Can a Humean Be a Contractarian?

dc.contributor.authorSugden, Robert
dc.date.accessioned2021-12-07T10:39:00Z
dc.date.available2021-12-07T10:39:00Z
dc.date.issued2009
dc.description.abstractIn this paper I argue, contrary to Hartmut Kliemt, that it is possible to be both a Humean and, in James Buchanan's sense, a contractarian. Hume sees principles of justice and political allegiance not as actual or hypothetical products of explicit agreement, but as conventions that have emerged spontaneously. However, it is fundamental to Hume's analysis that conventions are mutually advantageous, and hence cognate with agreements. The core idea in Buchanan's contractarianism is that the proper role of government is to implement voluntary exchanges between individuals, not to define and maximise a unified conception of social welfare. Although real politics cannot be based entirely on unanimous agreement, the voluntary exchange approach provides a valuable structure for normative economics.de_DE
dc.identifier.urihttps://jlupub.ub.uni-giessen.de//handle/jlupub/395
dc.identifier.urihttp://dx.doi.org/10.22029/jlupub-328
dc.language.isoende_DE
dc.subject.ddcddc:100de_DE
dc.subject.ddcddc:330de_DE
dc.titleCan a Humean Be a Contractarian?de_DE
dc.typearticlede_DE
dcterms.isPartOf2536124-7
local.affiliationExterne Einrichtungende_DE
local.source.epage23de_DE
local.source.journaltitleRationality, markets, and morals: RMMde_DE
local.source.spage11de_DE
local.source.volume0de_DE

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