Rationality, markets, and morals: RMM
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Studies at the intersection of philosophy and economics
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Item A Governing Convention?(2013) Vanderschraaf, PeterIn this essay I argue that one can understand the relationship between those who rule and those who are ruled in civil society as an implicit contractual relationship or contract by convention. I use variations of the extensive form Trust Game to summarize the structures of alternative forms of contracts, and apply these variations to model the relationship between the rulers and those under their rule. One of these variations, the Irrevocable Sovereignty Game, summarizes Hobbes' main argument for why it is conceptually impossible for a contract to exist between a sovereign and the subjects under its rule. I argue that Hobbes' argument presupposes a common understanding of a contract as a set of promises enforceable by a third party, such as a legally binding agreement. I use another variation of the Trust Game, the Repeatable Sovereignty Game, to show that rulers and ruled can establish and maintain a convention requiring the ruled to obey their rulers' commands in return for these rulers providing the ruled satisfactory benefits. In effect, the ruled and their rulers create an implicit contract that is self-enforcing rather than an explicit contract requiring third-party enforcement. I argue that this idea of a governing convention has roots in David Hume's discussions of government, and is even implicit in Hobbes' own treatment of sovereignty.Item Item A Stochastic Model of the Co-evolution of Networks and Strategies(2009) Berninghaus, Siegfried K.; Vogt, BodoWe consider a theoretical model of co-evolution of networks and strategies whose components are exclusively supported by experimental observations. We can show that a particular kind of sophisticated behavior (anticipatory better reply) will result in stable population states which are most frequently visited in co-evolution experiments.Item Affective Social Ties without the Need to Belong?(2013) Greiff, MatthiasItem Affective Social Ties—Missing Link in Governance Theory(2012) van Winden, FransAlthough governance is about interpersonal relationships, it appears that the antecedents and consequences of affective bonds (social ties) in social groups dealing with commonpool resources and public goods have been neglected. The welfare costs of the neglect of such bonds and their dynamic properties in economics are unclear but may be substantial. In this paper, I discuss a theoretical `dual process' social ties model and the behavioral experimental and recent neurological evidence this model has obtained. Furthermore, a number of implications and institutional issues are addressed.Item Anarchy, State, and Property(2014) Lindblom, LarsThe fundamental function of the state is safeguarding the safety of its citizens. The combination of Nozick's invisible hand explanation with his theory of justice implies that individuals can have full private property rights in the state. An individual with such property rights thus has the right to sell and destroy what he or she owns. This implies that it is perfectly fair to buy a state and dismantle it, thereby leaving citizens without protection. I conclude that Nozick's theory of the state fails since it cannot guarantee the protection of its citizens' safety.Item ,Aus ökonomischer Sicht ...‘(2009) Lübbe, WeymaEconomists, and notably health economists, very often add to their policy recommendations the formula ,from an economic point of view‘. The contribution starts by exploring what the message of this clause to non-economists might be. The vagueness that it brings about as to the general acceptability of claims to ,rational‘ allocation, ,best‘ outcomes etc. is then, first, assessed with respect to the recent debate about IQWiG’s (the German equivalent to Britain’s NICE) unorthodox methodology of health care evaluation. Weaknesses within the theoretical basis of standard health economist’s evaluations, well-known by theoretical economists but rarely mentioned when it comes to policy advice, are then, second, pointed out. Finally, some consequences are drawn for what has to be done to enhance the quality and impact of policy advice in the area of health resource allocation.Item Automatic Actions: Challenging Causalism(2011) Di Nucci, EzioI argue that so-called automatic actions—routine performances that we successfully and effortlessly complete without thinking such as turning a door handle, downshifting to 4th gear, or lighting up a cigarette—pose a challenge to causalism, because they do not appear to be preceded by the psychological states which, according to the causal theory of action, are necessary for intentional action. I argue that causalism cannot prove that agents are simply unaware of the relevant psychological states when they act automatically, because these content-specific psychological states aren’t always necessary to make coherent rational sense of the agent’s behaviour. I then dispute other possible grounds for the attribution of these psychological states, such as agents’ own self-attributions. In the final section I introduce an alternative to causalism, building on Frankfurt’s concept of guidance.Item Awards: A Disregarded Source of Motivation(2009) Frey, Bruno S.; Neckermann, SusanneAwards are prevalent in all societies and at all times. So far, however, they have escaped the attention of economists. This paper presents a first analysis of awards, distinguishing them from purely monetary forms of rewards. Additionally, popular notions about the use and prevalence of awards are addressed with descriptive statistics from the International Who's Who.Item Bygones Are Bygones(2009) Brennan, Geoffrey; Hamlin, Alan`Bygones are bygones' might seem to be an analytic truth, lacking any substantive content. Yet, economists think that, when they state that bygones are bygones, they are asserting something interesting and important. Furthermore, others would argue that the statement `bygones are bygones', when read appropriately, is false. By interrogating the statement `bygones are bygones' we identify a number of key issues relating to rational choice theory and the treatment of intentions, habits and promises. The more philosophical discussion of the things that economists say (and what they might mean) is particularly appropriate in honoring Hartmut Kliemt, much of whose work has brought philosophy and economics into closer proximity.Item Can a Humean Be a Contractarian?