the products produced on the land from which either Mr. O, or X, or Y used to produce and consume. The consumptions of the former and deprivation of the latter have direct relation, though they do not know each other. Actually, they are interrelated under established global system, though they may not realize it. Designers of the system, distance others, realize the reality very well. For this fundamental reason, all the actors and citizens deserve to be assigned correlative obligations. Otherwise, no moral justification can be provided for the latter to accept deprivation of their spaces and ensuing impoverishments for the sake of sustaining the wellbeing of the former. Likewise, any correlative obligation expected from the former should be considered as a way of maintaining their own wellbeing than a kind of extending positive duty towards the latter. The next chapter will work out this in detail with a focus on identifying omitted actions and how to extend the responsibility of incorporating omitted actions.

Conclusion

The main objectives of human rights are to respect, protect, and fulfill the rights of people. The responsibility of obligation bearers is to make sure that these objectives are attained. Given the above discussion, it can be concluded that land grab investments violate the basic right to space local communities depend for their survival. In addition, those violations can be traced to global and national land grab actors including states, governmental development agencies, multinationals, intergovernmental organizations, and emerged amalgamated institutions and initiatives. Hence, they should bear appropriate obligations. Particularly, investing states are the main obligation bearers. They appear in different forms like state, development agency, investors or multinational as share-holders. Intentionality of their conduct reflects in their plan, execution and cooperation with host states in a bid to meet the needs of their own citizens. Planning by itself is an acceptable duty of any state, what is refutable is executing those plans within the domestic spheres of other countries in a way that harm others.

Through global cooperation, they are able to transform global issue-areas into host states' national agricultural development goals and activities, i.e. enhancing agricultural productivity and agricultural investments. Investing countries used policy commitments of host states to send multinationals to occupy places and spaces in those countries. This can be accomplished through processes of localization and delocalization. These processes eliminate livelihood spaces of local communities exposing them to harms of landlessness, food insecurity, unemployment, loss of access to resources, social disarticulation, marginalization and others. Yet, instead of respecting, protecting and fulfilling the rights of affected people, they come up with instruments of VG and PRAI that facilitate expansion abroad. These tools are not in a position to respect and protect the rights of communities not to be evicted from the land they use for their livelihood. Finally, it can be concluded that land grab harms are the upshots of the actions the actors took and omitted. Due to expansion of the well-off abroad they eliminated spaces, displaced people and dispossessed land and resources. They omitted actions of releasing value-additive production processes by retaining them, while exporting their domestic risks to the poor.

6 Chapter Six

Proposal for Fair Global Distribution of Resources

Introduction

There are necessary and sufficient reasons to argue for global justice. We live neither in slavery nor in colonial era. We live in national communities, and at the same time in the era of globalization where the norms of global cooperation govern the relationships between societies. If one rejects this premise, it is similar to either admitting to slavery or colonialism or has to come up with something different from global cooperation and interdependence. Hence, my understanding of the conditions of global justice takes significantly the concept of interdependence of domestic conditions in to account. In this era of globalization, although we expect the discontinuity of the ugly characteristics of the slave and colonial eras, deprivation of distant others for every affluent life still occurs. In this era of high moral value and human rights, harming others is an unacceptable conduct. We expect the full exercise of the moral values that humanity has developed so far by learning from the wrongdoings of our bad histories. States have ratified various treaties that bound them to live up to those treaties both in their domestic and non-domestic conducts. As we live in national communities and globalized world we owe duty of justice to the distant others. The duty of justice among societies entails sharing the rightful claims of others that emanate from their participation in global cooperation. However, because there is global injustice, needless to say the issue of global justice becomes a major concern. Hence, I strongly argue domestic conditions and risks, global cooperation and structures have to be the focal points of our analysis for global justice.

In the previous chapters I have verified my premises of the conditions of global justice including: 1. national communities are not self-sufficient, 2. domestic justice of a society depends on their domestic capability and the domestic capability of other societies, 3. societies have interdependent life experiences driven by domestic risks, 4. global order, institutions and processes organize around common issue-areas, 5. harming others is the result of expansion abroad, accumulation of resources and value-additions for mitigating own domestic risks. *Accordingly, it can be concluded that well-off societies harm the poor as they design and impose global order on poor societies, expand abroad and accumulate resources and value-additions to mitigate their own domestic risks.*

This chapter concerns about the proposal for duty to distant others namely risk absorption drawn from the above premises. Risk absorption aims at reducing unfair accumulation of resources and value-additive production process as it obligates well-off societies to absorb potential risks before they are exported to others. This can be achieved by obligating affluent societies to release retained value-additive production processes while they retained while expanding abroad. Expansion abroad can be a salient feature of globalization but ensuing harms of risk exportation have to be retained where they originate. In the ideal case, to use Rawls's concept, international regulatory system might be able to compensate, but in the non-ideal case we need some form of reciprocal compensatory obligation. In that sense, value-additive production processes are rightful claims of the poor rooted in their participation in global cooperative activities. The duty to risk absorption rests on global interdependence and our own life experiences which is connected to the life experiences of distant others, in contrast to the failure of the poor to meet their basic needs and capacity of the affluent to help.

The chapter is organized in three major parts. The first concerns about the justification for duty to distant others. The second solves the puzzle I set in the first chapter namely invisibly linked life and crystalize major premises. The third works out my proposition for duty to risk absorption. It begins by elaborating Pogge's ideas of harm and compensatory obligation. Then comments on issues that I call pollutants of justice to differentiate justice from acts benevolence. This is followed by the substance of duty of risk absorption and its moral justifications.

6.1 Reconceptualizing the Concern to Distant Others

The main arguments presented so far debunk the moral question most writers raise with regards to global justice. In conclusion, the conventional moral question is incompatible with the globally interdependent life distant societies live for the reason distant others act closer. The significance of this assertion is that it dictates us shift our conception of the moral concern to others from "we" and "they" to the conception of justice within an interdependent societies per se. In that sense, the level of abject global poverty, that many concerns about, can be seen as an upshot of the global system and interdependence which in turn shows impracticality of the appeals many make under the guise of helping others. As it is elaborated earlier, statist

theoreticians trigger the duty to minimum assistance due to the failure of the poor. They think along the line that “their” failure is “our” duty. Yet, such thinking doesn’t explain whether the poor fail by themselves. A critical look at the interdependent world we live essentializes the need for an alternative thinking and conception of global justice which is based on society per se and interdependent life experiences.

Pogge vehemently argues based on a negative duty not to harm others. He is bothered about global poverty and reluctance of well-off societies who benefit from the harms. He not only appeals based on rigorous data on the level of global poverty including death and mortality rates of mothers and children, malnutrition, hunger, lack of medical services and other amenities but also by directly linking well-off societies with those problems. He argues:

- A. “That it is wrong severely to harm innocent people for minor gains” (Pogge 2008:32),
- B. “Any institutional design is unjust when it foreseeably produces an avoidable human rights deficit” (Ibid., 25),
- C. “The citizens and governments of the affluent countries - whether intentionally or not - are imposing a global institutional order that foreseeably and avoidably reproduces severe and widespread poverty” (Ibid., 207),
- D. ‘By continuing to support the current global order and the national policies that shape and sustain it without taking compensating action toward institutional reform shielding its victims, we share a negative responsibility for the undue harms they foreseeably produce’ (Ibid., 150).

These arguments are incongruent with global interdependence. His negative duty rests on three major grounds. The first, the existence of harm which is morally wrong (A). Meaning that there should be an objective reality namely harm or poverty. Many agree on this point however they differ on the next two points. The second, he identifies the responsible parties for causing the harms and directly links the citizens of well-off societies and their governments with those harms. They involve in shaping and imposing the current global economic order on the poor (C), which is nothing but global interdependence. He claims “[t]he designs of this order is fashioned and adjusted in international negotiations in which our governments enjoy a crushing advantage in bargaining power and expertise” (Ibid., 26-27). He further declares:

In this vein it is often mentioned that our governments have instigated the violent installation of many oppressive rulers in poor countries, are selling juntas and autocrats the weapons they need to stay in power (n. 323), and have fostered a culture of corruption by permitting our firms to bribe foreign officials, by blessing such bribes with tax deductibility (n. 243), and by providing safe havens for such illicit wealth. Still more significant, in my view, are the resource and borrowing privileges that our global order confers upon those who manage to bring a country under their control (Pogge, 2008:29).

The third, he assigns compensatory obligation to well-off citizens and their governments due to their harmful conducts (D). Pogge (Ibid) concludes “the citizens and governments of the affluent states are therefore violating a negative duty of justice when they, in collaboration with the ruling elites of the poor countries, coercively exclude the poor from a proportional resource share.” This underscores his justifications for compensatory obligation.

Still he finds a big problem that “... people do not see, and do not want to see, that we and our governments acting in our names are substantially involved in supporting such unjust rules and their coercive imposition” (Ibid., 31). Given this worry of Pogge, I strongly argue the reason lies on the fact that he misses the root causes of the harms as he analyses them based on their immediate causes and manifestations. If he had dealt with the root causes, his justifications would have been stronger. For instance, he tells us well-off states shape and impose global economic order. But, he does not tell us why they shape and impose the global institutional order except he says “minor gains” (A). This reflects his refrain from dealing with the domestic risks of well-off societies. As a consequence, he reflects unbalanced view on the “minor gains” he mentioned, the level of harm or global poverty that he is worried about, and the level of well-off societies’ involvement. As such, his demonstration of the relationships between harms, obligations, and people’s response and conducts appear weaker. In my view, he is supposed to equally look at the level of gains or benefits well-off societies generate from the harms they impose. The benefits well-off societies accrue are not “minor gains” but major gains, because they are not self-sufficient as they live with persistent domestic risks.

His assessment of the inquiry “[w]hat reasons do people in the developed West have for being unconcerned with the persistence of severe poverty abroad?” (Ibid., 7) needs attention too.

While he provides reasons of futility, jeopardy, perversity, and optimistic belief (Pogge 2008:7; Pogge adopted the concept of the rhetoric of reaction from Hirshmann) for people being unconcerned about the poor, he again missed reason of positive feedback (Soros 2013:322) which shows a gap in his view. According to those who give futility reasons, they have lost their hope for eradicating poverty due to the failures of the various efforts made to that end. Those who provide reason of jeopardy think enormity of the problem being beyond their financial capacity. Interestingly, others fear the negative consequences of saving the life of the poor like future world population growth. Finally, although there are optimistic people who appreciate the progress so far achieved with regard to uplifting of the living standards of the poor, they believe much more could not be done. In contrast, I argue the problem lies on the understanding of the situation they are trying to explain and also the moral question they employ to deal with global justice. I can say, the huge gap between the reality that Pogge and many others construct about the conditions of the poor, the response of people in well-off societies, and the results so far achieved is due to the nature of the question that focuses on the living conditions of the poor. As stated in the previous chapters, the life experiences of the poor and well-off can't be understood in isolation from each other due to their interdependence. Hence, we need to equally examine the life experiences of the well-off too.

It follows then, that lack of proper reflexivity can be the main reason for being unconcerned about the poor. As Soros (Ibid) noted “[r]eflexive feedback loops can be either negative or positive. Negative feedback brings the participants’ views and the actual situations closer together; positive feedbacks drives them apart.” Accordingly, as most apply positive feedback to understand global poverty they depart their view from the actual reality of interdependence. To relate this to our moral concern, many starts by conceiving global justice from the other which is the global poor. They construct a situation that the poor are living a life not worth to live. The poor are dying due to lack of basic amenities and they live under dictatorship and corrupt rulers. In contrast, they construct a situation where the well-off live with affluence whereby they enjoy full access to basic amenities and live a life worth to live. If we look at these two realities in isolation, they seem correct but they are partial and deceiving. Actually, the two are highly interdependent; for every affluent life, there is a deprived poor. Yet, many want to change the conditions of the poor based on their view of separated realities of the poor and affluent. Although, Pogge follow the same line of thinking he could come up with rigorous data showing the plights of the poor and its linkage with the conducts of well-off societies. But

still he does not address the root causes as a result of which he could not construct a view close to the reality. This reconceptualization leads to an intervention to his work which is elaborated in the subsequent sections. It starts by reconstructing the conception of the conditions of global justice relating it to the root causes of harm namely domestic risks .

