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dc.contributor.authorSpector, Horacio
dc.date.accessioned2021-12-08T19:49:16Z
dc.date.available2021-12-08T19:49:16Z
dc.date.issued2009
dc.identifier.urihttps://jlupub.ub.uni-giessen.de//handle/jlupub/425
dc.identifier.urihttp://dx.doi.org/10.22029/jlupub-358
dc.description.abstractPhilosophers and legal theorists still disagree about the correct analysis of `rights', both moral and legal. The `Will Theory' and the `Interest Theory'--the two main views--can each account for various features of rights, but neither of them is totally satisfactory. The controversy has now been running for decades and seems irresolvable. I will contend in this paper that the discussion of `value pluralism' in the Berlinian tradition can illuminate the debate over the concept of rights.de_DE
dc.language.isoende_DE
dc.subject.ddcddc:100de_DE
dc.subject.ddcddc:330de_DE
dc.titleValue Pluralism and the Two Concepts of Rightsde_DE
dc.typearticlede_DE
dcterms.isPartOf2536124-7
local.affiliationExterne Einrichtungende_DE
local.source.spage355de_DE
local.source.epage371de_DE
local.source.journaltitleRationality, markets, and morals: RMMde_DE
local.source.volume0de_DE


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