Fairness That Money Can Buy. Procedural Egalitarianism in Practice
dc.contributor.author | Güth, Werner | |
dc.contributor.author | Kliemt, Hartmut | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-12-08T22:10:09Z | |
dc.date.available | 2021-12-08T22:10:09Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2013 | |
dc.description.abstract | Contrary to communitarian market criticism institutions relying on money and bidding can strengthen faculties of `self-governance'. Securing procedurally egalitarian bidding on the basis of declared monetary evaluations guarantees that all realized changes of a status quo are in an `objective' (pecuniary) sense equally advantageous for all members of the community. We show how to use this idea in the context of Elinor Ostrom type common(s) projects. Empirical evidence on `procedurally fair bidding' is presented. The practical scope and limits of procedural egalitarianism need further empirical exploration but money may be the best means to express moral values in `communitarian consent'. | de_DE |
dc.identifier.uri | https://jlupub.ub.uni-giessen.de//handle/jlupub/467 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://dx.doi.org/10.22029/jlupub-400 | |
dc.language.iso | en | de_DE |
dc.subject | Fair Procedures | de_DE |
dc.subject | Governing the Commons | de_DE |
dc.subject | Communitarianism | de_DE |
dc.subject | Contractarianism | de_DE |
dc.subject | Egalitarian Mechanisms | de_DE |
dc.subject | Unanimity | de_DE |
dc.subject | ‘Crowding out’ | de_DE |
dc.subject.ddc | ddc:100 | de_DE |
dc.subject.ddc | ddc:330 | de_DE |
dc.title | Fairness That Money Can Buy. Procedural Egalitarianism in Practice | de_DE |
dc.type | article | de_DE |
dcterms.isPartOf | 2536124-7 | |
local.affiliation | Externe Einrichtungen | de_DE |
local.source.epage | 38 | de_DE |
local.source.journaltitle | Rationality, markets, and morals: RMM | de_DE |
local.source.spage | 28 | de_DE |
local.source.volume | 4 | de_DE |
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