6.2 Root Causes of Global Injustice

As I have argued so far, in order to generate moral duty to distant others, necessary and sufficient conditions of justice at global level have to be fulfilled. Like domestic justice, this should be based on the existence of shared common issue-areas, shared global institutions and cooperative activities meant for solving common problems from which justice can be generated. The existence of these conditions of global justice has been shown in the previous sections. This adopted approach, which is based on domestic risks, is a rational move away from the conventional thinking of the “we” and “they”. It relies on the conception of society per se, the root causes of global injustice, and associated premises. To summarize what has been described so far, I follow a two-step problem analysis: one, a simple observation of our own life conditions; two, deeper analysis of how our life conditions happens to be affluent or poor. The following paragraph explains the first simple observation.

6.2.1 Simple Observation

Societies are not autarky. I am of the opinion that we need to understand the life conditions of ours and others just like a society without labeling that condition poor or affluent. If we do that, our first observation confirms interdependence of the life experiences of distant peoples. As an example, in addition to my ideal type, we find cars in all countries but not all countries produce cars. Car producing countries do not have all the resources they need for producing the cars. Petroleum producing countries are few, but all countries use it. Majority of car producing countries are dependent on imported petrol. We find computers in all countries, but all countries do not produce computers. We have few operating systems and few corporations who produce them. Yet, those operating systems are in use in all countries. Computer producing countries do not have all the resources to produce computers. In all country's markets are full of imported items. We can list many things. A cursory observation of life experiences in all societies confirm this reality. Such a perspective demand us to make a critical reflection on

the reasons some societies are affluent and others remain poor. The following second level of problem analysis deals with the root causes of affluence and poverty, global injustice at large.

6.2.2 We Live in an Interdependent World

The poor and affluent not only live under shared global institutional arrangements (Pogge 2008) but they also have interdependent life experiences. Let us go back to my ideal type and reflect on root causes of global injustice. The aim of the ideal type is to make a representation of our interconnected daily life experiences so that we can characterize and scrutinize it to generate a moral duty thereof. To that end five persons from five countries and three continents are chosen as a representative of the life experiences of the wider societies and regions they live. The important question for discussion is: what kind of correlations exist between the individuals, and also the societies they live?

The life experiences in one society is highly connected to the life experiences in another societies. As Pogge argued, by using the global order and international regulatory system well-off states created that connectivity. To come back to the ideal type, Mr. A and B are respectively from affluent societies of the UK and Saudi Arabia. In contrast, Mr. O, X, and Y are respectively from the so-called poor societies of Ethiopia, Tanzania and Cameroon. Let us make an imaginary excursion to those societies, and first make observation of their life, and then make an interview. If we visit Mr. A, we may observe him living a life of an affluent person. Mr. A uses his car for his daily activities which he powers with biofuels. He may also elaborate his daily consumption patterns, if we ask him about it. The same applies to Mr. B too. Our observation may confirm us his life of affluence, and he may elaborate it well including his staple food which is rice. Both of them may tell us the origin, and the production and reproduction patterns of the commodities they consume. Probably they tell us the countries where those commodities are produced by reading it from the labels. If we further ask them they may tell us that their governments encourage agricultural investments abroad based on information from the media and political discussions in their respective countries. But, both of them might not tell us the size of land their respective countries acquired in Africa and their consequent harms on local communities which is missed from conventional discussions in their societies. Likewise, they may not tell us the level and severity of arable land and soil scarcity in their respective countries given the growing domestic demand for human goods, and global

competition for the same. It is up to us to make that analysis. The UK has expanded by 2,079,823 ha through 66 investment projects in the continent, among others 2 in Ethiopia and 9 in Tanzania, directly affecting more than 519,955 people. Saudi Arabia has expanded by acquiring 27 projects, 11 in Ethiopia and 6 in Sudan. One rice and soya project are located in the area where Mr. O displaced from.²⁰

On the other side, our excursion in the other three countries and communities may confirm the level of poverty. We find Mr. O and his colleagues in Kenya in a UNHCR migrants reception camp. We may feel sorry about his life and wonder the way he survives in the camp, and we may also wish him success in his effort to get a chance for third country protection. But, if we ask him, he may tell us about the experiences of displacement and dispossession such as loss of land and water resources, his cattle, trees, community, and others. He may also give us a comparative view of his life condition before and after displacement. He may also tell us that his land is given to a Saudi based company to produce rice for export. While he does his elaboration, we may observe his feelings of pain, misery, sadness, suffering, regret and other manifestations of bad experiences from his face. Back in his home village in Gambella, Ethiopia, we may see large industrial agricultures. We may appreciate the investments and the changes in the areas. We may also read national and international reports appreciating foreign agricultural investments, cooperation, opening of land market, and others. After some kilometers drive we may see resettlement areas where communities live. The resettlement areas depict the level of poverty and life conditions. If we ask the communities there, they may repeat the story Mr. O already told us that they are dispossessed of their land and brought to the resettlement areas.

Similarly, we may find the Tanzanian Mr. X in a poor condition with his small land where the produce is inadequate. But, if we ask him, he may describe to us impoverishment harms of the dispossession of 9000 ha of village land which is given to a UK based SunBiofuels. He may tell us the difficulties of grazing his cattle well, fire wood collection, farming, and other daily spatial activities. He may also tell us the problems his family members and others still face due to illness caused by the chemicals SunBiofuels company used in the Jatropha farm. On the way

²⁰ I have shown these figures in Page 16-20.

to the community we may also see a deserted Jatropha plantation SunBiofuels left. Summary of our observation demonstrates livelihoods compression and deprivation in the community.

Likewise, we may observe the fears reign in the Cameroonian community where a US based Herakles Farms negotiate with the government to acquire 70,000 ha of land. At first glance, we may see farmers working in their farm, including Mr. Y. We may appreciate greenness of the area and the cash crops in the farms. Life looks going normal. But, we may observe the level of fear, if we ask them closely. There is a widespread rumor that the government negotiated the land to give to the company. Land demarcation has been conducted without the participation of the farm owners. Particularly this land demarcation increased the level of fear of loss of land and property.

In nutshell, our observation demonstrates high correlation between the life experiences of the five persons. People might not realize the level of association between their life experiences as it remains invisible. Most importantly, this association is an inverse one; deprivation of the former and provision to the later. Meaning that national and global actors have unequally treated distant peoples. Mr. A and B are provided with the commodities they need to flourish their life, while Mr. O, X, and Y are deprived of their livelihood bases. The quotes that have been already presented in previous chapters can be interjected here to illustrate the level of deprivation and put it in to context. What do we feel when a Tanzanian responds to us: “It is like someone climbing a tree and finding a poisonous snake and below him there's a crocodile in the water. So, if he stays on the tree, the snake will bite him. If he goes into the water, the crocodile will get him. That's the situation we're in” (Oakland Institute, 2012). Now, we can fully explain this symbolic representation. The snake and crocodile can be respectively considered as national and global order. We can consider the snake as the conducts of affluent societies and global structures, and the crocodile as their own governments and administrative structures. Both national and global actors in tandem compress the life of the poor and flourish the life of affluent societies. Pogge's idea of global institutional order can be read this way too. We can see this further from the following quotation when an Ethiopian from a resettlement area in Gambella region tells us “the government is killing our people through starvation and hunger. It is better to attack us in one place than just waiting here together to die. If you attack us, some of us could run, and some could survive. But this, we are dying here with our children.

Government workers get this salary, but we are just waiting here for death” (HRW 2012:45). This person considers resettlement areas as concentration camps which is similar to Heidegger’s comparison of motorized food industry with gas chambers and extermination camps (see page 138). Definitely, this is what the Tanzanian want to say about the conducts of the crocodile and snakes. The Cameroonian farmer also ponders, “I am wondering how you can pay somebody’s farm worth a million, you pay only about 1,500 Franc to the government” (see: Herakles Debacle), and a Cameroonian woman defends “then why should you say we are hungry, we don’t need you” (Ibid). I interject the point that needs to be interjected, the conception of global justice from the view of the poor which most writers neglect in their conception of global justice.

The Tanzanian and Ethiopian articulate the displacement and dispossession harms they endured. The Cameroonian peasant presents us his own cost benefits analysis and he wonders as to how a self-respecting person, let alone a government, handover his property for an amount below current worthiness. Interestingly, the Cameroonian woman defends herself that she is not a hungry person, rather she is an able-bodied person as a result she does not need any external person to disturb her humanness; meaning that her capability to think, plan, act, and live the type of life she wants to live than thrown to a resettlement camp, like the people in Mr. O village, waiting for the mercy of donations from Mr. A and B, NGO’s, and relief organization. Above all, she does not want to be daily visited by international media crew for interview and filming for international media outlets or collect donations. For that matters, the medias feed us a positive feedback and the donations we give create strong invers association between deprivation and fulfilment of human goods that we experience in our daily lives. If we accept this connection, we should also accept the differential treatments of deprivation and provisions too. For that reason, the life experiences of the poor and affluent are highly interrelated. We cannot understand either of them in complete isolation.

6.2.3 No Society is Self-sufficient

We need to further look at the reason for our interdependent life. This is the root of all the conditions of global justice that Pogge does not address. My view of the world tells me that all societies are not self-contained or autarky regardless of their level of affluence or poverty. The previous premise, interdependent life rests on this assertion. In the arguments of statist, we find

an implicit assumption of self-sufficiency of affluent societies. A simple fact that we find imported items in markets of all countries disprove this implicit assumption. The reasons the governments of the countries of Mr. A and B promote expansion abroad, and also the governments of Mr. O, X, and Y promote incoming agricultural investments substantiate this premise too. All of them have a problem of expanding domestic demands for human goods and resources that they could not fully mitigate only with domestic capabilities. Hence, the association of life experiences of the affluent and the poor is deeply rooted to domestic risks. For that reason, the only way to achieve pseudo self-sufficiency like well-off societies is to expand abroad for controlling arable lands and other resources, and importing commodities.

At the core of domestic risks and expansion abroad are found resources. The UK and Saudi Arabia have reason to expand abroad, and the other three societies have reasons to receive the investments. Domestic risk to satisfy basic goods is the common denominator among cooperating societies. While the affluent have risks of biofuels, food security and arable land; others have risks of food security and energy but they have sufficient arable land. How can the EU meet its target of 10% replacement of fossil fuel consumption with biofuels? How could the EU attain that requiring 38% of domestic productive land? Where does the EU find that 38% productive land? No matter how they are efficient, technologically advanced, wealthy, and possess other domestic capabilities, they are not able to achieve that target only with domestic resources. In fact, “industrial biofuels are not the fuels of the poor; they are the foods of the poor transformed in to heat, electricity, and fuel for the rich” (Shiva 2008:78). The difference between the affluent and the poor is their level of affluence and efficiency of domestic structures, a capacity to expand abroad where they find strategic resources. Yet, this does not make a difference in offering lasting solutions to their domestic risks as they are inherent human needs. If we put this into historical context, since the era of slavery the search for resources is the driver of expansion abroad. As a result, injustices which emanate from expansion abroad still continue.

From this perspective, the rejection of the role of resources for domestic justice, particularly Rawls, is untenable. For instance, at the core of this argument we find an important resource, arable land and soil, that well-off societies lack and aggressively occupy abroad. Arable land and soil are vital resources for the production of agricultural commodities and just distribution

of human goods. The premise that no society is self-sufficient rely on this basic fact. Resources are arbitrarily distributed among societies. Some have abundant resources while others suffer from lack of resources. This provides societies with different potentials for domestic justice.

Therefore, like domestic structures, resources are important factors for the production of the objects of justice. Societies require both for establishing a just domestic system. An advanced well-off society need resources, as poor society that have abundant resources need to establish efficient domestic structures. Otherwise, well-off societies can't produce and reproduce human goods in sufficient quantities and qualities without getting access to resources abroad. Equally, societies living on abundant resources can't produce and reproduce human goods without having efficient domestic structures, technology and others.

We have different arguments concerning the role of natural resources for domestic justice and how to globally distribute them. For instance, "the crucial element in how a country fares is its political culture-its members' political and civic virtues-and not the level of its resources, the arbitrariness of the distribution of natural resources causes no difficulty" (Rawls 1999:117). This is how Rawls justify his disregard of resources. In contrast Beitz (1999:41) argues "...adequate access to resources is a prerequisite for successful operation of (domestic) cooperative schemes, and resources are scarce." As the later argument is tenable, the right to resources is equally defensible. But, the problem is not on the right itself. Rather, on the way resources ought to be accessed abroad. Whichever argument we follow, there is no moral justification for evicting local communities from the resources they rely for their survival for the benefit of others. In this regard, we can argue Mr. A, B, O, X, and Y, and their societies have equal right to arable land. Yet, we could not morally justify the eviction of Mr. O, X, and Y for the sake of providing Mr. A and B with the products they badly need. As such, I resort to a mechanism of realizing equal right for resources that I call the duty to risk absorption.

