A Governing Convention?

dc.contributor.authorVanderschraaf, Peter
dc.date.accessioned2021-12-10T13:48:58Z
dc.date.available2021-12-10T13:48:58Z
dc.date.issued2013
dc.description.abstractIn this essay I argue that one can understand the relationship between those who rule and those who are ruled in civil society as an implicit contractual relationship or contract by convention. I use variations of the extensive form Trust Game to summarize the structures of alternative forms of contracts, and apply these variations to model the relationship between the rulers and those under their rule. One of these variations, the Irrevocable Sovereignty Game, summarizes Hobbes' main argument for why it is conceptually impossible for a contract to exist between a sovereign and the subjects under its rule. I argue that Hobbes' argument presupposes a common understanding of a contract as a set of promises enforceable by a third party, such as a legally binding agreement. I use another variation of the Trust Game, the Repeatable Sovereignty Game, to show that rulers and ruled can establish and maintain a convention requiring the ruled to obey their rulers' commands in return for these rulers providing the ruled satisfactory benefits. In effect, the ruled and their rulers create an implicit contract that is self-enforcing rather than an explicit contract requiring third-party enforcement. I argue that this idea of a governing convention has roots in David Hume's discussions of government, and is even implicit in Hobbes' own treatment of sovereignty.de_DE
dc.identifier.urihttps://jlupub.ub.uni-giessen.de//handle/jlupub/484
dc.identifier.urihttp://dx.doi.org/10.22029/jlupub-413
dc.language.isoende_DE
dc.subjectGoverning Conventionde_DE
dc.subjectSimple Trust Gamede_DE
dc.subjectTrust Problemde_DE
dc.subjectIrrevocable Sovereignty Gamede_DE
dc.subjectRepeatable Sovereignty Gamede_DE
dc.subject.ddcddc:100de_DE
dc.subject.ddcddc:330de_DE
dc.titleA Governing Convention?de_DE
dc.typearticlede_DE
dcterms.isPartOf2536124-7
local.affiliationExterne Einrichtungende_DE
local.source.epage156de_DE
local.source.journaltitleRationality, markets, and morals: RMMde_DE
local.source.spage131de_DE
local.source.volume4de_DE

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