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dc.contributor.authorBuchanan, James M.
dc.date.accessioned2021-12-08T20:43:04Z
dc.date.available2021-12-08T20:43:04Z
dc.date.issued2011
dc.identifier.urihttps://jlupub.ub.uni-giessen.de//handle/jlupub/438
dc.identifier.urihttp://dx.doi.org/10.22029/jlupub-371
dc.description.abstractThe framework rules within which either market or political activity takes place must be classified in the non-partitionability set under the Samuelson taxonomy. Therefore there is nothing comparable to the profit-loss dynamic of the market that will insure any continuing thrust toward more desirable rules. ‘Public choice’ has at least partially succeeded in getting economists to remove the romantic blinders toward politics and politicians as providers of non-partitionable goods. It is equally necessary to be hard-nosed in evaluating markets as providers of non-partitionable rules.de_DE
dc.language.isoende_DE
dc.subject.ddcddc:100de_DE
dc.subject.ddcddc:330de_DE
dc.titleThe Limits of Market Efficiencyde_DE
dc.typearticlede_DE
dcterms.isPartOf2536124-7
local.affiliationFB 01 - Rechtswissenschaftde_DE
local.source.spage1de_DE
local.source.epage7de_DE
local.source.journaltitleRationality, markets, and morals: RMMde_DE
local.source.volume2de_DE


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