6.2.4 Importance of Global Cooperation for Domestic Justice

Given the above arguments, now we can look at the means self-insufficient societies become affluent or satisfy the needs of their citizens at the expense of the poor. Recall that I have stressed we neither live in slave nor in colonial era. Hence, societies participate in global cooperative activities. This is in congruent with Pogge's assertion "there is shared institutional

order that is shaped by the better-off and imposed on the worst-off” (Pogge 2008:205). Without global cooperative activities, no society can be found in its current level and form of advancement. Without global cooperation, the distribution of basic human goods and opportunities the way we see today in different societies is not possible. If this premise is rejected, its inverse we still live either in slave or colonial era will be true. Global and regional cooperation have become the norms of societal relationships. Societies cooperate around important and shared issue-areas. In this regard, food security is not only the problem of the poor, it is also the problem of the affluent. The same applies to climate changes and energy too.

Food security and climate change have emerged as common issue-areas. World leaders have been discussing and agreeing on issues related with these common issue-areas. They have developed certain norms to achieve common goals. Subsequently, they have established pertinent institutions and initiatives that societies work together. Furthermore, they have developed specific interventions for changing their aims into actions. As a driving force of global cooperation domestic risks develop into common issue-areas among societies around which they organize. From this point of view, it can be argued that: the first, without cooperation societal endeavor to establish and maintain a just system is not possible. To make a just distribution of the objects of justice, there should be objects of justice to be distributed. Hence, statist’s idea of domestic capabilities are not the only requirements for domestic justice. The second, global cooperation is equally important for establishing a just domestic system. As a result, the global cooperation that affects the global distribution of resources and objects of justice has to be the focus of analysis for the discussion of duty to distant others. For that same reason, the life of affluence and poverty that we have in different societies can be traced back to the shared global institution we have.

6.2.5 The National-Global Nexus

Nationality and common sympathy are important reasons statist writers rely on for confining justice to national compatriots. In this view every society is supposed to give priority to fellow citizens. This argument could lead to a condition of blockade of justice. If we follow this view, we will also end up with a state of injustice that we saw in my ideal type. The ideal type demonstrates injustices committed against local communities in cooperating African societies. This happens because well-off prioritized the interests of their own citizens. We have seen

well-off states and all the institutions representing their citizens did their job of national community. Executing the responsibilities of national communities is permissible. But, expansion abroad, retaining value-additive production processes and elimination of the domestic spaces of other societies is not permissible as harming others have no moral justifications. This is the characteristic of slavery and colonial eras. That is why I argue this assertion of statist promotes the continuity of harming others. Furthermore, statist fail to provide harm avoiding mechanism at global stage within the context of justice. Instead, they resort to minimum humanitarian assistance. In end effect, they fail to address the issue of global justice altogether. Therefore, the problem of such statist view is that it neglects the impacts of the conducts of national communities and global actors on others.

There could be a condition where the ideas of nationality and common sympathy can be acceptable and it is only within domestic sphere on issues not related with others. On a shared and common issue-areas society can prioritize their interest and compatriots so long as they give the rightful share of the others or not undermining the interest of others. Prioritizing societal interest is different from harming others. Societies can prioritize own interest but it does not necessarily mean they should harm others at the same time. They could face reciprocal action from other societies against their conducts in case they endanger the interests of others. Negative reciprocity could hinder societies from advancing their own interest. For that same reason, prioritizing own national interest has to be exercised with equal treatment of others both domestically and abroad. For instance, in my ideal type, the UK and Saudi Arabia could prioritize their interest, but when they come to cooperate with the other three countries they should not undermine the interest of the later societies and harm the poor.

Statist's application of domestic characteristics such as sharing nationality, common institutions and cooperative activities as inclusionary and exclusionary factors of justice emanate from the misconception of the difference between justice at domestic and global spheres. As statist dwell in domestic justice relying on these characteristics, they neglect the inclusion of domestic societies into global society. Local spheres have already become a global sphere too; societies enter to global cooperative activities and institutions as they transform from local to global societies. By global society, in addition to the supranational institutions

and regulatory systems, I mean interconnectedness of the life experiences of people living in different societies (6.3.1), distant others connect together.

Hence, we have other global inclusionary factors such as global institutions and cooperative activities driven by domestic risks (6.3.2). Global cooperative activities and institutions bring societies under common issue-areas and institutional arrangements. Through cooperative activities and shared institutions societies involve in global community. As a result, the outcomes of those cooperative activities and institutions need to be fairly distributed among participating societies. Global justice does not require societies to distribute those outcomes solely produced by their domestic cooperative activities. For example, a society may have a health insurance, welfare or pension scheme. They can be considered as full outcomes of domestic collective activities. Pension schemes are for people who work and contribute to the pension fund. Likewise, unemployment benefits are for people who are willing to work but unable to find jobs. These schemes may automatically exclude people who are not members of the society, as they are full outcomes of domestic collective activities. However, a foreigner who is legally employed in another society contributing to the pension, and health insurance schemes cannot be excluded from those benefits. For instance, Mr. O, X, and Y can be automatically excluded from the welfare, pension and health insurance schemes in the UK. But, a Tanzanian who is legally employed and work in the UK contributing to the pension and health insurance schemes has a full right to benefit from the schemes he contributed to, though he is a foreigner. The domestic system that let him legally work and contribute to its pension and health insurance system has no moral justification to exclude him from the system he contributes to.

The other dimension is that sectors that have to do with common issue-areas are liable to share their outcomes fairly with others. International trade can be a case in point. International trade is an exchanging mechanism among societies. We have international trade laws according to which societies are supposed to operate. Those laws are supposed to be fair to all. Development cooperation is another case in point where societies engage in cooperative activities. For instance, due to the expanding demand for agricultural commodities, agricultural development has become a cooperative activity among some African and well-off countries. Like international trade, development cooperation has to be fair too. In that sense, Mr. O, X, and Y

have a claim on the outcomes of the global cooperative schemes their states involve as a result of which they lose their land and resources. Due to global differential treatment, they are excluded from the outcomes; Mr. O, X, and Y take the burdens while Mr. A and B enjoy the benefits. This is the point I am identifying and call a state of global injustice.

The point I want to make is that there are pure domestic objects of justice societies may not share with others, while there are also global cooperative activities the outcome of which societies are bound to fairly share with others. In this regard, we cannot wholly argue that societies always give priority to their nationals and also societies should always equally treat nationals and foreigners. The notion of nationality and common sympathy can be applicable to issues not shared with others. Equal treatment of nationals and non-nationals will be applicable on common-issue areas. But, the notion of nationality and common sympathy the way statist promote perpetuate a state of global injustice.

6.2.6 Unfair Accumulation of Resources and Value-Additive Production Process

A common characteristic of slavery and colonialism is unfair accumulation of resources and value-additive production processes. Contemporary global cooperation equally epitomizes these characteristics too. What I refer unfair is the unbalanced distribution of the benefits and burdens of cooperative activities, together with the exclusion of the poor from resource use and ownership. Unfair accumulation of resources and value-additive production processes are deeply rooted to the domestic risks of well-off societies (6.3.2). Though, some thinkers disregard the role of resources for domestic just distribution, in order to satisfy the growing domestic demands for human goods and social progress in terms of innovation and adaptation, societies need to get access to strategic resources outside of their geographic boundaries.

The case of contemporary growing demands for food and biofuels crops substantiate this argument. The global and domestic risks of food and biofuels security is so huge that well-off societies could not tackle either domestically or from international markets. For that reason, they opt for expansion abroad for the control of arable lands, water, and other resources. In addition, by controlling such resources, and producing the agricultural crops by themselves they effectively export their domestic risks to others as they retain and control value-additive

production processes too. As a result, they effectively exclude the poor from sharing the benefits in the production of which they participate.

I have shown the level of the demands for food and biofuels crops. Likewise, I have demonstrated the amount of arable land different regions need to produce the agricultural crops they badly need. Particularly the West and Middle East regions respectively require huge amounts of biofuels and food crops. Interestingly, they are the one who experience severe scarcity of arable land given their growing domestic demands for the commodities. And again, they are the one who invest on industrial agriculture in sub-Saharan Africa. All in all, well-off states have acquired more than 56.2 million ha of arable land in Africa as a result of which at least 14 million people are displaced who are not only excluded from the use of the lands but also other resources and products too. As such, they are expelled from the whole system they rely for their survival.²¹

Important to the discussion under consideration is the effects of unfair accumulation. Three major implications could be listed. First, well-off societies expand their global land and resources control. In the case of land, their actual global land size expands by the size of land they acquire abroad. In contrast, poor societies' actual land size shrinks by the size of land they leased to well-off societies. Second, well-off societies' control over resources and production processes expand as well. Contrarily, poor societies' control over resources and production processes diminish. Third, the domestic distribution of human goods and opportunities in well-off societies expand, while the same compressed in poor societies. In nutshell, unfair accumulation deepens global poverty and inequality.

6.2.7 Differential Treatment of Distant Others

At the core of global justice, we find equal treatment and distribution of the outcomes of global cooperative activities. From the above discussions and the ideal type, it can be concluded well-off states and global order fail to serve this objective. At the level of life experience, the global order has provided the affluent with food and biofuels by depriving the poor. Here, equality is referenced as fairness not as sameness. "In the various notions of equality, it is possible to

²¹ For details of demand for agricultural crops, arable land, expansion abroad see chapter three and for the harms of expansion see chapter five.

distinguish two families of meaning. In the first, equality indicates a kind of justice or fair treatment. In the second, equality indicates sameness or homogeneity” (Lummis 2007:38). In that sense, I want to stress that the global order does not give the poor what they deserve from their participation in global cooperation.

Pogge has explained the injustices of the global order which is similar the concept of expansion abroad. My case does not only corroborate his assertions but also traces the root causes of the injustices of the global order which is rooted in the domestic risks of national communities (6.3.2). In that sense, harms committed against the poor are due to the decisions, policies, strategies, and actions of well-off societies to solve their own domestic risks.

Among others, the decisions made by strong states and global institutions concerning common issue-areas exert high impacts on the life experiences of individual persons in distant countries. “The affluent countries have been using their power to shape the rules of the world economy according to their own interest and thereby have deprived the poorest populations of a fair share of global economic growth – quite avoidably so, as the GRD proposal shows” (Pogge 2008:207). For example, EU’s decision to increase biofuels consumption by 10% have paramount consequence on the life of Mr. O, X, and Y. The decisions of biofuels adopting states concerning provision of financial resources to multinationals through their DFIs has high impacts on farmers in distant lands. Likewise, G8’s decision on food security and development cooperation have paramount consequence on rural communities in distant lands. The WB’s decisions, policy support, and operations in terms of land governance, commercialization, resettlement programs, and related matters affect the life of millions of farmers and pastoralist communities in poor countries. The operations of GDA in cooperating poor countries affect local communities in distant lands. Needless to make further analysis, in relation to this, since Pogge has already did great job (Ibid).

Rather, the reasons for their conducts need explanation. Affluent societies cooperate with the poor not due to the poor circumstances of distant others. It is not to produce and feed the poor or provide them with opportunities, instead they are unable to cope with their own domestic risks such as food and biofuels insecurities. Well-off societies are faced with likely future food or biofuels insecure scenarios. The challenges of climate change stimulate technological

innovation leading to the adoption of biofuels to replace with fossil fuels. But, the adoption of biofuels adds fuel to the fire as it aggravates the problem of food insecurity in import dependent societies due to diversion of food crops to fuel and competition for arable land. Majority of biofuels adopting countries do not have sufficient arable land. Yet, biofuels require huge amounts of land that has been used for other purposes, including for food crops production.

As a consequence, the only strategy potentially insecure well-off states adopt is to cooperate with arable land abundant states to expand abroad. We need to acknowledge that well-off states have the leverage to bring poor states on board on agendas of their interest, while poor states lack the same. By doing so, well-off states are able to acquire land and virtually expand in potentially secure countries. The upshot of this is that they are able to set up and control agricultural production and supply chains, and sustain their domestic distribution of human goods and opportunities. In contrast, cooperating arable land abundant poor societies compress their capabilities of domestic production and distribution of human goods and opportunities as they dislocate and dispossess local communities and eliminate domestic spaces where communities expedite their spatial activities. In this regard, more than 14 million people like Mr. O, X and Y, in cooperating land abundant African countries, are forcefully sacrificed their life conditions for the sake of satisfying the wellbeing of affluent societies like that of Mr. A and B (see: Chapter Five). Here, we can note the differential treatment and distributional effects of global cooperation. Furthermore, we see direct association between the life experiences of the poor and affluent. In the absence of such a global cooperation at least the 14 million people would have continued the way they used to live and at the same time the domestic risks of food and biofuels in expanding societies would not have been mitigated.

