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dc.contributor.authorRaub, Werner
dc.date.accessioned2021-12-08T19:11:29Z
dc.date.available2021-12-08T19:11:29Z
dc.date.issued2009
dc.identifier.urihttps://jlupub.ub.uni-giessen.de//handle/jlupub/414
dc.identifier.urihttp://dx.doi.org/10.22029/jlupub-347
dc.description.abstractWe survey research on incurring commitments by voluntary hostage posting as a mechanism of cooperation. The Trust Game is employed as a paradigmatic example of cooperation problems. We sketch a very simple game-theoretic model that shows how voluntary hostage posting can bind the trustee and thus induce trustfulness of the trustor as well as trustworthiness of the trustee. We then indicate how the model can be improved by including uncertainty and incomplete information, transaction costs of hostage posting and compensating effects as well as signaling effects of hostages. Further extensions of the theoretical analysis are outlined as well as testable hypotheses and references to empirical research. Problems for future research are suggested.de_DE
dc.description.sponsorshipSonstige Drittmittelgeber/-innende_DE
dc.language.isoende_DE
dc.subject.ddcddc:100de_DE
dc.subject.ddcddc:330de_DE
dc.titleCommitments by Hostage Postingde_DE
dc.typearticlede_DE
dcterms.isPartOf2536124-7
local.affiliationExterne Einrichtungende_DE
local.source.spage207de_DE
local.source.epage225de_DE
local.source.journaltitleRationality, markets, and morals: RMMde_DE
local.source.volume0de_DE


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