Rationality, markets, and morals: RMM
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Studies at the intersection of philosophy and economics
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Item Testing and Modeling Fairness Motives(2009) Bolton, Gary E.; Ockenfels, AxelThe advent of laboratory experiments in economics over the last few decades has produced an enormous literature devoted to describing, testing and modeling economic and social behavior. Measured by publications and citations, the development of social preference models to capture decisions motivated by fairness and other social criteria, is one of the success stories in this literature. But with this success, and maybe even because of it, controversies have arisen about what the models can and cannot do. In this note, we comment on some of these debates. Our main theme is that descriptive models of behavior should be judged with respect to their usefulness. This is often neglected, partly because there are no accepted measures and tests for the usefulness of a model, while standard procedures to test whether a model is true are readily available. A model that does not capture a `grain of truth' is unlikely to be useful; however, the relationship is not monotonic in that a `truer' model is not necessarily a more useful model.Item If Not Only Numbers Count: Allocation of Equal Chances(2009) Ahlert, MarliesIt is assumed that medical guidelines specify the appropriate amount of a divisible good which each individual should receive. Individual requirements and probabilities that the treatment is successful if an appropriate amount is received differ. The same applies to the success probabilities if individuals are inadequately treated. If supply is insufficient to serve all with appropriate amounts an allocation decision is necessary. We define probabilistic allocation rules that allocate chances of successful treatment to all individuals. We analyse a specific random allocation rule that assigns maximal equal gains of chances. We characterize the equal gain rule axiomatically.Item Commitments by Hostage Posting(2009) Raub, WernerWe survey research on incurring commitments by voluntary hostage posting as a mechanism of cooperation. The Trust Game is employed as a paradigmatic example of cooperation problems. We sketch a very simple game-theoretic model that shows how voluntary hostage posting can bind the trustee and thus induce trustfulness of the trustor as well as trustworthiness of the trustee. We then indicate how the model can be improved by including uncertainty and incomplete information, transaction costs of hostage posting and compensating effects as well as signaling effects of hostages. Further extensions of the theoretical analysis are outlined as well as testable hypotheses and references to empirical research. Problems for future research are suggested.Item Meinungsbildung in Gruppen(2009) Hegselmann, RainerThe article describes a radically simplifying model of opinion formation processes. The model abstracts away almost everything. A very common reaction to such an approach is the objection that important factors are not included. The article anticipates ten objections of this type and tries to show how to cope with them without giving up the radically simplifying approach. The strategies that we use can be summarized to a certain heuristics. Following the principles of this heuristics will often allow at least a partial qualitative understanding of real world phenomena. In many areas we probably cannot hope for more.Item Health Care Rationing and Distributive Justice(2009) Breyer, FriedrichThe rapid progress in medical technology makes it unavoidable to ration health care. In the discussion how to ration many people claim that principles of justice in distributing scarce resources should be applied. In this paper we argue that medical resources are not scarce as such but scarcity is a necessary by-product of collective financing arrangements such as social health insurance. So the right question to ask is the determination of the benefit package of such an institution. Hartmut Kliemt is currently involved in a commendable interdisciplinary research project in which principles of `prioritization' of medical care are studied. This contribution adds a specific perspective to this endeavour: we ask how the goal of distributive justice can be interpreted in this context and compare different approaches to implementing `just' allocation mechanisms.Item Rationing Health Care and the Role of the ‘Acute Principle’(2009) Rivera-López, EduardoIn several works, Hartmut Kliemt has developed an original account on the necessity of rationing health care and on how a rationing policy should be carried out. While I agree on several important points of that view, there is one important aspect of his account that I do not find plausible: his claim that the so-called `acute principle' (a principle that gives absolute preeminence to rescuing identified lives from dying) should be one of the basic criteria to carry out a rationing policy in a liberal state. After explaining Kliemt's view on rationing health care and, more specifically, the foundations of the acute principle, I argue that the acute principle is not supported by our basic moral intuitions. I then apply the previous argument to the case of rationing, arguing for the necessity of a compromise among intuitions supporting the acute principle and other moral intuitions. Finally, I try to show that a feasible system of public health care services is conceivable. In doing so, I make use, with some relevant modifications, of Kliemt's own ideas.Item Value Pluralism and the Two Concepts of Rights(2009) Spector, HoracioPhilosophers and legal theorists still disagree about the correct analysis of `rights', both moral and legal. The `Will Theory' and the `Interest Theory'--the two main views--can each account for various features of rights, but neither of them is totally satisfactory. The controversy has now been running for decades and seems irresolvable. I will contend in this paper that the discussion of `value pluralism' in the Berlinian tradition can illuminate the debate over the concept of rights.Item Dismissals: A Case for Business Ethics!