Global differential distribution effect of global cooperation is rooted to the domestic risks of affluent societies. They are able to export their domestic risks and import benefits by cooperating with the poor. Sub-Saharan African region has been identified, targeted and finally compressed. Majority of land grab investments are concentrated in Eastern, Western and Southern Africa regions. A strong correlation has been constructed between low land use growth potential in well-off societies and expansion abroad; that means investments originate from regions with low levels of land use growth potential and directed towards land abundant countries. Likewise, there is a direct correlation between low domestic crop production growth

potential, relative to growing demands, and expansion abroad. Investments originate from regions with low level of crop production growth potential and higher crops demand.

In the nutshell, without doing much philosophical argumentations two important conditions of global justice can be identified. The first, individual persons' entitlement and claims for basic needs and opportunities. Our entitlements and claims for objects of justice is from the society we live. But, we get access to what we lack domestically through global cooperation. The second, the differential treatment of the global cooperation towards the poor and the affluent. This is a very important point for the discussion of global justice. I have underscored that we neither live in slave nor in colonial era. In a globalized world, societies could expand abroad and flourish their domestic life conditions. But, compressing the life conditions of the poor for the sake of mitigating own domestic risks is morally not acceptable. As they expand abroad the affluent penetrate policy and strategy spaces, delocalize resources and spaces of the poor, occupy locations, and finally localize their investments and systems of agricultural production to export crops back home. Delocalization harms the poor as it destroys their spaces of livelihood basis. While expanding abroad affluent societies retain value-additive production processes as a result of which their domestic risks realize in poor societies in the form of harm. As a consequence, the poor are made to fail to improve their conditions.

6.3 The Poor are Made to Fail

The above points and arguments lead to a major conclusion *the poor are not failed, rather made to fail* which is sufficient enough to debunk the assertion "their failure" is "our duty". As a consequence, we can set and shift the conditions of global justice based on interdependent life experiences. Henceforth, I expound this conclusion. The dichotomous world view of affluent and poor societies gives an incomplete picture of global justice. Such world view fails if we inquire how self-insufficient society satisfy the basic needs of its population to the level it is today. Let us assume today all societies stop their import and export activities. Then ponder how they can sustain their current level of livelihood. This fundamental question lead to the essence of global justice rooted to domestic risks. Justice is about sharing benefits and burdens as an outcome of collective activities, giving the rightful share of the others, and also not to interfere in the affairs of others. Hence, the poor remain poor because they did not get their fair share from their participation in global cooperation. Most importantly, the global order act closer and interfere in the daily life of the poor with the assumption that they are not able to

change their conditions. The policy and regulatory advisory services global institutions, Governmental Development Institutions, and others provided, and the changes made thereof are interferences as a result of which the poor are dispossessed of their land and resources with paramount consequences of eliminating their local spaces. Therefore, as they act closer and affect the life of the poor, the poor are not failed by themselves. Likewise, without such interferences and acting closer the affluent wouldn't succeed.

The inability of theories to provide us with sufficient answer to this fundamental question ascertain their failure to address two major issues in their analysis of the duty to distant others and at the same time disregard of their importance. The first is domestic insufficiency and risks (6.3.2), no society is self-sufficient. Statists' implicit assumption of societal self-sufficiency is refutable as they experience persistent domestic expansion of demands for human goods and resources. Basic domestic structures, nationality, common sympathy, coercive institutions, technology, and others are necessary but not sufficient for the production, reproduction, and enjoyment of the objects of justice. The second, since no society is self-sufficient, they rely on global cooperative activities and exchanges (6.3.3) to act closer for attaining their goal of satisfying their domestic demands for human goods and opportunities. Therefore, like domestic structures, global interdependence and cooperative activities are equally important. From this, we can draw two conditions of justice. The first, the motive to cooperate with other societies and expand abroad. The second, global structures, institutions, and processes facilitate global cooperative activities and expansion abroad. Hence, our main focus area of global justice has to be whether global cooperation is fair or not. For that same reason, a theory that neglect these two fundamental issues will fail to address the very idea of global justice.

From this perspective, it can be argued the poor do not fail but made to fail, and also the affluent do not succeed but made to succeed. Instead of making proper societal reflexivity on own life experiences and domestic risks (6.3.1, 6.3.2), and global cooperation (6.3.3), many start their analysis of the moral concern of the affluent toward the global poor. Consequently, they assume poorness of the other living in distant lands and immerse themselves in the discussion of whether well-off societies have a duty of justice or humanitarian assistance. As they entertain the poorness of the poor they depart from their own domestic risks. They begin with the conditions of the others in isolation from the conditions of their own. For example, in the ideal

type they consider Mr. O, X, and Y as poor, and Mr. A and B as affluent. But, it does not mean Mr. O, X, and Y have no potential to survive though their life is not similar to the affluent, and also Mr. A and B are completely self-sufficient. The life of Mr. A and B would not be the same in a condition where there is no global cooperation and exchange (6.3.3). But the irony is that statisticians believe Mr. O, X, and Y are poor because of the failure of their societies to establish basic structures, institutions, lack of know-how, resource mismanagement, poor administration, corruption and other reasons. In the cases of Mr. A and B, the reverse is taken for granted that their societies did their best to lead a life of affluence refuting the role played and actions taken by their own states and global structures in exporting risks to the poor.

If we carefully scrutinize this view, the conditions of Mr. O, X, and Y are created neither by the individuals themselves nor by their governments alone. Rather the motive of the societies of Mr. A and B, the decisions and conducts of their leaders and global order have direct influence on the conditions Mr. O, X, and Y live today. In chapter three, I have shown the level of the growing demands for food and biofuels crops, arable land, and expansion abroad (6.3.2). I have also shown the various policies, for instance, of the EU and Gulf countries. In chapter four, I have shown how the global institutions organize around the common issue-areas of food security and climate changes (6.3.3). Most importantly, I have shown how the global actors produce and reproduce various initiatives and institutions solely meant for advancing industrial agricultural investments in the countries of Mr. O, X, and Y. The role of the WB and various GDA in assisting and advising the governments of the countries of Mr. O, X, and Y to change their land policies, seed, and other regulations have direct causal effect on the conditions of individual persons we call poor. National and global actors act closer and eliminate local spaces where communities rely for their survival.

Similarly, we should look at the conditions of the affluent, the same way we look at the conditions of the poor. Given their domestic capabilities, the conditions of the affluent improved because of the way global cooperation organized and operate. In addition to their ability to establish efficient domestic structures well-off societies are able to organize the global order in a manner that benefit them. In the next section, the proposed duty to risk of absorption will be dealt in detail. This intention of this proposal is to complement Pogge's reform proposal of global institutions by replacing his GRD.

6.4 A Proposed Duty of Risk Absorption

It has been argued that the underlining premise with regard to global justice should emanate from the conclusion no society is self-sufficient and the poor are made to fail. In the context of global justice, any implicit assumption of societal self-sufficiency is refutable that makes the proposal for minimum assistance to others, if they fail to satisfy their basic needs is untenable due to the existing correlation between affluence of well-off societies and deprivation of the poor. Well-off states and global order are responsible for the deprivation of the poor. With this assertion I can propose a duty of risk absorption which is based on justice, not benevolence.

In relation to this, Pogge's work on global institutional order and no harm principle are very instrumental. The mechanics of risk exportation such as protective barriers and resource privileges explain the existing global order. Relying on his work, the specific global order organized around the issue-areas of food security and climate change that unequally treat the well-off and the poor can be demonstrated. Pogge's thesis are: first, harming others is an unacceptable conduct; second, our participation in the design and imposition of harmful institutions make us responsible for the harms those institutions engender; third, if our conducts harm others, we need to assume compensatory obligation. Concurring with these premises, I advance them by elaborating his ideas of harm and compensatory obligation.

In order to understand global injustice and come up with a reasonable principle of global distributive justice one need to further look at the root causes of injustices based on the concept of distant others act closer. Pogge has shown us the causes but not the root causes. He does not scrutinize the reasons well-off societies harm the poor in the first place and also the reasons they shape, impose, and manipulate global institutions. In short, he does not provide us with the existential motives of well-off societies for imposing harmful global institutions that make the poor worse off. Reluctance of citizens of well-off societies towards the poor, as Pogge ponders, justifies such an inquiry. In addition, if we address the root causes, we can break the positive feedback loop that drives our views apart from the actual situations that we want to change namely global poverty (Soros 2013:322). For that reason, the above three premises of Pogge can be substantiated with another two premises so that we can address the root causes of global injustice. The first, no society is self-sufficient hence they are always at risk (6.3.2). The second, the domestic capabilities of a society depends on their own and others' domestic

capability, hence they are interdependent (6.3.1). Like the motive to enslave and colonize societies, these two premises ascertain societal *existential motives* to cooperate, expand abroad and harm others. Accordingly, in order to tackle their domestic risks well-off societies shape, manipulate, and impose global institutions on poor societies.

First and foremost, let alone the poor, affluent societies are not self-sufficient. In this connection, the direct association between affluence of the rich and deprivation of the poor must be well constructed. If we do this, we can understand why the affluent harm the poor and at the same time we can identify proper principle of distributive justice comparable to their domestic risks that motivate them to act closer. Harm is an exported risk from the affluent to the poor. And, global institutions are the means for transforming the risks of the affluent to the poor. This doesn't belittle the role of global institutions and harms in a way Pogge articulated, rather it elaborates their origin making his case more-stronger. Pogge asserts affluent societies benefit from harms. But, like the poor conditions of the poor that he illustrates, those benefits of the affluent need to be boldly shown so that correlations can be established.

In case of land grab, the origin of harm is nothing but the biofuels and food security risks of the affluent. Expansion of the affluent abroad in the form of agricultural investments aimed at importing benefits, either food security or biofuels. The biofuels Mr. A use and the food crops Mr. B consume are the benefits accrued from the displacement of Mr. O, X, and Y. Before the affluent do the investments, they know their level of domestic demands for the commodities and scarcities of arable land. It has been shown that Africa has the highest rate at 1.9% crop production potential and 0.44% potential of land use expansion. While affluent societies have the lowest level of both potentials, while their domestic demand for the commodities expand beyond their productive capacity. As it is quoted earlier only to meet the current demands the aviation industry would take 270 million hectares of jatropha (Oakland Institute 2013:15) requiring land size of one-third of Australia (Ibid). For that reason, the affluent acquired 56.2 million ha of arable land for producing and exporting food and biofuels crops back to their societies. These are the risks and the benefits they need and know before they organize the global and regional institutions around common issue-areas, produce, and reproduce amalgamated institutions, initiatives, and specific interventions that transform their risks to

harms of the poor. The following section assesses feasibility of Pogge's compensatory obligation to the conditions of global justice.

6.4.1 Complementing Pogge's Compensatory Obligation

Pogge generates moral obligation based on the harms well-off societies impose on the poor, and I have added and argued that harms originate from well-off societies and exported to the poor. The domestic risks of the affluent transform to harms of the poor when well-off societies accumulate resources and retain value-additions while expanding abroad (6.3.5), by imposing the global order. With this assertion, Pogge's compensatory obligation should be complemented with the moral duty of risk absorption, retention of risks while expanding abroad. Pogge's compensatory obligation goes like this, "those who have such a responsibility should either discontinue their involvement - often not a realistic option - or else compensate for it by working for the reform of institutions or for the protection of their victims" (Pogge 2008:56). This proposal for compensatory obligation involves two responsibilities of either discontinue or continue participating in harmful institutions. Continuing participation in harmful institutions is conditional that we need to work for the reformation of those institutions or protect the victims for instance through volunteer work or contributing to effective relief organizations (Ibid., 15).

Non-participation is self-defeating as it leads to blockade of justice. If citizens refrain from participating in harmful institutions, they endanger their own and others' wellbeing. As elaborated earlier, societies are self-insufficient, interdependent, have common issue-areas, and share institutions to deal with those common issue-areas. In such an interdependent world, non-participation implicates not to contribute to others and not to benefit from others. Above all, it could lead to a denial of basic rights a condition no self-respecting person expected to accept (Shue 2008:89-90).

