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Item A Governing Convention?(2013) Vanderschraaf, PeterIn this essay I argue that one can understand the relationship between those who rule and those who are ruled in civil society as an implicit contractual relationship or contract by convention. I use variations of the extensive form Trust Game to summarize the structures of alternative forms of contracts, and apply these variations to model the relationship between the rulers and those under their rule. One of these variations, the Irrevocable Sovereignty Game, summarizes Hobbes' main argument for why it is conceptually impossible for a contract to exist between a sovereign and the subjects under its rule. I argue that Hobbes' argument presupposes a common understanding of a contract as a set of promises enforceable by a third party, such as a legally binding agreement. I use another variation of the Trust Game, the Repeatable Sovereignty Game, to show that rulers and ruled can establish and maintain a convention requiring the ruled to obey their rulers' commands in return for these rulers providing the ruled satisfactory benefits. In effect, the ruled and their rulers create an implicit contract that is self-enforcing rather than an explicit contract requiring third-party enforcement. I argue that this idea of a governing convention has roots in David Hume's discussions of government, and is even implicit in Hobbes' own treatment of sovereignty.Item Item A Stochastic Model of the Co-evolution of Networks and Strategies(2009) Berninghaus, Siegfried K.; Vogt, BodoWe consider a theoretical model of co-evolution of networks and strategies whose components are exclusively supported by experimental observations. We can show that a particular kind of sophisticated behavior (anticipatory better reply) will result in stable population states which are most frequently visited in co-evolution experiments.Item Achieving Pareto-Optimality: Invisible Hands, Social Contracts, and Rational Deliberation(2013) Gauthier, DavidI begin with two simple, similar interactions. In one, maximizing agents will reach a Pareto-optimal equilibrium, in the other, they won't. The first shows the working of the Invisible Hand; the second, its limitations. Using other simple interactions in which equilibrium and P-optimality are incompatible, I argue that the rational outcome of interaction answers to optimality rather than maximization, and requires agents to cooperate in realizing an agreed outcome, rather than to seek their best reply to their fellows. The terms of cooperation are set by a social contract, which coordinates choices to achieve a Pareto-optimum when the Invisible Hand is absent.Item Affective Social Ties without the Need to Belong?(2013) Greiff, MatthiasItem Affective Social Ties—Missing Link in Governance Theory(2012) van Winden, FransAlthough governance is about interpersonal relationships, it appears that the antecedents and consequences of affective bonds (social ties) in social groups dealing with commonpool resources and public goods have been neglected. The welfare costs of the neglect of such bonds and their dynamic properties in economics are unclear but may be substantial. In this paper, I discuss a theoretical `dual process' social ties model and the behavioral experimental and recent neurological evidence this model has obtained. Furthermore, a number of implications and institutional issues are addressed.Item Alle auf Platz eins? - Kritische Anmerkungen zu einem kennzahlengestützten Ranking-System(1987) Stieger, HartmutItem Anarchy, State, and Property(2014) Lindblom, LarsThe fundamental function of the state is safeguarding the safety of its citizens. The combination of Nozick's invisible hand explanation with his theory of justice implies that individuals can have full private property rights in the state. An individual with such property rights thus has the right to sell and destroy what he or she owns. This implies that it is perfectly fair to buy a state and dismantle it, thereby leaving citizens without protection. I conclude that Nozick's theory of the state fails since it cannot guarantee the protection of its citizens' safety.Item Armutsorientierte Entwicklungspolitik : Schwerpunktprojekt des Zentrums für regionale Entwicklungsforschung(1994) Hemmer, Hans-RimbertItem ,Aus ökonomischer Sicht ...