(2009) Hahn, SusanneA scenario of dismissal is used to illustrate a business ethical reflection that is guided by the method of reflective equilibrium. Several rules of dismissal are considered with respect to an already proved practice and to the goals of the corporation. The deliberation shows how the demand for coherence between norms and practice and for the achievement of certain purposes works. The limits and chances of business ethical reflection are indicated on the basis of the discussed example. By providing the methodological frame business ethicists support decision makers in making enlightened decisions. They do not supply the decision maker with the `right ethical theory' which provides an algorithm to conclude the `right decision'.Item Niccolò Machiavelli on Power(2009) Holler, Manfred J.This paper uses the concept of power to analyze Machiavelli's The Prince and the Discourses on the First Ten Books of Titus Livius. This helps to distil the elements that form the Machiavelli program that has its short-term aim in the formation of a national state of Italy. A unification of Italy under the umbrella of a princely family (such as identified with Cesare Borgia) was meant to be the first stage in an evolutionary process which, in the end, could lead to a more or less stable republican system. For the latter, the Roman Republic as described in the Discourses is Machiavelli's model. The use of power, but also the minimization of cruelties, and the participation of the people, either in the form of militia to successfully fight foreign armies or to support the princely government, are major ingredients to this process.Item Why Bayesian Rationality Is Empty, Perfect Rationality Doesn’t Exist, Ecological Rationality Is Too Simple, and Critical Rationality Does the Job(2009) Albert, MaxEconomists claim that principles of rationality are normative principles. Nevertheless, they go on to explain why it is in a person's own interest to be rational. If this were true, being rational itself would be a means to an end, and rationality could be interpreted in a non-normative or naturalistic way. The alternative is not attractive: if the only argument in favor of principles of rationality were their intrinsic appeal, a commitment to rationality would be irrational, making the notion of rationality self-defeating. A comprehensive conception of rationality should recommend itself: it should be rational to be rational. Moreover, since rational action requires rational beliefs concerning means-ends relations, a naturalistic conception of rationality has to cover rational belief formation including the belief that it is rational to be rational. The paper considers four conceptions of rationality and asks whether they can deliver the goods: Bayesianism, perfect rationality (just in case that it differs from Bayesianism), ecological rationality (as a version of bounded rationality), and critical rationality, the conception of rationality characterizing critical rationalism. The answer is summarized in the paper's title.Item Weak-willed Animals?(2009) Spitzley, ThomasThe aim of this paper is to contribute to answering the conceptual question whether there can be weak-willed non-human animals. After some preliminary clarifications concerning the phenomenon of weakness of will three different accounts are examined for the conditions a being has to fulfill in order to be in a position to display weakness of will. It is argued that these conditions are very strong and that there are good reasons to assume that, e.g., only language users can be weak-willed. This is taken as an independent argument for Davidson's thesis that non-human animals which are not language users cannot act intentionally.Item The Internal Point of View as a Rational Choice?(2009) Baurmann, MichaelH.L.A.Hart's seminal book The Concept of Law entails arguments which are also of substantial importance for social theory: his claim that the existence of social and legal norms presupposes the dissemination of an internal point of view among the members of a social and legal community presents a serious challenge for any explanation of social order. Hartmut Kliemt emphasizes this aspect of Hart's work time and again in his own writings and surely with very good reasons. In my paper I will try to reconstruct Hart's theory in detail. I will argue that we have to clarify the different dimensions of the concept of an internal point of view to be able to assess its consequences for a theory of social and legal order especially for a rational choice approach which at first sight seems to be incompatible with the concept of an internal point of view.Item The ‘Rule of Rescue’ in Medical Priority Setting: Ethical Plausibilities and Implausibilities(2009) Schöne-Seifert, BettinaNot infrequently, the so-called Rule of Rescue gets invoked as an allegedly self-evident constraint to the CBE-goal of maximizing health benefit with a given health budget. In this paper this constraint is