Pogge's proposition lies in the second option namely working for institutional reform or protect the victims. This proposal can improve the rules of the game for the poor so that they can benefit from fair international trade. However, improvement of the operations of global institutions is not sufficient as they are not the root causes of harm. They are tools for exporting

and transforming risks to harms abroad. Furthermore, the conditions of poverty and societal risks are complex to be tackled only by improving the operations of global institutions alone. Particularly, issues of food security, energy, and arable land scarcities are different from trade that can be addressed only by improving global rule of the game. Natural resources are much complicated. Above all, improvements of the operations of global institutions may lead to further resource accumulation as well-off societies have the financial and political leverage. For that reason, we need to combine this reform proposal with duty to risk absorption to make it complete.

As such, the kind of compensatory obligation I add to Pogge is the duty to risk absorption. I have underscored non-participation leads to blockade of justice, volunteer work and contribution to effective relief organizations also pollute the conditions of justice. In contrast, constructive engagement of risk absorption makes fair global distribution of resources possible. Risk absorption is an individual and group duty to domestically absorb risks by releasing retained value-additive production processes. It aims at making sure the institutions we participate equally treat both the affluent and poor. This can be accomplished by absorbing the risks within the society they are originated, affluent societies, before they are exported. In this case, affluent societies could absorb risks by delocalizing value-additive production processes and localizing them in poor societies. If this prime idea is acceptable the answer to our original question why affluent societies should be concerned about the global poor is: 1) to advance their own wellbeing, 2) harming others to advance own wellbeing is an unacceptable conduct.

In this context, Pogge's idea of obligation and duty holders require some adjustments. The first, affluent states are the primary duty holders since they act closer by designing, manipulating and imposing the global order on poor states. Global institutions and international regulatory system are the outcomes of the conducts of affluent states. Accordingly, unless their designers, affluent states, correct their conducts the global order and institution cannot change their harmful conducts by themselves. The second, as Pogge argues, citizens of well-off societies have the obligation to work for changing the operation of harmful institutions. However, instead of the global institutions and regulatory system that are designed and manipulated by their own states, citizen's effort and engagement primarily need to focus on their own domestic institutions and governments. This obligation emanates from the fact that states are

representatives of citizens; domestic institutions and cooperative activities cannot be isolated from external policies, strategies and conducts of states; and citizens are beneficiaries of external harmful conducts of their own states. The third, civic organizations and NGOs are also duty holders. Again, they need to adjust their operation and focus too. Their focus has to be within affluent societies and states where harms originate and benefits are accumulated. They need to bring the correlations between the domestic risks of those societies, the harms exported to poor societies and the benefits generated out of them to those societies. With this they can create awareness among citizens of affluent societies and facilitate and mobilize them to work for changing the conducts of their own states.

Let me explain the baselines for risk absorption. The conception of risk absorption could take different forms depending on the types of risk exportation. Land grab is understood as expansion abroad. Elimination of livelihood spaces is the major harm exported to the poor. I have argued that many views global poverty in terms of the situations of the poor in isolation from their interdependence with the affluent. They disregard the harms exported to distant others. As I have argued the affluent need nothing but basic human goods. The poor also have same need for basic human goods. Therefore, when the two constructively confront they meet at the point of basic right which is a rational basis for justified demands the denial of which no self-respecting person can reasonably be expected to accept. *A self-respecting person do not accept losing properties and receive monetary compensation or live by relief aid. A self-respecting person do not eat the food or use the biofuels produced from the land taken from another person.* This is the baseline of my conception of sharing value-additions. Both sides need to exert their respective *maximum efforts* so that both satisfy their basic rights. We live an interdependent life hence we have mutual concern.

Most theories of global distributive justice face difficulty of operationalization of resource redistribution. For instance, Beitz's the right to resource do not provide solution for conflict of interest on access to resources. Whose interest comes first if more than two parties want different resources from same land at the same time? Concerning Pogge's proposal of GRD, at what point resources should be taxed? Who control and disburse the GRD? Which resource should be taxed? Who decides the amount of the tax? And, who should pay the tax? Above all, such proposals still make the poor recipient. In contrast, the duty to risk absorption brings the

parties who engage in common issues of resources to negotiation. Particularly, it empowers the poor as the condition of risk absorption oblige the affluent acknowledge and retain the risks instead of exporting them to the poor.

6.4.2 Pollutants of Justice

Before illustrating the substances of sharing value-addition, I would like to state my reservation from pollutants of justice; one, the kind of monetary compensation customarily promoted by global institutions, for instance in land grab; two, the kind of protection of the victims Pogge mentioned, for instance, through volunteer work or contributing to effective relief organizations. Both, delay justice by polluting the conditions of justice itself. They provide temporary cosmetic solutions which are not justice by themselves. Pollutants of justice entail the following drawbacks:

Firstly, justice involves equal treatment of the poor and the affluent. Monetary compensation and relief support contribute to unequal treatment of the poor and the affluent. Monetary compensation is meant to pay for damages done, which is not appropriate for cases of land grab and resource related harms. It is impossible to fully compensate damages of displacement and elimination of spaces. What can compensate a person who is waiting for death? What can compensate Mr. O, X, and Y? Above all, conceptually, why a person incurs damages and compensated for the sake of others? Which moral ground justify it? Likewise, relief support plays similar role. Relief organizations target the poor while they are not concerned about how the affluent harm and benefit from harming the poor. Instead of promoting their work of feeding the poor, they are supposed to expose the food and biofuels crops produced from the land taken from the poor. Hence, by promoting citizens to contribute to relief organizations they divert citizens from making the right commitment toward justice.

Secondly, monetary compensation and relief support promote expansion abroad. Compensate or help and acquire resource become a norm and it is difficult to draw the limit once the Pandora box is opened. Besides, expansion of human needs and resources are parts of human life complicating the limit to draw. Both play parallel role by feeding or paying compensation to the victims. As I already stated, most of such organizations are parts of the larger pictures of institutional expansion abroad conducting their specialized duty in tandem with other

institutions. Above all, their accountability is for the societies that fund their work, not the poor who receive their support.

Thirdly, compensation and relief aggravate poverty. The value of property to be compensated or supply of relief assistances are too small for the poor to survive. Properties could be valued and compensated, but things provided by spaces remain uncompensated. Social costs of elimination of spaces such as dispossession, displacements, environmental damages, access to community and natural resource, resettlement and rehabilitation costs are few of such uncompensated items. The task of relief organizations is also the same. They provide temporary support to the victims. They do not work for the rightful claims of the victims which is value-addition, development and growth. This is beyond the scope of their role. But, they make the poor think and live by relief supports than claim and engage in value-additive processes.

Because of these reasons pollutants of justice contribute to the condition that the poor sacrifice such comparable moral importance or pay the maximum costs of their life so that the affluent enjoy their wellbeing. Monetary compensations and relief engagements are commonly used in resource related investments. They divert the affluent from constructively engaging with the poor. My proposal of sharing value-addition do not involve pollutants of justice instead I focus on the rightful claims of the poor from their participation in global cooperative activities.

6.4.3 Sharing Value-additive Production Processes

The duty to risk absorption can be discharged by sharing value-addition as a means to absorb potential risks to be exported while expanding abroad. It replaces Pogge's proposal of GRD which is aimed at distributing resources by taxing the use of resources and distributing it back to the global poor. The problem of the GRD is that it detaches taxing from value-addition processes which ultimately perpetuate poverty. It does not have the tendency to break the cycle of poverty as value-additive processes and capital formations exported out from poor countries together with resources. What we want to achieve from resources redistribution is to change the circumstances of the poor. This noble aim can only be achieved through economic growth which is nothing but expansion of value-additive processes. The question is how to do it.

Sharing value-addition simplify things as it brings the right thing to the rightful persons at the right time and place. It eases identification of the risks of the parties as they engage for a common purpose with a common cause that I call common issue-area. For instance, in my example the UK acquires more than 2 million ha of land in Africa. Hence, the UK has the duty to release value-addition towards those communities forcedly contributed to the wellbeing of its citizens. In that sense, the UK is supposed to delocalize all the necessary resources for the production of biofuels and localize them in areas where lands are acquired abroad. Domestic risks are the issues the parties cooperate to find a solution. Value-additive production processes, resources, benefits, and burdens are shared elements we find among the parties. Injustice occurs when the poor take only the *burden* while the well-off accrue the benefits. To avoid the harms, well-off societies should share value-additive production process by bringing those investments where they acquire resources.

Value-addition involves processing and reprocessing of resources from raw material to end products. Each and every process that change the forms of inputs not only create new values but also improve knowledge, technology, employment and others. Recall that the purpose of expansion abroad is to export resources, food and biofuels crops, back to affluent societies. Those crops or resources are processed and reprocessed to end products of food commodities and biofuels outside of the countries where the crops are produced. Processing and reprocessing activities are also taken out of the countries and again accumulated outside of where the resources are produced. This is nothing but conversion of risks to harms and perpetuation of poverty. In contrast, the duty to risk absorption obliges affluent societies to delocalize the technologies, finance, know-how, and other resources needed for processing and reprocessing of the raw materials and localize them in the places where they acquire the resources. Distant others, in this case affluent societies, are forced to widen their action closer by incorporating value-additive production processes and investments.

Value-addition has a multiplying effect. Once they are localized in poor societies, new values will be created and recreated boosting growth and development. In terms of labor those processing and reprocessing activities absorb skilled and unskilled labor. It also creates new opportunities such as employment, small businesses, service sectors, transport, packaging, and others. Ultimately, this leads to a creation of new spaces composed of new forms of spatial

activities that accommodate the needs of both the affluent and the poor. Displaced and dispossessed people could be provided with different opportunities in the various value-additive processes. By doing so, it is possible to distribute human goods and opportunities among the affluent and the poor.

Value-addition encompass non-compensable items. GRD of Pogge and financial compensation as it is widely promoted by global institutions truncate items that are not personal properties but parts of wellbeing which are eliminated due to expansion abroad. Financial compensation aims at making investments financially feasible. Project feasibility is determined by cost-benefit analysis that truncate the services places, institutions, nature, social, economic, and other resources provide to communities. Such costs are dumped on local communities. That is why the Tanzanian and Ethiopian cases say they are just waiting for death, due to the fact their spaces and spatial activities are eliminated all-together. In contrast multiplying effects of value-addition help to establish vital components of well-beings as presented below.

6.4.4 The Substances of Duty of Risk Absorption

Risk absorption is a way of realizing the moral duty to distant others. Ultimately, it aims at creating and widening the social, cultural, economic, political and other spaces the poor could freely conduct their spatial activities. It is a creation of spaces that respect basic rights and facilitate the expansion and attainment of other rights. In practical terms, it enhances the local capabilities that enable communities to act for themselves. The obligation to risk absorption can be discharged in four parallel processes namely creation of basic social and cultural spaces, localization of value-additive investments, creation of political space, capital formation including community and state. All the components aim at enhancing and localizing community capacity and capital formation in an integrated manner so that an enabling space can be created.

The first pillar is basic social and cultural spaces. It involves the creation of various spaces communities perform their daily spatial activities. Harms of expansion abroad are multifaceted that includes landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, marginalization, food insecurity, loss of access to community resources, social disarticulation, among others. They are basic daily spatial practices people perform to satisfy their individual and communal needs. The poor are

denied of access to resources to the detriment of their life. Communities are separated. Intercommunity communications dismantled. Cultural places are destroyed. Hence, the intervention here is not only to rehabilitate them but also to transform and tune their life to a state of development. As there could be no one-size-fit-all space, the specific types of spaces and capabilities may vary depending on the specific types of risks people exposed to, which also depend on the political, policy, and administrative contexts of the localities. It also depends on the availability of resources acquired by multinationals, for example land and water. Besides, it is difficult to establish an exact copy of eliminated spaces, hence some adjustments may be needed. However, focus should be made on the expansion of spaces and opportunities. Harm reversal interventions could be:

- A. from landlessness to land-based resettlement, b. from joblessness to reemployment, c. from homelessness to house reconstruction, d. from marginalization to social inclusion, e. from increased morbidity to improved health care, f. from food insecurity to adequate nutrition, g. from loss of access to restoration of community assets and services, h. from social disarticulation to networks and community rebuilding (Cernea 2000:20).

