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dc.contributor.authorTaylor, Brad R.
dc.date.accessioned2021-12-13T10:17:13Z
dc.date.available2021-12-13T10:17:13Z
dc.date.issued2014
dc.identifier.urihttps://jlupub.ub.uni-giessen.de//handle/jlupub/502
dc.identifier.urihttp://dx.doi.org/10.22029/jlupub-431
dc.description.abstractThis paper uses hypothetical contractarianism to consider the value of children's rights laws as a means of protecting children. Laws protecting children from their parents have the unintended but predictable consequence of making child-rearing less desirable for some parents and thereby reducing the number of children born. Such laws therefore produce a trade-off between the expected wellbeing of actual and possible persons. I show that a possible child behind an appropriate veil of ignorance may rationally oppose laws which benefit some and harm no actual children.de_DE
dc.language.isoende_DE
dc.subjectContractarianismde_DE
dc.subjectaxiological possibilismde_DE
dc.subjectnormative population theoryde_DE
dc.subjectchildren’s rightsde_DE
dc.subject.ddcddc:100de_DE
dc.subject.ddcddc:330de_DE
dc.titleChildren’s Rights with Endogenous Fertilityde_DE
dc.typearticlede_DE
dcterms.isPartOf2536124-7
local.affiliationExterne Einrichtungende_DE
local.source.spage93de_DE
local.source.epage119de_DE
local.source.journaltitleRationality, markets, and morals: RMMde_DE
local.source.volume5de_DE


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