critically analyzed. It will be argued that some of its implications are worth considering--but not the inherently vague Rule as such.Item (Over-)Stylizing Experimental Findings and Theorizing with Sweeping Generality(2009) Güth, Werner; Kliemt, Hartmut; Levati, M. VittoriaHuman decision making is a process guided by different and partly competing motivations that can each dominate behavior and lead to different effects depending on strength and circumstances. `Over-stylizing' neglects such competing concerns and context-dependence, although it facilitates the emergence of elaborate general theories. We illustrate by examples from social dilemma experiments and inequality aversion theories that sweeping empirical claims should be avoided.Item The ‘Justice’ That Overrules the Rules of Justice(2009) de Jasay, AnthonyJustice is intrinsically distributive; it distributes by its rules. `Distributive' or `social' justice redistributes by overruling them. It has theories that do not start `from here'. It has no rules; it makes claims instead. Both its names are fraudulent aliases, `social' perhaps less blatantly so. Satisfaction of a claim in `social' justice depends on politics and tends to favour the poorer half of society. This commands general sympathy, but sympathy does not make it any less unjust.Item Critical Thinking and Legal Culture(2009) Pincione, GuidoWe often lack clear procedures for assessing statements and arguments advanced in everyday conversations, political campaigns, advertisements, and the other multifarious uses to which ordinary language can be put. Critical thinking is a method for evaluating arguments couched in ordinary, non-formal language. Legal education should foster this argumentative skill as an ability to assess the open-end variety of arguments that may arise in legal disputes. I will argue that the ability of critical thinking helps lawyers to thrive even in legal cultures that are hostile to critical thinking. There is, therefore, a happy harmony between professional and moral reasons to teach critical thinking at law schools: it promotes epistemic as well as instrumental rationality.Item Wir-Absichten in der individualistischen Sozialontologie(2009) Bühler, AxelAn individualistic social ontology attributes mental states merely to individuals, and denies the existence of collective attitudes such as we-intentions. Furthermore, if collectives cannot be bearers of minds, then collective mental states cannot serve as explanatory factors. In my paper, I first show that we-intentions do serve considerable explanatory purposes within developmental psychology. I then propose an account of weintentions as complexes of intentions of different individuals. These intentions are of a distinct kind: de-re-intentions, grounded in external objects in a specific situation. This grounding is achieved by embodied cognition, through appropriate senso-motoric activities. I conclude that my account of we-intentions is compatible with an individualistic social ontology.Item Bygones Are Bygones(2009) Brennan, Geoffrey; Hamlin, Alan`Bygones are bygones' might seem to be an analytic truth, lacking any substantive content. Yet, economists think that, when they state that bygones are bygones, they are asserting something interesting and important. Furthermore, others would argue that the statement `bygones are bygones', when read appropriately, is false. By interrogating the statement `bygones are bygones' we identify a number of key issues relating to rational choice theory and the treatment of intentions, habits and promises. The more philosophical discussion of the things that economists say (and what they might mean) is particularly appropriate in honoring Hartmut Kliemt, much of whose work has brought philosophy and economics into closer proximity.Item Dignity, Human Rights, and Democracy(2009) Garzón Valdés, ErnestoIn order to analyze what can plausibly be said about the relationship between dignity, human rights, and democracy, I will propose a basic assumption about human dignity (I) and then formulate five theses concerning the justification of democracy (II) which will allow me to conclude (III) that only when human rights are constitutionally established and effectively implemented democracy can be theoretically and practically justified as a political means to guarantee human dignity.Item Die dualistische Metaphysik von Jürgen Habermas(2009) Albert, HansIn contrast to traditional philosophy, Habermas does not view his ‘postmetaphysical thought’ as a conception of reality that claims to be true. Actually, however, his ‘postmetaphysical thought’ is a metaphysical dualism, which stands in opposition to the metaphysical naturalism proposed by other contemporary philosophers. In a specific way, he draws upon the Kantian idea of the constitutive function of reason. He holds, as other constructivists, an idealistic metaphysics that leads him to the construction of an epistemic dualism, contrasting the objective world of the natural sciences with the ‘Lebenswelt’. It turns out that he is unable to solve the problems connected with this view. Metaphysical realism, which avoids these problems, is rejected by him. His ‘postmetaphysical thought’, Habermas tells us, does not presume to decide what is reasonable or not in religious teachings. The core of religious experience, he suggests, is ‘opaque’ and therefore immune to criticism. Faith and knowledge are, as it seems, incommensurable, so that a reasonable critique of religion is impossible. Thus, he consents to an arbitrary restriction of the use of reason, as proposed also by Joseph Ratzinger.