This is not a complete list of risk reversal interventions. Other variables could be added depending on the specific contexts of the respective populations and localities. The most important feature of the above list is that it incorporates various social, economic, cultural, and other risks. For instance, landlessness and joblessness are economic variables. Various alternative economic risk reversal interventions could be undertaken. As an example, landlessness is a condition whereby people lost their land and replacement of land can be provided so that people restart agricultural activities. In the case of land grab, replacement of land is problematic, as people are displaced due to lack of unused land. In most cases displaced people complain that replaced land is not comparable to their previous land in terms of fertility, size, access to water, and other resources. Authorities may not seriously consider these problems so long as they allocate replacement land. But, risks could be perpetuated than improved. Also, there could be scarcity of land for disbursement as the number of displaced persons increase and available lands are transferred to multinationals. In such a case, additional economic activities have to be considered. The central idea behind is replacement of land should not be taken as the only option. Different alternative choices of economic activities

should be arranged too. Those choices could be replacement of agricultural activities or additional activities to agriculture that expand opportunities.

There is a misleading argument for investments that they create employment opportunities so that they provide the necessary alternative sources of livelihood. In addition, compensations might be considered as sufficient. However, both are not comprehensive enough to create the needed spaces for sustainable development. First, the amount of compensation and the type of employments have limitations. Second, social, cultural, loss of access to resources, marginalization, and other risks cannot be comprehensively compensated or replaced by employment. That is why the duty to risk absorption should aim at creating comprehensive spaces incorporating places, locations, and community specific spatial activities important for a better life. In contrast, impracticality of job creation of such investments has been confirmed.

A comprehensive global study carried out by the World Bank found the jobs created by land deals to be generally few: 0.01 jobs per hectare for grains, 0.02 for tree plantations, 0.018 for soybean. Other crops had higher labor intensity: 0.42 jobs per hectare for jatropha and for rubber, for instance. In yet other, labor intensity varied depending on farming techniques: employment creation for sugar cane ranged between 0.15 and 0.7 jobs per hectare depending on whether harvesting was manual or mechanized. According to the same data set, investment per job created was very high, in line with the picture of highly mechanized farming that creates few jobs: \$45,000 per job for grains, \$200,000 for soybean, and a staggering \$360,000 for tree plantations (Cotula 2013:139).

We can note that job creation potential of the agricultural investments is insignificant compared to the number of persons, more than 25 persons per km², they displaced. Besides, the notion of employment creation does not explain whether individuals willingly take those opportunities or through indirect pressure. Indirect pressure in this case means people may work as laborers due to compressed opportunities or lack of other alternatives to raise income. For instance, displaced persons with or without relatively small replacement land could have no other option than taking the only available opportunity as agricultural laborer. This justifies the need for diversified economic opportunities. Hence, as it is proposed, investment areas need to incorporate other sources of income so that displaced and dispossessed people could be fully absorbed to productive activities. To that end, other small business opportunities should be

promoted and made available to affected people and they should be provided with seed capitals and the necessary business skills.

Likewise, other transformative actions required for ensuring social and cultural needs. In line with this other risk reversal interventions like from social disarticulation to community reconstruction, from marginalization to social inclusion, and from expropriation to restoration of community asset and services need to be put in place. Displacement dismantle social organizations and networks. Land dispossession compress life sustaining social and geographic spaces. Cultural and burial grounds are destroyed or given to multinationals. A large field where communities graze their animals and perform cultural activities are dispossessed. In such a case, various cultural activities and communal attachments vanished all together. Ultimately, sovereign right of exercising one's cultural and social practices eliminated. That is where interventions of social and cultural spaces and capabilities lie.

Resettling people to other areas also destroys communal attachments to specific places and location. For communities, some places and locations are more meaningful than others. A large field could represent various social activities. It can be a grazing area where young boys look after their cattle. As a field, it is also a playing ground while young boys look after their cattle. It may also represent a place where communities perform cultural ceremonies or may have historical significance. The same field might represent a battle ground where sometime before neighboring communities together fought against their enemies. Likewise, it may represent a war and peace-making processes between neighboring communities, as resource conflict is common among communities. Such complicated social and cultural practices cannot be neglected as they are sources of social cohesion and practices. For that reason, here risk absorption can be read within the context of human capabilities as Nussbaum argued for.

The second pillar is localization of value-additive investments. Social and cultural spaces and capabilities can be realized in a sustainable manner if they are accompanied with meaningful economic transformations. Individual and communal economic capabilities have to be strengthened. For that reason, the second pillar of risk-absorption focuses at value-added investments. Value-addition is a very important factor in terms of human rights, capability, sovereignty, sustainable development, and others. I consider the right to space as a basic right

violated due to expansion abroad, hence the right to value-addition can be invoked as a rightful claim. The fundamental issue to be considered is livelihood reconstruction than leaving people impoverished, in short respecting the rational claims of the communities that emanate from the harms distant others inflict by acting closer. To put it bluntly, this claim rests on the promises of distant others, imposed harms, and the benefits well-off societies accrue from the harms which is in line with the conclusion the poor are not failed but made to fail.

Value-additive investment concerns about expansion of opportunities. It can be realized when certain processes are applied to change the physical state of a resource that enhances its value and customer base as a result of which the market value of the product accrues greater proportion of revenue to the producer (US Congress Act, 2002). Food and biofuels produced from the crops harvested from agricultural investments abroad are cases in point.

Value-added investment, in the context of land grab, can play vital roles. It facilitates sustainable growth and development. It represents the core part of my proposal as it represents both the claim of affected people and the obligation of the actors. In fact, value-addition is more than land grab. It requires the political will of well-off states. It is the bone of contention between well-off and poor states as it distributes economic growth among cooperating parties instead of unfair accumulation. Mainly because, whenever agricultural products, biofuels and food crops, exported back to investing countries, values to be added also exported. This is double harm to the poor. *As such, the purpose of this part of risk absorption is to make sure that the cycle of perpetual harm or poverty is broken.* It is a mechanism of retaining the real economic values that could be generated from economic activities related with agricultural products or resource extraction. Recall that I have mentioned earlier harms still persist from slavery to present era due to resources extraction and accumulation. Hence, if land grab does not bring value-addition, what difference could host countries make by dishing out their land and impoverishing their populations. As a result, value-addition is the only difference agricultural investments could make. As such, investment host societies have the right to claim for value-added investments so long as they engage in resource related cooperative activities.

Value-added investment aims at attaining two major objectives. The first is to expand and diversify production spaces for the poor. The second is to localize agro-industrial and biofuels

production processes within the surrounding localities where societies are harmed. Hence, I argue non-value-additive investment projects are not viable for poor societies as they export resources and value-additive production processes out of their countries.


Like other economic sectors, exportation of agricultural products produced from expansion abroad inhibit economic growth of the poor. By importing and processing agricultural commodities in their countries well-off countries do not only grab arable land and water but also growth and development potentials of the poor. Well-off societies maintain their economic dominance. If the cycle of poverty and injustices due to unbalanced economic cooperation is to be broken, the sources of injustice, accumulation of resources and value-addition, has to be addressed. The end products of food and biofuels commodities should be produced in host countries and exported to their consumers.

Value-addition is an agent of distributive justice. Global cooperation with regard to land and resources should not focus on mere investments rather on potential value-added investments. Most of the developmental promises of global actors can be attained from value-added investments than mere agricultural investments. Value-added investment has numerous advantages, firstly, it expands the production cycles from agricultural products to end products. Processing activities expand various opportunities. Particularly, biofuels production may require different production cycles, processes, and chains that may involve various intermediary industries. Secondly, the expansion of intermediary industries in turn contributes to industrialization of land grabbed areas and host countries at large. Thirdly, the quality and quantity of employment creation by intermediary industries is much more diverse than agricultural investments. Fourthly, it stimulates various economic activities in the regions through vertical and horizontal economic interactions. Fifth, it facilitates technology transfers as locals participate in the supply and production chains. Finally, it stimulates entrepreneurship.

Furthermore, value-added industries transform regions to industrial zones. In that case, value-addition would have paramount potential of transforming people harmed by expansion abroad. Figure 7.1 illustrates this strong argument. The Figure combines four components that feed to each other. The main assumption behind is instead of exporting agricultural products, the

distribution of value-addition expands and diversify opportunities and alternative livelihood strategies to the poor that the GRD can't accomplish.

Fig. 6-1 Localization of Value-addition



Source: by the author

The four components of Fig. 6.1 can be elucidated as follow. Land and resources are at the center of expansion abroad and global cooperation. Harms are injustices committed against the poor due to displacement. The poor are not properly provided with appropriate spaces to sustain their normal life. As a result, the creation of spaces that enable the poor perform their daily spatial practices that transform them to a status of development are needed. Value-added investment aims at fulfilling this purpose. First, it improves the quality of employment as it absorbs both skilled and unskilled labors, and also diversify employment opportunities. Second, the global food and biofuels markets are so huge to be satisfied. About 56.2 million hectares of land grabbed in Africa can accommodate huge industrial processing. Hence, the potential of the investments to transform the 14 million harmed people is already there. Third, the back and forth linkages between the various production processes create synergy for takeoff. Fourth, the dynamics among the various components entail diversified economic activities that benefit both land grab affected and other people in the regions. The economic opportunities and capabilities to be distributed to all participating parties in the global cooperation including affected people is highly promising.

Once these points are made clear, I expound the relationship between value-added investments and the other three components as follows. Value-added investments have direct relation to agricultural investments, land and population, and urbanization. First, the industries are direct recipients of agricultural products, both food and biofuels crops. The global demand for food and biofuels products stimulates industrial productivity which in turn stimulate agricultural productivity. The potential for absorbing more labor by both the industries and large-scale agricultures is imperative. In addition, the need for skilled labor also increases. Second, the more agricultural investments and industries absorb labor force, the more land is left for further agricultural, industrial and other infrastructural activities, with minimum harms of expansion abroad. The end effect is very important in terms of demographic changes. One of the main problems of poor countries is high number of rural populations. The lesser the number of rural populations the more the number of town and city dwellers which is a characteristic of transformation.

This leads to my next point which is urbanization. At the center of the above description is the release of rural populations to industrial and agricultural labor force. Labor force can be integrated into emerging urban centers. There are two possible focal points of urbanization that feed each other, resettlement and residential areas of agricultural and industrial workers. It has to be recalled that the villages and resettlement areas around agricultural fields have already been provided with social and cultural spaces, based on the assumptions drawn from the first component of risk absorption, which in turn provide the social capital for swift urbanization. These areas could swiftly develop into small towns. The possibility of small towns to evolve is very high as value-additive industries expand and the number of skilled and unskilled workers increase. Besides, the flourishing new and diversified economic opportunities provide people with various economic activities. Other sectors, like transport and packaging, that have direct relation with biofuels processing industries and large-scale agricultures will expand in the regions. Together with other economic activities this attracts service providers and small-scale businesses. Hence, the potential of industrial agricultures and value-additive industries is so huge that can transform rural areas into agro-industrial regions. In combination with other components of provision of social and cultural spaces, localization of value-addition can break the cycle of perpetual poverty.

At the center of this lies the duty of well-off societies to materialize value-added industries. I have demonstrated the detrimental effects of expansion abroad. The purpose of expansion abroad is to produce and export agricultural products, food and biofuels crops, back to investing countries. By processing and producing biofuels and food commodities outside of investments receiving communities, investing countries suck and drain growth and development potentials of the poor perpetuating poverty and injustices like slave and colonial eras. On the other hand, investing countries capitalize on perpetual poverties of host countries. I am of the opinion that the poor could diversify their development opportunities, if Pogge's proposal for GRD replaced by value-added investments.

The third pillar concerns about political space. It aims at empowering the poor. At the core of displacement and dispossession lies lack of political and governance space, both at domestic and global scale. Two of land grab impacts - social disarticulation and marginalization - signify loss of power on the part of affected people. We have exclusionary power structure from global to local levels. From the perspective of human rights, in the context of the subject under consideration, political power and empowerment are very important variables. The poor are not part of any of the decisions, be it national or global, that affect their lives. The power of the global order organized around global common issue-areas distributed to participating state and non-state actors. Regional and local administrations and executive bodies in poor countries are sanctioned with political power to execute globally agreed upon issues. At local level, they are the one to displace and dispossess the poor and also to hand over land to multinationals. In this power dynamics land grab affected people neither participate in the discussions of issues affecting their lives nor provided with appropriate means of voicing their interest. Instead of making them agents of transformation the global structure effectively marginalizes them.

