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dc.contributor.authorBischoff, Ivo
dc.date.accessioned2022-07-28T08:28:31Z
dc.date.available2004-01-09T08:38:27Z
dc.date.available2022-07-28T08:28:31Z
dc.date.issued2003
dc.identifier.issn0179-2806
dc.identifier.urihttp://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:hebis:26-opus-13789
dc.identifier.urihttps://jlupub.ub.uni-giessen.de//handle/jlupub/3492
dc.identifier.urihttp://dx.doi.org/10.22029/jlupub-3083
dc.description.abstractThis paper provides a theoretical model of party competition in a heterogeneous electorate. The latter consists of numerous groups of dominant-issue-voters who base their voting decision primarily on one issue of the political agenda. Parties follow a lexicographic objective function, aiming to gain power at minimum programmatic concessions. The emerging pattern of movement in policy platforms is fundamentally different to the concept of convergence proposed by the spatial theory of voting. Rather than the centre of the scale of policy preference, its extreme ends, occupied by dominant-issue-voters, attract the policy plattforms. The conclusions are found to be compatible with some major empirical findings of the Manifesto Research Group.en
dc.language.isoende_DE
dc.relation.ispartofseriesFinanzwissenschaftliche Arbeitspapiere; 68
dc.rightsIn Copyright*
dc.rights.urihttp://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/*
dc.subjectvotersen
dc.subjectincomplete informationen
dc.subjectpolitical partiesen
dc.subjectconvergenceen
dc.subject.ddcddc:650de_DE
dc.titleParty Competition in a heterogeneous electorate - the role of dominant-issue-votersen
dc.typeworkingPaperde_DE
local.affiliationFB 02 - Wirtschaftswissenschaftende_DE
local.opus.id1378
local.opus.instituteProfessur für VWL II Öffentliche Finanzende_DE
local.opus.fachgebietWirtschaftswissenschaftende_DE


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