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dc.contributor.authorKreilkamp, Niklas
dc.contributor.authorMatanovic, Sascha
dc.contributor.authorSchmidt, Maximilian
dc.contributor.authorWöhrmann, Arnt
dc.date.accessioned2023-12-07T15:19:52Z
dc.date.available2023-12-07T15:19:52Z
dc.date.issued2023
dc.identifier.urihttps://jlupub.ub.uni-giessen.de//handle/jlupub/18795
dc.identifier.urihttp://dx.doi.org/10.22029/jlupub-18159
dc.description.abstractThis paper presents a review of research regarding the effects of monetary executive incentives on risk-taking. More precisely, we investigate executives’ risk-taking (i) in response to the curvature (steepness, convexity, concavity) of the compensation function and (ii) with regard to reference points. Thereby, we refine and update common textbook knowledge. In this vein, we identify essential moderators at the personal, firm, or environmental level that can be used to assess the effectiveness of the incentive scheme in a specific context. Implications for incentive system design in practice and paths for future research are discussed.
dc.language.isoen
dc.rightsNamensnennung 4.0 International
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
dc.subject.ddcddc:330
dc.titleHow executive incentive design affects risk-taking: a literature review
dc.typearticle
local.affiliationFB 02 - Wirtschaftswissenschaften
local.source.spage2349
local.source.epage2374
local.source.journaltitleReview of managerial science
local.source.volume17
local.source.urihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11846-022-00582-0


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