For that same reason, political space should aim at the creation of appropriate mechanisms whereby communities fully participate in the emerging social, cultural and value-additive spaces. Besides, it should aim at enabling communities defend their rights in a sustainable manner. There should be a condition whereby they can influence political decisions. Stiglitz (2006:12) claims "insecurity is one of the major concerns of the poor; a sense of powerlessness is another. The poor have few opportunities to speak out. When you speak, no one listens; when

they are told something can be done, nothing is ever done.” In contrast, the new political space has to make sure that the voice of the poor is heard and executed accordingly.

I foresee a twin view of political space. The first concerning the poor and the second concerning the citizens of well-off countries. Political space enables the poor and citizens of well-off societies influence the policies of their respective states and global order as well. They have a common duty as they live an interdependent life. There is a clear difference between the harmed poor and well-off states in terms of changing host states’ policies. Well-off states are capable of penetrating and influencing the policies and regulations of poor states through their development agencies and global institutions. They finance various researches aimed at promoting large scale investments. In countries such as South Sudan, Mozambique, and Tanzania well-off countries pushed privatization of land and sponsored policy researches, concerning land and biofuels, that stimulate policy changes.²² On the contrary, the poor are not able to impact the policies of their own states towards their benefits. As a result, local communities are not able to preserve their land and resource use rights. Therefore, political space in this regard should provide the necessary spaces that enable communities to participate and negotiate in issues affecting their livelihood and also raise important issues of their concern.

Political space in the context of risk absorption is envisioned in a way that empower communities. The main issues in this regard are the right to organize for promoting and defending their socio-economic and cultural rights, resource rights, labor and other rights in the emerging spaces. In addition, the ability to negotiate before resources are transferred to multinationals. This include proper representation in local, regional, national and continental political structures and in global forums where issues relating to land grab, food security, biofuels, climate change, and other resources are discussed and decided. Most importantly they should have access to information on crucial global trends concerning resources, land, food security and biofuels. Access to such information will empower them to the level that they can defend their rights.

²² For details see chapter 4.2.2 the role of governmental development agencies, pp.121-124.

One major objection could be posed here. And that concern relates to the legitimacy of states in terms representing local communities at continental and global levels. The main question to such objection could be whether states are genuinely representing the interests of land grab affected people in a condition where host states are sandwiched between the needs and pressures of their citizens and well-off states. Are the acts of leasing lands, displacement, and dispossessions in the interest of local communities? If that is a legitimate act in the eyes of the affected people, then they are happy with what happens to them which is contrary to the objective reality. As a result, as long as investing and host states cooperate in a manner that affect targeted communities, affected people should have to get alternative ways of defending their rights. They need to organize themselves to get proper representation.

Another aspect of political space concerns the citizens of well-off societies. They are not well informed about the harms caused to the poor due to the policies and conducts of their own governments and their participation. They might be involved in various discussions concerning biofuels or food security. But, they do not know the biofuels they consume is from land dispossessed from the poor. Their governments and civil society organizations resort to presenting the conditions of the poor in another way; for instance, corruption, poverty, dictatorship and others. They do not equally present the relationship between the biofuels their national compatriots use and the condition of the poor. In that case, they are supposed to be provided with full information on the dependence of their life condition on the deprivation of the poor so that they properly engage and correct the conducts of their governments and also discharge their duty of risk absorption. In this regard, civil society organizations need to refocus their activities towards sensitization of citizens about their interdependence with the poor or a new form of civil organizations need to emerge.

Financing value-addition is the fourth important pillar. One wrong assumption that most writers and policy makers have in common is that the poor has no capital. I demystify this in a strong manner. The issue is not about the real capital, rather it is about valuing of the object of capital. An illustration is poignant. The required finance is only for the creation of social and cultural spaces and capabilities, the first component of risk absorption. The second component, value-addition, will be accomplished by profit making investments, and the political space concerns the administrative and governance issues. I am not dealing in detail with the various

economic analysis about raising the financial resources which is needed to realize risk absorption. However, some possible sources of financing can be indicated. The main issue is that the global actors, particularly investing states and their citizens, assume the duty to realize their share of financing. As beneficiaries, they are supposed to engage themselves in the processes too, in a similar way they engaged in imposing land grab investments. The same national and global, and also state and non-state actors involved in defining issues, and in the design and implementation of policies have that same duty too.

I can mention two potential viable sources of financing namely project financing and capital formation. They are not complete lists as there could be other alternatives too. However, they are selected due to their relevance and relation to resource-based investments and expansion abroad. In contrast to Pogge's proposal for the GRD, project financing and capital formation can be raised from within the system that triggers expansion abroad. While project financing is the duty of well-off societies, capital formation is the rational claim of the poor. Key is the obligation of well-off societies to acknowledge and expedite this duty.

Let me now focus on project financing. As discussed above, one of the components of risk absorption, creation of social and cultural spaces and capabilities, involve variety of projects depending on the specific context of the localities. In order to improve the life of affected people vital social services are needed. Possible social provisions may include housing, schools, health stations, water supply, training centers, seed capital for small business operation, roads, markets, animal health, agricultural technologies, cultural centers, and others. Overall, this requires project financing. Some of the projects may provide skills and facilitate integration of affected people into industrial agricultures and agro industries. It has to be noted that in the current situation displaced and dispossessed people have no alternative than taking the available daily laborer jobs in agricultural farms which is limited and under paid. Such an approach deepens impoverishment harms than improving their life circumstances. As such, these projects should aim at capacitating them for further expansion and diversification of job creation and employments. Furthermore, it stimulates and promote their integration into the emerging socio-economic activities in the evolving small towns around the agro-industrial areas.

Project financing is a legitimate claim of the poor against well-off societies. It is the duty of well-off societies to finance and realize the various projects in areas where expansion abroad occur. The amount of project financing is determined by the type and size of foreign investments, and complexity of community projects given the number of people harmed. Also, project financing lasts until the end of the contract period or the foreign investment ceases operation due to various reasons. However, the harms incurred to local communities due to discontinued investments should be handled by investment originating societies for the reason harms are imposed to mitigate their own domestic risks.

Now let me explain capital formations. Land grab affected people have a rational claim on foreign investments. Because they have sacrificed their lives and land or resources to the realization of expansion abroad, they have the right to claim for shareholding so that they can reinvest on community projects. They have enormous potential to raise financial contributions, if the value of land, water and other resources offered to multinationals properly evaluated. Capital formation is independent from the above project financing as it is the rightful claim of affected people. It is a powerful claim against multinationals, investing and host states. Basically, it is grounded on the rights to natural resources and to use them in a way they deem appropriate. One way of exercising this right, in the context under consideration, is shareholding. It has to be recalled that local communities are excluded from the discussions regarding the purpose of the investments and the decisions concerning land leases. Hence, shareholding empower them as it enhances their capability in terms of ownership and benefits from the project. They will also be party to the sustainability of the investments and global cooperation. I foresee two types of share-holding namely community and state shareholdings.

Community shareholding refers to a share to be owned by affected communities. Communities that are directly harmed should have the claim for owning the investments. In this case, the main issue about shareholding would be the sources of local communities' financial contribution to the investment capitals. The way to community financial contribution for shareholding is easy and available at their disposal, what is required only the political will of well-off societies. As an example, I propose the following financial sources, valuation of resources and contribution in kind.

Investment capital (multinational) = X

Resource valuation (community contribution) = Y

Total investment capital = Z, where $Z = X + Y$

Z is the combined or total investment capital including the share of the contribution of the multinational and local communities. X represents the share of the multinational, while Y is the share of local communities. Now the question is about the financial sources of Y. Land and other natural resources could generate the necessary financial contribution if they are properly evaluated. In fact, land, water, and forest resources are high value resources well-off societies badly need. In most cases multinationals use water, for example, for free. Apart from displacement and dispossession impacts, local communities are not allowed to exercise the right to capital formation from their own resources. They are excluded from both the processes and benefits of potential capital formations.

As illustration of potential capital formation, let us assume a multinational acquire 10,000 ha. of land in a certain locality for a lease period of 50 years. It may agree to pay \$10.00 per ha per year. For the 50-year lease period it will pay \$5,000,000.00. In addition to this, it is possible to assign additional \$2.00 per ha per year, for example, as community contribution in kind making the total lease fee \$12.00 per ha per year. In that case, the community can contribute \$1,000,000.00. Hence, the total cost of land lease for 50 years period will be \$6,000,000.00. The community contribution considered in kind, land. In other words, the community will have that amount of share in the multinational for which dividend will be payable. The higher the size of leased land and payment per hectare, the higher the amount of community contribution. For instance, if we increase the above example to 100,000 ha and allocate \$3,00 community contribution for 50 years lease period, the community contribution will increase to \$ 15,000,000.00. That means the community contributes a total of \$ 15,000,000.00 share to the capital of the multinational, in kind or land. As shareholder, the community will earn annual dividend, based on its share, which can be reinvested in to community projects.

Communities can also have other source of financing for shareholding. In addition to land, there are other resources that could be considered for such a purpose. Among others water

sources are highly valuable resources. Multinationals look after not only land but also water too. In most investment projects the value of water is not properly valued. Multinationals enjoy free access and utilization. Moreover, denial of community access to water sources is common. In Mozambique and Tanzania, for example, multinationals not only utilized water sources for free but also blocked community access. Therefore, the use of water sources by multinationals can be evaluated and considered as community contribution. The dividend received every year can finance water and sanitary projects in the communities.

State shareholding is another form of shareholding that states held a share in foreign investments. As cooperating states, poor state can claim for certain share in resource related foreign investments. I propose states claim 40 to 50 percent of share. Such states have a strong moral justification for this. The first, resources are limited. The second, poor states are responsible for any harm done to their citizens due to resource related foreign investments. The third, states reinvest the benefits from their share to poverty alleviation programs. The fourth, shareholding mechanisms are reliable means of global distributions.

I have shown how delocalization and localizations could be applied to discharge the duty to risk absorption. Some potential sources of community capital formations are demonstrated. Water and land are the major resources that can generate substantial community capital. It has to be noted that such capital formations can be made from within the system and projects, that trigger expansion abroad, not from external sources or taxation like Pogge's proposal of GRD. Together with project financing obligations of well-off societies, community and state capital formations have enormous potential for sustainable development of poor societies. Above all, it can break the cycle of poverty and global injustice. Large scale agricultural scheme and particularly investment projects truncate major costs to the disadvantage of communities and devalue the resources to make investments viable. By doing so, local communities are made to lose huge sums of capital formations so as to make investments economically viable and benefit citizens of well-off societies. For instance, the cheap land lease prices and free utilization of water sources might make investments economically viable, but the way they are made viable is unjust as it impoverishes local communities. This is not an approach of economics rather political decisions operate behind artificial land and resource markets. As a result, it sucks and

drains capital formation potentials of the poor. It is argued that community capital formation should be revitalized to allow affected people to have a legitimate right.

So far, I have demonstrated the essence and substances of the duty to risk absorption. Questions might be raised as to why investing states, multinationals or global institutions should assume such an obligation. In other words, the reason affected people should claim the rights to risk absorption or its component parts, for instance, community and state capital formation. In this case, we need to recall the motives of affluent societies for imposing global order, expand abroad, and harm the poor. As discussed and argued in the previous chapters and summarized in this chapter, the main reasons for this is nothing but the motive to mitigate domestic risks. In that case, affluent societies violate the moral duty not to harm others for mitigating their own risks. Hence, they have the obligation to discharge duty of risk absorption and equally the poor have the right to claim for it.

Conclusion

This chapter dwelled on the root causes of global injustice and proposing the moral duty to risk absorption. I strongly argued against the assertion that the poor have failed to meet their basic needs. In contrast, I commend Pogge's notion that well-off societies harm the poor as they shape and impose the global order. Yet, in order to promote his proposal of compensatory obligation I find it imperative to explain the reason why affluent societies harm the poor since he does not tell us this. I have shown that we live in an interdependent world where the life experiences of the poor and affluent are interlinked. Most of all, let alone the poor, well-off societies themselves are not self-sufficient. For that reason, so as to tackle their domestic risks, well-off societies shape and impose the global order. As a consequence, they expand abroad and export their risks that transform to harms of the poor. Pogge's proposal for the improvement of the operations of global institutions will be fruitful if and only if well-off societies assume the duty to risk absorption in resource related expansion abroad. This is because, harms mainly occur due to unfair accumulation of resources and value-additive production processes that exclude the poor in addition to the imposition of global order. The purpose of duty to risk absorption is to fairly distribute resources and value-additive production processes that respect the basic rights of both the affluent and the poor as participants of global cooperation.

