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dc.contributor.authorGaus, Gerald
dc.date.accessioned2021-12-08T22:02:25Z
dc.date.available2021-12-08T22:02:25Z
dc.date.issued2013
dc.identifier.urihttps://jlupub.ub.uni-giessen.de//handle/jlupub/465
dc.identifier.urihttp://dx.doi.org/10.22029/jlupub-398
dc.description.abstractThe recent renaissance of work on conventions, informal institutions, and social norms has reminded us that between the state and individual choice is a network of informal social rules that are the foundation of our cooperative social life. However, even those who appreciate the importance of social norms are reluctant to say that they are about real morality. The first part of the essay examines why this is so. The problem, I suggest, is a widely-embraced view according to which moral judgment is an individual decision about a type of truth that is largely independent of social facts. I show that this popular conception undermines effective social norms and moral conventions. The second part of the essay analyzes the conditions under which effective conventions can be made consistent with diverse individual judgments as to what is morally acceptable--and so conventions can be understood to concern what is genuinely moral. The key, I argue, is the idea of a publicly justified morality as modeled by a hypothetical social contract.de_DE
dc.language.isoende_DE
dc.subjectsocial normsde_DE
dc.subjectmoral conventionsde_DE
dc.subjectpublic justificationde_DE
dc.subjectsocial contractde_DE
dc.subject.ddcddc:100de_DE
dc.subject.ddcddc:330de_DE
dc.titleWhy the Conventionalist Needs the Social Contract (and Vice Versa)de_DE
dc.typearticlede_DE
dcterms.isPartOf2536124-7
local.affiliationExterne Einrichtungende_DE
local.source.spage71de_DE
local.source.epage87de_DE
local.source.journaltitleRationality, markets, and morals: RMMde_DE
local.source.volume4de_DE


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