‘(2009) Lübbe, WeymaEconomists, and notably health economists, very often add to their policy recommendations the formula ,from an economic point of view‘. The contribution starts by exploring what the message of this clause to non-economists might be. The vagueness that it brings about as to the general acceptability of claims to ,rational‘ allocation, ,best‘ outcomes etc. is then, first, assessed with respect to the recent debate about IQWiG’s (the German equivalent to Britain’s NICE) unorthodox methodology of health care evaluation. Weaknesses within the theoretical basis of standard health economist’s evaluations, well-known by theoretical economists but rarely mentioned when it comes to policy advice, are then, second, pointed out. Finally, some consequences are drawn for what has to be done to enhance the quality and impact of policy advice in the area of health resource allocation.Item Item Automatic Actions: Challenging Causalism(2011) Di Nucci, EzioI argue that so-called automatic actions—routine performances that we successfully and effortlessly complete without thinking such as turning a door handle, downshifting to 4th gear, or lighting up a cigarette—pose a challenge to causalism, because they do not appear to be preceded by the psychological states which, according to the causal theory of action, are necessary for intentional action. I argue that causalism cannot prove that agents are simply unaware of the relevant psychological states when they act automatically, because these content-specific psychological states aren’t always necessary to make coherent rational sense of the agent’s behaviour. I then dispute other possible grounds for the attribution of these psychological states, such as agents’ own self-attributions. In the final section I introduce an alternative to causalism, building on Frankfurt’s concept of guidance.Item Awards: A Disregarded Source of Motivation(2009) Frey, Bruno S.; Neckermann, SusanneAwards are prevalent in all societies and at all times. So far, however, they have escaped the attention of economists. This paper presents a first analysis of awards, distinguishing them from purely monetary forms of rewards. Additionally, popular notions about the use and prevalence of awards are addressed with descriptive statistics from the International Who's Who.Item Die Bedeutung ausländischer Direktinvestitionen für die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung der Dritten Welt(1971) Hemmer, Hans-RimbertItem Die Beteiligung von Frauen in der Politik im ländlichen Raum : Ländliche Regionalentwicklung und politische Partizipation(2005) Soboth, Andrea; Seibert, Caroline; Bauer, SiegfriedIm Diskurs der ländlichen Regionalentwicklung wird als ein wichtiger Ansatzpunkt für einenachhaltige Entwicklung ländlicher Räume das Engagement der Menschen vor Ort gesehen.Über deren Aktivierung und Einbindung in Regionalentwicklungsprozesse wird dabei versuchteine gemeinsame Strategie aller für die Zukunft zu entwickeln. Hier ist die Verschränkung zwischendem politischen und zivilgesellschaftlichen Diskurs besonders wichtig, wenn ein solcherProzess erfolgreich sein soll. Der nachfolgende Artikel greift den Aspekt des politischen Engagementsvon Frauen in ländlichen Räumen heraus und analysiert Beteiligungsmöglichkeiten und motive aus der Genderperspektive.Item Bygones Are Bygones(2009) Brennan, Geoffrey; Hamlin, Alan`Bygones are bygones' might seem to be an analytic truth, lacking any substantive content. Yet, economists think that, when they state that bygones are bygones, they are asserting something interesting and important. Furthermore, others would argue that the statement `bygones are bygones', when read appropriately, is false. By interrogating the statement `bygones are bygones' we identify a number of key issues relating to rational choice theory and the treatment of intentions, habits and promises. The more philosophical discussion of the things that economists say (and what they might mean) is particularly appropriate in honoring Hartmut Kliemt, much of whose work has brought philosophy and economics into closer proximity.Item Can a Humean Be a Contractarian?(2009) Sugden, RobertIn this paper I argue, contrary to Hartmut Kliemt, that it is possible to be both a Humean and, in James Buchanan's sense, a contractarian. Hume sees principles of justice and political allegiance not as actual or hypothetical products of explicit agreement, but as conventions that have emerged spontaneously. However, it is fundamental to Hume's analysis that conventions are mutually advantageous, and hence cognate with agreements. The core idea in Buchanan's contractarianism is that the proper role of government is to implement voluntary exchanges between individuals, not to define and maximise a unified conception of social welfare. Although real politics cannot be based entirely on unanimous agreement, the voluntary exchange approach provides a valuable structure for normative economics.Item Item Children’s Rights with Endogenous Fertility(2014) Taylor, Brad R.This paper uses hypothetical contractarianism to consider the value of children's rights laws as a means of protecting children. Laws protecting children from their parents have the unintended but predictable consequence of making child-rearing less desirable for some parents and thereby reducing the number of children born. Such laws therefore produce a trade-off between the expected wellbeing of actual and possible persons. I show that a possible child behind an appropriate veil of ignorance may rationally oppose laws which benefit some and harm no actual children.