(2009) Sugden, RobertIn this paper I argue, contrary to Hartmut Kliemt, that it is possible to be both a Humean and, in James Buchanan's sense, a contractarian. Hume sees principles of justice and political allegiance not as actual or hypothetical products of explicit agreement, but as conventions that have emerged spontaneously. However, it is fundamental to Hume's analysis that conventions are mutually advantageous, and hence cognate with agreements. The core idea in Buchanan's contractarianism is that the proper role of government is to implement voluntary exchanges between individuals, not to define and maximise a unified conception of social welfare. Although real politics cannot be based entirely on unanimous agreement, the voluntary exchange approach provides a valuable structure for normative economics.Item Item Children’s Rights with Endogenous Fertility(2014) Taylor, Brad R.This paper uses hypothetical contractarianism to consider the value of children's rights laws as a means of protecting children. Laws protecting children from their parents have the unintended but predictable consequence of making child-rearing less desirable for some parents and thereby reducing the number of children born. Such laws therefore produce a trade-off between the expected wellbeing of actual and possible persons. I show that a possible child behind an appropriate veil of ignorance may rationally oppose laws which benefit some and harm no actual children.Item Item Coevolving Relationships between Political Science and Economics(2012) Ostrom, ElinorDuring the last 50 years, at least four interdisciplinary developments have occurred at the boundaries of political science and economics that have affected the central questions that both political scientists and economists ask, the empirical evidence amassed as a new foundation for understanding political economies, and new questions for future research. These include: (1) the Public Choice Approach, (2) the Governance of the Commons debate, (3) New Institutional Economics, and (4) Behavioral Approaches to Explaining Human Actions. In this short essay, I briefly review the challenges that these approaches have brought to political science and some of the general findings stimulated by these approaches before identifying some of the major issues on the contemporary agenda.Item Cognitive Limits and the Beginning of Life(2009) Huster, StefanThe question which moral status the embryo has is of great practical significance because the possibility to justify a governmental prohibition of a set of important therapeutical and scientific measures depends on a special and therefore legal protectable status of the embryo. The identity argument which is often used in this context cannot constitute this status due to its mere epistemic character under the condition of the determinism.Item Colin Mayer: Firm Commitment(2014) Ziegler, MoritzItem Commitment and Goals(2013) Peacock, MarkIn this Comment, I examine Christoph Hanisch's recent contribution to this journal. In commenting on Hanisch's essay, I offer an interpretation of Amartya Sen's notion of `commitment' which makes committed choices both uncontroversial and quotidian. This interpretation contrasts with those which see some of Sen's pronouncements on commitment to be obviously false, counterintuitive or psychologically impossible.Item Commitments by Hostage Posting(2009) Raub, WernerWe survey research on incurring commitments by voluntary hostage posting as a mechanism of cooperation. The Trust Game is employed as a paradigmatic example of cooperation problems. We sketch a very simple game-theoretic model that shows how voluntary hostage posting can bind the trustee and thus induce trustfulness of the trustor as well as trustworthiness of the trustee. We then indicate how the model can be improved by including uncertainty and incomplete information, transaction costs of hostage posting and compensating effects as well as signaling effects of hostages. Further extensions of the theoretical analysis are outlined as well as testable hypotheses and references to empirical research. Problems for future research are suggested.Item Conduct and Contract(2013) de Jasay, AnthonyPolitical philosophy relies on three alternative types of theory to explain social order. The first, is order anarchy, built on the system of spontaneous Humean conventions. They are equilibria, self-enforcing or enforced by the participants' own contingent strategies and involve no central, specialised enforcer. The second type is contractarianism. This paper contends that its name is a misnomer hiding a redundancy. The third type is social contract theory, where there is unanimous commitment to submit to non-unanimous collective choices of certain kinds or reached by certain rules. The paper suggests that social contract theories serve mainly to render acquiescence in political obedience more palatable.