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dc.contributor.authorBernholz, Peter
dc.date.accessioned2021-12-08T19:42:53Z
dc.date.available2021-12-08T19:42:53Z
dc.date.issued2009
dc.identifier.urihttps://jlupub.ub.uni-giessen.de//handle/jlupub/423
dc.identifier.urihttp://dx.doi.org/10.22029/jlupub-356
dc.description.abstractThe assignment of rights to as low political levels as possible recommends itself because preferences of citizens are better known at the communal, provincial or state level, because their influence is greater, political powers are more distributed and since decentralization furthers efficiency and innovation in a system. Thus subsidiarity requires that only the necessary framework and those decisions related to cases with strong externalities or to public goods covering the whole society are taken at the highest level. Looking from this perspective at the Lisbon Treaty proposed for the European Community several important shortcomings are found which are mainly related to the fields of overlapping competencies of the Union and the member states. It is shown that the principle of subsidiarity, which has to be safeguarded by introducing adequate institutions, would be much better served by the proposals of the European Constitutional Group.de_DE
dc.language.isoende_DE
dc.subject.ddcddc:100de_DE
dc.subject.ddcddc:330de_DE
dc.titleHow to Safeguard Subsidiarity and Competition in the European Unionde_DE
dc.typearticlede_DE
dcterms.isPartOf2536124-7
local.affiliationExterne Einrichtungende_DE
local.source.spage327de_DE
local.source.epage334de_DE
local.source.journaltitleRationality, markets, and morals: RMMde_DE
local.source.volume0de_DE


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