General Conclusion

Constructive Confrontation

Throughout this work I have put forward an argument that the original moral question most writers raise in relation to global justice is inadequate to provide us with appropriate principle of global distribution. Despite the noble intention of contributing to the reduction of global poverty, most writers end up with proposals that are one step short of addressing its root causes namely denial of the rightful share of the poor. The inquiry into why well-off societies should be concerned about the poor conditions of distant others, they rely on, tends toward benevolence than justice. Moreover, majority of the scholarship neglect the common denominators among the affluent and the poor, instead, they focus only on the failure of the poor. *For that reason, the underlining idea a self-insufficient society that live with persistent domestic risks exporting those risks and harming the poor concerns about the same poor remains a paradox. It is self-contradictory.*

A critical look at the life experiences of the affluent and the poor within the context of global interdependence suggests the inquiry most writers rely on pay no attention to the objective reality that the poor internalize the burdens of the affluent. As such, the best way of looking at global justice is to confront both moral questions at the same time. I contend a satisfactory principle of global distribution should first be conceived from own life experiences, that is by analyzing how own domestic risks have been mitigated, rather than looking only at the conditions of an imaginary distant poor. Mainly because no society is self-sufficient. A bifurcated view of “we” the affluent as assistant providers and “they” the poor as assistant recipients lead to a failure of having incomplete view widening the gap between our view and the actual situation we want to change. The main objective of this study was to correct these shortcomings so that our view of global poverty and the actual state of the situation we want to change, global injustice, come closer. To do that, I have critically examined the above two moral questions to identify and define the conditions of global justice. I summarize my conclusions in the subsequent paragraphs below.

The duty triggering conditions most offer to the question why affluent societies should be concerned about the global poor revolves around: to the *capacity* of the affluent to help the poor, the *failure* of the poor to change their circumstances, and the *harm* affluent societies

inflict on the poor. The idea of capacity and failure relate to the notion of domestic responsibility. Societies are responsible for establishing domestic structures that satisfy the basic needs of their citizens. In that sense, well-off societies are conceived as able to establish efficient domestic structures, while the poor fail to make it. In contrast, the idea of harm relates to the conducts of affluent societies, their governments, and the global order that disadvantage the poor.

However, the conclusions drawn in this work that the poor are not failed rather they are made to fail ascertain external causal factors. The reasons for this are immense. The essence of domestic responsibility statist scholars put emphasis on is very remarkable as it holds societies responsible for their own affairs. In addition, the importance of basic domestic structures which Rawls postulates, is also very crucial. Equally relevant are the ideas of nationality, citizenship, and common sympathy. Altogether, these are *condition sine qua nons* for the respect of basic rights within domestic societies. Never the less, my conclusion is that in today's interdependent world these are not *the only necessary and sufficient conditions* for a just domestic society. There are other internal and external factors that contribute to domestic affluence and justice. I hold the argument that in an interdependent world, external and internal conditions are inseparable, and they are equally important. *For that reason, since well-off societies require external factors for their domestic conditions, and the poor fail due to the externalities imposed by well-off societies, this should be the entry point into our moral inquiry.*

This study critically examined the core argument of the statist which follows the reasoning that "... citizens of relatively affluent societies have obligations based on the duty of mutual aid to help those who, without help, would surely perish" (Beitz 1999:127). In fact, "[t]he obligation to contribute to the welfare of persons elsewhere, on such a view, is an obligation of charity" (Ibid). This is where I part ways with them on numerous grounds. This assertion demonstrates statist ideals are based on benevolence. And yet, charity is not based on the distribution of the outcomes of global cooperative activities. It is not a stringent requirement on the giver and beneficiaries have weaker claim for assistance. It depends only on the willingness of the affluent to assist. For that same reason, I can say the conception based on benevolence is out of context and a rejection of justice at global level.

To recapitulate my arguments, statist's assertion suffers major flaws for the following reasons: firstly, statist construct association only between justice and domestic characteristics. They pay no attention to the importance of external conditions, albeit, the reality is that no society is self-sufficient. In addition, national communities are not confined to domestic spheres, rather they operate both at global level and also within the domestic sphere of other societies. Similarly, the domestic capability of well-off societies depends on the domestic capability of distant societies. State and non-state actors abroad are able to impact and change policies and strategies of countries of weak economies. Mostly they have the political, strategic, and economic leverages than citizens of poor countries. In most cases those changes are to the benefits of the affluent than the poor. In that sense, they fail to address issues such as the limits nationality, common sympathy, and others and the impacts of expansion abroad on distant others.

At the center of global justice lies issues of non-interference, equal treatment and fairness of global cooperation. Institutions operating abroad should be held responsible for the harm they inflict on distant others. In this regard, there is a major misconception of national interest that states should always prioritize their national interest. The problem lies on its implication that they should overlook the interest of others. However, so long as global institutions and international regulatory systems operate according to the principles of equality and fairness this cannot be problematic. For example, in the context of the ideal type, a thorny question can be posed: why does Tanzania and Ethiopia allow foreign agricultural investments? It is difficult to assume the leaders of these countries have less sympathy to their own citizens than Saudi Arabia and UK have to their citizens. States have reasons to engage in global common issue-areas and cooperation. Global and national common issue-areas are very important for the common goods of all engaging parties as they facilitate the mitigation of domestic and common problems. That is the case the UK and Saudi Arabia get access to the arable land they need and can provide their citizens with basic human goods of food and biofuels. But, they should have done this without harming others.

Secondly, statist's implicit assumption of self-contained societies neglects domestic risks. When we look at contemporary world it is difficult to find a society which is self-sufficient. Domestic societies lack the *necessary and sufficient* resources to maintain and advance their

current level of advancement. For instance, let us assume country X which is liberal democratic, as Rawls defined it, with advanced technology and economy. Such a society can't produce and reproduce all the needed human goods and sustain a just system, no matter how efficient domestic institutions are. Though economically strong countries have the technological, institutional, and financial capabilities, they lack the necessary and sufficient resources to maintain their level of advancement and keep on new innovations and adaptation. On the other hand, while economically weak countries lack such capabilities, mostly they have natural resources. Even this is one of the arguments Rawls invoke against global resource redistribution. But, the problem we have is that the way natural resources accessed abroad *do harm* host communities and countries at large. Statists, particularly Rawls, rejection of the role of resource confirm their deviation from objective realities as they undermine not only domestic incapability of societies of weak economy but also economically strong societies too.

Thirdly, statist view also neglect of common issues-areas or problems that cannot be dealt with by one national community. Some issues are beyond national communities and need collective efforts of those who commonly share them. Issues like environment, population growth, international trade, global common resources, land, draught, energy, some health concerns, and others have become the concern of all as they pose trans-border impacts. Even productivity of one society has become the concern of other societies. For example, agricultural productivity in the USA and Russia determine the consumption pattern of all the societies who depend on the importation of those commodities. The production and distribution of oil in oil rich countries determine the way of life of each and every person in the world. The preservation of each cacao and coffee tree determine coffee and chocolate consumption pattern of many people in the world. Arable land scarce societies have the concern on the land use patterns of arable land abundant societies. Mainly because of global scarcity of arable land, high population growth, and the increasing demand for food commodities. The consumption patterns in the West determine agricultural production in developing countries. Mass industrial productions in the West impact industrialization in developing countries. The lack of space does not allow me to give further examples, however these and other issues cannot be left to domestic societies. The global community need to engage on all these issues, instead of waiting until global coercive institutions emerge, as Nagel advocates, and all societies integrate to the SP as Rawls contend. For this very fact, such issues need to be taken in to account than left out from the conditions of global justice as statists do. From the perspective of global justice, the

differential treatment global cooperation affecting the life chances of individual persons needs to be seriously considered.

Fourthly, we cannot play down the role of global order that coordinate and facilitate global interdependences, domestic and external conducts of states. Nagel deny the existence of such structures on the basis that they are not coercive, they are not authored by individuals, and they are voluntary by nature. Such assertion needs closer scrutiny as we have global structures which are coercive enough. Interestingly, the expectation of *exact similarity*, as Nagel argued, between global and domestic institutions is unrealistic for the reason that global order coordinate and facilitate global interdependence so that distant others act closer. In the first place, we have global institutions, rules, and regulations that regulate various aspects of global and regional common issue-areas having paramount impacts on the life chances of individual persons. We have rules that govern trade and commerce. There are a plethora of international conventions and dedicated institutions concerning environment, development cooperation, health, energy, security, agriculture, and others. Instead of underplaying their role, the main issue that should be raised from the perspective of global justice is whether they impose *harm* on certain societies and engender *differential distribution of benefits and burdens* among different societies.

In a nutshell, the above points boil down to the ideas of global cooperation, interdependence, and access to resources that statist undermine. Global interdependence and cooperation are objective realities of the world we live today. They are ingrained to domestic incapability, resource scarcity, and external and internal conducts of states. They have evolved as the necessary and sufficient conditions for both domestic and global justice. Otherwise in a situation where there are no such circumstances of justice the discussion on global justice is not appropriate. In this sense, the idea “the requirements of justice themselves do not, on this view, apply to the world as a whole, unless and until, as a result of historical developments not required by justice, the world comes to be governed by a unified sovereign power” (Nagel 2005) is not feasible. Rather, as Beitz (1999:144) emphatically argued, “if social cooperation is the foundation of distributive justice, then one might think that international economic interdependence lends support to a principle of global distributive justice similar to that which applies within domestic society.”

To put things in to context we need to constructively confront and provide sufficient answer to the two contending moral questions. Firstly, why affluent societies should be concerned about the poor? Secondly, why should the poor internalize the risks of the affluent? If we critically examine these questions, affluence and poorness cannot be common denominators for global distributive justice, but the basic right of an individual person. Naturally, no single human being is self-sufficient. As societies are composed of individual persons, they are not self-sufficient neither. They are always at risk of satisfying the basic rights of their members. “Basic rights are an attempt to give to the powerless a veto over some of the forces that would otherwise harm the most” (Shue 2008:89). Besides, “they are the rational basis for justified demands the denial of which no self-respecting person can reasonably be expected to accept” (Ibid., 90). If that is what basic right is, we need to relate it to global justice?

In the context of justice, basic right is the meeting point for cooperative activities among affluent and poor societies. It provides the conditions to cooperate or not. Distant others engage into cooperative activities if the cooperative activity they engage respect and protect the basic rights of their citizens. This means that they cooperate if the cooperative activity improves some of existing domestic risks without harming anyone with a consequence of violating basic rights.

The most important aspect of the proposal for sharing value-addition is its respect, protection, and fulfillment of basic rights. On the one hand, value-addition *protects* basic rights as risk absorption is *costly* for the affluent. Due to this fact, affluent societies may refrain from constructively engaging with the poor. On the other hand, sharing value-addition *respect and fulfill* basic right, if the affluent *accepts* both risk absorption and establishment of vital institutions in cooperating poor societies. Whether affluent societies *refrain from or accept the conditions of constructive engagement* of risk absorption, the poor will be empowered and their basic rights respected at least they do not go below their current level which is a benchmark for engagement. If affluent societies accept the conditions of risk absorption the domestic risks of the affluent and the poor will be improved. If the affluent refrain from accepting the conditions of risk absorption, the domestic risks of both parties remain unimproved. Any other option different from these two will raise a moral question which is different from the one

customarily raised. That condition is when affluent societies *refrain* from acknowledging duty to risk absorption and *persist harming* the poor to forcefully make them contribute to the wellbeing of affluent societies. In such a condition, the feasible moral question that should be raised would be: why poor societies internalize the risks of the affluent? Instead of why affluent societies concern about the poor? that is customarily entertained out of its context. At the core of this question lies sharing value-addition which is an instrument for respecting and protecting basic right that provides the poor with a justified demands the denial of which no self-respecting person expected to accept.

Principally and fundamentally, I conclude that we can have a good understanding of global justice if we provide satisfactory answers to the two essential and interrelated moral questions. Firstly, why should the affluent be concerned about the poor? Secondly, why should the poor internalize the risks of the affluent? The underlining answer must come from full understanding of the fact that societies are self-insufficient and interdependent at the same time. The most appropriate form of duty justice to distant others, in this case, would be to complement Pogge's proposal for global institutional reform with the duty of risk absorption. While his proposal improves the operation of international organization and cooperation as it creates fair playing ground for weaker states, the duty of risk absorption facilitate the release of resources from the affluent to the poor facilitating capital formation and expansion of opportunities through value-additive investments.

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