Value Pluralism and the Two Concepts of Rights
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Philosophers and legal theorists still disagree about the correct analysis of `rights', both moral and legal. The `Will Theory' and the `Interest Theory'--the two main views--can each account for various features of rights, but neither of them is totally satisfactory. The controversy has now been running for decades and seems irresolvable. I will contend in this paper that the discussion of `value pluralism' in the Berlinian tradition can illuminate the debate over the concept of rights.Link to publications or other datasets
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Rationality, markets, and morals: RMM 0 (2009), 355 - 371